0:00

This is a rooster teeth

0:02

production.

0:08

September twenty fifth nineteen seventy

0:10

eight. Pacific Southwest Airlines flight

0:12

one eighty two, a Boeing seven twenty

0:14

seven with a hundred thirty five people onboard

0:16

is approaching San Diego after an early morning

0:18

flight from Sacramento then onto Los Angeles.

0:21

The weather is clear with plenty of visibility

0:23

on the late summer southern California

0:25

morning. The three person crew of this tri

0:27

jet are minutes away from landing when air traffic

0:29

control alerts them to assess now one

0:31

seventy two approximately three miles away

0:33

in front of them. Captain tells air traffic

0:36

control that the traffic is in sight and

0:38

is instructed to maintain visual separation.

0:40

Eighty seconds later, the seven twenty seven collides

0:42

with the Sessna, sending both planes careening

0:45

out control to the ground below into

0:47

the North Park neighborhood of San Diego. The

0:49

crash kills everyone onboard both planes,

0:51

destroys twenty two homes kill

0:54

seven people on the ground and injured

0:56

nine others. How did these planes collide

0:58

if the PSA captain had the Chestnut in sight?

1:00

Could air traffic control have done more to intervene?

1:03

What prevents this kind of thing from happening today?

1:05

Find out on this episode of black box

1:07

down. Hello

1:13

everyone. Welcome to Black Box down. It's Ed Gus

1:15

and Chris. Hello, Chris. Hi. It's

1:18

been a crazy

1:18

day. It's been a busy morning.

1:21

We've we've had a lot going on. We had the power

1:24

go out at our studio and then we

1:26

were recording a big part

1:28

of the finale for campaign for tales

1:30

from stinky dragon

1:31

podcast. We've got

1:33

all kinds of things going on. But most importantly

1:35

right now, we have black box down going on. Yeah.

1:37

And

1:38

That sounds crazy for the the intro.

1:40

Yeah. It it's it's

1:43

unbelievable. Have you been to Sandio, Chris?

1:45

Yeah. Once. So I assume he

1:47

flew in -- Yeah. -- to the airport. A little bit of

1:49

trivia I learned in researching this

1:52

this incident. The San Diego

1:54

Airport is the busiest single

1:56

runway airport in the United States.

1:59

Single runway. Yeah. They only have one runway.

2:01

I didn't I that's fun. And there are many times had no

2:03

idea. They only had one runway. Yeah. Even here in

2:05

Austin, we've got two. Yeah. And it's a busier

2:07

space for

2:07

a dollar in Southern California. And that's where

2:10

they slam dunk. Landing. Right? Well,

2:12

that was San Francisco. So far oh, okay. The

2:14

other the other San city

2:16

in California. And this, of course, was

2:18

a different time we're talking about here, nineteen seventy

2:21

eight. I had to, you know, I've been to to San Diego a

2:23

few times. I I, you know, tried to map

2:25

out where these planes

2:28

ultimately crash of where they hit the ground. don't think I've

2:30

ever been in that neighborhood, but it's really close

2:32

to a freeway. It's close to Balboa Park, a little

2:34

east of Balboa Park if you're familiar with San Diego.

2:36

You know, we've talked about crashes where

2:39

they, you know, they'll crash into houses

2:41

or, you know, into parts of a

2:42

city. I I don't think we've ever covered one

2:44

that hit this many homes.

2:45

I know. That's it's really

2:47

crazy. Yeah. It's a lot of people there.

2:49

And it's it was really early in the morning. I you

2:51

know, if I remember, I was, like, eight or

2:53

not it was, like, it's around nine in the morning if I remember

2:56

right. You people were probably still home just starting

2:58

their day and, you know, they didn't do anything. They're

3:00

just in their house getting ready for the day

3:01

and, you know, seven people died and nine people were

3:03

injured. As a result of the the planes

3:05

coming down into the neighborhood. That's wild. And

3:08

we'll probably do follow us on Black

3:10

Book's down pod. I'm sure we'll have

3:12

images and things. This is it's actually

3:15

really haunting. There was

3:17

a I don't I don't know what it was for, but there was

3:19

press conference happening nearby

3:22

where these planes collided. Uh-huh. So there

3:24

were a bunch of reporters and news stations

3:26

that are covering the press conference. So as a result,

3:28

even though this is nineteen seventy eight, There's

3:30

photos and there's video

3:32

footage of the aftermath. Like, one of the

3:34

photographers who was there for the newspaper managed

3:36

to take two photos of the of the

3:39

the PSA passenger plane as it was

3:41

on fire and falling to the ground. It's

3:43

crazy that there are photos

3:45

of this considering, you know, the time frame, how difficult

3:48

it you know, in nowadays, I think we take

3:50

photos and video for granted. And

3:52

the fact that there are actual photos of this

3:54

is is unbelievable to me. It's funny

3:56

because, you know, we talk about lot of times how

3:59

eyewitness accounts aren't always the most accurate

4:01

because people don't know what they're looking at necessarily

4:03

and, you know, they kind of interject their

4:05

own opinions as far as

4:07

what happened. So you can't always rely on them. I

4:09

was watching an interview with one of the NTSB

4:12

investigators who worked on this

4:14

this crash. Worked on this accident. And

4:17

it was a woman by the name of Wally Funk,

4:19

very accomplished aviator. I should definitely

4:21

read up on her if that's your thing. I think she's

4:23

led a very interesting, very prolific life

4:26

in aviation. But anyway, she was talking

4:28

about how, you know, she was dispatched out there and she

4:30

was, you know, began interviewing the eyewitnesses

4:32

and that she said in her experience

4:35

talking to the eyewitnesses, it was

4:37

you could get the most reliable information from

4:40

children. From people under seventeen.

4:42

Because they were a lot more matter of fact about

4:44

what they saw and they they didn't

4:46

let like, they didn't have the life experience to

4:49

color what they saw or to change what they saw.

4:51

It was very more like this is what I saw

4:54

and, you know, she said that, you

4:56

know, there were a lot of kids out there. At

4:58

the time that she

4:59

did. In talking to the kids, she was able get what

5:01

she felt was more reliable information out there. That is

5:03

that's like it seems counterintuitive. It does, but

5:05

also when you when you break it down, you're

5:07

like, Okay. Yeah. They're not, like,

5:09

trying to, like, interpret. Right.

5:11

There it's just facts. What did I see?

5:14

This is what I saw.

5:15

Yeah. Yeah. And and this was the

5:17

act this is actually the deadliest US commercial

5:20

aviation disaster until American

5:22

Airlines one ninety one in Chicago, which is an

5:24

incident we covered. That's the one where the left engine

5:26

came off the wing as they were taken off from Chicago

5:28

in the plane crash. So this was the

5:30

deadliest accident for for almost a

5:32

year until until that other one. So I

5:34

I did a little bit of reading. I was not very

5:37

familiar with Pacific Southwest Airlines itself.

5:40

It was a a regional US airline. It was

5:42

headquartered in San Diego and it operated

5:44

from nineteen forty nine to,

5:46

I believe, it was nineteen eighty eight. It was

5:48

the first large discount airline in the United

5:51

States, and it called itself the world's friendliest

5:53

airline, and they painted a smile on the nose of

5:55

all of their airplanes. They call them the

5:58

the PSA grinning

5:59

birds. Oh.

6:00

I mean, that's cool. Like

6:02

I don't know. Yeah. It kinda made it kinda I yeah. It kinda

6:04

made the planes look like they had a face. Like, they they painted

6:07

the the the red on, like, the very tip of

6:09

the nose black. So it looked like a kind of

6:11

like a like a like almost like an animal's like

6:13

black nose. So the windows look like eyes and it's

6:15

got like big smile cylinder it, they were

6:17

very customer service oriented.

6:20

In fact, Southwest Airlines,

6:22

the founder of Southwest Airlines, took a lot of

6:24

cues from Pacific Southwest when

6:26

they started Southwest Airlines and tried to mimic

6:28

what they were doing when they started Southwest Airlines. So

6:31

even though PSA is gone, you see a

6:33

lot of that has held over. A lot of that culture

6:35

almost got transferred to Southwest Airlines. And

6:37

Southwest Airlines is is known for those things. You know?

6:39

Yeah. The PSA started all of that. Like,

6:42

the flight attendants telling jokes and the pilots

6:44

having, like, a laid back attitude. Like, I think,

6:46

you know, one of the pilots, you know, who

6:48

was involved with starting the

6:49

airline. When I was wearing Hawaiian shirt whenever

6:51

he was flying, I mean, like, he kind of tried to

6:54

to keep things real casual and fun for,

6:56

you know, the the employees and for the past And

6:58

and are they was Southwest still

7:00

using the Pacific Southwest Airlines

7:02

computers over the Christmas?

7:06

That's a very a very relevant joke.

7:08

Very topical. No, I don't think so, but

7:10

that's a but yeah. Yeah. The Southwest has

7:12

not had some some good headlines here

7:14

recently. Specifically, this was an early

7:17

one. It's like a commuter flight. Right? Like, they started

7:19

in Sacramento, flew down to LA, continuing

7:21

on to San Diego. These probably people who are, you know,

7:23

And this this was an early morning flight. These are people who

7:25

are going down to work or have business

7:27

taking a quick business trip for the

7:29

day. You know, like, gotta go down to LA for or

7:31

San Diego for the day, gonna

7:32

back home run this back and forth

7:35

several times -- Right. -- a day? Right. Exactly.

7:37

It's a it's a very commuter focused

7:39

route. How do you feel about early morning

7:41

flights? I avoid them if I can.

7:43

Yeah. Because what I end up doing is I just,

7:46

like, don't really sleep much because I

7:48

-- Yeah. -- I get nervous about missing

7:50

my

7:50

flights. Then I'll wake up earlier than I

7:52

need to. And I'm

7:53

sure you do that thing to me. Like, if I fall asleep right

7:55

now, I'll get six hours of sleep. Yeah.

7:57

And then, like Okay. Now,

8:00

Just falls asleep, now get five. Yeah.

8:03

Yeah. I will say the advantage to early

8:05

morning flights is that

8:07

you're less likely to run into operational

8:09

delays. Because as the day goes on, delays

8:11

cascade. So when you're starting the

8:13

day early on a flight, chances are

8:16

the plane will be there. It's not like Oh,

8:18

the plane was delayed earlier on another flight

8:20

and now it's delayed coming in here. But, I don't

8:22

know, that's not the case they're there. I'm not a big fan of early

8:24

morning flights, but Sometimes you gotta do what you

8:26

gotta do. Yeah. like midday. Yeah.

8:29

I'll I'll take that. So this plane, this this

8:31

flight flight one eighty two was kept

8:33

in by James Jim

8:35

McFerran. Nickname was Jim. And

8:37

first officer Robert Bob

8:39

Fox. Jim and Bob, very very

8:43

affable names where you're like Yeah.

8:45

They feel they feel like very easygoing names,

8:47

which, you know, with the smiling plane.

8:50

The greenbird. Yeah. Yeah. Oh, and, of course,

8:52

they had a flight engineer, older plane, Martin

8:54

j one. They had

8:57

four flight attendants And, you know, like

8:59

most of the time, flight from Sacramento to LA was uneventful.

9:02

And when they were on approach to San Diego,

9:04

they were making a visual approach to runway 27A

9:07

San Diego airport called Lindbergh Field. So if you hear

9:09

me say Lindbergh Field to San Diego Airport. So

9:11

visual approach runway two seven, that means

9:13

they got to we've talked about visual approaches before. They

9:15

have to keep the runway in sight. And if they're landing

9:17

on runway two seven, they're gonna be landing

9:20

to the west. This two hundred seventy

9:22

degrees. And they've been advised that location

9:24

of the Cessna by the approach controller And

9:26

the flight crew told the approach controller they had the

9:28

traffic in sight and they were instructed to maintain

9:30

visual separation from the Sessna and

9:32

to contact Lindbergh Tower. And that just means that

9:35

have to keep an eye on that assessment -- Uh-huh. -- and make sure

9:37

they maintain adequate separation from

9:38

it. Very common. When you're operating

9:40

under visual rules, this happens all the time.

9:42

Just maintain visual separation. Mhmm.

9:45

There's rules about how close you can get

9:47

and how far away you have to stay. I don't know what the rules

9:49

were at the time specific for this. Typically, you

9:51

know, they wanna stay at least at the very minimum

9:53

a thousand feet away, but keep an eye on

9:55

it and, like, that's an emergency. If

9:57

you're if you're that close. But you

9:59

you just keep an eye on it and you're like, okay, we're gonna

10:02

be turning this way. They're over there. We're fine. So

10:04

presumably all good. Yeah. They they can see it.

10:06

They told the control approach control they could see

10:08

it. They're told to maintain visual separation and

10:10

to contact the tower. Again, that's common when you come

10:12

in and you

10:13

switch frequencies a few times. Of the assessment, say?

10:15

No. This is this is all from the

10:17

The assessment. Yeah. Pacific. Okay.

10:19

I'll talk about the assessment here in a minute. So they

10:21

transfer over. They contact the tower. They

10:23

tell the tower they're on their downwind leg, which means

10:25

they're flying parallel to the runway in the

10:27

opposite direction they're gonna land from. And

10:30

they were again advised of the assessment's position.

10:32

The flight crew at this point did not have the assessment

10:35

site, oh, because they thought at this

10:37

point they had just passed

10:38

it. And it was off to their right and they continued

10:40

their approach. Off to the right, they

10:42

thought.

10:42

Yes. So they thought they'd like They

10:44

yeah. Because they all you know, this plane, the seven twenty

10:47

seven is gonna move much faster than the Sessna.

10:49

So the Sessna, it's a one seventy two

10:51

sky hawk. This is when if if

10:53

you ask anybody to, like,

10:55

imagine, like, a single propeller general

10:57

aviation plane, they're probably gonna picture

11:00

the one seventy two sky hawk. Okay. It's a high

11:02

wing plane. It's got one propeller theory

11:04

you can see four people realistically not not

11:06

so much. It's the kind of plane pilots

11:08

train on. It's the kind of plane I fly that I've been

11:10

flying when I've taken my pilot lessons.

11:12

It was operated by Gibbs Flight Centre,

11:15

and it departed from Montgomery Field, which is

11:17

a different airport, a little northeast of

11:19

Lindbergh Field. And it was flown by

11:21

two licensed pilots. Okay?

11:23

One was Martin Casey Junior who was thirty

11:25

two years old. He possessed single

11:27

engine, multi engine, and instrument

11:30

flight ratings as well as commercial certificate

11:32

and an instrument flight instructor certificate.

11:34

So he's a flight instructor. Was he instructing

11:37

the other pilot. Correct? Like, one

11:39

of one of his certifications or something? Correct.

11:41

And this line structure, by the way, had five thousand one hundred

11:43

thirty seven hours. So we're your experienced pilot. The

11:45

other pilot who was sitting in the left seat, his

11:47

name was David Boswell. He was thirty five years old,

11:50

and he was a US Marine Corps sergeant. Guy,

11:52

actually, he was also a licensed pilot.

11:54

He had single engine and multi engine

11:56

ratings and commercial certificate. So he was

11:59

a legal part that he he was beyond private

12:01

part. He had a commercial certificate as well. He

12:03

had flown four hundred seven hours at the time

12:05

of the accident. So he was not, like,

12:07

a fresh he was even though he was a student,

12:10

it's not like he was a brand new

12:11

pilot. Yeah. He he he had his pilots

12:13

license into the power of his commercials. Correct.

12:15

That's I mean, you we've talked about

12:18

your training --

12:19

Mhmm. -- and you're in

12:21

in terms, like, in I guess, like,

12:24

how many So I have about a hundred fifty

12:26

hours right Okay. So to get a commercial certificate,

12:28

I don't know about back then. Nowadays, to get versus certificate,

12:30

you need a minimum of two hundred fifty hours.

12:33

Okay. So he had flown that obviously.

12:35

He didn't have his instrument rating. So he's this

12:37

instrument rating he's he's flying

12:39

at this time right now. He's take he's taking

12:42

lessons to get the instrument rating, and that's the rating

12:44

that allows you to fly without looking in

12:46

clouds without looking outside. You're correct.

12:48

So lots of times when you are taking

12:51

instrument rating lessons, you

12:53

have either a hood or foggles on

12:55

to restrict your view so you can only

12:57

see the instruments inside the plane and you can't

12:59

see

12:59

outside. Uh-huh. Important.

13:02

Important. Important. Important. Yeah. So

13:04

But there's two pilots and one of them

13:06

didn't have blinders on correctly. So

13:08

you don't correct. The instructor is

13:11

operates as safety pilot. Yeah. So he can

13:13

see outside and, you know, Make sure

13:15

everything's okay. So, yeah, Boswell was

13:17

wearing that hood, limiting his field of

13:19

vision to just inside. It

13:21

looks like a big sun visor

13:23

with, like, panels to block peripheral vision

13:25

very normal in IFR

13:27

training. Yeah. Like, the blast shield. Yeah.

13:29

Exactly. I could aren't worth like the blast shield

13:31

now. Tried with the blast shield. The

13:33

assessment was under the control of the San Diego

13:35

approach control and it was climbing on

13:37

a northeast heading. The Lindbergh Tower

13:39

local controller had cleared the Cessna pilot to

13:42

maintain VFR conditions for visual flight rule

13:44

conditions -- Mhmm. -- and to contact San Diego

13:46

approach control. The approach controller told

13:48

him that he was in radar contact and instructed

13:50

him to maintain VFR conditions at

13:52

or below three thousand five hundred feet and to

13:54

fly heading of 070 degrees.

13:57

So this is all very common instructions. Okay.

13:59

To test on pilot acknowledge and repeated the controller's

14:01

instructions, all they have to do is stay

14:04

under three thousand five hundred and fly a

14:06

heading of 070

14:07

degrees, which is like a east northeast heading.

14:09

Directly east would be ninety, you know,

14:11

and north would be zero or three

14:13

sixty. So most mostly east,

14:15

but a little a little north. East northeast. And

14:18

the other planes heading two hundred and seventy

14:20

degrees

14:20

west, That's where they're landing, but they're on the downwind.

14:23

So they're flying the opposite direction,

14:25

which means they're flying 090. Okay.

14:28

So on the downwind, you fly parallel

14:30

to the runway, but in the opposite direction

14:32

where you put in the landing. So they're gonna be flying

14:34

east on A090. So all that

14:36

being said, the Cessna pilots for reasons

14:38

unknown did not maintain

14:40

that East Northeast heading of 070.

14:43

So after completing a practice instrument

14:45

approach, they didn't notify ATC

14:47

of their course change to 090.

14:51

So even though they were instructed to maintain 070

14:53

heading, they drifted a bit and they ended

14:55

up going

14:56

090. So and which direction

14:58

was the PSA flight going? Well, they were going

15:01

nine zero. Yep. Exactly

15:03

the same heading. So now

15:05

they're going the exact same

15:06

heading. Correct. But

15:09

would that mean, though, that they were, like, flying the

15:11

same direction? Yes. It wasn't

15:13

not a hit on collision. Oh, I

15:15

guess, I I clear. I I since I already said

15:17

they they collided, I can say that now. The

15:20

PSA flight, they were both heading in the same

15:22

direction, and the PSA flight overtook the

15:24

Sessna. It's like a rear ending. Like,

15:27

a rear

15:27

ending. A rear

15:27

ended a rear ended the sessa. Oh,

15:30

okay. Yeah. That's why I was asking

15:32

when when I or about twenty two seventy

15:34

is, like, oh, now there. Yeah. No. No.

15:35

No. It's it was not a head on. It was

15:38

overtaking because again, that PSA flight, the seven twenty

15:40

seven is gonna be much faster than that Sessna.

15:42

So I don't you know, there's there's there's

15:44

no black box in assessment. We don't

15:46

know what the pilots were saying. We don't

15:48

know what was going on with their instruments.

15:51

So we don't know. Sometimes, you know, when someone's

15:54

taking IFR training, it's possible that,

15:56

you know, they're so overwhelmed looking at all instruments

15:58

that their heading may slip a little bit, but that's

16:00

why the safety pilots there to be, like, or the instructor

16:02

to be like, hey, you didn't maintain your heading.

16:04

You know, if if I if when I'm taking

16:06

my I'm taking IFR training right When I'm taking

16:08

training, if I go off by, like, five

16:11

or ten degrees, you know, my instructor's like slapping me.

16:13

Like, hey. Take a look at your

16:15

head

16:15

and, you know, get back on your head and you

16:17

very important. Yeah.

16:18

Yeah. Yeah. That you maintain the heading you're supposed to

16:20

get, but you're supposed to be honest. It's part of the training,

16:22

especially when landing in in near airports.

16:24

Right. In airports when there's lots of traffic, it's

16:27

very important to maintain that because ATC

16:29

puts you on these headings anticipating you

16:31

follow it so that they can move traffic around appropriately.

16:34

But there is I don't know that this

16:36

happened in this case, but there is a phenomenon

16:38

I do wanna very briefly cover here. Uh-huh.

16:41

So in your in a plane like assessment one

16:43

seventy two, you have a compass that

16:45

sits on, like, the dashboard. Right? Okay.

16:48

The compass, though, is prone

16:50

to How can I say this? It's prone

16:53

to errors. Because if you think about it, a compass

16:55

is like a ball floating in

16:57

a liquid. And when you're in a plane and

16:59

you're turning or you're banking, it's

17:01

not exactly stable. Like, when you're on the ground and you look

17:03

at a compass, you know. It's definitely this

17:05

direction. It's definitely that direction. When you're not

17:07

touching the ground and you're, like, float you're flying

17:09

in the air and and, like, let's say, you

17:11

turn north, the compass may lead a little bit

17:13

or it may lag a little bit. So work. It

17:16

still works. So you don't use the

17:18

compass for your headings necessarily.

17:20

There's a separate instrument called like a heading indicator

17:22

--

17:22

Right. -- sometimes it'll be referred to as an HSI.

17:25

And that's gyroscopic based.

17:27

So

17:28

you use that to maintain your heading. It's

17:30

one of the instruments. It's like a a

17:32

round instrument that's on the it's in the panel. Okay.

17:34

And that's more reliable than -- Right. -- because

17:36

the compass is back up. Well, the compass,

17:39

it will always be correct. The problem with the heading

17:41

indicator is that it's prone

17:43

to what they call gyroscopic precession.

17:46

And over time, like all the vibration and all the

17:48

shaking, we'll make it drift a little bit.

17:50

So what you're supposed to do is

17:52

When you're in level unaccelerated flight,

17:54

every ten to fifteen minutes, you just compare the compass

17:56

to the heading indicator, and you may have to adjust the

17:58

heading indicator a little bit. Oh. So over

18:00

time, it could drift. And if you're not constantly

18:03

checking it to make sure it's correct with the compass,

18:05

it might read a little off. I don't know that's

18:07

what happened here, but I'm just saying, it's plausible

18:10

that the heading indicator was a little off.

18:12

The heading indicator might have been a little

18:14

off and then also the compass could

18:17

possibly be

18:19

Okay.

18:19

Yeah. If if if there you feel like timing or

18:21

accelerated Which date We already were. Yeah.

18:23

It's it's not entirely you can't verify

18:26

it. So it's just it's just

18:28

when you're piloting a small assessment. Like,

18:30

it's just another thing you gotta keep in the back of your

18:32

head. Yeah. And, you know, with me specifically

18:34

anytime I know I'm coming into the Austin airport or

18:36

I'm approaching an airport, like I verify

18:38

that that heading indicator over and over

18:40

because I know in sentence like this,

18:42

like, you want your heading indicator to be as

18:44

correct as possible to

18:47

comply with any ATC instructions. Yeah.

18:49

That all makes sense. Yeah. So I'm just trying to

18:51

give a little more background about how

18:54

all of that stuff. That works. Again,

18:56

the report doesn't say anything about that. But

18:58

it's something It's it's just something when I

19:00

was going through this, I was thinking about my own

19:02

experience like, oh, man. Sometimes hitting indicator

19:04

gets a little off and you don't know. Some

19:07

planes gets more often than others.

19:09

Like, every every every system has its

19:11

own little quirks. But I do believe this system

19:13

actually relatively new at the time. Not that that

19:15

excuses anything. Anyway, like

19:17

I said little earlier in the intro, this

19:19

collision, you know, obviously occurred in mid

19:22

air. It was about three miles northeast

19:24

of Lindbergh field. And, you know, fell to the ground

19:26

in the San Diego neighborhood of

19:29

North Park. And, you know, both

19:31

occupants of the cessna were killed. Everyone

19:33

on the Boeing seven twenty seven was killed

19:35

and seven people on the ground were also

19:37

killed and nine people were injured.

19:40

Twenty two dwellings were damaged or destroyed.

19:42

And this explosion in fire

19:44

created a cloud that could be seen for

19:46

miles. If you talk to people who lived in

19:48

San Diego at this time, like, everyone

19:50

remembers this. It's like, because they you could see it

19:53

for so

19:53

far, like, everywhere in the city. And I figured what

19:55

the number was. It was like, I was like sixty or

19:57

seventy percent of all the firefighters in San Diego

19:59

had to show up to try to control

20:01

this fire and put it out

20:03

because of the fuel

20:05

from the plane or it also catching

20:07

fire like, all the

20:08

houses, all the houses, all the trees, and things

20:10

that are -- Right.

20:11

-- just like everything you collided with along the way

20:13

just created this huge fire.

20:16

You know, since we talked

20:18

about it, the fact that they were,

20:20

like, kinda bumped into each other

20:22

going to sort of the same direction that

20:24

I wonder if that made the debris

20:26

spread out a further --

20:28

Mhmm. like a a greater distance

20:31

than it would have if they just collided head

20:33

on because and I head on collision, they you

20:35

know, the you were forced to drop each other, and

20:37

then they kinda fall more downward versus

20:40

this where they

20:40

kinda, like, could do it in, like, falling

20:42

apart. Yeah. Well, the the

20:45

I'll I'll read the specifics here in a little bit, but

20:47

the the Sethna pretty much fell apart

20:49

and fell straight down from that point. Flight

20:52

one eighty two, you know, suffered

20:54

some substantial damage to the

20:56

right wing, began, you know,

20:59

banking and entered a nose down

21:01

attitude, it was pretty much uncontrollable at

21:03

that point. So they, you know, they didn't it's not like

21:05

they fell straight down. The plane still did circle

21:07

for a bit. Oh. Before

21:09

trying to regain regain

21:12

control of the Yeah. Yeah. Because the pilots were

21:14

trying to, it probably wasn't

21:16

possible. Because of the amount of damage that was

21:18

sustained, but, you know, they're still gonna try. Yeah.

21:21

So the flight data recorder

21:23

for the PSA

21:25

flight, you know, The outer case was intact.

21:27

It did have some mechanical damage to the

21:29

right side section. So what so

21:31

so it hit sort of as

21:33

you said this or you're going to,

21:36

they hit whenever the

21:38

the main big plane was

21:40

descending. Right? Correct. And they went

21:42

down to thirty five hundred? Well, they were and

21:45

and and they were still descending at this point. Yeah.

21:47

So they they collided. I forget the exact altitude

21:49

they collided

21:50

at. Because the

21:51

the assessment was told to stay

21:53

below thirty five hundred. Correct. So so yeah. They

21:55

would they the collision did happen below three thousand

21:57

five hundred. I I wanna off the top of my head, I

21:59

wanna say, was it occurred around two thousand two hundred or two

22:01

thousand four hundred somewhere around there. Okay.

22:03

So it was it was already really low. So it's not

22:05

like the PSA flight was in the air for

22:07

a long time, but it did it's not like it I just wanted

22:10

to clarify. It didn't immediately go straight

22:12

down. It did continued to to fly for

22:14

a little bit. Anyway, this FDR, outer

22:16

case was intact. It had been subjected to

22:18

fire and extreme heat an examination

22:20

of the pertinent portion of metal foil recording.

22:23

You remember, this is the old style black

22:25

box. They have that metal foil recording. It

22:27

showed that its surface was covered completely with

22:29

heavy crushed deposits, so

22:31

they had to do repeated chemical and ultrasonic

22:34

cleanings to remove those

22:36

deposits, to permit the entire

22:38

record of altitude, airspeed, and magnetic

22:40

heading to be seen, However, the

22:43

traces containing the minute marks, vertical acceleration,

22:45

and radio transmission indications were

22:47

not visible over the last four minutes of flight. So

22:50

that's just all to say They're able to get

22:52

a lot of the data off of the flight data recorder,

22:54

but some of it was unreadable. The last four

22:56

minutes. The last four minutes of

22:58

vertical acceleration, radio transmission

23:00

indications. So they still

23:03

did have altitude indicated air speed and

23:05

magnetic hitting. So they still had a good amount

23:07

of information. But this did create

23:09

a little bit of a problem because the minute marks were

23:11

not available for timing, the foil movement precisely.

23:14

So and then the lack of radio transmission

23:16

made like syncing the FDR with the CVR

23:18

a little more

23:19

difficult, like synchronizing -- Yeah. -- the

23:21

cockpit voice recorder with the flight data recorder. So

23:23

it just It it was little inconvenient like

23:25

they had to work at it to get everything to

23:27

to be read. The cockpit voice recorder was damaged

23:30

severely and had been subjected to intense heat.

23:32

However, they were able to get all

23:34

of the data off of it without too much trouble.

23:36

And they transcribed but in the report,

23:39

the last five minutes were transcribed, and I was

23:41

able to read through all of that. This episode of

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thousand people. So obviously,

27:09

they're gonna go back and kind of like

27:11

create a timeline for everything that's hot.

27:13

So at about eight sixteen

27:15

in the morning, The Sethna, which

27:17

was operated by Gibbs Flight Center,

27:19

departed Montgomery Field California on

27:21

an instrument training flight. So Montgomery Field

27:24

is a little northeast of you would

27:26

consider the San Diego Airport Lindbergh field.

27:28

Since the flight was gonna be constructed

27:30

in visual conditions, you know,

27:33

there was no flight plan filed and no one was

27:35

required. It's visual. But

27:37

even though it's visual, but

27:40

he's training or non visual? Correct.

27:42

So what the way that normally works

27:44

is the pilot whose training will

27:46

wear the the visor to simulate

27:48

instrument training even though it's visual. And the

27:50

safety pilot or the instructor will, you know, keep

27:53

an eye on all the visual stuff. And the

27:55

instructor will simulate the radio calls. Like,

27:57

what the controller would be saying if there was an instrument.

27:59

So it's like, you have a conversation with the tower,

28:01

but you don't click the button. You just send it to

28:03

the guy sitting next to you. And like

28:05

we're saying here, the fine structure sat in the right seat

28:08

and another certificated Pilot was receiving

28:10

instrument training occupied the left seat,

28:12

very common for instrument train. So

28:14

the Chestnut left Montgomery Field and

28:16

proceeded to Lindbergh Field where

28:18

two practice ILS approaches to runway

28:20

zero nine were flown. And the reason

28:22

they had to do that is there were no

28:25

other instrument approaches in San Diego County

28:27

at the time. So in order to practice an

28:29

instrument approach, they had to go to Lindbergh

28:31

field. So, like, here in Austin, even though I'm taking

28:33

the train -- Uh-huh. -- lots of times, I'll fly out.

28:35

There's you can do it lots of places. I would I'll fly

28:37

out to Taylor. I'll fly to Georgetown

28:40

or San Marcos. Like, there's lots of other smaller

28:42

airports in the area where you can do instrument

28:45

approaches. But this is the only one. And at

28:47

at the time, Lindbergh Fuel was the only place

28:49

that had an instrument approach that they had to go

28:51

there to practice. Mhmm. And at the time,

28:53

the reported wind was calm Runway

28:56

two seven was the active runway at Lindbergh,

28:58

but they flew their practice purchase into runway

29:00

nine. Shouldn't be a big deal. They're talking to

29:02

the tower. At about eight fifty seven,

29:04

the assessment ended a second approach and began

29:07

a climb out to the northeast. At

29:09

eight fifty nine, the Lindbergh Tower local controller

29:11

cleared the assessment pilot to maintain VFR conditions

29:14

and contact San Diego approach control. So

29:16

they're leaving Lindbergh

29:18

field probably heading back to Montgomery. So

29:20

they're climbing and leaving the area.

29:23

At eight fifty nine and fifty seconds, assessment

29:25

pilot contacted San Diego approach controls stated

29:27

he was at one thousand five hundred feet and northeast

29:30

bound. The approach controller told him he was in

29:32

radar contact and instructed him to maintain

29:34

VFR conditions at or below three thousand five

29:36

hundred, flyheading of 070,

29:38

cessed a pilot acknowledged and repeated the controller's

29:40

instruction. All very common. Mhmm. The

29:43

Pacific Southwest Airlines flight, and it was

29:45

regularly scheduled passenger flight between Sacramento

29:47

and San Diego with a stop in LA on the way.

29:49

They departed Los Angeles at eight

29:51

thirty four on an IFR flight plan

29:54

with a hundred twenty eight passengers in the cruise seven

29:56

on board and The first officer was flying the aircraft

29:58

at the time. Company personnel familiar with Apollo's

30:01

voices identified the captain as person conducting

30:03

almost all air to ground communications is

30:05

very common, uh-huh, wherever it's flying, normally

30:07

just flies, and then the other pilot will handle

30:10

all the communication. So, yeah, they've

30:12

divided their responsibilities. The cockpit for

30:14

sure quarter established the fact that there

30:16

was a a deadheading company pilot

30:18

who was also sitting in the cockpit

30:20

as

30:20

well. So he was just

30:21

like an extra Yeah. He was he wasn't there

30:23

officially. He was he was commuting for

30:26

work most likely. Remember San Diego

30:28

was their headquarters, so he was probably flying down to

30:30

fly another plane later in the day. I don't know

30:32

that for a fact. I'm just guessing that speculating,

30:34

I should say. At eight fifty three and nineteen

30:36

seconds, flight one eighty two reported to the

30:38

San Diego approach control tower at eleven

30:41

thousand feet and they were cleared to descend to

30:43

seven thousand feet. At eight fifty seven,

30:45

so four minutes later, flight one eighty two reported was

30:47

leaving nine thousand five hundred feet for seven thousand

30:49

feet and they had to run way in sight. PRoch

30:51

controller cleared the flight for a visual approach on

30:53

runway two seven and acknowledge and repeat

30:55

the approach clearance. So coming in,

30:58

you know, they they gonna be landing on runway

31:00

two seven, so they'll be landing to the west. Shortly

31:03

after that, at eight fifty nine and twenty eight seconds,

31:05

The approach controller advised, flight one eighty two,

31:07

there was traffic at twelve o'clock, one mile

31:09

northbound. In five seconds later, the flight answered,

31:11

we're looking. So when you're told, know, typically when

31:14

the pilots told traffic at whatever,

31:16

they'll look for it and they'll say either traffic in sight

31:18

or looking for that

31:19

traffic.

31:20

Yeah. Right. Okay. So looking at and they're

31:22

referring to the assessment. So this is actually

31:24

a separate plane. Oh, so then

31:26

then eleven seconds later,

31:29

The approach controller advised flight one eighty two

31:31

additional traffic's twelve o'clock, three

31:33

miles just north of the

31:34

field, north eastbound, Assessinil one

31:37

seventy two climbing VFR. This is up. This

31:39

is up. Yeah. Out of one thousand four

31:41

hundred. And according to the cockpit voice recorder

31:43

at eight fifty nine to fifty seconds, the co pilot

31:45

responded, okay, we've got that other twelve.

31:47

So he's and this is when he saw. So

31:49

in my mind, this is an ambiguous statement.

31:52

That you know you're right because the

31:54

other twelve could be the first one

31:56

or this second

31:57

one. Yeah. Right. But he says we've

31:59

got that other twelve in my mind, that

32:02

sounds like they're talking about the other plane.

32:04

But it's open to interpretation

32:06

--

32:06

Yeah. -- because when I when my maybe it's because

32:08

I was, like, jumping at it. But to me,

32:10

it sounded like assessed that first.

32:12

Right. We've got that other twelve. So we got the

32:14

other twelve. It makes me think they're talking about

32:16

the third the third play. But who

32:18

knows? At nine o'clock and

32:20

fifteen seconds, about fifteen seconds after instructing

32:23

the Sesna pilot to maintain VFR at a below three

32:25

thousand five hundred feet. The approach controller advise

32:27

flight one eighty two. Traffic's at twelve

32:29

o'clock, three miles out of one thousand

32:31

seven hundred. And then at nine o'clock in twenty

32:33

one seconds, the first officer said, got him.

32:36

And then one second later, the captain informed the controller

32:38

traffic in sight. So this is when they see

32:40

the the system that they end up colliding with. Okay.

32:42

So I think the previous statement was

32:44

about some other plane. Now here,

32:47

they they see the Well, as far

32:49

as we know, they they see the Cessna that they

32:51

ultimately collide with. Then a few seconds later

32:53

at nine o'clock and twenty three seconds, the approach controller

32:55

clear flight one eighty two to maintain visual

32:58

separation, contact Lindbergh Tower.

33:00

And then a few seconds later, the answer, okay.

33:02

And three seconds later, the approach controller advised assessment

33:05

pilot. There was traffic at six o'clock, two

33:07

miles eastbound, PSAJ inbound

33:09

in Lindbergh, out of three thousand

33:11

two hundred has you in sight. The Session

33:13

of Pilot acknowledged one one golf Roger. This

33:15

is this is a nightmare for me by the way.

33:18

If if I'm flying assessment

33:20

and I'm told there's there's a commercial

33:22

plane at my six o'clock.

33:25

That's directly behind you. It's it's hard

33:27

to look back in a plane like this in a in a sense

33:29

of it's hard to turn around. Like in a car, you just

33:31

like you'd pop over your shoulder and see it's hard to see

33:33

behind you in a sense. Passing your plane at my

33:35

six

33:35

o'clock, I'm not happy about that.

33:37

And so in that

33:38

situation though, you would just

33:40

make sure you follow then fact Apologies. Yep.

33:43

Do exactly Don't need this call. Right.

33:45

Right? Right. Right. And

33:47

there's probably no way you can see it, but they did

33:49

say the other traffic says they have you in sight.

33:51

So I'm like, okay. Well, least they seem, you know. Yeah.

33:53

For that kind of thing. At nine

33:55

o'clock in thirty four seconds, flight one to report

33:57

it to Lindbergh Tower, they were on the downwind leg

33:59

for landing, so they're flying

34:01

presumably on about A090 heading.

34:03

Because if they're on the downwind, they're flying parallel

34:05

to the runway, in the opposite direction of what they're

34:08

gonna land. The tower acknowledged the transmission and

34:10

formed flight one eighty two, there was traffic twelve

34:12

o'clock one mile, Sethna. To

34:14

be close some distance and that

34:16

assessment is now previously it was three miles

34:18

away.

34:19

Now it's one mile away. Did they still see

34:21

him? This is when they don't see him. So

34:23

at nine o'clock in forty one seconds, the first officer

34:25

calls for five degrees of flaps and the

34:27

captain asks Is that the one we're looking

34:29

at? The first officer answered, yeah,

34:32

but I don't see him now. So they've

34:34

they lost sight of the assessment. According

34:37

to the copied voice recorder, nine o'clock

34:39

in four to four seconds, flight one eighty two told

34:41

the local controller, okay, we had it there

34:43

a minute ago. And six seconds later,

34:46

I think he's passed off to our right. The local

34:48

controller acknowledges transmission. So

34:51

this is a point of contention

34:53

right here. Uh-huh. According to the air traffic

34:55

control transcript, at nine o'clock and

34:57

fifty seconds, the transmission was

35:00

think he's passing off to our right.

35:02

And the local controller testified he heard he's

35:04

passing off to our right. What

35:06

they said though on a copper voice recorder was

35:08

I think he's passed off to our right

35:10

and he's

35:11

passed. So it's a difference of passed

35:14

or passing. If you say passing, that's

35:16

a lot more active. Like, we see him

35:19

and and we're

35:20

passing. Like, we're we're in the process

35:22

of passing versus They're

35:24

behind it. I think he's passed. Is

35:26

like, we we think he's behind us,

35:28

but we can't see. Uh-huh. So

35:31

there's some ambiguity

35:32

here. Then in in the local recordings

35:35

for their traffic control, there's like, static.

35:37

That's timed just at that

35:38

second syllable. So that's why

35:40

it's like that's why he heard passing

35:43

even though the pilots actually

35:45

said

35:45

passed. But either

35:47

way, well, I guess one sounds

35:50

more active. Yeah. But I

35:52

guess he's passing

35:54

that the the cock they heard what passing?

35:57

The controller heard, yeah, passing.

35:59

In which case, they would have them inside. Right.

36:01

And also so be able to visually

36:03

see that they're not gonna hit

36:05

them. Correct. So

36:07

it's just one of those things

36:09

that one

36:10

of those little things that adds up. Right. It's not

36:12

like this is

36:12

what caused it, but it's just another it's

36:14

one of the things One of the

36:15

compounding thing. Yeah. Stupid static.

36:20

So they they use data from the flight data

36:22

recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and the

36:24

ATC transcripts. And the, you

36:26

know, the comparator with the Sestna one hundred and seventy two performance

36:28

data, and they even use some sizmological data

36:31

to reconstruct the probable

36:34

ground tracks of the two flights

36:36

and to figure out the time that

36:38

they impacted the ground. Okay? You

36:40

know, Southern California has a lot of seismic

36:42

activity, so got a lot of seismological

36:45

sensors. Uh-huh. So they're able to -- Oh.

36:47

-- see when the planes hit the ground based on

36:49

the the

36:50

The readings.

36:51

Yeah. The the the ground impacts.

36:53

Real quick, going back after the

36:55

we think he's passed off to right? Did air

36:57

traffic say anything? What did they say? The

37:00

the he just the local authorities acknowledge the transmission.

37:02

Like, okay. Though I don't know that he's that

37:04

they said okay. All that said was acknowledged transmission.

37:07

So but that's all I have in front of me.

37:09

The ground tracks showed that flight one eighty two

37:11

overflowed the mission bay vortex it. It's

37:13

like a a navigation aid. Mhmm. They turned

37:15

left to heading of about 090 and

37:17

maintained that heading until the collision. And

37:20

again, remember the assessment was also on A090

37:22

heading. They should have been 070.

37:24

If they had gone 070, they

37:26

would have been further north. And the

37:29

PSA plane would have missed them because they would have

37:31

been slightly twenty degrees turned to the left.

37:33

Yeah. It's still pretty close though.

37:35

It still it it depends on the timing, but it

37:37

could be close. But You know, also I think they only need

37:39

to maintain, like, thousand feet of separation. Yeah.

37:42

I guess like, this had to been

37:44

the the most perfect bad

37:46

timing -- Yeah. -- because for them to

37:49

cross paths exactly

37:51

at that moment at the exact

37:53

altitude. Right? Yeah. There's

37:55

there's a thing I hear a lot of pilots say

37:57

this. You're right. Like, the

38:00

the timing has to be so precise for two

38:02

planes to collide. Wow. It's not going down. Lots

38:04

of pilots will say sky big, plain small.

38:06

Like, it's really improbable to

38:09

have two planes be in the

38:11

exact same space at the exact same time.

38:13

Because you have three-dimensional movement. When talking about

38:15

going down, like one's descending, one's

38:17

climbing, then they both happen to be at

38:19

the same altitude, in the same space, at

38:21

the same time. And at the time of the

38:23

collision, the altitude was at about two thousand six

38:25

hundred feet. I know you'd asked that earlier, so there it is.

38:28

The track showed flight one eighty two flew about

38:30

four point two miles south of Montgomery Field

38:33

That's where the assessment was based out of. And

38:35

the ground check showed the assessment turned to the northeast

38:37

just west of Lindbergh field and maintained

38:39

that approximate heading for about one minute

38:41

Then the Cessna turned right to a heading

38:43

of about 090 and maintained that approximate

38:46

heading until the collision. The copy voice recorder

38:48

showed that flight one eighty two's flight crew continued to

38:50

discuss the location of traffic. At nine

38:52

o'clock in fifty two seconds, the captain said,

38:54

he was right over there a minute ago. The

38:56

first officer said, yeah. Nine

38:58

fifty two nine o'clock and fifty

39:00

two

39:01

seconds. Nine o'clock.

39:02

Okay. Fifty two seconds. Yeah. That was okay. Yeah.

39:04

No. No. That was, like, ten minutes passed. Then

39:06

at 901 and eleven seconds after

39:08

the captain told the local controller how far they were gonna

39:10

extend their down one leg. The first officer

39:12

asked, are we clear of that assessment? The

39:14

flight engineer said, supposed to be

39:16

The captain said, I guess. And

39:19

the four jump seat occupant said, I hope.

39:21

Oh my god. That's not the

39:24

confirmation you want. That's not no. Then

39:26

ten seconds later at 901 and twenty one

39:28

seconds, Kevin said, oh yeah, before we turn

39:30

down

39:30

wind, I saw him about one o'clock probably

39:33

behind us now. So they they

39:35

they lost sight of him and just don't

39:37

know

39:37

at this point. And he's right below

39:39

them? He's right below -- Yep. -- right in front

39:41

of them and right

39:42

below them. In front of them below them,

39:44

and and they're gonna lower They're

39:46

descending into these clogs. Looks like on top yeah.

39:48

That 901 and thirty one seconds first officer

39:51

called gear down. Then seven seconds later,

39:53

the first officer said, there's one underneath he's

39:55

looking at the gear indicators. And then one second later,

39:57

he said, I was looking at that inbound there.

39:59

Uh-huh. Approach control on the ground

40:01

picked up an automated conflict alert nineteen

40:04

seconds before the collision, but did not

40:06

relay this information to the aircraft. Because

40:08

according to their approach coordinator, such alerts

40:11

were commonplace even when no actual

40:13

conflict existed. So they got these

40:15

alerts all the time, so they didn't say anything. But

40:17

then why have them? Right. Exactly.

40:20

Why have the alert if it's just gonna give you

40:22

false false alarms? The NTSB

40:24

stated based on all information available

40:26

to him decided the crew of flight one eighty

40:28

two were complying with their visual separation clearance.

40:31

They were accomplishing an overtake maneuver

40:33

with the separation parameters of the conflict

40:35

alert computer and that therefore

40:37

no conflict existed. So the controller even

40:40

though he's getting the alert. He's been told,

40:42

like when AH2 sees the traffic and they're

40:44

gonna do what they need to do to avoid it.

40:46

And in his brain, he

40:49

heard we're passing right.

40:51

So they he maintained sight of them the

40:54

whole

40:54

time. Right. Because flight one eighty two never told the

40:56

controller they lost sight of the Sessna. As far

40:58

as the approach controller knows, they still see it and

41:00

they're they're doing their job and

41:02

keeping that

41:02

separate.

41:03

Other than when he said, we think.

41:05

I think that was just internal. Oh,

41:07

I don't think he ever broadcast that. Let me check.

41:09

I thought it was Oh, yeah. You're right. I think he's passed

41:11

off to our

41:12

right. Instead of think he's passing off to

41:14

our right. Think is an important

41:16

word because the think the passing

41:19

and past That that's

41:21

but the

41:21

think. Yeah. You you don't wanna hear that. You

41:24

you wanna know definitively yes or no.

41:26

Yeah. At 901 and forty

41:28

seven seconds, the approach controller advised the assessment

41:30

pilot of traffic in your vicinity, a

41:32

PSA jet has you in sight. He's

41:34

descending for Lindbergh, and this transmission

41:36

was not acknowledged. The approach controller

41:39

did not inform Lindbergh Tower of the conflict alert

41:41

involving Flight one eighty two in the Sessna, because

41:43

he believed that One eighty two's flight crew had the Sessna

41:45

in sight. And this was the exact moment

41:47

when the collision occurred 901 in forty seven seconds.

41:50

That's why no one there was no response

41:52

because that's when they hit. They hit the

41:54

two planes collided. According to the report,

41:56

the system may have been a difficult visual target

41:58

for the the jets pilots --

42:00

Uh-huh. -- because it was below them and it

42:02

blended in with the multicolored houses of

42:04

the residential area that was beneath them.

42:07

The Sesenas fuselage was yellow

42:09

And most of the houses were a yellowish color.

42:11

So it's kind of almost like a weird camouflage.

42:13

Yeah. And the apparent motion of thecessna

42:16

is viewed from the Boeing was minimized because they

42:18

were going. Oh, no. It's in the same direction.

42:20

Yeah. So it's like, our eyes can

42:22

pick up movement pretty well, but since they

42:24

were going in the same

42:25

direction, there was no real like,

42:27

it didn't appear to really be moving very much.

42:29

How fast were each plane? I don't

42:31

know that for a fact. I'm

42:33

gonna guess assessment climbing

42:35

out two thousand six hundred feet hitting

42:37

for three thousand five hundred. It's

42:40

probably doing eighty knots,

42:42

eighty five knots, something like that. It's

42:44

not a tremendous amount of speed. I don't know what

42:46

the approach speed of seven twenty seven is,

42:48

but the assessment probably was not going very fast.

42:50

And another reason that

42:53

It may have been difficult to see the Cessna was

42:55

because of the phenomenon of

42:58

force shortening. You know, it's like how when you

43:00

look at Like, let's say you have an

43:02

object, and you look at it from the side. Like, it's

43:04

really like like, say, you have fork -- Uh-huh. --

43:06

and you look at it from the side. And it's like that fork's

43:08

really wide and big. But if you turn it at an

43:11

angle so that it's like, pointing at you or

43:13

away from you, it becomes more

43:14

narrow. Yeah. And shorter and small. That's four

43:16

shortening. So it's like, since the assessment

43:18

was no

43:19

No. It was climbing. No.

43:21

No. Because it was maintaining below thirty five

43:23

hundred, but was it declining? It's climbing up to three thousand

43:25

five hundred. So it's like it's at and it's

43:27

it it's not crossing their

43:29

path, it's going along the same path. So

43:31

it looks more narrow than it would

43:34

otherwise.

43:35

Yeah. Does it say what I'm saying? Yeah. Okay.

43:37

I

43:37

think so. Forks. Forks. Or

43:39

it's it's like when in animation when

43:41

you like, animations are flat

43:43

to the surface. Mhmm. And they want when they wanna

43:46

show, like, someone's, like, reaching

43:48

forward, they'll make, like, the arm longer.

43:50

Like, as it reaches into the four grams forward That's,

43:52

like, four shortening. It's, like, it it gets shorter,

43:54

but it gets longer your brain perceives

43:56

that. Anyway, so since

43:59

the assessment was turned, it didn't

44:01

have as much of a target for them to see

44:03

is what it boils down to. However, that

44:05

same report in another section said that

44:07

the white surface of the assessment swing could

44:09

have presented a relatively bright target in the

44:11

morning sunlight. So it's possible that the sun

44:13

should have been reflecting off of it and maybe it would

44:15

have that should have helped them identify

44:17

it. Probably

44:18

weren't looking below them. Maybe

44:20

they thought it was behind them.

44:22

For a while, they thought it was in front of them because they said

44:24

three miles in front, one

44:25

mile, and then they thought they were passing it. So they should

44:27

have been able to see it for a while there.

44:29

Actually, somewhere in a little bit, I'm gonna talk about

44:31

I have a breakdown when they should have been able to see

44:33

it. We won't get to that in here in a bit. According

44:35

to the witnesses, both aircraft were proceeding

44:38

in an Easterly direction before the collision, Flight

44:40

one eighty two was descending and overtaking the Sesenuk,

44:43

which was climbing in a wing level attitude.

44:45

Just before the impact flight one eighty two banked

44:47

to the right slightly and the assessment pitch

44:49

nose up and clatted with the right wing

44:51

of flight one eighty two. The system

44:53

broke up immediately and exploded and segments

44:56

of fragmented wreckage fell from the right wing

44:58

and impanage of flight one eighty two impanage

45:00

course is the tail. Flight one eighty two began a

45:02

shallow right descending turn leaving a trail of

45:04

vapor like substance from the right wing.

45:06

A bright orange fire erupted in the vicinity

45:09

of the right wing and increasing intensity as

45:11

the aircraft descended. The aircraft remained

45:13

in a right turn, and both the bank and

45:15

pitch angle increased during the descent to

45:17

about fifty degrees that impact. So you

45:19

know, that right wing's damaged. So

45:21

the left, you know, the left wing's gonna keep providing

45:23

more lift and that's gonna slowly begin

45:26

bank to the right and, you know, they're gonna descend

45:28

because they don't have as much lift and that's why, you

45:30

know, they enter that descending bank

45:32

to the right and impact the ground. At

45:34

901 forty seven seconds, a crunching

45:36

sound was recorded and disturbances in the aircraft

45:38

electrical system were detected on an unused

45:41

radio channel in the cockpit voice recorder. That's why

45:43

able to establish that 901 and forty

45:45

seven seconds was the time of collision. Electrical

45:48

power to the recorder ended at 902

45:50

and four seconds about two and a half

45:52

seconds before the ground impact was recorded on

45:54

the seismic graph. Both aircraft were destroyed

45:57

by the collision, in flight, and post impact

45:59

fires, and of course impact No survivors.

46:02

Terrible, terrible tragedy all

46:04

around. Flight one eighty two crashed

46:06

at a heading of about two hundred degrees

46:08

in a right wing low nose down

46:11

attitude. So they had been heading ninety

46:13

degrees initially. Two hundred is the

46:15

one eighty would be south. So then two hundred's like

46:17

just a little west of south. So

46:19

South Southwest. K? The Sess nine

46:21

seventy two was damaged extensively by the collision and

46:23

fell to the ground in several pieces. The seven

46:25

twenty seven fuselage was damaged severely by

46:27

ground impact, fuselage structure from

46:29

the cockpit to the air stair compartment

46:32

was collapsed and was completely fragmented. Major

46:34

portions consumed by ground fire. Like we said, there was

46:37

huge fire on the ground.

46:39

The right wing was fragmented completely by ground

46:42

impact, almost all identifiable pieces

46:44

of wing structure that have been damaged by either

46:46

in flight or post impact ground fire or both.

46:48

Measurement of the flap jack screw showed the flaps

46:50

were in fifteen degree position at impact.

46:53

The Impanage, which is the tail, horizontal

46:55

and vertical stabilizers and rudder assembly were

46:57

damaged severely by ground impact and

46:59

fire. All three engines had separated

47:01

from the air craft were found in the main wreckage

47:03

area,

47:04

all to date, all to be separated Mhmm.

47:06

-- from probably from the forms of the impact

47:08

of evident. Okay. And like we've talked about in

47:10

previous episodes, they were

47:13

in the main wreckage area, which means they didn't

47:15

separate before the crash. You know,

47:17

they landed. Even though they separated from

47:19

the frame, they were there with all the other parts.

47:21

That's one of the ways they figure out if something

47:23

broke a head time, but even though this one's very clear

47:25

cut, it was a collision. Except for parts of the assessments

47:28

left wing and left wing fuel tank Major portions

47:30

of the Sesnes records fell to the ground about three

47:32

thousand five hundred feet northwest of the wreckage

47:34

of the Boeing seven twenty seven. So you were asking,

47:36

like, mhmm. How spread out would have occurred

47:38

because it was overtaking. So all told

47:41

the assessment fell in one spot and then

47:43

about thirty five hundred feet away was

47:45

the the wreckage of the seven twenty seven. That's

47:47

not that far? No. It's -- Yeah. -- a

47:49

little over half a mile. It's not it's

47:52

not that far at all. I mapped it. Like I said, I was looking

47:54

at Google Maps trying to figure out where everything wasn't. It's

47:56

just like blocks away from each other. It's not not

47:58

far away at

47:58

all. Because they were so

47:59

low -- Right. -- at that point. Yeah. It it's

48:01

just not that very much time to do anything.

48:04

Various pieces of the seven twenty seven's right

48:06

wing leading edge flaps system were recovered

48:08

in the Cessna wreckage, so presumably from

48:10

the point of impact, like parts of the seven twenty

48:12

seven, you know, get stuck in

48:14

and fall down with the Cessna wreckage.

48:17

The Cessna's left wing fuel tank was

48:19

recovered at the seven twenty seven's wreckage

48:21

site. Half of the tank was missing and the

48:23

remaining portion was crushed. So it probably

48:26

ripped off the left wing of the Cessna

48:28

and, you know, just took it to it with yeah. Wow.

48:30

So the big question, of course, all

48:32

this boils down to is, was it possible

48:35

for the pilots of seven twenty seven to see the

48:37

assessment? Right? Yeah. Since, like, you like,

48:39

you you've mentioned, you know, the assessment was a little

48:41

low. You should they've been able to see over the nose of

48:43

the plane and see down there and see the assessment

48:45

below them. So there was a cockpit visibility

48:48

study based on a series of photographs

48:50

they took with a binocular camera

48:52

mounted in the cockpit. Of a similar

48:55

Boeing seven twenty seven at the design

48:57

I reference point for the pilot and copilot

48:59

seats and an arbitrary eye position

49:01

for the observer seat. So there's specific

49:04

locations that the seats are

49:06

designed to be used in. So they don't

49:08

know, you know, exactly where the

49:11

captain, the first officer, had their seat adjusted

49:13

to, so they set the seats to a standard

49:15

the standard position where you should

49:17

be sitting so that you have the appropriate

49:20

amount of view in front of you and instruments.

49:22

Okay? Assuming they were sitting correctly.

49:25

Correct. Exactly. And they took similar photographs

49:27

from the inside of the Sesta one seventy

49:29

two you

49:30

know, just to just to see as well.

49:32

And then and on top of that, they also

49:34

took additional photographs for the seven twenty

49:36

seven with the camera mounted five inches

49:38

forward of the normal design eye reference

49:41

point to represent a pilot leaning forward

49:43

five

49:43

inches just like to be looking Right. He's leaning

49:45

forward to try to look over the nose. They

49:47

call this position, the alert position. Okay?

49:50

So they're they're just trying to recreate what

49:52

could they have seen. What does the the

49:54

view look like. And the photograph showed

49:56

a panoramic view of the window configuration as

49:58

seen by the crew member as he rotates his

50:01

head from one extreme side to the

50:02

other. I think nowadays, it would probably use the computer

50:05

simulations. So, like --

50:06

Yeah. Yeah. -- to, like, recreate all of that. But

50:08

this is, like, no. We're gonna set up vernacular

50:10

cameras and we're gonna, you know, we're gonna put out

50:12

graph paper and, you know, we're gonna make a grid and

50:14

that's what they did, you know. So they

50:16

they made a a grid of horizontal and

50:18

vertical lines in five degree increments and they

50:20

superimpose it over the photographs. Wow.

50:24

It's like a while to think about now. It's like you would

50:26

you would just simulate this or do it on a computer

50:28

nowadays. Then each photograph contains

50:30

seventeen points, which represent the calculated

50:33

location of the target aircraft. On

50:35

the viewing aircraft's windshield, from a

50:37

hundred seventy

50:38

seconds, just ten seconds before the collision.

50:40

So so up until ten seconds

50:42

before it, there So they they they

50:44

try to calculate that's just the time frame where they try

50:46

to calculate it. And then so now

50:48

the answer to the question you're you're getting out there.

50:50

The photographs taken from the captain and first officer's

50:52

seat showed that the assessment would have been almost

50:54

centered on their windshields. From a hundred

50:56

seventy to ninety seconds before the collision.

50:59

And thereafter, it was positioned on the lower

51:01

portion of the windshield just above the windshield

51:03

wipers. Movement to the alert position

51:06

elevated the position of the Cessna targets

51:08

during the last eighty seconds slightly. The

51:10

view from the observer seat showed the Cessna target

51:13

would have been hidden by the captain's head and shoulders

51:15

and the aircraft structure. So that's essentially

51:17

saying the assessment would have been centered

51:19

in their windshield for eighty seconds.

51:22

Between a hundred seventy and ninety seconds before

51:24

impact. And that's that's almost the

51:26

whole time that was plenty of time. That

51:28

well, because they got okay. They called out

51:30

we see the assessment. They were

51:32

alerted the assessment eight fifty nine. Then they

51:34

said they found it at nine.

51:37

Then at nine forty one, they

51:39

lose

51:39

it? Right. So at 901 and forty

51:41

seven seconds is impact time. So let's work

51:43

back from that. So the for

51:46

ninety seconds before that, that would be

51:48

nine o'clock and seventeen seconds.

51:51

Mhmm. And then eighty seconds before that.

51:53

So between eighty seconds

51:55

before that leading up to nine

51:57

o'clock in seventeen seconds, they should have been able

51:59

to see it. Right center in their windshield. Yeah.

52:02

And then after that, they could still see it.

52:04

It was just lower right above their windshield

52:06

wipers. But it was there. It was there.

52:08

And then, you know, if they moved up to the alert

52:10

position, they could still

52:12

see it for the last eighty seconds slightly.

52:14

So when they said, we think he's best off to

52:16

her right. It was not

52:17

correct. Yeah. He was -- Right. -- straight

52:20

in front of him. Mhmm. And again,

52:22

like like we talked about the

52:24

assessment was kinda like this orange ish yellow

52:26

color. Kinda look like the house is below.

52:28

Yeah. It was flying in the same direction, so it

52:30

didn't have any really apparent movement. That's

52:33

crazy. But the the amount of time from

52:35

seeing it to disappearing was

52:37

for them to lose it was, like, nothing.

52:39

Yeah. It's real quick. They probably both looked down at their

52:41

instruments. To do something and they look

52:44

back up and like, oh, where did it go? Yeah. We

52:46

don't know specifically what they were looking

52:48

at, you know, where their head was positioned, but

52:51

it should have been there. And I know it sounds

52:54

improbable. Like, how can they not see it? How can they

52:56

lose it? It's hard to see planes

52:58

sometimes. Even when I'm flying sometimes, Maybe

53:00

like, you know, there's a Boeing seven thirty seven

53:02

three miles off to your right. I'm like, I don't see anything

53:04

over there. Like,

53:06

okay. I'm looking. SSAs

53:08

are way smaller.

53:09

Yeah. Way, way smaller. Yeah. It's like

53:11

it makes me nervous sometimes. I'm like, I don't see it. Where

53:13

it? But at least now nowadays, we'll

53:15

get the nowadays part in a bit. But nowadays, it's

53:18

much safer for a variety of reasons, and we're

53:20

gonna talk about that here in a bit. Alright.

53:22

So it's about time to, like, talk

53:24

about the conclusions. Right? What are the findings

53:27

from all of this? And the first first

53:29

one I'm gonna cover here is the assessment was operating in

53:31

an area where air traffic control was being

53:33

exercised and its pilot was required

53:35

to either comply with ATC instructions to

53:37

maintain the 070 heading or to

53:39

advise the controller if he was unable to do

53:41

so. And the setup pilot failed to maintain

53:43

the assigned heading contained in his ATC

53:46

instruction.

53:47

And we don't know what happened there.

53:49

They were at 070.

53:51

They ended up at 090.

53:53

And ATC didn't correct them.

53:55

Did they know did I guess they saw it on the radar?

53:57

Yeah. ATC would have seen it. Remember the the

53:59

collision alert starts popping up? Yeah.

54:02

So they could Mhmm.

54:02

Yeah. Air traffic control should have in my mind,

54:05

air travel should have been like, hey, what's going

54:07

on with the

54:07

head and And then officer should have told the other

54:09

plane. So it's like everyone messed

54:11

up. There

54:12

were lots of mess ups. Yeah. All messed

54:13

up. In the perfectly wrong

54:15

way. Right. And the other plane member never

54:17

told anyone they couldn't see the assessment anymore. See it.

54:19

Yeah. As far as their traffic control

54:21

knew, The PSA pilots had

54:23

saw the assessment the whole time.

54:24

They had When they assumed they had passed

54:26

it. When they had when they had it. Right.

54:28

The cockpit visibility study shows that

54:30

if the eyes of the Boeing seven twenty seven pilot was

54:32

located at the aircraft's design I reference point,

54:34

the assessment target would have been visible. Two

54:37

separate air traffic control facilities were controlling

54:39

traffic in the same airspace. We talked about that.

54:41

Getting handed off from approach to tower, that's

54:43

very common. That happens. You come in

54:45

here to Austin, you'll talk to approach,

54:47

then you get handed off to final approach, then

54:49

you get handed off to the tower. So coming into

54:51

land in Austin, you can expect three different you could talk

54:53

about three different people before you land. So

54:56

that that's not uncommon. Approach

54:58

controller did not instruct flight one eighty two

55:00

to maintain four thousand feet until clear of the

55:02

Montgomery Field Airport traffic area

55:04

in accordance with established procedures. So

55:06

the approach controller should have told one eighty

55:08

two to stay above four thousand feet. Because

55:11

remember they kept getting assessed that to stay at

55:13

or below three thousand five

55:14

hundred. That's like the emergence That should be

55:16

like your emergency buffer there. Mhmm.

55:18

But they didn't they

55:19

didn't tell, like, one eighty two to maintain four thousand

55:21

feet.

55:22

Yeah. That's kind of a big one.

55:24

Yeah. Especially since it was

55:26

visible on the radar that they weren't in the right

55:29

heading. Right. And just in general,

55:31

there might be other traffic because I

55:33

don't know what the airspace around San Diego

55:35

was at the time. And I don't know how the

55:37

laws have changed over the last almost fifty or forty

55:39

five years. Right? Nowadays, if

55:42

you're let's say, if definitely

55:44

if you're around San Diego, you have to have

55:46

an active transponder so they can see you on radar.

55:49

But at some smaller airports nowadays, you

55:51

don't need to have that transponder. So you might not show

55:53

up on radar. So that's why

55:55

you have rules like this. Like -- Yeah. -- there

55:57

might be traffic without a transponder

56:00

going into Montgomery Field. So keep

56:02

the lower altitudes clear in case there's

56:04

a plane we don't see on our radar. Okay.

56:07

It's very complicated. I'm not gonna get into all the

56:09

detail of that, but just kind of a broad

56:11

explanation of things that are possible to happen.

56:14

The issuance and acceptance of the maintained visual

56:16

separation clearance made the flight crew of one eighty

56:18

two responsible for seeing and avoiding the Sessna

56:20

ultimately. They were told to maintain visual

56:22

separation. It was on them to

56:24

see and avoid, and they lost sight of the

56:26

assessment and didn't tell anyone. And that's

56:28

the next one. The flight code of flight one eighty two lost sight

56:30

of the assessment and did not clearly inform controller

56:32

personnel of that fact. The tower local

56:35

controller and vice flight one eighty two that assessment was

56:37

at twelve clock one mile, the flight crew

56:39

comments the local controller, indicated

56:41

to him that they had passed or were passing

56:43

the Sessna, the approach controller received

56:45

a conflict alert on flight one eighty two, and

56:47

the sesna at 901 and twenty

56:49

eight seconds, the conflict warning alerts the

56:51

controller the possibility that under certain conditions,

56:54

Less than required separation may result if

56:56

action is not or has not been taken

56:58

to resolve the conflict, the approach controller took

57:00

no action upon receipt of the conflict alert

57:03

because he believed flight one eighty two had the assessment

57:05

site and the conflict was resolved, this was

57:07

nineteen seconds before impact. And

57:09

that was right after they lost visibility.

57:11

Right? They lost visibility.

57:13

I don't remember what was the time frame when they

57:15

lost that

57:16

visibility. Or

57:17

to keep track of the site. There's a lot of Yeah. Well, it

57:19

all happened so fast. Yeah. Normally, we talk

57:21

about this. It's like, I can I remember the seconds?

57:23

remember the min

57:24

well, we're talking about minutes. Now it's like seconds

57:26

seconds that we're talking about all of this. I mean, there's

57:28

so many things happened. We broke down nine

57:30

to I know

57:31

what? Yeah. Like, there's, like, eight bullet

57:33

points. Yeah. So it was at

57:35

901 and eleven seconds

57:38

that the pilots had the internal conversation.

57:40

Are we clear that Cessna? Supposed to be, I

57:42

guess, I hope that whole exchange. That was at

57:44

901 and eleven seconds. They they so they

57:46

definitely don't see it at that point. And then

57:48

just before that, at nine o'clock in forty one

57:51

seconds, that's when the first officer called for

57:53

the flaps and asked, you know, is that the one

57:55

we're looking at? Yeah. But I don't see him now. So that's

57:57

when they that's when they lose him. Nine o'clock and forty

57:59

one seconds. That's what? Thirty seconds.

58:02

No. No. That's a little more than thirty seconds.

58:04

That's about forty seven seconds before

58:06

this alert goes off. And about

58:08

a minute before the impact. The conflict

58:10

alert procedures in effect at the time of the accident

58:12

did not require the controller warn the pilots

58:14

of the aircraft involved in any conflict

58:16

situation. What do you mean? Like, that

58:18

thing goes off and it's the warning,

58:21

conflict. What would they say

58:23

in that situation? What should he have said? He

58:26

would say, you know, like, PSA182

58:28

climb, you know, expedite climb,

58:30

maintain four thousand feet or whatever. And then it

58:33

sets up whatever their tail number was,

58:35

descend or maintain altitude,

58:37

like, to try to

58:38

get some vertical separated. Should they go the right they

58:40

they go opposite direction? Right.

58:41

Nowadays, we have t Yeah. Yeah. That resolves that. They

58:43

didn't have TCAS back then. So the controller would

58:45

have to have to act as TCAS, order

58:47

one plane up and order one plane down. TCAS

58:49

is the automated system that automatically tells

58:52

both planes but stretched to

58:53

go. Exactly. The traffic traffic collision avoidance

58:55

system. And we're we're actually gonna talk about

58:58

TCAS here in just a bit. And then

59:00

the last bullet point here is the Boeing seven twenty

59:02

seven was probably not controllable after

59:04

the collision, though there's really

59:06

nothing they could have done. There was so

59:09

we talk about these every now and then there

59:12

and I'm always I'm always hesitant

59:14

to bring them up, but there was a dissenting conclusion

59:17

found It doesn't happen all the time,

59:19

so I feel compelled to bring it up when it does happen,

59:21

or it's like some of the investigators disagree

59:24

or have a slightly different opinion.

59:27

Some of the times we've talked about this in the past, it's like,

59:29

what would the dissenting opinion or the dissenting

59:31

inclusions radically different? Or

59:33

it's like in the something entirely different

59:35

than what we talked about. This dissenting conclusion

59:38

is largely the same. There's only

59:40

a few, like, minor differences. Okay.

59:42

Now I was I was hesitant to bring it up, but

59:44

Since it does exist, I did I did wanna bring

59:46

it up. The dissenting conclusion finds

59:48

the failure of flight crew of flight one aim

59:51

to to maintain visual separation and to

59:53

advise the controller when visual contact was lost,

59:55

and the air traffic control procedures in effect,

59:57

which authorize the controllers to use visual separation

59:59

procedures in a terminal area environment and

1:00:02

the capability was available to provide either lateral

1:00:04

or vertical radar separation to either aircraft

1:00:06

contributing to the accident war, the failure

1:00:09

of the traffic control system to establish procedures

1:00:11

for most effect of use of the conflict alert system

1:00:13

at the San Diego approach control facility, the

1:00:16

failure of the controller to restrict PSA one hundred and eighty

1:00:18

two to four thousand foot constitute until clear the

1:00:20

Montgomeryfield airport traffic area, the

1:00:22

improper resolution by the controller of the conflict

1:00:24

alert, the procedure whereby two

1:00:26

separate air traffic control facilities were controlling

1:00:29

traffic in the same airspace, the failure

1:00:31

of the controller to advise PSA-one hundred and eighty two of

1:00:33

the direction of movement of the assessment, the failure

1:00:35

of the assessment maintain assigned heading, A

1:00:37

possible misidentification of the setup by

1:00:39

PSA one hundred and eighty two due to the presence of a third

1:00:42

unknown aircraft in the area. It's a

1:00:44

lot. It's a lot. It's largely the

1:00:46

same. It's a lot of a lot of it's the

1:00:48

same stuff we already talked about.

1:00:49

Yeah. Well, I I thought that was

1:00:50

all. Yeah. So this is this is the dissenting

1:00:53

conclusion. Wait. What was different? Right.

1:00:55

I can't even I could not even tell it was

1:00:57

different. I think it it boils down to

1:00:59

very specific wording. Mhmm. Like,

1:01:01

you know, a layperson's gonna read and It's it's

1:01:03

exactly the same. There's very

1:01:06

minor differences. I

1:01:08

think the big one here is

1:01:10

that last one that I read. The possible

1:01:12

misidentification of the assessment by PSA-one hundred and eighty

1:01:14

two due to the presence of third unknown aircraft

1:01:17

in the area. Some of

1:01:19

the people some of the eyewitnesses who were interviewed

1:01:21

on the ground number I mentioned to Wally Funk earlier.

1:01:23

Some of the people she interviewed I forgot the

1:01:25

exact number. I wanna say she said, interviewed either

1:01:27

twenty seven or twenty nine eyewitnesses on the

1:01:29

ground, sixteen of them said

1:01:31

there was a third aircraft in the area. So

1:01:34

And there was no they went back through the radar

1:01:36

data. There's no record of a third aircraft in

1:01:39

the area. So Not even the

1:01:41

other one that we talked

1:01:42

about? That that's that's a different one. So

1:01:45

this is a This is another No. There's a fourth

1:01:47

or fourth

1:01:48

one possibly. Right. So they referred

1:01:50

to it as third aircraft because that other one

1:01:52

we talked about was, like, that resolved

1:01:54

earlier. Okay. So these I wanted to say that

1:01:56

there was another aircraft in the area

1:01:58

and that's really, I think, what this dissenting

1:02:01

conclusion is about is maybe

1:02:03

PSA one hundred eighty two saw this other plane

1:02:05

and thought that was their traffic. But in reality,

1:02:07

it was the assessment that they hit. And they never saw

1:02:09

the assessment at all. Right. Again,

1:02:12

there was no they they could not find

1:02:14

any solid evidence to say there was another

1:02:16

aircraft there, but sixteen

1:02:18

people on the ground said they sought. Not

1:02:21

everyone, but six that's a lot of people. Then they

1:02:23

interview these people independently. Right. It's

1:02:25

not like one person heard another person

1:02:27

say it. And were these people

1:02:30

I assume most of these people looked

1:02:32

up when they heard the thing.

1:02:34

Right. Or some of them were already

1:02:36

looking up watching the planes. Like, I don't know. But

1:02:38

anytime I hear a plane, I look up. Like, so

1:02:41

Maybe they heard the planes and they were looking up already

1:02:43

and saw everything

1:02:44

happen. Okay.

1:02:45

So that that that's a lot of people.

1:02:47

It's a lot of people, Chris. So how many of

1:02:49

them were kids? I don't

1:02:51

I don't know that exact

1:02:52

number. And think that's the big

1:02:54

reason for this dissenting. Okay. Yeah. No.

1:02:57

And that makes sense because when you I didn't catch

1:02:59

it at first because when he said because of the other plane,

1:03:01

in my

1:03:01

head, I went back to Oh, yeah. The one that Mm-mm.

1:03:03

No. There was, like, another unknown aircraft.

1:03:05

And like we said, not every aircraft

1:03:08

I don't know what the airspace was like back then. I don't know

1:03:10

what the rules were back then, but not every aircraft

1:03:12

necessarily has to have a transponder. So not every

1:03:14

aircraft may show up on radar

1:03:17

not every aircraft may necessarily

1:03:19

contact air traffic control and be participating

1:03:21

in traffic separation. So it's

1:03:23

possible there was a third aircraft

1:03:25

there, but there's no record of

1:03:27

it and no one ever came forward and said, hey,

1:03:29

I was flying in that area as well that morning.

1:03:32

So I don't know. It's just a

1:03:34

possibility. It maybe it happened There's

1:03:36

no way to confirm that. Okay. And, you know, these

1:03:38

reports like to be very fact based. Like,

1:03:41

this is we know for fact one hundred

1:03:43

percent this would happen, and this one's this last

1:03:45

point's a little speculative. So,

1:03:47

you know, we we mentioned TCAS a little a little

1:03:49

while ago. It's and like Chris explained,

1:03:51

it's an automated system that

1:03:54

all, you know, passenger planes. Lots

1:03:56

of lots of planes have nowadays that

1:03:59

can detect when there's going to be collision

1:04:01

and can give traffic resolution to both

1:04:03

planes. It'll tell one to climb, one the other one to

1:04:05

descend, or one to turn in one direction, the

1:04:07

other one to turn also in a direction so that

1:04:09

they don't collide. TCAS was put This

1:04:11

was one of the incidents that led to the development

1:04:14

of TCAS. I can't say this one definitively

1:04:16

by itself, but this is one of the incidents

1:04:18

that cause the FAA to

1:04:21

pursue the technology of

1:04:22

TCAS. TCAS went into development

1:04:24

in nineteen eighty one, so three years after this accident.

1:04:27

And and when you say, like, developments, like,

1:04:29

they think they knew how to it otherwise,

1:04:31

we we need a system. We need a system. We need

1:04:33

a system. We need to figure this out. So

1:04:35

that's when they they started it. And I

1:04:37

think TCAS finally went into it

1:04:39

was certified in April nineteen eighty six and

1:04:41

approved for operational assessment early

1:04:43

nineteen eighty seven. So took them five or six years

1:04:45

to build it and figure it out. Yeah. And then

1:04:48

they they started going out. And now And

1:04:50

we've talked about other incidents before where TCAS,

1:04:52

you know, alerts, planes. That's that's

1:04:54

a huge thing for making sure

1:04:56

that planes don't don't collide

1:04:57

anymore. Yeah. It's still a big

1:05:00

big sky little plane and now there's a system

1:05:02

that takes care of that even if

1:05:04

it

1:05:04

is, they do happen to end up

1:05:06

on path Right. And and and and just for clarification,

1:05:09

assessment of that size even today does not have

1:05:11

to have two cast. Right. Probably. Only aircraft

1:05:13

certified to carry nineteen o more passengers

1:05:15

or maximum takeoff weight of more than twelve

1:05:17

thousand six hundred pounds requires TCAS.

1:05:19

So the Cessna, even today does not require

1:05:21

TCAS, but is

1:05:24

we've talked about this system before. There's ADSB,

1:05:27

which is like the ability for

1:05:29

to breed transponders. So

1:05:32

you and I went flying before, you know, I had

1:05:34

that iPad that I was using.

1:05:36

That shows me all the traffic. It shows me all the

1:05:38

ADSB data of planes in the area. So it's not

1:05:40

TCAS. If there's gonna be a collision, it

1:05:42

doesn't tell me what to

1:05:43

do, but it lets me know of all the planes around

1:05:45

me. With all the planes around me with ADS B.

1:05:47

Okay. So so it's kinda like

1:05:50

it tells you where the planes are. So

1:05:52

it's like secondhand ADS B.

1:05:54

Secondhand TCCAT. TCCAT. Sorry. Yes.

1:05:56

Second hand TCAS. Kinda. Yeah. It's like,

1:05:59

hey. And it'll alert me. It'll say, like, you

1:06:01

know, if there's if you start getting close to

1:06:03

a plane my iPad, it'll pop up and say, like, traffic,

1:06:05

twelve

1:06:05

o'clock, three miles or whatever. So it's like,

1:06:07

oh, it's cool. Yeah. You know, when you so it'll

1:06:09

alert you. It's not as robust as

1:06:11

TCAS, but it is still

1:06:13

really good to have. And you have you not

1:06:16

every plane is required to have ADS B either, but

1:06:18

if you're flying around busy airport, you do have

1:06:20

to have ADS B. Okay? So it's

1:06:22

you know, these two systems together kinda

1:06:25

help you be safer when you're in

1:06:27

the air. Also, you know, like we

1:06:29

like we said, at the time, San

1:06:31

Diego Linberg Airport or Lin Linberg

1:06:33

Airport. Linberg Field was the only

1:06:35

airport in San Diego County with an ILS. Right

1:06:38

after this accident, FAA installed systems

1:06:40

at Montgomery

1:06:41

Field, a McClellan Palomar Airport,

1:06:43

as well as a localizer at Gillespie Field. That

1:06:45

way, planes could practice instrument approaches

1:06:47

at

1:06:47

the other smaller airports and didn't

1:06:49

have to come into San Diego anymore. But

1:06:51

like I said here in Austin, there's tons of small airports

1:06:54

in the area where you can practice you don't have to go

1:06:56

to Austin Bergstrom to do it because why would you

1:06:58

do

1:06:58

that? That's great. All the big all the big planes

1:07:00

are, you don't wanna have another incident like this. You

1:07:02

brought to a small airport just has general

1:07:04

aviation. Sit there and then get better and then try

1:07:06

the bigger airports. Right. And,

1:07:08

you know, after this incident, there were changes. There

1:07:10

were some technical changes made to the airspace

1:07:13

around the Lindbergh

1:07:13

airport. They made it a class bravo airspace,

1:07:15

which I think we had an episode where we talked about the

1:07:18

different

1:07:18

class -- Yeah. -- of airspace. And, you know, bravo

1:07:20

is a very busy airport. So it just it provides

1:07:22

more robust control. It requires more

1:07:24

technology for flying into a bravo. You need to

1:07:26

have ADS B. You need to have a radio.

1:07:29

You know, it's it's a lot more strict.

1:07:31

And this accident also led

1:07:34

to we've talked about this before as

1:07:36

well in previous episodes. This accident led

1:07:38

to the sterile cockpit rules that

1:07:40

planes have to adhere to, where

1:07:42

if you're below ten thousand feet, the only

1:07:44

thing pilots can talk about is

1:07:47

things related to operating the airplane --

1:07:49

Oh. -- the landing or the takeoff. What

1:07:51

else were they talking about? They were telling stories.

1:07:53

Remember there was that other pilot who was deadheading in

1:07:55

the cockpit Uh-huh. We didn't didn't get into

1:07:57

the

1:07:57

transcript. But if you read the transcript for this --

1:07:59

Uh-huh. --

1:07:59

crash, they're like telling stories

1:08:02

or, you know, just chatting to each other about

1:08:04

stuff that's going on. If there's a lot

1:08:06

of unnecessary conversation happening.

1:08:09

So -- Yeah. -- which is distracting them from

1:08:12

flying the plane and looking outside and seeing

1:08:14

traffic. And everything that needs to get done. Okay.

1:08:16

Yeah. Because it's like, I don't remember this thing. No. We

1:08:18

didn't we didn't get into all of those details.

1:08:20

But now whenever pilots

1:08:22

are below ten thousand feet, they have to they can

1:08:24

the only things they're legally allowed to talk about.

1:08:27

Like, it has to be directly related to

1:08:29

the flight. And directly related to what's happening

1:08:31

right now. That way, they stay alert and

1:08:34

focused on what's going on. And if you remember

1:08:36

when we flew in the the small assessment, I even

1:08:38

told you, hey, or take off the landing.

1:08:40

Don't talk to me unless you're pointing out traffic.

1:08:43

I think that's -- Yeah. Yeah. -- that's that's the gist of

1:08:45

of what I told you at the time. Like, we're taxi, take

1:08:47

off landing. We I need to focus on what's going

1:08:49

on here. And then once we're at cruising altitude, it's fine.

1:08:51

Yeah. That's it. PSA one hundred eighty two awful

1:08:54

accident. But, I mean, it it led to some

1:08:56

very fundamental changes

1:08:58

that have made things way safer nowadays.

1:09:01

Yes. Sounds kind of tick kind of deeper grab. Yeah.

1:09:03

And like I said, it's amazing in general that

1:09:06

any photos of this accident exist.

1:09:08

We'll post those on social media if you

1:09:10

give us a follow on black at black box down pod

1:09:13

on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. You

1:09:15

you can see that. I'll see if I can find some of the

1:09:17

aerial photos of the neighborhood work

1:09:19

crash. I'll see if I find, like, Google Maps and kind of,

1:09:21

like, give you some reference as to where

1:09:24

it happened in San Diego. But,

1:09:26

yeah, that's it. We're gonna be this is our

1:09:28

our our final episode for this batch

1:09:30

of episodes. We're gonna we're gonna be back

1:09:32

in two weeks with a supplemental episode. We

1:09:34

gotta take a little break you know, write up

1:09:36

our next batch of episodes. So there's no new

1:09:39

episode next week, but a week after that, we'll be back

1:09:41

with supplemental

1:09:41

episode. Hopefully, to keep everyone entertained.

1:09:44

We'll also have a first class episode

1:09:46

for people who are rich teeth first members

1:09:48

or who help support us by

1:09:51

going to the black box down

1:09:53

pod dot com.

1:09:54

Yeah. Can directly support this podcast

1:09:56

for two ninety nine a month. You get episodes

1:09:58

early and ad free. And we'll

1:10:00

say thank you. And and bonus bonus content.

1:10:02

Yeah. Like first class. Alright. Well, that's it

1:10:04

for this episode and we'll see you guys next time.

1:10:06

Bye.