Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Released Thursday, 17th April 2025
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Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Craig Larkin: The Politics of Memory, From Mosul to Beirut to Gaza

Thursday, 17th April 2025
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0:00

Beirut was my entry point to

0:02

the Middle East and I was

0:04

interested in intergenerational memory among Lebanese

0:06

youth that were coming out of

0:08

this civil war. So these are

0:11

young people that didn't experience the

0:13

civil war, but were living with

0:15

the consequences of it. And I

0:17

was curious, maybe perhaps because of

0:19

my own background from Belfast, also

0:21

at the end of the Troubles

0:23

and the fact that we were

0:25

in a society that was very

0:27

much silencing the past, publicly. But

0:29

privately, memory was every word.

0:33

Welcome to Babel, translating the Middle

0:35

East, a podcast from the Middle

0:37

East program at CSIS. Here

0:39

on Babel, we take you beyond the headlines

0:41

to take a closer look at what's happening

0:44

in the Middle East and why it matters.

0:47

This week on Babel, I speak

0:49

with Dr. Craig Lorcan, director of

0:51

the Center for the Study of

0:53

Divided Societies at King's College London.

0:55

Larkin is also a research lead

0:57

on memory and conflict, for except

0:59

a research consortium studying cross -border

1:01

conflict. There, he focuses

1:03

on the relationship between communal

1:05

memory and violence. Together,

1:07

we unpack different approaches taken

1:10

to reconstruction and reconciliation after

1:12

violence in the Middle East. And

1:14

then, in his farewell babble appearance, Martin

1:17

Pimentel takes my spot,

1:19

continuing the conversation with Unarfa

1:21

Waal and Will Toddman

1:23

to discuss pitfalls the international

1:25

community should avoid when

1:27

supporting post -conflict recovery. To

1:30

translate some of what's happening in

1:32

the Middle East, this is Babel. Craig

1:36

Larkin, welcome to Babel. Thank you for

1:38

having me. It's a pleasure to be here. You've

1:41

written a lot about social

1:43

reconstruction in conflict -defected environments.

1:46

What is social reconstruction? What

1:48

are its components? I've

1:50

been really interested in

1:52

the intersection of memory.

1:55

conflict and identity and

1:57

particularly looking at how

1:59

cities can be both destroyed and

2:01

then the attempt to rebuild

2:03

and reconstruct and I suppose I've

2:05

been interested while there's been

2:07

a lot of focus on physical

2:10

rebuilding on the restoration of

2:12

society. I would argue

2:14

there's been not enough focus

2:16

on how to communities

2:18

heal how can you reintegrate.

2:21

communities and people after conflict. So

2:23

I would say social reconstruction

2:25

is one of my Iraqi interview

2:27

said it's not about rebuilding

2:29

the stones, it's about rebuilding the

2:31

people. You know, in

2:33

a lot of conflict affected environments, there

2:35

are a lot of pre -existing power

2:38

structures, like tribal leaders, sectarian

2:40

leaders, some of whom may have contributed

2:42

to the violence in the first place. How

2:44

do you think about their roles? I

2:46

mean, it seems to me that in some

2:48

ways having these kinds of

2:51

leaders can help you get things moving

2:53

in the near term, but it

2:55

can also plant the seeds of division

2:57

in the longer term. The

2:59

reality is after conflict

3:01

and war, we have a

3:03

post -war status quo that

3:06

perhaps has integrated hierarchies

3:09

or integrated inequalities.

3:11

So any type of process of moving

3:14

a society forward has to deal

3:16

with what the war has left behind

3:18

and how do you deal with

3:20

political elites. Whether it's been

3:22

my work in Lebanon, Israel, Palestine

3:24

or Iraq. It's

3:26

a very difficult challenge

3:28

of negotiating those hierarchies

3:31

and power structures, but

3:33

also recognizing. that they are a

3:35

consequence and a result of violence.

3:37

So perhaps the violence has created

3:39

new elites and new hierarchies

3:42

that you don't want to consolidate,

3:44

that you want to attempt to sort

3:46

of create a more egalitarian society.

3:49

In many post -conflict settings, that's not

3:51

viable. So I think there's all sorts

3:53

of moral questions of who you

3:55

should be speaking to, who you should

3:57

be funding. How do you

3:59

think about it? What are the limits to what

4:01

you should allow and what are the alternative arrangements

4:04

to emerge. We have

4:06

to be very open with our

4:08

approach. We need to

4:10

talk to local inhabitants and

4:12

not a certain social norms. I

4:15

was struck by the

4:17

sort of peace building jargon

4:19

even around forgiveness and

4:21

reconciliation that was controversial in

4:23

certain communities, particularly from

4:25

a western prescribed idea. And

4:27

I think it's useful to ask

4:29

local communities what they actually

4:32

believe. transitional justice should

4:34

look like? What do

4:36

they prioritize? And

4:38

again, this went back to reconstruction

4:40

where there was a pushback

4:42

in Iraq on the question of

4:44

timing. Should the focus be

4:46

on perhaps the reconstruction of key

4:48

symbolic sites or monuments, as

4:51

opposed to infrastructure rebuilding,

4:54

as opposed to rebuilding

4:56

houses, hospitals, social services

4:58

instead? the Western

5:00

international community focused on cultural

5:02

heritage, focused on monumental

5:04

rebuilding of the mosques, the

5:06

churches, the sacred sites. When

5:09

many Maslowis, many Iraqis wanted

5:11

the focus was on everyday life,

5:13

the focus was on service

5:15

provision. That's one factor

5:17

that we need better engagement

5:19

with local communities. We also

5:21

need a greater sensitivity to

5:24

the language and culture and

5:26

conceptual differences. So to be

5:28

open that we're not sort

5:30

of imposing new neoliberal, neo -colonial

5:32

frameworks. In your

5:34

experience, are a lot

5:36

of Iraqis or other people

5:38

in these conflict -affected environments

5:40

interested in the ideas

5:42

you have about social reconstruction?

5:44

Or are they interested

5:46

in services, infrastructure, more

5:49

tangible things? How much support is

5:51

there for some of the softer ideas

5:54

that you think are important? What

5:56

you can see is mobilization around grassroots

5:58

issues. So I take Mosul,

6:00

for example, that has been a site that

6:02

I focused on quite a lot of

6:04

research with the EXEP project. While

6:06

UNESCO's vision was for reviving the

6:08

spirit of Mosul, I mean, an

6:10

excellent idea. You know, this was

6:12

one of Iraq's most cosmopolitan cities

6:14

destroyed by ISIS. Minorities

6:17

were displaced and killed. And the

6:19

idea of reuniting the city, of

6:21

reconstructing the mosques and churches, were

6:24

valued, but what

6:26

was also very significant were

6:28

the local grassroots initiatives

6:31

of heritage homes, local

6:33

initiatives around rebuilding the

6:35

soaps, the marketplaces, because

6:37

there's a recognition that they

6:39

can't just wait on the symbolic

6:42

large sites to be built.

6:44

They needed everyday spaces to allow

6:46

people to interact, to allow

6:48

people to reimagine. their city and

6:50

to engage with each other.

6:52

And that is happening on a

6:55

grassroots level. There's great mobilization,

6:57

particularly among Muslawi youth that want

6:59

to move beyond the trauma

7:01

and violence of the past, but

7:03

need some help in the

7:05

direction that they're heading. play

7:09

in this space. Clearly there are

7:12

people who have business interests that they

7:14

want to advance and they love

7:16

international money to help them do it.

7:18

There are sectarian leaders who want

7:20

to have more money that they can

7:22

direct to their people. There

7:24

are local business folks who

7:27

see their own compelling business reasons

7:29

for rebuilding one thing or

7:31

another. How should the international community

7:33

think about untangling? the different

7:35

motivations and the different needs of

7:38

a community that in many

7:40

ways understands each other much better

7:42

than anybody on the outside

7:44

could ever understand them. Sometimes I

7:46

think it comes down to

7:48

the funding direction and how the

7:51

West creates large scale projects

7:53

that then trickle down where there's

7:55

always room then for corruption. I

7:58

think it should be reversed

8:00

and there be greater funding

8:02

of grassroots local -led initiatives

8:04

that are not just based

8:06

on very small two -year projects,

8:08

but of greater longevity. I

8:11

would suggest the investment in

8:13

local people, local activists, and

8:15

those that are willing, that

8:17

have invested in their community,

8:19

that are committed to their

8:21

community, and not in the

8:23

sort of professionalization of NGO

8:25

and NGO class, but in

8:27

fact, we should go back

8:29

to grassroots initiatives. Of course,

8:31

I'm not naive to the

8:33

complexities of that. The reality

8:35

that there will be opportunities

8:37

for corruption, opportunities for manipulation,

8:40

but also there's great potential within

8:42

that if we go back

8:44

to a grassroots approach, if we

8:46

fund from below, if we

8:49

try to encourage local communities. And

8:51

also just to capture the

8:53

different visions that many of these

8:55

organizations have for their communities.

8:57

The reality is it's i think

8:59

you can have iraq and

9:02

and never planes this is a

9:04

complex multi -ethnic community that have

9:06

suffered in different ways and

9:08

therefore the tensions are not always

9:10

felt around religious division i

9:12

would say right now in mausoleum

9:15

there's greater intra religious division

9:17

between sunni community between those that

9:19

have been displaced newcomers in

9:21

fact some of this is class

9:23

based so part of the

9:25

problem comes from a very much.

9:28

Western reading that is often

9:30

sectarian driven that is often ethnic

9:32

focused when in fact we

9:34

need to have a finer grain

9:36

understanding that there's class dynamics

9:38

of play that there's issues of

9:41

displacement and how communities can

9:43

be reintegrated or whether they should

9:45

be reintegrated into those particular

9:47

cities or spaces that they've been

9:49

forced out of. As

9:51

you think about a smaller

9:53

scale bottom up process. Is

9:56

there a place you

9:58

think it's been done especially

10:00

well where the international

10:03

community or support from the

10:05

international community was able

10:07

to catalyze something that was

10:09

really important, really durable,

10:11

went very much in the

10:14

right direction? Yeah, it's

10:16

an excellent question. I think it's easier

10:18

to pick out spaces that haven't been done

10:20

very well than to pick out. success

10:22

stories. I would go back to Beirut that

10:24

was the start of my research many years

10:26

ago and sort of memory and conflict. And

10:29

I think the downtown Beirut

10:31

is a good example of

10:33

a space that was not

10:35

constructed well, that became incredibly

10:37

elitist, exclusive. This was

10:39

the downtown Solidaires project that

10:41

even now it's still sort of

10:43

barricaded off and for many

10:45

Lebanese they feel dislocated from that

10:48

center. So it's a good

10:50

example. of where Mosul

10:52

in Iraq shouldn't go in

10:54

the rebuilding project. In

10:56

other words, this vision was

10:58

very much based on creating

11:01

a commodified cosmopolitan center that

11:03

would be founded basically by

11:05

tourism. And it excluded many

11:07

Lebanese who couldn't afford to live there,

11:09

who couldn't afford to shop there, and excluded

11:11

them from their center where it used

11:13

to be a meeting place, it used to

11:15

be a pluralistic center. Mosul.

11:18

the danger would be and sometimes

11:20

this is happening a little

11:22

bit in Baghdad the funding of

11:24

these huge malls like western

11:26

shopping malls as opposed to the

11:28

older sooks that were more

11:31

informal that they had much better

11:33

interaction between communities. So

11:35

in Mosul I think there

11:37

is an opportunity to fund the

11:39

local sooks that helped to

11:41

network and knit communities together as

11:43

opposed to these grander. shopping

11:46

centers that very often can just

11:48

be linked to political elites

11:50

and can be linked to wealthy

11:52

entrepreneurs. So in

11:54

Mosul, we are beginning to

11:56

see localized activists that are

11:58

trying to reclaim the city. But

12:01

of course, this is against the

12:03

backdrop of political uncertainty and violence

12:05

in the region, which makes any

12:07

type of reconstruction very hard. But

12:10

I think back to American cities

12:12

as I. think to Middle Eastern cities

12:14

that I know, a

12:16

process of renovation almost necessarily

12:19

involves gentrification as a

12:21

way to finance the renovation

12:23

and people who were

12:25

more marginal get squeezed out.

12:28

I say, is there an example of

12:30

doing this in a very different

12:32

way? I think of Fenwell Hall in

12:34

Boston. All the example

12:36

of the Inner Harbor in Baltimore, Maryland.

12:40

All the examples seem to involve taking

12:42

what is considered to be

12:44

urban blight, creating infrastructure,

12:46

creating transportation so people

12:49

can come in and

12:51

creating some sort of

12:53

commercial viability that can

12:55

then spawn other areas

12:57

where, again, traditional communities

13:00

adapt, some people get

13:02

jobs, some people have to move. I

13:04

mean, is that a necessary part

13:06

of reconstruction? I think the

13:08

gentrification of cities in

13:10

the west is almost an

13:12

inevitable consequence you know i

13:14

grew up in belfast and

13:16

and what we see is

13:18

the gentrification of downtown belfast

13:20

what becomes more complex i

13:22

would say in belfast is

13:25

an example when you have

13:27

a divided city inside a

13:29

contested state the marginalization of

13:31

communities goes beyond just a

13:33

class -based issue this then can

13:35

lead to greater instability so

13:37

for bay root the fact

13:39

that solid air at a

13:41

very sort of gentrification model

13:43

that might be okay but

13:45

it becomes problematic in a

13:47

Lebanese state that is based

13:49

on power sharing that is

13:51

based on sort of intercommunal

13:53

arrangements and therefore the exclusion

13:55

of particular communities from that

13:58

center is problematic and I

14:00

think that's what marks it.

14:02

differently to Western gentrification. We're

14:04

not just talking about gentrification,

14:06

we're talking about probably the

14:08

sort of consolidation of sectarian

14:10

elites and exclusion and marginalisation

14:12

that can have a destabilising

14:14

effect on the future. So

14:16

I would say in my work on

14:19

Lebanon, young people felt like

14:21

they were excluded and marginalised from

14:23

the centre, that they didn't

14:25

have a space where they could

14:27

Interact that they could come

14:29

together and therefore it continued to

14:31

be contested the public protests

14:33

we go back to Thaura in

14:35

2019 the Lebanese sort of

14:37

uprising against the sectarian elite. This

14:39

was also an attempt to

14:41

reclaim the city and attempt to

14:44

reclaim the spaces that you

14:46

felt marginalized from the youth felt

14:48

that they had no place

14:50

within that city. And similar

14:52

processes happen in Baghdad at the

14:54

same time of protest against the

14:56

political elite and corruption, but also

14:58

about housing, about social provision, about

15:00

welfare. I would call this in

15:02

Le Fevre in terms of the

15:05

right to the city to actually

15:07

belong there and to have space

15:09

within these cities. So

15:11

how much similarity do you

15:13

see across the Middle East which

15:15

has, as you know, a

15:17

wide range of conflict affected societies?

15:20

To what extent are the problems similar?

15:22

Do they rhyme? And

15:25

what are the key differences that

15:27

you see from site to site? Bay

15:29

Roots was my entry point

15:31

to the Middle East. And I

15:34

was interested in intergenerational memory

15:36

among Lebanese youth that were coming

15:38

out of the civil war.

15:40

So these are young people that

15:42

didn't experience the civil war,

15:44

but were living with the consequences

15:46

of it. And I was

15:48

curious, maybe perhaps because of my

15:50

own background from Belfast, Also

15:52

at the end of the troubles

15:54

and the fact that we

15:56

were in a society that was

15:58

very much silence in the

16:00

past publicly but privately memory was

16:02

everywhere stories were told history

16:04

and traumatic events were reworked and

16:06

relived through narratives and through

16:08

particular sites. I felt that

16:11

in Lebanon that young people were

16:13

struggling to process the public

16:15

silences and attempted amnesia after the

16:17

war and the reality that

16:19

they lived in a divided society

16:21

that the street, the school,

16:23

the neighborhood that they grew up

16:25

in was very often segregated

16:27

that the war was not taught

16:29

in their education syllabus but

16:31

yet it was lived out in

16:33

everyday life so the memory

16:35

component there was very much about

16:37

the continuation of war memory. That

16:40

then moved me to understand

16:42

how memory can also be embedded

16:44

within the urban landscape of

16:46

memory. So part of that reconstruction

16:48

process. So whenever later I

16:50

went to look at work in Iraq, again,

16:53

the issue of memory of

16:55

what happens after herbicide, after your

16:57

city is destroyed purposely. How

17:00

do you reimagine the past? How

17:02

do you live with that past

17:04

when there's competing memories and competing

17:06

actors that have got a very

17:08

clear vision for the future. So

17:11

I've always been interested. And

17:13

I think it's very different. Memory

17:15

is an ambivalent concept and

17:17

is an ambivalent tool of analysis.

17:19

But we can see how

17:21

more recently it can be weaponized

17:24

and politicized and can lead

17:26

to all sorts of divisions. But

17:28

likewise, I find that there's

17:30

an opportunity to address the past,

17:32

acknowledge the past, create a

17:34

space. for dialogue and encounter. So

17:37

my research has always held

17:39

that ambivalence of memory and conflict

17:41

that it's not just a

17:43

catalyst for future violence, but

17:45

it's a lens for understanding how

17:47

people are interpreting the past to try

17:49

to deal with their present demands

17:52

and their future vision. How

17:54

does all of that affect

17:56

how you think governments should

17:58

think about the reconstruction of

18:00

Gaza? which itself was a

18:03

complex society with people displaced

18:05

from different parts of historic

18:07

Palestine, different kinds of

18:09

divisions inside a huge amount

18:11

of physical reconstruction that needs to

18:13

be done. What's

18:15

the advice you would give, not being

18:17

a Gaza expert, but having thought

18:19

through these processes, that people

18:22

need to put front of mind

18:24

that probably isn't front of mind? What's

18:27

happened? I would say in

18:29

Gaza is not just herbicide, but

18:31

more than likely moving towards

18:33

genocide or herbicide is part of

18:35

a genocidal attack. So there's

18:37

a purposeful focus and structure, a

18:40

structural attack on

18:42

destroying Palestinian life there,

18:44

cultural heritage, mosques,

18:47

museums, churches.

18:50

And that will be part of the rehabilitation,

18:52

the reconstruction. It's not just about

18:54

Gazans as a people. but

18:57

palestinian cultural heritage identity that is

18:59

developed over hundreds of years in

19:01

that area so very often there's

19:03

a reduction to gas and people

19:05

or palestinians in the gas and

19:07

strip as if the reconstruction is

19:09

just about their homes is just

19:11

about you know they can be

19:13

moved around or there's no attempt

19:15

to bring them back into that

19:17

space but i think. If

19:20

we want to envision a

19:22

future for Gazans, it needs to

19:24

be a complete reconstruction, not

19:26

just of housing, not just on

19:28

social services, but on their

19:30

cultural heritage. That is going

19:32

to be very difficult, but I think

19:34

it's very necessary. Let

19:36

me ask a hard question, which

19:38

I think is somebody who grew up

19:41

in Belfast, you must have an

19:43

especially nuanced understanding of, how can you

19:45

tell whether the kinds of things

19:47

you're recommending are working? It's

19:49

very difficult to say how

19:51

effective such policy decisions

19:53

are. I think we can

19:56

clearly see where there's

19:58

been dangerous consequences, perhaps because

20:00

they're not properly thought

20:02

through. And my work

20:04

would point to that, that

20:06

memory needs to be understood in

20:08

its entirety and there is

20:10

danger whenever we try to silence

20:12

it. the silences are often

20:14

very noisy, so there's a generational

20:16

component that it might look

20:18

like a cold peace, it might

20:20

look like societies are healing. I'd

20:23

come back to the Belfast

20:25

example and while there hasn't

20:27

been concerted violence for over

20:29

a decade, it does not

20:31

mean that the societies are

20:33

integrated. Education is

20:35

93 % segregated, people live

20:37

in segregated communities, paramilitary

20:39

still function. in some

20:41

ways criminal gangs, there's

20:43

challenge to state authorities.

20:46

There's many things that have not

20:48

been resolved inside this cold peace

20:50

in the Good Friday Agreement. And

20:53

that's where I believe we

20:55

need to go back to deal

20:57

with memory of the troubles,

20:59

open up what's actually happened. Similarly,

21:03

in Lebanon, it's very clear where

21:05

there's been multiple cycles of

21:07

violence. We're almost

21:09

up to the 50th anniversary

21:12

of the beginning of

21:14

the Lebanese civil war in

21:16

1975, but there's been

21:18

multiple conflicts Israeli war in

21:20

2006 ongoing Israeli attacks

21:22

to the port explosion Thaura

21:24

and these are cumulative

21:26

traumas that affect Lebanese society

21:28

and they don't replace

21:30

the last trauma they're embedded

21:33

they add to it.

21:35

I was interviewing ex Islamist

21:37

from. roomy prison in

21:39

Lebanon, mostly from Tripoli and

21:41

these are ISIS, Jabhat

21:43

al -Nusra fighters. We interviewed

21:45

about 40 ex -prisoners that were

21:47

fighting in Syria and I

21:49

was curious to understand their motivation.

21:52

For many, the historic memory

21:54

of violence and their

21:56

upbringing in Tripoli and Lebanon

21:58

had a mobilizing component. The

22:01

historic violence of the past

22:03

has real life consequences and realities

22:05

on the present. So I

22:07

think that's where there is policy

22:10

relevance to say, very often

22:12

we just want to focus on

22:14

the current issue, but we

22:16

don't want to address some of

22:18

the deeper historic issues. It

22:21

seems to me that as

22:23

I think about the places you

22:25

study, what we now think

22:27

of as what were successful models

22:29

of coexistence themselves emerged from

22:32

earlier cycles of violence in earlier

22:34

centuries. without the kinds

22:36

of solutions you're describing that

22:38

there are some communities, whether

22:40

it's Baghdad, Jerusalem, the

22:43

cities that have had

22:45

histories of remarkable cosmopolitanism

22:47

and coexistence, which broke

22:49

down into cycles of

22:51

horrific violence, exile, massacres.

22:54

And then we're able to reconstruct

22:56

and create these cosmopolitan societies again,

22:58

which now people look back and

23:00

say, oh, if we could only

23:02

recapture that moment. In that

23:04

kind of environment where we

23:06

almost have cyclical violence and cosmopolitan

23:08

coexistence, how should we think

23:11

about what success really looks like?

23:13

How long should we think

23:15

success would last? It could

23:17

be easy to sort of read

23:19

this as a romanticization or a

23:21

nostalgia for a previous mixed past,

23:24

but that's embedded in the historical

23:26

memory of the communities as well,

23:28

that they live together, they work

23:30

together, and they're very

23:32

much Maslawis or Beirutis

23:34

or Jerusalemites. There's a shared

23:37

cultural heritage that needs

23:39

to be encouraged, but

23:41

that doesn't mean that you neglect

23:43

what led to your rupture. You

23:45

know, so I think that came

23:48

through in some of the work

23:50

on muscle that the focus can

23:52

be about reviving a unified past,

23:54

but unless you address how ISIS

23:56

emerged, why they emerged and what

23:58

some of the underlying factors were

24:01

for that emergence. Then

24:03

it can lead to cycles

24:05

of violence again. So you

24:07

almost approach the past with

24:09

a double -handed approach of

24:11

the unifying cosmopolitanism, but trying

24:14

to grapple with what destabilizes

24:16

that. What are the factors

24:18

that cause the fragmentation within

24:20

society? And can they be

24:22

critically addressed? Can they be

24:24

addressed in a way that

24:26

better integrates and unifies? I

24:28

would say Lebanon is a

24:30

perfect example of society that's

24:32

got such a rich cultural

24:34

heritage of cosmopolitanism. But

24:36

right now, in schools, they're

24:39

not teaching their students any history

24:41

of the Civil War. You know, up

24:43

to current politics, it's too controversial.

24:45

They can't agree it. And I think

24:47

that is a little bit dangerous. I

24:49

think there has to be an attempt

24:51

to at least allow students to grapple

24:53

with the different narratives to try

24:55

to understand. or it can

24:57

easily be mobilized again. And

25:00

the same critique that I would have

25:02

for Lebanon, I would have for

25:04

my own community. Similarly, there is

25:06

no teaching on the troubles within

25:08

most schools in an Northern Irish context.

25:11

So let me close with a

25:13

question on what outsiders really

25:15

can do. You're describing processes that

25:18

have very deep roots, people

25:20

who have tremendous stakes, not only

25:22

for their children, but their

25:24

grandchildren. and an international

25:26

community whose attention is

25:28

often not sustained and that

25:30

often moves from issue

25:32

to issue. How can

25:35

the international community maximize its

25:37

constructive impact when in

25:39

so many ways its input

25:41

is transient? We're

25:43

trying to deal with

25:45

a dynamic and moving situation

25:47

and very often the

25:49

international community lack focus, lack

25:52

a willingness to commit. to

25:54

particular projects and I think

25:56

that's a reality particularly of

25:58

this political moment that we

26:01

find ourselves there's probably a

26:03

retreat from an international vision

26:05

to intervene in such communities

26:07

but I would push back

26:09

against that and I think

26:11

there is still an important

26:13

role for international community and

26:16

actors to support and to

26:18

work alongside communities and this

26:20

is part of a peace

26:22

-building process. This is part

26:24

of helping towards a transitional

26:26

justice that doesn't conform to

26:29

a very structured Western approach,

26:31

but encourages a more contextual,

26:33

local partnership to help communities

26:35

move forward together and to

26:37

be able to work collaboratively. Greg

26:40

Larkin, thank you very much for joining us

26:42

on Babel. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure.

26:52

What are some potentially distorting or

26:54

disruptive effects of outside aid on

26:56

reconstruction? How do we navigate local

26:58

politics to ensure that aid is having the desired

27:00

effects on the right people? Well,

27:02

anytime you put a lot of money

27:04

into a fragile and conflict -affected environment,

27:06

there's going to be unintended consequences. One

27:09

of the issues that often happens, as Dr.

27:11

Larkin mentioned, is this challenge of mismatched priorities,

27:13

that there are international actors who come in

27:15

with an understanding of what needs to be

27:17

done in this environment, but those are not

27:19

necessarily aligned with the needs or the understandings

27:22

of the people on the ground. I

27:24

think in a fragile environment, you see

27:26

variation across different regions, territories that have

27:28

different modes of governance, different levels of

27:30

fragility, different knock -on effects of the

27:32

conflict itself. And you often

27:34

see international actors come in with a sort of

27:36

national level plan for how to reconstruct a country. And

27:39

I think that can fail at more local levels. A

27:42

second challenge that you see is profit motives

27:44

shaping the way in which reconstruction takes place.

27:46

This is one of the risks that we

27:48

are already starting to witness right now in

27:50

the context of Syria. For example,

27:52

you see countries like the UAE and

27:54

Turkey planning how to bring in their own

27:56

domestic businesses to reconstruct certain parts of

27:58

the country. And I think what we'll see

28:00

is that there is going to be

28:02

a focus on areas of the country that

28:04

are most likely to expand economic engagement,

28:06

for example, between Turkey or the UAE and

28:08

Syria. So that might focus on critical

28:10

infrastructure, ports, roads, things of that

28:12

nature. But there are other parts of

28:14

the country that also have really important reconstruction

28:16

needs. For example, in agricultural areas where

28:18

there are enormous quantities of unexploded ordinance, that's

28:20

going to require enormous amounts of money,

28:22

enormous amounts of manpower through reconstruction to be

28:24

able to make these areas farmable again.

28:26

But there are less economic incentives for international

28:28

actors to intervene in that particular respect.

28:31

And so I think that will shape the

28:33

way in which reconstruction ends up playing

28:35

out. Definitely, I think. aid

28:37

by its very nature is distorting.

28:39

When you have a huge amount

28:41

of money coming in externally, that

28:43

changes the balance of power. It

28:46

changes depending on what it's spent

28:48

on, where it's spent, who is spending

28:50

it. And so I think it

28:52

is impossible for it not to be distorting. But

28:54

I think in addition to all the ways

28:56

that Marty laid out, it has

28:58

a distorting effect on the labor market as

29:00

well, a huge influx of

29:03

contracts or money in a certain

29:05

sector. like the construction sector perhaps

29:07

in Lebanon at the moment reconstruction

29:09

is not yet fully underway but

29:11

when it does come underway companies

29:13

working in concrete or in windows

29:15

in glass will really benefit from

29:17

this and so it has an

29:19

effect that people will shift and

29:21

businesses will shift to try to

29:23

access these opportunities and then later

29:25

on in the process as well

29:27

there are the distorting effects of

29:29

salaries of those who are involved

29:31

in the aid process so quite

29:33

often. People who work for

29:35

international NGOs or even directly

29:37

for international donors have huge salaries

29:39

in comparison to a lot

29:41

of people in the local market

29:43

and there are times when

29:45

this is hugely distorting so in.

29:48

Lebanon, again, because of the

29:50

collapse of the currency, if you

29:52

are paid in US dollars, then

29:54

you are doing relatively well in

29:56

Lebanon right now. Your money goes a

29:58

lot further. Whereas if you're still paid

30:00

in Lebanese lira, then your

30:03

salary has lost a huge percentage of

30:05

its worth. So I think there are a

30:07

whole host of ways in which this

30:09

is distorting. And there are real political effects

30:11

of that. I also think that

30:13

One of the implications of the complexity

30:15

of reconstruction is that monitoring evaluation becomes

30:17

really important. Just because there are unintended

30:19

side effects reconstruction doesn't mean that we

30:21

ought not to do it, but it

30:24

does mean that we should be careful

30:26

about how we do it and recognize

30:28

when things are going in a way

30:30

that we didn't anticipate to begin with.

30:32

But that leads to challenges when we

30:34

try to implement reconstruction at a more

30:36

localized level, as Dr. Larkin mentioned. The

30:38

problem with utilizing local actors is that

30:41

they have less capacity to monitor and evaluate

30:43

in the way in which international actors

30:45

typically conceptualize doing so. And so

30:47

I think one of the challenges that the

30:49

international community needs to grapple with is

30:51

how can we continue to localize reconstruction efforts,

30:53

bring in local perspectives to guide the

30:55

priorities of international actors in reconstruction, but

30:57

also do so in a way that

31:00

is mindful of the need to monitor. on

31:02

intended side effects and finding creative new

31:04

ways that we can do so that meets

31:06

the capacity of local actors. On

31:09

that note, how can local actors leverage

31:11

and at times manipulate foreign actors when

31:13

it comes to reconstruction? What

31:15

kinds of tools do they use to do so? They

31:17

have a lot of choices as

31:19

well. They can choose the kinds

31:21

of reconstruction activities that they get

31:23

involved in, as Marty was saying,

31:26

infrastructure projects are really lucrative. they

31:28

might be incentivized to get involved

31:30

in those over working on governance

31:32

reforms, things like that, which are

31:34

much less lucrative and a more

31:36

challenging process to work through in

31:38

many ways. They also

31:40

have the ability to play different donors off

31:42

against each other. Sometimes there are multiple

31:44

donors that are really keen to engage in

31:46

an area and they might not all

31:48

have the same priorities. And that

31:50

can even involve some extent of

31:53

great power competition. I mean, China is

31:55

involved in certain aspects of reconstruction. maybe

31:58

the Chinese proposition is much more

32:00

attractive to some people who don't want

32:02

to see the same kinds of

32:04

conditionality that we traditionally associate with Western

32:06

donors. They also have

32:08

a lot of bureaucratic tools

32:10

at their disposal to be

32:12

able to shape and distort

32:14

the kinds of projects they

32:16

get. Government officials can

32:18

deny permissions for projects in certain

32:20

areas or deny visas for those

32:22

who want to come and work

32:24

on them in order to

32:26

prioritize and shift aid towards other

32:28

areas. And then physical

32:30

control and security control is

32:33

also a tool that they

32:35

have somewhere like Southern Lebanon

32:37

until recently Hezbollah exerted a

32:39

huge amount of influence over

32:41

who goes there, which kinds

32:43

of international aid actors can

32:45

access parts of Southern Lebanon.

32:47

And so they can then

32:49

force themselves to be intermediaries

32:52

that can help bolster their

32:54

own credibility. Or if they choose

32:56

not to act as an intermediary, then they

32:58

can at least prevent the influence of others that

33:00

might be trying to undermine their influence or

33:02

their grip on power there. I

33:04

also think it's important to differentiate what

33:06

kinds of local actors we're talking about.

33:09

In most post -conflict environments, when

33:11

reconstruction starts, the conflict isn't always

33:13

over. These things tend to continue.

33:15

And we see this in Lebanon, we've seen

33:18

it in Syria, where there is

33:20

still low level conflict, there is control

33:22

by non -state armed groups. In fact, the

33:24

ICRC has found that 40 million people

33:26

in the Middle East and North Africa

33:28

live in territory that's controlled by non

33:30

-state armed groups. And so even

33:32

in quote unquote post -conflict settings, we often

33:34

find that reconstruction is shaped by ongoing

33:36

conflict dynamics. And so these groups have

33:38

particular mechanisms by which they can shape

33:41

methods of reconstruction, partly because they control

33:43

territory and so they can decide who

33:45

is or is not allowed to conduct

33:47

reconstruction work in this particular territory. They're

33:49

also seen as security guarantors in some

33:51

contexts, and so they may be seen

33:53

as reliable security partners in order to

33:55

prevent the outbreak of violence. So they

33:57

can use that leverage to dictate what

33:59

kinds of reconstruction is or is not

34:01

permissible in these areas. And

34:03

they also have In some cases, in economic

34:05

influence, well, a lot of the times

34:07

these militias or other armed groups are also

34:10

integrated into illicit economies and have substantial

34:12

economic influence that then allows them to shape

34:14

reconstruction efforts. And so when you are

34:16

building a new economy in these areas, you

34:18

have to deal with people who are already embedded

34:20

in systems that they have an incentive to maintain. Let's

34:23

shift now to social reconstruction. What

34:26

can successful social reconstruction look like

34:28

in post -conflict settings across the

34:30

region? What roles do, for

34:32

example, urban renewal or religious

34:34

and ethnic diversity play? I

34:36

think what makes social reconstruction such an

34:38

interesting concept is because it can mean so

34:40

many different things depending on the particular

34:42

moment and the particular people that you're talking

34:44

about. I think one of the ways

34:46

in which we have seen social reconstruction play

34:48

out beyond just the dimension of urban

34:51

reconstruction is an artistic expression as well. Dr.

34:53

Larkin speaks quite a bit about the

34:55

role of mosques and suks in communal places

34:57

for people to meet together as a

34:59

form of social reconstruction and rehabilitating social ties.

35:01

I think music can also play another

35:03

role in that as well. There are different

35:05

kinds of social interactions like music, like

35:07

art. We recently had someone on Babel that

35:09

spoke about urban art as well at

35:11

large scales and how this can be a

35:13

mechanism for creating new kinds of communal

35:15

ties and raising issues that are difficult to

35:17

speak about in other contexts. And

35:19

so I think we have seen that

35:21

in many places. Afghanistan is one in which

35:23

artists have played a particular role in social

35:26

mobilization and reflecting the needs of communities. I

35:28

also think that with social reconstruction,

35:30

it really is where if the

35:32

rubber meets the road in terms

35:34

of ideology and more pragmatic concerns

35:36

about reconstruction. For me,

35:39

I think about the differential outcomes

35:41

between Turkey and Morocco in terms

35:43

of nation building resolving ethnic differences. In

35:45

Turkey, you had a very particular

35:48

mode of nation building after their own

35:50

revolution, which was very much predicated

35:52

on a modern concept of Turkey that

35:54

was different than the ways in

35:56

which the Kurdish population conceptualized their own

35:58

identity. And it necessitated in the

36:00

minds of the Turkish government reforming

36:03

or changing the ways in which

36:05

Kurdish people spoke and presented themselves.

36:07

Whereas in North Africa, you saw a

36:09

different dynamic where in Morocco, for

36:11

example, social ties were predicated

36:14

more on religion rather than on

36:16

ethnic difference. And so it

36:18

was a way in which the

36:20

Moroccan monarchy was able to move

36:22

past differences between its Arab population

36:24

and its Amazigh population. This wasn't

36:26

a perfect process, but it does

36:28

show how conceptualizing what a society

36:30

and a community means and looking

36:32

for areas of commonality can be

36:34

a way to move past situations

36:36

in which you have heterogeneity in

36:38

other contexts. I'm also

36:40

really intrigued by this idea of

36:42

social reconstruction. And some of this

36:45

comes down to the perceptions of

36:47

the choices that people make when

36:49

they are prioritizing what gets reconstructed

36:51

and what doesn't. There are so

36:53

many opportunities for certain groups to

36:55

feel that they are being marginalized,

36:58

that their needs are not being prioritized over

37:00

the needs of others. One

37:02

piece of this is ensuring

37:04

as much as possible that

37:06

aspects of different communities, cultural

37:09

sites, are being

37:11

simultaneously addressed. And

37:13

Dr. Larkin talked a bit about Mosul, and I

37:15

think Mosul is a really interesting example here. They

37:18

simultaneously reconstructed churches in

37:20

old Mosul, alongside the Nuri

37:22

Mosque, which is it

37:24

has this famous or had

37:26

a famous minaret that

37:28

was leaning. And this

37:30

actually gave Mosul its nickname. So

37:32

the people from Mosul are called

37:34

Alhadba, which is something like the

37:37

hunchback. And it's a

37:39

hugely culturally significant landmark that

37:41

ISIS destroyed. It has

37:43

now been completely reconstructed. And

37:45

I think that plays into this

37:47

feeling that not only were

37:49

Christians and Muslims simultaneously received the

37:51

benefits of reconstruction, but also

37:53

it's this symbol that can come to

37:56

stoke pride and a sense of rebirth

37:58

among the people who live there. I

38:00

think there's also something about

38:03

shared spaces. And when some

38:05

cities have been rebuilt, they

38:07

have purposefully added in communal

38:09

spaces that are designed to

38:11

be accessible for all. Going

38:13

back to Beirut, Dr. Larkin

38:16

used the example of Solidaire being a really exclusionary

38:18

area. There's also a huge park in the

38:20

middle of Beirut, which is completely cut off to

38:22

everyone. Someone once told me that only foreigners

38:24

can go there if you show your foreign passport,

38:26

you can go, but no Lebanese can go

38:28

inside. More recently, there has been

38:30

more of a push towards building spaces

38:32

where people can have interactions

38:35

from different kinds of social classes

38:37

and backgrounds. And then

38:39

just finally, as he mentioned, I

38:41

think educational curricula, museums, these play

38:43

a huge role as well. And

38:45

it is so important to think

38:47

through what people are told about

38:49

their past. Dr. Larkin mentioned about

38:51

some of the pieces that are

38:53

not talked about in Northern Ireland. I

38:56

will say, as someone who grew up

38:58

going to a British school, there are

39:00

huge amounts of British history, often involving

39:02

war, that we just did not learn

39:04

about as well. And it was really

39:06

a shamefully late stage in my life

39:08

that I learned about some of this.

39:10

And that really does shape your identity.

39:12

And so I think museums and curricula

39:14

are another really key piece of this

39:16

social reconstruction idea. Part of

39:18

what you just mentioned, well, is how long

39:20

it can take to fill some of these gaps.

39:23

Social reconstruction, just like physical reconstruction, is

39:25

not a process that will take

39:27

six months or a year or two

39:29

years. It's an ongoing process, and

39:31

it's a generational project, particularly for severe

39:33

conflicts. And one of

39:35

the challenges that the international community will have

39:37

to face is how to develop long -term

39:39

thinking about reconstruction in a moment where

39:41

there are so many different conflicts going on,

39:43

and it's so hard to maintain focus

39:45

on things. And one of the

39:47

benefits of the shock to the

39:49

international aid system that's going on right

39:52

now is that there is a

39:54

real focus on figuring out how can

39:56

we build durable projects, work

39:58

on durable reconstruction that can exist even

40:00

the face of shocks to international aid.

40:02

And this is one of those questions

40:04

that is really front and for people

40:06

working on these issues right now. And

40:08

one of the benefits of social reconstruction,

40:11

I think, is that it allows people

40:13

to buy into the project themselves, local

40:15

level. I think that has the benefit

40:17

of least the potential for a more

40:19

sustainable mode of reconstruction over time. Marty,

40:22

Will, thank you very much. Thanks,

40:24

Dana. Thank you, Nader. Thanks

40:27

for listening to Babbel. If

40:29

you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe

40:31

to the podcast on iTunes or

40:33

Spotify or wherever you listen to

40:35

podcasts. You can

40:37

find more analysis on this topic, linked in

40:40

the show notes on the CSS website. and

40:42

you can find us on Twitter CSIS

40:45

Mideast.

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