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haymarketbooks .org, where all paperback
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books are 20 %
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off every day. Welcome
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to the Dig, a podcast from
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Jacobin Magazine. My name is
1:20
Daniel Denver, and I'm broadcasting from
1:22
Providence, Rhode Island. This
1:24
is the second in our
1:26
three -part series with Aziz
1:28
Rana reexamining the entirety of
1:30
American history through alternating periods
1:33
of conflict and quiescence
1:35
around our liberal
1:37
capitalist imperialist constitutional order. This
1:40
is the history of how
1:42
an avowed white Anglo settler
1:44
colony, practicing the widespread enslavement
1:46
of black workers while expanding westward
1:49
through the dispossession of indigenous
1:51
land, transformed itself in the wake
1:53
of the Spanish -American War in
1:55
World Wars I and II, into
1:57
a global empire that claimed its
2:00
right to hegemony by
2:02
virtue of its universalist
2:04
emancipatory principles. And then
2:06
it's the history of how that all.
2:08
through our present moment, has
2:10
spectacularly fallen apart. In
2:13
the first episode, we traced the
2:15
foundation of the American settler empire
2:17
from the revolutionary generation through the
2:19
eve of World War One. This
2:22
episode, we moved through World
2:24
War One in the ensuing first
2:26
red scare, a time
2:28
of hypernationalistic, racist, and
2:30
xenophobic 100 % Americanism that
2:32
crushed the organized left. Then
2:35
we move on to
2:37
the Communist Party USA, the
2:39
New Deal, World War
2:41
II, the war in
2:43
court, and the Cold
2:45
War, when American liberalism,
2:47
anti -communism, and empire
2:49
triumphed. In our third and
2:52
final episode, we'll tell the
2:54
story of the long unraveling of
2:56
the American order, domestically and
2:58
globally, from the Vietnam
3:00
War through our
3:02
moment today. facing the
3:04
extraordinary authoritarian challenge
3:06
of MAGA 2 .0. Briefly,
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P -A -T -R -E -O -N dot com
4:02
slash the dig. Okay, here's Aziz
4:04
Rana, a professor of law at
4:06
Boston College Law School, where his
4:08
research and teaching center on constitutional
4:10
law and political development. He's the
4:12
author of two books, The
4:15
Two Faces of American Freedom,
4:17
and the book we're discussing this
4:19
series, The Constitutional Bind,
4:21
how Americans came to idolize
4:23
a document that fails them.
4:26
This is the second in a three part
4:28
series. The
4:44
US entry into World War
4:46
I in 1917 changed American
4:48
politics dramatically and definitely much
4:50
for the worse. But in
4:52
the years leading up to
4:54
the war, as we were
4:57
discussing in the prior episode,
4:59
there were powerful critiques, both
5:01
more radical critiques and more
5:03
mainstream critiques, of the US
5:05
Constitution and of the entire
5:08
American system. The
5:10
radical critiques came from groups
5:12
like the Socialist Party of
5:14
America, which itself had very
5:16
significantly left and right factions,
5:18
and also the very radical
5:20
industrial workers of the world,
5:22
or IWW. Meanwhile,
5:24
the mainstream critiques came
5:26
from the progressive
5:29
movement, itself a rather
5:31
heterogenous bunch. What
5:33
did various radical currents
5:35
from the Socialist Party to
5:37
the IWW propose and
5:39
how did those visions differ
5:41
from what mainstream progressives
5:43
were arguing for? So
5:46
there was a general climate
5:48
in the years leading up to
5:50
World War I of real
5:53
skepticism and critique from different reformist
5:55
movements about the constitutional system. And
5:58
this is the ideas that
6:00
were especially associated with somebody like
6:02
Charles Beard, but traveled pretty
6:04
broadly across these various spaces that
6:06
read the Constitution as a
6:08
counter -revolutionary document, as a containment
6:10
of the democratic energy that had
6:12
been unleashed in the 1770s,
6:15
1780s. So I want you to
6:17
notice something here up front,
6:19
which is even across radical spaces,
6:21
there's this distinction that's being
6:23
made between the declaration and
6:25
the Constitution. So the
6:27
Declaration is being claimed for
6:29
various types of even
6:31
revolutionary politics, but the
6:33
Constitution is being viewed as this
6:36
concrete instantiation for the reassertion
6:38
of forms of class hierarchy in
6:40
particular. And we can think
6:42
a little bit about why that
6:44
might be the case, that
6:47
the declaration isn't concretely embedded in
6:49
the set of institutional arrangements.
6:51
It's a way for radicals to
6:53
maintain continuity with particular types
6:55
of nationalist narratives, even if they're
6:57
explicitly internationalist. We can think
7:00
about the strengths of that as
7:02
political strategy, but also the
7:04
weaknesses and limitations, the inability even
7:06
among various radical groups to
7:08
sort of highlight the forms of
7:11
persistent indigenous suppression. and
7:13
expropriation that marks various elements of the
7:15
American experience, something for us to
7:17
contemplate. But if there
7:19
was this broad critique, There
7:21
was also really differences
7:23
in perspective about how
7:25
to pursue meaningful institutional
7:28
change. I'd say across
7:30
progressives and socialists that ended up
7:32
sort of aligning with the Socialist
7:34
Party of America, there was the
7:36
argument that the problem of the
7:38
constitutional system in the US was
7:40
at root, not one that was
7:42
just about a specific institution, let's
7:44
say the federal judiciary, but
7:46
a broader issue of
7:48
institutional design. So there was
7:50
a kind of broad
7:52
range agreement that as a
7:55
matter of how the
7:57
institutions were organized, they actually
7:59
produced a system that
8:01
undermined basic commitments to mass
8:03
democracy. And both progressives and
8:05
socialists are looking to Europe. They're
8:07
thinking about ways to create something that
8:09
looks much more like a parliamentary
8:11
system organized around proportional representation. They
8:14
see the American version
8:16
of judicial review as an
8:18
extreme assertion. of judicial
8:20
power in ways that contradicts
8:22
small d democracy. And
8:24
then they were also thinking not
8:27
just about the kind of institutions of
8:29
representative government, but also the difficulty
8:31
of amendment, so a more flexible amendment
8:33
process, how to produce various kinds
8:35
of change, and also the rights vision,
8:37
the fact that the U .S. has
8:39
a constitutional order that's built around
8:41
a very limited range of negative liberties
8:43
tied to property, a desire
8:45
to actually produce a system that
8:48
has something like much more expansive
8:50
socioeconomic rights. So these
8:52
are positions that in a
8:54
way connect progressives and socialists. But
8:57
I'd say what the
8:59
primary dividing point ends
9:01
up being over time
9:03
is that the socialists
9:05
develop a theory that's
9:07
deeply suspicious of thinking
9:09
about constitutional politics as
9:11
really a site for
9:13
a constitutional law, some
9:15
fundamental law that stands
9:18
above ordinary politics. This
9:20
is a matter of degree,
9:22
let's say, but they pressed
9:24
the hardest for producing a
9:26
political system in which you
9:28
have institutional arrangements that allow
9:30
organized bases, especially folks that
9:32
are connected to union movements,
9:34
to be able to negotiate
9:36
and renegotiate the terms of
9:38
politics. over time. To
9:41
see constitutional politics as not
9:43
something that's supervised by elites,
9:45
but as a site for
9:47
mass political agency through amendment,
9:50
through legislation that collapses the
9:52
divide substantially between higher and
9:54
ordinary law, and that protects
9:56
marginalized communities not through extreme
9:58
forms of checks and balances,
10:01
but through entrenched and powerful
10:03
intermediate groups like the party,
10:05
like the union. And
10:07
over time, what that
10:09
means is that while progressives,
10:12
at least initially, are
10:14
quite interested in formal
10:16
changes to the Constitution, they
10:19
increasingly shift toward
10:21
a defense instead of
10:23
rather than formally
10:25
changing the Constitution. pressing
10:27
for informal arrangements
10:29
that strengthen presidential power,
10:32
shifts through the
10:34
interpretation overseen by courts,
10:36
and the use of changes
10:39
in who serves on the
10:41
court, who you elect as
10:43
the president, as a way
10:45
of effectively producing constitutional reform
10:47
in a steady and moderated
10:50
way without necessarily having
10:52
mass transformations through the replacement
10:54
of one text with another. And
10:57
in a way, the Socialist
10:59
Party's position is no, it's
11:02
really important actually to formally
11:04
alter the text of the
11:06
Constitution because you want to
11:08
highlight the need for an
11:10
oppositional culture that understands the
11:12
existing arrangements as not the
11:15
fulfillment of popular sovereignty. And
11:17
also that there's a
11:19
worry among socialists that unless
11:22
you formally implement something
11:24
like parliamentary democratic practice and
11:26
simplified amendment processes that
11:28
allow mass publics to create
11:30
change through popular law, you
11:32
will effectively over time
11:35
give too much authority over
11:37
to the same range
11:39
of elites, politicians that are
11:41
elected as president and
11:43
judges that are insulated from.
11:45
popular decision -making. And
11:47
so the socialist argument is that
11:49
you need to pay attention to
11:51
the structure of the constitution because
11:53
that ends up shaping the possibility
11:55
of pursuing a whole range of
11:57
other alternatives that you can't distinguish
11:59
between what you might think of
12:01
as bread and butter issues of
12:03
the economy and these procedural questions
12:05
of democracy. But in pursuing
12:07
that, you have to have a much more
12:09
thoroughgoing commitment to the type
12:12
of democratic infrastructure that would
12:14
allow mobilized publics to intercede. And
12:16
then separately, there is, let's
12:18
say, a disagreement between
12:20
the SPA and then folks
12:23
that are really associated with
12:25
the IWW and various kinds
12:27
of syndicalist groups. So folks
12:29
in the IWW are also
12:31
deeply critical of the Constitution, but
12:33
are much more suspicious
12:36
of the electoralism among socialist
12:38
politicians. They're worried. that
12:40
the same kind of substitution of
12:42
interests that presidents and judges will
12:44
just sort of pursue their own
12:47
their own drives independent of what
12:49
the public wants will play out
12:51
if you have socialist politicians that
12:53
are too focused on election season
12:55
and they also think that ultimately
12:57
they're just deeply suspicious of like
13:00
the state as something that can
13:02
be fully corralled and that they'd
13:04
much rather have direct political authority
13:06
exercised at the union through like
13:08
workplace controls that end up shaping
13:11
the terms of collective life. And
13:13
so even if they're critical of
13:15
the constitution, they're more suspicious of
13:17
the reconstructionist agenda through formal constitutional
13:19
change that emerges out of the
13:21
SPA. And there was a lot
13:24
to be suspicious of in terms
13:26
of the SPA's right wing. Absolutely,
13:28
which is, I've
13:31
marked out three different positions.
13:33
Broadly speaking, progressive.
13:35
wants constitutional change, even substantial
13:37
constitutional change, but ultimately
13:39
is seeking it informally through
13:42
presidential power, arguments about
13:44
nationalism, a direct connection between
13:46
presidents and citizens, and
13:48
then, you know, judges in conversation
13:50
with presidents. Then you
13:52
have the socialist position, which is
13:54
a much more thoroughgoing democratization
13:56
of the institutions, a simplification of
13:58
the amendment process, a continual
14:00
re -engagement and renegotiation with political
14:02
life awareness. of the nationalist
14:04
sentiments that are coming out of
14:07
the progressives. And then you have
14:09
the syndicalist view, which is critical
14:11
of the constitution, but based
14:13
on a kind of anarchist sympathies, very
14:15
worried about what happens with the state
14:17
and the capacity of the state, even
14:19
if run by socialists, to end up
14:21
imposing new forms of domination. Within
14:24
these groups, there's still
14:26
a lot of variation. They're
14:28
progressives that call for a
14:30
new constitutional convention. They're
14:32
socialists, especially on the right wing,
14:34
that sound a lot more
14:36
like progressives, like, you know, especially
14:39
mayors of Wisconsin and the
14:41
folks that are associated with the
14:43
Wisconsin Socialist Party. that tend
14:45
to emphasize the importance of constitutional
14:47
interpretation, the fact that you
14:49
might not need to have this
14:51
like fundamental rupture, that you
14:53
should use national symbols, you should
14:55
meet the public where it
14:57
is, including when it comes to
14:59
like their own racist sentiments
15:01
and commitments. And so that there's
15:03
a spread. And then among
15:06
the IWW folks, there's similarly a
15:08
spread. So, you know, it's
15:10
not, it's not for nothing that
15:12
that Eugene Debs is involved
15:14
with the founding of the IWW
15:16
or that Big Bill Haywood
15:18
is part of the SPA and
15:20
that there are these like
15:22
synergistic alliances effectively. And
15:24
so that, you know, somebody like
15:26
Haywood would say that his vision
15:28
of the project of one big
15:30
union and of industrial unionism is
15:32
socialism with its like, with its
15:34
hard hat on something like that.
15:36
Socialism and its work clothes or
15:38
something. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, so there's
15:40
clear continuities, but there's nonetheless these
15:42
cleavages of perspective. Within
15:44
this, I think it's
15:47
just worth highlighting the very
15:49
different type of conversation
15:51
that's taking place. This is
15:53
a conversation that's about
15:55
what are the varieties of
15:57
constitutional democracy that would
15:59
be compatible ultimately with a
16:01
pretty profoundly changed political
16:03
economy. And for socialists and
16:05
folks in the IWW, the
16:08
goal is, you know, the
16:10
overcoming of capitalism. It's replacement
16:12
with a socialist economic system
16:14
that's predicated on the control
16:16
of workers over the conditions
16:18
of their own work life
16:20
that's organized around this idea
16:22
of a cooperative Commonwealth. And
16:25
in particular, a sense...
16:27
the current institutions of representation make
16:30
it very very difficult to
16:32
pursue these transformations to the economy.
16:34
That you have to have
16:36
an agenda that links the two
16:38
because without an agenda that
16:40
links the two you're effectively fighting
16:42
for the cooperative Commonwealth with
16:44
one hand tied behind your back.
16:46
Now where you go as
16:48
far as strategy to prioritize in
16:51
the here and now direct
16:53
action at the workplace or formal
16:55
changes to the constitution and
16:57
electoralism, that's where you start seeing
16:59
divergences between socialists and folks
17:01
in the IWW. The
17:03
years between 1913 and
17:05
1920 did witness a
17:07
lot of mainstream constitutional
17:09
reform. There were amendments
17:11
that allowed for the
17:14
direct election of senators
17:16
because recall that senators
17:18
were previously elected
17:20
by state legislators, women's
17:22
suffrage, alcohol prohibition, and
17:24
a federal income tax. All
17:27
of this is rather
17:29
substantial. But 15 states even
17:31
called for a straight -up
17:33
general constitutional convention. But
17:35
as you just indicated, nothing like
17:37
that ever happened. How, with the
17:39
U .S. entrance to the war, did
17:42
Wilson's repressive, nationalistic
17:45
presidentialism temporarily
17:47
resolve these constitutional crises that
17:49
had emerged, at least as
17:51
far as Wilson and his
17:53
friends were concerned. And
17:56
then how did
17:58
that provisional, rather reactionary
18:00
settlement transform the
18:02
broader politics around the
18:04
American constitutional order? So
18:07
I think it's really key
18:09
to start with the point that
18:11
you note, which is the
18:13
broader climate, the broader progressive climate
18:15
within which you can think of
18:17
the socialist party in particular
18:19
as perhaps the kind of radical
18:22
edge really emphasizing the need for
18:24
constitutional replacement effectively, was
18:26
one in which you were able
18:28
to use this amendment process, which
18:30
is notoriously, again, the hardest in
18:32
the world to implement to pursue
18:34
pretty profound changes on some critical
18:36
issues of the time and so
18:38
for constitutional amendments in a seven -year
18:41
period along with a variety of
18:43
other kinds of actions that are
18:45
taking place at the state level
18:47
so state constitutional arrangements that incorporate
18:49
things like initiative referenda that's pressing
18:51
for so little d democratic reforms
18:53
broad engagement with issues about socioeconomic
18:55
rights that should be built into
18:57
state constitution so that this is
18:59
an era of extensive constitutional experimentation
19:01
that's taking place at the state
19:04
level where you actually have much
19:06
more consistent success with
19:08
the broadly speaking progressive
19:10
and socialist vision and then
19:12
even success at the
19:14
federal level. And so
19:16
it tells us something
19:18
about the mass popular support
19:20
that existed precisely because
19:23
of the strength of all
19:25
of these intermediate institutions
19:27
that incorporated working class Americans.
19:30
into what we can think of
19:32
as like a left cultural world.
19:34
So whether it's the variety of
19:36
different unions across the ideological spectrum,
19:38
the forms of party organization, the
19:41
various other kinds of civic and
19:43
religious organizations. So you had an
19:45
entire infrastructure that sustained left politics
19:47
that was also part of making
19:49
arguments for constitutional change. There's newspapers
19:52
out of Kansas, like, you know,
19:54
the appeal to reason that are
19:56
writing articles about the problems of
19:58
the Constitution. There's a
20:00
plethora of journalistic and historical work
20:02
that's being done, making the argument
20:04
that the Constitution is undemocratic and
20:06
that the country needs pretty profound
20:09
forms of institutional renewal that goes
20:11
to the heart of how state
20:13
and economy have been organized, because
20:15
these conversations about the Constitution are
20:17
fundamentally conversations about first principle, how
20:19
to organize this political community. And
20:22
that's the nature of the conversation
20:24
in the U .S. on the eve
20:26
of World War I. And
20:28
what World War I does
20:31
is, in many ways, it
20:33
sort of fractures this discussion. Because
20:36
one of the things I think
20:38
that's key to highlight is that
20:40
many of the folks that are
20:42
participating in this discussion about the
20:44
need for constitutional change are themselves
20:46
elites. so that they're
20:48
Anglo -Americans, they're native
20:50
born, they come from particular kinds
20:52
of class backgrounds, they're
20:54
involved in reform movements, but
20:56
it's not just a politics
20:59
from below. Even somebody like
21:01
Woodrow Wilson, you know, had
21:03
written in his earlier years
21:05
about the need for constitutional
21:08
change. I mean, he'd called
21:10
in his own personal notebooks,
21:12
his own sort of private
21:14
diaries, in the 1870s
21:16
as a young student, he'd called
21:18
the Constitution something that created
21:20
a miserable delusion of a republic
21:22
because of the fact that
21:24
it didn't implement these various kinds
21:26
of democratic, little
21:29
de -democratic initiatives. And
21:31
so the thing that
21:33
World War I does is
21:36
it gives, interestingly, a
21:38
set of principles for
21:41
the folks that, let's say, are
21:43
committed to defending the Constitution just
21:45
as it is. So like a
21:47
business elite. We've reached a point
21:49
in American history where really it's
21:51
business elites that are the single
21:54
entity that are strongly committed to
21:56
keeping the constitutional arrangements just as
21:58
they are. But the fact
22:00
that now the country is mobilizing
22:02
for war, this war is viewed as
22:04
a kind of existential confrontation between
22:06
American values and values that you see
22:09
in Europe against. the backdrop of
22:11
a huge amount of opposition, it
22:13
allows business elites to be able
22:15
to tap into a set of
22:17
principles that are tied to constitutionalism.
22:19
It's that idea that had been
22:22
percolating, that had had this dress
22:24
rehearsal in places like the Philippines
22:26
of the Cretal Constitution is what
22:28
justifies American power, that's now given
22:30
a concrete instantiation through the war.
22:32
And then at the same time,
22:35
this focus on the
22:37
constitution not only is
22:39
able to give business elites a
22:41
kind of grounding for their own.
22:43
objectives, it's able to
22:45
tie as well to folks
22:47
that are backing military preparedness. So
22:50
it had been the case that you'd
22:52
had arguments proceeding about the need for
22:54
a standing army, for military preparedness, for
22:57
national security infrastructure, but that was also
22:59
viewed in various ways as perhaps un
23:01
-American, that you needed to instead
23:03
have this kind of isolationist project
23:05
that focused on demographic transformation domestically within
23:07
the country. But the
23:09
war effort Energizes
23:11
military preparedness arguments and the connection
23:13
of the war effort to
23:16
the Constitution Gives a justification for
23:18
the national security apparatus and
23:20
so now all of a sudden
23:22
you have these three different
23:24
elements you have folks that are
23:26
talking about the genius of
23:28
the Constitution business elites that are
23:30
connected to military preparedness groups
23:33
who are then also using the
23:35
constitution and constitution support to
23:37
back their own positions. And
23:39
in this context, it taps
23:41
into really an extensive base. And
23:44
this is not a broad
23:46
base because there's a lot of
23:48
internal opposition to the war
23:50
effort, but especially nativist groups, folks
23:53
that are, let's say, Anglo -American
23:55
settlers that are wary of
23:57
the broad sort of immigration transformations
23:59
and demographics. The second Ku
24:02
Klux Klan, the American Legion. Totally.
24:04
All of these groups, they're
24:06
viewing this moment of
24:09
political conflict, including around the
24:11
Constitution, as one
24:13
of chaos domestically, and
24:15
they see the war effort.
24:17
as a way of solidifying
24:19
a set of principles to
24:21
defend that's deeply kind of
24:23
traditionalist about business interests, the state
24:25
as it currently exists, and
24:28
the need for the US
24:30
to assert robust power. And
24:32
it's why it's during this period
24:34
that you for the first
24:36
time have national mobilizations around
24:38
constitutional support. It's organizations like
24:40
the National Security League that
24:42
emerged during this era that
24:44
end up pressing For
24:46
the celebration of Constitution Day, Constitution
24:48
Day becomes an event that's
24:50
celebrated annually beginning really in World
24:52
War I. You have groups
24:54
like the Klan and notions of
24:56
100 % Americanism that are starting
24:58
to rally around the Constitution.
25:00
And then you have various veterans
25:02
groups and groups that are
25:04
sort of broadly associated with the
25:06
war effort, like the American
25:08
Protective League, that are themselves pressing
25:10
aggressively for on the one
25:12
hand, constitutional rededication on
25:14
terms of the existing state
25:16
apparatus, the economy and the
25:18
state exactly as they are,
25:21
alongside a strong commitment to
25:23
the war. And what
25:25
this does is
25:27
it transforms steadily the
25:29
perception of both
25:31
criticism of the Constitution
25:34
and also support
25:36
for socialism, where both
25:38
in various ways become tarred
25:40
with a kind of anti
25:42
-Americanism. where in the years
25:44
before the war, being a
25:46
socialist in a sense is
25:48
absolutely part of the broader
25:50
American Republican heritage, somebody like
25:52
Debs. But during the war,
25:54
because of socialist opposition to the
25:56
war effort, there's a way in
25:59
which socialist commitments, and so capitalism
26:01
becomes increasingly associated with American identity,
26:03
socialism is read out of the
26:05
appropriate range of acceptable opinion for
26:07
chunks of the political lead and
26:09
the public more generally, and then
26:12
at the same time, criticism
26:14
of the Constitution starts being
26:16
read as anti -American is
26:18
something that's associated with immigrant
26:20
pockets in particular. And here,
26:23
the transformation of Wilson is
26:25
really telling. Because in
26:27
the 1870s, Wilson is
26:29
arguing that the Constitution is
26:31
fundamentally broken. By the
26:33
time you get to 1917, he's
26:35
strongly backing congressional bills like
26:37
the Sedition Act, various
26:39
kinds of bills that criminalize
26:42
speech, including speech that
26:44
would critique the Constitution. And
26:46
so the Constitution now becomes
26:48
this symbol. the state apparatus and
26:50
whatever existing disagreements might have
26:52
taken place about the organization of
26:54
economy and state how the
26:56
institutions of government should be framed
26:58
what Wilson is effectively standing
27:00
for during the wartime is that
27:02
all of those first -order questions
27:05
have to be suppressed and
27:07
that to back the Constitution is
27:09
really not to back a
27:11
project of critical dissent and engagement
27:13
but to back the
27:15
constitutional state exactly as it is
27:17
from all perceived enemies, including
27:19
the sources of dissent domestically, people
27:21
like Debs, people like Crystal
27:23
Eastman, that are making arguments for
27:25
free speech itself. And Debs
27:27
is imprisoned for just simply criticizing
27:29
the war. Absolutely. So he's
27:32
imprisoned effectively on seditious speech grounds
27:34
for his opposition to the
27:36
war. And it's, in fact, socialists
27:38
and reformers that are saying,
27:40
well, if you have this text,
27:42
you should support, live up
27:44
to the principles, the civil libertarian
27:46
principles that exist within the
27:48
document. And it's the state that's
27:50
saying, no, veneration for
27:52
the Constitution. in a
27:55
way that's built on
27:57
ideological uniformity and really top
27:59
-down deference requires the suppression
28:01
of civil libertarian commitments. And
28:04
this overwhelmingly repressive crackdown
28:06
marks the first red scare.
28:08
It's a crackdown on
28:10
radicals like Debs who are
28:13
imprisoned simply for speaking
28:15
out against the war, a
28:17
crackdown on immigrant radicals
28:19
who are deported in large
28:21
Numbers for speaking out
28:23
against the war speaking out
28:26
against the American system
28:28
and this all only intensifies
28:30
after the war has
28:32
concluded why So I think
28:34
one of the things
28:36
that's worth highlighting is that
28:39
this is a period
28:41
of intense social conflict within
28:43
the US so this
28:45
period between especially late 1917
28:47
1919 that
28:49
the idea that the country might
28:51
actually experience something like social
28:53
revolution is something that's taken very,
28:55
very seriously across the ideological
28:58
spectrum. And it makes sense. There's
29:00
the example of the Russian
29:02
revolution that's out there. There's the
29:04
example of the Mexican revolution
29:06
and a fundamentally different constitutional document.
29:08
There's the experience of the
29:10
general strikes in major American cities.
29:13
that 1918 -1919 is
29:15
a high tide for
29:17
labor activism, strike
29:19
actions, and various kinds
29:21
of radical political organizing. And
29:24
what this does is it
29:26
both generates intense forms of
29:28
repression that's brought to bear
29:30
against left -wing activists and
29:32
repression that's justified precisely on
29:34
the grounds that you're preserving
29:36
or protecting the constitutional state.
29:39
from attack, an American way
29:41
of life. And so drawing
29:43
on the reserves, the fairly
29:45
deep reserves that existed for
29:47
constitutional support as a way
29:49
of justifying these forms of
29:51
action, but then also drawing
29:53
on the fact that you
29:56
have a really divided public
29:58
and you have substantial parts
30:00
of the public. the kind
30:02
of Anglo -American settler public that's
30:04
wary about the type of
30:06
social crisis and disorder that
30:08
might take place, that's deeply
30:10
xenophobic against folks that are
30:12
coming from Eastern and Southern
30:15
Europe, that also maintains
30:17
a commitment to various kinds of
30:19
white supremacist politics, and so that's
30:21
feeding organizations like the Klan, which
30:23
is a mass membership organization of
30:25
the North and the West, in
30:28
the 1920s. And World
30:30
War I is followed by
30:32
horrific spasm around the country
30:34
of violence against black people.
30:36
Absolutely intense forms of
30:38
physical violence and, you know,
30:40
white violence against African Americans. And
30:43
what this does in
30:46
the 1920s is it means
30:48
that it's not that
30:50
You have uniformity, ideological
30:52
uniformity around the genius of
30:54
the Constitution or commitment
30:57
to these Constitution Day events.
31:00
But you have deep internal
31:02
political cleavages in a
31:04
setting in which there's now
31:06
a national base connected
31:08
in both parties, the Democratic
31:10
and the Republican Party, to
31:13
a business and racial elite. that
31:15
is willing to use the instruments
31:18
of the state to suppress what are
31:20
viewed as threats to the existing
31:22
social order. And that
31:24
has an absolutely destructive
31:26
effect on left institutions. It
31:28
produces the collapse in various ways
31:30
of the IWW. It
31:33
suppresses the willingness of mass
31:35
publics to commit to supporting You
31:37
know, left -wing newspapers, organizations, so
31:39
you can just take something
31:42
like The Messenger, A. Philip Randolph's
31:44
socialist black newspaper that had
31:46
been tied during this period to
31:48
the Socialist Party. The
31:50
number of people that subscribed
31:52
to it, plummet over the
31:54
course of the 1920s until
31:56
it finally like goes out
31:58
of business, even NAAC membership
32:00
drops. So this
32:02
is a period of suppression
32:04
that really undermines the organizing.
32:06
Yet at the same time,
32:09
I think one of the
32:11
things that's worth noting is
32:13
it also builds subterraneously certain
32:15
kinds of radical politics that
32:17
persists during this era. Precisely
32:20
because of the fact that you have
32:22
this intense white violence against African Americans,
32:24
it's harder to hold on. to
32:26
that civil war creedal story of
32:28
the U .S. as steadily overcoming
32:30
whatever kind of racist ambitions might
32:32
have existed internally. And so it
32:34
produces, it's the condition that produces
32:36
the base, the black base for
32:38
the Communist Party, for instance, in
32:40
the South. It produces far
32:42
greater forms of internationalism
32:45
within black politics. So this
32:47
is the era of
32:49
the rise of Garveyite politics,
32:51
various other forms of
32:53
kind of anti -colonial internationalism
32:55
that become a mainstay of
32:57
black politics. And it
32:59
also means that you still
33:01
have strong traditions of
33:04
labor activism, socialist activism. But
33:06
within white pockets, there's
33:08
this interesting ambiguity that emerges,
33:10
that Crystal Eastman, great
33:12
socialist feminist, captures. So
33:14
Eastman is a fellow traveler
33:17
within socialist circles, within
33:19
anti -imperial, anti -racist circles. She's
33:21
one of the authors of
33:24
the Equal Rights Amendment. in the
33:26
1920s. She's one of the
33:28
founders of the ACLU as
33:30
an anti -World War I activity
33:32
and exercise. Her
33:34
view about in this climate
33:36
of repression how the
33:38
left should operate is that
33:40
the left should negotiate
33:43
a rejection of the constitutional
33:45
system of the existing
33:47
operation of state and economy
33:49
while using the legal
33:51
tools that exist to press
33:53
through litigation, through argument,
33:55
for rights against those that
33:57
are most marginalized. And
33:59
when the legal system succeeds, then
34:01
you provide a reprieve for workers, for
34:03
black people against the violence of
34:06
the state and of business and racial
34:08
elites. But when the
34:10
legal system fails, it also
34:12
serves the politically educated function of
34:14
highlighting how that the only way to
34:16
get true commitments to civil rights or
34:18
civil liberties will be through a kind
34:20
of transformation of the system. This is
34:22
an argument that we're going to see
34:24
replicated across the 20th century. But
34:27
even she notes something
34:29
which is a growing
34:31
hesitance of labor activists,
34:34
socialist politicians, to
34:36
make the argument about the
34:38
need to transform or overcome.
34:41
So a commitment to using the
34:43
tools of the legal system to
34:45
say that rights are being violated,
34:47
that labor should have the ability
34:49
to boycott or strike, or that
34:51
black people should have protections against
34:53
white violence or against segregation. But
34:56
an unwillingness to then
34:58
say when it's failed,
35:00
that's a function. of
35:02
the failures endemic to the
35:04
institution and instead a tendency
35:06
to collapse effectively into an
35:08
argument about how the state
35:10
is not living up to
35:12
its own values. In other
35:14
words, a kind of constitutionally
35:16
venerative sheen that starts to
35:18
take hold even among activists
35:21
that are themselves quite skeptical.
35:23
So she says famously at
35:25
the 1920 Socialist Party Convention
35:27
that during World War I,
35:29
in some ways, the most
35:31
radical thing that a socialist
35:33
can do was to say
35:35
that Wilson, Palmer, and the
35:37
state had to live up
35:39
to its constitutional principles and
35:41
that she worried that with
35:43
the war over, this is
35:45
a kind of premonition about
35:47
where American politics went in
35:49
the 1920s, with the war
35:51
over, that these socialists will
35:53
come to imagine that simply
35:56
by living up to the
35:58
constitution, you'll get the social
36:00
revolution. And that is an
36:02
inherent impossibility. Revealingly,
36:05
the exaltation of the Supreme
36:07
Court was also part of
36:09
this nationalistic reaction. It was
36:12
during the 20s that plans
36:14
to construct the grand building
36:16
that the court and habits
36:18
today were made. And the
36:20
design, I learned from your
36:22
book, was inspired by the
36:24
Roman architectural revival of Mussolini's
36:26
Italy. So, one thing
36:28
that I think is really important
36:31
to highlight is that even though
36:33
it spreads across both political parties,
36:36
I think we can
36:38
sort of identify the
36:40
politics of constitutional veneration
36:42
and this extreme defense
36:44
of the constitutional state. Defending
36:48
the Constitution actually means
36:50
compromising, rejecting, limiting civil liberties.
36:52
So the constitutional venerators
36:54
are the very same people
36:56
that are imprisoning folks
36:59
like Debs for speech crimes.
37:02
This is, you know, broadly
37:04
speaking, the culture of
37:06
the right. And in
37:08
the teens, the 20s, and the 30s,
37:10
and the early part of the decade, the
37:13
right is really able
37:15
to succeed in pursuing
37:17
a cultural project around
37:20
constitutional veneration that's deeply
37:22
reactionary and restorative. We
37:24
can see how it plays out in
37:26
a bunch of different settings. I think the
37:28
most spectacular example of it is what
37:31
you just described, which is today's Supreme Court.
37:33
Today's Supreme Court, if you
37:35
go to D .C., was designed
37:37
and built during this era.
37:39
If you just look at
37:41
the court, you're like, this
37:44
thing is a massive and imposing
37:46
architectural entity. There's nothing about
37:48
the experience of looking at
37:50
it or being in it
37:52
that feels democratic, that's part
37:54
of a collective culture of
37:56
ruling and being ruled in
37:58
turn. And that's
38:00
by conscious design. So
38:02
the architect of the court
38:04
is a person named Cass Gilbert,
38:06
who had participated in sort
38:09
of various kinds of propaganda efforts
38:11
during World War I to
38:13
support the war. that is strongly
38:15
concerned with critiques of the
38:17
Constitution, with socialist politics, and that
38:20
is very taken with Mussolini.
38:22
In fact, he goes to
38:24
Italy. He shows the
38:26
drawings to the folks within
38:28
the Italian government that he
38:30
wants to get the marble
38:32
specifically from Italy. And
38:34
the thought is what the
38:36
architectural design and the building
38:38
is supposed to do is
38:41
impose awe on the citizen.
38:43
The worry is that the
38:45
court is itself facing a
38:47
legitimacy crisis precisely because of
38:49
its attachments still to business
38:51
and that the way to
38:53
overcome partially this legitimacy crisis
38:55
is to have an architectural
38:57
space that underscores the near
38:59
godly quality of the justices
39:01
themselves. And I think
39:03
it's something for us to
39:05
reflect on, which is we're
39:07
still living with the cultural
39:09
products of an era. in
39:12
which the profound organizing of
39:14
how one experiences the Supreme
39:16
Court is built on an
39:18
authoritarian frame. That's broadly
39:20
speaking part of the
39:22
culture that marks this period.
39:24
It's the 20s and
39:26
30s where you have the
39:28
proliferation of these Constitution
39:30
Day celebrations. You
39:32
have the spread of constitutional instruction
39:34
as something that's mandated in
39:36
public. schools, so it goes to
39:38
43 states by the time
39:40
you get to 1941. You
39:42
have oratorical competitions in the 20s about
39:44
the genius of the Constitution, a million
39:46
and a half high school students that
39:49
are participating in this. And
39:51
then in the 30s too,
39:53
you start seeing the
39:55
requirement of constitutional law as
39:57
a course in law
39:59
schools. So this is a
40:01
kind of transformation as well of the
40:03
educational infrastructure. I want to
40:05
be clear about this. There had been
40:07
constitutional instruction in the 19th century
40:09
in universities and history departments. So
40:12
it's not like it didn't exist previously. And
40:14
if you just look at the 19th century story
40:16
and you look at the textbooks and the number
40:18
of editions published in specific textbooks, it can
40:20
seem like, well, there was a lot. But
40:22
if you zoom out, let's say, from that
40:24
set of trees, to
40:27
the broader forest, there is a
40:29
profound transformation that's taking place
40:31
in the first half of the
40:33
20th century in terms of
40:35
just the sheer scope of a
40:37
focus on general constitutional instruction
40:40
that even at law schools, it
40:42
had long been the case
40:44
in the 19th century, late 19th
40:46
or early 20th century that
40:48
really law schools instruct in private
40:50
law subjects like torts, property
40:53
contracts, and constitutional law is really
40:55
something that's left. for political
40:57
science and history departments. And that
40:59
starts to change too. And
41:02
the focus especially on
41:04
this broader vision of
41:06
constitutional education and especially
41:08
popular constitutional education pursued
41:10
by business and governmental
41:12
elites is again, uniformity
41:15
of instruction. Not critique,
41:17
not critical evaluation of the
41:20
text of judicial opinions,
41:22
but an almost rote or
41:24
mechanical assertion of
41:26
the genius of the Supreme Court, the
41:28
genius of checks and balances, the
41:31
perfection of the constitutional
41:33
system. And that's
41:35
going hand in hand with what
41:37
we're seeing within right -wing civil society
41:39
associations like the Klan, where the
41:41
Klan makes one of its symbols
41:43
of Klancraft, the Constitution,
41:46
which is associated with
41:48
the flag and is supposed
41:50
to stand for the
41:52
principles of what amounts to
41:55
Anglo -American ethno. ethno -nationalism.
41:57
So there's this entire cultural
41:59
context also shaping
42:01
the politics of the 20s and that's
42:03
becoming part of the drinking water
42:05
of what new generations of Americans just
42:07
come to understand as like the
42:10
American baseline is promoted by, let's say,
42:12
the received culture of the society. We
42:15
should also emphasize that
42:17
the teens and 20s
42:19
are the high point
42:21
for restrictionist exclusionary anti
42:23
-immigrant legislation that cuts
42:25
off immigration from Asia
42:27
basically entirely and all
42:29
but cuts off immigration
42:31
from southern and eastern
42:33
Europe. Also a period
42:35
when the English language
42:37
becomes so closely identified
42:39
with 100 % Americanism. And
42:41
so in the last
42:44
episode, we discussed this
42:46
sort of budding universalist,
42:48
creedal idea that legitimated
42:50
US imperialism abroad. But
42:52
here we see that
42:54
whipsawing back into this
42:56
idea that there is
42:58
something ethnoculturally particular about
43:00
Anglo -Saxon America and
43:02
the capacity of 100 %
43:04
Americans to engage in
43:06
self -rule. That's particular
43:08
to the exceptional genius
43:10
of American democracy and
43:13
the constitutional system. This
43:15
is the era in many ways
43:17
that I think we should locate
43:19
as a kind of origin story
43:21
for let's say the attacks on
43:23
CRT or even quote unquote DEI
43:25
that we see in the present.
43:29
So in recent years you've had
43:31
various states that have passed these
43:33
laws limiting the ways in which
43:35
you can engage in instruction about
43:37
the American past. And I
43:39
think one of the things
43:41
that's really complicated and confusing
43:43
for Americans that are left
43:45
of center or liberals is
43:47
that so much of these
43:49
laws are framed in the
43:51
language you would think of
43:53
kind of universalism, universal inclusion.
43:55
They have a kind of
43:57
civil rights language, which they
43:59
say that the problem of
44:01
teaching quote unquote divisive anti
44:04
-American ideologies is that they
44:06
reject a kind of general
44:08
universal principle of color blindness.
44:10
They present the U .S. as
44:12
not committed to longstanding civil
44:14
rights agendas. And
44:16
so it's using the language
44:18
of universal inclusion as an
44:20
argument for why actually telling
44:22
the history of the American
44:24
past and highlighting past and
44:26
ongoing forms of racism should
44:28
be treated as a suspect. And
44:31
that's a kind of
44:33
kernel that we start seeing
44:35
during this period, which
44:37
is we tend to divide
44:40
between civic nationalism and
44:42
ethno -nationalism. So civic nationalism
44:44
or accounts of membership that
44:46
are inclusive of all.
44:48
Ethno -nationalism. or accounts of
44:50
membership that focus on, you
44:52
know, organic ties to
44:55
particular ethno -religious groups. You
44:57
could counterpose Obama's vision for
44:59
a composite America versus
45:01
Trump's most kind of white
45:03
ethno -nationalist edges. Yeah,
45:06
exactly. But the thing
45:08
that happens during this period, and
45:10
this is one of the tools of
45:12
the Constitution and its flexibility, for
45:15
the right is an
45:17
interesting combination of both. Where
45:19
the idea of creed and constitution,
45:21
their linkage is central to the war
45:23
effort, that the reason why the
45:25
U .S. is special is the place
45:28
that the Enlightenment values came down to
45:30
earth. It's expressed through the declarations,
45:32
given concrete teeth in the Constitution. The
45:34
U .S. stands for the interests of
45:36
all. It's committed to the equal
45:38
rights of all peoples. But
45:40
it's not for nothing again
45:43
that it's Wilson that's the
45:45
embodiment of these ideas and
45:47
that they start percolating across
45:49
the political elite because the
45:51
claim is also that the
45:53
reason why it touched down
45:56
in the U .S. is
45:58
because of the cultural specificity
46:00
of Anglo Protestant, even Anglo -Saxon
46:02
American settlers, that there's something
46:04
special about their culture that
46:06
actually promotes enlightenment values and
46:08
that the problem in the
46:11
country in the teens and
46:13
the 20s with immigrant politics,
46:15
with black politics, with labor
46:17
activism, is that
46:19
these universal values that
46:21
are distinctly tied to
46:24
the Anglo -Saxon experience are
46:26
now essentially under assault
46:28
from various communities that
46:30
are not culturally attuned.
46:33
And so that the only way abroad,
46:35
for instance, for American values to
46:37
be able to dominate is for the
46:39
U .S. to essentially enjoy a kind
46:41
of hierarchy where other societies that
46:43
are less developed are in a two
46:45
-layer relationship with the country. And then
46:47
domestically, this actually requires a
46:49
huge amount of suppression of external groups
46:51
that are viewed as fundamentally un -American.
46:53
So it goes hand in hand.
46:55
The very same people that are pressing
46:58
For this combined account of ethno
47:00
and civic nationalism, they're also
47:02
making arguments about nativism and the
47:04
need to restrict entry from
47:07
other parts of the world. So
47:09
you get the National Origins
47:11
Act from 1924. They're making arguments
47:13
about English -only instruction in schools
47:15
because German or other kinds
47:17
of instruction undermines an inculcation in
47:19
American values. And then they're
47:21
looking at the types of constitutional
47:23
experiments that are taking place
47:25
elsewhere. So again, Not
47:27
just Russia, not just
47:29
even Weimar Germany and its
47:31
constitutional experiments, but Mexico.
47:33
Mexico is a neighbor that's
47:35
engaged in an extensive
47:37
experimentation with building in socioeconomic
47:39
rights into a new
47:41
constitutional order and even that
47:43
is viewed as a
47:45
kind of threatening example of
47:47
un -American values because of
47:49
quote -unquote ethno -racial immaturity
47:51
that could end up undermining
47:53
the national project. And
47:55
so you even have, during
47:57
this period in the 20s,
47:59
laws that have more than
48:01
just a rhyme in common
48:04
with what we'll see 100
48:06
years later. Out of Wisconsin,
48:08
you have laws that limit
48:10
the teaching of particular kind
48:12
of textbooks, but then give
48:14
parents the ability to sue.
48:16
public school educators for the promotion
48:18
of un -American ideas within the
48:21
classroom in a way that
48:23
almost directly replicates the kinds of
48:25
laws that are emerging a
48:27
hundred years later. And so that
48:29
there's a long tradition, a
48:31
through line of these policies on
48:33
the right that use the
48:35
language of civic nationalism to entrench
48:37
or sustain ethno -nationalist views. In
48:39
fact, I'd say in the
48:41
north and the west, it's really
48:43
that becomes the dominant language
48:45
of white supremacy in the country.
48:49
The Communist Party USA was
48:51
formed in 1919 amid World
48:53
War I and in the
48:55
wake of the Bolshevik Revolution.
48:57
It was formed in part
48:59
by a split by the
49:01
radical anti -war left wing of
49:04
the Socialist Party USA. How
49:06
did the politics of the Communist
49:08
project relate to the American system
49:11
and the ideologies that upheld the
49:13
American system? throughout the 1920s and
49:15
then 30s, because on the one
49:17
hand, the CPUSA promoted
49:19
forms of internationalist solidarity that were
49:21
fundamentally incompatible with American nationalism
49:23
or nationalism of any sort. But
49:25
then by the mid 1930s
49:27
amid the New Deal, and we're
49:30
going to talk about the
49:32
New Deal a lot in a
49:34
few minutes, by
49:36
then the party line was
49:38
that, quote, Communism
49:40
is 20th century
49:42
Americanism. How did
49:44
the CPUSA approach the American
49:46
system and Americanism as it
49:48
was pushed and pulled by
49:51
by changing domestic political situations
49:53
alongside the external dictates of
49:55
the common turn? I
49:57
think it's actually valuable to
49:59
put the story of
50:01
the Communist Party in conversation
50:03
initially. with the
50:05
cleavages within the Socialist Party
50:07
from the years before World
50:09
War I in this way,
50:11
which is socialist party politicians,
50:13
especially the left wing or,
50:15
you know, folks outside of,
50:17
let's say, the right of
50:19
the party, committed to internationalism, so
50:22
are suspicious of the ways
50:24
in which national identities and
50:26
forms of patriotism actually break
50:29
down class. consciousness and class
50:31
solidarities that should broadly be
50:33
thought of as transcending the
50:35
national boundary. It's one
50:37
of the places the Socialist
50:39
Party forced strong commitments to
50:41
anti -racism. There's a reason
50:43
why you have people like
50:45
Hubert Harrison or A. Philip
50:47
Randolph that end up becoming
50:49
connected to the Socialist Party. But
50:52
at the same time, there's
50:54
this very specific kind of
50:56
development or tension, which is
50:58
the country is a majority
51:00
white society, and it's a majority
51:02
white settler society. And
51:05
there's always this issue about
51:07
how is it that you build
51:09
majority support in that context,
51:11
especially in a setting in which
51:13
you have the mass disenfranchisement of
51:15
black people, an intense violent suppression
51:17
of black people, as well as
51:19
real persistent traditions and cultures of
51:22
white supremacy, including, frankly, among some
51:24
of the leaders of the Socialist
51:26
Party. This
51:28
ends up producing kind of
51:30
real internal tensions where one of
51:33
the great failures of the
51:35
Socialist Party was that leadership increasingly
51:37
argued that, well, you kind
51:39
of have to meet white people
51:41
where they are. And
51:43
that requires, for instance, emphasizing
51:46
class in a way that
51:48
effectively de -emphasizes race or
51:50
just treats race as part
51:53
of a class story. and
51:55
it also means at
51:57
its worst, not pushing back.
51:59
against segregated practices among
52:02
socialists in the South, attempting
52:04
to tell the story, for
52:06
instance, of the authoritarianism of
52:08
the Constitution through an explicitly
52:10
class veil that doesn't emphasize
52:12
how slavery is not just
52:15
a system of feudal elite.
52:17
Slavery is a system that's
52:19
organized around a particular brand
52:21
of racial authoritarianism. This is
52:23
the argument that Hubert Harrison
52:25
is making that actually to
52:27
succeed in organizing a
52:29
working class, it must be
52:31
multiracial because the problem of
52:33
the proletariat in the U
52:35
.S. is one that necessarily
52:37
incorporates the particular conditions of
52:39
industrialized work on the farm
52:42
and the factory that black
52:44
people experience. And so
52:46
all of these are pre
52:48
-existing issues that American left activists
52:50
had faced. And I just
52:52
want to emphasize, socialist
52:54
congressmen, Victor Burger, he was a
52:56
straight -up racist. Yeah. So you
52:58
have people like Burger that
53:00
are, you know, straight -up committed
53:02
to versions of what amount to
53:04
biological racism. Then you have,
53:07
on the other hand, folks like
53:09
Debs. So Debs is
53:11
somebody that is absolutely committed to
53:13
racial equality. He's committed to
53:15
internationalism. But at the same
53:17
time, he's unable to
53:19
articulate the specificity of what today
53:21
we would call racial capitalism
53:23
within the terms of the American
53:25
capitalist order, that the US
53:27
capitalist system is not just like
53:29
any other kind of capitalist
53:32
entity that you'd see in Europe,
53:34
but is the product of
53:36
the dispossession of native peoples and
53:38
the enslavement of black peoples
53:40
to engage in coerced labor. And
53:42
it's that intersection that creates
53:44
very specific kinds of racial dynamics.
53:47
in the structure of American capitalist politics. Now
53:49
this is something that Hubert Harrison, who
53:51
had been a fellow traveler with
53:53
the Socialist Party, ends up becoming connected
53:55
to the Garveyites, is a significant
53:57
public order and voice out of Harlem
54:00
in the teens and twenties as
54:02
an internationalist. He's making these points, but
54:04
effectively they're kind of falling on
54:06
deaf ears within the party and the
54:08
party is unable to essentially
54:10
come to grips with the racial dynamics
54:12
of the society as a way of
54:14
building a genuinely transformative majority. And many
54:16
of these problems play out again with
54:18
the communists. They play out
54:20
in different ways because the
54:22
thing that the Communist Party
54:24
does initially, and this is
54:26
wonderful work, seminal classic work
54:29
by Robin Kelly, Hammer and
54:31
Ho, is that the
54:33
party unlike the socialists from
54:35
the years before World War
54:37
I is willing to essentially
54:39
mobilize a black base in
54:41
the south and to give
54:43
leadership authority over to black
54:45
Americans when it comes to
54:47
the issue of mobilization and
54:50
also pretty significant forms of
54:52
policy decision -making. And
54:54
it's the reason why for
54:56
periods in the 20s and
54:58
early 30s, Kelly highlights how
55:00
actually the Communist Party in
55:02
various ways vied with the
55:04
NAACP for dominance within black
55:06
politics, especially in the South.
55:08
And it's highlighted symbolically by
55:10
the willingness of the party,
55:12
for instance, to represent, you
55:14
know, folks that were falsely
55:16
accused of rape in the,
55:18
like the. tragic story of
55:20
the Scotsboro boys, but like
55:22
to actually go to the
55:24
hardest questions when it comes
55:26
to issues of civil rights.
55:28
It produces these really interesting
55:30
moments of kind of black
55:32
intellectual argument within the terms
55:34
of the Communist Party, and
55:37
here I think we can
55:39
think of somebody like Harry
55:41
Haywood, black communist that develops
55:43
some of the most interesting
55:45
versions of the black belt
55:47
thesis. So you
55:49
have a position coming
55:51
out of the Soviet
55:53
Union about treating various
55:56
ethno -national communities as worthy
55:58
of self -determination and
56:00
so pursuing a vision
56:02
of like independent Soviet
56:04
republics, for instance, for
56:07
Lithuania, you know, other
56:09
national communities. And
56:11
we can think a little bit about these
56:13
commitments in theory and in practice, of
56:15
course. But then, top down, making
56:17
this argument that this is the appropriate
56:19
way to think about the black position in
56:21
the US, that the black position is
56:23
anti -colonial just like all these others, so
56:26
a self -determination project. There
56:28
is a fair amount of
56:30
hesitance from white and black Communist
56:32
Party members in the US
56:34
to this idea because of the
56:36
sense that maybe if the
56:38
colonial analogy might make some sense,
56:40
it's not a perfect fit. But
56:43
nonetheless, these really striking black
56:45
developments of taking the colonial
56:47
analogy and then working through
56:50
its intricacies in an American
56:52
setting, where it's not quite
56:54
the case that black people
56:56
form a separate nation like
56:58
India vis -a -vis the British
57:00
Empire, but it is
57:02
the case that black
57:04
people experience a specific kind
57:07
of colonial relationship tied precisely
57:09
to what today we would
57:11
call settler colonialism, but that
57:13
links black, you know,
57:15
coerced labor to indigenous dispossession. What
57:18
somebody like Haywood starts to
57:20
argue is that the best way
57:22
to actually transform the conditions
57:24
of life in the South, this
57:27
is a kind of recovery
57:29
of that notion of jubilee from
57:31
black rural workers after the
57:33
Civil War. is to have meaningful
57:35
sovereignty over the land. But
57:38
you're only gonna get this
57:40
meaningful sovereignty over the land
57:42
if they're transformations to the
57:44
institutions of government. And so
57:46
he calls for a black
57:49
belt that spans Virginia to
57:51
Texas that breaks up the
57:53
unit of the state. He
57:55
sees the state as one
57:57
of like the central mechanisms
58:00
for entrenching forms of white supremacy. And
58:02
so he calls for a breakup of
58:04
the unit of the state. into
58:06
different political and administrative units
58:08
that ensure that you have
58:10
white, poor, and black Americans
58:13
that it can exercise meaningful
58:15
majority rule and through exercising
58:17
meaningful majority rule at the
58:19
state level can transform the
58:21
conditions of national politics and
58:23
produce the terms by which
58:25
you can have meaningful redistribution
58:27
and transformation of the land
58:29
base. These are
58:31
really interesting, creative, constitutional
58:33
ideas that are percolating from
58:36
black intellectuals at this time that
58:38
are never taught, by the way,
58:41
in contemporary debates, either about constitutional history
58:43
within the legal scholarship or about constitutional
58:45
interpretation, but in many ways are just
58:47
like more relevant for how we should
58:49
be thinking about things now. So
58:52
this is a kind of
58:54
really remarkable culture, but then,
58:56
of course, especially with the New
58:58
Deal, there's this big
59:00
issue that comes to the
59:02
fore, which is, How
59:04
do you ensure that this
59:06
party that has a black
59:09
base in the south as
59:11
well as working class immigrant
59:13
base in the north actually
59:15
can vie for kind of
59:17
national attention with the majority
59:19
of white citizens, especially a
59:21
majority of white citizens that
59:23
have been shaped culturally now
59:25
by the preceding 15 years
59:27
of Constitution Day events and
59:29
oratorical celebrations or competitions around
59:31
the text? And the
59:33
party itself is secretive. It's
59:36
top -down. It's taking
59:38
direction from Stalin effectively
59:40
in ways that I
59:42
think really compromise its
59:44
capacity to build local
59:46
grassroots. And one
59:48
of the kind of top -down
59:50
focuses is a shift in
59:53
orientation. And so you have a
59:55
de -emphasis on black leadership in
59:57
the South. This is the
59:59
stuff that Kelly has emphasized, but
1:00:01
really coming to my story
1:00:03
about the Constitution, Browder
1:00:05
and the leadership of the
1:00:07
Communist Party increasingly move
1:00:09
away from some of these
1:00:11
arguments about the need
1:00:13
for constitutional reform and sort
1:00:16
of explicit critique of
1:00:18
the Constitution to a claim
1:00:20
instead that communism is
1:00:22
20th century Americanism that's perfectly
1:00:24
consistent with various kinds
1:00:26
of patriotic politics and that
1:00:28
if anything, Everything
1:00:31
that you might want, this is
1:00:33
an even more radical version of
1:00:35
the claim that conservative socialists had
1:00:37
made in the teens. Everything that
1:00:39
you might want in terms of
1:00:41
getting to communism, you can get
1:00:43
through the Constitution. So, Browder is
1:00:45
going around giving speeches, stumping for,
1:00:47
in 36 and 37, stumping
1:00:50
for the Communist Party. by
1:00:52
arguing that not only is
1:00:54
communism 20th century Americanism he'll
1:00:56
pull out his own copy
1:00:58
of the Constitution as proof
1:01:00
of his dedication to American
1:01:02
identity, further reinforcing the notion
1:01:04
that you have to support
1:01:06
the Constitution to be an
1:01:08
American. And this
1:01:10
shift certainly pays some dividends in
1:01:12
the context of the popular
1:01:15
front culture of the New Deal,
1:01:17
but it also really undercuts
1:01:19
the capacity of the party to
1:01:21
continue to serve as a
1:01:23
mass mobilizing agent for black people
1:01:25
in the south. And so
1:01:27
it really undermines its grassroots connections,
1:01:29
and it's part of the
1:01:31
story of really the NAACP's definitive
1:01:33
victory over some of these
1:01:35
left formations in terms of shaping
1:01:37
the direction of black politics. And
1:01:40
I just want to pause here
1:01:42
to highlight the deep connection that
1:01:44
you're pointing out between domestic and
1:01:46
international politics, because this insistence that
1:01:49
these two things can be separated,
1:01:51
as we'll see throughout our discussions,
1:01:54
it's repeatedly core to a certain sort
1:01:56
of liberal capitalist political project throughout
1:01:58
the 20th century, and even very much
1:02:00
so today as we can see
1:02:02
with Gaza. And in this case, this
1:02:05
support for black liberation, particularly
1:02:07
in the South, it was fundamentally
1:02:09
related to the Communist Party's
1:02:11
internationalism and then it's their turn
1:02:13
towards Americanism and popular front
1:02:15
politics. That's what involves abandoning
1:02:17
a lot of that. And
1:02:19
then again, it's related to international
1:02:21
politics again on this other
1:02:24
level because it relates to this
1:02:26
very real problem of the
1:02:28
common turn in Stalin dictating CPUSA
1:02:30
politics. So I think
1:02:32
it's useful here just very quickly to note two
1:02:34
different things. So the first is precisely
1:02:37
because of the failures of
1:02:39
the Reconstruction Amendments, that the
1:02:41
kind of Douglas Cretal Constitution
1:02:43
vision that we now associate,
1:02:45
let's say, with somebody like
1:02:47
Obama is facing real pressure
1:02:49
and dissent within black politics.
1:02:51
And it creates space. across
1:02:53
the first two thirds of
1:02:55
the 20th century, and particularly
1:02:57
in the era that we're
1:02:59
describing, for the emergence
1:03:01
of all of these internationalist
1:03:03
black formations that say, well, maybe
1:03:05
the best way to think
1:03:07
about the black experience is through
1:03:09
an analogy with colonialism, but
1:03:11
one that is tailored to
1:03:14
the particularities. of the black
1:03:16
experience in the U .S. and
1:03:18
yet at the same time finds solidarities
1:03:20
and common cause with a broader world
1:03:23
of what later would be called like
1:03:25
the third world, a broader world of
1:03:27
color in the language of somebody like
1:03:29
Hubert Harrison. So that's there as a
1:03:31
strain. And in the
1:03:33
20s, And in the 30s, it's
1:03:35
also connected in various ways to
1:03:37
the politics that's emerging out of
1:03:39
communist formations in the Soviet Union
1:03:41
because of how the Soviet Union
1:03:44
is linked to various types of
1:03:46
anti -imperialist efforts. But
1:03:48
the problem here, and this is something that
1:03:50
needs to be stated, given the fact that
1:03:52
we're going to spend a lot of time
1:03:54
and we have spent a lot of time
1:03:56
talking about American empire, is that the Soviet
1:03:58
Union is not only a deeply oppressive extreme
1:04:01
brand of authoritarianism domestically
1:04:03
under Stalin, but as
1:04:05
it's engaged in its own forms of imperial
1:04:07
power and rivalry, and is
1:04:09
incredibly sort of instrumental and
1:04:11
strategic about these kinds of connections,
1:04:14
and so helps facilitate the
1:04:16
development of institutions that can
1:04:19
express forms of internationalism and then
1:04:21
is willing effectively at the
1:04:23
drop of a hat because of
1:04:25
shifts in judgments in Moscow
1:04:27
to essentially abandon left -wing activists
1:04:29
on the ground in ways that
1:04:32
produce time and again real
1:04:34
forms of despondency and disillusionment. The
1:04:36
politics of imperial rivalry plays
1:04:39
out in both directions vis -a -vis
1:04:41
the US and its own
1:04:43
actions and also the Soviet Union.
1:04:47
Let's get into the
1:04:49
new deal because the
1:04:51
conflicts of this period
1:04:53
and how they were
1:04:56
settled simultaneously modified the
1:04:58
American constitutional system while
1:05:00
also demobilizing and marginalizing
1:05:02
its critics. As we
1:05:04
discussed in the first episode,
1:05:06
the Supreme Court in the late
1:05:08
19th century began aggressively striking
1:05:10
down laws that protected labor and
1:05:12
regulated capital. And this
1:05:14
judicial intervention of the
1:05:16
High Court brazenly doing the
1:05:18
bidding of the ruling
1:05:20
class. It reached a crisis
1:05:23
point in FDR's first
1:05:25
term when in 1935 and
1:05:27
1936 the Supreme Court
1:05:29
struck down major New Deal
1:05:31
reforms and it seemed
1:05:33
poised to strike down the
1:05:36
Social Security Act and
1:05:38
the Wagner Act. Signature New
1:05:40
Deal laws that respectively
1:05:42
created universal retirement insurance and
1:05:44
formalized protections and processes.
1:05:46
for organized labor. In
1:05:48
response, there was a major
1:05:51
push from the left, including from
1:05:53
organized labor against the power
1:05:55
of a high court that famed
1:05:57
garment workers union president, Sydney
1:05:59
Hillman called a quote, judicial
1:06:01
dictatorship. Before
1:06:03
we get to how this
1:06:05
conflict was famously resolved, let's let's
1:06:07
cover how it developed. First,
1:06:09
what was the Supreme Court strategy
1:06:12
in taking such an
1:06:14
aggressively obstructive approach to FDR's
1:06:16
presidency. And then
1:06:18
how did the various factions
1:06:20
of the broad New Deal
1:06:22
coalition propose responding to that
1:06:24
challenge from FDR himself to
1:06:26
the labor movement to various
1:06:29
left -wing organizations? So,
1:06:31
I mean, I think the first thing
1:06:33
to note about the court is, and this
1:06:35
is, they'll obviously be connections to the
1:06:37
present, but the court
1:06:39
was composed of individuals. that
1:06:41
served for life that were
1:06:43
nominated by presidents confirmed by
1:06:45
the Senate, you know,
1:06:47
from effectively an earlier
1:06:50
historical moment. And so real
1:06:52
embodiments in various ways
1:06:54
of a type of business
1:06:56
state. agreement around a
1:06:58
brand of politics that emphasized
1:07:00
the strengths of the
1:07:02
capitalist state. The court
1:07:04
itself had divisions. So
1:07:06
there were four justices that were
1:07:08
collectively called by the New Deal
1:07:10
reformers, the four horsemen of the
1:07:12
apocalypse. So these are the conservative
1:07:14
diehards. And then you
1:07:16
had three justices that constituted the kind
1:07:18
of liberal wing of the court.
1:07:20
what today we would call the liberal
1:07:23
wing but really like the progressive
1:07:25
wing of the court and then you
1:07:27
had two justices in the middle
1:07:29
that were more or less swing justices.
1:07:31
So one is Charles Evans Hughes
1:07:33
who had been the Republican nominee for
1:07:35
president in 1916 as the chief
1:07:37
justice of the court is associated with
1:07:39
a kind of mild brand of
1:07:42
progressivism and then there's another justice named
1:07:44
Owen Roberts. And in
1:07:46
this setting it essentially
1:07:48
meant that especially through the
1:07:50
first term of the
1:07:52
New Deal administration, you more
1:07:54
or less had five
1:07:56
justices that were willing to
1:07:58
strike down various kinds
1:08:00
of regulatory measures passed by
1:08:02
Congress or even state
1:08:04
laws that dealt with providing
1:08:06
relief and need. to
1:08:08
citizens or various types of
1:08:10
labor protections as inconsistent with the
1:08:13
kind of business frame of
1:08:15
the Constitution most famously as inconsistent
1:08:17
with what the court in
1:08:19
1905 in a case called Lochner
1:08:21
had called businesses sort of
1:08:23
fundamental right to contracts. There's like
1:08:25
freedom of contract that's supposed
1:08:27
to be written into the Constitution
1:08:29
that limits the capacity of
1:08:31
any state actor to pass various
1:08:33
types of laws that would
1:08:35
infringe on contracting prerogatives. Now,
1:08:39
that is taking place against
1:08:41
a very particular social backdrop,
1:08:43
which is the Great Depression
1:08:45
and the largest capitalist crisis
1:08:47
in world history. And
1:08:49
it means that there's just
1:08:51
a huge amount of political
1:08:53
organizing that's occurring outside the
1:08:55
institutions of government and certainly
1:08:58
outside the court. It's
1:09:00
also the fact that you've now
1:09:02
had really a half century of
1:09:04
labor organizing. So powerful intermediate
1:09:06
institutions that are mobilizing and incorporating
1:09:08
white male workers within a
1:09:10
politics that's committed to fairly
1:09:13
significant changes to the nature of
1:09:15
the economic system. That's just
1:09:17
like part of the culture of
1:09:19
the society. And it's one
1:09:21
of these things that's sometimes
1:09:23
worth noting, which is sometimes, just
1:09:26
as in terms of effective
1:09:28
power, within society you
1:09:30
can have incredibly strong labor movements.
1:09:32
even under context of incredibly
1:09:34
repressive legal frameworks. And by contrast,
1:09:36
you might have legal frameworks
1:09:38
that seem more supportive, but if
1:09:40
you've had a business culture
1:09:42
that systematically dismantled the union, this
1:09:44
is a way of perhaps
1:09:46
telling part of the story of
1:09:48
the last half century, then
1:09:50
you don't have these sort of
1:09:52
intermediate institutions that can mobilize
1:09:54
people within an oppositional culture. So
1:09:56
all of that exists. And
1:09:59
what it means is that anti
1:10:02
-constitution sentiment, arguments that
1:10:04
the court needs to be
1:10:06
fundamentally reformed. The amendment
1:10:08
process should be simplified. Socioeconomic
1:10:11
rights and workers' rights and farmers' rights
1:10:13
need to be incorporated into the text.
1:10:15
The country needs to move toward something
1:10:17
that looks much more like, you know,
1:10:20
proportional representation in parliamentary democracy.
1:10:22
All of these things come
1:10:24
back to the fore in
1:10:26
the first term. of
1:10:28
FDR's presidency. And you
1:10:30
also have folks that were connected
1:10:32
to the old progressives that
1:10:34
are making arguments about the need
1:10:36
for changes to the constitutional
1:10:39
system, maybe alterations to even powers
1:10:41
of judicial review. You have
1:10:43
people that are tied in various
1:10:45
ways to the Communist Party,
1:10:47
like Vito Marcantonio, the great congressman
1:10:49
out of New York that's
1:10:51
proposing a constitutional convention in the
1:10:54
mid -1930s. And the 36...
1:10:56
election ends up, and this is
1:10:58
stuff that a lot of different constitutional
1:11:00
scholars have done work on, becomes
1:11:02
in many ways a referenda
1:11:05
not just on the court
1:11:07
but on this constitutional system
1:11:09
as a whole and whether
1:11:11
or not ultimately there needs
1:11:13
to be fairly profound changes.
1:11:17
And FDR wins in a
1:11:19
landslide really that the country
1:11:21
had not seen since Monroe Monroe
1:11:24
basically runs unopposed in 1820. He
1:11:26
gets over 60 % of the
1:11:28
vote in the House and the
1:11:30
Senate. He has the backing, including
1:11:32
aligned independents and Republicans of what
1:11:34
amounts to three quarters or even
1:11:37
80 % of the House and Senate.
1:11:39
And so this is a reelection.
1:11:42
that is a genuine transformative
1:11:44
political mandate that's marked by the
1:11:46
fact that in a way
1:11:48
that is truly historically unusual in
1:11:50
the U .S., before and after,
1:11:52
you have large, rolling supermajorities
1:11:54
organized through working -class institutions that
1:11:56
are backing New Deal policies and
1:11:58
change. Something that's quite different,
1:12:00
by the way, than thinking about,
1:12:02
like, you know, Trump getting
1:12:04
not 50 % of the vote
1:12:06
in this last election. We'll
1:12:08
perhaps get to that later. And
1:12:11
one of the things that FDR
1:12:13
proposes is court packing as an
1:12:15
initial mechanism for overcoming the potential
1:12:17
threat posed by the court because
1:12:19
there are these big cases that
1:12:21
are on the horizon and the
1:12:23
biggest one has to do with
1:12:25
the constitutionality of the National Labor
1:12:27
Relations Act and whether or not
1:12:29
collective bargaining is going to be
1:12:31
held to be unconstitutional by the
1:12:33
court, which is the general expectation.
1:12:39
proposing a reorganization of the federal
1:12:41
courts that would add a
1:12:43
new justice to the court for
1:12:45
everybody that is over the
1:12:47
age of 70. And since that's
1:12:49
all four of the conservatives
1:12:51
and two other justices, that would
1:12:53
basically mean six new justices
1:12:55
up to 15. There's
1:12:57
an interesting internal debate
1:13:00
that's taking place within,
1:13:02
broadly speaking, the
1:13:04
kind of New Deal intellectual infrastructure. Folks
1:13:08
that are New Deal aligned, New
1:13:10
Deal lawyers as well as in labor
1:13:12
and civil rights groups, they
1:13:14
tend pretty much across the board,
1:13:16
these factions. There are some other people
1:13:18
within the New Deal alliance that
1:13:20
are wary of court packing and the
1:13:23
kind of assertions of presidential power
1:13:25
that it might entail. But
1:13:27
let's say labor civil
1:13:29
rights groups and New Deal
1:13:31
lawyers, FDRs lawyers, they
1:13:33
all support court packing. They
1:13:36
think that, you know, that you're going
1:13:38
to have to change who's on the court
1:13:40
in order to ensure that decisions are
1:13:42
actually consistent with what the mass of public
1:13:44
wants. They see it as a kind
1:13:46
of democratization effort and that this is a
1:13:49
moment to ensure that working class interests
1:13:51
are able to overcome all of these anti
1:13:53
-democratic roadblocks that have basically de -emphasized and
1:13:55
undermined the power of the vote. But
1:13:58
there's a disagreement. between
1:14:01
some of the folks that are part
1:14:03
of the intellectual sort of infrastructure of the
1:14:05
New Deal. So some lawyers,
1:14:07
even somebody like Charles Beard, and
1:14:10
then some people like, you
1:14:12
know, socialists for instance. So
1:14:14
somebody like Norman Thomas. Over
1:14:16
whether or not court
1:14:18
packing at the end of
1:14:20
the day needs to
1:14:22
be connected to formal constitutional
1:14:24
changes to the representative
1:14:27
institutions. So the argument
1:14:29
that somebody like Du Bois
1:14:31
or Norman Thomas make is
1:14:33
that, yes, court packing now, but
1:14:36
it has to be tied
1:14:38
more programmatically to a set
1:14:40
of amendments that would essentially
1:14:42
make the infrastructure more consistent
1:14:44
with democratic practice. For Du
1:14:46
Bois, he's taking really seriously
1:14:48
these ideas about the state.
1:14:50
He views the centrality of
1:14:52
the state. as the
1:14:54
basic unit of representation as something that
1:14:56
will necessarily replicate Jim Crow politics,
1:14:58
especially given the fact that black people
1:15:01
are denied the vote in the
1:15:03
south and that the south will be
1:15:05
able to maintain a kind of
1:15:07
bastion of racial and economic rule for
1:15:09
a particular kind of, you know, planter
1:15:12
class still effectively. And so he
1:15:14
thinks that you have to confront what
1:15:16
he calls the taboo of the
1:15:18
state in order to be able to
1:15:21
ensure that you're able to
1:15:24
eliminate this sort of white
1:15:26
authoritarian roadblock. For Norman Thomas,
1:15:28
he thinks that there needs
1:15:30
to be broad changes to
1:15:32
the constitutional order. The socialists
1:15:35
are still calling for things
1:15:37
like a simplified constitutional amendment,
1:15:39
a workers' rights amendment that
1:15:41
specifies particular types of socioeconomic
1:15:43
guarantees. and changes, formal
1:15:46
changes to the judiciary, but
1:15:48
that are organized through amendment
1:15:50
that are not just about adding
1:15:52
judges, but altering, for
1:15:54
instance, the power the
1:15:57
judges have, so containing judicial
1:15:59
review by providing perhaps
1:16:01
legislative overrides, producing term limits
1:16:03
for the court, so
1:16:05
general package of structural changes.
1:16:08
On the other side, you
1:16:10
have new dealers that
1:16:13
say, well, you know, Americans are
1:16:15
kind of increasingly attached to this
1:16:17
text, especially as it's exited this
1:16:19
sort of venerative period of the
1:16:21
teens and twenties. And rather than
1:16:23
sort of worrying about changing it
1:16:25
formally and sort of confronting these
1:16:28
debates about whether or not that's
1:16:30
un -American, because you have
1:16:32
so much mass support, you
1:16:34
can play on the informal
1:16:37
tools that are available. Like
1:16:39
the president and the courts,
1:16:41
if the courts or differently
1:16:43
organized, they can just produce
1:16:45
political outcomes that are consistent
1:16:48
with popular need. And
1:16:50
for Beard, this is the
1:16:52
genesis of ideas of the constitution
1:16:54
should be thought of as a
1:16:56
living constitution. Yes, the Framers document
1:16:58
was undemocratic, but this document, without
1:17:00
being formally rewritten, is so open -ended
1:17:03
that you can basically implement
1:17:05
the changes that you might want.
1:17:07
FDR's court packing proposal is Always
1:17:09
presented retrospectively as one of
1:17:11
the most radical things he
1:17:13
did, but it's actually a
1:17:15
workaround from actually substantively overhauling the
1:17:18
Constitution or it has this
1:17:20
ambiguity it has this really
1:17:22
profound ambiguity because on the
1:17:24
one hand Absolutely, it could have
1:17:26
been quite radical if implemented.
1:17:28
So as it turns out,
1:17:30
we'll tell the story of
1:17:32
why we don't end up getting
1:17:34
court packing. But you could
1:17:36
imagine an alternative world in
1:17:39
which if the court is
1:17:41
expanded to 15, and
1:17:43
then perhaps legislatively there's also the implementation
1:17:45
of various kinds of structural changes
1:17:47
to the nature of the federal judiciary,
1:17:50
that that could have produced a very
1:17:52
different kind of constitutional order going forward.
1:17:54
It's the reason why you have communist,
1:17:56
socialist, labor, civil rights support
1:17:58
for the policy. But on
1:18:00
the other hand, this is
1:18:02
the point that Norman Thomas
1:18:04
makes. So Norman Thomas says,
1:18:06
it's a strange thing to
1:18:08
actually even have labor activists
1:18:10
so excited about court packing
1:18:12
because that alone will just
1:18:14
mean rule by 15 judges
1:18:16
rather than nine. And
1:18:19
in a way, that's more
1:18:21
the mindset of FDR, which
1:18:23
is FDR is wary of
1:18:25
going down the constitutional amendment
1:18:27
path because he sees it
1:18:29
as even if there's support,
1:18:32
a lot of opportunity for business
1:18:34
elites, conservatives to muck up
1:18:36
the process and make it hard
1:18:38
to implement the changes. And
1:18:40
we can think even about the
1:18:42
difficulties of new constitutions in
1:18:44
places like Chile. So this is
1:18:46
a real concern. He's worried
1:18:48
primarily about economic royalists. But
1:18:50
at the same time, He's
1:18:52
worried about opening the system to something that
1:18:54
might look like genuine social revolution. If you
1:18:56
go down the path of saying we wanna
1:18:58
break up the states, alter the
1:19:01
administrative, the basic administrative and representative units
1:19:03
of the government, if you wanna
1:19:05
simplify the amendment process. And
1:19:07
he much prefers
1:19:09
holding firm to a
1:19:11
story of American
1:19:13
renewal and restoration through
1:19:15
constitutional rededication. So
1:19:17
he gives speeches. for
1:19:20
instance, on Constitution Day about the
1:19:22
way in which he's just trying
1:19:24
to think of the Constitution as
1:19:26
a document that now can be
1:19:28
made living and available effectively to
1:19:30
all. But at the same time,
1:19:33
what this does is it puts
1:19:35
the power in the office of
1:19:37
the president in FDR's hands to
1:19:39
balance what he sees as these
1:19:41
socially revolutionary forces and these economically
1:19:43
royalist forces. And
1:19:46
I think the choice, maybe we
1:19:48
can get into this, Ultimately,
1:19:51
to pursue court packing which
1:19:53
fails and then close the
1:19:56
door on these more structural
1:19:58
reform changes really does have
1:20:00
profound and lasting effects that
1:20:02
we're dealing with to this
1:20:04
day. It's probably the last
1:20:06
historical moment where it would
1:20:08
have been possible to imagine
1:20:10
a large -scale renewal of the
1:20:13
basic institutions of governance. Let's
1:20:15
get into that. Now this
1:20:17
is this famous moment in American
1:20:19
history known as the switch
1:20:22
in time that saved nine FDR
1:20:24
threatened to pack the court
1:20:26
a huge political fight ensued the
1:20:28
court ultimately responded by upholding
1:20:30
major New Deal legislation Essentially capitulating
1:20:32
to the president allowing him
1:20:35
to pull back on the court
1:20:37
packing proposal and so the
1:20:39
Supreme Court adapted and it what
1:20:41
it adapted to was a
1:20:43
government that like Woodrow
1:20:45
Wilson's in some ways, though
1:20:47
with very different politics, that
1:20:50
was using an expanded administrative
1:20:52
state and expanded presidential power
1:20:54
to work around the textual
1:20:56
rigidity of the Constitution. And
1:21:00
so this arrangement did save
1:21:02
core New Deal measures from the
1:21:04
court. But as
1:21:06
you just said, the
1:21:08
settlement had major
1:21:10
implications, particularly insulating the
1:21:12
constitutional order from
1:21:14
more radical threats. All
1:21:16
of this, you
1:21:18
write, wrapped up
1:21:20
with a stabilization of the
1:21:23
American system that did so
1:21:25
many things that pushed the
1:21:27
labor movement rightward alongside this
1:21:29
increasingly patriotic, suburbanized white working
1:21:31
class that undermined labor's ability
1:21:33
to organize the South. All
1:21:35
key factors in so much
1:21:37
of what has gone wrong
1:21:39
in this country ever since. Why
1:21:42
did this provisional settlement
1:21:45
of the constitutional crisis have
1:21:47
such important long -lasting impacts?
1:21:50
So the chapter on the
1:21:52
New Deal using a phrase
1:21:54
that's sort of been made
1:21:56
famous in legal scholarship by
1:21:58
Riva Siegel refers to this
1:22:00
as an era marked by
1:22:02
transformation and preservation. And I
1:22:04
think it's really worth highlighting
1:22:07
both that what the court
1:22:09
packing episode absolutely kicks off
1:22:11
is a profound transformation in
1:22:13
the constitutional system, one that
1:22:15
we sometimes don't end up appreciating in the
1:22:17
U .S. because there's this idea that, well, we've
1:22:19
had the same text in 1787. But
1:22:22
in truth, our constitutional
1:22:24
order and those elements of
1:22:26
the Cretal constitutional order that
1:22:28
I described in the last
1:22:30
episode are really like their
1:22:32
genuine like institutional genesis point
1:22:35
are these battles and debates
1:22:37
in the 30s. And they're
1:22:39
consolidated over the course of
1:22:41
these three really decisive decades
1:22:43
between the 30s and the
1:22:45
60s. And so it's absolutely
1:22:47
transformative. But at the
1:22:49
same time, it's preservationist in
1:22:52
sort of maintaining some of the
1:22:54
really constitutive flaws that it
1:22:56
existed from the beginning in the
1:22:58
democratic arrangements. And it's maybe
1:23:00
worth just like going through both
1:23:02
elements of it. So what
1:23:04
happens after the election, which is
1:23:07
this historic landslide election? Owen
1:23:09
Roberts, who's one of these
1:23:11
swing justices in the middle, he
1:23:13
decides at that moment in
1:23:15
December, it seems, that you
1:23:17
know what, the public has spoken, this
1:23:20
was an election on these kinds of constitutional
1:23:22
questions, and that he's going to switch. He's
1:23:24
going to end up flipping. So
1:23:26
it's not quite the case that
1:23:28
he flips because of court packing, because
1:23:30
court packing is only really introduced.
1:23:32
later, but it's nonetheless the
1:23:35
case that the context, the
1:23:37
political context ends up shaping where
1:23:39
he's coming from. And
1:23:41
then there are these two cases.
1:23:43
There's a case in March that
1:23:45
comes out that has to do
1:23:47
with basically labor legislation that just
1:23:49
impacts women out of the state
1:23:52
of Washington. And here you
1:23:54
now have five justices in an opinion
1:23:56
written by the Chief Justice. cues
1:23:59
that rejects Lochner says that there
1:24:01
is no constitutional basis for the
1:24:03
idea of freedom of contract and
1:24:05
that you cannot strike down such
1:24:07
labor legislation and Roberts is the
1:24:09
justice that flips and so that's
1:24:11
thought of as the switch in
1:24:14
time that saves nine but really
1:24:16
the energy around court packing and
1:24:18
court reform hasn't abated yet because
1:24:20
the big case is the one
1:24:22
that's going to be decided in
1:24:24
April. And that has to do
1:24:26
with the constitutionality of the Wagner
1:24:29
Act, collective bargaining, the National Labor
1:24:31
Relations Act. And then the
1:24:33
court, similar, 5 .4,
1:24:35
Roberts flipping, upholds
1:24:37
the constitutionality of the Wagner Act.
1:24:39
And that actually produces mass celebrations
1:24:41
within labor circles, including in Eloquipa,
1:24:43
which is the headquarters of the
1:24:46
company that's contesting the constitutionality of
1:24:48
the National Labor Relations Act in
1:24:50
that particular case. And
1:24:52
it's that moment where the
1:24:54
Wagner Act has been constitutionalized
1:24:56
that starts to dissipate the
1:24:58
kind of mass energy around
1:25:00
whether or not in point
1:25:02
of fact you actually need
1:25:04
really broad range formal structural
1:25:06
reforms to the institutions of
1:25:09
the courts and by extension
1:25:11
to the constitutional system at
1:25:13
large. And then there's another
1:25:15
moment that's key. which is
1:25:17
one of the four horsemen
1:25:19
of the apocalypse, Willis
1:25:21
van de Venter, decides to retire in
1:25:23
May. And when he decides to
1:25:25
retire, that means that FDR is going to be
1:25:27
able to nominate a new justice to the
1:25:29
court and that the composition of the court is
1:25:31
going to fundamentally change. And that's really the
1:25:34
story through the 30s and 40s. By the time
1:25:36
FDR leaves office, he's basically been able to
1:25:38
do transformative appointments to reconstruct who's on the court.
1:25:41
And this basically establishes a
1:25:43
pattern for how constitutional
1:25:45
change takes place in the
1:25:47
20th century in the
1:25:49
US, which is you have
1:25:51
elections. You get
1:25:53
presidents elected. Those presidents
1:25:55
then nominate justices to the
1:25:57
court that are consistent with their
1:25:59
own ideological vision. The idea
1:26:01
is that these elections are majoritarian
1:26:03
so that the kind of
1:26:05
counter -majoritarian features of the state
1:26:07
won't necessarily intrude on the ability
1:26:10
of the elections to transform
1:26:12
the composition of the courts. And
1:26:14
then Presidents are able to pass,
1:26:16
ideally, landmark pieces of legislation. So in
1:26:18
the 30s, things like the Social
1:26:20
Security Act or Wagner Act, later on
1:26:23
we'll see things like Medicare, the
1:26:25
Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act.
1:26:28
And then these landmark pieces of legislation
1:26:30
become cornerstones of the constitutional system,
1:26:32
even if they're not written into the
1:26:34
text, through their democratic
1:26:36
authorization and then through interpretation
1:26:38
from the courts that upholds
1:26:40
them. So it's a new
1:26:42
framework or model for what
1:26:44
amounts to informal changes to
1:26:46
the Constitution without textual changes
1:26:49
because of a hesitance of
1:26:51
FDR to pursue textual changes.
1:26:53
And then after the FDR
1:26:55
moment, a kind of difficulty
1:26:57
of mobilizing the types of
1:26:59
super majorities that would be
1:27:02
necessary to actually pass through
1:27:04
amendments becomes basically a kind
1:27:06
of dead letter. Now
1:27:08
this, it should be stated, produces
1:27:11
a dramatic change in the constitutional
1:27:13
system. This is the period where we're
1:27:15
starting to see entrenched, not
1:27:17
just a commitment to
1:27:19
capitalism and market capitalism, but
1:27:21
regulated by an administrative
1:27:24
state in a limited but
1:27:26
meaningful social welfare framework. And
1:27:28
so it's the emergence of
1:27:30
the administrative state, the emergence
1:27:32
too of an administrative state.
1:27:34
That's meant to be kind
1:27:36
of independent from just presidential
1:27:38
say so and so has
1:27:40
agency authority that's been Authorized
1:27:42
by Congress but that produces
1:27:44
its own internal insulation dynamics
1:27:46
of expertise that are supposed
1:27:48
to avoid absolute extreme forms
1:27:50
of political pressure and intervention
1:27:52
and I should note That
1:27:55
on the one hand if
1:27:57
you're just thinking about this
1:27:59
in the mid 30s 37
1:28:01
38 bills like the Fair
1:28:03
Labor Standards Act, that
1:28:05
there's a way in which
1:28:07
this is a story of extending
1:28:09
and entrenching the presidential workaround
1:28:11
that we've started to see with
1:28:14
Wilson and even before Wilson,
1:28:16
Teddy Roosevelt, so that the system
1:28:18
itself is misshapen. But
1:28:20
maybe presidentialism can produce
1:28:22
a kind of democratic authorization
1:28:24
and generate the type
1:28:26
of administrative state that can
1:28:28
solve social problems. And
1:28:31
so in that way, it's an
1:28:33
extension of that vision, and we can
1:28:35
think about the problems of it,
1:28:37
especially in national security domains. We've already
1:28:39
started to see this with the
1:28:41
crackdowns with World War I. It's going
1:28:43
to intensify as the country becomes
1:28:46
a genuinely global hegemon. But
1:28:48
on the other hand, it's also
1:28:50
worth highlighting. This
1:28:52
is work that Kate Andrews, as
1:28:54
well as Willie Forbath and Joey
1:28:56
Fish can have done, that there
1:28:58
was an effort to think about
1:29:00
if you're going to adapt an
1:29:02
administrative state onto this constitutional order
1:29:05
and you're not going to change
1:29:07
the institutions of representation, can you
1:29:09
make that administrative state democratic? Can
1:29:12
it be not just marked by insulated
1:29:14
expertise? And one of the thoughts here,
1:29:16
and you start to see this in
1:29:18
bills like the Fair Labor Standards Act,
1:29:21
is creating tripartite
1:29:23
arrangements that are
1:29:25
corporatist, but where it's
1:29:27
government, business, and labor
1:29:29
that are given the authority
1:29:31
to actually make decisions
1:29:33
about how to regulate the
1:29:35
economy. So how do
1:29:37
you incorporate labor effectively as
1:29:40
a decision maker that
1:29:42
can participate in the organization
1:29:44
of what had typically
1:29:46
been managerial prerogatives and so
1:29:48
have an administrative state
1:29:50
that is organized in ways
1:29:52
to not just produce,
1:29:54
you know, insulated expertise but
1:29:56
to combine social science
1:29:58
expertise with various types of
1:30:00
entrenchments, authorized entrenchments for
1:30:02
the intermediate institutions of civil
1:30:05
society. Now
1:30:07
the problem, and this
1:30:09
is the ultimate story
1:30:11
of preservation, is
1:30:13
really like the problem that
1:30:16
Harry Haywood and that Du
1:30:18
Bois is articulating. Du Bois
1:30:20
has two books on the
1:30:22
Constitution, Black Reconstruction
1:30:24
and then later on Color
1:30:27
and Democracy in 45,
1:30:29
Black Reconstruction is 35. These
1:30:31
to me are masterworks
1:30:34
of constitutional theory and argument
1:30:36
and yet are rarely,
1:30:38
even if they're taught, increasingly
1:30:40
in other domains are
1:30:42
rarely taught by constitutional scholars
1:30:44
as about constitutional life.
1:30:47
It's another way in which
1:30:49
all of these very
1:30:51
interesting figures of constitutional thought
1:30:53
from Crystal Eastman to
1:30:55
Du Bois basically get written
1:30:57
out of the conventional
1:30:59
story. But the
1:31:01
argument that Du Bois is
1:31:04
basically making is that
1:31:06
unless FDR faces up, not
1:31:08
just to the Jim Crow
1:31:10
politics of the South, but the
1:31:12
institutions of representation that sustain
1:31:14
it, that this vision of democratizing
1:31:16
the administrative state is itself
1:31:18
going to break down. Now,
1:31:21
FDR and those around
1:31:23
him understand that Jim Crow
1:31:25
politics and black disenfranchisement
1:31:27
is a huge problem for
1:31:29
the New Deal agenda.
1:31:32
He tries to run against
1:31:34
white reactionaries, southern reactionaries
1:31:36
in 38. But
1:31:38
at the same time, FDR
1:31:40
is very hesitant to
1:31:43
explicitly tie the question of
1:31:45
Jim Crow and segregation
1:31:47
to the politics of economic
1:31:49
dispossession that marks the
1:31:52
New Deal period. He
1:31:54
tries to keep these two
1:31:56
issues as separate. He's not
1:31:58
pressing in these elections, these
1:32:00
midterm elections, the question of
1:32:02
race in the context of
1:32:04
the confrontation with southern racial
1:32:06
reactionaries. And
1:32:08
all of that means that there's
1:32:10
this dynamic that ends up being read
1:32:12
into the New Deal order. And
1:32:14
this is our cats Nelson of the
1:32:16
people's work. Namely the
1:32:18
fact that there's this carve
1:32:21
out that ends up being
1:32:23
implemented where you have social
1:32:25
programs. But at the
1:32:27
same time, these labor protections
1:32:29
oftentimes carve out. The
1:32:31
you know basic protections for
1:32:33
farm workers for workers that are
1:32:35
gonna be overwhelmingly black within
1:32:37
the context of the southern economy
1:32:39
domestic workers domestic workers and
1:32:41
Du Bois is saying the reason
1:32:43
why you have to do
1:32:45
these carve -outs the reason why
1:32:47
Southern white reactionaries are gonna start
1:32:49
compromising undermining the New Deal
1:32:51
project is because of the system
1:32:53
of representation As long
1:32:56
as you have state -based representation
1:32:58
that dramatically overrepresents the power
1:33:00
of these figures at the
1:33:02
national level, and then on
1:33:04
top of it, you know,
1:33:06
you have a situation where
1:33:08
black people are disenfranchised within
1:33:10
those states, so it's like
1:33:12
a double overrepresentation, then effectively,
1:33:15
the entire national agenda is
1:33:17
going to be held You
1:33:20
know, it's essentially going to be
1:33:22
held hostage to the goals and
1:33:24
objectives of Jim Crow politicians. And
1:33:26
that's precisely what happens, which is
1:33:28
that you have Jim Crow politicians
1:33:30
in the South that start taking
1:33:32
apart even those tripartite arrangements within
1:33:34
the administrative state. A lot of
1:33:36
that stuff really falls out by
1:33:38
the time we get to the
1:33:40
1940s. The thing that
1:33:42
remains about the administrative apparatus is
1:33:45
in a way like the assertion.
1:33:47
of presidential power and insulated expert
1:33:49
management divorced from this vision of
1:33:51
attempting to democratize the administrative state
1:33:53
as a way of addressing some
1:33:55
of the underlying sort of anti -democratic
1:33:57
features of the American system. And
1:34:00
then the perpetuation of
1:34:02
racial carve -outs that effectively
1:34:04
compromise both the extent of
1:34:07
the New Deal agenda,
1:34:09
but then the difficulty of
1:34:11
being able to organize
1:34:13
multiracially. across the South and
1:34:15
across the country to
1:34:18
confront shared class experiences. And
1:34:20
so, in a way,
1:34:23
what the ultimate story ends
1:34:25
up being is one
1:34:27
of really profound transformation that
1:34:29
should not be undersold,
1:34:31
but against a backdrop in
1:34:33
which the failure to
1:34:35
take advantage in various ways
1:34:38
of the mid -30s as
1:34:40
this potentially socially revolutionary
1:34:42
moment, including affecting the institutions
1:34:44
of governance, the structure
1:34:46
of the courts, the nature
1:34:48
of representation, produce an
1:34:50
outcome that sort of freezes
1:34:53
these persistent problems, these
1:34:55
constitutive flaws into the constitutional
1:34:57
order going forward. If
1:34:59
FDR holding back in the
1:35:01
mid -1930s is in retrospect
1:35:03
a bit of a tragedy, Obama
1:35:06
not just holding back but
1:35:08
doing almost nothing in the
1:35:10
wake of 2008 is just
1:35:13
farcical. If anything, this
1:35:15
is one place to, in a
1:35:17
way, be appreciative of the particular kinds
1:35:19
of choices that FDR is facing.
1:35:21
FDR, nonetheless, is engaged
1:35:23
in pretty profound forms of norm breaking by saying,
1:35:25
hey, we're going to push for, I mean,
1:35:27
he's absolutely committed to court packing. And
1:35:30
it tells you something, which
1:35:32
is even FDR, if we're
1:35:34
telling the story, is preservation
1:35:36
and transformation. absolutely understands that
1:35:38
given the inflexibility of American
1:35:40
institutions, the way that you've
1:35:42
gotten democratic renewal in the
1:35:44
U .S. is oftentimes, as
1:35:46
Corey Robin would say, precisely
1:35:49
through norm erosion. And
1:35:51
so, you know, having this
1:35:53
kind of inflexible approach to maintaining
1:35:55
the strictures of a past
1:35:57
compact, both culturally as well as
1:35:59
institutionally, has historically been
1:36:01
a pathway effectively to fail to
1:36:03
address the problems of the
1:36:05
times. And I think one way
1:36:08
to read Obama post -2008 is
1:36:10
Obama's very much a politician
1:36:12
shaped and formed by what ends
1:36:14
up becoming the official Cold
1:36:16
War Compact. And so absolutely unwilling
1:36:18
to even think in the
1:36:20
kinds of creative ways that somebody
1:36:22
like FDR was. I'm
1:36:24
Micah Utrich, editor of Jacobin.
1:36:27
You're listening to The Dig. podcast
1:36:29
that brings you an incredibly
1:36:31
wide -ranging analysis of politics,
1:36:33
history, economics, and more, covering
1:36:36
the entire planet at a consistent
1:36:38
depth that, frankly, I find
1:36:40
a little hard to comprehend. I'm
1:36:42
not sure exactly how Dan does it,
1:36:44
but I'm pretty sure it's connected to
1:36:46
you supporting the podcast at patreon.com. The
1:36:59
far right ascends around the
1:37:01
globe amid war and wildfires.
1:37:04
The coming period promises more in
1:37:06
deeper crises, but
1:37:08
also to ignite mass social
1:37:10
movements with increasing frequency. It's
1:37:12
a crucial time for the
1:37:15
left to come together and
1:37:17
build durable organizations, coalitions,
1:37:20
and relationships. At this
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critical juncture, the Socialism
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register by April 25th
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for the early bird
1:38:21
discounted rate. Hope to
1:38:23
see you there. The
1:38:29
new deal, it was also
1:38:31
interestingly how he ended up
1:38:33
with this specifically American term
1:38:36
liberal liberals throughout the world
1:38:38
are people who are supporters
1:38:40
of free markets. But in
1:38:42
the United States, liberal
1:38:44
refers to someone who
1:38:46
elsewhere might be called a
1:38:48
social Democrat. You write, quote,
1:38:51
FDR very self -consciously refused to
1:38:53
call himself a progressive. He
1:38:56
believed the label had been burdened
1:38:58
by the conflicts of the past
1:39:00
and instead reclaimed the term liberal.
1:39:03
Liberalism had long been associated with
1:39:06
century ideas of limited government
1:39:08
and a self -regulating commercial society.
1:39:11
But FDR now reconceived it
1:39:13
as a shared commitment
1:39:15
to personal autonomy. How did
1:39:17
that happen? And what
1:39:19
were the consequences of
1:39:21
it? Is it merely this
1:39:23
kind of curious backstory
1:39:25
to a somewhat confusing semantic
1:39:27
peculiarity or has it
1:39:29
been substantively consequential for American
1:39:31
politics in some way?
1:39:33
Yeah. So it's a decade -long
1:39:35
story of the 30s. And I
1:39:37
think it's important to highlight that FDR
1:39:40
wants to distinguish what he's doing
1:39:42
from the kind of progressive era debates
1:39:44
and disputes as I articulated, and
1:39:46
so ends up turning to this word.
1:39:49
But part of the turn to
1:39:52
the word is also a
1:39:54
shift in thinking about the
1:39:56
nature of work and the relationship
1:39:58
between work and collective identity.
1:40:00
So in some ways, When
1:40:02
business conservatives were talking about
1:40:05
freedom of contract, they
1:40:07
in a way shared a language
1:40:09
with labor radicals, which is work
1:40:11
is a site for flourishing and
1:40:13
that for the business conservative, that
1:40:15
means that there should be no
1:40:17
infringements on the employee -employer contracting
1:40:19
relationship because whatever. It's the product
1:40:21
of it as a site of
1:40:23
their own self -expression. The labor radicals
1:40:26
would reject that and would say,
1:40:28
no, instead you have to have
1:40:30
a fundamentally different way of organizing
1:40:32
the workplace on democratic principles so
1:40:34
as to ensure that individuals are
1:40:36
engaged in self -directed work and
1:40:38
it's a site of freedom as
1:40:40
self -rule. What's happening in
1:40:42
the 30s, interestingly, is
1:40:45
a change in the
1:40:47
relationship to the activity of
1:40:49
work, where the focus
1:40:51
increasingly instead is a language
1:40:53
of security, where
1:40:55
the thing that you're supposed to do
1:40:57
is to ensure that people have
1:40:59
something like a living wage, the
1:41:02
basic conditions to
1:41:04
overcome necessitous circumstances,
1:41:07
and so that it's a place to
1:41:09
provide something like economic security, which
1:41:11
is part of the initial phrasing and
1:41:14
language for what becomes the Social
1:41:16
Security Act, and that
1:41:19
Alongside those broad programs, what it's
1:41:21
then supposed to unleash is
1:41:23
your ability to enjoy autonomy in
1:41:25
other domains. Your
1:41:27
freedom comes from self -expression
1:41:30
that might not be necessarily
1:41:32
tied to work. And
1:41:34
liberal has this capacity
1:41:36
in the late 1930s of
1:41:39
both characterizing the defense
1:41:41
of New Deal social programs,
1:41:43
but also increasingly reflecting this
1:41:45
new confrontation that the US
1:41:48
finds itself in, which is
1:41:50
a confrontation with a fascist
1:41:52
Europe and fears about the
1:41:54
nature of the world as
1:41:57
the US is moving toward
1:41:59
war, in particular with Nazi
1:42:01
Germany. And what
1:42:03
starts to happen in the
1:42:05
late 1930s is that that
1:42:07
reality produces this really interesting
1:42:09
reclamation of the Bill of
1:42:11
Rights. So the Bill of
1:42:13
Rights hadn't really been thought
1:42:15
of as this separate kind
1:42:17
of independent human rights charter
1:42:20
like the Magna Carta that
1:42:22
stands for individual rights and
1:42:24
principles. Initially, in the latter
1:42:26
part of the 18th, early
1:42:28
19th century, had basically been
1:42:30
understood as a kind of
1:42:32
federalist guarantee of limiting congressional
1:42:34
power against the states. It's
1:42:36
why the First Amendment is
1:42:38
Congress shall not when talking
1:42:40
about free speech or free
1:42:42
exercise. And yes, there's this
1:42:44
language of the Bill of Rights that starts
1:42:46
to emerge during Reconstruction. It's present
1:42:48
in the way that the US is talking about
1:42:50
the Philippines and Puerto Rico, but
1:42:53
it really comes to the fore
1:42:55
in the late 30s and early 1940s.
1:42:57
It's in 1938 that some of
1:42:59
the states that had never even ratified
1:43:01
the Bill of Rights, ratified the
1:43:03
Bill of Rights like the state of
1:43:05
Massachusetts. And there's a
1:43:07
growing interest in a way that
1:43:09
there simply just had not been at
1:43:11
the 50th or the 100th anniversary
1:43:13
of celebrating the 150th anniversary of the
1:43:15
Bill of Rights. FDR is
1:43:17
very much involved in this, so
1:43:19
are a whole range. of civic associations
1:43:21
and now not just the business
1:43:23
actors that were involved in constitution day
1:43:26
exercises during World War I. Now
1:43:28
this kind of constitutional support for the
1:43:30
Bill of Rights is spreading to
1:43:32
labor, it's spreading to the civil rights
1:43:34
movement, to organizations like the NAACP. And
1:43:37
liberal captures both a
1:43:40
commitment to regulation of
1:43:42
the economy that provides
1:43:44
basic kinds of social
1:43:46
provisions and also an
1:43:48
account of freedom as
1:43:50
something that you enjoy
1:43:52
through speech, through religious
1:43:55
worship and exercise, and
1:43:57
it even becomes tied now to
1:43:59
a new sort of entrenched version
1:44:01
of the creedal constitution that pushes
1:44:03
back against the nativism of the
1:44:05
20s, where you have a commitment
1:44:07
to what's going to be called
1:44:10
Judeo -Christian America, but in a
1:44:12
way here is really like a
1:44:14
tri -faith, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish politics of
1:44:16
identity in which the thought is
1:44:18
that Americans have come from all
1:44:20
of these different corners of the
1:44:22
world. They have these different forms
1:44:24
of worship and expression. Pluralism
1:44:26
is actually essential to national
1:44:29
identity. It's what distinguishes the U
1:44:31
.S. from the collectivism and totalitarianism
1:44:33
of Nazi Germany or even
1:44:35
the Soviet Union. and that
1:44:37
liberal captures both of
1:44:39
these dimensions, autonomy, respect
1:44:41
for pluralism, a commitment
1:44:43
to a particular set of
1:44:45
social safeguards. And that's
1:44:48
the culture around constitutional commitment
1:44:50
that the country carries into
1:44:52
World War II and that
1:44:54
is associated with the specific
1:44:56
dynamics of what the word
1:44:58
means in the American setting.
1:45:00
And here, you know, it's a really
1:45:03
interesting thing to note. because
1:45:05
if during World War
1:45:07
I, support for the Constitution
1:45:09
had been about the
1:45:11
state, protecting the state from
1:45:13
all these various kinds
1:45:15
of threats. World War
1:45:17
II, through this language of liberalism,
1:45:20
support for the Constitution is now
1:45:22
closely tied to the Bill of
1:45:24
Rights. There is not the
1:45:26
view among new dealers that, hey,
1:45:30
the arrangements, the institutional arrangements,
1:45:32
of the constitutional order that the framers came
1:45:34
up with is some genius system of
1:45:36
checks and balances. They've just experienced the difficulty
1:45:38
of actually getting new deal legislation passed.
1:45:41
They're like, well, it's kind of a shape
1:45:43
-in. It's sort of a problem. But we've
1:45:45
basically overcome it. Maybe we don't need
1:45:47
formal changes. But the thing
1:45:49
that redeems the whole system
1:45:51
is this bill of rights,
1:45:53
which FDR even invokes as
1:45:55
a product of Madison's genius,
1:45:58
as distinguishing the U .S.
1:46:00
from Nazi Germany, as speaking
1:46:02
to a charter of liberty
1:46:04
as great as anything outside
1:46:06
of the Magna Carta. And
1:46:09
that becomes a central component of constitutional
1:46:11
commitment. So what we're seeing by the
1:46:13
time we get to World War II
1:46:15
is, now interestingly, creed and
1:46:17
constitution are bound, those two
1:46:20
are bound in various ways to
1:46:22
now civil libertarian commitments and during
1:46:24
World War I they become entrenched
1:46:26
with an account of capitalism but
1:46:28
that's now through New Deal arrangements
1:46:30
bound as well to an administrative
1:46:32
apparatus. This was
1:46:35
this period as you
1:46:37
just described where liberal is
1:46:39
sort of remade into
1:46:41
a term to describe this
1:46:44
New Deal ideal of
1:46:46
forms of personal autonomy rooted
1:46:48
in both economic and
1:46:50
political liberty. But it
1:46:53
was also a period where FDR
1:46:55
presided over the mass internment of
1:46:57
Americans of Japanese descent. How did
1:46:59
he square that circle? Well,
1:47:01
I think what that
1:47:03
does is it speaks to
1:47:05
the persistence of this
1:47:07
combination of ethnic nationalism or
1:47:10
ethno -nationalism and civic nationalism.
1:47:13
And it plays out especially in
1:47:15
national security context because one of
1:47:17
the things that's noteworthy about Japanese
1:47:19
internment is that many of the
1:47:21
folks in California that are most
1:47:23
aggressive about pressing for Japanese internment
1:47:25
are themselves the people that are
1:47:28
participating in the Bill of Rights
1:47:30
celebrations. So like they're involved in
1:47:32
organizing celebrations of Americanism and the
1:47:34
Bill of Rights and then at
1:47:36
the same time saying that in
1:47:38
order to be able to preserve
1:47:40
civil liberties, you're going to have
1:47:42
to engage in the mass internment
1:47:45
of people of Japanese descent. And
1:47:47
the way that they square this
1:47:49
circle is to say that civil
1:47:51
liberties are a central component of
1:47:53
what it means to be an
1:47:55
American, but those liberties
1:47:57
are under threat from various
1:47:59
kinds of communities that don't
1:48:01
really properly understand American values and
1:48:04
that certain types of infringements
1:48:06
are actually necessary to ensure
1:48:08
the promotion and spread of civil
1:48:10
libertarian commitments. And this
1:48:12
has a kind of
1:48:14
link to long -standing practices
1:48:16
because the idea of cultural
1:48:18
unfitness is like racialized
1:48:20
in ways that has like
1:48:22
a long pedigree. people
1:48:24
that were Asian American, a very
1:48:26
long story that went back to
1:48:29
the 1870s and 1880s where it's
1:48:31
Asian immigrants in particular that were
1:48:33
separated out as non -citizens that
1:48:35
could never naturalize. You have the
1:48:37
Chinese exclusion laws. You have the
1:48:39
bans on alien, quote unquote, land
1:48:42
laws. At the state level, you
1:48:44
have the 1924 National Origins Act
1:48:46
that you just described. And
1:48:48
at the same time, it
1:48:50
looks forward to the politics of
1:48:52
the Cold War. because as
1:48:55
civil liberties claims become increasingly central
1:48:57
to national identity, there's
1:48:59
always this play in the
1:49:01
joints with the kind of
1:49:03
national security frame where the
1:49:05
thought is Truman makes this
1:49:07
argument during the second Red
1:49:09
Scare that the best way
1:49:11
of protecting American civil libertarian
1:49:13
values is actually by limiting
1:49:16
or prescribing the rights of
1:49:18
those that would undermine or
1:49:20
compromise American commitments and that
1:49:22
there's a national security justification
1:49:24
for precisely these policies. And
1:49:26
so one thing that we
1:49:28
start to see from Japanese
1:49:30
internment going forward is the
1:49:32
way in which effectively constitutionalism
1:49:34
and arguments about national security
1:49:36
or even more broadly speaking
1:49:38
empire fit together, where we
1:49:41
tend to think of these
1:49:43
things as in opposition, liberty
1:49:45
versus security, constitutions versus empire. But
1:49:48
the centrality of constitutional language
1:49:50
to the justification of American national
1:49:52
security and American imperial power
1:49:54
means that it operates on both
1:49:56
sides of the ledger. It's
1:49:58
a constant invocation that
1:50:00
need to preserve even constitutional
1:50:02
liberties for the aggressive
1:50:04
assertion of power against those
1:50:06
that are deemed outsiders. And
1:50:09
yet at the same time, the
1:50:11
willingness to then look back and say,
1:50:13
oh, that was a bridge too
1:50:16
far or that we need to limit
1:50:18
or constrain the forms of violence
1:50:20
that we might exercise at the margins.
1:50:22
So it's a tool for checking
1:50:24
the worst abuses or avoiding doing exactly
1:50:26
the same thing in the future.
1:50:28
So you won't have exactly Japanese internment
1:50:30
again. But it's
1:50:32
precisely this interchange between invocations
1:50:35
of constitutionalism as the
1:50:37
foundation. for the security project
1:50:39
and like the security
1:50:41
project is necessarily needing to
1:50:44
preserve or protect a
1:50:46
constitutional domain that produced these
1:50:48
rights violations in the
1:50:50
first place. Relatedly
1:50:52
along those lines, the world
1:50:55
where you struggle against fascism,
1:50:57
it's followed by the Cold War
1:50:59
against communism and this is
1:51:01
the period when the U .S.
1:51:03
becomes a truly global superpower
1:51:05
underwriting a new liberal international order,
1:51:08
justified by you write, quote,
1:51:10
an anti -totalitarian account of individual
1:51:12
liberty and market capitalism, an
1:51:14
embrace of American checks and balances
1:51:16
with the Supreme Court at
1:51:18
the forefront, and a commitment to
1:51:20
U .S. global leadership and primacy.
1:51:23
How did this period from World War
1:51:25
II and then now entering the
1:51:27
Cold War, how did this
1:51:30
entwining of free speech and free markets
1:51:32
do everything that it did to
1:51:34
legitimate the rise of the U .S.
1:51:36
as a global hegemon with, quote, interests
1:51:39
that are coterminous with
1:51:41
the world's interests. Yeah,
1:51:44
so one of the things
1:51:46
that we're starting to see really
1:51:48
during this period, especially in
1:51:50
the 1940s, is precisely this point
1:51:52
about as the language of
1:51:54
liberalism becomes dominant and it has
1:51:56
both of this quality about
1:51:58
a defense of social programs, something
1:52:01
like a social safety net
1:52:03
and a focus on individual autonomy,
1:52:06
that it ends up
1:52:08
linking together market capitalism with
1:52:10
civil liberties. There's this idea
1:52:12
that civil liberties can be
1:52:14
thought of as the preservation
1:52:16
of an individual from some
1:52:18
kind of overweening or destructive
1:52:21
state. And
1:52:23
property rights can be thought of
1:52:25
as similarly the sort of
1:52:27
self -regarding sphere where property rights are
1:52:29
also a kind of preservation
1:52:31
of the individual from an overweening
1:52:33
state. and so
1:52:35
that civil liberties commitments naturally
1:52:37
go hand in hand
1:52:39
with market capitalism so long
1:52:41
as there are just
1:52:43
enough programs at the margins
1:52:45
effectively to ensure that
1:52:48
that system of capitalism is
1:52:50
regulated. All of
1:52:52
this is kind of combining
1:52:54
during the 1940s. And it's combining
1:52:56
in interesting ways against a
1:52:58
very specific type of historical backdrop,
1:53:00
which is the two world
1:53:02
wars have essentially just destroyed the
1:53:04
European imperial system. And
1:53:06
it means that the European powers, whether
1:53:08
or not they formally won or lost
1:53:10
World War II, just do
1:53:12
not have the capacity. to be
1:53:14
able to assert power on the global
1:53:17
stage as they once did. And
1:53:19
that also means against the backdrop of
1:53:21
a decolonizing world that you now
1:53:23
have really vibrant and powerful anti -colonial
1:53:25
movements and a push that's almost like
1:53:27
an inevitable push toward independence across
1:53:30
the global south. And
1:53:32
all of that is taking place
1:53:34
against a backdrop in which the
1:53:36
US increasingly, even though it's going
1:53:38
to enjoy kind of a dominant
1:53:40
global status as the most powerful.
1:53:42
of the countries has to deal
1:53:44
with an ideological competitor in the
1:53:46
Soviet Union that has its own
1:53:49
economic model as a model of
1:53:51
development for the global south, has
1:53:53
its own system of political as
1:53:55
well as economic authority. And
1:53:57
what emerges in the US
1:54:00
is for the first time
1:54:02
really the success of a
1:54:04
kind of commitment to American
1:54:06
global international power that's unchecked
1:54:08
by a very strong isolationist
1:54:10
block, which essentially collapses with
1:54:12
World War II. And
1:54:15
now the full flourishing of a
1:54:17
vision about like, well, what is it
1:54:19
that the US is supposed to
1:54:21
promote on the international stage? And
1:54:24
it's precisely all of these
1:54:26
various kinds of conjoined elements.
1:54:29
of the constitutional system that's been steadily
1:54:31
developing within the country. And the
1:54:33
thought is that what the US promotes
1:54:35
abroad is not a principle of
1:54:38
empire, but it's instead this principle of
1:54:40
constitutionalism. It's the reason why the
1:54:42
US's interests are the same as the
1:54:44
interests of other countries. And it's
1:54:46
given expression through an idea of a
1:54:48
constitution for all peoples, which is
1:54:50
what you can sort of think of
1:54:52
as the UN system. This is
1:54:55
why the US is so committed to
1:54:57
the UN system, to multilateral institutions, to
1:54:59
international treaties that collectively even
1:55:01
Americans come to call the
1:55:04
International Bill of Rights. And
1:55:07
then also at each individual sort
1:55:09
of international state or foreign state
1:55:11
level, the replication
1:55:13
of American practices of both
1:55:15
statecraft and capitalism as
1:55:17
the framework for their own
1:55:19
constitutional orders. So whether
1:55:21
it's academics or state department
1:55:23
officials, you have the spread
1:55:25
of the constitutional expert as somebody that's
1:55:27
going to be a consultant to help
1:55:30
countries rewrite their own texts. You
1:55:32
have the development. of
1:55:34
institutions like the USAID that's
1:55:36
founded in 1961, really as a
1:55:38
Cold War institution to promote
1:55:40
the thought that, well, the
1:55:42
US is committed to spreading material
1:55:45
progress to parts of the global south
1:55:47
in ways that can compete with
1:55:49
the vision promoted by the Soviet Union.
1:55:52
And all of this has this
1:55:54
really interesting double dimension. It's
1:55:57
predicated on the idea that since
1:55:59
the US is setting up these arrangements,
1:56:01
it It recognizes that it too
1:56:03
must be rule bound. It's unique. So
1:56:05
Americans would argue by comparison with
1:56:07
other powers because it binds itself
1:56:10
to a set of legal principles
1:56:12
that are core to its own
1:56:14
national identity. And then also this
1:56:16
is the stuff about the creed.
1:56:18
Racial liberalism, the idea of inclusion
1:56:20
increasingly becomes something that's front and
1:56:22
center because you have to be
1:56:24
able to make arguments about why
1:56:27
the US should be. leading a
1:56:29
global community that's overwhelmingly non -white, and
1:56:31
part of the thought is that inherent in
1:56:33
the American constitutional project is a commitment to
1:56:35
racial equality. Things like segregation that might persist
1:56:37
in the U .S. are just kind of
1:56:39
archaic holdovers that the U .S. is in the
1:56:41
business of overcoming. So you
1:56:44
have this combination of commitments, economic
1:56:46
material prosperity, self
1:56:49
-limitation through the rule -bound
1:56:51
order, so to speak.
1:56:54
Racial liberalism is something that's also
1:56:56
core. Yet at the same
1:56:58
time, there's this basic
1:57:01
fact, which is the brand
1:57:03
of market capitalism and
1:57:05
corporate authority that's entrenched in
1:57:07
the American project may
1:57:09
not be something that folks
1:57:11
across the global south
1:57:13
in fact want. And
1:57:15
what happens when there's genuine disagreement
1:57:17
with the types of policies that the
1:57:19
U .S. is interested in pursuing? Or
1:57:21
what happens when the U .S. seems
1:57:23
to just be operating as a
1:57:25
successor to the interests of the old
1:57:27
European powers and sustaining various kinds
1:57:29
of colonialist projects and enterprises? And
1:57:32
so you have intense
1:57:34
forms of local resistance. And
1:57:36
the way that the U .S. responds
1:57:38
is by saying, well, precisely
1:57:40
because the U .S. principles
1:57:43
are embedded in constitutionalism,
1:57:45
it alone enjoys this
1:57:47
ability to ensure collective
1:57:49
order and security. These
1:57:51
exercises of opposition are forms
1:57:53
of disorder, and the U
1:57:55
.S. therefore has a legitimate right
1:57:58
to step outside of the rules,
1:58:00
to exercise a kind of international
1:58:02
police power to reconstruct those societies
1:58:04
as it sees fit. And so
1:58:06
the period really between the 40s
1:58:08
60s and 70s is one
1:58:10
of continuous violence and intervention, including
1:58:12
backing extreme forms of violence like
1:58:15
mass killings in Indonesia, the
1:58:17
assassination attempts, as well as
1:58:19
successful assassinations of politicians. You can
1:58:21
think of Lumumba and Congo.
1:58:23
Kuzh in Guatemala, Iran.
1:58:25
Kuzh everywhere. So it's really
1:58:28
key to note that what
1:58:30
we're articulating is a kind
1:58:32
of high tide. for
1:58:34
the quote unquote rules -based liberal
1:58:36
order that is absolutely entrenched
1:58:38
in American notions of constitutionalism, and
1:58:41
a high tide for the
1:58:43
US saying it wants to establish
1:58:45
and maintain general commitment to
1:58:47
multilateral arrangements at the international level.
1:58:49
It cares about the UN,
1:58:51
it cares about institutions like the
1:58:53
USAID because it's seen as
1:58:55
connected to American foreign policy. While
1:58:58
nonetheless, a
1:59:00
near continuous defection from those rules
1:59:02
and that's a persistent balancing act
1:59:04
and domestically the way that that's
1:59:06
expressed is through the growth in
1:59:08
the power of the presidency. This
1:59:11
presidency that was kind of built as
1:59:14
an adaptation to the problems of
1:59:16
the constitutional system that's given real heft
1:59:18
during the New Deal now becomes
1:59:20
this instrument of an incredibly powerful and
1:59:22
unconstrained national security state that even
1:59:24
the courts are going to be in
1:59:26
the business of deferring to because
1:59:28
there's a general elite agreement in the
1:59:30
project of the Cold War. It's
1:59:33
really remarkable how the U
1:59:35
.S. attempts to inhabit this
1:59:37
contradictory status of being both
1:59:39
an anti -colonial beacon and counter
1:59:41
-revolutionary Hegemon. And the fact
1:59:43
that the U .S. is a
1:59:46
counter -revolutionary Hegemon during this
1:59:48
period is obvious to pretty
1:59:50
much anyone listening to this
1:59:52
podcast. But you tell some
1:59:54
remarkable stories about third -world leaders,
1:59:56
at least in the earlier
1:59:59
years of decolonization, really
2:00:01
being sympathetic to the story
2:00:03
that the U .S. is
2:00:05
telling about itself as being
2:00:07
the sort of first among
2:00:09
anti -colonial nations, even though, of
2:00:12
course, as we know, the
2:00:14
U .S. as we've been
2:00:16
discussing, the U .S. was
2:00:18
founded as a settler colonial project
2:00:20
that revolted against a metropolitan crown.
2:00:22
Just two stories that really jumped
2:00:25
out to me. First, the Indian
2:00:27
leader Nehru in a 1949 visit
2:00:29
to the U .S. said, quote, like
2:00:32
you, we have achieved our freedom through
2:00:34
a revolution. And more
2:00:36
shockingly, in the opening
2:00:38
to the historic 1955
2:00:40
Afro -Asian Conference in Bandung,
2:00:42
Indonesia, Indonesian President Sukarno
2:00:44
saying, quote, the battle
2:00:46
against colonialism has been a long one.
2:00:48
And do you know that today is a
2:00:50
famous anniversary in that battle? On
2:00:52
the 18th day of April, 1
2:00:55
,775, just 180
2:00:57
years ago, Paul Revere wrote at
2:00:59
midnight through the New England countryside, warning
2:01:02
of the approach of British troops
2:01:04
and of the opening of the American
2:01:06
War of Independence, the
2:01:08
first successful anti -colonial war
2:01:10
in history. And it
2:01:12
was only a decade later,
2:01:15
as you referenced just a
2:01:17
few minutes ago, that the
2:01:19
same U .S. government that Sukarno
2:01:21
had looked so optimistically to
2:01:23
would help orchestrate his overthrow,
2:01:25
an overthrow accompanied by a
2:01:28
massive anti -communist genocide. Yeah,
2:01:30
I mean, so you had
2:01:32
US officials that had told Sukarno
2:01:34
and the folks around Sukarno
2:01:37
about Paul Revere and were very
2:01:39
pleased about the fact that
2:01:41
that had been incorporated. And I
2:01:43
think the thing that it
2:01:45
highlights is a kind of dual
2:01:47
quality that's taking place both
2:01:49
within American political elites and then
2:01:51
also within sort of national
2:01:53
anti -colonial elites across the global
2:01:56
south. So on the
2:01:58
American side, in a
2:02:00
world that's increasingly non -white, you're
2:02:02
trying to show connections, especially
2:02:04
because you're trying to win hearts
2:02:06
and minds vis -a -vis the
2:02:08
Soviet Union, about the connections between
2:02:10
your experience and the experience
2:02:12
of newly decolonizing societies. And
2:02:14
so one of the arguments that becomes
2:02:17
really a bedrock of American foreign policy
2:02:19
and lips it Social scientists gives it
2:02:21
a kind of famous frame by talking
2:02:23
about the U .S. as the first
2:02:25
new nation is that, well, the U .S.
2:02:27
was the first country that went through
2:02:29
an anti -colonial resistance against the British. And
2:02:32
so its history is an appropriate
2:02:34
model or guide. And it's able,
2:02:37
the American history is able to
2:02:39
show how to avoid sort of
2:02:41
the extremisms of Nazi Germany or
2:02:43
the Soviet Union and produce outcomes
2:02:45
that are broadly consistent with, you
2:02:47
know, liberty. and equality. And
2:02:50
in a way, just
2:02:52
like these arguments generally about the
2:02:54
US as inherently constitutional, from one
2:02:56
perspective, you can think of this
2:02:59
as almost just a kind of
2:03:01
guise of veil for power. But
2:03:03
at the same time, I think one of the
2:03:05
things that's really key, and when we talk about the
2:03:08
civil rights movement and the domestic changes, this will
2:03:10
come to the fore, is that
2:03:12
these are decades from the
2:03:14
40s to the 60s. and
2:03:16
seventies, where there's also I
2:03:18
think a profound shift in
2:03:20
the cultural identity of American
2:03:22
national elites, especially outside of
2:03:24
the South. And it's
2:03:26
the period in which Americans
2:03:28
are basically going, white Americans
2:03:30
are essentially going from thinking
2:03:32
of their country as a
2:03:35
white settler sibling, like, you
2:03:37
know, white Australia or white
2:03:39
South Africa, to instead
2:03:41
as a country that's tied
2:03:43
to this broadly speaking creedal
2:03:45
vision. A nation of immigrants.
2:03:47
A nation of immigrants. To
2:03:49
even conceive of the country
2:03:51
in settler terms makes no
2:03:53
sense because it violates the
2:03:55
underlying principles of what the
2:03:57
country has been since the
2:03:59
founding. It's sort of the
2:04:01
full mainstreaming. of Frederick Douglass'
2:04:03
composite nation idea from Civil
2:04:05
War and Reconstruction into the
2:04:07
reaches of white American life.
2:04:09
And I think this actually,
2:04:11
you know, part of it
2:04:13
has to do with confronting
2:04:15
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust
2:04:17
and the ways in which
2:04:19
the confrontation with Nazi Germany
2:04:21
and the Holocaust of Jewish
2:04:23
people becomes an anti -racist
2:04:25
politics as well. Like all
2:04:27
of these things are part
2:04:29
of this story, but it's
2:04:32
something that is deeply held
2:04:34
by a specific brand of
2:04:36
Cold Warrior, where they understand
2:04:38
themselves in terms of a
2:04:40
commitment to a type of
2:04:42
racial liberalism. It's what gives
2:04:44
their sacrifice meaning. And then
2:04:46
on the side of the
2:04:48
national elites, it's the same
2:04:50
sort of double play where
2:04:52
Nehru in the 40s knows
2:04:54
that he's speaking to an
2:04:56
audience that when he's talking
2:04:58
to white politicians that don't
2:05:00
necessarily respect Indian
2:05:02
people as equals. What
2:05:05
Truman wants is for India to
2:05:07
sign up to the US side
2:05:09
in the Cold War, and he
2:05:11
wants to maintain non -alignment. And
2:05:13
so the trip itself ends up
2:05:15
failing on those terms. And so
2:05:17
there's a way in which you're
2:05:19
using this language of, oh, we
2:05:21
have a shared anti -colonial tradition, not
2:05:23
unlike how black activists going back
2:05:25
to Douglas try to invoke narratives
2:05:27
of meaning. to press
2:05:29
for arguments that you yourself
2:05:32
know are not actually internalized within
2:05:34
the dominant power. And so
2:05:36
there's some of that that's at play. But
2:05:38
at the same time, you know,
2:05:40
it's also the case that for
2:05:42
Neru and even for Socarno and for
2:05:44
other figures that There are
2:05:46
these elements of the American
2:05:49
experience that are part of the
2:05:51
story that they want to
2:05:53
tell about what a successful anti
2:05:55
-colonial revolution might be. So in
2:05:57
the Indian context, there's all
2:05:59
of these really interesting experimentations with
2:06:02
constitutionalism. The Indian constitution diverges
2:06:04
in lots of different ways, but
2:06:06
there's no doubt that you
2:06:08
have Indian figures that are thinking
2:06:10
about how can you successfully
2:06:13
combine a project of real
2:06:15
investment in the dramatic elevation of
2:06:17
the status of poor people that's
2:06:19
consistent, let's say, with socialist principles
2:06:21
that you might associate with the
2:06:24
Soviet Union and other places, with
2:06:26
a commitment to civil liberties and
2:06:28
political liberty that they're associating with
2:06:30
aspects of the American representative system.
2:06:33
It's not like the U .S.
2:06:35
has the answer or that the
2:06:37
U .S. alone is the solution, but
2:06:39
there is a general
2:06:41
universal project of trying to figure
2:06:43
out how to connect the two,
2:06:45
and that can be the project
2:06:47
of the third world, but that
2:06:49
has its own interesting connections to
2:06:51
the American experience. This
2:06:54
sort of liberal Cold
2:06:56
Warrior ideology, the
2:06:58
sincerity of it, though there's plenty
2:07:00
of examples we can point
2:07:02
to, that underlined the cynicism as
2:07:04
well. But the sincerity of
2:07:06
its visible in the scholarship of
2:07:08
that era worked from people
2:07:11
like Richard Hofstadter and Robert Dahl
2:07:13
that read this mid -century moment
2:07:15
of consensus back throughout the
2:07:17
entirety of American history. And so
2:07:19
in this framework, deviance from
2:07:21
consensus becomes defined as a pathological
2:07:23
form of populism, whether that
2:07:26
be socialist extremes or white supremacist
2:07:28
and McCarthyite extremes. And
2:07:30
like you said, This
2:07:32
is, relatedly, this moment when the country's
2:07:34
self -conception of being a Anglo -settler
2:07:36
state was supplanted by this novel fiction
2:07:38
that the U .S. is a, quote,
2:07:40
unquote, nation of immigrants. Despite the
2:07:42
fact that the country during this period
2:07:44
before 65 has a foreign -born population
2:07:46
of 5%. Yeah. And even today,
2:07:48
when Americans talk about the country as
2:07:50
a nation of immigrants, the
2:07:52
foreign -born population is, what, like
2:07:54
15%. So it's, you know, wildly
2:07:56
out of step with the actual
2:07:59
policy framework. But it speaks to
2:08:01
a kind of enduring truth that's
2:08:03
connected to the FDR's popular front
2:08:05
culture, that tri -faith set of arrangements
2:08:07
that marked pluralism in the 30s
2:08:09
and 40s, and that connects all
2:08:11
the way back to somebody like
2:08:14
Douglas. What
2:08:16
were the consequences of
2:08:18
this sort of
2:08:20
mystifying projection backwards of
2:08:23
American consensus? So
2:08:25
that there's an international story
2:08:27
that we've been telling. about the
2:08:29
centrality of constitutionalism to the
2:08:31
construction of the post -war order
2:08:33
and the ways in which constitutionalism
2:08:35
didn't mean constraint, so that
2:08:37
rather than thinking of constitutionalism as
2:08:39
an opposition to empire, these
2:08:41
two things were deeply interconnected in
2:08:43
the projection of American power
2:08:45
in ways that were both self
2:08:47
-limiting and also perpetuated extreme forms
2:08:49
of violence. Domestically,
2:08:51
there's a similar kind
2:08:53
of play that's going
2:08:55
on as well, which
2:08:58
is the big thing
2:09:00
that's central to cementing
2:09:02
constitutional arguments during the
2:09:04
early Cold War are
2:09:06
the debates about McCarthy.
2:09:10
McCarthy emerges. There's
2:09:12
this intense effort to kind of
2:09:14
purge anybody that's viewed as communist. The
2:09:17
second red scare with McCarthy
2:09:19
as this embodiment has a lot
2:09:21
in common with the extremism
2:09:23
of the assault on dissident speech
2:09:25
that we saw during the
2:09:27
first red scare. In
2:09:29
truth, McCarthyism
2:09:32
was an expression of
2:09:34
general mainstream anti -communism
2:09:36
of the Truman
2:09:38
administration. In other words, the
2:09:41
general chill when it comes
2:09:43
to speech, the general attacks on
2:09:45
individuals that might have dissenting
2:09:47
political views or taking on board
2:09:49
those kinds of activities that
2:09:51
we saw during the First Red
2:09:53
Scare and just even intensifying
2:09:56
them in various ways. And so
2:09:58
McCarthyism wasn't really out of
2:10:00
step. It was just an extreme
2:10:02
reaction to it. But
2:10:04
then when McCarthyism
2:10:06
collapses, you have
2:10:08
this interesting set of arguments that
2:10:11
emerge within both the academy, political
2:10:13
commentators, and then also the national
2:10:15
political elite, which is to say,
2:10:17
McCarthyism is not the same thing
2:10:19
as... you know, good old -fashioned anti
2:10:21
-communism. And part of the reason
2:10:23
why they're willing to make this
2:10:26
claim is that by the end,
2:10:28
like McCarthy was even attacking the
2:10:30
central sites of the Cold War
2:10:32
state, the state department itself as
2:10:34
like the hotbed of communist subversion.
2:10:36
So there's a way in which
2:10:38
it had gone to such an
2:10:41
extreme that it was now eating
2:10:43
the institutions that were necessary for the
2:10:45
Cold War project. An anti -communist
2:10:48
boomerang of sorts. Exactly. And
2:10:50
so that context makes it
2:10:52
easier for officials and commentators to
2:10:54
say, well, this is just
2:10:57
like disreputable. It's not actually good
2:10:59
anti -communism. And in fact,
2:11:01
good anti -communism is incredibly rights -respecting.
2:11:03
And the fact that the U .S.
2:11:05
was able to sort of make it
2:11:07
through the fever of communism and
2:11:09
end up on the other side says
2:11:11
something specific by the time it
2:11:13
gets into the mid -1950s about the
2:11:15
U .S., like the U .S. unlike the
2:11:17
Soviet Union, unlike Nazi Germany, has
2:11:19
been able to maintain its
2:11:22
own, you know, set of
2:11:24
long -standing liberal commitments. And it
2:11:26
produces this really interesting period
2:11:28
of scholarship. Sometimes it's associated
2:11:30
with consensus historiography, but like
2:11:33
basically through the 50s and
2:11:35
early 60s, where scholars start
2:11:37
looking back to all of
2:11:39
American history and saying, you
2:11:41
know, actually they're these deep
2:11:44
wells of cultural support for
2:11:46
what we can think of
2:11:48
as liberalism. and that
2:11:50
this idea of a creedal constitution
2:11:52
is something that's a kind of
2:11:55
defining feature of American identity across
2:11:57
time. Now, it's a strange thing
2:11:59
to say because 45, 46 is
2:12:01
like one of the most intense
2:12:03
periods again of labor conflict. We've
2:12:05
just had it. And racist violence. Racist
2:12:08
violence, the mid -30s, a period
2:12:10
right after World War I.
2:12:13
And so to read out in
2:12:15
particular here, Socialist argument
2:12:17
as something that is just like
2:12:19
never had roots in the US
2:12:21
is a really strange rereading of
2:12:23
a very recent history. But
2:12:26
what folks argue instead is
2:12:28
that, well, actually, it's
2:12:30
telling that McCarthy was
2:12:33
strongest in Wisconsin, which
2:12:35
is the same place where
2:12:37
the populace and the socialists were
2:12:39
strong, even though actually the
2:12:41
kind of precinct by precinct, you
2:12:43
know, like analysis suggests that
2:12:45
actually McCarthy got a traditional Republican
2:12:47
vote base and a different
2:12:49
type of vote base than what
2:12:51
populists and progressives. Different communities.
2:12:54
Totally. But the thought
2:12:56
is that actually maybe
2:12:58
what this highlights is that
2:13:00
the U .S. has always
2:13:02
been marked by a
2:13:05
thoroughgoing egalitarianism and liberalism. and
2:13:07
that these kinds of
2:13:09
moments, even the moments of violence
2:13:11
and conflict, are really
2:13:14
a product of the pathologies
2:13:16
that result from too
2:13:18
much majority commitment, majority support
2:13:20
for conformity to a
2:13:22
kind of general ethos, and
2:13:25
that there are expressions
2:13:27
of a kind of populist
2:13:29
reversion against anybody that
2:13:31
might be thought of as
2:13:33
a better. So it's
2:13:36
a kind of status anxiety
2:13:38
that emerges within a
2:13:40
society that's so thoroughly democratic.
2:13:43
And indeed, McCarthyism, interestingly here, is
2:13:45
not only paired with populism,
2:13:47
so this is the same thing.
2:13:50
It's a kind of, you
2:13:52
know, the demagogic effects of too
2:13:54
much tyranny of the majority,
2:13:56
but even with Jim Crow. where
2:13:58
the, though like McCarthy himself
2:14:01
was not like particularly committed to,
2:14:03
you know, segregation as a
2:14:05
very different kind of politics. The
2:14:07
thought is like, well, he's
2:14:09
interested in tarring wrong ideas or
2:14:12
picking out specific individuals as
2:14:14
like elites to be rejected that
2:14:16
are in the State Department
2:14:18
while segregationists tar entire racial groups.
2:14:21
And the argument that then emerges
2:14:24
during this period is that The
2:14:26
US has these great cultural reserves,
2:14:28
which is why, you know, constitutionalism came
2:14:30
down to earth, the reason why
2:14:33
the US is exceptional in the global
2:14:35
stage. But just like other places, there's
2:14:37
a potential threat that
2:14:39
McCarthy embodies of tyrannical impulses.
2:14:41
But in the country,
2:14:43
those tyrannical impulses are best
2:14:45
understood as majoritarian. And
2:14:48
so, here is the period.
2:14:50
the 1950s that you have
2:14:52
the essentially folks that 20
2:14:54
years earlier would have been
2:14:56
New Deal critics of the
2:14:58
court reclaiming the Supreme Court.
2:15:00
It's not during the 30s.
2:15:02
It's not earlier. The
2:15:04
court then was still associated
2:15:06
with the business right. But
2:15:08
now the thought is the
2:15:11
court is a kind of
2:15:13
institution that reduces political passions.
2:15:15
The Senate is an institution that
2:15:17
reduces political passions. But
2:15:19
the Senate in its own way is not good enough,
2:15:21
because it's still elected McCarthy, that
2:15:23
you want to have these countermajoritarian
2:15:26
frameworks. The American system of checks
2:15:28
and balances, in fact, is a
2:15:30
genius system. It's not misshapen. And
2:15:32
it's the mechanism, especially through the
2:15:34
elevated Supreme Court, to entrench values
2:15:36
like those embodied in the Bill
2:15:39
of Rights. And that McCarthyism then
2:15:41
gets read as un -American. and
2:15:43
the kinds of anti -democratic elements
2:15:45
of the constitutional system are
2:15:47
now interpreted as positive roadblocks for
2:15:49
tyrannical majorities to operate. And
2:15:52
this liberal anti -communist hygieny with
2:15:54
its strict constraints on public
2:15:56
debate marginalizing both extremes on the
2:15:58
right and extremes on the
2:16:00
left, that meant new openings for
2:16:03
the civil rights movement and
2:16:05
other reformers, but at a cost.
2:16:07
You write, quote, these
2:16:09
interactions between reformers and the state.
2:16:11
often operated through a type of
2:16:13
bargain. Challenges could be made to
2:16:15
one feature of the society, for
2:16:17
instance, by steadily uprooting formal
2:16:19
legal discrimination on the basis of
2:16:22
race, gender, or sexual orientation, but
2:16:24
not to other elements of
2:16:26
the national project, such as American
2:16:28
international police power during the
2:16:31
Cold War, or the basic structural
2:16:33
organization of the state and
2:16:35
economy. Why did the Cold
2:16:37
War American bargain function like that? I
2:16:39
think the first thing that I
2:16:42
think is worth noting is that
2:16:44
this is now a period in
2:16:46
which there had been a plethora
2:16:48
of arguments about American constitutionalism, but
2:16:50
it's now being consolidated into a
2:16:52
single model, which is this Cold
2:16:54
War official model that is now
2:16:56
used not as a critique. of
2:16:58
the existing structures of state economy,
2:17:00
etc., but instead as a way
2:17:03
of legitimating a particular form of
2:17:05
statecraft and then promoting it and
2:17:07
spreading it abroad. It
2:17:09
also is, I think, a
2:17:11
fundamental misreading of American
2:17:13
history where actually it had
2:17:15
been precisely socialists and
2:17:17
folks on the margins and
2:17:19
mass publics that had
2:17:22
entrenched constitutional protections. The
2:17:24
successes of the New Deal
2:17:26
period and the extent to
2:17:28
which it incorporates mass publics
2:17:30
into democratic life through these
2:17:32
broad provisions of social programs
2:17:35
is not because of elites
2:17:37
constraining tyrannical majorities, but instead
2:17:39
creating conditions in which majorities
2:17:41
can overcome the real roblox
2:17:43
that have entrenched forms of
2:17:45
rights constraint. And that's the
2:17:47
minority power that's applied by
2:17:50
business and racial elites. within
2:17:52
the country's history. So
2:17:54
all of that is now being
2:17:56
read out of American history.
2:17:58
And instead, the successes and achievements
2:18:00
of the past are the
2:18:02
product of enlightened leadership by a
2:18:04
specifically cohesive cultural and political
2:18:07
elite. Now, within
2:18:09
that context, one
2:18:11
of the things that becomes really key
2:18:13
is precisely because you're trying to win
2:18:15
hearts and minds in the global south. that
2:18:18
there's these national security
2:18:20
Cold War imperatives to
2:18:22
address the problems of
2:18:24
racial discrimination at home.
2:18:27
And this plays out through cases like Brown
2:18:29
versus Board of Education that strike down
2:18:31
separate but equal as inherently unequal, get rid
2:18:33
of segregation in public schools. The
2:18:35
Justice Department files an amicus brief
2:18:37
in the case that says that there
2:18:40
are these Cold War national security
2:18:42
imperatives that are important for getting rid
2:18:44
of Plessy versus Ferguson overcoming. separate
2:18:46
but equal. And
2:18:48
it highlights something about
2:18:51
the mid -20th century that
2:18:53
becomes increasingly key, which is
2:18:55
it produces, if the
2:18:57
30s produced the social infrastructure
2:18:59
of the new administrative
2:19:01
state, the 50s and 60s
2:19:03
produce a center -left
2:19:05
and center -right elite that both
2:19:07
understand some commitment to racial liberalism
2:19:09
as essential for the National
2:19:12
Security Project. It's the condition that
2:19:14
ends up producing ultimately not
2:19:16
just Brown, but the Civil Rights
2:19:18
Act, the Voting Rights Act. And
2:19:21
it's also what leads
2:19:23
folks on the center -right
2:19:25
to start to view organizations
2:19:27
like the Klan as
2:19:30
actually like un -American because
2:19:32
of the ways in which
2:19:34
their lawlessness and violence
2:19:36
against black people, against movement
2:19:38
activists on the ground
2:19:41
is really undermining US national
2:19:43
security objectives and compromising
2:19:45
principles of constitutionalism. So you
2:19:47
have this moment. in
2:19:49
which the kind of official construction
2:19:51
of who's lawful and who's lawless
2:19:54
starts to flip, where it becomes
2:19:56
civil rights activists for some range
2:19:58
of national elites who are attempting
2:20:00
to just operate in ways consistent
2:20:02
with constitutional decisions from the Supreme
2:20:04
Court that are targeted for violence,
2:20:06
that they are now read in
2:20:08
a way that had not been
2:20:10
the case historically as the people
2:20:12
that are lawful and it's instead
2:20:14
white supremacists that are seen as
2:20:16
the sites of real violence and
2:20:19
danger for the body politic. This
2:20:22
produces, I think, a striking moment that's
2:20:24
worth highlighting, which is so much of the
2:20:26
story that we've been telling and absolutely
2:20:28
the story of the Cold War is one
2:20:31
of the violent suppression. of
2:20:33
the left of socialists and black
2:20:35
radicals. But you're also seeing
2:20:37
a desire to contain the far
2:20:39
right, to maybe persist in
2:20:41
various types of dog whistles, to
2:20:44
continue to have brands on the
2:20:46
right of ethno -nationalist politics, but
2:20:48
to use dog whistles while
2:20:50
at the same time steadily
2:20:52
eliminating specific kinds of ideological
2:20:55
positions and even figures. And
2:20:57
that's part of this Cold
2:20:59
War frame. And in that
2:21:01
context, that means something very
2:21:03
specific for black activists, which
2:21:05
is that there had been
2:21:08
a long -standing 20th century
2:21:10
debate within black life about which
2:21:12
path effectively to pursue,
2:21:15
one that was organized around
2:21:17
maintaining contact with the
2:21:19
U .S. state's project, with
2:21:21
narratives of nationalism. You
2:21:23
might certainly oppose fascism or
2:21:25
colonialism abroad, but make arguments about
2:21:28
how that opposition is connected
2:21:30
to American principle. And
2:21:32
then there's other elements within
2:21:34
black life that were much
2:21:36
more suspicious. of
2:21:38
nationalist claims and we're making arguments
2:21:40
about the importance of transformative arrangements
2:21:42
in a way like Root and
2:21:44
Branch to the state and economy
2:21:46
that was tied to a type
2:21:48
of internationalist agenda. Now, these are
2:21:50
ideal types. There's a lot of
2:21:52
flexibility and fluidity across both of
2:21:54
these. They're figures like A. Philip
2:21:57
Randolph that have interesting touch points
2:21:59
across them. But what's happening
2:22:01
in the 50s and
2:22:03
60s is that the institutions
2:22:05
of the black socialists
2:22:07
left are facing intense repression
2:22:09
and they're also basically
2:22:11
being contained and defeated even
2:22:13
within black cultural life
2:22:15
while the institutions like the
2:22:17
NAACP that sign up
2:22:19
to the Cold War You
2:22:22
know, they see real benefits
2:22:24
because if you use the language
2:22:26
of American Cold War Creed,
2:22:28
you can get all of these
2:22:30
forms of racial inclusion. And
2:22:32
for the broad public, the broad
2:22:34
black public, there's a recognition
2:22:36
that these are real achievements. Take
2:22:39
1948. So you
2:22:41
have an election in
2:22:43
1948 when Henry Wallace is
2:22:45
running as an independent
2:22:47
candidate on an incredibly pro
2:22:50
-civil rights agenda backed by people like
2:22:52
Paul Robeson and W. E. B.
2:22:54
Du Bois, but really only gets
2:22:56
10 % of the black vote, 70 %
2:22:59
vote for Truman. And that's
2:23:01
because of a strategic assessment that
2:23:03
in a society that's been marked
2:23:05
by pervasive forms of white supremacy
2:23:07
and white violence against black people,
2:23:09
that there's this moment of genuine
2:23:11
opening so that signing up to
2:23:13
the project of the Cold War
2:23:15
State can produce these positive end
2:23:17
in a way that wasn't even
2:23:19
the case in the context clearly
2:23:21
around World War One. Right. I
2:23:23
mean, there are these huge victories,
2:23:25
but on the other hand, you
2:23:27
have the NAACP's Walter White, Roy
2:23:29
Wilkins attacking Paul Robeson, kicking Dubois
2:23:31
off its board. Claudia Jones and
2:23:33
CLR James are deported. Dubois,
2:23:35
Robeson, William Patterson had their
2:23:37
passports revoked. Du Bois was charged.
2:23:40
was in the context of
2:23:42
we charge genocide and so an
2:23:44
effort to use the UN
2:23:46
as a way using NAACP information
2:23:48
and statistics to make claims
2:23:50
on the international stage of just
2:23:52
the extent of violence within
2:23:54
the US against black people. And
2:23:56
then you have a similar
2:23:58
dynamic in the labor movement, which
2:24:01
becomes this institutional feature of
2:24:03
American capitalism during this period with
2:24:05
real material gains, particularly for
2:24:07
the white organized working class, but
2:24:09
then also from 1949 through
2:24:11
1950, the CIO in the shadow
2:24:13
of the anti -communist Taft -Hartley
2:24:15
Act expelled 11 unions representing 1
2:24:17
million workers for communist ties,
2:24:19
which was followed by the rest
2:24:22
of labor rating those unions
2:24:24
and decimating them, really one -time
2:24:26
giant radical unions like the United
2:24:28
Electrical Workers. Yeah,
2:24:30
absolutely. This
2:24:32
is a period of intense repression
2:24:34
against the left, both in the
2:24:36
context of labor and in the
2:24:39
context of the civil rights movement,
2:24:41
that speaks to this combination of
2:24:43
the way that consent and coercion
2:24:45
are working, so that there are
2:24:47
real benefits of signing up to
2:24:49
the Cold War state for labor
2:24:51
writ large, for African -American activists,
2:24:53
and then the real costs for
2:24:56
maintaining a kind of oppositional stance. And
2:24:58
in a way, This ends
2:25:01
up having really profound kind
2:25:03
of cultural effects that mark
2:25:05
this whole period. So one
2:25:07
of the era's great sort
2:25:09
of acts of constitutional veneration
2:25:11
is something called the Freedom
2:25:13
Train that takes place in
2:25:15
1947. It starts on Constitution
2:25:17
Day, September 17th. Travels across
2:25:19
the country. It's really a
2:25:21
product. of business in terms
2:25:23
of the limitation of what's included,
2:25:26
so like a de -emphasis on the
2:25:28
second Bill of Rights, so the effort
2:25:30
to really entrench a language of
2:25:32
rights around socioeconomic guarantees, a
2:25:34
focus instead on a fairly
2:25:36
kind of limited reading of
2:25:38
constitutional meaning. But there's
2:25:41
uncertainty about how labor
2:25:43
and civil rights activists should
2:25:45
respond to it. Labor
2:25:47
ultimately sees such
2:25:49
white working class support for
2:25:51
these documents in the wake of
2:25:54
the war, that they're
2:25:56
really hesitant to stage strong oppositional
2:25:58
relationships to the fact that
2:26:00
people are genuinely coming out for
2:26:02
this freedom train. And then
2:26:04
for black activists, the fact that
2:26:06
it's segregated in certain places
2:26:08
in the South becomes a way
2:26:11
against the Cold War backdrop
2:26:13
to highlight the failures of the
2:26:15
US to live up to
2:26:17
its principle. And it really
2:26:19
ends up requiring officials to make
2:26:21
decisions about whether or not it's
2:26:23
going to allow for segregated viewing.
2:26:25
And the fact that it ends
2:26:27
up not allowing for segregated viewing
2:26:29
and limits the ability to go
2:26:31
into certain locations is understood as
2:26:33
a kind of victory for the
2:26:35
civil rights movement on precisely these
2:26:37
Cold War civil rights grounds. And
2:26:40
both of those things end up
2:26:42
shaping cultural life by the time
2:26:44
you get to the 1960s, which
2:26:46
is within black politics, It
2:26:48
highlights who ends up
2:26:50
in leadership positions that
2:26:52
come to define the
2:26:54
historical memory of Black
2:26:56
engagement, where the whole
2:26:58
range of radical activists
2:27:01
who faced intense forms
2:27:03
of suppression, their
2:27:05
memory and their engagement is limited.
2:27:07
as part of how folks
2:27:09
tell the story of the civil
2:27:11
rights movement going forward. Robeson
2:27:13
stays in the U .S. but
2:27:15
is incredibly marginalized. Du
2:27:18
Bois ends up emigrating going into
2:27:20
exile in Ghana as one last
2:27:22
act of defiance. He joins the
2:27:24
Communist Party before going to Ghana
2:27:26
and that it's instead people that
2:27:28
are part of this Cold War
2:27:31
Compact like Thurgood Marshall. that
2:27:33
are understood as sort of the
2:27:35
figureheads of civil rights achievement, as well
2:27:37
as the central narrators of national
2:27:39
identity. And then when it comes to
2:27:41
the labor movement, you have a
2:27:43
similar development, but alongside the way in
2:27:46
which both the achievements and the
2:27:48
curtailing of its own left ends
2:27:50
up reshaping the cultural life
2:27:52
of the working class so that
2:27:54
increasingly rather than a kind
2:27:56
of working class consciousness that marks
2:27:58
the identity of your typical
2:28:01
union member, there's a way in
2:28:03
which even if you're a
2:28:05
union member, the terms of your
2:28:07
life in an increasingly suburbanized
2:28:09
American society is really much more
2:28:11
equivalent to somebody else that
2:28:13
you share a similar community with,
2:28:15
like you're in the same
2:28:18
neighborhood, you have home ownership benefits
2:28:20
that are racialized, and that
2:28:22
you become a kind of amorphous
2:28:24
member of a middle class
2:28:26
rather than the militant working class
2:28:28
consciousness that did shape the
2:28:30
insurgencies of the 30s and 40s.
2:28:33
Let's end by turning to
2:28:35
the famously liberal Supreme Court that
2:28:37
emerged from the New Deal
2:28:39
era. How was it that
2:28:41
the Supreme Court went from
2:28:43
being an obstructionist instrument of
2:28:45
reaction against popular democratic government
2:28:47
to then stepping out of
2:28:49
out of the way for
2:28:52
FDR in the mid -1930s
2:28:54
to by the time of
2:28:56
the Warren court in the
2:28:58
1950s and 60s becoming becoming
2:29:00
this high -profile supporter of civil
2:29:02
rights and civil liberties and
2:29:04
a ball work against government
2:29:06
repression and censorship a system
2:29:08
again contrasted against the totalitarianism
2:29:10
of the Soviet and Nazi
2:29:12
regimes, what did it mean
2:29:14
for the judiciary in general
2:29:17
and the High Court in
2:29:19
particular to become sacralized as
2:29:21
the bedrock of liberal American
2:29:23
freedom, particularly a form of
2:29:25
liberal American freedom framed as
2:29:27
being against the tyranny of
2:29:29
the majority? The thing
2:29:31
that's key here is that FDR
2:29:33
succeeds in basically reconstructing the membership of
2:29:35
the courts during the 30s and 40s.
2:29:37
And so it's really a new deal
2:29:39
court by the time you get to
2:29:42
Truman and then Eisenhower. But
2:29:44
by the time Eisenhower is president
2:29:46
in the early 1950s, it's also the
2:29:48
case that at the national level
2:29:50
among national elites, especially outside of the
2:29:52
South, that there's
2:29:54
this growing kind of bipartisan
2:29:57
agreement about the
2:29:59
necessity of preserving and protecting
2:30:01
this official Cold War project. So
2:30:03
you don't necessarily have
2:30:05
the infusion of mass supermajority
2:30:07
support outside of the
2:30:09
institutions of government like in
2:30:11
the 1930s, but you
2:30:14
now have this very particular
2:30:16
period of elite cultural
2:30:18
cohesion across both parties in
2:30:20
a way that is
2:30:22
genuinely quite unique and distinctive
2:30:24
when we think of
2:30:26
the long American 20th century.
2:30:29
And it means that the type of people
2:30:31
that Eisenhower is nominating to the court,
2:30:33
even though he's a Republican, agree
2:30:35
on a whole range of issues with
2:30:37
the kind of person that you'd expect
2:30:39
a democratic president to nominate the ideological
2:30:41
states. Earl Warren was the Republican governor
2:30:44
of California. Exactly. Earl
2:30:46
Warren is the Republican governor of California.
2:30:48
He had been the attorney general.
2:30:50
He'd actually supported Japanese internment, something that
2:30:52
he came to regret, though he
2:30:54
did not mention that really until posthumously
2:30:56
in public writing. But,
2:30:58
you know, the figure of
2:31:00
the liberal court is a
2:31:02
Republican appointee. And that
2:31:04
Earl Warren Court in the
2:31:06
50s and 60s becomes a
2:31:08
kind of apex for a
2:31:10
liberal revolution in the courts
2:31:12
when it comes to the
2:31:14
rights of criminal defendants, due
2:31:16
process, free speech, civil
2:31:18
rights, and liberties. And
2:31:21
it's important to kind of dissect
2:31:23
two things. The first
2:31:25
is what's happening in this
2:31:27
post -war period even before
2:31:29
this transformation in the
2:31:31
courts is that You
2:31:33
have a new appreciation because of
2:31:35
that understanding of what produced McCarthy
2:31:37
in the way that the court
2:31:39
might be a bulwark against it, of
2:31:42
the centrality of constitutionalism
2:31:44
as constitutional law, now separate
2:31:47
from ordinary law overseen
2:31:49
by the courts associated with
2:31:51
the courts. This is
2:31:53
the period in which in law schools, con
2:31:55
law is not only now required as a
2:31:57
course that's being taught, but becomes
2:31:59
very closely identified with the most famous
2:32:02
people that are at law school. So
2:32:04
in the first half of the 20th
2:32:06
century, most well -known
2:32:08
law professors really
2:32:10
engage with non -constitutional
2:32:12
topics. And kan
2:32:14
law is not something primarily taught in
2:32:16
law schools. Indeed, it would be
2:32:18
strange to think of kan law as
2:32:20
like a lawyer's document because constitutional
2:32:23
law would have been
2:32:25
understood in constitutional politics as
2:32:27
an entire complex system.
2:32:30
All of these arrangements of
2:32:32
governance, of checks and
2:32:34
balances, the court structure, the
2:32:36
houses of Congress, and
2:32:38
that to just focus on the courts
2:32:40
would essentially be to take just
2:32:42
a single element and then reduce the
2:32:44
complexity of the system to what
2:32:46
judges say. But in the second
2:32:48
half of the 20th century and starting especially in
2:32:50
the 50s, that once you've
2:32:52
now had the suppression of those debates
2:32:54
about first order questions of economy
2:32:57
and state, then really
2:32:59
the domain of a constitutional
2:33:01
dispute becomes just interpretation between
2:33:03
judges and lawyers over bits
2:33:05
of text, and in a
2:33:07
backdrop in which you think,
2:33:09
well, having a court exercise
2:33:11
authority over these disputes is
2:33:13
a way to suppress a
2:33:16
tyrannical majority, then there's the
2:33:18
elevation of the Constitution is
2:33:20
almost equivalent. to the courts. And
2:33:23
some of the folks that are really
2:33:25
participating in making this argument, so that there's
2:33:27
a scholar named Alexander Bickle who has
2:33:29
a famous book from the early 60s called
2:33:31
The Least Dangerous Branch Defending Judicial Review, they're
2:33:34
actually kind of critics of
2:33:36
the Warren Court. They're not
2:33:38
sure that the legal reasoning that
2:33:40
folks in the Warren Court are using
2:33:42
to reach these opinions is necessarily
2:33:44
the best opinions even if they might
2:33:46
support some of the underlying policies
2:33:48
like getting rid of segregation. And
2:33:51
so there's this interesting moment
2:33:53
in which there's now this
2:33:55
emerging cult of the court
2:33:57
that's taking place, that's developing
2:33:59
within institutions of academy and
2:34:01
state, while at the same
2:34:03
time, a little bit more
2:34:05
sort of standoffishness with the
2:34:07
transformations that are taking place
2:34:09
in the Warren court specifically.
2:34:12
And you're having the promotion, the
2:34:14
proliferation of this idea of the
2:34:16
court as what stands for the
2:34:18
Constitution because you now, this is
2:34:20
this period when you start seeing
2:34:22
the emergence of a new journalistic
2:34:24
figure, the Supreme Court reporter that
2:34:26
emerges in the 50s and 60s.
2:34:28
Anthony Lewis who writes a book
2:34:30
called Gideon's Trumpet about one of
2:34:32
the Warren Court decisions is a
2:34:34
central figure in the development of
2:34:36
this new journalistic personality that's going
2:34:38
to to spend time paying attention
2:34:40
to the particular dynamics of the
2:34:42
courts, the backgrounds, biographical backgrounds of
2:34:44
each of the people that are on the
2:34:46
court, and yet again,
2:34:49
this growing identification of
2:34:51
the Constitution with the study
2:34:53
of law and with
2:34:55
what happens at the Supreme
2:34:58
Court level. Now,
2:35:00
by the time you get to
2:35:02
the 70s, when arguments by Lewis who's
2:35:04
deeply impressed with the work of
2:35:06
the Warren Court and former clerks that
2:35:08
had worked for the justices that
2:35:10
were part of the Warren Court are
2:35:13
now in the legal academy, they're
2:35:15
looking back on the Warren
2:35:17
Court and are saying, this
2:35:20
is vindication. that you can
2:35:22
get all of the liberal
2:35:24
principles that you want fulfilled
2:35:26
through the activity of the
2:35:28
court. That the court is
2:35:30
this incredible mechanism for avoiding
2:35:33
the extremes of left and
2:35:35
right. and moving the country
2:35:37
in inclusive directions through a
2:35:39
steady conversation that takes place
2:35:41
between lawyers, especially lawyers
2:35:43
at elite law schools and
2:35:45
judges, and that judges should enjoy
2:35:47
a kind of right to
2:35:50
manage the project of American reform.
2:35:52
Notice this is precisely because first
2:35:54
order questions of state and economy,
2:35:56
whether or not you should have
2:35:58
a Supreme Court, what should you
2:36:00
do about the states have already
2:36:02
been removed from the table, but
2:36:04
the achievements of the war in
2:36:07
court for a new generation of
2:36:09
liberal lawyers becomes proof of the
2:36:11
fact that this overarching system that
2:36:13
links the declaration to the constitution,
2:36:15
to civil liberties, to a regulated
2:36:17
form of capitalism, to checks and
2:36:19
balances with the court at its
2:36:21
apex really is the best model
2:36:23
of constitutionalism perhaps ever and certainly
2:36:25
one that can be replicated everywhere.
2:36:27
And not just for liberal lawyers
2:36:29
as we'll get into in the
2:36:31
next episode, liberals in general have have
2:36:34
since this period put their
2:36:36
faith in the courts to save
2:36:38
us. Ruth Bader Ginsburg apparently
2:36:40
thought the courts would save us
2:36:42
even as she refused to retire
2:36:44
in time to ensure a liberal
2:36:46
replacement by a Democratic president. And
2:36:49
these days, it really feels
2:36:51
like that just may not
2:36:53
be the case. Yeah, we'll
2:36:55
discuss this. But I think
2:36:57
one way of underscoring it
2:36:59
is that What
2:37:01
we've covered or we've discussed is
2:37:03
the kind of contingent circumstances
2:37:05
domestically and internationally that shaped these
2:37:07
three decades like the 30s
2:37:09
to the 60s that are punctuated
2:37:11
by FDR and the successes
2:37:13
of the New Deal and the
2:37:15
rise of something like the
2:37:17
war in court in the Cold
2:37:19
War period and the constitutionalization
2:37:21
of a set of civil rights
2:37:23
achievements like the Civil Rights
2:37:25
Act, the Voting Rights Act, but
2:37:27
that the role played by
2:37:29
the institutions within this story, and
2:37:31
especially the role played by
2:37:33
the Supreme Court in the 50s
2:37:35
and 60s, really is kind
2:37:37
of exceptional if you're thinking of
2:37:39
the long delay of American
2:37:41
history, that it's a product of
2:37:43
a very particular set of
2:37:45
dynamics tied especially when we're talking
2:37:48
about the court to the
2:37:50
Cold War politics that produced elite
2:37:52
cultural cohesion among center left
2:37:54
and center right, and that I
2:37:56
think one of the long kind
2:37:58
of effects is that especially among
2:38:01
central left folks and among American
2:38:03
liberals has been the idea that
2:38:05
the terms of collective life that
2:38:07
ended up being generated and the
2:38:09
vision of institutions like the court
2:38:11
are just the way that American
2:38:13
life is going to be always
2:38:15
and the way that these institutions
2:38:17
will always operate. And
2:38:19
so in a sense, Americanism
2:38:21
and a brand of constitutional veneration
2:38:23
has been read back across
2:38:25
all of American history and forward
2:38:27
as something that's a persistent
2:38:29
feature that one can expect. And
2:38:32
what I think folks in the
2:38:34
Democratic Party, American liberals more generally
2:38:36
are confronting in this moment is
2:38:38
what to do when the types
2:38:40
of Cold War strictures, the compact
2:38:42
that one had assumed had a
2:38:44
kind of stable footing in collective
2:38:46
life really no longer does. That
2:38:56
was the second in a three
2:38:58
-part series. Aziz Rana is
2:39:01
a professor of law at Boston College
2:39:03
Law School, where his research and teaching
2:39:05
center on constitutional law and political development.
2:39:07
He's the author of two books, The
2:39:09
Two Faces of American Freedom and
2:39:12
the book we're discussing throughout this series,
2:39:14
The Constitutional Bind, how Americans
2:39:16
came to idolize a document
2:39:18
that fails them. Thank
2:39:20
you for listening to The Dig from
2:39:22
Jacobin Magazine. As Marks once said,
2:39:24
After noting that, while the working men,
2:39:26
the true political power of the
2:39:29
North, allowed slavery to defile their own
2:39:31
republic, they boasted it the
2:39:33
highest prerogative of the white -skinned laborer
2:39:35
to sell himself and choose his
2:39:37
own master. They were
2:39:39
unable to attain the true freedom
2:39:41
of labor. While other
2:39:43
podcasts have only interpreted the world in
2:39:45
various ways, our point is to change
2:39:48
it. We're posting new episodes most weeks.
2:39:50
The Dig was produced by Alex Lewis.
2:39:52
Our associate producer is Jackson Roach.
2:39:55
Music by Jeffrey Brodsky. Our
2:39:57
operations manager is Sylvia Atwood. Our
2:39:59
senior advisors are Franco
2:40:01
-Sand, Ben Check our Vag...
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