0:00

In February of this year

0:02

and with the flick of a switch, Europe's

0:05

energy systems were reshaped. Around

0:14

the world, electrical transmission operators have

0:16

been working to build a

0:18

new type of grid. These

0:20

will be ready for the

0:22

far more distributed and fluctuating

0:25

generation provided by renewables. They

0:27

must be suited to the demands of

0:29

the energy trilemma. The power should

0:31

be reliable, affordable and

0:33

sustainable. In

0:41

the Baltic states, stretching between Poland to

0:43

the south and Russia to the north, there's

0:46

been an additional driver for change. These

0:49

countries' grids have been tied since

0:51

their inception to that of their neighbour

0:53

Russia. To maintain reliability

0:55

and to ensure the power

0:57

they use is from sustainable sources,

0:59

they needed to reorient their

1:01

grids, synchronising them with those to

1:03

the West. This was a project

1:06

decades in the making. It

1:08

required the installation of new

1:10

overhead lines, new systems to

1:12

manage supply and demand, and

1:14

new international connections. It

1:16

would cost 1 .6 billion

1:18

euros and require years of

1:21

careful diplomacy. But

1:23

when the switch came, it came

1:25

in an instant. The

1:38

tension in the control

1:40

room was physically, you

1:42

felt it physically, this

1:44

kind of important moment

1:46

or second that we're

1:48

going to make history

1:50

disconnect. First, and

1:53

then one day later, to

1:55

connect to the connective

1:57

Europe, but to see visually

1:59

how the frequencies synchronized, it

2:01

was quite emotional. And

2:07

the cheers and happy faces. I've never

2:09

seen my head of control center so

2:11

happy in my life. People,

2:14

everybody was really... It was basically landing

2:16

in the moon. The feeling of

2:18

landing in the moon. It was an

2:20

excellent, excellent feeling. Latvia,

2:24

Lithuania and Estonia had achieved

2:26

their political independence with mass

2:28

protests during the fall of

2:30

the Soviet Union in the

2:32

early 1990s. For a

2:34

young Hannes Kont, now director

2:37

of the synchronization project for

2:39

Estonian transmission system operator Ellering,

2:41

this was a life -changing time. I

2:44

think my personality was

2:46

shaped by the Berlin

2:48

Wall, by the... end

2:51

of history, kind of attitude

2:53

in the end of 80s,

2:56

beginning of 90s. So I

2:58

can say that my generation,

3:00

I'm 50 now, my generation

3:02

is actually shaped totally by

3:04

the understanding that we can

3:07

tear down those walls. This

3:09

kind of emotional

3:11

understanding that sooner or

3:13

later this evil empire will

3:16

diminish and we can actually

3:18

break free from this prison. But

3:21

that optimism was tempered by an

3:23

awareness of the threat posed by

3:25

Russia. up

3:29

to this point I was clear that I

3:31

was going to study theatre. I

3:33

go into a theater school

3:35

but after that because of

3:37

this feeling that we need

3:39

to somehow protect our freedom.

3:42

I, when I graduated

3:44

high school, I went,

3:46

firstly, newly graded Estonian

3:48

Defence Academy and

3:51

chose path on

3:53

my way on

3:55

career. These

3:57

nations have now been free of occupation

3:59

and foreign control for more than

4:01

30 years. But in the

4:03

decades since their independence, they've suffered

4:05

aggression and interference. More

4:08

recently, they've witnessed cyber attacks,

4:10

undersea cable and pipeline

4:12

breaches, and mystery fires on

4:14

cargo delivered by planes

4:16

departing from their airports. And

4:22

since the end of the Cold War, there

4:24

was a major vulnerability. Their electricity

4:26

transmission systems all remained

4:28

under the control of Moscow.

4:32

Protecting these countries' energy security

4:34

and strengthening the potential frontline

4:36

of free Europe in the face

4:38

of rising global autocracy would need

4:40

the same spirit of unity

4:42

and cooperation shown in the years

4:44

of liberation. Welcome

5:00

to Engineering Matters. I'm

5:02

Bernadette Ballantyne. And I'm Jonny

5:04

Dowling. This year, over the weekend

5:06

of February 7th, the Baltic

5:08

nations cut their connection to

5:10

the Moscow -controlled electricity transmission

5:12

system and synchronised their networks to

5:14

that of their neighbour, Poland, and

5:16

from there onward to the other

5:19

nations of Europe and across the

5:21

Mediterranean to North Africa. In

5:23

this episode, we'll look at the

5:25

diplomacy, investment... and engineering

5:27

excellence needed to build resilience

5:29

on one of Europe's

5:31

most important borders. In

5:42

the 1960s, the Soviet Union was

5:44

building out its electrical grid. To

5:46

the west, communist -ruled Poland, an

5:48

independent country, had linked its grid

5:51

to that of other communist

5:53

nations. is

5:55

a member of the board of ENTSOE,

5:58

the European Grid System, and

6:00

Deputy Director of Polish

6:02

Transmission System Operator, PSE. Since

6:06

the early 60s, Polish Polish system

6:08

was a part of the Synchronous

6:10

Area, which was managed, to my

6:12

understanding, from the

6:14

dispatching centre in Prague, and

6:16

also we were connected to

6:18

the Russian system. But

6:21

the Baltic nations were, at this

6:23

point, 20 years into being subsumed

6:25

into the Soviet Union. Their

6:27

grids would be established as

6:29

part of that nation's transmission

6:32

network, known as IPS -UPS,

6:34

and they were controlled in

6:36

Moscow. Historically, when

6:38

the electrification of the

6:40

industry started, so Lithuania

6:42

was part of the

6:44

Soviet Union and all... Basically,

6:47

construction of power stations,

6:49

overhead lines was centrally

6:51

managed from Moscow. So

6:53

there was like central

6:56

planning. So all networks

6:58

were built for a

7:00

single power system. But

7:03

ultimately, when

7:05

the Baltics became independent,

7:07

we immediately started

7:09

to think what can

7:11

be done to

7:13

disconnect our systems. But

7:15

back then, in the 90s,

7:18

there were very limited technical

7:20

capabilities to decouple such a

7:22

small system back then in

7:24

time. As

7:28

Donatas Matelones, Head of

7:30

Power Systems Operations with

7:32

Lithuanian TSO Litgrid explains,

7:35

his country had been selected in

7:37

the 1970s as home to one

7:39

of the Soviet Union's largest and

7:42

most modern nuclear power stations. One

7:44

unit at the Ignalina plant

7:46

was brought into operation in

7:48

1983. A second unit's

7:50

commissioning was delayed after the

7:52

Chernobyl disaster, but it came

7:54

online a year later. Together,

7:56

they met 70 % of

7:59

Lithuania's energy demand. After

8:01

independence, the EU

8:03

demanded the closure of the

8:05

plant as a condition of

8:07

EU entry and helped fund

8:09

its decommissioning. That turned Lithuania

8:11

from an energy exporter to

8:13

an energy importer reliant on

8:15

Russia for power. After

8:19

the closure of

8:21

nuclear both Lithuania but

8:23

also Baltic region

8:26

as a whole became

8:28

a deficit area

8:30

where the biggest source

8:32

of electricity came

8:34

from Russia and we

8:36

had no other

8:38

possibilities to import. After

8:40

that, there were

8:43

cables built with

8:45

Sweden, Lithuania, Poland,

8:47

and also increased

8:50

capacity between Estonia

8:52

and Finland to

8:54

diversify these import

8:56

capabilities, but also

8:59

integrating EU markets.

9:03

EU energy was not

9:05

competitive, so there were

9:07

huge imports. from

9:09

Russia. So in

9:11

Lithuania back then, if

9:13

we imported 60 % of

9:16

local consumption, so majority

9:18

of that came from

9:20

Russia. For

9:22

a while, in the

9:24

1990s and early 2000s, it

9:27

looked like freedom and

9:29

democracy might bloom in Russia.

9:31

In 2001, Belarus, Russia,

9:33

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed

9:36

to maintain the IPS -UPS

9:38

network. Under the

9:40

BREL agreement, named for these five

9:42

nations, their grids would remain

9:44

synchronized for the next 25 years.

9:47

Nominally, this system would be

9:50

managed together, but in reality,

9:52

all the levers of control

9:54

were held by Russian hands.

9:56

The frequency management was

9:58

managed by the BREL parties,

10:00

mainly Russia. So that was

10:03

a strategic risk for us.

10:05

And obviously we saw it

10:07

already after the Crimea that

10:09

we should do something

10:11

quickly to mitigate the risk. Shortly

10:14

before the Brel agreement had

10:16

been signed, KGB officer Vladimir

10:18

Putin came to power, replacing

10:21

an increasingly tired and emotional

10:23

Boris Yeltsin. Over the

10:25

years to come, Russian interference in

10:27

the political systems of its neighbors

10:29

and outright military aggression would build

10:31

and build. So in the beginning,

10:33

it was a shiny happy family.

10:36

Everybody thought that end of history, let's

10:39

join hands. And all this

10:41

emotional kind of change was

10:43

very clearly visible also within

10:45

Russia. But already

10:47

in the middle of the

10:50

90s, former Prime Minister

10:52

Primakov, who was also head

10:54

of Russian Foreign Intelligence

10:56

Service, in a closed

10:59

meeting declared. that

11:01

the emperor needs to

11:03

strike back. In 2007,

11:05

key institutions of Estonia's

11:07

economy, political system and

11:09

civil society suffered a

11:11

range of crippling cyber

11:13

attacks. That year, the

11:15

leaders of Estonia, Latvia

11:17

and Lithuania set synchronisation

11:19

with the ENTSO -E, the

11:21

European Network of Transmission

11:23

System Operators for Electricity,

11:26

as their shared strategy.

11:32

First of all, it was

11:34

important to have a

11:36

political strategic objective that, yes,

11:38

we are looking to

11:41

the solution to disconnect and

11:43

connect to European network.

11:45

And afterwards, there was a

11:47

number of studies, technical

11:50

studies, to find a technical

11:52

feasible solution to synchronize

11:54

the networks. With the Russian

11:56

invasion of eastern Ukraine

11:59

in 2014. the need

12:01

for energy security became even

12:03

more apparent to the Baltic

12:05

states. And it was obvious

12:07

for everybody, already from the,

12:09

after the 2014, they

12:11

should be, we should do

12:14

something quickly. And that's why

12:16

I was, it was very

12:18

clear that there were some

12:20

negotiations with Poland mainly. but

12:22

also with the European

12:24

Commission, how to finance and

12:27

how to manage this

12:29

major infrastructure project, because the

12:31

challenge was very, very

12:33

hard for politics. It's enormous.

12:35

As you see from

12:37

the numbers, the budget for

12:39

this program was 1 .6

12:41

billion euros. And it

12:43

was very clear from beginning

12:45

that we need to deliver. those

12:48

grid enhancements and build up of

12:50

the grid in a new system

12:52

very, very quickly. But while those

12:54

closest to Russia could see the

12:56

threat, many in Europe and

12:58

the West saw Putin as a stabilising

13:01

force. It would take a

13:03

long process of diplomacy by the

13:05

Baltic nations to persuade their neighbours of

13:07

the need to support their resilience. Still,

13:10

there was in Europe corridors

13:12

people who thought that there

13:14

is a way to doing

13:16

normal business with Russia. Let

13:19

me remind you that

13:21

Germany built Nord Stream

13:23

connections, gas connections, undersea

13:25

connection with Baltic Sea after

13:27

that. So there was

13:29

clearly tension within the

13:31

member states of EU

13:34

concerning how to face the

13:36

Russia challenge or threat.

13:39

and some member states

13:41

and some interested groups

13:43

from within the European

13:45

Commission were very sceptical

13:47

about this programme. We

13:49

should understand what it means

13:51

to synchronise two grids. It

13:56

doesn't necessarily mean that electricity

13:58

can be traded back and forth

14:00

between them, but it means

14:02

that they can be operated together,

14:04

with reserves used to keep

14:06

the entire synchronous area stable. Synchronization

14:09

is actually when the

14:11

power systems, the frequency

14:13

of the power systems

14:15

are pulsing at the

14:17

same phase. So

14:22

in Baltics and Continental

14:24

we have the same frequency,

14:27

50 Hz, but previously

14:29

they were separated. So the

14:31

control was separated and

14:33

the phase of the frequency

14:35

was separated. When we

14:37

connected synchronously, it means that,

14:39

first of all, we have

14:42

the same frequency at the

14:44

exact moment when the frequency

14:46

is high in Baltics. It

14:48

means that it's high in

14:50

continental Europe and vice versa.

14:52

And all the changes are

14:54

pulsing at the same phase.

14:58

The whole European synchronous

15:01

area, the balance control

15:03

and frequency control is

15:05

performed in a coordinated

15:07

manner. So all countries,

15:09

all areas are contributing

15:12

to the frequency. And

15:14

if there's some disturbance,

15:16

some event of outage,

15:18

or maybe there's excess

15:20

generation of renewables. it

15:23

means that all the

15:25

areas in all synchronous

15:27

area are supporting and

15:29

contributing to reduce this

15:31

failure or excess energy

15:33

so these so -called

15:35

reserves are distributed within

15:38

all synchronous area and

15:40

everybody is contributing to

15:42

to maintain the stable

15:44

and secure operation of

15:46

synchronous area before disconnecting

15:48

from ips ups the

15:50

Baltic states would need to

15:52

identify a way to connect to

15:54

ENSO -E. They could join the

15:56

system either to the main

15:58

continental Europe's synchronous area, CISA, or

16:00

to that of the Nordic

16:02

subregion. There

16:04

was a need to identify

16:07

what kind of lines we

16:09

would need to build. There

16:11

was also a discussion, maybe

16:13

the synchronization should happen with

16:15

the Nordic area. So

16:17

there were very different

16:19

discussions on a technical level.

16:23

But indeed, when the

16:25

Litpolink connection was finalised,

16:27

we established a back -to

16:29

-back connection. After completing

16:31

the studies, it was

16:34

identified that, yes, it

16:36

is the most feasible

16:38

solution to synchronise with

16:40

continental Europe. The

16:42

Litpolink is a land

16:44

connection between Lithuania and Poland.

16:46

built in 2015. It

16:48

was originally designed to trade

16:51

electricity between grids. Substantial

16:53

changes would be needed for it

16:55

to be used to synchronize frequencies on

16:57

the two grids. If the capacity

16:59

was to be used for frequency control,

17:01

then a new link would be

17:03

needed for energy trading. Poland

17:05

had been chosen as the point at which

17:07

the Baltics would connect to the wider European

17:09

system. Its grid, and that

17:11

of its former communist neighbors, had

17:13

been connected to CISA in the

17:16

1990s. To allow for

17:18

trading, with Litpol now dedicated

17:20

to frequency control, the initial

17:22

plan was to run a

17:24

subsea cable around the Russian

17:26

military enclave nestled between Lithuania

17:28

and Poland. This historically was

17:30

known as Königsberg, but it

17:32

was renamed Karlingrad in 1946

17:35

after one of Stalin's closest

17:37

allies. But

17:39

eventually the process,

17:42

the project

17:44

development... coincide

17:46

with the war

17:48

in Ukraine, the high

17:50

interest in offshore

17:53

development, and actually the

17:55

project budget exceeded

17:57

initial estimations several times.

18:00

And then the decision was found,

18:02

alternative solution was found to

18:04

implement the project on land. The

18:06

Litpol link would be used

18:08

to ensure that the grids were

18:10

kept in sync. But a

18:12

second line between the two countries,

18:14

Harmony Link is now being

18:17

built on land to allow for

18:19

trading. So now

18:21

the Harmony Link, the

18:23

interconnector between Lithuania

18:25

and Poland is now

18:27

being implemented on

18:29

land, which is

18:31

basically the objective of

18:33

this project is to

18:35

ensure a commercial exchange

18:38

possibility to import and

18:40

export electricity on both

18:42

directions. In

18:51

2018, after years of

18:53

diplomatic persuasion, the European

18:55

Commission and Poland were convinced that

18:57

synchronisation to CESA should go ahead

19:00

and funding made available. In 2019,

19:02

it was agreed that this would

19:04

be a six -year project, due

19:06

for delivery at the end of

19:08

2025. But nevertheless,

19:10

in 2018, there

19:13

was clear that in a level of

19:15

prime ministers and presidents of Baltic State

19:17

in Poland and also head of European

19:19

Commission, Janker, that there

19:21

was two agreements or

19:23

political commitments signed in

19:25

2018. And

19:28

in 2019, there was

19:30

a connection agreement Baltic States

19:32

with continental Europe system

19:34

operators. There

19:36

are three pillars to

19:38

a project like this.

19:40

physical infrastructure, IT systems

19:42

and regulatory agreements. So

19:46

first phase was to build

19:48

up infrastructure in the north

19:50

to south direction. So from

19:52

Estonia in northeast to the

19:54

Latvia, to the Lithuania, to

19:56

the Poland. So it was

19:58

enhancements or reconstruction or build

20:00

up of high -volta sewer

20:02

headlines. And then

20:04

was developing to invest

20:06

in how to

20:08

have permanent capability operating

20:10

in island mode.

20:12

So that needed some

20:14

IT investments, mainly

20:16

SCADA systems and frequency

20:18

management IT tools. So

20:21

there is a lot of different kind

20:23

of pillars, I would say. I would

20:25

say three pillars. And

20:38

the physical infrastructure

20:40

needed to allow

20:42

the Baltics to

20:45

operate their grid

20:47

outside of Moscow's

20:49

control required some

20:51

highly engineered components.

20:54

The most important for maintaining

20:56

grid stability are synchronous

20:58

condensers. In

21:02

simple terms, synchronous

21:04

condensers, it's a

21:06

rotating engine, electrical

21:08

engine, which is

21:10

rotating. And next

21:12

to the motor

21:14

is the flywheel, which

21:16

is heavy, very

21:18

heavy. And when the

21:20

rotor is spinning,

21:22

so it's... a huge

21:24

mass which is

21:26

rotating and creating inertia

21:28

on the spinning

21:30

wheel and these equipments

21:33

are necessary to

21:35

stabilize the electric power

21:37

system because in

21:39

the recent days, recent

21:41

years, when

21:43

all energy sector is

21:45

transforming to renewable

21:47

energy sources which are

21:49

intermittent. which are

21:51

converter -based. It's

21:54

power electronics used

21:56

in these equipments. In

21:59

traditional grid systems, with power

22:01

supplied by fossil fuels or

22:03

nuclear, the spinning masses at

22:06

the heart of the power

22:08

station provide inertia, keeping frequencies

22:10

steady as supply or demand

22:12

rises and falls. But

22:14

as our grid turns to renewables,

22:16

the synchronous condensers are needed to

22:18

add this inertia. As we'll see,

22:20

that means that the preparations made

22:22

in the Baltics for synchronisation also

22:24

make them highly suitable for renewable

22:26

energy. Other equipment was also needed

22:28

to connect the Baltic continental grids.

22:30

When first built in 2015, the

22:33

Litpol link had made use of

22:35

back -to -back converter stations to switch

22:37

from AC at the edge of

22:39

one grid to DC and then

22:41

back to AC at a different

22:43

voltage at the other end of

22:45

the line. This allowed

22:47

for the transfer of electricity

22:49

between grids, but it caused delays

22:51

that would prevent synchronization. With

22:53

the DC connection, you

22:56

can share the reserves, but

22:58

there is certain delay

23:00

in time in which these

23:02

reserves can be delivered.

23:05

And although there are milliseconds,

23:08

because you have the power

23:10

electronics connections, the milliseconds

23:12

in the reaction of

23:14

the back -to -back, There

23:17

is no possibility to

23:20

transfer the inertia through

23:22

the back -to -back or

23:24

DC links. That

23:29

meant a different technology. Auto

23:31

transformers would need to be

23:33

installed. These feature a

23:36

single wire, precisely wound around

23:38

itself to switch voltages. Auto

23:41

transformer is a special kind

23:43

of the transformer. And

23:46

then this device

23:48

allowed us to connect

23:50

our system but

23:52

without impact on the

23:54

frequency from one

23:56

system to the other

23:58

and without the

24:00

possibility of transferring the

24:03

phenomenon that we

24:05

would like to avoid.

24:08

The main reason why we

24:10

need that equipment is

24:12

that in due to different

24:14

voltage levels between our

24:17

networks. Continental Europe

24:19

or Polish network is

24:21

based on 400 kV

24:23

network, while Baltics

24:25

and basically all

24:27

former Soviet network was

24:30

built for 330

24:32

kV network. As

24:34

a passive component, autotransformers operate

24:36

without the millisecond lag

24:38

suffered by back -to -back AC

24:40

to DC lines. The

24:43

main feature of the synchronisation

24:45

of two systems is

24:47

ability to share, without any

24:49

delay, the reserves.

24:51

The reserves are shared with

24:53

the speed close to the

24:55

speed of light. By

24:59

2019, work on the project

25:01

was well underway. And then

25:03

the world changed. Covid

25:07

swept its way across the

25:09

planet. From airport to airport and

25:11

then from person to person.

25:14

The global pandemic had begun and

25:16

the world entered lockdown. Transportation

25:21

of the equipment was

25:23

key and we had quite

25:26

a lot of challenges

25:28

to overcome. To make it

25:30

happen that equipment would

25:32

be produced on time and

25:34

would be delivered to

25:37

the location on time. But

25:39

also it was the

25:41

cost price, cost increased

25:44

because we had to

25:46

change and find the

25:48

new suppliers to have

25:51

strategic projects finalised on

25:53

time. As

25:56

the planet learned to live with

25:59

Covid and effective vaccines were made widely

26:01

available, it looked like the project

26:03

was back on track. Russia

26:06

had invaded Ukraine in

26:08

2014. with irregular forces,

26:10

known as Little Green Men,

26:12

used to install collaborationist

26:14

regimes in the east of

26:16

the country. But on

26:18

February 21st, 2022, columns of

26:21

tanks and troops surged

26:23

over the country's borders, attempting

26:25

occupation. Ukraine's

26:27

energy assets, including the vast

26:29

Zafarisia nuclear power plant, were

26:31

targeted. The country had been

26:33

planning to move to island

26:36

operation as the extended invasion

26:38

happened, and now as CISA

26:40

for support in an emergency

26:42

synchronization. Ukrainians

26:45

were in the process

26:48

of the synchronization or

26:50

preparation for a couple

26:52

of years earlier than

26:54

the Baltics. And in

26:56

2022, in February, there

26:59

was foresaw performance

27:01

of the island operation

27:04

test. And once

27:06

the Ukrainians... disconnected

27:08

from the IPS

27:10

-UPS and went

27:13

on an island,

27:15

then the war

27:17

started. And

27:20

after the initiation

27:22

of the war,

27:24

the Ukrainians decided

27:26

not to reconnect

27:29

to the power

27:31

grid of the

27:33

aggressor and they

27:35

asked the

27:37

continental Europe for the

27:39

emergency synchronization, they

27:42

were maybe not fully

27:44

ready. They didn't

27:46

manage to deliver all

27:48

the requirements that were

27:50

supposed to, but based

27:52

on the studies that

27:54

were performed and based

27:56

on some kind of

27:58

conditions that were imposed,

28:00

we were also able

28:02

to connect them synchronously.

28:04

in March 2022 to

28:06

the continental Europe. But

28:08

the experience of Ukraine

28:10

also provided assurance. The

28:12

Baltic nations and the

28:14

rest of free Europe

28:16

had the skills and

28:18

infrastructure needed to perform

28:20

an emergency synchronization even

28:22

under wartime conditions. The

28:24

Litpol link between Lithuania and

28:26

Poland is a vital component

28:29

of the project. To prepare

28:31

for synchronization, Lithuania had pushed

28:33

hard, with European and Baltic

28:35

support, to make its own

28:37

grid ready. The Lithuanians proposed

28:39

an early test of island

28:41

operations in 2023. Island

28:44

operation, it means

28:46

that electric power systems,

28:48

Baltic power systems,

28:50

are operating in this

28:52

small island, like

28:54

a physical island in

28:56

the Mediterranean area

28:58

or, for example, an

29:00

island. which operates

29:03

synchronously with the

29:05

geographical area, but still

29:07

we can maintain

29:09

DC connections with our

29:11

neighbors because DC

29:13

converters, DC interconnections are

29:16

more or less

29:18

the same as some

29:20

offshore generator, but

29:22

such interconnectors can provide

29:24

more services, more

29:26

functionality and support the

29:29

island mode. In

29:36

the beginning, it was planned

29:38

that we're going to synchronize

29:40

in the end of 25,

29:42

in the beginning of 26.

29:44

And because of the war,

29:47

the second phase of the

29:49

war started 22 February, everybody

29:51

was clear that we need

29:53

to do it quicker and

29:55

faster. And the discussion or

29:57

diplomatic challenge was that some

29:59

parts of Lithuania was more

30:01

kind of aggressive towards this

30:03

goal. They wanted to do

30:05

it more quickly. But the

30:07

problem was that the Estonian

30:09

side, our grid was very

30:11

weak because we had already

30:13

critical parts of the grid

30:15

were not reinforced yet. While

30:18

the other Baltic nations decided they

30:20

needed more time to prepare their grids,

30:23

Lithuania went ahead with its own

30:25

test of island operation. performed

30:32

in lithuania that

30:34

was our national national

30:37

project national also

30:39

target because we set

30:41

up our lithuanian

30:43

development of power system

30:45

in such way

30:47

to have capabilities we

30:49

installed the battery

30:51

storage systems just in

30:53

order to have

30:55

technical capabilities to operate

30:57

in the island

31:00

mode and the

31:02

test was performed successfully

31:04

and that was once

31:06

again a strong basis

31:08

and strong message for

31:10

our partners that we

31:12

already have the technical

31:14

capabilities to operate in

31:16

the island mode and

31:18

also prepare for synchronization.

31:20

The invasion of Ukraine

31:22

had focused everyone's attention

31:24

on the synchronization deadline. The

31:27

Lithuanian test of its own

31:29

ability to achieve island operation and

31:31

the Polish experience of supporting

31:33

the Ukrainian emergency synchronisation had given

31:35

everyone new confidence. Now the

31:38

decision was made. Baltic synchronisation would

31:40

be brought forward by months.

31:42

Rather than taking place at the

31:44

end of 2025, it would

31:46

be scheduled for the first weekend

31:49

in February. I

31:51

would say that it's...

31:53

Ukrainian synchronization just

31:55

showed that for us

31:57

that there are

31:59

possibilities. If you are

32:01

looking to the

32:03

solutions, you can

32:05

find some and that

32:07

was an additional push

32:09

for Baltics to find

32:11

what actually is critical, what

32:14

is must and maybe some projects

32:16

could be still finalized afterwards, which

32:18

is now the case. So

32:21

that was a

32:23

discussion between partners. What

32:25

is the critical projects?

32:28

And one of these was

32:30

synchronous condensers that we

32:32

have sufficient of them to

32:34

be able to synchronize

32:36

and operate securely. The

32:38

lessons learned from Ukraine had

32:41

shown that synchronization could be performed

32:43

in an emergency, in wartime,

32:45

with a bare minimum of components.

32:48

The successful Lithuanian test of

32:50

island operation demonstrated that

32:52

these nations' networks could be

32:54

kept stable. With Russia's

32:56

aggression laid bare, CISA

32:58

supported the decision to move the

33:00

deadline forward. Around

33:04

the world, projects of this

33:06

scale routinely come in late and

33:08

over budget. Moving an international

33:10

project of this scale forward would

33:12

be unthinkable for most project

33:14

managers. It

33:16

was an enormous challenge. Anybody

33:18

who has built big

33:20

programs, created or

33:23

delivered big programs, especially

33:25

the very multinational, again,

33:27

it has to remind

33:29

that there were four

33:31

different companies from four

33:33

different countries. So it

33:35

was obviously a big

33:37

challenge to us all. to

33:40

somehow synchronize and

33:42

mitigate the risks

33:44

connecting to the

33:47

different projects. And

33:50

rescheduling the synchronization wouldn't

33:52

just require coordination between

33:54

individual private companies and

33:56

public sector operators. There

34:00

was a rigorous risk

34:02

management on this program.

34:05

It was a big, big challenge

34:07

how to... how to

34:09

have the same understanding of

34:11

the strategic risk and how

34:13

to mitigate the risk, how

34:15

to manage the risk and

34:17

how to cooperate. First of

34:19

all, it's easier to cooperate

34:22

between the business entities, but

34:24

when you engage also with

34:26

the intelligence community, because if

34:28

you want to understand what

34:30

is the Russian possible hybrid

34:32

threat against energy infrastructure. If

34:34

you want to engage also with the

34:37

ministries and agencies, it's going to be

34:39

more more complicated. This

34:41

would require a whole

34:43

-of -society approach. In

34:47

the end, everybody

34:49

came along, ministries

34:51

of energy, security services

34:53

and intelligence community, even

34:55

military stepped in in

34:57

the final days of

34:59

the synchronization. to enhance

35:01

protection of the physical

35:03

and critical infrastructure. So

35:06

at the end, that

35:08

was an enormous coordination exercise

35:10

for everybody. Still, the

35:12

threat of sabotage was clear

35:14

to everyone in the

35:16

control room. What actually made

35:18

it more complicated in

35:20

an Estonian perspective was that

35:22

the government decided that

35:25

even though the energy security

35:27

risks were mitigated, But

35:29

because just kind of

35:31

a month before there was

35:33

S -Link 2, so the

35:35

subsea cable connecting Estonia

35:38

to Scandinavia was sabotaged by

35:40

so -called Russian Shadow Fleet,

35:42

we saw that there

35:44

was a pattern. There was

35:46

a pattern that there

35:49

might be some kind of

35:51

hybrid sabotage against this

35:53

synchronization. and the government was

35:55

high alert and that's

35:57

why they decided that they

36:00

need to enhance also

36:02

a kind of civil protection

36:04

aspect of the society

36:06

and there was a kind

36:08

of nervousness in public

36:10

in general because everybody understood

36:13

that there is a

36:15

risk of blackout if Russia

36:17

is going to sabotage

36:19

this either on land or

36:21

on sea or in

36:24

cyber domain. The Baltics

36:26

would test island operation, assuring

36:28

stability across the regional

36:30

grid before connecting to CESAR.

36:32

So we had like

36:34

two days. Baltics

36:37

started to prepare

36:39

on Friday for

36:41

the test and

36:43

the synchronization. And

36:46

then for Friday

36:48

the 7th. And

36:50

then they started

36:52

to disconnect on

36:54

Sunday. the lines

36:56

with the Konigsberg

36:58

region, then Belarus,

37:00

and then remaining

37:02

elements, the remaining

37:04

lines with Russia.

37:07

And this was,

37:09

according to plan,

37:11

disconnected in the

37:13

morning on Sunday.

37:15

And simultaneously, they

37:17

ended up being on the

37:20

island. And the island

37:22

operation test was initiated. Donatus

37:32

was leading operations in

37:34

the Lithuanian control center, which

37:36

would be responsible for

37:38

coordinating synchronization with Poland and

37:40

CISA. are

38:01

planning making a calculations

38:03

that what we are operating

38:05

and what actions will

38:07

be taken so they are

38:09

secure and and will

38:12

not endanger the power systems

38:14

also we had team

38:16

of analysis analyzing the data

38:18

because during a test

38:20

we had to perform certain

38:22

tests so for example

38:24

to increase and decrease the

38:26

generation so Just

38:29

after these events, we

38:31

had to analyze the

38:33

data to draw conclusions,

38:35

whether it is correct

38:37

behavior of our control

38:39

systems, or maybe we

38:41

have to improve something. And

38:43

of course, there was

38:45

a coordination with our

38:47

partners. So there was

38:49

quite an intensive weekend

38:52

for all of us

38:54

to make it happen.

38:57

Across the Baltics, each nation

38:59

first had to disconnect

39:01

from IPS -UPS. From

39:03

the beginning, the very

39:06

important step was decoupling

39:08

from the Russian network.

39:10

So it went very

39:12

smoothly. As

39:14

planned, nine in the morning,

39:16

we were decoupled and

39:19

started the island operation. And

39:22

immediately after that, we

39:24

started the tests because

39:26

the time schedule was

39:28

quite tight. And we

39:30

performed tests which successfully

39:33

proved that our preparations

39:35

and our control systems

39:37

work fine. So

39:39

we started, in the beginning,

39:42

we started to disconnect first

39:44

from Königsberg, Kaliningrad area, Lithuania

39:47

on 8 February.

39:50

And then there was a

39:52

disconnection of lines between Lithuania

39:54

and Belarusia. Then it was

39:56

a disconnection of line between

39:58

Estonia and Russia. And then

40:00

we were island boat for

40:02

30 plus hours. So

40:05

that was the critical

40:07

that we wanted to

40:09

be separated as an

40:11

island. And why we wanted

40:13

to do it was to

40:16

test that for the future, that

40:18

we are ready for critical

40:20

scenarios, that if in future somehow

40:22

we are disconnected from continental

40:24

Europe in the context of frequency

40:26

management, that we can sustain

40:28

it and survive it with our

40:30

technology and with our power

40:32

plants. And then the engineers

40:35

spent much of the weekend stress

40:37

testing their grids in island operation.

40:41

As the tests were being conducted, a

40:44

real -life emergency happened. We

40:48

had unplanned disconnection of

40:50

one of the gas

40:52

-fired power plants. It

40:54

was not planned, but

40:56

we call it

40:59

a stress test because

41:01

it was nearly

41:03

400 megawatts of capacity

41:05

lost during island

41:07

mode. We

41:09

defined it as a

41:11

reference incident, the biggest

41:13

incident that our system

41:15

can withstand. So we

41:18

have not planned it,

41:20

but we have prepared

41:22

it. And this event

41:24

showed that all preparations

41:26

were enough and all

41:28

parameters, how our system

41:30

control is working, they

41:32

are very good. So

41:34

from one side it

41:37

was an unplanned event.

41:39

For generator it was

41:41

a failure, but for

41:43

us it was also

41:45

a success that our

41:47

work was correct. With

41:53

these planned and unplanned

41:55

stress tests passed, the control

41:58

rooms moved towards synchronization. So

42:02

eventually we had to

42:04

balance the Baltic power

42:06

system. to get

42:08

closer to the continental Europe. And

42:11

then synchronization was performed,

42:14

just connecting the circuit

42:16

breaker and connecting the

42:18

two power systems synchronously

42:20

through to transform. The

42:30

weekend was a success. Latvia,

42:32

Lithuania and Estonia had shown they

42:34

could keep their grids synchronised with

42:36

each other and with those of

42:39

their neighbours to the west. Donata

42:42

sees the successful synchronisation as

42:44

a vital step in strengthening

42:46

the Baltic's independence. First

42:50

of all, it was

42:52

the oil independence, gas independence.

42:54

We stopped electricity trade

42:56

and then we finally decoupled

42:58

our system. So first

43:00

of all, it is the

43:02

energy independence that... No

43:05

third party could have

43:07

an impact on our

43:09

energy, in this case

43:11

electricity power system, and

43:13

we ourselves are controlling

43:16

everything and we are

43:18

prepared to do it

43:20

in a secure and

43:22

cost -efficient way. It

43:25

also creates a bright future

43:27

for these nations, with modern

43:29

grids ready to export renewable

43:31

energy to partners across CISA.

43:39

Synchronization also allowed us to

43:41

create and establish the

43:43

framework for further development of

43:46

our system, that we

43:48

are developing the system on

43:50

the same parameters and

43:52

the same framework as in

43:54

the whole Europe. So

43:57

there are same rules, same

43:59

rules in the electricity

44:01

market. any

44:03

development of electricity generation

44:05

or any demand

44:07

is under the same

44:10

conditions as in

44:12

all continental Europe. And

44:15

what is important

44:17

for the decarbonization of

44:19

the energy sector,

44:21

our synchronization project, especially

44:23

with synchronous condensers,

44:26

put very good technical

44:28

conditions that we

44:30

can install. a significant

44:32

number of renewables,

44:34

which is actually happening

44:37

in Lithuania. And

44:40

it supports the stability of the

44:43

entire CESA grid. The larger the

44:45

network of power sources across the

44:47

grid, the more ability there is

44:49

to match supply and demand. So,

44:53

in a sense, there is, right now, big

44:56

discussion across Europe how...

44:58

the TSOs should be

45:00

supported and what tools

45:02

should have the TSOs.

45:04

And for us in

45:06

Poland, we are looking

45:08

forward to maintain and

45:11

expand the capacity market.

45:13

This will be also

45:15

the source of the

45:17

power for us in

45:19

case of the... loss

45:21

or not generation from

45:24

the renewables yes there

45:26

is a plan to

45:28

build additional connection what

45:30

we are right now

45:32

we are right now

45:34

in a planning phase

45:36

in designing phase of

45:39

the new connection this

45:41

will be the the

45:43

on our side this

45:45

will be 220 double

45:47

circuit 220 line and

45:49

this will be on

45:51

polish side the

45:54

cable connection. We

45:56

will build the cable

45:59

across the freeway

46:01

that we have. On

46:04

the Lithuanian side, it

46:07

will be partially cable,

46:09

partially overhead line. Currently,

46:11

the plan is to have

46:13

the new link in 2030. On,

46:17

I think, positive side, both

46:19

we and Lidric, we already

46:21

took the investment decisions and

46:23

we are like, we

46:27

are ready to perform this

46:29

project. The

46:48

engineers we've heard from today

46:50

have dedicated decades of their careers

46:52

to give their countries the

46:54

power to protect freedom's front line.

46:56

The question is, what will

46:59

today's young engineers need to do

47:01

to maintain resilience across Europe's

47:03

infrastructure? Engineering

47:17

Matters is a production of Reby

47:19

Media. This episode was written and

47:21

produced by Will North and edited

47:23

by me, Johnny Dowling. It was

47:25

hosted by me and by Bernadette

47:28

Ballantyne, sound engineering by Ross McPherson.

47:30

And the man who gives us

47:32

the capacity to operate in perfect

47:34

synchronization is Rory Harris. Thank

47:36

you for listening. You can

47:38

find us on all podcast

47:40

apps, on our website, engineeringmatters

47:43

.reby .media, and on LinkedIn. You