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This podcast is for informational purposes
0:46
only and should not be relied upon
0:48
as a basis for relied upon as
0:50
a basis for investment decisions. I'm Zach
0:53
Fuss and today we're breaking down arm
0:55
holdings. Armed designs the architecture powering
0:57
billions of devices from smartphones and
0:59
centers to to devices and
1:01
automotive systems. In this In
1:04
this episode, we'll explore value unique
1:06
value proposition. it thrives as a how it thrives
1:08
as a licensing giant in a
1:10
market dominated by leading -edge manufacturers. this business
1:12
discuss the business model, that the partnerships that
1:14
drive its growth, in and its role
1:16
in enabling companies like Apple, the and
1:18
Qualcomm. We We will also
1:20
unpack ARM's business history, including its
1:22
acquisition by by Softbank. its failed
1:25
takeover by Nevada, and its IPO
1:27
earlier this year. currently Orm currently
1:29
$150 billion market market cap,
1:31
but sales $5 $5 billion.
1:33
robust a rather robust 30
1:35
times revenue multiple. is, of course, This
1:37
valuation is of course predicated
1:39
on its 90 % plus gross
1:41
margins, by arm's by ARM's dominant market
1:43
share and its and its share share
1:45
gains in markets like automotive,
1:47
cloud computing, and IoT, IOT, with with
1:49
its technology being licensed in
1:51
nearly 30 billion chips annually. annually. To
1:53
break down I am I
1:56
am joined by Goldberg,
1:58
who is the CEO
2:00
and lead at D2D Advise.
2:02
a technology and strategy consultancy, and who
2:05
has spent various roles in the semiconductor
2:07
ecosystem. We hope you enjoy this conversation.
2:09
All right, Jay, it is great to
2:11
have you back. The world continues to
2:13
change and evolve, particularly as it comes
2:16
to your area of expertise, semiconductors. Today
2:18
we're talking about arm. So to start
2:20
things off, I know this is a
2:22
loaded question, and it has a fair
2:24
degree of complexity. may require a bit
2:27
of a semiconductor 101 education for our
2:29
audience, but let's start with a brief
2:31
overview of arms business model, what exactly
2:33
they do, and how they fit into
2:35
the broader semiconductor ecosystem. So I'm going
2:38
to give you an analogy on arm
2:40
to give an intuitive sense of what
2:42
they do. This is not a hundred
2:44
percent perfect analogy, but it's what we
2:47
work with. Arm licenses, it's intellectual property.
2:49
It's IP, two companies that design chips.
2:51
So they don't make chips themselves and
2:53
they license their IP to companies like
2:55
Qualcomm or Invidia or Broadcom, these big
2:58
chip companies, who then design that IP
3:00
into their own chips, which they get
3:02
manufactured at CSMC or one of the
3:04
foundries. So arm is fairly early in
3:06
the process of this whole semiconductor flow.
3:09
The way to think about arm is
3:11
that the IP that they provide is
3:13
almost like a blueprint, but a special
3:15
type of blueprint. So imagine you're an
3:17
architect and you're designing a house. As
3:20
an architect you differentiate yourself by how
3:22
the house looks. What's the curb appeal?
3:24
How does the light flow? These big
3:26
architectural features. Typically as an architect you
3:29
don't get rewarded much because you have
3:31
the best designed plumbent. You don't have
3:33
the best designed bathrooms. Those are important
3:35
in a house, but that's not really
3:37
where you as the architect differentiate yourself.
3:40
And especially in lots of places, bathrooms
3:42
are generally very standard. And what you
3:44
could do is just take the generic
3:46
blueprints for a standard bathroom and you're
3:48
going to copy and paste those around
3:51
your design. That frees you up to
3:53
design the parts of the house that
3:55
really matter. that are really going
3:57
to drive your
4:00
business as an architect
4:02
as an architect I think it's a
4:04
good analogy for how arm interacts with
4:06
its customers. with There's a certain amount of
4:08
low of work that needs to be
4:10
in lots of types of chips. Certain Certain
4:12
types of math, certain types of functions
4:14
need to be in all chips, but
4:16
there's no way that a no way that a
4:18
Qualcomm or a NVIDIA really differentiates around those.
4:20
It's basic math things that need to
4:22
get done. that need to that IP from
4:24
from arm. and then they work that into
4:26
their chip, and then they can differentiate
4:28
on things on things It's how their It's work,
4:30
how their communication systems work, or for
4:32
NVIDIA, how their graphics and AI processing works.
4:35
graphics and AI processing vital function, providing a
4:37
really important piece of the overall
4:39
functioning of a chip. of the with
4:41
still allowing the flexibility for their customers,
4:43
their licensees to design their their they
4:45
see fit. what they do is they
4:47
license that IP, So what their business model
4:49
works essentially IP they charge business payment and
4:51
then they take a royalty, their amount of
4:53
money per chip per chip licensee actually ships.
4:56
actually a really helpful analogy
4:58
to frame it. My research it. In
5:00
my research, clearly, GPUs have the day, at
5:02
least in the last call it 12
5:04
to 18 months. My understanding
5:06
is that this is a CPU
5:08
oriented business. So help So us us to
5:10
better understand the importance of their
5:12
CPU versus the GPU architecture that
5:14
people are working with today and
5:16
the interplay between those two in
5:18
a future world state. The The CPU is
5:20
very much a general -purpose chip. run It
5:23
can run any type of workload. the It
5:25
can run the low -level functions of the
5:27
keyboard the mouse and the hard drive
5:29
for your computer. It can handle the operating
5:31
system and the applications. It's
5:33
a general -purpose purpose jack-of-all chip. chip. But of
5:35
the geometry and physics of of
5:37
you can always design a chip
5:39
that does a single one of
5:41
those tasks better than the CPU. CPU.
5:44
the case of GPUs, they were
5:46
first developed to run graphics really,
5:48
really well. A CPU could run basic
5:50
graphics, but a GPU can do much better
5:52
better than a CPU. GPU can't run GPU can't
5:54
run the operating system well. It can't do
5:56
all the low -level functions as well. can It
5:58
can do graphics really well. So an engineer... you're off,
6:00
what do you need the chip to
6:02
do? need You make those trade You you
6:04
design different tasks to different chips. And
6:06
with GPUs now becoming important tools for
6:09
AI, with GPUs these becoming chips are even
6:11
more finely tuned towards chips are even more finely
6:13
And that's similar to GPU math. don't
6:15
need to get into that's video story.
6:17
In regards to need to what's common to
6:19
all this is you have certain general
6:21
purpose functions In ARM sits at the heart
6:23
of all those. to So you don't
6:25
need certain general purpose IP, that ARM sits
6:27
at of a GPU. of all those. because
6:30
not what the GPU is there to do, but you're gonna
6:32
want it inside the CPU. You're gonna
6:34
want that functionality. inside the most compute systems,
6:36
you're always gonna need some functionality. So all
6:38
the multiple tasks. So even in these
6:40
big NVIDIA systems that have to 72 GPU
6:42
cards all linked together, there's gonna be
6:44
some number of CPUs in those as
6:46
well. So the way to think about
6:49
arm in relation to the growth of
6:51
AI, 72 GPU the hot topic now is
6:53
going to are exploding. We're seeing so many
6:55
more GPUs being sold eight or doing really
6:57
well selling all around the world. there
6:59
is some degree of CPU attached to
7:01
that. depending on where they source the
7:03
CPU from, that can often be
7:06
an ARM -based CPU. And in fact,
7:08
NVIDIA probably prefers to sell its own
7:10
CPU, to sell its own It often attaches
7:12
those to its GPU systems to its that
7:14
CPU is ARM CPU is arm-based. we
7:16
we their unique business model model the
7:19
CPU versus GPU GPU dynamics, I I
7:21
guess I I to really try to
7:23
wrap it all around is that
7:25
core technology. What is it
7:27
about IP IP and their
7:29
business model, how it strips, that differ
7:31
differ from their competition? armyly faces
7:33
two elements of two elements of
7:35
competition. they have been seen as they
7:38
have been seen with X86. with to take a step
7:40
back and take a step back and
7:42
say, called sometimes called set architecture, an
7:44
ISA. And that's just and that's just a
7:46
framework for how ships are supposed
7:48
to handle these types of math,
7:50
these sorts of problems. 40 years
7:52
ago, ago, there were dozens of
7:54
different of different ISAs. And over time, down to
7:56
two, two. the arm There's the arm
7:58
architecture, and then there's the... X-86 architecture. And
8:00
today there's two companies that provide X-86 architecture,
8:02
AMD and Intel. Intel started it and then
8:04
AMD joined along. And arm is the other
8:07
instruction set architecture, which historically wasn't used for
8:09
computers, wasn't used for PCs, really got its
8:11
big boost from smartphones and mobile. That's changing.
8:13
We can get into that. Historically, you'd use
8:15
X-86 in a PC and you'd use arm
8:17
in a smartphone. Most recently we've seen another
8:19
ISA enter the fold called risk five. R.I.S.C.
8:21
v. Risk 5 and that scene is an
8:23
open source, not exactly open source, but it's
8:25
open. It's not owned by one company. It's
8:27
designed by a consortium that anybody can contribute
8:29
to and use freely. So Risk 5 is
8:31
out there as an alternative to arm. It's
8:34
still very early days for Risk 5. So
8:36
it's on the, I'd call it an emergent
8:38
potential competitor as opposed to certainly not a
8:40
dire threat to arm anytime soon. So if
8:42
we think about how we got here and
8:44
work from the start. the general familiarity with
8:46
arm came through the early days success they
8:48
had with apple but how did they go
8:50
from this what i would call niche player
8:52
to someone that's so dominant in the architecture
8:54
of the future today what is the business
8:56
story arm came out of England out of
8:59
the UK there was a company called acorn
9:01
computers and this is back in the seventies
9:03
when everybody was making computers and acorn was
9:05
selling computers through other people's brands typically like
9:07
the BBC and they had a couple hit
9:09
products and they realized that to be competitive
9:11
they wanted to design their own ship. So
9:13
they tasked the team with designing a chip
9:15
as a photo CPU of the day and
9:17
that was the kernel of what would become
9:19
arm. Eventually they split that off the chip
9:21
design team and the hardware team went their
9:23
separate team and the hardware team went their
9:26
separate ways and the genesis of arm the
9:28
company today was originally called Acorn Risk Machines
9:30
and later advanced risk machines. We can talk
9:32
about what risk means later but the point
9:34
is it was part of Acorn it got
9:36
spun off into a three-way joint venture joint
9:38
venture between Acorn. VLSI, chip company of its
9:40
day, and Apple. Because Apple originally wanted to
9:42
use this arm IP. for the
9:44
Newton products. The Newton
9:46
didn't do particularly well,
9:48
but well, but Arm did
9:51
pretty well. made a
9:53
lot of money from
9:55
Newton, which it then
9:57
used which then grow as
9:59
part of portfolio. part-up And
10:01
from the get -go, the
10:03
Arm was an IP
10:05
licensor. They stopped making
10:07
their own ships when
10:09
they spun off they spun off,
10:11
their IP first to
10:13
Apple and then to
10:16
many others. to many others. slowly
10:18
but surely that grew. grew. then they
10:20
started adding customers. I think after
10:22
Newton, I think first few big customers were
10:24
fax machines, were designing designing fax machines
10:26
of all things. things. And then I think
10:28
what really tricked them into the beginning
10:30
of this big growth trajectory was
10:32
Nokia. was Nokia Nokia their their chip Texas Instruments,
10:34
started using ARM in the late
10:36
80s or early 90s. And the first
10:38
ARM first mobile phone was actually the
10:40
phone was which is the 8110, which is the That
10:42
was the first That was mobile phone. And
10:44
very quickly, other mobile phone companies started
10:46
to realize the appeal of using ARM
10:49
realize the ARM of using arm mobile phones. And
10:51
the reputation And very early on was that
10:53
it was much more power power than
10:55
alternatives, especially something like like X86, which at
10:57
that point really evolved into something that
10:59
was meant for a device that was
11:02
powered, a laptop or a PC laptop or a
11:04
to power. Mobile phones were so power
11:06
were so power conscious ARM had a lot of
11:08
appeal. it So in was in a lot
11:10
of feature phones. time, time, their capabilities increased,
11:12
and what really really kicked it in
11:14
the high gear was was 2007, the launch of
11:17
the iPhone and this explosion in in smartphones. suddenly
11:19
you needed very very complicated very advanced
11:21
processors for your phone the the best way
11:23
to do that was to start with
11:25
an the core the core of the phone
11:27
to to answer your question really the the
11:29
explosion came with the growth of mobile of
11:32
mobile. So history dictates here, here, arm
11:34
went on to dominate mobile
11:36
devices. Presumably they have a growing presence
11:38
in other markets, automotive, internet
11:41
of things. My guess My guess is
11:43
that if I walk through my living
11:45
room, there's probably eight or nine
11:47
devices that have some arm architecture licensed
11:49
to them. to But I guess I guess
11:51
most is this increasing demand for AI
11:53
AI. and machine learning. So I So I
11:55
guess in contemplating why a business today
11:57
that is rating close to to billion
11:59
of revenue. has a hundred and billion market
12:01
cap, it kind of begs the question, the
12:03
what the heck is going on here?
12:05
on here? So it's a few a few things. is, the
12:07
arm of today is very of today is very, very
12:09
different than the arm of just even a
12:11
few years ago. long For a long time, they
12:13
had talked about expanding into new markets. By
12:16
the mid much a they were very
12:18
much a companies. Ninety-something percent of the was
12:20
derived from derived from In the last
12:22
decade, but especially in the last
12:24
three, four years, they have made
12:26
huge inroads into other markets. The
12:28
most important of which is probably
12:30
the data center is they're helping all
12:32
the center, where Amazon, Microsoft, the Google,
12:34
Facebook, all in all, bye, bye, bye. at
12:36
this big Super Facebook, Ali now
12:38
designed their own CPUs to run
12:40
have workloads, and those are all based
12:42
on ARM chips. And this is an
12:44
alternative to using on arm Intel and AMD data center
12:46
chips. These companies went out and designed their own
12:48
chips. to using place for any of
12:50
those companies to start with would be ARM, because
12:52
there's really no other alternative. went So and
12:54
say their own and foremost, their biggest
12:57
growth opportunity. IOT is is
12:59
out there. IoT is a messy market. there,
13:01
They're doing okay there, but nobody does too
13:03
IoT. It's too complicated and too messy. is
13:05
certainly really, really, really interesting. I think I think they've
13:07
made good inroads there with a lot of their partners,
13:09
their a lot of their A are doing well there. are
13:12
takes a long time to mature. These are long
13:14
product cycles, five to a years to develop a chip
13:16
into production product as opposed to to or two years
13:19
for everybody else. a So we'll see how that
13:21
goes, but it's looking pretty good right now. as opposed
13:23
to one or is doing well everybody pretty much
13:25
everywhere. else. And I think you're right, AI is such
13:27
such the story of the day. it's
13:29
not it's not quite as clean
13:31
a story there, because I said, they're
13:33
not necessarily going to have an an
13:36
in every GPU, or every AI accelerator that's out
13:38
there, but there is some rate. You'll
13:40
need you'll you'll need other control functions.
13:42
There's cores in networking chips that
13:44
sit next to all of this to
13:47
connect all these all servers together. So
13:49
there's a lot of content going
13:51
into stuff that's to the core invidia, AI
13:53
AI accelerators. And ARM is absolutely benefiting
13:55
from that that hugely. But I But I
13:57
personally think arm's valuation is justified by more than
14:00
than just AI, it's this broad
14:02
expansion into so many other things. to
14:04
back up a little up a little
14:06
bit, I know there's
14:08
kind of this classic debate
14:10
amongst semi around risk risk and
14:12
these two and these two
14:14
fundamental architectural approaches in processor design.
14:16
It feels It feels important here. So
14:18
maybe we should just spend a
14:20
little bit of time explaining those
14:23
two and why two and why adopted
14:25
a risk approach a how that contributed
14:27
to its success. success. It's It's funny,
14:29
this risk versus CISC debate is something that's
14:31
been in computer science topics for a
14:33
long time. Back in the early
14:35
days of the this debate was incredibly
14:37
important. was I remember I took some
14:40
computer science classes in the I took some
14:42
and that was the topic of
14:44
the day. was 90s, and was is better, of
14:46
of famous moments around it. But
14:48
at heart, it's two ways to think
14:50
about how you architect a chip, it.
14:52
and at stands for to instruction set,
14:55
and chip, and risk stands for complex instruction set.
14:57
And the basic idea is you you have
14:59
a chip the the chip runs on
15:01
zeros and ones, a but a level
15:03
above that, are there are assembly language.
15:05
There's human readable code that the chip translates
15:08
into. zeros and into And the idea behind the
15:10
idea is that each of the critical mathematical
15:12
functions you want to implement in the you
15:14
you have a separate instruction for those. the
15:16
And as opposed to have a there's a
15:18
much smaller number of instructions you can give
15:20
the chip. And if you want to
15:22
do more complex a you have to string
15:24
a few of the simpler instructions together. So
15:26
the simplest way to think about this,
15:28
trigger the example, it's not quite perfect, but
15:30
quite perfect, but SISC architecture, you might have something
15:32
like a square root function, where it
15:34
calculates the square root. It knows how to
15:36
do that math and it moves to It
15:38
once knows to do the square root of a number. and it moves
15:40
you would have to do a
15:42
series of the subtraction, addition steps in
15:44
order to get that same command implemented.
15:47
and ones around to do at the time, used to
15:49
of religious about which one was better. And the
15:51
truth is, I don't think you could say that
15:53
one is better than the other. other. There are just
15:55
different situations when one works better than the other.
15:57
There's always trade is This is engineering. There's always trade
15:59
-offs between what is good. what's right for the application in
16:01
front of you. front of ended up happening
16:03
was risk, initially it was very, very
16:05
memory memory You needed a lot of
16:07
memory because you a to remember all those
16:09
steps. you had to the time, all more appealing
16:11
because it didn't need as much memory
16:13
and memory was very expensive. Over time,
16:15
need as -chip memory got very cheap very,
16:17
very quickly and that made risk much
16:19
more attractive. got very because it was
16:21
this reduced instruction set. more you
16:23
can say it ended up requiring less
16:25
power. That's oversimplifying it a bit, but
16:27
at the heart of it, you needed
16:30
less power to do these calculations because
16:32
the steps involved in the complex instruction
16:34
sets were complicated by design and those
16:36
ended up chewing up more power. up chewing up
16:38
more how that's how initial reputation for being
16:40
much more power efficient than power What
16:42
ended up happening in history is
16:44
x86 took the CISC path, the
16:47
complex path path, took the the risk-reduced
16:49
set set path. that's how they how they
16:51
back in the late in the early early
16:53
80s. And it's humorous to me that it's
16:55
still a topic that keeps coming up.
16:57
We have have the project, which is
16:59
very explicitly risk based. Coming on stream
17:01
today saying, hey, we we have all the
17:03
benefits of risk. And I think as
17:05
much as this is about low chip
17:08
interactions, what what it really, really what what
17:10
this difference between sys can risk
17:12
meant. risk meant, was risk-allowed users a degree of degree
17:14
of flexibility their in designing their chips. power
17:16
It wasn't just the power savings
17:18
that made risk appealing, it was much
17:20
more about the flexibility. I I need
17:22
risk to do something slightly different
17:24
than what what done. done. I'm gonna take
17:26
this other approach and I'm gonna
17:28
optimize for power savings, I'm gonna optimize
17:30
for this function and that function
17:32
and that flexibility was really important. Cause
17:34
one of the critical differences between
17:36
X86 and Because that X86 is owned
17:38
by two companies arm is that X86 AMD and
17:40
Intel. companies ARM is available to be licensed
17:42
by anybody. It's very, very hard to
17:44
license anybody to Anybody with enough money can
17:46
get an ARM license. an So then So
17:48
a step further. a step further, of the
17:51
interesting things about things about this five, this project, is
17:53
that it is free for anyone to
17:55
use, use. or at least to take the
17:57
code, code, so it's even cheaper and more
17:59
available. to ARM, and it and it is
18:01
by design even more flexible. You can
18:03
really shape this around and use RISC -V
18:05
in ways that you can't even do with
18:07
ARM, which itself is already pretty flexible. are
18:10
drawbacks drawbacks to that, don't have to get into
18:12
them. are software complexities down the stream
18:14
from that. down the stream heart, really,
18:16
the debate is around the debate of
18:18
instruction sets to customize to for
18:21
each individual chip design each licensee to
18:23
do as they see fit. see fit. It's It's
18:25
not every day that you
18:27
approach a business that trades at
18:29
30 time sales this has this
18:31
classic where there's this open this open free
18:33
to hypothetically free to use, nothing
18:36
free. is free. but I think before
18:38
we but I think before we
18:40
go into the competitive landscape and
18:42
the dynamics around the X86 and risk 5, I just
18:44
want to better I just want to better
18:46
understand what that partnership and licensing model
18:48
is really like. How How does that model
18:50
work going forward in a world where there's
18:52
so much competition? And what
18:54
are the key advantages to licensing
18:56
Apple and Apple and Qualcomm and Samsung
18:58
and others versus vertically integrating the
19:00
business in a way that could
19:03
help to maybe make their competitive
19:05
advantage more durable? This is a little is
19:07
a little complex answer. Let Let me talk about historically,
19:09
speculate on where things are going. where Historically,
19:12
it was essential in early days that they didn't
19:14
manufacture chips. chips. Part of the problem when
19:16
you manufacture a chip is a chip someone has
19:18
to do the design. That's expensive. You design. have
19:20
to hire designers to do that. that's what
19:22
to and NVIDIA do. to They that's do their chips.
19:24
And then once you've designed your chip, you
19:26
have to pay someone else to manufacture it,
19:28
typically. then So Qualcomm or Broadcom will pay
19:30
TSMC to do the manufacturing for it. So
19:32
that's a lot of or expense. will pay There's a
19:34
lot of capital involved. You have to pay
19:36
for a sets. You have to build inventory.
19:39
You have to take ownership of all those
19:41
chips. That's a lot of expense, inventory,
19:43
and and you have to take in the early
19:45
days, it just wasn't financially viable. viable.
19:47
It It was much simpler to just just their
19:49
IP. It was It was also something the market
19:51
really needed. needed. So I think that was driven
19:53
originally by necessity and the earliest CEO was dead set
19:55
on on this model. He He saw the opportunity
19:57
and grabbed it and really ran with it.
19:59
it. And then time emerged, you got this
20:01
big ecosystem of lots of other
20:04
customers, lots of licensees designing their
20:06
chips that really helped grow the
20:08
ecosystem. grow the there was a period
20:10
in the early in the there was a
20:12
big debate between big and and arm, And
20:14
this was around around mobile mostly, but other as
20:16
well, where where ARM was able to
20:18
succeed it it certainly did its own
20:21
set of R &D and innovation, but
20:23
but then they had hundreds of of licensees
20:25
are also innovating and exploring the market
20:27
and finding every segment and every
20:29
niche. and And that drove a huge
20:31
amount of volume of chip designs chip
20:33
X86, which was Intel and AMD. Big
20:36
big, capable companies, but but limits to
20:38
how much they could explore. So arm was
20:40
was able to, beyond the technical merits
20:42
and the power savings available and spones. They
20:44
had they had this giant ecosystem, which
20:46
was very, very powerful in expanding the
20:48
university dressable market. And then over
20:50
time, because of the rise of rises of
20:52
it also drove volume to the
20:54
foundries. It It really the the growth of
20:56
TSMC into the it is is today. you
20:58
have So you have this big ecosystem
21:00
that that worked really well in its
21:03
favor. now we're at a point we're at a
21:05
point today, the where the market has consolidated
21:07
a lot. There's always lots of competition
21:09
in semis. in The question is, is, does
21:11
want to build its own chips? it's certainly,
21:13
I certainly, I think, in a realm of
21:16
the possible where they're going to move up
21:18
a step and design their chips. I I
21:20
don't think they're going to go so far
21:22
as to necessarily put their own label
21:24
on a chip and design it and sell
21:26
it into the market like a merchant solution.
21:28
But I do think it's very possible
21:30
that they will take a lot of steps
21:32
to help their customers, their licensees, bring arm
21:34
chips to reality. a step a step in
21:36
here that's important. In between having ARM IP
21:38
and actually then sending it to the to there's
21:41
a lot of steps that have to
21:43
take place. take place. We the IP, taking
21:45
the IP from the digital files and good
21:47
ideas. good ideas, and translating that into
21:49
the design for a chip. That's a fairly
21:51
cumbersome process, and I think ARM is
21:53
now taking a lot of steps to make
21:55
that process easier, it, and I it. that I
21:57
think what that will probably do is open
21:59
the... door to new customers who may not
22:01
design chips today, but with ARM's help,
22:03
they can bring those chips to market
22:06
faster, better in ways that probably weren't
22:08
possible before just relying on merchant partners.
22:10
And that's sort of what we're seeing
22:12
with the hyperscalers. ARM has done a
22:14
lot to help those companies design their
22:16
chips, and I think they're going to
22:18
take a few more steps and get
22:20
very, very close to doing a full
22:22
design of their own chips. And when
22:24
you consider those steps to designing chips
22:26
and partnering with other technology companies that
22:28
participate in other parts of the ecosystem,
22:30
who else are you bringing together for
22:32
this project, then ultimately spec yourself into
22:35
something which I assume has extremely high
22:37
switching costs on a go forward basis?
22:39
So I think that the chief complexity
22:41
here is in the software realm, because
22:43
chips don't exist in isolation. You build
22:45
a chip so that it can run
22:47
some form of software. There are certainly
22:49
incremental steps in the design process, but
22:51
I think what's more critical than any
22:53
of that is the software that's going
22:55
to run on these chips. And a
22:57
big part of the ARM story of
22:59
the last decade has been the amount
23:01
of work that software companies are doing
23:04
to make their software run better on
23:06
ARM architecture. So in theory, you have
23:08
all these different ARM chips out there
23:10
in the data center. Like I said,
23:12
Amazon has one, Microsoft has one, Facebook
23:14
has one. There's a fair degree of
23:16
compatibility that if you have software that
23:18
runs on Microsoft's CPU, you can fairly
23:20
easily port that over to run on
23:22
Amazon. CPU. And that's the real critical
23:24
part of that. And there is a
23:26
whole history of how ARM got there.
23:28
It was a lot of work and
23:30
a lot of blood, sweat, and tears
23:33
that went into it. But it's at
23:35
a fairly advanced stage now. And I
23:37
think that's really critical. That compatibility layer
23:39
is very, very important and appreciates how
23:41
people think about what their choice of
23:43
design and ISA. So this business has
23:45
a very interesting history in the way
23:47
it's developed, but recent history has been
23:49
full of all types of dramatics. There
23:51
was the soft bank take private. There
23:53
was the Nvidia transaction. There was more
23:55
recent IPO. What was everyone thinking as
23:57
those things were going on from an
23:59
industry perspective? and also what is what is the
24:01
strategy behind the scenes why to why
24:04
these different parties were so interested in an
24:06
asset that at the time people thought
24:08
everyone was overpaying for but in retrospect,
24:10
seemingly they got a good deal. and
24:12
they got a good deal. So ARM about
24:14
arm years ago. years ago at the
24:16
time, there was a lot of head
24:18
scratching. They paid that paid 32 billion for it. it
24:20
I think many people, myself included, didn't
24:22
quite see it. it And then for a long
24:25
time, for most of a decade actually ARM
24:27
went to sleep. I think in part they had
24:29
done so well in mobile, they they were
24:31
the only in in town for mobile. got They
24:33
got acquired by at a a point in
24:35
which it was clear that ARM was gonna
24:37
be the only thing in mobile. thing in
24:39
wasn't gonna be there. All the last the last
24:41
tiny that had left over from the 80s
24:43
and 90s, they were all done. 90s, they were
24:46
all gone. had a monopoly on on chip
24:48
for mobile phones, and that was a
24:50
massive market. market. acquired them,
24:52
and they didn't have any pressure after that. They
24:54
just had to do what SoftBank asked, but they
24:56
didn't have the pressure of the public market asking
24:58
them quarter after quarter what's next, what's next. quarter
25:01
then at some point, what's next, what's investment fund. They
25:03
needed an exit. They exit. needed liquidity. it's NVIDIA came
25:05
along and offered to buy them for an billion,
25:07
needed which if billion, and a great deal. You paid
25:09
came you sell it and offered to especially because there
25:11
wasn't a lot of growth left if You didn't
25:13
really know what to do You it. didn't bank,
25:15
It's an interesting question paid to
25:18
why for $54, wanted to buy It's an
25:20
Certainly part of it was as to were in
25:22
the process then of designing their own CPU.
25:24
Certainly. they They saw this growth wave coming
25:26
for AI, knew that they and they knew that
25:28
they would need more powerful, more capable CPUs.
25:31
and they probably weren't particularly happy with
25:33
the pace of that arm, the sleepy the sleepy
25:35
company to delivering to them and they wanted
25:37
to accelerate work work ARM was doing
25:39
for data center workloads. Beyond that,
25:41
it's a little tough to see the that
25:43
invidia had in ARM. Nvidia didn't
25:45
play in mobile at that point. I
25:47
think it comes down to down to Huang,
25:49
the CEO of of invidia. His in my my mind
25:52
willing willing to make big bets, take big
25:54
chances. He's not afraid of failure. And as
25:56
And as much as he's this huge success
25:58
today, he's made a lot. mistakes along
26:00
the way. his real ability is his
26:02
ability to not be afraid of those
26:04
mistakes. to keep moving and to keep moving Most other companies
26:06
Most other companies do some of the things that
26:08
have over the years. They over the years. up, would give up.
26:10
give CEO would give up. The board would kick
26:12
him out. him That didn't happen kick him out, that didn't he
26:14
was able to keep pushing things through and making
26:17
these big bets. And I think ARM was in
26:19
that camp. It wasn't necessarily fully thought out. It
26:21
was a need, and they tried to acquire it.
26:23
And then when it didn't work out, they moved
26:25
on to something else. And then AI happened. we The
26:27
ARM we didn't, deal broke three years ago. we'd, And
26:29
the one good thing that came out of that
26:31
was, up and said, oh, wait a up and said, oh, wait
26:33
a second. need We've been sleeping on this. in need And
26:35
they company back in gear. so they brought in a
26:37
they knew they had to take it public. in
26:39
a new brought they new management team, brought in a
26:41
new CEO, brought in a new CEO, who has done a
26:43
tremendous job of reinvigorating the company. in a new waking
26:46
them up they starting to get them really
26:48
active they excited again, in, they pushing them. brought in,
26:50
He fixed all these things. He things. fixed
26:52
pricing, fixed over, and he fixed marketing, and said,
26:54
just go down the list. All these things
26:56
that hadn't been done said, they've tripped up
26:58
or overlooked, said, and he got them moving
27:00
again, headed in really good directions. And I
27:02
think at heart, what Arm is really trying
27:04
to do today is the the value that they
27:07
that they can get from the industry. if you
27:09
look at you look at it by
27:11
numbers, in 2023 on they went public,
27:13
on average, they earned about So they licensed the
27:15
IP, they get a So they payment, that they
27:17
get a royalty payment. cents That was
27:19
about on .07 per chip on average. age,
27:21
Today, it's over to nine close to rough math,
27:23
it rough math, probably gets to 12
27:25
cents over the next three, four years. years. And you think
27:27
about it, R makes, arm in the case of case
27:29
of invidia, a system
27:31
for a ,000. $100,000, arm probably makes a
27:33
buck or two on that. or two you look at it in
27:35
that context, you're like, well, maybe there's a little room
27:37
for a little bit more going well, maybe there's a
27:39
that across all the chips and bit more these
27:41
end markets. And you start to realize
27:43
there is this potential to greatly increase their
27:45
value in all these end And just to illustrate
27:48
how big that addressable market is and
27:50
how often we interact with their licensed
27:52
technology, can you just give an example
27:54
of where their chips are? like the In some
27:56
ways, it's like or inverse of whether
27:58
or not, is there seemingly everywhere. But I
28:00
just want to illustrate that point to better
28:02
drive home the market opportunity they have in
28:04
the event that they can push pricing further
28:06
they can push pricing much every electronic
28:08
device in your house in your house
28:10
content in it. in it.
28:12
that run on that will have
28:14
will have some arm cores somewhere in there,
28:16
maybe running Bluetooth or Wi-Fi or something.
28:19
Everything has ARM everything electronic. PC's smart phones, smart
28:21
home devices, your -Fi router, your
28:23
thermostat, your your lock. There are some
28:25
advanced Apple plugs. into plug it
28:28
into the wall. Some of those
28:30
have very low -cost ARM cores
28:32
in them to do something
28:34
who knows. your Your AirPods, all of
28:36
your speakers, in all of that
28:38
has ARM content in it. probably
28:41
refrigerator probably has some in it. arm Your
28:43
TV has lots of arm content in it.
28:45
cars. They have a little cars, they have a little
28:47
bit today. They're gonna have a lot
28:49
more in the future. Anything with
28:51
any digital smarts is gonna have some
28:53
kind of arm content in it. it. It's
28:55
It's really incredible. Part of this
28:57
conversation you obviously you the importance of
29:00
Jensen the his culture at and his culture
29:02
at semiconductor industry has become
29:04
has with all these
29:06
mercurial founders and executives.
29:08
have Lisa and Dee, Pat Gelsinger, who
29:11
who recently aside aside How Intel. is How
29:13
important is management to this business
29:15
they have they had as much
29:17
influence directly as some of these
29:19
other luminaries have in their particular
29:21
businesses? There's three three people I
29:23
think who deserve credit for arms success in
29:25
world. The first is Sophie Wilson, who
29:27
one of the founders of the arm
29:29
design team back when they were back
29:31
of they were still And I think she, more
29:33
than almost anyone else, really led
29:35
to the technical success that they had
29:38
initially. that they had them to
29:40
be appealing to Apple. them to And for
29:42
reasons, she didn't actually go to arm
29:44
when it got spun off. actually but she's the
29:46
often unsung hero of all this. the
29:48
The next important person would be Simon The
29:50
who was the founding CEO would separated
29:52
from Saxby, He had come in from, I
29:54
think, Motorola. He had this
29:56
vision of arm as an IP licensor and
29:58
he IP the... licensor, the business model and really
30:00
drove it to success. He's the one
30:03
who got them into their first deals, into their
30:05
first really them them to become where they
30:07
are today. them then the third one
30:09
is the current CEO, then the third I touched
30:11
on this a moment ago, where he
30:13
has reinvigorated the company and really positioned it
30:15
for its next big growth wave. and It's
30:17
a good case study in how management
30:19
can matter. I don't want to case any
30:21
of the past CEOs, even when they're I
30:23
of want they had a decent management team the
30:25
but it was task for different purposes. But
30:27
I think those three more than anyone
30:29
else have really been the ones who are
30:31
positioned, positioned to where it is. armed to where it
30:33
Given how pervasive arms technology is
30:36
throughout the semi the semi ecosystem combined
30:38
with their licensing a royalty model, I
30:40
I imagine it manifests itself in
30:42
an incredible economic engine. I I think
30:44
I read prior to this margin profile
30:46
is more more emblematic that software with
30:48
90 % gross margins, operating margins exceeding
30:50
40%. Can you just take us
30:52
through the business's financial profile and
30:54
maybe highlight the most important financial
30:56
KPIs? KPIs. We've been talking
30:59
a lot about abstract high -level things, about
31:01
technology. things about and their history, and their
31:03
but deep down they have this really
31:05
powerful economic model as well. as
31:07
On paper it looks a lot like a software company.
31:09
you have You margins in excess of
31:11
90%. of 90% that that flows through to
31:14
the bottom line and operating margins that
31:16
are 40, sometimes that are 40, That's very powerful
31:18
very powerful, because what is is happening here is
31:20
they have a big upfront cost. They
31:22
have to do the R the work. work.
31:24
to to keep pushing the technology forward. Gotta
31:26
pay to pay a lot of very smart computer
31:28
scientists and electrical engineers to keep coming up with
31:30
new advances, new products, new features. new
31:33
products, that's done, then you've spent all
31:35
that on R you've the cost of marginal
31:37
sales is essentially of while the sale is
31:39
are collecting a few pennies per they're And
31:41
it doesn't matter to them whether that's of
31:43
or a sales is cost them no extra to
31:45
sell that. And that all flows through the
31:47
bottom that It's a very, very powerful model. sell that,
31:49
to If you think about the leverage that provides,
31:52
to the royalty rate is gonna continue to increase.
31:54
to increase. over time over the next few years. years.
31:56
And even though though it's only a
31:58
few pennies, nominal increase in royalty. to all of
32:00
that flows through the bottom line. It's
32:02
just such a powerful amount of leverage
32:04
in this model. I do want to
32:06
caveat that a little bit. I say
32:09
it looks like a software model, but
32:11
it's important to understand that this is
32:13
not software. Arm is licensing IP. It's
32:15
not software. There's some pretty important differences.
32:17
If you think about things like you
32:19
can't patch this software website, website goes
32:22
down, you can patch it, you can
32:24
patch it, you can patch it, you
32:26
can patch it, you can patch, you
32:28
can't, Design process and so I don't
32:30
think you should think about it as
32:32
software It just has that sort of
32:34
economic model that looks very very similar
32:37
to software and over time I think
32:39
this model will evolve a little bit
32:41
Adopted what looks like a premium or
32:43
a premium model where they're using different
32:45
pricing schemes to get users in the
32:47
door again, it's not software, but they're
32:50
using a lot of those growth tools
32:52
that software companies use I think that
32:54
will slash out their sales profile their
32:56
revenue growth as well, but they're also
32:58
looking at new products talking about moving
33:00
up to stack, maybe getting very close
33:02
to building their own ships, that will
33:05
come probably at the price of the
33:07
cost of lower gross margin percentage with
33:09
the benefit of added gross margin dollars.
33:11
So that tradeoff's worth it, even if
33:13
percentage points come down to you, absolute
33:15
dollar pool gross. But for the most
33:17
part, I think they'll keep doing this
33:20
model and will continue to deliver these
33:22
kinds of results. And then I guess
33:24
the next five to 10 years are
33:26
going to be incredibly interesting for how
33:28
everything evolves. both in the electrification of
33:30
everything and the digitization of our entire
33:33
consumer economy. But there are risks to
33:35
this story. Growth won't necessarily run unabated,
33:37
although they've gone from one to two
33:39
to five billion dollars in revenue quite
33:41
rapidly. What are the risks to this
33:43
story? How real is that open source
33:45
competition? What is the decision tree from
33:48
here and where things could go? And
33:50
the best case scenario, the base case,
33:52
and then if things were to deteriorate,
33:54
what would have to happen? So I
33:56
think it's important to understand it, arms
33:58
product, instructions that architect... these ISAs are
34:01
are deep into chip deep,
34:03
deep and functionality. very hard
34:05
it's very, very hard to replace
34:07
it. We saw this a few
34:09
years ago, actually, when Apple moved
34:11
from Intel its own M series CPUs its own
34:13
Apple spent years preparing all kinds Apple spent years
34:15
preparing all kinds of software support
34:17
for that, preparing developers for that,
34:19
really put a huge effort into
34:21
getting people ready for that transition
34:23
because that transition essentially broke software
34:26
compatibility. So things written for written OS to
34:28
run X86 Intel Silicon wouldn't necessarily work on arm. And so
34:30
so Apple had to spend a
34:32
lot of money to make sure
34:34
that they did, at least at
34:36
some basic level, still function. still
34:38
today, if you're a programmer and
34:40
you're dealing in some newer stuff,
34:42
you download some new software in some
34:44
some new language, dealing still a
34:46
distinction. Are you running this on
34:48
Intel or are you running this
34:50
on Apple some newer stuff. point being that
34:52
it's very, very hard to replace
34:54
it. And that is an immense,
34:56
immense barrier to entry. entry. And we
34:58
look at there's this situation now
35:00
where ARM is suing Qualcomm, and
35:03
they've had and for years. Qualcomm's
35:05
probably one of ARM's biggest customers, one of
35:07
its biggest one of They don't like ARM, they don't
35:09
like being sued by ARM, but what choice
35:11
do they have? They They can't just go out
35:13
tomorrow and say, all right, we're gonna stop using
35:15
ARM, we're gonna switch to have? They It would
35:17
take them a decade to really work that through
35:19
their whole portfolio. using arm, we're
35:21
competitive threat that It would posed was to
35:24
a period through took its eye
35:26
off the ball, risk five was
35:28
able to capture a lot of
35:30
new growth opportunities. So for
35:32
instance, we see this big wave of
35:34
new chip companies coming up in China. That
35:36
That explosion took place in the late
35:38
when arm ARM wasn't quite ready for it
35:40
wasn't totally paying attention to their companies in
35:43
China today that are risk five five centered.
35:45
They're mostly doing embedded IOT low-value value devices.
35:47
. . that was the threat was the threat
35:49
is that risk five would get its foothold
35:51
and slowly work way up into other things. things. One
35:53
of the big changes that took place when
35:55
Haas took over as CEO is he fixed
35:57
pricing in such a way to make to make risk
35:59
five lesser. attractive in comparison to ARM. to Just having
36:01
having to to isn't the thing that's having famous
36:03
still a lot of work that has to
36:05
take place to design that that a real chip,
36:08
to harden that. And ARM has a big
36:10
advantage there. that. And fixing the
36:12
pricing and fixing some of the
36:14
licensing terms, the he greatly reduced of the
36:16
the appeal he greatly for all kinds
36:18
of use cases that otherwise of risk
36:20
5 for all kinds of use cases don't want
36:22
to say risk 5 is not a threat,
36:24
but I do think the degree of
36:26
threat is not huge right now. and if
36:28
it were, it would take years to develop.
36:31
I'm going gonna have my my friends get
36:33
angry at me, but I'm gonna say
36:35
that risk five is not ready for
36:37
data center workloads today. ready maybe a workloads
36:39
metrics, our how fast it goes, that
36:41
very raw it goes, that very raw it's comparable, maybe.
36:43
But in terms of everything else that
36:46
goes into it, the design it, the design
36:48
the hardening, the software, we got years
36:50
and years before risk five is really
36:52
ready for for let alone let center. data
36:54
Now, I could be wrong. It could
36:56
come sooner than we than There could be
36:58
some there could be some but I don't see risk
37:00
five today as five today as an to arm the way
37:02
you could have arm the way it to be a few
37:04
years ago. to be a back to
37:06
your question, So the base case is
37:08
they just continue to grow. They add value,
37:10
they capture more value, they get into
37:12
more markets. they I would say the upside
37:15
case is the they turbo is that. where
37:17
they really start to flex their
37:19
muscle. their in some they have a
37:21
monopoly on on ISAs. especially now that
37:23
they've blunted risk fodge In many senses, they're
37:25
not quite a monopoly a monopoly legally,
37:27
but functionally, they're pretty close. And
37:29
if they use that to increase
37:31
their value big degree and a big degree,
37:34
and they really flex their muscles
37:36
to you start to get significant
37:38
increases in royalty rates. that's certainly I
37:40
think that's certainly possible. just keep without that,
37:42
if they just keep going to the steady
37:44
incremental, slowly pace, I more value still I think
37:46
there's still a position to do really
37:48
well. But there's definitely a scenario where they
37:50
really turbo -charge that that. and it gets much
37:52
bigger than even these numbers would suggest. suggest.
37:55
The bare is, we just see a radical
37:57
shift in how we do compute. talked
37:59
talked a little. bit the tap between AI accelerator and
38:01
ARM based CPUs. Depending on who who you ask, it's
38:03
something like two to one to eight to
38:05
one today. If If it goes to like a
38:07
hundred to one, you where you really just
38:09
don't need that many CPUs. the arm market, the TAM,
38:11
the TAM, the adjustable market, is nowhere
38:14
near as big as we would have expected.
38:16
So growth growth plateaus at some point. how I
38:18
see I see the addressable market question is really
38:20
be focused on exploring the bear the bear
38:22
case. Just to go back to the economics,
38:24
we're talking about pennies per device and
38:26
billions of devices, some of which have some
38:29
of which the tens of thousands
38:31
of dollars of it relates
38:33
to automobiles, but also to automobiles, but
38:35
also of dollars. thousands of does the
38:37
contract work such that they
38:39
do, or or Steve a a de minimis revenue
38:41
per chip? chip? Is it crazy
38:43
to think that that can go
38:45
materially higher? I think the I think
38:48
the chief criticism you have leveled at arm or
38:50
15 years ago was that just kept prices
38:52
too low. too If you really want to
38:54
get into the mechanics of the model,
38:56
like I said, there's two components. There's
38:58
the I said, payment then there's the ongoing
39:00
royalty payment. And I think for a
39:02
long time, they moved towards favoring big
39:05
the payments at the expense of lower
39:07
royalty rates, which made sense as the
39:09
industry big and you started to have these
39:11
massive customers the you needed to fund
39:13
the R &D that those which made to advance
39:15
the ARM ecosystem, ARM architecture. and what what
39:17
ended up happening was was companies couldn't afford
39:19
arm licenses. arm So one of the things that's
39:21
been fixed in recent years is they've reset
39:23
all of that. recent in a
39:26
lot of ways, they have what are of
39:28
software like pricing tiers they where you pay
39:30
a little bit upfront like a premium model,
39:32
where you get limited access for a small
39:34
upfront payment. But then as you expand where
39:36
you you pay more and more. Essentially, it's
39:38
a lower upfront payment in exchange for
39:40
higher for a payment. I think this really worked
39:42
wonders. It's got a lot of people
39:44
in the fold. The thing is, if
39:46
you get people in the door and you have them
39:48
designing on payment, once you have that, they're almost locked
39:50
in. locked Like I said, it's very expensive to switch
39:52
to risk to switch to risk five. So lower the the upfront
39:54
cost significantly, get get more people in the door,
39:56
and then you make that up by having
39:58
higher royalty rates down the stream. I think
40:00
that's pretty much what they're moving towards. There's other
40:02
things they have going on as well, where they're moving
40:04
up the stack and doing more of the physical
40:06
design work. That's another good way for
40:08
them to increase their royalty rates. So
40:10
there's a lot of levers they can pull. And
40:12
then they've pretty successfully diversified
40:14
their revenue streams from one
40:17
that was primarily mobile to
40:19
now networking, auto, mobile, internet
40:21
of things, consumer electronics. But
40:23
are there any other areas or
40:25
market opportunities where they're under penetrated and
40:28
you feel like that story is
40:30
just taking off? Yeah, touched
40:32
on it a minute ago as automotive.
40:34
Automotive is the big opportunity. think that
40:36
most semiconductor companies are looking at today
40:38
where we can quibble over the exact
40:40
numbers, but there's a few hundred dollars
40:42
of semiconductor content in cars today, and
40:44
that's growing double digits every year because
40:46
just more and more things in the
40:48
car are becoming electronic, especially with electric
40:50
vehicles, but certainly all vehicles in general
40:52
you have more advanced digital cockpits, infotainment
40:54
systems, driving assist, and I'm not even
40:57
talking about autonomy. Autonomy is huge, huge
40:59
semiconductor content if and when it arrives.
41:01
But even before we get there there's
41:03
just layer after layer of more semiconductor
41:05
content in cars. and it's more compute,
41:07
and more compute means more arm. And
41:10
our typical question and conclusion is,
41:12
what are the lessons that you've
41:14
learned through your studies for ARM
41:16
that can be applied in evaluating
41:19
other businesses in the ecosystem? and
41:21
at the same time for operators, investors
41:23
in the space. or can be
41:26
applied to their businesses in order to
41:28
take some of these lessons from what
41:30
ARM has done, and a business model
41:32
that on paper sounds incredible and that
41:34
they've licensed pervasive technology that you would
41:36
apply elsewhere. The first
41:38
one is you need to invest heavily
41:40
in R &D. They spend 30
41:42
% of revenue goes into R &D. It's
41:44
expensive to do what they do. This is
41:46
a company with very high gross margins,
41:48
but also high operating expenses, because they need
41:50
to keep pushing the capabilities of their
41:52
architecture further and further afield. So one
41:54
of the areas where they under -invested, I
41:56
think, was AI, tensor cores, GraphicsCores, they
41:59
have... those products today, just not many people
42:01
use them because they just under -invested in
42:03
them in the last decade. And there's
42:05
definitely an alternate universe in which they hadn't
42:07
done that. They actually invested heavily in
42:09
AI and they'd be even more important today.
42:11
And we'll see. That's certainly another one
42:13
of those areas where I wouldn't count them
42:15
out yet. They still have some big
42:17
ambitions to increase their content in AI. But
42:19
investing in R &D, it's expensive. You got
42:21
to do it. It's lots of very
42:23
expensive talent required. But do that and do
42:26
that well. I think it's really important. The
42:28
other really important lesson for
42:30
ARM is having an ecosystem. as
42:33
a competitive advantage. And I don't think
42:35
they exactly set out to do
42:37
this, but in hindsight, it's just so
42:39
powerful, the fact that they have
42:41
hundreds or thousands of licensees all contributing
42:43
in some way, participating in building
42:45
up that ecosystem, building up the software
42:48
compatibility, making it more appealing, exploring
42:50
every market segment, every market niche. That's
42:52
been a huge, huge force multiplier
42:54
for them. So you need the R
42:56
&D to attract that ecosystem and keep
42:58
them engaged. Once you have that
43:00
in place, it's just immensely valuable. Well,
43:03
this has been a case study in
43:05
a business that clearly is on the
43:07
right trajectory. And in order to grow
43:09
into this valuation, we'll ultimately need to
43:11
sustain it for quite some time. Seems
43:13
like the pieces are all in place.
43:15
We'll see how the future unfolds here. Yeah,
43:18
I have to admit, I think they're well positioned.
43:20
It's fun to see I've followed this company for a
43:22
long time, and it's nice to see them really
43:25
hustling and moving again. Thanks so much. Thank you. To
43:27
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43:30
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43:32
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43:36
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43:38
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