1:59

of any off the top of my head. Maybe we'll

2:01

come up with some that we can post while we're

2:03

talking about this accident. I don't wanna

2:06

undersell how remote

2:08

the jungle was where this aircraft

2:11

debris came down. I know I kind of mentioned

2:13

it in passing in the intro.

2:15

It's one of the most remote jungles in the

2:17

world where the wreckage was. And

2:20

one of the accident investigators,

2:22

I saw an interview with him about this crash.

2:25

He said, on the first day alone of

2:27

the investigation, there

2:28

were eight snake bites. Three people

2:31

had broken legs. They were three broken

2:33

legs and one cardiac arrest.

2:35

Oh my God, what? Someone

2:37

had a heart attack? Maybe because of the snake bite or

2:40

I don't. I think it was just like the exertion

2:42

from having to go through such

2:44

a difficult to reach area. Oh

2:46

my God, more people are gonna die trying to get to them than die

2:49

on the plane. But they're definitely, people are definitely

2:51

getting hurt or actually people got hurt trying

2:53

to get to the wreckage. And over

2:55

a hundred square mile, that's a big area. And

2:58

that's roughly 10 miles by 10 miles would

3:00

give you a hundred square miles of space that you have

3:03

to look for a wreckage. That's wild.

3:06

The plane was a 12 year old plane, not super

3:08

old, but not like brand new. You know, 12 years is, I

3:10

guess new-ish in aviation terms. You know,

3:12

you have a 12 year old car. You're like, that's kind of old. You have

3:15

a 12 year old plane. It's like, yeah, it's still fine. It was a 12

3:17

year old Boeing 737 200,

3:19

servicing Copa Airlines flight 201. It

3:22

was captained by Rafael Carlos

3:24

Chial who was 53 years old, had 23,750 flight hours, of

3:30

which about 7,000 were in a Boeing 737. So

3:33

very seasoned, very experienced pilot or

3:35

captain. First officer

3:37

was Cesario Tejada

3:40

who was 25 years old with 3,450 flight hours,

3:43

of which 1,600 hours were on the Boeing 737. So

3:47

not as experienced, but still that's

3:49

plenty of time. That's not like a brand new pilot

3:51

by the stretch of the imagination.

3:53

So Copa Airlines is the

3:55

flag carrier of Panama. I've never

3:57

flown a Copa Airlines. I'm gonna guess you

3:59

probably.

3:59

haven't either Chris. I have not.

4:04

I've never been to Panama. I'd like to visit some time. I've

4:06

never been even like the first I think

4:08

the furthest South I've been is Nicaragua.

4:11

It's further than me I think the furthest yeah at least in America.

4:14

Yeah the furthest South I've been in on this

4:16

part of the world is like Cancun. So

4:21

not quite as far. So you know Copa Airlines

4:23

flag carrier of Panama they've been operating

4:25

since 1947 the headquartered in Panama

4:27

City

4:28

and just a side note because this kind of ties

4:30

into another incident we covered a long

4:32

time ago. In 1992 Copa Airlines signed a strategic

4:35

alliance with Taka Airlines and the airline

4:37

began flying from Tocqueman International

4:39

Airport

4:40

which is the airport in Panama City

4:43

making it the first flight connection center in Latin America.

4:45

Taka Airlines they

4:47

we covered an accident or an incident involving

4:49

Taka Airlines. It was the pilot who

4:52

had lost an eye in the war and he only

4:54

had one eye and both of his engines

4:56

flamed out and he had to land on a levee

4:58

and everyone everyone survived. It was down

5:00

in Louisiana. Oh yeah

5:03

yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah

5:05

yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah that was a that

5:07

was a long time ago that was like in season

5:09

two of Black Box Town. That was like the

5:12

14th episode or something?

5:14

Somewhere around there yeah that's what that's one of my favorites.

5:16

Anyway I only bring it up because you

5:18

know Taka Airlines had this alliance with

5:21

Copa Airlines which we're talking about now. Anyway

5:23

Copa Airlines 201 I

5:25

was operating a non-stop passenger flight from

5:27

Tocqueman International Airport in Panama

5:29

to Cali, Colombia and

5:32

they departed from runway 2-1 left at 1.36 universal time. So

5:34

2-1 left means they're kind

5:38

of slow sort of

5:40

Southwest in like a south-southwest

5:42

direction. After takeoff the crew made initial

5:45

contact with Central Panama at 1.37 requested

5:47

a heading of 1.20 degrees

5:50

in order to circle a large area of bad weather located

5:52

at the Gulf of Panama. Shortly thereafter the crew

5:54

requested a deviation to the left of 090 degrees

5:57

and the controller approved the request so they kind of

5:59

started out Southwest, then when they make

6:02

the turn to 120, they're kind of heading Southeast,

6:04

then they go further left to 090. So they're going

6:07

straight East at this point.

6:08

That's not the right, they're just doing that to avoid the

6:10

weather. Right, yeah, there's bad weather at the time.

6:13

So they're kind of trying to vector around

6:15

it all in order to get clear

6:17

of it, to then turn straight

6:19

South down to Kali. Cause normally what they

6:21

would do from there, it's just a pretty straight shot

6:24

Southeast from Panama city to

6:26

Kali. So if they're, you know, they're flying East

6:29

to kind of get around the weather and

6:31

then they're probably gonna head straight South. Kind of like,

6:33

if you imagine a triangle, they were gonna fly on the hypotenuse,

6:36

but there were storms there. So they're flying on the other

6:38

legs of the triangle to get to Kali, or that's the plan

6:41

anyway.

6:41

They requested an altitude of flight level 270.

6:45

However, they could not get that altitude because there was another

6:47

Southeast bound aircraft at that time. So

6:50

the controller offered them either flight level 250 or 290.

6:54

So remember they're flying East, so they need to

6:56

be at an odd thousand altitude.

6:59

They requested 27, it's not available.

7:01

So they can take 25 or 29.

7:02

And we talked about that in one of our previous episodes.

7:05

When they're flying East, you fly at an odd thousand.

7:08

If you're flying West, you fly at an even thousand. So

7:10

since 270 wasn't available, they went ahead

7:12

and selected flight level 250. At

7:15

around two o'clock universal

7:17

times, whether that's about 24 minutes after takeoff,

7:20

the flight experienced a loss of control, which

7:22

resulted in in-flight structural

7:25

failure. And it crashed into the jungle about

7:27

a hundred nautical miles Southeast of Panama

7:29

City. All told, on board the aircraft,

7:31

there was two pilots, five

7:32

flight attendants and 40 passengers. And

7:35

everyone on board the plane

7:37

was killed in the crash. I'm intentionally being

7:39

cagey because now it's like, we have to figure out what

7:41

happened. The mystery. Right, the Darien

7:43

National Park, that's like right on the border between

7:46

Colombia and Panama. Like the border between the

7:48

two countries goes right through it. I

7:51

will admit, I feel like my knowledge,

7:53

Central America where it connects to like South

7:56

America, it is a little lacking.

7:58

I have to look at the map sometimes.

7:59

talking about incidents in this area to kind of like wrap

8:02

my head around specifically what we're talking about. I did too.

8:04

I pulled one up because you said that Cancun

8:06

was the most southern place you've been.

8:09

Yeah. That's not entirely true. Oh yeah.

8:11

You have been to Puerto Rico, which is just

8:13

south of Cancun. Oh, well I'm talking

8:16

about like, yeah, yeah. That's why I didn't bring it up. Central

8:18

America. Yeah. Yeah. That's the Caribbean. Yeah. Yeah. I didn't bring

8:20

it up because I was like,

8:22

I didn't know if you that if we counted that as like

8:25

America, North South America,

8:27

Central America. Although when I lived there, I was

8:29

surprised like living in Puerto Rico. It's like, Oh,

8:32

I'm like, South America is a lot closer than you

8:34

think it is. Like, Venezuela is just right over there. Yeah.

8:37

It's not too far away. The wreckage was discovered

8:39

by search aircraft on the morning of June 7th, 1992 in

8:42

a densely forested jungle of hilly and rugged

8:45

terrain. Examination of the wreckage showed

8:47

that the aircraft had broken up severely before

8:49

impact with the ground. And the largest portions of the aircraft

8:51

were the cockpit, the central section

8:54

of the portions of the left and right wings, the

8:56

horizontal and vertical stabilizer, and the rear

8:58

part of the fuselage containing the rear galley and

9:01

bathroom. The outer wing sections were found approximately 300

9:03

feet east of the main wreckage. And

9:05

the partitions were bent in a left and right direction

9:08

from the wing tip to the engine pillars and met 70

9:10

feet apart.

9:11

None of the leading edge high lift devices were

9:13

found in this area. So things are

9:16

a little spread apart is what they're getting at here.

9:18

The cockpit, including much of the electronics compartment,

9:21

was located about 5,000 feet from the center

9:23

section. The cockpit lay on its right side

9:25

on a heading approximately North and have been

9:27

flattened about half its width by the impact forces,

9:30

which

9:30

is crazy to think about that. It hit the ground so

9:32

hard that the cockpit smushed to half

9:35

its normal size.

9:36

Ooh, yeah. I mean, I

9:38

don't think if planes is smushing either normally.

9:40

So, right. Yeah. So it hit

9:43

hard. And yeah, there is, there's a little more I want

9:45

to get into, but I'm going to wait a second here.

9:46

The cockpit voice recorder suffered only

9:49

light impact damage in the accident and

9:51

showed no evidence of smoke residue or heat damage,

9:53

which sounds good, right? You're like, Oh, the cockpit

9:55

voice recorder is going to be fine.

9:57

When they opened it up, they

9:59

realized

11:51

without

12:00

a corresponding change of course. Around

12:03

the longitudinal axis, which is like the

12:05

roll axis, you imagine a plane rolling left

12:07

to right.

12:08

Around that axis, it had an attitude

12:10

of about 35 degrees left wing down.

12:13

Then about 25 seconds before the loss of information,

12:16

it did like an

12:17

aileron roll to the right at 25

12:20

degrees from the right wing down. And the pitch

12:22

attitude had decreased to 15 degrees nose

12:25

down. So it's almost like it had been in

12:27

a 35 degree left bank,

12:29

then all of a sudden it very rapidly snapped

12:32

to the right to 25 degrees right

12:34

wing down and the nose went down 15

12:36

degrees.

12:38

Okay. Which is

12:40

weird. With no, like

12:42

they didn't give any input for that, it just happened.

12:45

That's what the flight data recorder is telling them,

12:47

that is the attitude of the plane. The attitude of

12:49

the plane just went from that to that. Just looking at the

12:52

attitude information, it very rapidly

12:54

snapped essentially 60 degrees from one direction

12:56

to another. Okay, go on. At

12:59

the end of the recording, the information indicates the

13:02

aircraft had a speed of 486 knots

13:04

on a heading of 356 degrees,

13:06

a pitch of 63 degrees right wing

13:08

down. Wow. And the altitude of the time

13:11

of the last recorded information was 9,900 feet above sea level.

13:14

So it's like they're heading north, pitched

13:16

way down, way like the right wing

13:19

is way down and going really fast.

13:21

So I guess they

13:23

spun almost

13:25

like, because they were going east, right? Correct.

13:28

So yeah, they must have spun like 270 degrees or

13:32

something, huh? To be pointed north. So

13:34

they probably from the right pointed down,

13:37

they go whoosh, right?

13:40

Right, I think that's a very fair assessment

13:42

of what's going on based on all the information we have. I think. The

13:45

sound effects. That's probably

13:47

what it sounded like too.

13:49

The almost total disintegration of the

13:51

aircraft, the complete lack of cockpit voice

13:53

recorder, and that weirdness

13:56

in the actual, the quirkiness in that flight data recorder

13:59

roll data. all kind of really

14:02

left a lot of questions in the investigators' heads.

14:05

So when they start looking at this, they

14:08

look at the different possible scenarios

14:10

that could have caused this plane to come down.

14:12

They consider scenarios like terrorism,

14:15

sudden depressurization, or bad

14:17

weather. So like earlier we talked

14:19

about,

14:20

everything's a possibility. They're kind of like, let's

14:22

open it all, go through everything, start

14:24

eliminating stuff, and then narrow it down and figure

14:26

out exactly what this could have been.

14:28

Yeah, sudden depressurization is

14:30

weird because that didn't seem like

14:33

that would push, go

14:35

to the right, but maybe if it was on

14:37

that section of the plane? Maybe,

14:40

and I think maybe the thought process is, why

14:42

would the pilots be giving inputs like that?

14:44

Severe left bank, severe right bank, were

14:47

they hypoxic? Like were they not thinking

14:49

straight?

14:50

Mm, oh, oh, so the

14:52

pressurization could have happened sooner. Right,

14:55

and maybe it was affecting their

14:58

thought. I'm speculating, that might be what they're

15:00

thinking of. That might be the angle they're taking

15:02

here. You said they were 27,000 feet up? 25, okay,

15:06

and so that's enough. Yeah, that's still,

15:08

that's very thin air.

15:10

Well, we're gonna break down a little, almost

15:12

like play by play, what the aircraft

15:14

went through here. So at 1.36 universal

15:16

time, the flight took

15:19

off on runway 21 left, and

15:21

the first part of the flight path was the 149 degree

15:24

radial from the Toboga VOR.

15:26

And after takeoff, they made contact with Central

15:28

Panama at 1.37 and requested

15:31

a heading of 1.20 degrees to circle the large

15:33

area of bad weather located in the Gulf of Panama. Like we said,

15:35

they took off to the Southwest, kind of turned

15:37

Southeast, and they're beginning to kind of like figure

15:40

out how they're gonna get around the weather.

15:42

10 minutes later at 1.46, the

15:44

crew asked the controller for additional information on weather

15:46

conditions along their flight path. And the controller

15:48

reported that bad weather was severe 30 to 50 miles

15:51

from his radar position, and that from Southwest

15:53

to 60 miles from his radar antenna, it

15:55

was scattered.

15:56

He also explained to them he could not have weather information

15:58

beyond 60 miles since...

15:59

beyond that distance, the radar antenna could only show

16:02

aircraft transponder signals. So

16:05

he was only looking at his limited 60 mile

16:07

window of weather.

16:08

Okay.

16:09

At 148, the flight crew reported being at

16:11

flight level 250, and this is

16:13

the last known transmission received by the flight

16:16

controller.

16:16

The COPPA operations officers reported that the person

16:18

who made the radio transmission was the captain,

16:21

which by company practice indicates that the first

16:23

officer was flying the aircraft. Again, remember, with

16:25

no cockpit voice recorder, they're having to rely

16:27

on other things to try to piece together, who was

16:30

flying, what was happening. So as of

16:32

that moment, they know

16:33

the captain was making the radio calls, which means the

16:35

first officer was flying the plane.

16:37

So now that they, if they're, well, I guess it could

16:39

be either one of them if they're investigating like

16:42

one of the pilots doing something, but that could have been

16:44

either one of them still. Right. So

16:47

nine minutes later at 157, so

16:49

nine minutes after that radar transmission at 157, the

16:52

controller transmitted to COPPA 201, that

16:55

radar contact had been lost.

16:56

The controller made several unsuccessful attempts to contact

16:59

the flight, but received no response. And

17:01

the controller also requested another flight to

17:03

attempt to contact COPPA 201. And

17:05

we've talked about this before, since the radio maybe

17:08

can't get all the way there from the ground, you know,

17:10

the ground air traffic control will talk to a plane in the air

17:12

that's closer to the plane they're trying to talk to and relay a

17:14

message. Yeah. And this was an Aero

17:16

Air flight. And the Aero Air flight crew also

17:18

was unsuccessful in contacting COPPA 201. And

17:21

that's three minutes before they lose control,

17:24

right? Cause they lost control at 2 p.m.? Yeah,

17:26

that's correct.

17:26

Oh, good memory, Chris. I didn't

17:28

remember, I wrote it down. Yeah. So

17:32

just to be clear, it's not 2 p.m. universal, it's 2

17:34

a.m. universal. So this is an evening flight for Panama.

17:37

Okay, 2 a. And so it's a

17:40

curious. So that means

17:42

possibly if there was malicious intent

17:44

that

17:47

like radio was turned off or

17:50

disconnected or? It

17:52

could be, look at you, you're really becoming like

17:55

a full-fledged investigator here, Chris. So

17:57

like as part of like trying to figure out what's going on, the controller

17:59

also.

17:59

makes telephone contact with the air traffic controller

18:02

in Columbia who works that airspace to try to

18:04

see if he can contact the flight. And also

18:07

that effort was unsuccessful. So shortly thereafter,

18:10

search and rescue effort was initiated to locate the aircraft.

18:12

And like we mentioned earlier, they found the aircraft the

18:15

next morning with no survivors.

18:16

The controller reported that he had decided to vector

18:19

the flight around the north side of the

18:21

bad weather since other aircraft were also

18:23

diverting to the north. When

18:25

Copa 201 asked

18:27

the controller if they were still in radar, he told them yes. And

18:30

when the pilot requested permission to return to

18:32

their route, the controller said he thought it was a

18:34

bit early as there still appeared to be some bad weather

18:37

on his radar screen ahead of the aircraft.

18:39

And he said also it's not unusual to lose

18:41

radar contact in the area of the flight's last

18:43

signal return.

18:44

He also stated he waited about seven minutes after

18:46

observing the last return of the signal before

18:48

he transmitted radar contact loss at 157. And there's

18:50

no evidence of having faced

18:53

problems with land navigation aid equipment. So the

18:55

air traffic is not a good thing. And he sometimes loses

18:57

radar contact with planes in that area. So he

18:59

gave it a few minutes before he really started

19:02

investigating and finding out what's going on.

19:04

Yeah. Okay. Residents near

19:06

the area of the accident reported having observed

19:08

a ball of fire falling from the sky, followed

19:10

by small sparks of fire. And during

19:13

the interview with the residents, they themselves reported

19:15

they saw stars in the sky and that it was not

19:17

raining. They do not remember hearing thunder

19:19

or seeing lightning. So I think that's kind of a big

19:22

clue, right?

19:23

If the people on the ground can see stars, then

19:26

the weather's not bad. If the store

19:28

there, they weren't in that storm that they were trying to

19:30

avoid investigators search the flight

19:32

path and found the aircraft was nowhere near the storm

19:34

when it fell from the sky. So they

19:36

can rule out weather as a factor in the crash.

19:39

If people on the ground were able to see the stars and see

19:41

the fire, they know the plane was not in

19:44

clouds. It was probably clear of the weather.

19:46

Yeah, you can rule it out.

19:48

Explosive experts searched for evidence of an

19:50

onboard bomb. The signature blast

19:52

marks from a superheated gases would have been

19:54

present on metal debris and examination

19:57

of the wreckage and the remains of the passengers proved

19:59

there was no

19:59

indication of a bomb like name or check

20:02

the bodies as well for any shrapnel

20:04

like from our from a bomb and now

20:06

there is no and it'll find any of the explosive

20:08

residue and do they found most

20:11

of the plane structure so they're able to test a good deal

20:13

of it so they can say that pretty definitively

20:15

no no bomb know whether

20:17

were

20:17

there any other like parts

20:20

from other planes nearby

20:22

what the so that's that's a

20:24

really good question

20:26

right so that's the other thing we talked about

20:28

his the possibly colliding

20:30

with a plane that's running

20:32

silently that's running drugs because

20:34

this is where this happened it's near cartel

20:36

controlled territory so like

20:38

you said what

20:39

they'll do to try to determine that is one

20:42

go look for parts from another plane to

20:44

the look for paint rub oh

20:46

yeah where would have like yeah

20:48

right where the two planes would have collided you're

20:50

there would be a transfer of paint from one surface to another

20:53

and now they don't find any evidence of any other

20:55

plane parts or any paint transfer

20:57

from home from any other aircraft

21:00

hebron wanna take a moment to remind you are tx

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I'm off to Miami. No, actually,

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23:21

I want to rewind for just a second. There

23:23

was an additional

23:25

thing I thought was a really interesting tidbit that

23:27

I read about on this incident. You

23:29

know, they investigated the bomb. We talked about how they

23:31

found there was no evidence of a bomb. And

23:34

they also found there was no evidence of

23:36

fire

23:37

before the accident. So there was

23:39

no onboard fire that led to this

23:41

situation.

23:42

And the way they determined that is they inspect

23:44

the outflow valve. You know, we talk about

23:46

like how there's pressure release and there's like

23:48

an outflow valve

23:49

where the pressure in the cabin

23:52

gets vented out, essentially.

23:54

Yeah, so there would have been like smoke

23:57

residue and stuff if there'd been a fire inside,

23:59

huh? Right, and there was none. There was

24:02

no smoke residue on the outflow valve. So

24:04

that tells them there was not a fire in the cabin

24:06

before the crash. Sounds like

24:08

something internal in the plane, something

24:11

busted. So I think they also

24:14

look at the final two minutes of the flight and they

24:16

keep looking at this bank that happens

24:19

where it's like rolling to the left and it snaps

24:21

back to the right. So they perform

24:23

an autopsy and toxicology report on the pilots

24:26

to see, were they under the influence

24:28

of any medication? Were they on drugs? Were

24:30

they hypoxic like we talked about? And

24:34

it reveals that they were not incapacitated by

24:36

any medical issues at the time of the accident. I didn't think

24:38

so. Yeah, no hypoxia, no

24:41

drugs in their system,

24:41

nothing out of the ordinary, nothing

24:44

that should explain any type of erratic behavior.

24:47

This is the kind of frustrating incident where all

24:49

of the obvious easy ones, it's like, nope, nope,

24:52

nope, like eliminating all of

24:54

the easy possibilities. So, you know, like

24:57

you said it a little while ago, kind of almost impassing,

24:59

like it must've been something inside the plane.

25:01

Yeah, like something that was built into

25:03

it. Like what do you mean? Do you mean like,

25:05

do you have anything specifically in mind? Cause

25:07

there's fires,

25:09

it seems like, like maybe

25:11

wiring sparked something or-

25:15

I'll throw you an additional wrinkle right now, Chris. Sorry,

25:17

I'm gonna make it a little more complicated for you. At

25:19

this point also, when they're investigating all this, they determined

25:21

that the fire that the people on the ground saw

25:24

was the fuel in the wings igniting as

25:26

the plane broke apart. Hmm,

25:29

hmm, hmm. The fuel in the wings

25:31

igniting.

25:32

Right, so it's like that the plane is

25:35

descending so quickly it begins to break

25:37

apart and fuel starts to spill out and

25:39

ignites. And that's what that fire is that they

25:42

see. Okay, so there wasn't

25:44

an explosion because it sounds

25:46

like that would have led to like

25:48

some shrapnel, even if it

25:50

wasn't a bomb. And then it

25:53

sounds like the fire was only after the fact,

25:55

after it started going down that fast. Right,

25:58

exactly. Sounds more and more like- like

26:00

a terrorist or something, or

26:03

someone doing it consciously,

26:05

a villain. You know,

26:07

after eliminating all of these things, like you, the investigators

26:10

are trying to see what's left,

26:12

what's left on the table. So- Do they look into

26:14

the backgrounds of the pilots and

26:16

the passengers? Well, I assume

26:19

they did, but we're gonna go in a slightly different direction

26:21

right now. They decide to look at the

26:23

instruments to see, you know, kind

26:25

of like how you said, maybe something was broken on the plane.

26:27

I think that's the next step they take at this point,

26:29

where it's like, let's examine what we

26:32

found. Let's examine the instruments and see if

26:34

maybe there was, there was something that was

26:36

not working right. See if they'll play for us.

26:39

Right. And the captain

26:41

and first officers gyros and attitude

26:43

indicators were tested and they found an

26:45

anomaly in them. Oh. The gyros

26:48

seem to operate properly, but when testing

26:50

the captain's attitude indicator, it

26:52

would like freeze and stick momentarily every

26:54

now and then, and then continue.

26:56

The gyro, is that the

26:58

thing that like determines like the

27:00

levelness of the plane or? So the gyro

27:03

is an internal component that kind

27:05

of measures the role and the bank

27:07

of the plane, and then this translates

27:09

it and displays it on the attitude indicator. You can think of the

27:11

attitude indicator like a ball. It's like the one

27:14

that's blue on top and brown on the bottom. And

27:16

it shows when the plane's banking or when

27:18

it's climbing or descending. The gyro

27:20

was working fine, but the ball

27:23

part, the attitude indicator would like stick

27:25

every now and then it would like freeze

27:26

and then unfreeze and then keep working.

27:29

The mechanical part of it or like the computer?

27:31

You know what I'm saying?

27:34

Like was there a? Well, they

27:36

test it and they try to figure it out. And they find

27:38

out that there was a manufacturing

27:40

discrepancy in the vertical barrel gyro

27:42

rotor synchronizer wiring, which resulted

27:45

in a short circuit. They basically, they found a

27:47

break in one wire feeding information

27:50

to the captain's attitude indicator. It was like

27:52

the wire was barely making contact.

27:55

So when it was making contact, it was working, but

27:57

then like the wire would move a little bit and lose contact.

27:59

the attitude indicator would like stick and freeze

28:02

and then it would make contact again and it would start working.

28:05

Does autopilot function off the gyrometer

28:07

or the attitude indicator?

28:09

So the gyro, just to be clear, it's all

28:12

one unit. There's a gyro in the attitude indicator

28:15

that feeds it that data. Like it's all

28:17

like. That's, it's the same thing. It's not like

28:19

one thing. Yeah, okay. Right. It's not

28:22

like, yeah, I mean, it is two separate parts, but

28:24

it's all in the same component. So what kind

28:26

of causal or kind of related to what you're

28:29

asking.

28:30

Investigators realized the flight data recorder

28:32

was getting faulty roll data because

28:34

it was reading its data from the captain's attitude

28:36

indicator.

28:37

Those quick rolls and that quick snapping left and

28:40

right, that wasn't actually happening. That

28:42

was the attitude indicator would get stuck

28:44

and it would, that's why it would look like the plane was in a bank and then

28:46

it would unstick and it would look like the plane just very

28:48

quickly banked in the other direction. Okay.

28:51

All right.

28:52

Interesting. Through calculating all

28:54

the other parameters they have on the flight data recorder, they

28:56

found that flight 201 was actually making really

28:59

slow banking corrections to counter

29:01

the faulty roll data from the malfunctioning attitude

29:04

indicator. So the

29:06

pilots weren't like whipping the plane around left

29:08

and right. They were, you know, slowly banking

29:11

more and more in each direction. However,

29:13

because that attitude indicator

29:16

was sticking, they didn't realize how far

29:18

they had banked until they kept banking

29:20

to a point where the plane became unrecoverable.

29:22

Oh, oh, holy, wait.

29:25

So they were just, they banked

29:27

that hard. Well, it's like the attitude

29:29

indicator froze for so long that they kept banking

29:32

gently, but over time, it just kept growing

29:34

and growing to where they were banked in

29:36

extremely, they were going very fast banked

29:39

at an extreme angle in one direction.

29:41

Did it like, you know, a point where the

29:43

plane, what did, what happened to the plane? Did it

29:46

like so fast? It's such a weird angle

29:48

that it like,

29:49

like you said, broke the plane. Right. Essentially

29:51

it started coming apart. Oh my God. So

29:53

it is from the speed that they were going and

29:56

the crazy angle that they were going. Right. They were

29:58

banked. And then it also caused them to know.

31:59

So they have this,

32:02

what appears to be a smoking gun. This probably

32:04

caused the accident, but why?

32:07

Like you said, first officer's flying, his

32:09

attitude indicator was correct. There's a standby

32:12

indicator they can use to compare him.

32:13

What happened here? Why did this

32:15

plane crash? Yeah. When investigators

32:18

recreated the events of this flight and simulations,

32:21

there was a really weird discovery.

32:24

They discovered that

32:25

the accident aircraft had

32:28

what they call a modified gyro switch that

32:30

differed from the equipment on which they were trained. In

32:33

the event that one attitude

32:35

indicator fails, there's a switch

32:37

they can flip.

32:38

Like let's say, like in this case, right? The captain's

32:40

failed. There's a switch they can flip that says, ignore

32:43

the captain's attitude indicator, or like use

32:46

the first officer's attitude indicator to override

32:49

the captain. So that way the captain becomes basically

32:51

a mirror of the first officer's. That way

32:53

they can both see good data without having

32:55

to look at the other one.

32:57

In the simulator, flipping the toggle

33:00

switch to the left switches the captain's

33:02

instrument to auxiliary gyro independent

33:04

of the other two. Okay, the

33:06

backup, the third backup. Right, in

33:08

the simulator, flip the switch to the left, the

33:10

captain's pulls from backup data. However,

33:13

on flight 201, flipping the switch to

33:15

the left puts both instruments on the captain's

33:18

malfunctioning gyro. Oh! And

33:20

the vertical gyro switch on flight 201 was

33:22

found in the, what they call the both on VG1

33:25

position. So they had flipped it to the left,

33:27

which meant

33:27

the first officer's attitude indicator

33:30

was now pulling data from the captain's first attitude

33:32

indicator. And then, so that

33:34

made it worse, right? Right,

33:36

right. Now both attitude

33:39

indicators are wrong. Oh

33:42

no. And did they realize that happened?

33:45

Well, there's no cockpit voice recorder, so we don't know. Oh

33:47

no.

33:48

Yeah, what'll typically happen is when there is a disagreement

33:50

between the attitude indicators, there's like a little alarm,

33:53

like a little, not like an audio alarm, but like

33:55

a little light that lights up that says like, disagree,

33:58

your attitude disagree.

33:59

And then, like,

33:59

like they flipped the switch. And then once they flipped

34:02

the switch, that disables the alarm. So

34:04

most likely they knew there was a disagreement

34:07

and they flipped it, but in the simulator,

34:09

flipping it to the left resolves the problem, but in

34:12

the specific plane they were in, flipping it to the

34:14

left makes the problem worse. They were manually

34:16

flying too, right? Yeah, they were hand flying.

34:19

COPA Airlines had acquired a

34:21

fleet of 737 aircraft that were originally

34:23

delivered to a variety of airlines, including Britannia

34:26

Airways, German Airlines, Lufthansa, Air

34:28

New Zealand, Gulf Air, Malaysian Airlines,

34:31

Thai Airways, and the result of

34:33

all component tests led to the discovery

34:36

of an anomaly that could have been the causative factor

34:38

in the accident. Details of a manufacturing

34:40

discrepancy in the vertical barrel gyro

34:42

rotor synchronizer wiring resulted in a short

34:44

circuit. Flight instrument configuration

34:47

varies based on individual specifications of

34:49

the original seven purchasing airlines

34:51

and modernization of flight instrument systems during

34:53

the 15 years of production. The operator

34:55

had five different instrument deployment configurations

34:58

in its fleet of aircraft. So it's all just to say, it

35:00

was obviously the short circuit and the wiring, there was

35:02

a problem in the instrument, but this

35:04

airline had purchased these planes from

35:06

seven different airlines that all

35:08

had different configurations on their instruments. That's

35:11

so crazy. There was no standardization in

35:13

the layout of the buttons or what the switches did, which

35:15

is why these pilots train one way

35:17

in the simulator, but in the plane, it's not

35:19

the same. That is crazy.

35:21

So like, yeah, I know initially there's

35:23

a lot of questions, like how can this happen? They have standby instruments,

35:26

they should be trained. It seemed based on the

35:28

way that the instruments were found, they

35:30

did what they thought they were supposed to do. They flipped the appropriate

35:32

switch to the left, which is what you do in

35:34

the simulator. But on this specific

35:37

plane, flipping it to the left is not what you need to do.

35:39

They should have flipped it to the right. That's

35:41

so frustrating. Yeah. As we mentioned,

35:44

there's at least three separate independent attitude

35:46

indication systems on commercial air transport

35:48

aircraft. Like we said, the one in front of the captain, the

35:50

one in front of the first officer,

35:51

and then the emergency standby indicator

35:54

located in the common area of the instrument panel between

35:56

the two flight crew members. The two ADIs,

35:59

the attitude indicator.

35:59

So if you say ADI, that's what that is. The two ADIs

36:02

are independently supplied with pitch and roll information

36:05

by two independent vertical gyros. In

36:07

the normal mode of operation, VG1, which

36:10

is the captain's gyro, provides information

36:12

to the captain's ADI. VG2

36:14

provides information to the first officer's ADI. The

36:17

difference between the information of the captain

36:19

and that of the first officer are perceived in an

36:21

instrument comparator.

36:23

If the two instrument systems disagree, warning

36:25

lights are displayed above both attitude indicators.

36:28

Like I said, when they're not the same, there's

36:30

a warning for them. If there's a disagreement between

36:32

the two indicators, the crew can then

36:34

change the operation of both ADIs to

36:36

either of the two vertical gyros. And

36:39

once this has been done, both ADIs should

36:41

indicate the same thing and the comparator

36:43

warning enunciator should turn off because

36:46

it's not comparing anymore. It's putting the same data to both.

36:48

During the examination of the wreckage, this transfer

36:50

switch was found to be engaged at the time of impact.

36:53

The

36:53

investigators indicated both

36:55

ADIs were displaying information

36:57

from VG1 because the transfer switch was

36:59

selected both on VG1. That's

37:01

they flipped it to the left, which means

37:03

feed from the vertical gyro on the captain's

37:06

side. Another switch indicated the compass selection

37:08

was selected on both on compasses,

37:10

which indicated both heading indicators were

37:13

being actuated by the directional gyroscope. If

37:15

the flight crew suspects there's an error in the indication

37:18

system of the pilot, the operating procedure

37:20

directs the crew to compare the indications between

37:22

the three systems, confirm there's an error,

37:25

identify the vertical gyro source

37:27

associated with the error, and then switch to a

37:29

vertical gyro source that can supply attitude information

37:31

reliable to both ADI for the remnant of the

37:33

flight. So that's essentially what they did. They looked,

37:36

they determined which one was wrong,

37:38

and then they flipped the switch again. In

37:40

the simulator, they flipped it the correct way, but on this

37:42

specific plane, they flipped it the wrong way.

37:44

And at that point, they were already

37:46

so far messed up or

37:49

so far... Oh

37:50

man. I get it. They

37:52

were trying to operate based on what they're

37:54

seeing. And since it's sticking,

37:56

it's not giving them real time information. It's playing

37:59

catch up every now and then.

37:59

and they just make the situation worse

38:02

and worse.

38:03

So like if you want, they actually attempt

38:05

to break it down to kind of give like a timeframe.

38:08

Cause I know you're curious, like how much were they

38:10

whipping the plane around? How much were they banking?

38:12

You know, the 160 degree course was selected

38:15

with an inclination to the right of 23 degrees. They

38:18

began

38:19

banking

38:20

and it took seven seconds to reach that. So it

38:22

means that the rate would have been about three

38:24

degrees per second. After reaching the 23 degree

38:26

bank, the aircraft then rolled back

38:28

to level wings direction at the same rate.

38:30

So it rolled three degrees a second to the right, then

38:33

rolled back three degrees per second to the left, but

38:35

it stopped four degrees bank

38:37

right wing down for about 15 seconds. And

38:40

at that point, they say one of two things could have happened.

38:42

The first would have been an announcement of an indication

38:45

incompatibility in the comparators of the

38:47

ADI. This is probably when that

38:50

alert popped up saying that the ADI's were disagreeing.

38:53

The crew at that time selected the position

38:55

of both on vertical gyroscope one

38:58

on the navigation transfer switch pal. That's the switch

39:00

that was different in the simulator than on the plane.

39:02

And then by doing this, the comparator lights were turned

39:04

off by this action.

39:06

The pilot who was flying at the time attempted to correct

39:08

the aircraft's role attitude by applying aileron

39:10

to level the wings. While applying aileron,

39:12

the aircraft responded in the commanded direction. However,

39:15

the ADI did not respond and continued to indicate

39:17

a roll of 37 degrees to the left on

39:19

the longitudinal axis. So they're

39:22

trying to correct the bank and they're

39:24

doing it, the plane's responding, but the ADI is not showing

39:26

it. The crew doesn't think anything's happening.

39:29

Oh no. The crew member

39:31

then responded by applying right aileron to correct

39:33

the turn. And the aircraft responded by following

39:35

the right turn order.

39:37

The 37 degree turn of the left wing down

39:39

was maintained for 30 seconds, at which

39:41

time the ADI turned 117 degrees to the right on

39:44

the longitudinal axis, coinciding

39:46

with the turning attitude of the aircraft.

39:48

Even though it was showing 37 degrees left, then

39:51

all of a sudden it snapped to 117 degrees right, which

39:54

is what they actually were at. And at that point,

39:56

the aircraft was lost at that point. The nose

39:59

fell below the...

39:59

horizon and speed began to increase. That's

40:02

so, oh man, I'd be so mad.

40:05

Right. And that's what pilots are trained to do. When you can't

40:07

see outside, you have to trust your instruments.

40:11

Oh my God, I would be so mad if I was, I

40:13

mean,

40:14

they didn't have time to be mad, but geez. Right.

40:16

Yeah. The aircraft was actually began diving

40:18

at the ground at a rate of 49,000 feet

40:21

per minute,

40:22

which means it would have in 30 seconds, right?

40:24

At 25,000 feet, they would have hit the ground

40:26

in 30 seconds. It fragmented

40:29

in the air. So it came apart below

40:31

about 10,000 feet above sea level at

40:33

a speed of more than 486 knots, which is 559 miles an hour or 900 kilometers

40:35

an hour.

40:39

So yeah, it's, it just basically was pointed

40:42

down really fast and just started breaking

40:44

apart that and within 30 seconds,

40:46

you know, it's crazy that it happened that fast,

40:49

but I guess they were doing things that it's not supposed

40:51

to do, not realizing it for a while.

40:54

Right. Because the instruments weren't

40:57

telling them what was going on. Their instruments were unreliable.

41:00

And

41:00

man, that is really frustrating.

41:03

Like I said, they, they, they came up with two

41:05

scenarios and what I said there was

41:08

one scenario where they were banking

41:10

and then they tried to correct it. And then the disagree

41:12

came on the disagreement, uh, annunciator.

41:15

The second scenario was only, was pretty

41:17

much the same thing. It was really only different

41:20

in that if this crew or a previous crew

41:22

had selected both on VG one

41:25

before the discrepancy noted above, the

41:27

events would have been pretty much the same only it would have

41:29

been the absence of that warning from the annunciator.

41:32

So the second scenario

41:33

is basically maybe they had switched

41:35

to VG one earlier in the flight or

41:37

maybe a previous crew had done it. There's no way to

41:39

know without a cockpit voice recorder. Did

41:42

it show how often that thingy

41:44

would

41:45

glitch out? It didn't give an exact

41:47

breakdown of how, how often the

41:49

attitude indicator was sticking. But even

41:52

if it's just a few seconds at a time, you can see how quickly

41:54

things fall apart. Yeah. When that happens,

41:57

there's quite a bit of technical talk in this report

41:59

about

41:59

the wiring, how the wiring came

42:02

basically lost a little bit of insulation

42:05

and that's what caused it to be exposed and that's what kind

42:08

of caused it. It was like what they call a post in

42:10

there that it was kind of rubbing against that

42:12

kind of caused it to sheath and kind of break apart. And

42:14

that's why it was only intermittently touching with itself.

42:17

And that's why the attitude indicator was intermittently

42:20

working.

42:21

Whose fault was this? The

42:23

manufacturer or the airline

42:26

for not training them? I don't.

42:29

So that becomes the question. All

42:31

right. It's OK.

42:33

We know more or less we have a very good idea

42:35

of what caused this. Now it's

42:37

like now you have to look at the maintenance history of the plane. Right.

42:41

Oh, yeah. Was this an ongoing issue that they know about it? So

42:44

they review the maintenance history of the plane. All

42:46

the maintenance that's carried out follows with COPPA and with

42:48

the previous operator in an attempt to identify

42:50

any maintenance activity that could have caused

42:52

this. There was no indication

42:54

in the records that the accident aircraft had experienced

42:57

any significant abnormality with any of the

42:59

systems with specific emphasis on

43:02

the attitude reference system of the

43:03

flight instruments, which had not been corrected

43:05

before the accident flight. So there was no

43:07

history of problem with this. That's even

43:09

more frustrating because there was no chance

43:12

for them to have fixed it.

43:13

Right. Because lots of times we'll get

43:15

to this point and be like, let's look at the maintenance. Like,

43:17

oh, this was a recurring problem that nobody

43:20

had fixed correctly. No,

43:21

it did not show up in any of the maintenance history for

43:23

this plane. This was just happened to be the time

43:26

when

43:26

it finally

43:28

began working intermittently on like

43:30

a nighttime flight,

43:31

avoiding weather when there's no visual

43:34

landmarks to help you try to

43:36

gauge how much of a bank you're in. Did they

43:38

have like fault? I think

43:40

that is the that's like the

43:42

American in us. Who

43:45

would you sue? Who's at fault? Who's

43:47

you know, who was going to pay for this? So there were

43:50

wrongful death lawsuits brought

43:52

against one of the parts suppliers for

43:54

the Boeing 737. It's a company called

43:57

Lucas Aerospace and that case was

43:59

settled out of court for now.

43:59

an undisclosed amount.

44:01

And in 1993, one

44:03

of the relatives of one of the passengers who was a US

44:05

passenger filed a lawsuit against Copa

44:07

Airlines in a Texas federal court, alleging

44:10

that the airline had sold a ticket to the passenger through

44:12

a travel agency in Houston. Although the

44:14

airline has no operation center in Texas, that

44:16

case was dismissed eventually in 1994. So

44:19

it seems like

44:20

the only lawsuit

44:22

was against

44:23

a part supplier and that

44:25

was settled out of court. So

44:28

that's really about it. But

44:30

yeah, it's a tough one. I don't know who to blame for this. Yeah,

44:33

I don't know. Cause it's like the part

44:36

was the cause of it, but then

44:38

having

44:39

the planes not have

44:41

a standardized system was

44:44

also the fault. But then also the airline

44:46

that bought it didn't train

44:48

the pilots that systems varied

44:51

plane to plane. Yeah, and you know, that

44:53

is maybe the one

44:55

bit of fault you could talk about or I can think

44:57

about is when

45:00

the pilots realize this, you know, they

45:02

compare, they identify the issue and, you

45:04

know, switch over to VG1, they

45:06

don't continue to look at the standby, the emergency

45:09

indicator. Yeah. Cause

45:11

that one would still be working correctly. You know, when all

45:13

is going on and you know, they're trying to

45:16

correct the plane the whole time

45:19

when their attitude and your not working the standby, one should

45:21

be working. But it also happened so

45:23

fast. Also, that's the thing. Yeah,

45:25

it was also just a matter of seconds. I do want to also clarify

45:28

earlier. I said that attitude indicators like a ball, you

45:30

think of it like a ball with the blue on top and the black

45:32

on bottom or brown on bottom. Nowadays, a lot

45:34

of times it's like a computer display.

45:37

So modern like what they call glass cockpits would

45:39

probably only have that as like the standby one.

45:41

The main one that they use in front of them is probably electronic

45:44

or glass, but this was 1992. So

45:47

they probably had the old style back then.

45:49

So, you know, the conclusions were that the aircraft

45:51

lost its structural integrity before crashing to the

45:53

ground due to excessive speed and G forces

45:56

outside of its tolerances for flight limitations.

45:59

There was no presence of explosives or incendiary

46:02

products, no evidence of a fire

46:05

found prior to fragmentation of the aircraft.

46:07

In a review of the documents and the history of

46:09

the aircraft, it was observed that it did not have ongoing

46:12

discrepancies due to maintenance that could have contributed to

46:14

the accident. That's a tough one, man. It

46:16

was not a known issue. I know. It

46:18

just so happened to finally break

46:20

right then. No evidence was observed that the

46:22

electrical system that powers the flight instruments had presented

46:25

failure because the flight data recorder continued

46:27

to operate until the aircraft began to lose its structural

46:29

integrity. There was a tropical storm

46:31

lateral to the path of the flight made by the aircraft.

46:34

The aircraft did not enter the storm area during the flight.

46:36

Witnesses indicated there

46:37

was no bad weather at the accident site. However,

46:39

during the flight, there was no natural reference. That's

46:42

to say, it

46:42

was dark. There was no way

46:45

they could see outside.

46:47

The role attitude information and

46:49

the heading information from the flight data recorder

46:51

of the accident aircraft, which records the

46:53

signals from the captain's flight instruments, confirms

46:56

the existence of an intermittent error in the attitude

46:58

indication.

46:59

Since the aircraft flight controls cannot carry out

47:01

the high rate of change in the role maneuvers indicated

47:03

by the flight data recorder. That's the same number, those

47:05

weird like rapid snaps to the left and the right. They

47:08

were on the flight data recorder. Like, those were impossible.

47:10

The plane can't actually do that. So

47:12

that's why that kind of confirms that there

47:15

was an error in there and the data that it was being

47:17

fed, it's being fed and it was being fed the data

47:19

from the captain's side.

47:21

In addition, following periods of incorrect attitude

47:23

information, the flight data recorder information indicated

47:25

that the crew tried to maneuver the aircraft

47:28

in order to correct the attitude errors that were indicated.

47:30

An intermittent short circuit was found in the winding

47:33

of the barrel synchronizer of the vertical twist,

47:35

which was caused by a pinched wire against the

47:38

loop.

47:38

Loss of voltage to the barrel synchronizer would cause

47:41

a respective attitude directional indicator to

47:43

freeze or lock in place. A

47:45

pinched wire, Chris. I mean, jeez.

47:48

Well, it's not just that though, to be clear. It's

47:50

a pinched wire with

47:52

irregular planes and

47:55

not bad information about

47:57

those planes. So it's like, but it all it all

47:59

stopped. It's still like three factors. Yeah.

48:03

Which is more comforting.

48:04

The first

48:07

officer could have been the pilot flying at the time the

48:09

indication of attitude error began because the captain

48:11

was found in the accident aircraft with no indication

48:13

of having a seat belt on and a tray of food was also found in the flight

48:15

cabin. So presumably

48:18

the captain was eating dinner,

48:20

eating a dinner service and the first officer was flying the plane at the time

48:22

this happened.

48:24

It is most likely that the emergency standby

48:26

attitude indicator was available to the flight crew

48:28

during the intermittent failure of the captain's primary

48:30

system

48:31

since the post impact damage presented by the emergency

48:34

indicator indicated it was operating

48:36

at the moment of impact with the ground. That's kind of

48:37

what I mentioned earlier. It's like

48:40

the standby one was still working. They

48:42

should have maybe been referencing that.

48:44

The emergency attitude indicator was

48:46

not used successfully to identify attitude

48:49

error in the primary flight instruments and maintain

48:51

control of the flight because the company simulator

48:53

and training procedure was carried out in a different

48:55

cabin configuration from that of

48:57

the accident aircraft and this training introduced

48:59

an element of confusion. So again,

49:02

slightly different aircraft layout

49:04

compared to the simulator they train on

49:07

and it could have contributed to them not looking at the

49:09

standby indicator.

49:10

Fleet cockpit standardization is a factor

49:12

in this accident because the flight crew repeated previous

49:14

actions learned in the simulator to select an alternate

49:16

source of guidance that would have been appropriate

49:19

for some COPA aircraft with one source. Auxiliary

49:21

vertical gyro but in the accident aircraft

49:23

moving the vertical gyro script to the both

49:26

on VG1 position resulted in loss of reference

49:28

from VG2 and further confusion. Again, that's

49:30

just that standardization. The switch was different

49:32

in the simulator than on the actual plane.

49:34

Just a couple more to go through here.

49:59

the crew to determine how to place switches

50:02

based on the aircraft being operated at the time. And

50:05

the last one on here, incomplete simulator and ground

50:07

crew training, as it did not present aircraft

50:09

differences and crew resource management in sufficient

50:11

detail to provide the crew with knowledge to overcome

50:14

intermittent errors in attitude indication and

50:16

to maintain control of the aircraft. So

50:19

just kind of

50:20

could be better training.

50:21

Yeah. Yeah. So there were

50:23

some safety recommendations here that were addressed to different groups

50:26

and different parties involved to

50:28

the International Civil Aviation Organization, the FAA

50:31

and Boeing provide information regarding

50:33

this accident to all aeronautical authorities and

50:35

operators. The benefit will be increased cockpit

50:37

awareness to carry out more effective combined

50:39

flight instrument checks and to move airlines

50:41

towards standardization of aircraft instrument and

50:44

system deployment. So just

50:46

educate everyone about what happened here.

50:48

That way you know that this is something that can happen

50:51

and that airlines should be standardizing

50:53

their cockpits to avoid this kind of accident.

50:55

Oh yeah, for sure. I mean, I feel like standardizing

50:58

cockpits.

50:59

You should already, they shouldn't have to say it.

51:02

Yeah. But you know, sometimes these planes are

51:04

old or they're like different generations and

51:07

things change as they're made. You know, this

51:09

Boeing 737 has been flying for like 50 years now. The Boeing 737

51:12

that gets delivered today is nothing like the one that was

51:14

delivered when it first came off the line 50 years ago.

51:17

So it's like you have, but there are of course

51:19

models along the way. So I get it. But

51:22

they need to like figure out what that standardization

51:24

is to the operator. In the case, Copa

51:26

airlines,

51:27

including the flight crew operations manual before

51:29

the startup checklist, a daily test of the voice

51:31

recorder. So test the cockpit voice

51:33

recorder every day to make sure it's working.

51:35

Establish fleet standardization objectives

51:38

for air transport operations that include aircraft

51:40

systems and cockpit instrument deployments

51:42

and achieve such objectives through review of aircraft

51:45

purchases, leases, or direct modifications

51:47

to aircraft in cases where instruments and

51:49

nonstandard aircraft must be operated. Training

51:52

must be provided on the ground and in simulator specifically

51:54

on the differences and the flight crew operations

51:57

manual and checklist

51:58

verification procedures.

51:59

must be quoted to cover all aircraft in the fleet.

52:02

So it's saying, if

52:04

the plane that you're flying is not standard

52:06

compared to everything else, you must have specific

52:09

training that focuses exclusively

52:11

on those differences.

52:13

Yeah. Which of course makes sense. And

52:15

the last one on here, establish initial training

52:17

and recurring training of crew resource management

52:20

following the International Civil Aviation Organization

52:22

guidelines and the operational examples of

52:24

the largest airlines in the world. So again,

52:27

just more CRM training. I feel like that comes up

52:29

so often. That's like almost

52:32

all of them in some way. You

52:34

got, you have, that's why you have two pilots

52:36

in the cockpit to divide

52:39

tasks and assign them and have

52:42

two people troubleshooting and working on something. One

52:44

person

52:45

doing it by themselves is not nearly as effective, but

52:47

that's it. Copa Airlines flight 201, man,

52:50

just an absolutely

52:52

frustrating one all the way around. Not

52:54

because, I feel like I say that sometimes when it's like, oh,

52:56

there was so much incompetence It's

52:59

like here, it's just like,

53:00

it was almost unpredictable. I know, I know. Yeah,

53:02

this one, that's what's frustrating. It's like,

53:05

man, it's like hard.

53:06

One of the rare cases where there wasn't that

53:09

much that could have been done to avoid it. Right.

53:11

Maybe flipping the switch in the other direction of which they

53:14

had not been trained to do. All right, but that's it. Don't

53:16

forget, I feel like we mentioned it a couple of times.

53:18

RTX is coming up July 7th to 9th in Austin. Yeah,

53:21

come to RTX. You can get tickets at rtxaustin.com.

53:23

We're wrapping up this podcast in a couple of weeks.

53:26

Our last episode for Black Box Down will

53:28

be the end of June, right before RTX.

53:30

And we're gonna have a panel for Black Box Down there.

53:33

It should be fun. We'll talk about doing

53:35

this podcast for three years

53:36

and the things we've learned. And maybe we'll cover, we'll

53:39

briefly talk about some accidents we didn't get

53:41

to cover. Yeah.

53:43

But anyway, go check it out, rtxaustin.com.

53:46

Bye. All right, bye.