Two versions of Curry's paradox are presented, a paradox highly regarded as the most vexing and the most threatening to a consistent and viable truth-theory, with some conclusions drawn.
Short of provable inconsistency, what are the strongest large cardinal axioms, and a look at extending into inconsistency with paraconsistent dialethicist truth-theory
On the provability or non-provability of certain mathematical theorems wiithin 'weak' subsystems of second-order number theory in relation to differential equations, in particular, the Cauchy-Peano existence-theorem for solutions to differentia
I construct a model in which 'strongness' of a cardinal k is indestructible under k+-weakly closed Prikry Forcing, and a solution to Hajnal's Conjecture
On the problem of shared preferences of 2 or more Bayesian decision makers and the necessity to indexicalize conditionalization, and some reflections on the impact on theory-selection in science
Some of my proofs that superstring (M) Theory is the only possible GuTheory, and some reflections on the philosophy of physics/science (the 'physical' proofs will be provided in pdf-form and linked in various groups and my page)
on supersymmetric gauge invariance and the uniqueness of superstring-M-Theory w.r.t. gauge/gravity dualities and shrodinger symmetries (lecture 3, part 2)
Reflections on the relative consistency of large cardinals in the range between supercompact to Vopenka's Principle, and the limits of large cardinal axioms