0:00

You're listening to an airwave

0:02

media podcast. Ben Franklin's

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World is a production

0:07

of Colonial Williamsburg Innovation

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Studios. Hello and welcome to

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Ben Franklin's World Great Visited.

0:14

A series of classic episodes

0:16

to bring fresh perspective to

0:18

our latest episodes and add

0:20

deeper connection to our understand

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of our understand of our

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understanding of early American history.

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and I'm your host, Liz

0:29

Cove Art. Yesterday, January 20th,

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marked inauguration day in the United

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States, the day a new president and his

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administration takes office. So it seems

0:37

like a fitting time for us to

0:39

revisit a conversation that we had in

0:42

2020 about the creation of the executive

0:44

branch and more specifically, the creation

0:46

of the president's cabinet. Lindsay Travinsky

0:48

is an award-winning presidential historian

0:51

and the executive director of

0:53

the George Washington Presidential Library.

0:55

In 2020, she published her first book.

0:57

called the cabinet. George Washington and

0:59

the creation of an American institution.

1:02

Now during our conversation, we investigated

1:04

what the United States Constitution has to

1:06

say about who can advise the president

1:09

and the different types of advisory bodies

1:11

that George Washington turned to before he

1:13

created the cabinet. This is a really

1:15

great conversation for us to revisit because

1:17

not only has a new presidential administration

1:20

taken office, but also next week, we'll

1:23

speak with Lindsay Travinsky again about her

1:25

new book making the presidency. John Adams

1:27

and the precedence that forged the

1:29

Republic. As a preview, John Adams' cabinet

1:32

played a large role in his presidency,

1:34

so it will be helpful for us

1:36

to revisit this conversation now about how

1:38

the cabinet was created and how

1:41

George Washington established precedence for

1:43

how the cabinet secretary should

1:45

work and how they should act. All right,

1:47

let's get to it and revisit our conversation

1:49

with Lindsay Travinsky. Our

2:03

guest is the Scholar in Residence at

2:05

the Institute for Thomas Payne Studies and

2:07

a senior fellow at the International

2:09

Center for Jefferson Studies. She's a

2:11

historian of early American political history,

2:13

and she specializes in the history

2:15

of the presidency and federal government.

2:17

Prior to becoming a scholar in

2:19

residence and senior fellow, she worked

2:21

as the White House historian for

2:23

the White House Historical Society. Today,

2:26

she joins us to discuss the

2:28

early history of the President's cabinet

2:30

with details from her book, The

2:32

Cabinet. George Washington and the creation

2:34

of an American institution. Welcome back

2:36

to Ben Franklin's world, Lindsay Dravinsky.

2:38

Thanks so much for having me

2:40

back. I'm thrilled to be here.

2:42

So Lindsay, you're back on the

2:44

show because you wrote a book

2:46

about the cabinet. And I wonder

2:48

if we could start with a

2:50

brief overview of the cabinet and

2:53

the function it plays in the

2:55

United States government. So the cabinet

2:57

was originally created to be a

2:59

private advisory body for the president

3:01

and to really serve... However, the

3:03

president needed it to serve. So

3:05

whether it was advice occasionally or

3:07

daily advice, it was really up

3:09

to whoever was in office. Now,

3:11

of course, today it has expanded

3:13

and institutionalized in some ways. The

3:15

National Security Council exists and that

3:18

took over some of the responsibilities

3:20

of the original cabinet. but the

3:22

same flexibility is still there and

3:24

the president can have really close

3:26

relationships with the cabinet secretaries or

3:28

not depending on their personalities and

3:30

their preferences. How precisely did the

3:32

cabinet function and who makes up

3:34

the membership of the cabinet? Yeah,

3:36

so the cabinet itself when it

3:38

comes together is designed to provide

3:40

advice to the president on big

3:43

issues that sort of go beyond

3:45

the purview of one department. So

3:47

each department secretary oversees their own

3:49

bureaucracies and in the 1790s they

3:51

were very small. They maybe had

3:53

one or two clerks or a

3:55

few if it was the treasury

3:57

department and today of course those

3:59

are really gigantic institutions and

4:01

oversee such important parts of the

4:04

country and the government. So each

4:06

department secretary oversees their own section

4:08

basically and then when they come

4:10

together the ideas that war or

4:13

diplomacy sometimes or constitutional questions often

4:15

touch on several different departments and

4:17

so they come together to provide

4:20

different perspectives different opinions and so

4:22

they come together to provide different

4:24

perspectives different opinions based on their

4:27

experience and help the president in

4:29

that way. Now Jennifer wonders how and

4:31

why the cabinet was created and how

4:33

it received its name. So could we talk

4:35

about Article 2, Section 2 of

4:38

the United States Constitution, and about

4:40

the different options it sets forth for

4:42

the creation of an advisory body

4:44

for the president? That is the

4:46

perfect place to start. So the delegates

4:49

to the constitutional convention actually

4:51

really didn't want a cabinet.

4:53

The British government had a

4:55

cabinet. And they were very

4:57

distrusting of that institution because

5:00

they felt like it really

5:02

obscured responsibility and transparency at

5:04

the highest levels of government.

5:07

And they knew that it met behind

5:09

closed doors, but it really wasn't clear

5:11

who was calling the shots. And so

5:13

they actually rejected proposals for an

5:16

advisory body or a council that

5:18

looked very similar to what ended

5:20

up happening. And instead, they put in

5:23

two clauses into Article II to provide

5:25

support and advice for the president because

5:27

they understood that, of course, no one

5:29

can, you know, have all of the

5:31

answers or lead by themselves. And so those

5:34

two options are the president

5:36

can request written advice from

5:38

the department secretaries on matters

5:40

pertaining to their department. And this

5:42

was very important because written advice

5:45

would ensure that there is basically

5:47

a paper trail. There is evidence

5:49

about... who said what and who

5:51

advocated which position and that

5:53

would ensure American citizens

5:56

that there was a person who

5:58

was advocating good policies and

6:00

if someone wasn't advocating good policies

6:03

they could be removed from office.

6:05

So that was really crucial. The

6:07

second option that they made available

6:09

for the precedent was that the

6:11

president would advise and consent with

6:13

the Senate on treaties and foreign

6:15

appointments. And from a 21st century

6:17

perspective it's kind of hard for

6:19

us to understand this because we

6:21

now see this Senate today sort

6:24

of as either a rubber stamp

6:26

for the president's policies. or they

6:28

veto treaties or appointments. But the

6:30

delegates really expected that the Senate

6:32

would actually serve as an advisory

6:34

body on foreign affairs and that

6:36

the president would go meet with

6:38

the senators and they would provide

6:40

advice and support. And the Senate

6:42

was considered a much more responsible

6:45

and safe advisory body because they

6:47

were indirectly elected through the state

6:49

legislatures. So if... they gave bad

6:51

advice or if they advocated for

6:53

a bad policy they could be

6:55

removed by the state legislatures and

6:57

therefore they were sort of safe

6:59

as someone to provide advice to

7:01

the president. It's really great you

7:03

mentioned the British cabinet because Susie

7:06

is curious about the precedence Washington

7:08

and those of the constitutional convention

7:10

must have looked at for an

7:12

advisory body and in particular Susie

7:14

wonders whether we can trace the

7:16

cabinet to earlier colonial governor's counsels

7:18

or some other British tradition. So

7:20

Lindsay, could you tell us a

7:22

bit more about the British Cabinet

7:25

and why Americans seem to hate

7:27

that institution so much? Absolutely. So

7:29

the British Cabinet contributes a number

7:31

of things to our American version.

7:33

First of all, it contributes the

7:35

name. So the term Cabinet actually

7:37

comes from the King's Cabinet Council.

7:39

Initially, the King had a privy

7:41

council that would provide... advice and

7:43

support and sort of help the

7:46

king manage the affairs of the

7:48

kingdom. But then that started to

7:50

get fairly large and anyone who

7:52

sat in with a big meeting

7:54

knows that the more voices you

7:56

have sometimes the harder it is

7:58

to make a decision. And so the

8:00

king started meeting with a small group

8:03

of advisors in a small chamber off

8:05

of the room where the Privy Council

8:07

met. And that little room was called

8:09

the king's cabinet. That was just what

8:11

they called it. And so this group

8:13

of sort of favorites became known

8:16

as the king's cabinet council. And

8:18

eventually the council part was dropped

8:20

and it was just the king's

8:22

cabinet. So that was sort of a

8:24

term that was already in the political

8:26

lexicon for a small group of advisors

8:28

that sort of met privately, maybe in

8:31

secret, and advised the executive, whether

8:33

it was a monarch or a

8:35

president. But the reason the colonists

8:37

were so distrusting of this group was

8:39

exactly that, that it was secret, it

8:41

was private. They didn't really know what

8:43

was going on behind closed doors. There

8:45

weren't really records of what

8:48

decision-making process took place. There

8:50

weren't really records of what

8:52

the King thought or what Lord North

8:54

thought, who was one of the more

8:56

hated British ministers. And so they didn't

8:58

know who to blame when a policy came

9:01

up, like the stamp tax or the sugar

9:03

tax, and they hated this policy, and

9:05

they didn't know who to blame for

9:07

that decision. And so that was really

9:09

why they were so distrusting of this

9:12

process. Furthermore, these ministers, while

9:14

they were technically elected through Parliament,

9:16

they gained this position of authority

9:19

because they were favorites of the

9:21

king. And so that sort of

9:23

cronyism or corruption, colonists

9:25

and then eventually Americans, were

9:28

really eager to try and prevent

9:30

that sort of system from taking

9:32

place. And so in a lot of

9:34

ways, the British cabinet was

9:36

almost an anti-orgen because Washington

9:39

and the other secretaries... were very

9:41

wary of being compared to

9:43

the British cabinet, they knew

9:45

that Americans were very distrusting

9:47

of this institution, and they didn't

9:49

want to appear to be operating in

9:51

the same way. And I would say

9:54

that the governor's councils also sort

9:56

of served as an anti-organ because

9:58

the governor's councils were... intended

10:00

to limit executive authority. Most of

10:02

the state constitutions that were passed

10:05

during the revolution created a very

10:07

weak executive or a very weak

10:09

governor and they created a council

10:12

that was in theory intended to

10:14

advise the governor but in practice

10:16

was appointed by the legislature. and

10:19

the governor was really obligated to

10:21

follow their advice. So it had

10:23

incredible limiting power on the governor's

10:26

ability to act. And so Washington

10:28

and the secretaries, many of whom,

10:30

like Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Randolph,

10:33

had served as governors of states

10:35

with these sort of councils, did

10:37

not want to recreate that sort

10:40

of system. I think what's really

10:42

interesting here is that There is

10:44

this big precedent of British Americans

10:47

and people in Great Britain thinking

10:49

that their executive really needs to

10:51

have some sort of advisory body

10:54

in order to perform as a

10:56

good executive, that the executive really

10:58

shouldn't be expected to make all

11:01

of the important decisions for their

11:03

people and nation by themselves. Yeah,

11:05

that's right. I mean... Even today

11:08

we know that issues that come

11:10

up that face the president, they're

11:12

really challenging and they're really complex

11:15

and that was certainly true with

11:17

Washington. He was essentially creating the

11:19

framework of a government from scratch.

11:22

I often encourage students and listeners

11:24

to actually look at the text

11:26

of Article II, which is the

11:29

section in the Constitution that pertains

11:31

to the president, and it is

11:33

remarkably short. which means that so

11:36

many details about how the president

11:38

is supposed to conduct himself or

11:40

hopefully herself in the future are

11:43

not actually written down. And so

11:45

Washington had to figure out all

11:47

these sort of fuzzy details himself

11:50

and he needed advice to do

11:52

so because he only knew his

11:54

experience and his perspective. But for

11:57

example, he had never been to

11:59

Europe. Barbados when he was

12:01

a teenager. And so he didn't really

12:03

know much about diplomacy or foreign policy.

12:06

And while he certainly understood

12:08

the financial plans that Secretary

12:10

of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton,

12:13

put forward, he didn't have that same

12:15

sort of really creative financial mind. And

12:18

so he knew that there were

12:20

limitations in his own training and

12:22

intellect. And so he sought

12:24

out people that could supplement that information

12:26

with their own expertise and

12:29

knowledge. And I think that's been true

12:31

of great leadership really across the history

12:33

of humanity is they know what they're

12:35

good at and what they're not, and they

12:37

recognize that they often need help. Earlier

12:40

you mentioned that the Constitution in

12:42

Article 2, Section 2, Section 2, lays

12:44

out some ideas for how and where

12:46

the president might seek advice. And one of

12:48

the bodies that the Constitution set up,

12:50

so that the president wouldn't have this

12:53

hated secretive cabinet, was the

12:55

Senate. And Washington seems to have

12:57

really experimented with seeking advice from

12:59

the Senate, you know, at least

13:01

for a time. So Lindsay, would you

13:03

tell us about Washington's

13:06

experiments with using the Senate as an

13:08

advisory body? So this is one

13:10

of my favorite stories from Washington's

13:12

presidency. You're absolutely right.

13:15

When Washington first entered office,

13:17

he really intended to follow the

13:19

guidelines that were written down in

13:21

the Constitution. And it's important to

13:23

remember that he had served as

13:26

the president of the Constitutional Convention.

13:28

He was good friends with many

13:30

of the delegates. He had socialized

13:32

with them daily after the end of

13:34

each session. So he had a very

13:36

clear understanding of what the expectations were

13:39

in terms of who he was supposed to

13:41

consult with as president. So in the summer

13:43

of 1789, Washington had only been in

13:45

office for a couple of months. And

13:47

he was planning to send delegates

13:50

to a peace convention between several

13:52

Native American nations and representatives from

13:54

North and South Carolina. And they were

13:57

going to try and figure out some sort

13:59

of solution to the... conflict and violence

14:01

on the border of the states and

14:03

the Native American nations. And Washington had

14:05

never done something like this before. He

14:08

had never organized a peace commission on

14:10

behalf of the new nation. He had

14:12

never written instructions to guide the commissioners

14:14

as they're trying to come towards a

14:17

peaceful solution. And so he planned to

14:19

meet with the Senate in August, and

14:21

he sent them all of the existing

14:24

treaties so that they would have all

14:26

of the information at hand. He let

14:28

them know he was coming. This was

14:30

not a surprise. And on the day

14:33

of the appointment, he arrived and he

14:35

brought Secretary of War Henry Knox, who

14:37

had been in charge of overseeing those

14:39

treaties, and who could provide any additional

14:42

information or answer any questions that the

14:44

senators might have. Washington arrived and he

14:46

brought this address with him that had

14:49

a series of questions at the end,

14:51

and he handed it to John Adams,

14:53

who was the vice president and therefore

14:55

the president of the Senate. And Adams

14:58

read this address. Now the windows were

15:00

open because it was summer and it

15:02

was really hot. And the room where

15:04

the Senate was meeting was on Wall

15:07

Street, which looked, of course, a little

15:09

different than it does today, but it

15:11

was still a very busy part of

15:13

town. And so there were horses going

15:16

by and carriages and people were hawking

15:18

their goods and having conversations. And so

15:20

it was incredibly loud and none of

15:23

the senators really heard Adams. So they

15:25

asked them to close the windows and

15:27

they asked Adams to repeat this address

15:29

and so he did. And then they

15:32

were met with silence. Some senators sort

15:34

of twiddled their thumbs, some shuffled papers,

15:36

some avoided eye contact, and Senator William

15:38

McClay of Pennsylvania hypothesized that maybe some

15:41

of the senators were intimidated by Washington

15:43

because he was one of the most

15:45

famous men in the world and certainly...

15:48

incredibly popular and so well-known and respected

15:50

that maybe some of the younger senators

15:52

didn't want to say anything. So he

15:54

stood up and he said, you know,

15:57

could we refer this issue to committee

15:59

to discuss? further and can you come

16:01

back next week? And Washington absolutely

16:03

lost it. He stood up and

16:06

he yelled, this defeats every purpose

16:08

of my coming here, except, you know,

16:10

louder and he is taller and

16:12

sort of scarier and it must

16:14

have been incredibly intimidating. And he

16:17

eventually calmed down and agreed to

16:19

come back the following week, but on

16:21

his way out of the chambers, he

16:23

reportedly said that he would never again

16:26

return for advice. Now we don't have a

16:28

whole lot of evidence about whether or

16:30

not he actually said that, but in

16:32

this case actions definitely speak louder than

16:34

words because he never again returned for

16:36

advice. And so there was this one moment

16:39

where the Senate had an opportunity to

16:41

prove itself as a really valuable advisory

16:43

body and they were coming at this

16:45

issue like a legislative body. They

16:47

wanted to discuss it privately in

16:49

committee and then make a recommendation.

16:51

And Washington was coming at it

16:53

from the perspective of he wanted them to

16:56

have the conversation in front of him so

16:58

he could hear the different perspectives.

17:00

He wanted them to debate answers to

17:02

the questions he had put before them.

17:04

And so it was really a case

17:06

of just mismatched expectations. You know, we've heard

17:09

a lot of stories about

17:11

Washington's famous self-control, except when it

17:13

came to his temper. And I think your story

17:15

about his frustration with the Senate...

17:17

Really, this is a pretty good

17:20

idea of Washington's personality and his

17:22

temper and what they may have been like.

17:24

Yeah, he really tried to not show

17:26

emotion on his face. He really tried

17:28

to be in control of his temper

17:30

at all times as sort of a

17:33

virtuous Republican gentleman would do. And most

17:35

the time he was successful, but apparently

17:37

when he did lose his temper, it

17:39

was quite a sight to behold. Now

17:42

it seems like another office that

17:44

Washington could have turned to for

17:46

advice wouldn't have been the office

17:48

of his vice president, John Adams.

17:50

So why don't we see Washington having

17:52

sought advice from Adams and using

17:54

Adams more of a sounding board

17:57

for his ideas about policy and

17:59

governance? This is one of the

18:01

great sort of perplexing questions of

18:04

Washington's presidency, and I suspect that

18:06

if Martha Washington hadn't burned her

18:08

correspondence with George, we might have

18:10

a little bit of a better

18:12

sense of why that didn't happen.

18:15

Early on in the presidency, Washington

18:17

did write letters to John Adams

18:19

and sort of asked for his

18:21

advice on issues of social etiquette,

18:23

how the president should entertain people,

18:26

what sort of invitations he could

18:28

accept himself. how he should be

18:30

seen out in public, that kind

18:32

of thing. But there's definitely a

18:35

break. There's not, they don't have

18:37

a fight. There's no evidence that

18:39

there was one sort of falling

18:41

out moment. It just seems like

18:43

they exchange less correspondence and Washington

18:46

never invites him to a cabinet

18:48

meeting. My hypothesis is that Adams

18:50

sort of burned his social capital

18:52

when there was the title controversy,

18:54

when the Congress was trying to

18:57

figure out. what to call the

18:59

president and Adams advocated a very

19:01

long and elaborate title and a

19:03

lot of people thought it was

19:05

sort of monarchical in nature and

19:08

so he sort of lost some

19:10

of his credibility and I think

19:12

Washington thought that perhaps in that

19:14

moment he showed poor judgment and

19:17

so perhaps didn't trust him as

19:19

much going forward. They also just

19:21

weren't necessarily as close as some

19:23

of the other people that Washington

19:25

corresponded with or were in his

19:28

social circle and so I don't

19:30

think there was a really close

19:32

personal relationship to sort of overcome

19:34

those challenges. It sounds like early

19:36

on, though Washington was really trying

19:39

to honor the Constitution and all

19:41

the advice it set forth for

19:43

where he could seek advice from.

19:45

We know he tried out the

19:47

Senate as an advisory body, which

19:50

didn't work out well. It seems

19:52

like he must have tried John

19:54

Adams, the vice president, as an

19:56

advisory body, but for whatever reason

19:58

we don't know, you know, that

20:01

relationship didn't work out. And now

20:03

I'm curious. Did Washington ever give

20:05

the House of Representatives a chance

20:07

to serve as the advisor? body

20:10

that he was looking for. When

20:12

I share this story sometimes people

20:14

don't believe me because it's so

20:16

outlandish to consider in today's world

20:18

but initially James Madison almost served

20:21

as sort of a pseudo prime

20:23

minister in Washington's administration and so

20:25

for example when Washington wrote his

20:27

first address after his inauguration to

20:29

Congress Madison was instrumental in drafting

20:32

that address. Madison then went and

20:34

wrote Congress's response to the inaugural

20:36

address. And then he helped Washington

20:38

write his response to Congress's response.

20:40

So he was essentially writing both

20:43

sides of the correspondence and having

20:45

a conversation with himself. And he

20:47

was also very instrumental in making

20:49

sure if Washington felt strongly about

20:52

a certain issue, Madison could sort

20:54

of advocate it without revealing what

20:56

Washington's thoughts were on that particular

20:58

issue. So it is possible that

21:00

that sort of prime minister type

21:03

relationship could have developed. Unfortunately, Madison

21:05

and Washington's relationship sort of started

21:07

to fracture and cool as Madison

21:09

opposed some of Hamilton's financial measures.

21:11

And so as they grew less

21:14

close and even at times sort

21:16

of had a hostile relationship, that

21:18

possibility for that type of advisory

21:20

body receded. Wow. I mean, Washington

21:22

really scoped out the different offices

21:25

of government searching for that advisory

21:27

body in 1789 and 1790. We've

21:29

talked about how he tried out

21:31

the Senate, how he tried out

21:34

the vice president and the House

21:36

of Representatives. So by the end

21:38

of his exploration, he only really

21:40

has one more government body left

21:42

to turn to for advice, and

21:45

that would be the Supreme Court.

21:47

Lindsay, did Washington ever seek advice

21:49

from the Supreme Court and try

21:51

that government body out? Yeah, so

21:53

John Jay was one of Washington's

21:56

closest advisors and they got along

21:58

very well. They had the utmost

22:00

respect for each other. And initially,

22:02

John Jay had been the Secretary

22:05

of Foreign Affairs under the Confederation

22:07

Congress. And there's some evidence to

22:10

suggest that Washington asked him to

22:12

stay on in that position, and he decided

22:14

that he would prefer to be the Chief

22:16

Justice of the Supreme Court. And

22:18

so he and Washington corresponded

22:21

quite regularly when Washington first took

22:23

office. Jay basically served as the

22:25

acting Secretary of State until Jefferson

22:27

came on. and took office in

22:30

early 1790, and he continued to

22:32

provide really important advice to

22:34

Washington, but also to the

22:36

other secretaries, even while he

22:38

was serving as Chief Justice.

22:40

In fact, Washington encouraged the

22:42

other secretaries to sometimes get

22:44

Jay's opinions on various issues. And

22:47

Jay seemed to have no problem playing

22:49

both of these roles. So in 1793,

22:51

when the neutrality crisis breaks out

22:54

because France has declared war on

22:56

Great Britain, Washington again wants

22:58

to get Jay's advice on how

23:00

the United States can remain neutral

23:02

in that particular issue. And so he

23:05

goes and he consults with Jay and

23:07

Jay seems more than happy to provide

23:09

that sort of support, but he says

23:11

that he should really confer with his

23:13

other co-justices and speak with them about

23:15

their opinions that the Supreme Court can

23:18

kind of speak with one voice. And

23:20

when they all get together, they write

23:22

back to Washington in the cabinet and

23:24

they basically say, No, we really can't

23:26

speak to these issues. That would

23:29

be inappropriate and would be a

23:31

problem in terms of separation of

23:33

powers. So to me, that sort

23:35

of suggests that Jay was more

23:37

than happy to play that role

23:40

individually, but couldn't get the institution

23:42

involved in official advice. And

23:44

so because the Supreme Court said

23:46

no, they never took up sort of

23:48

a role as an unofficial advisory

23:50

body. So Washington really made a

23:52

good faith effort to follow the letter of

23:55

the Constitution. We've heard how he sought

23:57

advice from the Senate, perhaps from the

23:59

Vice President. House of Representatives and the

24:01

Supreme Court, but in each of

24:03

his experiments, he failed to receive

24:06

reliable, timely advice. So in the

24:08

end, Washington convened what would become

24:10

known as the first cabinet meeting

24:12

on November 26, 1791, which was

24:14

really two and a half years

24:16

after he became president. Lindsay, would

24:19

you tell us about Washington's cabinet?

24:21

Liddy would really like to know

24:23

who served in the first cabinet

24:25

and... How Washington went about selecting

24:27

the different officers and advisors in

24:29

that cabinet? Washington's cabinet was primarily

24:32

made up of four men. There

24:34

was the Attorney General, the Secretary

24:36

of State, the Secretary of War,

24:38

and the Secretary of Treasury. The

24:40

Attorney General didn't have a department

24:42

like the Department of Justice today,

24:45

but Washington really treated that person

24:47

as an equal to the other

24:49

secretaries. And so I generally just

24:51

referred to them as the cabin

24:53

secretaries. because that's how Washington viewed

24:55

them. Washington was very careful about

24:58

how he selected his appointees, especially

25:00

with the cabinet. First, he needed

25:02

to have a close relationship with

25:04

all of them. He had to

25:06

know them and he had to

25:08

trust them, which makes sense, because

25:11

if you're asking advice of these

25:13

people in moments of crisis, he

25:15

wanted to trust that they will

25:17

lead you in the right direction.

25:19

He then wanted to make sure

25:21

that they had knowledge and expertise

25:24

that he did not. So for

25:26

example, Edmund Randolph, who was the

25:28

first attorney general, was a brilliant

25:30

legal mind. He had served as

25:32

the attorney general for the state

25:34

of Virginia. He had served in

25:37

the Virginia legislature. He had served

25:39

as the Virginia governor. He was

25:41

so well respected for his legal

25:43

insights that the other secretaries, even

25:45

if they had a legal education,

25:47

still consulted with him on the

25:50

constitutionality of certain measures. Secretary of

25:52

War Henry Knox had served as

25:54

the Secretary of War under the

25:56

Confederation Congress. He had been Washington's

25:58

meter general of our... he had

26:00

served as the commander of West

26:03

Point, and so he had essential

26:05

military experience, but also experienced Native

26:07

American nations that Washington

26:09

really valued. Secretary of the

26:11

Treasury Alexander Hamilton was, again, a

26:13

brilliant financial mind and sort of

26:15

really creative about ways that they

26:18

could salvage the economy and help

26:20

put the nation's credit on the

26:22

right foot. And Thomas Jefferson had served

26:24

as the minister to France for

26:26

several years. He understood diplomacy,

26:28

he had traveled all across

26:30

Europe, he could provide firsthand

26:33

insight as to what was happening

26:35

in these European courts and the

26:37

places that were potential allies or

26:39

enemies of the new nation. Critically,

26:41

he was also fluent in French,

26:43

which was the language of diplomacy

26:45

and something that Washington did not

26:47

have, so that was a really

26:50

essential trait for the Secretary of

26:52

State position. The final factor that

26:54

Washington considered was geographic and

26:57

factional balance. So of course,

26:59

all four of these guys are white

27:01

men. And so the concept of diversity

27:04

in the 1790s was somewhat limited, but

27:06

as much as they were aware of

27:08

the concept of diversity, Washington tried

27:10

to honor that. So he made

27:12

sure that they were people

27:14

represented from different parts of

27:17

the country. He made sure that there

27:19

were people that spoke for

27:21

different interests. So Thomas Jefferson

27:23

was a plantation owning slave

27:25

owner. Whereas Alexander Hamilton sort of

27:27

cozied up with the merchant elite

27:29

in New York, and so they

27:32

represented different economic interests,

27:34

different religious interests, different parts

27:36

of the country in a way

27:38

that allowed the nation to sort

27:40

of see themselves in the administration.

27:42

It's important to remember in

27:45

1789 when Washington is making these

27:47

appointments, that nationalism really wasn't

27:49

a thing. The flag didn't have the

27:51

same sort of symbolic importance that we

27:53

think of it today. And so Washington

27:56

was the closest touchstone that people

27:58

had for a national symbol. and

28:00

he worked really hard to try

28:02

and get the different states to

28:04

build emotional bonds with each other,

28:06

to feel as though they are

28:08

tied to the nation, to feel

28:10

as though they are a part

28:13

of one country as opposed to

28:15

13. And so one way that

28:17

he did that was by making

28:19

sure that there were appointments from

28:21

different states and different interests, whether

28:23

it be the cabinet or the

28:25

Supreme Court or other positions, to

28:27

help states feel that they had

28:29

a state in how the country

28:32

went. So it sounds like Washington

28:34

really put some thought into how

28:36

he can make his cabinet represent

28:38

the different geographies and cultural views

28:40

of the nation. Yes, absolutely. And

28:42

that is a precedent that he

28:44

said that most presidents have really

28:46

tried to follow. And of course,

28:49

our definition of what diversity means

28:51

and who should be included in

28:53

those considerations has expanded to include

28:55

women and people of color and

28:57

different sexual orientations and religions. But

28:59

that concept that the nation should

29:01

be represented is a very important

29:03

precedent that Washington left in his

29:05

cabinet. Okay, but here's where I

29:08

get a little stuck with Washington's

29:10

early American ideas about American diversity.

29:12

Of the four men that Washington

29:14

appointed to his cabinet, you have

29:16

Edmund Randolph and Thomas Jefferson from

29:18

Virginia, Alexander Hamilton from New York,

29:20

and Henry Knox from Maine and

29:22

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:25

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:27

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:29

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:31

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:33

Maine and Maine and Maine and

29:35

Maine and Massachusetts and Maine and

29:37

Maine and Maine and Massachusetts from

29:39

Maine and Massachusetts and Massachusetts and

29:41

Massachusetts and Massachusetts and Massachusetts and

29:44

Did Washington ever think about reducing

29:46

the number of Virginians in his

29:48

cabinet to appoint someone from the

29:50

Deep South, which in this case

29:52

was not only the underrepresented region,

29:54

but the non-represented region in his

29:56

cabinet? It's a great question. I

29:58

don't know if he really thought

30:01

about including someone from the Deep

30:03

South for the cabinet. There's some

30:05

speculation that maybe he... sought out

30:07

Charles Coatesworth Pinckney, who was from

30:09

South Carolina. maybe to serve as

30:11

the Secretary of War or the

30:13

Secretary of State. I think in

30:15

that case, the personal relationships tended

30:17

to serve as a more important

30:20

factor for that decision-making. That being

30:22

said, he did have James Irodell

30:24

of North Carolina on the Supreme

30:26

Court, and so he made sure

30:28

that the Deep South was sort

30:30

of represented in other ways through

30:32

other appointments. And later on, once

30:34

people started to retire, he did

30:37

try and get Pinkney back into

30:39

the cabinet. He offered him the

30:41

position of Secretary of State, and

30:43

he actually turned him down. Now,

30:45

if we count Washington, three of

30:47

the five members of Washington's cabinet

30:49

were from Virginia, and I wonder,

30:51

was there any impact or specific

30:53

contributions that these Virginians had on

30:56

the institution of the cabinet? In

30:58

other words, Lindsay. Is there something

31:00

distinctly Virginia about the cabinet? It's

31:02

a great question. I don't know

31:04

that there is anything distinctly Virginia

31:06

because all three played such different

31:08

roles in the cabinet. What I

31:10

find particularly fascinating is the different

31:13

perspective that Jefferson and Hamilton brought

31:15

to the cabinet and Washington's role

31:17

in making them come together. So

31:19

Washington did not mind conflict. He

31:21

actually found... pretty contentious debate to

31:23

be a very helpful tool because

31:25

it allowed him to see both

31:27

sides of an issue. It allowed

31:30

him to almost stress test those

31:32

different positions and see what the

31:34

weaknesses and the strengths of each

31:36

side were. And so he would

31:38

sit back and sort of let

31:40

them go at it and fight

31:42

with each other. And Jefferson, of

31:44

course, really hated this type of

31:46

conflict and he presented himself in

31:49

one form. of masculinity that was

31:51

informed by his time as diplomat

31:53

where if you are coming to

31:55

an argument or if you're coming

31:57

to blows or if you're really

31:59

yelling. at each other than diplomacy

32:01

has broken down. Whereas Hamilton had,

32:03

you know, really made the name for

32:06

himself on the battlefield and he had

32:08

served in Washington's headquarters and had

32:10

been there when there were councils

32:12

of war that were also incredibly

32:14

contentious sometimes and headquarters

32:17

or meeting in Washington's

32:19

campaign tent was dirty and smelly

32:21

and there were bugs and it was

32:23

the scene of battle and so he

32:25

was used to a much more sort

32:28

of militarized version of masculinity. So. I do think

32:30

there are these two perspectives, these

32:32

two ways to be virtuous Republicans,

32:34

and then Edmund Randolph is kind

32:36

of trying to find the middle

32:39

ground. He really saw himself as

32:41

an unbiased observer and tried to

32:43

go with each side depending on how he

32:45

felt about a particular issue. I know

32:47

we want to talk about the

32:49

Hamilton Jefferson Cabinet feud, but

32:51

before we get there, I'd like for us

32:53

to talk about the cabinet and how it

32:55

worked. Eugene would like to know

32:57

what role Washington saw his cabinet and

33:00

its members as playing in his administration

33:03

and how Washington ran his cabinet

33:05

meetings. The cabinet was really

33:07

intended to provide advice and support

33:09

when there were really big issues.

33:12

So Washington, even when the cabinet

33:14

was meeting regularly, Washington primarily

33:16

dealt with department issues and

33:19

department business one-on-one with the

33:21

secretaries. And so in that capacity,

33:23

whether they were exchanging letters or

33:25

they were meeting one-on-one, they were really

33:27

bureaucrats that were reporting on their

33:30

department to their superior. When they

33:32

came together in the cabinet, it was

33:34

because there was an issue that was so

33:36

big that Washington could not afford to just

33:38

have one voice, or it was so big

33:41

that it dealt with matters of the war

33:43

department and the State Department

33:45

and the Treasury Department, and

33:47

so he couldn't exclude certain

33:49

people from the conversation. And

33:51

so in that instance, Washington would

33:53

convene a cabinet meeting, he would

33:55

usually send out a letter ahead of

33:58

time with maybe some questions or... topic

34:00

they were going to consider so

34:02

that they could prepare and have

34:04

their information ready. Once the secretaries

34:07

gathered in his private study in

34:09

the president's house, they would usually

34:11

use those questions as the agenda

34:13

to sort of guide the conversation.

34:15

And Washington would allow the secretaries

34:18

to make a case for their

34:20

position. Washington very rarely came to

34:22

a cabinet meeting with a decision

34:24

about what the administration should do

34:27

ahead of time. He really reserved

34:29

cabinet meetings for issues when he

34:31

didn't know what to do and

34:33

so he wanted this advice. Then

34:36

if the secretaries disagreed, which frankly

34:38

was more often than not, he

34:40

would ask for written advice so

34:42

that he could make sure he

34:44

fully understood each side, make sure

34:47

he fully understood what the secretaries

34:49

were saying, would allow him to

34:51

make a decision sort of in

34:53

his own time more slowly. And

34:56

it also provided sort of written

34:58

evidence of who had supported what.

35:00

And so that's really how he

35:02

managed each cabinet meeting and the

35:05

very fiery personalities that often came

35:07

with it. So Lindsay and I

35:09

have had conversations over the years

35:11

at conferences and just in the

35:13

course of being early American historians

35:16

together about the spaces in which

35:18

Washington held his cabinet meetings. And

35:20

I've really found her point about

35:22

the physical space of cabinet meetings

35:25

to be. Really fascinating. So Lindsay,

35:27

would you tell us about the

35:29

physical space in which Washington convened

35:31

his cabinet meetings and what it

35:34

was like for these five fiery

35:36

personalities to be in the same

35:38

room with each other? Absolutely. The

35:40

physical space was so important because

35:42

it was a relatively small room

35:45

when the secretaries were gathering. They

35:47

met at Washington's house, which was

35:49

on the corner of sixth in

35:51

market or six in high streets

35:54

in Philadelphia. The site is still

35:56

there today. There's a National Park

35:58

Service site. You can see where

36:00

the home was. The room was

36:03

not particularly large. it was only

36:05

about 15 by 21 feet. And

36:07

by 21st century standards, it was

36:09

absolutely stuffed with furniture. So Washington

36:11

had a large French desk that

36:14

was over five feet long. He

36:16

had his uncommon chair, which swibbled.

36:18

He had a large globe. He

36:20

had three bookcases. He had his

36:23

dressing table. There was an iron

36:25

stove in the corner. And then

36:27

they probably brought in a small

36:29

table and chairs when there was

36:32

a meeting planned. So it would

36:34

have been a very tight fit.

36:36

It was definitely a personal space.

36:38

It was where Washington addressed in

36:40

the morning. It was where his

36:43

enslaved ballet helped him shave and

36:45

do his hair. And it was

36:47

also where he did all his

36:49

correspondence and his work. When the

36:52

secretaries gathered, they probably would have

36:54

sat around the table, although Hamilton

36:56

was known for sort of pacing

36:58

and gesticulating wildly when he got

37:01

onto a particular subject. But it's

37:03

important to remember that these five

37:05

men were not particularly small individuals.

37:07

Washington was very tall for his

37:09

time. Knox was a little bit

37:12

shorter, but he was sort of

37:14

notoriously rotund, and this space, they

37:16

would meet for hours and hours,

37:18

sometimes up to five times per

37:21

week. Most of the meetings took

37:23

place in the summer. without air

37:25

conditioning in Philadelphia, and we know

37:27

for example that the summer of

37:30

1793 was incredibly hot and humid

37:32

because there was a really bad

37:34

yellow fever outbreak that fall. So

37:36

imagine being stuffed in a room

37:38

without air conditioning for several hours

37:41

with people you hate, and Hamilton

37:43

and Jefferson at this point hated

37:45

each other. And so it must

37:47

have just been an incredibly uncomfortable

37:50

experience and very tense. Washington sort

37:52

of tried to smooth over the

37:54

hurt feelings by inviting the secretaries

37:56

to have a family dinner with

37:59

him after a meeting or if

38:01

a meeting was taking so long

38:03

that they needed a break they

38:05

would sometimes have dinner in the

38:07

middle. But I think that this

38:10

space is crucial to understanding the

38:12

animosity in the cabinet and to

38:14

understanding Hamilton and Jefferson's other political

38:16

activities, because I think their insistence

38:19

that the other side was trying

38:21

to destroy the country and their

38:23

efforts to sort of build up

38:25

the early beginnings of political parties.

38:28

can sort of be directly attributed

38:30

to the fact that they simply

38:32

could not get away from each

38:34

other and were stuck in this

38:36

room almost like a hot house

38:39

of political tensions. This is really

38:41

quite the scene, isn't it? You

38:43

know, to have these five grown

38:45

men, one Washington being particularly tall

38:48

and large, one Knox being particularly,

38:50

you know, rotund as you put

38:52

it, all hanging out in this

38:54

small, cramped furniture-filled space that was

38:56

also really hot and humid. Plus,

38:59

it really sounds like Hamilton and

39:01

Jefferson added lots of tensions given

39:03

their political animosity and perhaps personal

39:05

animosity towards each other. And this

39:08

topic of animosity between Hamilton and

39:10

Jefferson is something that Jeremy would

39:12

like to know more about. So,

39:14

could you tell us more about

39:17

Hamilton and Jefferson's relationship and what

39:19

and why they started adding tension

39:21

to important cabinet meetings? Absolutely. So

39:23

initially, they were never friends, but

39:25

I think they initially certainly respected

39:28

each other and respected the other

39:30

person's service and commitment to the

39:32

nation. The problem really was, as

39:34

I previously said, they had completely

39:37

different ways of presenting themselves and

39:39

the way that they sort of

39:41

embodied masculinity and virtuous Republican behavior.

39:43

They also had completely different visions

39:46

for what the nation should be.

39:48

Jefferson really thought that the future

39:50

of the country was a nation

39:52

of yeoman farmers that could have

39:54

independence by taking care of themselves

39:57

and their family on family farms.

39:59

Whereas Hamilton really advocated for a

40:01

future that was more based in

40:03

cities with merchants and trade and

40:06

a strong military. So they were

40:08

already sort of set up to

40:10

be diametrically opposed. And then I

40:12

think to a certain extent their

40:15

personalities just probably annoyed each other.

40:17

And sometimes that just happens where

40:19

personalities clash. And when they're stuck

40:21

in this space, we can see

40:23

in their various notations, their frustration

40:26

with each other. And at one

40:28

point, Jefferson writes that Hamilton gave

40:30

a jury speech for three quarters

40:32

of an hour in a cabinet

40:35

meeting, which means that in this

40:37

tiny space. Hamilton spoke for 45

40:39

minutes uninterrupted and based on the

40:41

other sort of descriptions we have

40:44

of him, he was probably pacing,

40:46

he was probably waving his arms

40:48

wildly, and he was probably really

40:50

invading the other secretary's personal space

40:52

or their sense of personal space.

40:55

And so you can kind of

40:57

just see Jefferson's head starting to

40:59

explode in this meeting, and then

41:01

they come back the next day

41:04

for another meeting. And Hamilton does

41:06

it again. He speaks for another

41:08

45 minutes. And so I believe

41:10

that their clash was sort of

41:13

inevitable because of their wildly different

41:15

perspectives on the world and what

41:17

the country should be, but because

41:19

they were confined so often together

41:21

that exacerbated the issue. And so

41:24

their tension start in 1791. when

41:26

Hamilton is introducing this financial legislation,

41:28

which Jefferson opposes, and then it

41:30

just really gets worse from there,

41:33

and especially in 1793, where the

41:35

United States is sort of stuck

41:37

between France and Great Britain as

41:39

there's an international war. They both

41:42

agree that neutrality is essential, but

41:44

Jefferson sort of prefers a pro-French

41:46

neutrality, and they just are doomed

41:48

to be enemies. Understanding this context

41:50

really changes how I'm viewing Hamilton

41:53

and Jefferson because we can now

41:55

see that these cabinet meetings are

41:57

in small rooms that Jefferson and

41:59

Hamilton's towards one another really fills

42:02

that small room with tension. And

42:04

then there would be these really big

42:06

moments, these big moments that

42:08

Washington designed the cabinet to

42:10

help them deal with, like the

42:13

neutrality crisis of 1793, which just added

42:15

its own level of tension on

42:17

top of everything else going on.

42:19

Now, speaking of the neutrality crisis,

42:21

would you tell us more about this

42:24

crisis and how Washington looked to

42:26

his tension-filled cabinet to steer

42:28

the young nation through that

42:30

moment? Absolutely. So in

42:32

February of 1793, France declared war

42:35

on Great Britain, and it very

42:37

quickly escalated to an

42:39

international conflict that included

42:41

their allies and their

42:43

colonial holdings. And Washington

42:45

learned about the conflict in early

42:47

April and quickly announced he

42:50

was at Mount Vernon at the

42:52

time, announced to the secretaries that

42:54

he'd be coming back to Philadelphia

42:56

earlier than he had planned. and

42:58

that they would have a meeting to try

43:00

and figure out what to do. And as

43:02

I said, both Jefferson and Hamilton

43:04

and Knox and Randolph as well

43:06

agreed that neutrality was essential. The

43:09

country was just beginning to recover

43:11

from the Revolutionary War, both physically

43:13

in terms of the land and

43:15

the bodies, economically in terms of

43:17

the market and credit, and

43:19

then also emotionally. Not to mention,

43:22

the country didn't really have an

43:24

army or a navy, so even

43:26

if it had wanted to get

43:28

involved, there wasn't really any way

43:30

for it to do so. But what

43:32

neutrality meant and how the country

43:34

would implement it and whether or

43:37

not it would be respected by

43:39

foreign nations was a brand new

43:41

challenge because the country had never

43:43

done so. And while those questions

43:46

in theory might seem kind

43:48

of simple, they actually bring

43:50

up a ton of legal

43:52

questions. So for example, if

43:54

you declare neutrality, who's going

43:56

to enforce it? If citizens decide

43:58

to, you know, go off to

44:00

war with one country or the

44:03

other, who is in charge of

44:05

making sure they're brought back? Who

44:07

is in charge of trying them

44:09

for breaking the law? What court

44:11

is that decision going to be

44:14

made in? What is the punishment?

44:16

Who is going to impose it?

44:18

Those are just the domestic questions.

44:20

Then if you get to the

44:22

international ones, it gets even more

44:24

complicated, especially when we think about

44:27

the role of privateers. And privateers

44:29

were basically private ships that were

44:31

given a letter of mark or

44:33

kind of like almost a license

44:35

from a foreign country to fight

44:38

on its behalf and to attack

44:40

that country's enemies. And France and

44:42

Great Britain were using privateers left

44:44

and right in this war. And

44:46

they would often come into US

44:48

ports, either to sell the goods

44:51

that they had stolen from other

44:53

ships or to... buy more food

44:55

and supplies for their journey or

44:57

to make repairs? So does U.S.

44:59

neutrality prohibit those ships from coming

45:02

into port? Or are they allowed

45:04

to come into port, but not

45:06

buy certain things? So these were

45:08

all questions that the cabinet was

45:10

really struggling with and trying to

45:12

figure out how they were going

45:15

to carve out a path for

45:17

the new nation. And it was

45:19

complicated by the arrival of the

45:21

new French minister, kind of disregarded

45:23

all of Washington's rules that he

45:26

had proclaimed about neutrality, and was

45:28

basically arming French privateers in the

45:30

Porton of Philadelphia, which at the

45:32

time was only about six blocks

45:34

from Washington's house. So he was

45:36

literally thumbing his nose at the

45:39

Washington administration. Washington relied on the

45:41

cabinet to basically discuss and provide

45:43

advice for every single one of

45:45

these issues, which is why we

45:47

see a huge spike in cabinet

45:50

meetings in 1793. Prior to that

45:52

year, Washington had convened a couple

45:54

of meetings in 1791, about six.

45:56

in 1792, and then somewhere between

45:58

49 and 51 meetings in 1793.

46:00

The evidence is a little murky

46:03

on a couple about whether or

46:05

not they actually met. So the

46:07

huge spike in meetings was to

46:09

try and deal with these issues

46:11

and the new information that was

46:14

constantly coming in and sort of

46:16

the new provocations that were being

46:18

demonstrated by Jeanet and other American

46:20

citizens as well. And the cabinet

46:22

basically guided the Washington administration through

46:24

this year and ensured that one,

46:27

the president would play a very

46:29

active role in carving out diplomatic

46:31

policy for the nation. In August,

46:33

the cabinet advised Washington to request

46:35

the recall of Jeanette from France,

46:38

which was a huge moment because

46:40

the United States had never requested

46:42

the recall of a foreign minister

46:44

and it wasn't really clear France

46:46

was going to agree. But when

46:48

France did in fact agree, it's

46:51

sort of... tacitly acknowledged that the

46:53

United States had the right to

46:55

set its own foreign policy and

46:57

then the right to demand that

46:59

it be respected by foreign ministers.

47:02

In August, the cabinet also wrote

47:04

down a list of rules of

47:06

neutrality that would sort of guide

47:08

their actions for the rest of

47:10

the year, and then Congress codified

47:12

them into law the following June,

47:15

and that law actually guided periods

47:17

of neutrality up to the civil

47:19

war. So it was a very

47:21

important year for both Washington and

47:23

the cabinet and the country. And

47:26

then, you know, right on the

47:28

heels of this neutrality crisis, which

47:30

presented, as you mentioned, a lot

47:32

of foreign policy questions, the United

47:34

States experiences a crisis of domestic

47:36

policy in the whiskey rebellion. So

47:39

Lindsay, would you tell us more

47:41

about the whiskey rebellion and how

47:43

it added to the work and

47:45

tensions of Washington's cabinet? Absolutely. If

47:47

the neutrality crisis was essential in

47:50

helping the cabinet in Washington carve

47:52

out authority over diplomatic issues, the

47:54

whiskey rebellion... was essential in helping

47:56

the cabinet in Washington carve authority

47:58

over domestic issues. So the whiskey

48:00

tax had been passed several years

48:03

earlier and there was a number

48:05

of incidents of resistance and protest

48:07

but none of them had been

48:09

particularly violent. Kentucky just ignored the

48:11

law altogether and simply refused to

48:14

honor it, refused to bring cases

48:16

against people who didn't comply, and

48:18

Hamilton and Washington kind of decided

48:20

to ignore that. Pennsylvania was a

48:22

little bit different, one because of

48:24

its historic importance as sort of

48:27

the seat of government and because

48:29

of its very important role as

48:31

a size and the wealth of

48:33

the state. And in July of

48:35

1794, there was an outbreak of

48:38

violence in western Pennsylvania and the

48:40

protesters burned down the home of

48:42

a tax collector. Washington and the

48:44

cabinet learned about this incident and

48:46

had to decide what they were

48:48

going to do. And I think

48:51

it's really interesting to recognize and

48:53

to notice that at this point

48:55

Jefferson had already retired. So Edmund

48:57

Randolph is the new Secretary of

48:59

State and Washington has appointed a

49:02

new Attorney General, William Bradford, who

49:04

happened to be from Pennsylvania. When

49:06

the cabinet met to figure out

49:08

how they were going to handle

49:10

this situation, there were a couple

49:12

of options that they could consider.

49:15

One, they could wait for Congress

49:17

to come back in the fall

49:19

and figure out, you know, how

49:21

to handle this insurrection because it

49:23

was a domestic issue. Washington could

49:26

convene an emergency session of Congress

49:28

and ask them to come back

49:30

sooner. Washington could basically leave the

49:32

issue to the states and say,

49:34

you know, it's a Pennsylvania issue,

49:36

the Pennsylvania government should deal with

49:39

it, or Washington could use a

49:41

law that had been passed the

49:43

previous year. that allowed the president

49:45

to call up the state militias

49:47

in the event of a insurrection

49:50

or an invasion by a foreign

49:52

country. And what was really important

49:54

about this law is that the

49:56

president would have to submit. evidence

49:58

that this sort of action was

50:00

necessary to a justice of the

50:03

Supreme Court and get their approval.

50:05

So Washington and the secretaries decided

50:07

to use this last option, this

50:09

law, and they did so in

50:11

one meeting, which means in one

50:14

meeting they decided to completely sideline

50:16

Congress and to ignore the Pennsylvania

50:18

state government. They then met with

50:20

the Pennsylvania state government and said

50:22

that they were planning on doing

50:24

this. And some of the Pennsylvania

50:27

officials, including Thomas Mifflin, who was

50:29

the governor, was absolutely outraged because

50:31

they felt like they hadn't really

50:33

been given the opportunity to put

50:35

down the insurrection. So over the

50:38

course of the next couple of

50:40

months, the cabinet essentially bullies the

50:42

Pennsylvania officials into complying. And this

50:44

process sort of happened slowly because...

50:46

Washington and the secretaries were very

50:48

attentive to public opinion, and so

50:51

they sent out a peace commission

50:53

to Western Pennsylvania to meet with

50:55

the rebels to try and come

50:57

up with a peaceful solution to

50:59

demonstrate that all peaceful options had

51:02

been considered and utilized first. And

51:04

while that was taking place, they

51:06

started to organize the state militias,

51:08

and there is a series of

51:10

letters between Hamilton Randolph and Mifflin

51:12

that are simply extraordinary because Mifflin

51:15

sends these letters to Washington complaining

51:17

about the administration, complaining about their

51:19

behavior. Hamilton writes the replies, but

51:21

then Randolph edits them and sends

51:23

them under his name. And I

51:26

don't know if that's because Randolph

51:28

was more Republican leaning and so

51:30

maybe they would be a little

51:32

bit more palatable or because Mifflin

51:34

and Hamilton didn't have a good

51:36

relationship. But it's a very interesting

51:39

example of the cabinet working together

51:41

to enforce Washington's policy. It really

51:43

seemed like the neutrality crisis followed

51:45

by the whiskey rebellion brought an

51:47

end to Washington's first cabinet, which,

51:50

you know, has gone down in

51:52

history as one of the most

51:54

famous cabinets in United States history.

51:56

Would you tell us about the

51:58

retirements of... Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton,

52:00

and Henry Knox, and why those

52:03

men chose to retire during and

52:05

after these crises? Yeah, the turnover

52:07

in Washington's administration definitely changes the

52:09

character of the cabinet going forward.

52:11

Jefferson had initially wanted to retire

52:14

in early 1792. I think that

52:16

he felt like he wasn't being

52:18

heard. He felt like he had

52:20

lost Washington's ear, that Hamilton had

52:22

gained more influence. and he really

52:24

hated the conflict that he was

52:27

seen within the administration. Washington convinced

52:29

him to stay until early 1793,

52:31

and then once the neutrality crisis

52:33

broke out, he agreed to stay

52:35

through the following year just to

52:38

make sure that they could sort

52:40

of wrap things up. So he

52:42

stayed almost two years longer than

52:44

he intended and retired on December

52:46

31st, 1793. At the end of

52:48

1794, Henry Knox, the Secretary of

52:51

War, retired because he was in

52:53

really bad financial situation. The pay

52:55

for secretaries at the time was

52:57

fairly low, and his estate in

52:59

Maine was really struggling, and he

53:02

really felt that he needed to

53:04

go home, and he needed to

53:06

focus all of his attention on

53:08

his business and his estate. I

53:10

also think it's important to note

53:12

that Knox had gone from a

53:15

major general in the Continental Army.

53:17

to commanding West Point to serving

53:19

as the Secretary of War under

53:21

the Confederation Congress to serving as

53:23

Washington Secretary of War. And so

53:26

for basically 20 years, he was

53:28

not home. And so I do

53:30

think that's an important measure to

53:32

point out as well. So he

53:34

retired at the end of 1794

53:36

and then Hamilton followed in January

53:39

of 1795 for many of the

53:41

same reasons. Hamilton desperately needed money.

53:43

and he wasn't really making good

53:45

money as a secretary of treasury

53:47

and he knew that in private

53:50

practice he could make significantly larger

53:52

sums and which he did and

53:54

so he returned to New York

53:56

City to serve as a lawyer

53:58

but he did continue to provide

54:00

very important guidance and advice to

54:03

Washington through letters. So right away

54:05

within basically a year's time three of

54:07

the four original secretaries are gone

54:09

and Edmund Randolph stays here's

54:12

the Secretary of State and

54:14

he is at this point

54:16

absolutely Washington's closest advisor. He

54:18

and Washington had known each other

54:20

for decades. He had actually served

54:23

as Washington's private attorney during the

54:25

entire time Washington was commander in

54:27

chief of the Continental Army and

54:30

then as president as well. And

54:32

so he was an essential part of

54:34

Washington's administration. And Washington

54:36

really struggled to find people to

54:38

fill office. It wasn't considered a

54:41

particularly glamorous position. As I said,

54:43

the pay was relatively low. You were

54:45

probably living away from your family

54:47

or at least you were living

54:49

away from home and traveling back

54:51

and forth was very difficult because

54:53

conditions of the roads just weren't that

54:55

great. It was very hard work. You

54:58

were probably going to be criticized by

55:00

at least someone. So he had approached

55:02

at least six people for the

55:04

Secretary of State position after Edmund

55:06

Randolph left and really couldn't find

55:09

anyone. And so I think that

55:11

it's essential to sort of know that

55:13

the people he did end up putting

55:15

in the positions. Timothy Pickering was his

55:17

secretary of war and then became his

55:20

third secretary of state. Oliver Wolcott

55:22

Jr. was the secretary of the

55:24

treasury. He went through a series

55:26

of attorney generals and James McHenry

55:28

was his new secretary of war. They

55:30

were really the B team. And he did

55:33

not see them as equals to

55:35

the original people he had put

55:37

into office. And so the number

55:39

of cabinet meetings declined by

55:41

a huge margin. And he

55:43

goes back to one-on-one consultations.

55:46

He goes back to written

55:48

advice. He goes back to

55:50

asking for input from people

55:52

outside of the administration. And

55:54

because the cabinet changed in this

55:56

way, it really ensured that

55:59

the cabinet... didn't have a

56:01

right to be a part of

56:03

the decision-making process. There was no

56:05

legal mechanism that ensured that the

56:07

president had to consult with the

56:09

cabinet. It was only if he

56:11

felt like it. And that was

56:13

a crucial part of Washington's cabinet

56:16

legacy. It's really been striking to

56:18

hear just how much of this

56:20

cabinet operated on personal relationships. And

56:22

you didn't mention that earlier. You

56:24

mentioned that Washington wanted men in

56:26

his cabinets, who he had personal

56:28

relationships with. As you were saying,

56:30

a lot of what happened with

56:33

the first cabinet seemed like these

56:35

personal relationships just kind of broke

56:37

down. You know, as you mentioned,

56:39

Jefferson didn't feel heard, he didn't

56:41

feel like his personal relationship with

56:43

Washington was working out, so he

56:45

retired. And then of course, you

56:48

have Henry Knox and Alexander Hamilton

56:50

where the personal relationship was working,

56:52

but it sounds like they really

56:54

stuck around and did their jobs

56:56

out of personal loyalty to Washington

56:58

and that... to do so it

57:00

costs them a lot personally like

57:02

both of them had finances that

57:05

they were really struggling with. So

57:07

you had three of the four

57:09

members of Washington's cabinet retire for

57:11

those various reasons and then when

57:13

he had to replace those three

57:15

cabinet secretaries and add new bodies

57:17

into his cabinet Washington really just

57:20

doesn't seem to have gotten along

57:22

with his new advisors like they

57:24

didn't have those personal relationships and

57:26

so his cabinet turned into something

57:28

that was dysfunctional or just didn't

57:30

serve him well. Yeah, absolutely. I

57:32

do think that Hamilton and Knox

57:34

and Randolph as well served out

57:37

of a deep sense of duty

57:39

and honor to the nation, but

57:41

especially to Washington. They valued that

57:43

relationship above all. And at one

57:45

point in 1794, Knox asked for

57:47

permission to go back to his

57:49

estate because it is literally teetering

57:52

on the brink of bankruptcy. And

57:54

it's right as the whiskey rebellion

57:56

is breaking out. And he says

57:58

to Washington, like, if you need

58:00

me here, I will stay. I'm

58:02

paraphrasing. But he says, if you

58:04

need me here, I will stay.

58:06

So he will stay and risk

58:09

losing everything if Washington wants him

58:11

to. And Washington does give him

58:13

permission, but I think that that

58:15

moment is extraordinary and shows the

58:17

depths of their loyalty. Is this

58:19

dynamic still at play today? Do

58:21

presidents rely on personal relationships to

58:24

make their cabinets work and to

58:26

get the advice that they hope

58:28

to get? This is one of

58:30

the extraordinary things about Washington's legacy

58:32

that I think is often underappreciated.

58:34

which is that each president gets

58:36

to decide who their closest advisors

58:38

are going to be. And sometimes

58:41

they're in the cabinet. Sometimes presidents

58:43

do have really close relationships with

58:45

cabinet secretaries. But sometimes they're not.

58:47

Sometimes they prefer the advice of

58:49

the vice president. So for example,

58:51

Obama and Biden were incredibly close.

58:53

Sometimes they prefer the advice of

58:56

businessmen or people of industry and

58:58

sort of consult with them separately.

59:00

Sometimes they prefer family members. So

59:02

Kennedy, of course, his brother was

59:04

his attorney general and was one

59:06

of his closest advisors. And that

59:08

flexibility and each president's ability to

59:10

decide for themselves who they're going

59:13

to listen to is a direct

59:15

byproduct of Washington's decision to create

59:17

the cabinet in this way. Of

59:19

course, there will be secretaries in

59:21

the department and the cabinet meetings

59:23

will take place. but the president

59:25

really doesn't have to listen to

59:28

anything they say and doesn't have

59:30

to convene them regularly if he

59:32

doesn't want to. You've mentioned a

59:34

couple different legacies of Washington's first

59:36

cabinet, but I wonder, what do

59:38

you think the greatest or biggest

59:40

legacies of Washington's first cabinet are,

59:42

and which of those legacies do

59:45

we still carry forth into the

59:47

present? I think the biggest legacy

59:49

is that the cabinet provides incredible

59:51

potential for good or for potential

59:53

disaster. And it really depends on

59:55

each president to determine how those

59:57

relationships are going to work. cabinet

1:00:00

is effective and successful if a

1:00:02

president is able to manage their

1:00:04

personalities and get people to work

1:00:06

together towards a common goal, then

1:00:08

they almost fade into the background

1:00:10

and we don't really pay attention

1:00:12

to them. But they are such

1:00:14

important tools for public outreach, for

1:00:17

coalition building, for working with Congress,

1:00:19

for working with different aspects of

1:00:21

the nation. But it can also

1:00:23

be an almost impossible task because

1:00:25

these people are probably very experienced.

1:00:27

They're probably pretty opinionated. Sometimes they

1:00:29

bring their own egos and ambitions.

1:00:32

And so managing all of these

1:00:34

different personalities is nearly impossible. And

1:00:36

we have seen several administrations throughout

1:00:38

American history when the cabinet is

1:00:40

not managed by the president and

1:00:42

they kind of take over or

1:00:44

they can become very divisive or

1:00:46

they can undermine the administration. Then

1:00:49

we start to really focus on

1:00:51

the scandal or the disruption or

1:00:53

the conflict within the administration. And

1:00:55

so I think that potential for

1:00:57

good and for evil is one

1:00:59

of the most important things that

1:01:01

we are left with. I also

1:01:04

think the other part of that

1:01:06

is that as we discussed in

1:01:08

the very beginning of our conversation,

1:01:10

the Senate was really supposed to

1:01:12

be the advisory body on foreign

1:01:14

policy, and it's not anymore. There

1:01:16

isn't really that much oversight between

1:01:18

the president and their advisors, depending

1:01:21

on who they are, whether it's

1:01:23

cabinet or family or friends or

1:01:25

other acquaintances. There isn't really congressional

1:01:27

oversight. There isn't really public oversight.

1:01:29

And that is something that I

1:01:31

think Americans grapple with all of

1:01:33

the time and something that we

1:01:36

really have to think about when

1:01:38

we are evaluating American history and

1:01:40

the president's role on it. It's

1:01:42

the perfect transition into our time

1:01:44

work. This is the fun segment

1:01:46

of the show where we ask

1:01:48

you a hypothetical history question about

1:01:50

what might have happened if something

1:01:53

had occurred differently or if someone

1:01:55

had acted. did differently. In your

1:01:57

opinion, what might have happened if

1:01:59

Washington's initial experiments with seeking advice

1:02:01

from the Senate had been more

1:02:03

timely, had been more timely, had

1:02:05

been more timely, had been more

1:02:08

timely, had been more timely and

1:02:10

smooth had been more timely and

1:02:12

smooth? Had been more timely and

1:02:14

smooth? Had been more timely and

1:02:16

smooth? Had been more timely and

1:02:18

smooth? Had been more timely and

1:02:20

smooth? Had been more timely and

1:02:22

smooth? Washington have created the cabinet

1:02:25

if the Senate had been easier

1:02:27

to meet with and obtain advice

1:02:29

from in 1789? I love this

1:02:31

question and I hadn't really considered

1:02:33

it until you had posed it.

1:02:35

I think that a couple of

1:02:37

things would have happened. As the

1:02:40

Senate grew larger it would have

1:02:42

become cumbersome and sort of impossible

1:02:44

to work with in the way

1:02:46

that Washington or future presidents may

1:02:48

have wanted. So I think it's

1:02:50

possible we could have seen something

1:02:52

like a, you know, a committee

1:02:54

of the Senate on foreign affairs,

1:02:57

like we have today, we have

1:02:59

a committee that is focused on

1:03:01

diplomacy and foreign policy, and that

1:03:03

committee would have continued to play

1:03:05

the role of advising the president.

1:03:07

I think it's likely, given the

1:03:09

nature of power and the executive

1:03:12

branch, that the president still would

1:03:14

have had close relationships with certain

1:03:16

secretaries and maybe consulted them. as

1:03:18

advisers from time to time, depending

1:03:20

on who was in office. I

1:03:22

think Washington probably would have continued

1:03:24

to do so with Hamilton and

1:03:26

Randolph either way because he was

1:03:29

close with them and Knox perhaps

1:03:31

as well. But I don't necessarily

1:03:33

think that the cabinet would have

1:03:35

developed in the same way because

1:03:37

I don't think there would have

1:03:39

been the same need to provide

1:03:41

a comprehensive picture of how a

1:03:44

foreign policy issue or a constitutional

1:03:46

issue. would influence the nation in

1:03:48

the same way that there was

1:03:50

once the Senate wasn't helpful. Now

1:03:52

Lindsay, you finished your research on

1:03:54

Washington's first cabinet. So what aspect

1:03:56

of history are you researching and

1:03:58

writing about now? Well, I haven't

1:04:00

quite gotten cabinets out of my

1:04:03

system. I have become convinced that they are

1:04:05

one of the most interesting ways

1:04:07

to evaluate presidential administrations

1:04:10

and presidential leadership and

1:04:12

one of the most underappreciated because

1:04:14

it is such a challenging task.

1:04:16

So I'm going to be comparing one

1:04:18

of the best cabinets and one of

1:04:20

the worst cabinets in American history.

1:04:22

I'm going to look at John Adams and

1:04:25

Thomas Jefferson. the best of

1:04:27

intentions, but his cabinet was

1:04:29

borderline treasonous and Jefferson, while

1:04:31

his cabinet put forth policies that

1:04:33

weren't necessarily successful, like the

1:04:36

embargo of 1807, was an

1:04:38

incredibly effective cabinet and had

1:04:40

the least turnover of any cabinet that

1:04:42

followed. So I think that that

1:04:44

comparison will be really fascinating

1:04:47

for all of the extraordinary literature

1:04:49

on those two men and their

1:04:51

relationship and their presidency is there

1:04:53

really hasn't been anything that has

1:04:55

looked at that aspect of their

1:04:57

administrations. And I think you will also

1:05:00

have some contemporary relevance because it's really

1:05:02

a story about power and ego and

1:05:04

ambition and how presidents manage those

1:05:06

things, which is I think an ever-present

1:05:09

question in the American experiment.

1:05:11

How can we get in touch with you if

1:05:13

we have more questions about Washington and

1:05:16

his cabinet or about the institution of

1:05:18

the cabinet? I have a website,

1:05:20

which is Lindsay churvinsky.com,

1:05:23

and you can contact

1:05:25

me through the website.

1:05:28

You can see some of my

1:05:30

other work. You can sign

1:05:32

up for my monthly

1:05:34

newsletter, which is called

1:05:36

A Spot of Parchment.

1:05:39

I'm also incredibly active

1:05:41

on Twitter, so my

1:05:43

handle is L.M. Churvinsky.

1:05:46

Thank you so much for taking us

1:05:48

inside Washington's first cabinet and for introducing

1:05:50

us to the institution and work of

1:05:52

the cabinet. Thanks so much for having

1:05:54

me. I really appreciate it. George Washington

1:05:56

created the president's cabinet because he

1:05:58

needed a real reliable body of

1:06:01

advisors to counsel him on big

1:06:03

foreign and domestic issues. As Lindsay

1:06:05

related, the United States Constitution really

1:06:07

provides little by way of instruction

1:06:09

for where the president should seek

1:06:11

counsel. Now in Article 2, Section

1:06:13

2, the Constitution does note that

1:06:15

the president should consult with the

1:06:17

Senate on foreign policy issues. So

1:06:19

George Washington tried that in August

1:06:21

1789. Washington informed the Senate that

1:06:23

he needed to consult with them.

1:06:25

on a new treaty or a

1:06:27

series of new treaties with Native

1:06:29

American nations. To prepare for this

1:06:31

meeting, Washington sent the Senate previous

1:06:33

treaties and correspondence so that they

1:06:35

could study up. Then, on the

1:06:37

appointed day and time, Washington showed

1:06:39

up in the Senate so that

1:06:41

they could all discuss and debate

1:06:43

the issues at hand. The Senate

1:06:45

met Washington with silence. The members

1:06:47

of the Senate preferred to meet

1:06:49

within committees and debate in private,

1:06:51

where Washington really preferred to discuss

1:06:53

and debate altogether. So Washington left

1:06:55

the Senate disappointed and he never

1:06:57

really again returned to the Senate

1:06:59

for foreign policy advice. Now after

1:07:01

the Senate, Washington may have sought

1:07:03

advice from Vice President John Adams.

1:07:05

We know he conferred with Congressman

1:07:07

James Madison, at least until the

1:07:09

two had a falling out, and

1:07:11

he may have also tried to

1:07:14

seek advice from the Supreme Court.

1:07:16

But all of this was to

1:07:18

no avail. So when none of

1:07:20

the existing institutions of government proved

1:07:22

ready and capable of providing advice,

1:07:24

Washington gave in and created the

1:07:26

cabinet. Now as Lindsay noted, one

1:07:28

of the biggest legacies of Washington's

1:07:30

cabinet comes in the form of

1:07:32

the institution's flexibility. In terms of

1:07:34

this flexibility, the cabinet serves however

1:07:36

the president wants it to serve.

1:07:38

The cabinet is made up of

1:07:40

government department heads, who the president

1:07:42

has the ability to nominate for

1:07:44

Senate confirmation. If the president finds

1:07:46

that he or she doesn't like

1:07:48

those department heads, well, they don't

1:07:50

have to take the advice offered

1:07:52

by those people. The president can

1:07:54

simply choose to appoint friends... family

1:07:56

and civilian leaders to a more

1:07:58

informal cabinet of advisors. And as

1:08:00

we've seen throughout history, even in

1:08:02

George Washington's own cabinet, this has

1:08:04

happened. After the retirement of Thomas

1:08:06

Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Henry Knox,

1:08:08

Washington found that he didn't want

1:08:10

to take the advice of the

1:08:12

men who succeeded them. So Washington

1:08:14

wrote to Hamilton and others for

1:08:16

their advice, even after they left

1:08:18

government service. Now, I think what

1:08:20

strikes me most about the cabinet.

1:08:22

This fact that the framers had

1:08:24

the ability to establish this institution

1:08:27

in the constitution, but they passed

1:08:29

on the idea, because they hated

1:08:31

the secrecy and cronyism of the

1:08:33

king's cabinet. But at the same

1:08:35

time that the framers passed on

1:08:37

the idea of creating a cabinet,

1:08:39

they created the Senate. A body

1:08:41

of men appointed by state legislatures

1:08:43

rather than directly elected by the

1:08:45

people, who met and deliberated in

1:08:47

secret, so that they be less

1:08:49

accountable to the people. Today, the

1:08:51

Senate is a much more open

1:08:53

body, and senators are elected directly

1:08:55

by the people. But in the

1:08:57

late 18th century, it seems to

1:08:59

me that the framers created one

1:09:01

secret institution, at the same time

1:09:03

they opted not to create the

1:09:05

cabinet, for fear of just how

1:09:07

secretive that body would be. This

1:09:09

is just an interesting observation I've

1:09:11

had throughout this episode, and as

1:09:13

we close out here, I thought

1:09:15

you might find it an interesting

1:09:17

observation to think about, too. You

1:09:19

can find more information about Lindsay,

1:09:21

her book, the cabinet. Plus notes

1:09:23

and links for everything we talked

1:09:25

about today on the show notes

1:09:27

page. Ben Franklin's world.com/two seven nine.

1:09:29

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to discover and listen to their

1:09:48

other podcasts, visit airway media.com. I'll

1:09:50

see you next week when we

1:09:52

meet with Lindsay Travinsky again to

1:09:54

talk about the presidency of John

1:09:56

Adams and the role that his

1:09:58

cabinet played in his presidential

1:10:00

administration. I hope

1:10:02

you have a great week and don't

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