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0:00
Beirut was my entry point to
0:02
the Middle East and I was
0:04
interested in intergenerational memory among Lebanese
0:06
youth that were coming out of
0:08
this civil war. So these are
0:11
young people that didn't experience the
0:13
civil war, but were living with
0:15
the consequences of it. And I
0:17
was curious, maybe perhaps because of
0:19
my own background from Belfast, also
0:21
at the end of the Troubles
0:23
and the fact that we were
0:25
in a society that was very
0:27
much silencing the past, publicly. But
0:29
privately, memory was every word.
0:33
Welcome to Babel, translating the Middle
0:35
East, a podcast from the Middle
0:37
East program at CSIS. Here
0:39
on Babel, we take you beyond the headlines
0:41
to take a closer look at what's happening
0:44
in the Middle East and why it matters.
0:47
This week on Babel, I speak
0:49
with Dr. Craig Lorcan, director of
0:51
the Center for the Study of
0:53
Divided Societies at King's College London.
0:55
Larkin is also a research lead
0:57
on memory and conflict, for except
0:59
a research consortium studying cross -border
1:01
conflict. There, he focuses
1:03
on the relationship between communal
1:05
memory and violence. Together,
1:07
we unpack different approaches taken
1:10
to reconstruction and reconciliation after
1:12
violence in the Middle East. And
1:14
then, in his farewell babble appearance, Martin
1:17
Pimentel takes my spot,
1:19
continuing the conversation with Unarfa
1:21
Waal and Will Toddman
1:23
to discuss pitfalls the international
1:25
community should avoid when
1:27
supporting post -conflict recovery. To
1:30
translate some of what's happening in
1:32
the Middle East, this is Babel. Craig
1:36
Larkin, welcome to Babel. Thank you for
1:38
having me. It's a pleasure to be here. You've
1:41
written a lot about social
1:43
reconstruction in conflict -defected environments.
1:46
What is social reconstruction? What
1:48
are its components? I've
1:50
been really interested in
1:52
the intersection of memory.
1:55
conflict and identity and
1:57
particularly looking at how
1:59
cities can be both destroyed and
2:01
then the attempt to rebuild
2:03
and reconstruct and I suppose I've
2:05
been interested while there's been
2:07
a lot of focus on physical
2:10
rebuilding on the restoration of
2:12
society. I would argue
2:14
there's been not enough focus
2:16
on how to communities
2:18
heal how can you reintegrate.
2:21
communities and people after conflict. So
2:23
I would say social reconstruction
2:25
is one of my Iraqi interview
2:27
said it's not about rebuilding
2:29
the stones, it's about rebuilding the
2:31
people. You know, in
2:33
a lot of conflict affected environments, there
2:35
are a lot of pre -existing power
2:38
structures, like tribal leaders, sectarian
2:40
leaders, some of whom may have contributed
2:42
to the violence in the first place. How
2:44
do you think about their roles? I
2:46
mean, it seems to me that in some
2:48
ways having these kinds of
2:51
leaders can help you get things moving
2:53
in the near term, but it
2:55
can also plant the seeds of division
2:57
in the longer term. The
2:59
reality is after conflict
3:01
and war, we have a
3:03
post -war status quo that
3:06
perhaps has integrated hierarchies
3:09
or integrated inequalities.
3:11
So any type of process of moving
3:14
a society forward has to deal
3:16
with what the war has left behind
3:18
and how do you deal with
3:20
political elites. Whether it's been
3:22
my work in Lebanon, Israel, Palestine
3:24
or Iraq. It's
3:26
a very difficult challenge
3:28
of negotiating those hierarchies
3:31
and power structures, but
3:33
also recognizing. that they are a
3:35
consequence and a result of violence.
3:37
So perhaps the violence has created
3:39
new elites and new hierarchies
3:42
that you don't want to consolidate,
3:44
that you want to attempt to sort
3:46
of create a more egalitarian society.
3:49
In many post -conflict settings, that's not
3:51
viable. So I think there's all sorts
3:53
of moral questions of who you
3:55
should be speaking to, who you should
3:57
be funding. How do you
3:59
think about it? What are the limits to what
4:01
you should allow and what are the alternative arrangements
4:04
to emerge. We have
4:06
to be very open with our
4:08
approach. We need to
4:10
talk to local inhabitants and
4:12
not a certain social norms. I
4:15
was struck by the
4:17
sort of peace building jargon
4:19
even around forgiveness and
4:21
reconciliation that was controversial in
4:23
certain communities, particularly from
4:25
a western prescribed idea. And
4:27
I think it's useful to ask
4:29
local communities what they actually
4:32
believe. transitional justice should
4:34
look like? What do
4:36
they prioritize? And
4:38
again, this went back to reconstruction
4:40
where there was a pushback
4:42
in Iraq on the question of
4:44
timing. Should the focus be
4:46
on perhaps the reconstruction of key
4:48
symbolic sites or monuments, as
4:51
opposed to infrastructure rebuilding,
4:54
as opposed to rebuilding
4:56
houses, hospitals, social services
4:58
instead? the Western
5:00
international community focused on cultural
5:02
heritage, focused on monumental
5:04
rebuilding of the mosques, the
5:06
churches, the sacred sites. When
5:09
many Maslowis, many Iraqis wanted
5:11
the focus was on everyday life,
5:13
the focus was on service
5:15
provision. That's one factor
5:17
that we need better engagement
5:19
with local communities. We also
5:21
need a greater sensitivity to
5:24
the language and culture and
5:26
conceptual differences. So to be
5:28
open that we're not sort
5:30
of imposing new neoliberal, neo -colonial
5:32
frameworks. In your
5:34
experience, are a lot
5:36
of Iraqis or other people
5:38
in these conflict -affected environments
5:40
interested in the ideas
5:42
you have about social reconstruction?
5:44
Or are they interested
5:46
in services, infrastructure, more
5:49
tangible things? How much support is
5:51
there for some of the softer ideas
5:54
that you think are important? What
5:56
you can see is mobilization around grassroots
5:58
issues. So I take Mosul,
6:00
for example, that has been a site that
6:02
I focused on quite a lot of
6:04
research with the EXEP project. While
6:06
UNESCO's vision was for reviving the
6:08
spirit of Mosul, I mean, an
6:10
excellent idea. You know, this was
6:12
one of Iraq's most cosmopolitan cities
6:14
destroyed by ISIS. Minorities
6:17
were displaced and killed. And the
6:19
idea of reuniting the city, of
6:21
reconstructing the mosques and churches, were
6:24
valued, but what
6:26
was also very significant were
6:28
the local grassroots initiatives
6:31
of heritage homes, local
6:33
initiatives around rebuilding the
6:35
soaps, the marketplaces, because
6:37
there's a recognition that they
6:39
can't just wait on the symbolic
6:42
large sites to be built.
6:44
They needed everyday spaces to allow
6:46
people to interact, to allow
6:48
people to reimagine. their city and
6:50
to engage with each other.
6:52
And that is happening on a
6:55
grassroots level. There's great mobilization,
6:57
particularly among Muslawi youth that want
6:59
to move beyond the trauma
7:01
and violence of the past, but
7:03
need some help in the
7:05
direction that they're heading. play
7:09
in this space. Clearly there are
7:12
people who have business interests that they
7:14
want to advance and they love
7:16
international money to help them do it.
7:18
There are sectarian leaders who want
7:20
to have more money that they can
7:22
direct to their people. There
7:24
are local business folks who
7:27
see their own compelling business reasons
7:29
for rebuilding one thing or
7:31
another. How should the international community
7:33
think about untangling? the different
7:35
motivations and the different needs of
7:38
a community that in many
7:40
ways understands each other much better
7:42
than anybody on the outside
7:44
could ever understand them. Sometimes I
7:46
think it comes down to
7:48
the funding direction and how the
7:51
West creates large scale projects
7:53
that then trickle down where there's
7:55
always room then for corruption. I
7:58
think it should be reversed
8:00
and there be greater funding
8:02
of grassroots local -led initiatives
8:04
that are not just based
8:06
on very small two -year projects,
8:08
but of greater longevity. I
8:11
would suggest the investment in
8:13
local people, local activists, and
8:15
those that are willing, that
8:17
have invested in their community,
8:19
that are committed to their
8:21
community, and not in the
8:23
sort of professionalization of NGO
8:25
and NGO class, but in
8:27
fact, we should go back
8:29
to grassroots initiatives. Of course,
8:31
I'm not naive to the
8:33
complexities of that. The reality
8:35
that there will be opportunities
8:37
for corruption, opportunities for manipulation,
8:40
but also there's great potential within
8:42
that if we go back
8:44
to a grassroots approach, if we
8:46
fund from below, if we
8:49
try to encourage local communities. And
8:51
also just to capture the
8:53
different visions that many of these
8:55
organizations have for their communities.
8:57
The reality is it's i think
8:59
you can have iraq and
9:02
and never planes this is a
9:04
complex multi -ethnic community that have
9:06
suffered in different ways and
9:08
therefore the tensions are not always
9:10
felt around religious division i
9:12
would say right now in mausoleum
9:15
there's greater intra religious division
9:17
between sunni community between those that
9:19
have been displaced newcomers in
9:21
fact some of this is class
9:23
based so part of the
9:25
problem comes from a very much.
9:28
Western reading that is often
9:30
sectarian driven that is often ethnic
9:32
focused when in fact we
9:34
need to have a finer grain
9:36
understanding that there's class dynamics
9:38
of play that there's issues of
9:41
displacement and how communities can
9:43
be reintegrated or whether they should
9:45
be reintegrated into those particular
9:47
cities or spaces that they've been
9:49
forced out of. As
9:51
you think about a smaller
9:53
scale bottom up process. Is
9:56
there a place you
9:58
think it's been done especially
10:00
well where the international
10:03
community or support from the
10:05
international community was able
10:07
to catalyze something that was
10:09
really important, really durable,
10:11
went very much in the
10:14
right direction? Yeah, it's
10:16
an excellent question. I think it's easier
10:18
to pick out spaces that haven't been done
10:20
very well than to pick out. success
10:22
stories. I would go back to Beirut that
10:24
was the start of my research many years
10:26
ago and sort of memory and conflict. And
10:29
I think the downtown Beirut
10:31
is a good example of
10:33
a space that was not
10:35
constructed well, that became incredibly
10:37
elitist, exclusive. This was
10:39
the downtown Solidaires project that
10:41
even now it's still sort of
10:43
barricaded off and for many
10:45
Lebanese they feel dislocated from that
10:48
center. So it's a good
10:50
example. of where Mosul
10:52
in Iraq shouldn't go in
10:54
the rebuilding project. In
10:56
other words, this vision was
10:58
very much based on creating
11:01
a commodified cosmopolitan center that
11:03
would be founded basically by
11:05
tourism. And it excluded many
11:07
Lebanese who couldn't afford to live there,
11:09
who couldn't afford to shop there, and excluded
11:11
them from their center where it used
11:13
to be a meeting place, it used to
11:15
be a pluralistic center. Mosul.
11:18
the danger would be and sometimes
11:20
this is happening a little
11:22
bit in Baghdad the funding of
11:24
these huge malls like western
11:26
shopping malls as opposed to the
11:28
older sooks that were more
11:31
informal that they had much better
11:33
interaction between communities. So
11:35
in Mosul I think there
11:37
is an opportunity to fund the
11:39
local sooks that helped to
11:41
network and knit communities together as
11:43
opposed to these grander. shopping
11:46
centers that very often can just
11:48
be linked to political elites
11:50
and can be linked to wealthy
11:52
entrepreneurs. So in
11:54
Mosul, we are beginning to
11:56
see localized activists that are
11:58
trying to reclaim the city. But
12:01
of course, this is against the
12:03
backdrop of political uncertainty and violence
12:05
in the region, which makes any
12:07
type of reconstruction very hard. But
12:10
I think back to American cities
12:12
as I. think to Middle Eastern cities
12:14
that I know, a
12:16
process of renovation almost necessarily
12:19
involves gentrification as a
12:21
way to finance the renovation
12:23
and people who were
12:25
more marginal get squeezed out.
12:28
I say, is there an example of
12:30
doing this in a very different
12:32
way? I think of Fenwell Hall in
12:34
Boston. All the example
12:36
of the Inner Harbor in Baltimore, Maryland.
12:40
All the examples seem to involve taking
12:42
what is considered to be
12:44
urban blight, creating infrastructure,
12:46
creating transportation so people
12:49
can come in and
12:51
creating some sort of
12:53
commercial viability that can
12:55
then spawn other areas
12:57
where, again, traditional communities
13:00
adapt, some people get
13:02
jobs, some people have to move. I
13:04
mean, is that a necessary part
13:06
of reconstruction? I think the
13:08
gentrification of cities in
13:10
the west is almost an
13:12
inevitable consequence you know i
13:14
grew up in belfast and
13:16
and what we see is
13:18
the gentrification of downtown belfast
13:20
what becomes more complex i
13:22
would say in belfast is
13:25
an example when you have
13:27
a divided city inside a
13:29
contested state the marginalization of
13:31
communities goes beyond just a
13:33
class -based issue this then can
13:35
lead to greater instability so
13:37
for bay root the fact
13:39
that solid air at a
13:41
very sort of gentrification model
13:43
that might be okay but
13:45
it becomes problematic in a
13:47
Lebanese state that is based
13:49
on power sharing that is
13:51
based on sort of intercommunal
13:53
arrangements and therefore the exclusion
13:55
of particular communities from that
13:58
center is problematic and I
14:00
think that's what marks it.
14:02
differently to Western gentrification. We're
14:04
not just talking about gentrification,
14:06
we're talking about probably the
14:08
sort of consolidation of sectarian
14:10
elites and exclusion and marginalisation
14:12
that can have a destabilising
14:14
effect on the future. So
14:16
I would say in my work on
14:19
Lebanon, young people felt like
14:21
they were excluded and marginalised from
14:23
the centre, that they didn't
14:25
have a space where they could
14:27
Interact that they could come
14:29
together and therefore it continued to
14:31
be contested the public protests
14:33
we go back to Thaura in
14:35
2019 the Lebanese sort of
14:37
uprising against the sectarian elite. This
14:39
was also an attempt to
14:41
reclaim the city and attempt to
14:44
reclaim the spaces that you
14:46
felt marginalized from the youth felt
14:48
that they had no place
14:50
within that city. And similar
14:52
processes happen in Baghdad at the
14:54
same time of protest against the
14:56
political elite and corruption, but also
14:58
about housing, about social provision, about
15:00
welfare. I would call this in
15:02
Le Fevre in terms of the
15:05
right to the city to actually
15:07
belong there and to have space
15:09
within these cities. So
15:11
how much similarity do you
15:13
see across the Middle East which
15:15
has, as you know, a
15:17
wide range of conflict affected societies?
15:20
To what extent are the problems similar?
15:22
Do they rhyme? And
15:25
what are the key differences that
15:27
you see from site to site? Bay
15:29
Roots was my entry point
15:31
to the Middle East. And I
15:34
was interested in intergenerational memory
15:36
among Lebanese youth that were coming
15:38
out of the civil war.
15:40
So these are young people that
15:42
didn't experience the civil war,
15:44
but were living with the consequences
15:46
of it. And I was
15:48
curious, maybe perhaps because of my
15:50
own background from Belfast, Also
15:52
at the end of the troubles
15:54
and the fact that we
15:56
were in a society that was
15:58
very much silence in the
16:00
past publicly but privately memory was
16:02
everywhere stories were told history
16:04
and traumatic events were reworked and
16:06
relived through narratives and through
16:08
particular sites. I felt that
16:11
in Lebanon that young people were
16:13
struggling to process the public
16:15
silences and attempted amnesia after the
16:17
war and the reality that
16:19
they lived in a divided society
16:21
that the street, the school,
16:23
the neighborhood that they grew up
16:25
in was very often segregated
16:27
that the war was not taught
16:29
in their education syllabus but
16:31
yet it was lived out in
16:33
everyday life so the memory
16:35
component there was very much about
16:37
the continuation of war memory. That
16:40
then moved me to understand
16:42
how memory can also be embedded
16:44
within the urban landscape of
16:46
memory. So part of that reconstruction
16:48
process. So whenever later I
16:50
went to look at work in Iraq, again,
16:53
the issue of memory of
16:55
what happens after herbicide, after your
16:57
city is destroyed purposely. How
17:00
do you reimagine the past? How
17:02
do you live with that past
17:04
when there's competing memories and competing
17:06
actors that have got a very
17:08
clear vision for the future. So
17:11
I've always been interested. And
17:13
I think it's very different. Memory
17:15
is an ambivalent concept and
17:17
is an ambivalent tool of analysis.
17:19
But we can see how
17:21
more recently it can be weaponized
17:24
and politicized and can lead
17:26
to all sorts of divisions. But
17:28
likewise, I find that there's
17:30
an opportunity to address the past,
17:32
acknowledge the past, create a
17:34
space. for dialogue and encounter. So
17:37
my research has always held
17:39
that ambivalence of memory and conflict
17:41
that it's not just a
17:43
catalyst for future violence, but
17:45
it's a lens for understanding how
17:47
people are interpreting the past to try
17:49
to deal with their present demands
17:52
and their future vision. How
17:54
does all of that affect
17:56
how you think governments should
17:58
think about the reconstruction of
18:00
Gaza? which itself was a
18:03
complex society with people displaced
18:05
from different parts of historic
18:07
Palestine, different kinds of
18:09
divisions inside a huge amount
18:11
of physical reconstruction that needs to
18:13
be done. What's
18:15
the advice you would give, not being
18:17
a Gaza expert, but having thought
18:19
through these processes, that people
18:22
need to put front of mind
18:24
that probably isn't front of mind? What's
18:27
happened? I would say in
18:29
Gaza is not just herbicide, but
18:31
more than likely moving towards
18:33
genocide or herbicide is part of
18:35
a genocidal attack. So there's
18:37
a purposeful focus and structure, a
18:40
structural attack on
18:42
destroying Palestinian life there,
18:44
cultural heritage, mosques,
18:47
museums, churches.
18:50
And that will be part of the rehabilitation,
18:52
the reconstruction. It's not just about
18:54
Gazans as a people. but
18:57
palestinian cultural heritage identity that is
18:59
developed over hundreds of years in
19:01
that area so very often there's
19:03
a reduction to gas and people
19:05
or palestinians in the gas and
19:07
strip as if the reconstruction is
19:09
just about their homes is just
19:11
about you know they can be
19:13
moved around or there's no attempt
19:15
to bring them back into that
19:17
space but i think. If
19:20
we want to envision a
19:22
future for Gazans, it needs to
19:24
be a complete reconstruction, not
19:26
just of housing, not just on
19:28
social services, but on their
19:30
cultural heritage. That is going
19:32
to be very difficult, but I think
19:34
it's very necessary. Let
19:36
me ask a hard question, which
19:38
I think is somebody who grew up
19:41
in Belfast, you must have an
19:43
especially nuanced understanding of, how can you
19:45
tell whether the kinds of things
19:47
you're recommending are working? It's
19:49
very difficult to say how
19:51
effective such policy decisions
19:53
are. I think we can
19:56
clearly see where there's
19:58
been dangerous consequences, perhaps because
20:00
they're not properly thought
20:02
through. And my work
20:04
would point to that, that
20:06
memory needs to be understood in
20:08
its entirety and there is
20:10
danger whenever we try to silence
20:12
it. the silences are often
20:14
very noisy, so there's a generational
20:16
component that it might look
20:18
like a cold peace, it might
20:20
look like societies are healing. I'd
20:23
come back to the Belfast
20:25
example and while there hasn't
20:27
been concerted violence for over
20:29
a decade, it does not
20:31
mean that the societies are
20:33
integrated. Education is
20:35
93 % segregated, people live
20:37
in segregated communities, paramilitary
20:39
still function. in some
20:41
ways criminal gangs, there's
20:43
challenge to state authorities.
20:46
There's many things that have not
20:48
been resolved inside this cold peace
20:50
in the Good Friday Agreement. And
20:53
that's where I believe we
20:55
need to go back to deal
20:57
with memory of the troubles,
20:59
open up what's actually happened. Similarly,
21:03
in Lebanon, it's very clear where
21:05
there's been multiple cycles of
21:07
violence. We're almost
21:09
up to the 50th anniversary
21:12
of the beginning of
21:14
the Lebanese civil war in
21:16
1975, but there's been
21:18
multiple conflicts Israeli war in
21:20
2006 ongoing Israeli attacks
21:22
to the port explosion Thaura
21:24
and these are cumulative
21:26
traumas that affect Lebanese society
21:28
and they don't replace
21:30
the last trauma they're embedded
21:33
they add to it.
21:35
I was interviewing ex Islamist
21:37
from. roomy prison in
21:39
Lebanon, mostly from Tripoli and
21:41
these are ISIS, Jabhat
21:43
al -Nusra fighters. We interviewed
21:45
about 40 ex -prisoners that were
21:47
fighting in Syria and I
21:49
was curious to understand their motivation.
21:52
For many, the historic memory
21:54
of violence and their
21:56
upbringing in Tripoli and Lebanon
21:58
had a mobilizing component. The
22:01
historic violence of the past
22:03
has real life consequences and realities
22:05
on the present. So I
22:07
think that's where there is policy
22:10
relevance to say, very often
22:12
we just want to focus on
22:14
the current issue, but we
22:16
don't want to address some of
22:18
the deeper historic issues. It
22:21
seems to me that as
22:23
I think about the places you
22:25
study, what we now think
22:27
of as what were successful models
22:29
of coexistence themselves emerged from
22:32
earlier cycles of violence in earlier
22:34
centuries. without the kinds
22:36
of solutions you're describing that
22:38
there are some communities, whether
22:40
it's Baghdad, Jerusalem, the
22:43
cities that have had
22:45
histories of remarkable cosmopolitanism
22:47
and coexistence, which broke
22:49
down into cycles of
22:51
horrific violence, exile, massacres.
22:54
And then we're able to reconstruct
22:56
and create these cosmopolitan societies again,
22:58
which now people look back and
23:00
say, oh, if we could only
23:02
recapture that moment. In that
23:04
kind of environment where we
23:06
almost have cyclical violence and cosmopolitan
23:08
coexistence, how should we think
23:11
about what success really looks like?
23:13
How long should we think
23:15
success would last? It could
23:17
be easy to sort of read
23:19
this as a romanticization or a
23:21
nostalgia for a previous mixed past,
23:24
but that's embedded in the historical
23:26
memory of the communities as well,
23:28
that they live together, they work
23:30
together, and they're very
23:32
much Maslawis or Beirutis
23:34
or Jerusalemites. There's a shared
23:37
cultural heritage that needs
23:39
to be encouraged, but
23:41
that doesn't mean that you neglect
23:43
what led to your rupture. You
23:45
know, so I think that came
23:48
through in some of the work
23:50
on muscle that the focus can
23:52
be about reviving a unified past,
23:54
but unless you address how ISIS
23:56
emerged, why they emerged and what
23:58
some of the underlying factors were
24:01
for that emergence. Then
24:03
it can lead to cycles
24:05
of violence again. So you
24:07
almost approach the past with
24:09
a double -handed approach of
24:11
the unifying cosmopolitanism, but trying
24:14
to grapple with what destabilizes
24:16
that. What are the factors
24:18
that cause the fragmentation within
24:20
society? And can they be
24:22
critically addressed? Can they be
24:24
addressed in a way that
24:26
better integrates and unifies? I
24:28
would say Lebanon is a
24:30
perfect example of society that's
24:32
got such a rich cultural
24:34
heritage of cosmopolitanism. But
24:36
right now, in schools, they're
24:39
not teaching their students any history
24:41
of the Civil War. You know, up
24:43
to current politics, it's too controversial.
24:45
They can't agree it. And I think
24:47
that is a little bit dangerous. I
24:49
think there has to be an attempt
24:51
to at least allow students to grapple
24:53
with the different narratives to try
24:55
to understand. or it can
24:57
easily be mobilized again. And
25:00
the same critique that I would have
25:02
for Lebanon, I would have for
25:04
my own community. Similarly, there is
25:06
no teaching on the troubles within
25:08
most schools in an Northern Irish context.
25:11
So let me close with a
25:13
question on what outsiders really
25:15
can do. You're describing processes that
25:18
have very deep roots, people
25:20
who have tremendous stakes, not only
25:22
for their children, but their
25:24
grandchildren. and an international
25:26
community whose attention is
25:28
often not sustained and that
25:30
often moves from issue
25:32
to issue. How can
25:35
the international community maximize its
25:37
constructive impact when in
25:39
so many ways its input
25:41
is transient? We're
25:43
trying to deal with
25:45
a dynamic and moving situation
25:47
and very often the
25:49
international community lack focus, lack
25:52
a willingness to commit. to
25:54
particular projects and I think
25:56
that's a reality particularly of
25:58
this political moment that we
26:01
find ourselves there's probably a
26:03
retreat from an international vision
26:05
to intervene in such communities
26:07
but I would push back
26:09
against that and I think
26:11
there is still an important
26:13
role for international community and
26:16
actors to support and to
26:18
work alongside communities and this
26:20
is part of a peace
26:22
-building process. This is part
26:24
of helping towards a transitional
26:26
justice that doesn't conform to
26:29
a very structured Western approach,
26:31
but encourages a more contextual,
26:33
local partnership to help communities
26:35
move forward together and to
26:37
be able to work collaboratively. Greg
26:40
Larkin, thank you very much for joining us
26:42
on Babel. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure.
26:52
What are some potentially distorting or
26:54
disruptive effects of outside aid on
26:56
reconstruction? How do we navigate local
26:58
politics to ensure that aid is having the desired
27:00
effects on the right people? Well,
27:02
anytime you put a lot of money
27:04
into a fragile and conflict -affected environment,
27:06
there's going to be unintended consequences. One
27:09
of the issues that often happens, as Dr.
27:11
Larkin mentioned, is this challenge of mismatched priorities,
27:13
that there are international actors who come in
27:15
with an understanding of what needs to be
27:17
done in this environment, but those are not
27:19
necessarily aligned with the needs or the understandings
27:22
of the people on the ground. I
27:24
think in a fragile environment, you see
27:26
variation across different regions, territories that have
27:28
different modes of governance, different levels of
27:30
fragility, different knock -on effects of the
27:32
conflict itself. And you often
27:34
see international actors come in with a sort of
27:36
national level plan for how to reconstruct a country. And
27:39
I think that can fail at more local levels. A
27:42
second challenge that you see is profit motives
27:44
shaping the way in which reconstruction takes place.
27:46
This is one of the risks that we
27:48
are already starting to witness right now in
27:50
the context of Syria. For example,
27:52
you see countries like the UAE and
27:54
Turkey planning how to bring in their own
27:56
domestic businesses to reconstruct certain parts of
27:58
the country. And I think what we'll see
28:00
is that there is going to be
28:02
a focus on areas of the country that
28:04
are most likely to expand economic engagement,
28:06
for example, between Turkey or the UAE and
28:08
Syria. So that might focus on critical
28:10
infrastructure, ports, roads, things of that
28:12
nature. But there are other parts of
28:14
the country that also have really important reconstruction
28:16
needs. For example, in agricultural areas where
28:18
there are enormous quantities of unexploded ordinance, that's
28:20
going to require enormous amounts of money,
28:22
enormous amounts of manpower through reconstruction to be
28:24
able to make these areas farmable again.
28:26
But there are less economic incentives for international
28:28
actors to intervene in that particular respect.
28:31
And so I think that will shape the
28:33
way in which reconstruction ends up playing
28:35
out. Definitely, I think. aid
28:37
by its very nature is distorting.
28:39
When you have a huge amount
28:41
of money coming in externally, that
28:43
changes the balance of power. It
28:46
changes depending on what it's spent
28:48
on, where it's spent, who is spending
28:50
it. And so I think it
28:52
is impossible for it not to be distorting. But
28:54
I think in addition to all the ways
28:56
that Marty laid out, it has
28:58
a distorting effect on the labor market as
29:00
well, a huge influx of
29:03
contracts or money in a certain
29:05
sector. like the construction sector perhaps
29:07
in Lebanon at the moment reconstruction
29:09
is not yet fully underway but
29:11
when it does come underway companies
29:13
working in concrete or in windows
29:15
in glass will really benefit from
29:17
this and so it has an
29:19
effect that people will shift and
29:21
businesses will shift to try to
29:23
access these opportunities and then later
29:25
on in the process as well
29:27
there are the distorting effects of
29:29
salaries of those who are involved
29:31
in the aid process so quite
29:33
often. People who work for
29:35
international NGOs or even directly
29:37
for international donors have huge salaries
29:39
in comparison to a lot
29:41
of people in the local market
29:43
and there are times when
29:45
this is hugely distorting so in.
29:48
Lebanon, again, because of the
29:50
collapse of the currency, if you
29:52
are paid in US dollars, then
29:54
you are doing relatively well in
29:56
Lebanon right now. Your money goes a
29:58
lot further. Whereas if you're still paid
30:00
in Lebanese lira, then your
30:03
salary has lost a huge percentage of
30:05
its worth. So I think there are a
30:07
whole host of ways in which this
30:09
is distorting. And there are real political effects
30:11
of that. I also think that
30:13
One of the implications of the complexity
30:15
of reconstruction is that monitoring evaluation becomes
30:17
really important. Just because there are unintended
30:19
side effects reconstruction doesn't mean that we
30:21
ought not to do it, but it
30:24
does mean that we should be careful
30:26
about how we do it and recognize
30:28
when things are going in a way
30:30
that we didn't anticipate to begin with.
30:32
But that leads to challenges when we
30:34
try to implement reconstruction at a more
30:36
localized level, as Dr. Larkin mentioned. The
30:38
problem with utilizing local actors is that
30:41
they have less capacity to monitor and evaluate
30:43
in the way in which international actors
30:45
typically conceptualize doing so. And so
30:47
I think one of the challenges that the
30:49
international community needs to grapple with is
30:51
how can we continue to localize reconstruction efforts,
30:53
bring in local perspectives to guide the
30:55
priorities of international actors in reconstruction, but
30:57
also do so in a way that
31:00
is mindful of the need to monitor. on
31:02
intended side effects and finding creative new
31:04
ways that we can do so that meets
31:06
the capacity of local actors. On
31:09
that note, how can local actors leverage
31:11
and at times manipulate foreign actors when
31:13
it comes to reconstruction? What
31:15
kinds of tools do they use to do so? They
31:17
have a lot of choices as
31:19
well. They can choose the kinds
31:21
of reconstruction activities that they get
31:23
involved in, as Marty was saying,
31:26
infrastructure projects are really lucrative. they
31:28
might be incentivized to get involved
31:30
in those over working on governance
31:32
reforms, things like that, which are
31:34
much less lucrative and a more
31:36
challenging process to work through in
31:38
many ways. They also
31:40
have the ability to play different donors off
31:42
against each other. Sometimes there are multiple
31:44
donors that are really keen to engage in
31:46
an area and they might not all
31:48
have the same priorities. And that
31:50
can even involve some extent of
31:53
great power competition. I mean, China is
31:55
involved in certain aspects of reconstruction. maybe
31:58
the Chinese proposition is much more
32:00
attractive to some people who don't want
32:02
to see the same kinds of
32:04
conditionality that we traditionally associate with Western
32:06
donors. They also have
32:08
a lot of bureaucratic tools
32:10
at their disposal to be
32:12
able to shape and distort
32:14
the kinds of projects they
32:16
get. Government officials can
32:18
deny permissions for projects in certain
32:20
areas or deny visas for those
32:22
who want to come and work
32:24
on them in order to
32:26
prioritize and shift aid towards other
32:28
areas. And then physical
32:30
control and security control is
32:33
also a tool that they
32:35
have somewhere like Southern Lebanon
32:37
until recently Hezbollah exerted a
32:39
huge amount of influence over
32:41
who goes there, which kinds
32:43
of international aid actors can
32:45
access parts of Southern Lebanon.
32:47
And so they can then
32:49
force themselves to be intermediaries
32:52
that can help bolster their
32:54
own credibility. Or if they choose
32:56
not to act as an intermediary, then they
32:58
can at least prevent the influence of others that
33:00
might be trying to undermine their influence or
33:02
their grip on power there. I
33:04
also think it's important to differentiate what
33:06
kinds of local actors we're talking about.
33:09
In most post -conflict environments, when
33:11
reconstruction starts, the conflict isn't always
33:13
over. These things tend to continue.
33:15
And we see this in Lebanon, we've seen
33:18
it in Syria, where there is
33:20
still low level conflict, there is control
33:22
by non -state armed groups. In fact, the
33:24
ICRC has found that 40 million people
33:26
in the Middle East and North Africa
33:28
live in territory that's controlled by non
33:30
-state armed groups. And so even
33:32
in quote unquote post -conflict settings, we often
33:34
find that reconstruction is shaped by ongoing
33:36
conflict dynamics. And so these groups have
33:38
particular mechanisms by which they can shape
33:41
methods of reconstruction, partly because they control
33:43
territory and so they can decide who
33:45
is or is not allowed to conduct
33:47
reconstruction work in this particular territory. They're
33:49
also seen as security guarantors in some
33:51
contexts, and so they may be seen
33:53
as reliable security partners in order to
33:55
prevent the outbreak of violence. So they
33:57
can use that leverage to dictate what
33:59
kinds of reconstruction is or is not
34:01
permissible in these areas. And
34:03
they also have In some cases, in economic
34:05
influence, well, a lot of the times
34:07
these militias or other armed groups are also
34:10
integrated into illicit economies and have substantial
34:12
economic influence that then allows them to shape
34:14
reconstruction efforts. And so when you are
34:16
building a new economy in these areas, you
34:18
have to deal with people who are already embedded
34:20
in systems that they have an incentive to maintain. Let's
34:23
shift now to social reconstruction. What
34:26
can successful social reconstruction look like
34:28
in post -conflict settings across the
34:30
region? What roles do, for
34:32
example, urban renewal or religious
34:34
and ethnic diversity play? I
34:36
think what makes social reconstruction such an
34:38
interesting concept is because it can mean so
34:40
many different things depending on the particular
34:42
moment and the particular people that you're talking
34:44
about. I think one of the ways
34:46
in which we have seen social reconstruction play
34:48
out beyond just the dimension of urban
34:51
reconstruction is an artistic expression as well. Dr.
34:53
Larkin speaks quite a bit about the
34:55
role of mosques and suks in communal places
34:57
for people to meet together as a
34:59
form of social reconstruction and rehabilitating social ties.
35:01
I think music can also play another
35:03
role in that as well. There are different
35:05
kinds of social interactions like music, like
35:07
art. We recently had someone on Babel that
35:09
spoke about urban art as well at
35:11
large scales and how this can be a
35:13
mechanism for creating new kinds of communal
35:15
ties and raising issues that are difficult to
35:17
speak about in other contexts. And
35:19
so I think we have seen that
35:21
in many places. Afghanistan is one in which
35:23
artists have played a particular role in social
35:26
mobilization and reflecting the needs of communities. I
35:28
also think that with social reconstruction,
35:30
it really is where if the
35:32
rubber meets the road in terms
35:34
of ideology and more pragmatic concerns
35:36
about reconstruction. For me,
35:39
I think about the differential outcomes
35:41
between Turkey and Morocco in terms
35:43
of nation building resolving ethnic differences. In
35:45
Turkey, you had a very particular
35:48
mode of nation building after their own
35:50
revolution, which was very much predicated
35:52
on a modern concept of Turkey that
35:54
was different than the ways in
35:56
which the Kurdish population conceptualized their own
35:58
identity. And it necessitated in the
36:00
minds of the Turkish government reforming
36:03
or changing the ways in which
36:05
Kurdish people spoke and presented themselves.
36:07
Whereas in North Africa, you saw a
36:09
different dynamic where in Morocco, for
36:11
example, social ties were predicated
36:14
more on religion rather than on
36:16
ethnic difference. And so it
36:18
was a way in which the
36:20
Moroccan monarchy was able to move
36:22
past differences between its Arab population
36:24
and its Amazigh population. This wasn't
36:26
a perfect process, but it does
36:28
show how conceptualizing what a society
36:30
and a community means and looking
36:32
for areas of commonality can be
36:34
a way to move past situations
36:36
in which you have heterogeneity in
36:38
other contexts. I'm also
36:40
really intrigued by this idea of
36:42
social reconstruction. And some of this
36:45
comes down to the perceptions of
36:47
the choices that people make when
36:49
they are prioritizing what gets reconstructed
36:51
and what doesn't. There are so
36:53
many opportunities for certain groups to
36:55
feel that they are being marginalized,
36:58
that their needs are not being prioritized over
37:00
the needs of others. One
37:02
piece of this is ensuring
37:04
as much as possible that
37:06
aspects of different communities, cultural
37:09
sites, are being
37:11
simultaneously addressed. And
37:13
Dr. Larkin talked a bit about Mosul, and I
37:15
think Mosul is a really interesting example here. They
37:18
simultaneously reconstructed churches in
37:20
old Mosul, alongside the Nuri
37:22
Mosque, which is it
37:24
has this famous or had
37:26
a famous minaret that
37:28
was leaning. And this
37:30
actually gave Mosul its nickname. So
37:32
the people from Mosul are called
37:34
Alhadba, which is something like the
37:37
hunchback. And it's a
37:39
hugely culturally significant landmark that
37:41
ISIS destroyed. It has
37:43
now been completely reconstructed. And
37:45
I think that plays into this
37:47
feeling that not only were
37:49
Christians and Muslims simultaneously received the
37:51
benefits of reconstruction, but also
37:53
it's this symbol that can come to
37:56
stoke pride and a sense of rebirth
37:58
among the people who live there. I
38:00
think there's also something about
38:03
shared spaces. And when some
38:05
cities have been rebuilt, they
38:07
have purposefully added in communal
38:09
spaces that are designed to
38:11
be accessible for all. Going
38:13
back to Beirut, Dr. Larkin
38:16
used the example of Solidaire being a really exclusionary
38:18
area. There's also a huge park in the
38:20
middle of Beirut, which is completely cut off to
38:22
everyone. Someone once told me that only foreigners
38:24
can go there if you show your foreign passport,
38:26
you can go, but no Lebanese can go
38:28
inside. More recently, there has been
38:30
more of a push towards building spaces
38:32
where people can have interactions
38:35
from different kinds of social classes
38:37
and backgrounds. And then
38:39
just finally, as he mentioned, I
38:41
think educational curricula, museums, these play
38:43
a huge role as well. And
38:45
it is so important to think
38:47
through what people are told about
38:49
their past. Dr. Larkin mentioned about
38:51
some of the pieces that are
38:53
not talked about in Northern Ireland. I
38:56
will say, as someone who grew up
38:58
going to a British school, there are
39:00
huge amounts of British history, often involving
39:02
war, that we just did not learn
39:04
about as well. And it was really
39:06
a shamefully late stage in my life
39:08
that I learned about some of this.
39:10
And that really does shape your identity.
39:12
And so I think museums and curricula
39:14
are another really key piece of this
39:16
social reconstruction idea. Part of
39:18
what you just mentioned, well, is how long
39:20
it can take to fill some of these gaps.
39:23
Social reconstruction, just like physical reconstruction, is
39:25
not a process that will take
39:27
six months or a year or two
39:29
years. It's an ongoing process, and
39:31
it's a generational project, particularly for severe
39:33
conflicts. And one of
39:35
the challenges that the international community will have
39:37
to face is how to develop long -term
39:39
thinking about reconstruction in a moment where
39:41
there are so many different conflicts going on,
39:43
and it's so hard to maintain focus
39:45
on things. And one of the
39:47
benefits of the shock to the
39:49
international aid system that's going on right
39:52
now is that there is a
39:54
real focus on figuring out how can
39:56
we build durable projects, work
39:58
on durable reconstruction that can exist even
40:00
the face of shocks to international aid.
40:02
And this is one of those questions
40:04
that is really front and for people
40:06
working on these issues right now. And
40:08
one of the benefits of social reconstruction,
40:11
I think, is that it allows people
40:13
to buy into the project themselves, local
40:15
level. I think that has the benefit
40:17
of least the potential for a more
40:19
sustainable mode of reconstruction over time. Marty,
40:22
Will, thank you very much. Thanks,
40:24
Dana. Thank you, Nader. Thanks
40:27
for listening to Babbel. If
40:29
you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe
40:31
to the podcast on iTunes or
40:33
Spotify or wherever you listen to
40:35
podcasts. You can
40:37
find more analysis on this topic, linked in
40:40
the show notes on the CSS website. and
40:42
you can find us on Twitter CSIS
40:45
Mideast.
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