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0:00
All right, welcome listeners to episode 84
0:02
of Know Your Enemy. I'm Matt Sippman,
0:04
your podcast co-host, and I'm here, as
0:06
always, with my great friend, Sam Ethelbell.
0:08
Hey, Sam. Hi, Matt. I'm so excited
0:10
for this episode. I know we say
0:12
that all the time, but the combination
0:14
of guest and topic and text really...
0:17
It was one I had so
0:19
much fun preparing for and then
0:21
actually having the conversation. Yeah,
0:23
it turned out really great. Yes,
0:26
and we explained a lot at
0:28
the start of the episode, but
0:30
really since this summer with the
0:32
discourse over the Oppenheimer film and
0:35
also the death of Daniel Ellsberg. Yeah.
0:37
Daniel Ellsberg was the person who leaked
0:40
the Pentagon Papers and was a kind
0:42
of activist against nuclear weapons because he
0:44
had been a nuclear planner in the
0:47
Defense Department. That combination
0:49
of events, we just
0:51
started cooking up something to do with maybe
0:54
nuclear weapons, and we
0:56
lit upon both the
0:58
best answer and the most know-your-enemy answer,
1:01
which is we decided to take as
1:03
our text, Gary Wills' really
1:05
incredible 2010 book called
1:08
Bomb Power, the modern presidency in
1:10
the national security state, which really
1:13
traces kind of how the
1:15
development of the atom bomb, the processes around
1:17
it, the secrecy and so on, totally
1:20
transformed our system of government to
1:22
make it almost a kind of permanent
1:25
presidential dictatorship because the power
1:27
to deploy the atom bomb
1:29
was solely lodged in one
1:31
man's hands. And we had a
1:33
great guest, and that was Eric Baker.
1:35
That's right. He actually went to
1:38
the same parish in Chicago as Gary Wills. Yeah.
1:41
So Eric was Wills-pilled before any of us, at
1:43
least me and Sam, and he
1:45
really, you can tell just the thoughtfulness
1:47
and sensitivity he brings to working through
1:49
Gary's ideas and arguments was really remarkable.
1:51
And he's just one of my favorite
1:54
writers and thinkers. Great writer. And from
1:56
afar, just a lovely human being. He
1:58
is lovely. It's
4:00
been a great year with those boys
4:02
and with you our listeners and with all of
4:04
our guests and with all of our guests It
4:07
really is true. Sometimes I do feel
4:09
almost guilty how generous so many of our
4:12
guests have been They give up a few
4:14
hours of their afternoon. We always record for
4:16
at least two hours I know we really
4:18
do now before it's all said and done.
4:20
So our guests are just very generous with
4:22
their time and expertise and Hope
4:25
again, everyone has a restful holiday
4:27
break. Yeah, Merry Christmas. I'll say
4:29
it Thank you
4:33
Alright, alright, shall we get to it? Let's
4:35
do it. Here's our episode with Eric Baker
4:37
about Gary Wills's incredible 2010 book Enjoy
4:53
You All
4:58
right, let's get started Eric Baker welcome
5:00
to know your enemy Thanks guys. Happy
5:03
15 year anniversary of the time
5:05
guy through a shoe at George W. Bush
5:08
Well, that is sort of appropriate for what we're talking about
5:10
today 100% yeah as
5:13
well as the demise of former Secretary
5:15
of State Henry Kissinger Yeah,
5:18
I was thinking about that This is a
5:20
great episode for approaching the end of 2023
5:22
because it has Gary Wills who has accompanied
5:24
the podcast quite a lot this Year, it's
5:27
got the nuclear bomb hearkening back
5:29
to the great Oppenheimer Barbenheimer
5:32
era of 2023 and
5:34
it's got plenty of Henry Kissinger, too so
5:37
all of our favorite characters and Themes
5:40
of this year will be addressed in this
5:42
great book. Yes. Oh, we should get to
5:44
what that book is Sam
5:46
as you mentioned once again, we're going back
5:48
to Gary Wills. It's been a Wills year
5:50
for the podcast and This
5:53
is a conversation. We've been really eager
5:55
to have especially with you Eric and
5:57
it's about Wills is probably not
6:00
one of his most famous books, you
6:02
know, compared to Nick's Naganistas or Lincoln
6:04
at Gettysburg. It's called Bomb
6:06
Power, the Modern Presidency in the
6:08
National Security State. It was published
6:10
in January 2010 when Wills would
6:12
have been in his mid-70s. So
6:15
right in the middle of Obama's first term,
6:18
thus importantly, really not long at all
6:20
after George W. Bush's administration, which kind
6:22
of looms over this book in certain
6:24
ways. And we're going to talk
6:27
all about this book. But before we do, Eric,
6:29
Sam and I have already regaled listeners with
6:31
how we got into Gary Wills. I
6:33
know this book is one that's meant a lot to you
6:36
and that you've written about
6:38
and kind of has informed your views. How
6:40
did you first get into Gary Wills? Well,
6:42
I discovered Gary Wills work for the first
6:45
time when I was deliberating whether or not
6:47
to be confirmed into the Catholic Church. Here
6:50
we go. And my confirmation
6:52
sponsor, I had told him
6:55
a lot of my concerns,
6:57
my outrage at
6:59
the many awful things
7:02
in which the church had been implicated
7:04
throughout history. And I said that
7:06
I wasn't sure if I could be a Catholic despite
7:08
all of that. And my confirmation
7:10
sponsor said, you know, there's a guy who
7:12
goes to church here who wrote
7:14
an interesting book about this. And
7:17
he gave me this book called Why
7:19
I Am a Catholic by Gary Wills,
7:21
professor of history at Northwestern and fellow
7:24
parishioner at the church that my family attended
7:26
on the North side of Chicago. And
7:29
that book is the title is kind
7:31
of a joke because the
7:33
vast majority of this book is
7:35
just a really brutal history of
7:38
everything awful that the church and
7:40
especially popes have done. And
7:43
it concludes with this kind of set of
7:45
personal reflections on why Wills
7:48
has remained a Catholic. So
7:50
that was my first encounter with Gary
7:52
and his work. And then a
7:55
few years after that, I remember very
7:57
clearly when this book came out, there
7:59
was some kind of event at the church and
8:01
my parents came home with a copy
8:03
signed from him. A copy of Bomb
8:05
Power? A copy of Bomb Power, yeah.
8:08
Yeah, I started reading it and my mind
8:11
was just totally blown. I was very
8:13
staunchly anti-war, anti-Bush at
8:15
that time, starting
8:18
to be disillusioned, disappointed with
8:20
the limits of Obama's presidency,
8:22
how little he had seemed
8:24
to fulfill his promises on
8:26
the national security side. Exactly,
8:28
yeah, imperial presidency, stuff like that.
8:31
It seemed like this book, it actually explained
8:33
it. All the other
8:35
explanations, it was a weakness of
8:37
will or Obama was just lying
8:40
about his beliefs and there are,
8:42
I'm sure, many factors that explain
8:44
Obama's myriad failures on this front.
8:47
But this book took a different tack granted in
8:49
history. So this book really was one of the
8:51
first books that I read that made me think,
8:53
maybe this is what I want to do with
8:55
my life. To that respect,
8:57
it is a very important book, one
8:59
that I've returned to again and one that
9:02
I've also been thinking about pretty much constantly this
9:04
year. Did you meet Gary?
9:06
Oh yeah, yeah. Again, we went to
9:08
church every week together. After
9:11
this book was released, we were at his
9:13
house for dinner and he was regaling his
9:15
group of guests and someone asked him what
9:17
he was working on and he said,
9:20
well, I'm working on an exegesis
9:22
of the Epistles, the Hebrews, but
9:25
I think to be provocative, I'm going to
9:27
title it, Why Priests? Yes,
9:30
I remember that book. Yes,
9:32
he produced this book, a kind
9:35
of argument that the Hebrews
9:37
has been systematically misrepresented by the
9:39
church to justify its untenable theological
9:42
claims about the priesthood. And yet
9:44
again, still a Catholic. So what
9:46
you're saying, Eric, is all the
9:49
best American leftist Catholics are
9:51
from Chicago, apparently, you, Gary Wills
9:53
and John Cusack. Exactly.
9:56
Yes. Well, Eric, I did want to say too
9:58
that that's such a... the appropriate kind
10:01
of introduction to this book, meeting
10:04
Gary through the context of your parish
10:06
in Chicago. Because did either of you
10:08
notice what the dedication of the book
10:10
is? Blessed are
10:12
the peacemakers. Oh, wow.
10:15
I mean, Gary's anti-war
10:17
convictions, outrage, many
10:19
of the events that are narrated
10:22
in a historical mode in this
10:24
book really helped to catalyze Gary's
10:26
initial sort of political
10:28
transformation. And especially his
10:31
shift to a more oppositional stance
10:33
towards the church hierarchy. He was
10:35
a great defender of the Baragans
10:38
during the Vietnam era. Opposition
10:41
to war has been, I think,
10:43
a real bedrock principle of this
10:45
thinking. I think one thing to
10:47
do right now is to just read the first
10:50
paragraph of the book to give listeners
10:52
a sense of what it's about. And then
10:54
we'll talk a little more about the context of this
10:56
book, how it fits into both his
10:58
many books over the years and his preoccupations.
11:01
But also, the context in which this book
11:03
was published and kind of the significance of
11:05
that for how Wills wrote it. But before
11:07
we go any farther, I'm
11:10
gonna read this bracing first paragraph from the
11:12
book. It's from the introduction titled
11:14
War in Peace. This book
11:16
has a basic thesis that the bomb,
11:19
capital B, altered our
11:21
subsequent history down to its
11:23
deepest constitutional roots. It
11:25
redefined the presidency, as
11:27
in all respects, America's commander in chief,
11:30
a term that took on a new and
11:32
unconstitutional meaning in this period. It
11:34
fostered an anxiety of continuing crisis
11:37
so that society was pervasively
11:39
militarized. It redefined the
11:41
government as a national security state with
11:44
an apparatus of secrecy and executive
11:46
control. It redefined Congress
11:48
as an executor of the executive,
11:51
and it redefined the Supreme Court as a
11:53
follower of the follower of the executive. Only
11:56
one part of the government had the
11:58
supreme power, the bomb. and all
12:00
else must defer to it for the good of
12:03
the nation, for the good of the world, for
12:05
the custody of the future in
12:07
a world of perpetual
12:09
emergency superseding ordinary constitutional
12:11
restrictions. How
12:14
a way to start the book. A cold
12:17
shot in the morning, a slap in the
12:19
face. It's a brisk arresting introduction to this
12:21
book. I'll just say quickly it feels like
12:23
Wills' aim in this book, which he really
12:25
succeeded at from my perspective, was to defamiliarize
12:28
the national security state for the reader.
12:30
This thing that's built up in the
12:33
form of the CIA, the
12:35
NSA, the NSC, this sort of permanent security
12:37
footing that people of our generation are just
12:39
completely used to because it's been the water
12:42
that we swim in. There's obviously been some
12:44
moments of resistance toward it. There's
12:46
been some pushback against the
12:48
level of secrecy and classification that's involved
12:51
with it, but in most sense it's
12:53
only been a ratcheting up of the
12:55
sort of power, authority, moral
12:57
and legal of the national security
12:59
state in our lifetimes. That's
13:02
kind of what he does, sort of
13:04
give you a history of how
13:06
that national security state came to be.
13:08
The distinctive thing about his argument, and
13:10
I'd love to hear Eric lay this
13:12
out a little bit more, is that
13:14
he locates the origin, the
13:17
original sin with the creation of the
13:19
atomic bomb and the circumstances in which
13:21
it was made, and it's really the
13:24
necessities of having a nuclear
13:26
arsenal for the president to be
13:28
prepared to respond to nuclear war,
13:31
which is this kind of corrosive
13:34
force in our government that makes
13:36
democratic governance imperiled
13:38
if not impossible. He says at some
13:41
point, lodging, quote-unquote, the fate of the
13:43
world in one man with no constitutional
13:45
check on his actions caused
13:47
a violent break in our whole
13:49
governmental system. I think that's exactly
13:51
right, and I think the other
13:54
important preoccupation of this book that
13:56
he again locates its origins in
13:58
the possession of the Capitol. B
14:00
bomb is the idea of
14:02
kind of perpetual warfare. I
14:04
mean, it's a strong claim of this
14:06
book that despite kind of protestations or
14:09
obfuscation to the contrary, the United
14:11
States has in a very deep
14:14
sense been at war without ceasing
14:16
since the atomic bomb has been dropped. And
14:19
that in some sense, it could not have been otherwise.
14:21
I mean, the threat of total
14:24
annihilation that the bomb entails sort
14:26
of leads to this kind of
14:28
heightened sense of permanent war and
14:31
the orientation of the entire
14:33
apparatus of American government around
14:35
that purpose of war. And
14:38
that's where I think you can see the connections
14:40
with the broader preoccupations of his work. And
14:42
I mean, because of my background, I have
14:44
a very hard time thinking of Gary
14:47
as anything other than a fundamentally
14:50
religious thinker. And I see the
14:52
traces in this book of his long
14:54
standing engagement with the thought
14:56
of St. Augustine. In fact, I
14:59
believe that his previous publishing
15:01
project before this book was
15:03
his Penguin Classics translation of
15:05
Augustine's Confessions, which kind of
15:07
shows the breadth of his thought. He goes from translating
15:10
the Confessions to writing this book. But
15:13
there's a real sense in this book that the
15:15
bomb has sort of mythologized
15:17
politics. It sort of gives
15:19
a charge to everything. There's
15:22
this apocalyptic eschatological valence
15:26
to governance in the era of the
15:28
bomb. And I think that the Augustinian
15:31
and Wills sees this as a
15:34
really fundamental perversion, a
15:36
kind of mixing of registers that should
15:38
not be mixed. And that's
15:41
something that runs throughout his writing on
15:43
war through his entire career. Definitely. I
15:45
think it was our last main episode
15:47
when we talked about Wills' book, The
15:49
Kennedy Imprisonment. I mentioned that came out
15:51
in the early 80s. And
15:53
so it was kind of like right in the
15:55
middle of Gary's career, kind of like him at
15:57
the height of his powers, kind of a prison.
16:00
approaching middle age, but this book is kind
16:02
of late wills. Bomb Power comes out in
16:04
2010, and I feel like
16:06
Late Wills is marked by relatively
16:09
slim religious books like What Jesus
16:11
Meant and What Paul Meant. Both
16:14
of those were published in 2006. It was
16:16
in 2005. He published his
16:18
little book on praying the Rosary. It
16:20
was in 2007. He published
16:22
a book called Head and Heart,
16:24
American Christianities. So this
16:27
kind of period of Wills that the Bomb
16:29
Power book emerges from, it really
16:31
is, I think, a pretty religious phase of
16:34
Wills' career as a writer. He's
16:36
never not a religious writer, but just the
16:39
kind of number of titles in this period
16:41
that take up explicitly religious themes
16:44
is notable. And I
16:46
would also say something we haven't talked about
16:48
as much. It does come through in the
16:50
Kennedy episode, and it will make
16:52
sense in light of Nixon Agonistos too.
16:55
He really is a student of leadership.
16:58
He published one of the stranger books, or
17:00
more idiosyncratic ones, back in 1994
17:02
called Certain Trumpets,
17:04
The Call of Leaders. He
17:07
wrote a book on Lincoln, on Nixon,
17:09
on Kennedy, on George Washington, his book
17:11
called Cincinnatus. And of course,
17:13
you can't forget this comes after almost a
17:16
decade spent engaging in a very real way
17:18
with the history of the papacy. Yes. Papelson
17:21
is a major theme again of I am
17:23
a Catholic. Yes. So that
17:25
theme of leadership, especially his fascination with the
17:27
presidency, I think this book in some ways,
17:30
it's a very interesting addition to that part
17:32
of Wills' thought and work
17:35
because I don't mean this as
17:37
a criticism of him, but I admit I'm influenced
17:39
by his choice of photos for
17:41
his dust jackets on his books. He always
17:43
kind of looks a bit like a fuddy-duddy.
17:46
His big glasses, dressed very
17:48
conservatively, kind of looks like a nerd.
17:51
Sometimes he has his dog there with him. There
17:53
was something a bit old-fashioned, right? He
17:55
does political and intellectual history. He's
17:58
concerned with leaders. Another major thing. major
18:00
topic of his, of course, was the
18:02
American founding. He wrote a book on
18:04
Jefferson's Declaration on the Federalist Papers. He
18:06
might not put it this way, but great men,
18:09
you know. And this book is interesting and corrective
18:11
because it's so focused on structures
18:13
and decisions to structure
18:15
things a certain way then unfold
18:18
over time. There's a logic that
18:20
comes out of it in a
18:22
way that's kind of beyond the
18:24
capacity of any single human being
18:26
to lead or guide or resist
18:28
possibly even. Yeah. It's interesting to hear
18:30
you saying that. I hadn't really put that together. You're
18:32
sort of saying that the logic of bomb power generates
18:36
this concentration of, to use Eric's
18:38
term, sort of mythic power in
18:41
the person of the president, which
18:43
is totally incompatible
18:45
with small-r Republican
18:47
democratic governance. And
18:49
so if he has a great amount
18:51
of interest in the sort of singular
18:54
contributions of singular men at certain times,
18:56
whether they're for ill or for good,
18:58
in this book, he's sort of saying how a
19:00
structure and a sort of like sequence
19:03
of events in history that are unleashed
19:05
by this particularly weird
19:07
moment, this thing that happens with
19:09
the bomb, that that can
19:11
sort of dangerously invest
19:14
so much greatness
19:16
and terribleness in the president, that that's
19:18
a great danger. I think
19:20
that's exactly spot on. And I think
19:22
that it speaks to what
19:24
I see as one of the striking features of
19:27
this book. And what to me is, to be
19:29
honest, to some extent, I think a political limitation
19:31
of the approach, which is that throughout
19:34
the book, the emphasis is
19:36
strongly on the unconstitutionality of
19:38
the regime of bomb power.
19:40
And Gary really deploys all of
19:42
his psychological talents
19:45
to explicating exactly
19:48
the ways in which the
19:51
defenders, the ideologues of bomb
19:53
power have tortured the
19:55
meeting of the Constitution in order
19:57
to pretend that this apparatus that they've
20:00
created is unconstitutional. But
20:02
Gary comes across very strongly in this
20:04
book as a great believer in constitutionalism,
20:07
especially the idea of checks
20:09
and balances, the power
20:12
of the legislature, and to some extent,
20:14
the Supreme Court to constrain the presidency,
20:16
which I think is one of the
20:18
most dated parts of this book. And
20:20
I think that Gary would be unapologetic
20:23
about the relatively old-fashioned nature
20:25
of that inclination. I remember
20:27
one conversation, someone mentioned casually
20:30
in passing something about him no longer being a
20:32
conservative anymore. And he actually took Umbridge at that
20:34
and said that, of course, in many
20:37
substantive ways on a whole range of
20:39
issues, his political
20:41
positions were left wing,
20:43
but he still identified himself
20:45
in many ways as a
20:47
conservative person, someone with a
20:49
conservative sensibility. And I do
20:52
think that that crumbs across in this book,
20:54
both for better and for worse. Well, it's
20:56
in the afterword, speaking of this sort of
20:58
constitutionality or constitutionalism of his thought at this
21:00
period, it's in one of the very last
21:02
paragraphs of the afterword where he says, on
21:04
January 25th, 2002, White House counsel, Alberto
21:07
Gonzalez, signed a memo written by
21:09
David Addington that called the Geneva
21:12
Conventions, quote, quaint and quote obsolete.
21:15
Perhaps in the nuclear era, the
21:17
Constitution has become quaint and obsolete.
21:19
Few people even consider anymore
21:21
Madison's lapidary pronouncement, quote,
21:24
in Republican government, the legislative authority
21:26
necessarily predominates from Federalist 51. You
21:29
know, I'm just thinking of when Matt
21:31
starts looking at the pictures of Gary
21:33
and seeing him sort of fuddy-duddy and
21:35
conservative and disposition and dress, calling his
21:37
preoccupation with the Constitution potentially quaint and
21:39
obsolete, you know, out of touch. That's
21:42
a place where that kind of texture comes
21:44
through in the very end of the book.
21:46
Like, so what if it's quaint to believe
21:48
in these guardrails? I still do. I was
21:51
thinking too, we don't really have much concern
21:53
at this point in the podcast to, you
21:55
know, shoehorn our topics into a framework where
21:57
we say this is what it means for
22:00
understanding the right in conservatism. I
22:02
think this book, the
22:04
power of its argument and kind of
22:06
the radicalness of it will make its
22:08
relevance to all kinds of questions we're
22:10
still grappling with very clear, but I
22:12
was thinking that it's interesting that a
22:15
major kind of theme of
22:17
mid-century conservatism, I'm thinking
22:20
of people like James Burnham and
22:22
Wilmore Kendall, was their advocacy for
22:24
the legislature, for Congress, against
22:27
the kind of overweening presidency.
22:30
And the administrative state. And the administrative state,
22:32
which I think they viewed as kind of
22:34
like the handmaiden of progressivism. And
22:36
the executive branch, yeah. And so
22:39
you see James Burnham writing a
22:41
book like Congress in the American
22:43
tradition, Wilmore Kendall's emphasis on deliberation,
22:45
which clearly happens in legislatures, maybe
22:48
not only there, but preeminently there. And
22:50
it was interesting to me that Wills kind
22:53
of shows, he doesn't make
22:55
this reference explicit, but all
22:57
those mid-century Cold Warrior
22:59
conservatives who also were
23:02
advocating for return to something like
23:04
Congress's pride of place in our
23:06
constitutional system, that was never gonna
23:08
work. Right,
23:10
like the Cold War part of it,
23:12
meaning the bomb power part of it,
23:15
they hadn't adequately, I think, reckoned with
23:17
what it might've meant for our political
23:19
system, specifically in light of that question
23:21
of the relative balance between the executive
23:23
and the legislature. And I
23:25
think there's an even more devastating kind of
23:27
imminent critique of that position
23:30
in this book, which is that
23:32
he really shows the way that
23:34
bomb power, unconstrained executive
23:37
authority has been
23:39
deployed, especially since Reagan,
23:41
but even earlier, to
23:43
dismantle Congress's attempts to
23:45
expand the regulatory state.
23:48
Congress passes legislation that creates
23:50
new institutions and the executive
23:52
branch are supposed to have
23:55
a regulatory function, and then the president,
23:58
A certain kind of unlimited authority.
24:00
the over everything, but you know,
24:02
especially over the Executive Branch it
24:04
carries view functionally nullifies those pieces
24:06
of legislation by dismantling to be
24:08
a for example. So this idea
24:10
that if Congress versus the regulatory
24:12
state for Gary, that's exactly wrong.
24:14
It's the Imperial Presidency vs. Congress
24:16
and the regulatory institutions that Congress
24:18
create. Maybe just to give the
24:20
listener another good summary of what
24:22
Gary Wells is up to in
24:24
this, but I'm in a read
24:26
from a piece that I hope
24:28
we get back to later, which
24:30
Eric you wrote in The Bachelor
24:32
on occasion of Daniel Ellsberg staff
24:34
this year, who of course, a
24:36
famous whistle leaked the Pentagon Papers.
24:38
What we can talk about Ellsbury
24:40
more think he's really interesting figure
24:42
in this book, but also in
24:44
the kind of Gary Wills cosmos
24:46
surface. He's a senior who has
24:48
led a qualities that are, I
24:50
think are admirable in the kind
24:52
of ethical world that Gary Wills
24:54
operates in as well. But here's
24:57
that this is a summary of
24:59
the book, but you offer in
25:01
this piece on Ellsberg you say
25:03
Ellsberg had a particularly acute grasp
25:05
of what the historian Gary Wills
25:07
has called bomb power. The way
25:09
that the very existence of the
25:11
United States nuclear arsenal fundamentally constrains
25:13
the possibility of exercising democratic oversight
25:15
of the nation's military. The power
25:17
to annihilate all human civilization cannot
25:19
same li be disposed of by
25:21
popular vote, The bomb is a
25:23
weapon suited only to have a
25:25
never went dictator. and that is
25:27
how the United States came to
25:29
envision the presidency in the nuclear
25:31
age, culturally, politically and even legally.
25:33
Autocracy of course was easier to
25:35
produce them. Benevolence. The bombed and
25:37
and secrecy. Secrecy demands line, and
25:39
lying demands lawlessness. Yeah, I think
25:41
that that exactly sums it up.
25:43
And I think that that's to
25:45
go back to earlier point that
25:47
talking about this book and deletions
25:49
summers curious clear admiration for. A
25:52
kind of classical idealists should as noble
25:54
leadership and been he. He really wants
25:57
to say that that's on par, makes
25:59
that. Impossible to exercise. I
26:01
think that this is so essential
26:03
to think about in relation to
26:05
the completion of of this this
26:07
book and and in some ways
26:09
I think that the animus for
26:11
reading this book in the the
26:13
disappointment so thoroughly Obama administration again
26:15
this momentous like to to some
26:17
extent the moral qualities of the
26:19
individual occupying the presidency do not
26:22
matter because they will be inevitably
26:24
corrupted crown Town by the force
26:26
of this almost kind of demonic
26:28
power that has been erected around.
26:30
A nuclear bomb? Yes, I think that's so
26:32
key, eric. But I also think it's a
26:34
very interesting. Perhaps. Critique of
26:36
the way a lot of people
26:38
understood the George W. Bush Administration
26:41
right were so many things that
26:43
went wrong that the Iraq War,
26:45
the Financial crisis. but in this
26:47
context, especially buses foreign policy. A
26:49
So much of that was attributed
26:51
to his personal qualities. Right is
26:53
a even joke. Who doesn't believe
26:55
in science? He prayed to God
26:57
before he invaded Iraq that Hold
27:00
Bush is a failure. It's and
27:02
incompetent kind of fail Sons, You
27:04
know, his family and fortune. End
27:06
the wicked Advisors yet around him like
27:08
Karl Rove. You know that was the
27:10
problem of the Bush Years. That's why
27:12
things went so wrong. That's why we
27:14
made his disastrous were policy decisions. And
27:17
in some ways you know this book
27:19
is same. Really it was Dick Cheney
27:21
and David Addington. Really, it was Str.
27:23
I mean that that's that's that's what
27:25
So astonishing every day which was Rebel
27:27
a Tory to me as a young
27:29
person reading this I had spent years
27:31
record stating that over you know that
27:34
the institution of the Presidency Bush's. To
27:36
credited so much that it's a
27:38
kind anticipation of a lot of
27:40
with American liberals said about about
27:42
Donald Trump. but there's a sense
27:44
we used to be governed by
27:46
these noble statesmen you know who
27:48
did so much to transfer a
27:50
country where real governors and now
27:52
Bush's is just kind of evil
27:54
moron who has destroyed all fetzer
27:56
to be able to say no.
27:58
actually there are no exceptions. There
28:00
that know postwar presidents who has
28:02
even made a dent in this
28:05
edifice. It's is universal complicity and
28:07
you cannot imagine a better kind
28:09
of image of what you were
28:12
just describing Eric's Then the passing
28:14
from George W. Bush to Brock
28:16
Obama meeting two men who were
28:19
so different in so many ways.
28:21
You know, the brilliant intellectual savvy
28:23
Obama with his charisma, intelligence and
28:26
talents vs. Ws, the damn evangelical
28:28
from Texas s and. Those two
28:30
men, despite being so different, the move
28:33
from one to the other only put
28:35
the barest of dense. If we could
28:37
say that in the way or country
28:39
operates as a national security states and
28:42
side of just the way it's all
28:44
these structures in the commitments they entail
28:46
around the world among other things to
28:48
overwhelm any particular individual who sense the
28:51
presidency, whether it's George W, Bush or
28:53
Obama Will let me make one point
28:55
about what's distinctive about the George W
28:57
era. I mean I think Will is
29:00
very. Angry about George W. Bush
29:02
the absolute total disregard for certainly
29:04
like humanitarian ethics by also toward
29:06
him as he sex at of
29:09
constitutionality as it had been understood.
29:11
He repeats this La Jolla several
29:13
times, which I think liberals of
29:16
that era would be very familiar
29:18
with. About what did George W.
29:20
Bush presidency rots your squat? The
29:23
faulty legal justification for military tribunals,
29:25
suspended Habeas corpus, Extraordinary Rendition secret
29:27
prisons around the world, warrantless surveillance.
29:30
of citizens at home to abrogation of
29:32
the geneva conventions unilateral dispensation from treaties
29:34
and enhanced interrogation methods like waterboarding of
29:36
course which he calls torture elsewhere in
29:39
the book because that is what it
29:41
is these things that were characteristic of
29:43
the response to nine eleven the war
29:45
on terror i do think you could
29:48
see how the effects of bomb power
29:50
makes impossible in a very specific way
29:52
which is that most of these things
29:54
are being done in secret based on
29:57
legal justification that are also secret you
29:59
know Well, the contest within the administration,
30:01
whenever there was, between John Yoo in
30:03
the Justice
30:06
Department, Office of Legal Counsel, and John
30:08
Ashcroft, who was sometimes a little bit
30:10
not on board with every single thing
30:12
that the Bush administration wanted to do,
30:14
these contests were just completely behind the
30:16
scenes, different lawyers arguing with each other
30:19
about what they could do in secret.
30:22
Secret legal justifications for secret actions
30:24
that unleashed evil on the world.
30:26
But the idea that these things ought to
30:28
be and can be kept secret, not
30:31
just from the public but from Congress, that
30:33
is the legacy of bomb power. The necessity
30:35
for the executive branch, the people around the
30:37
president to be on a permanent security
30:40
and war footing and be
30:42
able at all times to use nuclear power in the
30:44
worst case scenario, it creates the
30:47
justification for secrecy. Yeah, I think secrecy
30:49
is such an important theme. The layers
30:51
of deception and the assertion of secrecy
30:53
is almost a kind of moral right
30:56
of the executive. I mean, there are
30:58
so many examples that Jerry provides in
31:00
this book that are so striking. He
31:02
writes at some point, quote, secrecy emanated
31:05
from the Manhattan Project like a giant
31:07
radiation emission. Anything connected to
31:09
the bomb, its development, scientific advisors,
31:12
protection, deployment, possible use was,
31:14
as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
31:16
said, born secret. It was
31:18
self-classifying. And then
31:20
he writes, and the power of secrecy
31:22
that enveloped the bomb became a model
31:24
for the planning or execution of, and
31:26
this is in capital letters, anything important,
31:29
as guarded by, capital I, important capital
31:31
P, people, because the government was the
31:33
keeper of the great secret. It began
31:35
specializing in secret keeping. Yes. He
31:38
believed that it contained the seeds of kind
31:40
of everything else that followed. He
31:42
called the Manhattan Project a poisonous
31:44
admixture of government and secrecy, and
31:47
he writes, the secrecy that had enveloped
31:49
Los Alamos would steal quietly across the
31:52
entire American landscape in the years to
31:54
come. Yeah, and Eric, you said you
31:56
thought, based on your perception of objects,
31:58
that the Manhattan Oppenheimer that Christopher Nolan
32:01
must have read this book when he was working
32:03
on it. Yeah, that's my strong hunch at least.
32:05
This theme is so central to that movie
32:08
and I think it's one thing that the
32:10
movie really does quite well. I mean, I
32:12
think Nolan kind of dramatizes this
32:14
argument of Gary's that a lot
32:16
of the kind of apparatus of
32:18
security and surveillance and persecution and
32:21
paranoia that we associate with the
32:23
McCarthy period in the 1950s actually
32:26
was created around the Manhattan
32:29
Project and the kind of cutting
32:31
back and forth between Los Alamos, the development of
32:33
the Manhattan Project and Oppenheimer's own
32:35
persecution at the hands of the
32:38
National Security State, which Gary
32:40
devotes a fair bit of time to in
32:42
this book. The parallels are so
32:44
striking. I remember in the book,
32:47
he describes how clearance, the privilege
32:49
to read classified information which you
32:51
get from being a part of
32:53
the National Security State is a
32:55
form of initiation, a mark of
32:58
prestige. You're part of the elect
33:00
once you have a classification. And so
33:02
when Oppenheimer, when they're trying to deprive
33:04
him of that during the McCarthy era
33:06
because of his relationship to accused
33:09
communists, when he's losing his security clearance, he's
33:11
unmanned by it. It's almost like one of
33:13
the things that's weird about the movie Oppenheimer,
33:16
which is that the bomb goes off two
33:18
thirds of the way through and then there's a
33:20
whole other third of the movie that's just about
33:23
whether this guy's going to get to keep his
33:25
clearance decades later. And it just seems like how
33:27
can you possibly keep the stakes high because we
33:29
saw the fucking nuclear bomb go off. But
33:32
when you think about it in Gary's terms,
33:34
they are completely connected. This is what
33:37
happens when the Manhattan Project has run
33:39
the way that it is, that it
33:41
may eat its own and that actually
33:43
bomb power operates by
33:45
threatening to deprive people like
33:47
Oppenheimer of their access
33:50
to the Clerisey, their special
33:52
initiation right. I mean, the
33:54
very particular word Wills uses
33:56
to describe Oppenheimer being denied
33:58
a security clearance. He says
34:01
unfrocking, and defrocked. And
34:03
then, Sam, as you were getting at Will's rights
34:05
about this, his defrocking, meaning
34:08
Oppenheimers, was accomplished by denying
34:10
him access to secrets. Secrecy
34:13
had become a way of punishing,
34:15
not protecting. Such a
34:17
great line. But that's also how the Catholic Church operates,
34:19
right? Yes. The idea of
34:22
unfrocking or defrocking, especially in the
34:24
Catholic context, it is like the
34:26
removal of faculties to
34:28
be a part of this elite class
34:31
that governs and perpetuates the
34:33
institution. And that's especially interesting in light
34:35
of the fact that, again, at exactly
34:37
the time this book is being published,
34:39
Gary is beginning work on the book
34:41
that will later be published as
34:44
Y-Priest. He's turning
34:46
very strongly against the
34:48
very institution of the priesthood in the
34:50
modern Catholic Church. So there's
34:52
the sense that it's punishment, but it's
34:55
a mode of punishment that sort of reveals
34:57
its absurdity, the absurdity of the whole institution.
35:00
I think the other point that he makes is
35:02
that depriving someone of security clearance is not just
35:04
a way of punishing them as
35:06
an individual, but it's a
35:08
way of rendering them irrelevant
35:10
to the debate. And
35:13
the film captures this. Oppenheimer's
35:15
crime is skepticism of
35:18
the H-bomb and the expansion of
35:20
the nuclear program to ever
35:23
greater heights of destructive capability.
35:26
And so the maneuver here, it's not to
35:29
necessarily discredit him, cause some
35:31
sort of scandal about him
35:34
or to confront his arguments head on,
35:36
God forbid. It's to
35:38
deny him security clearance because then it's always
35:41
possible to say, well, that's
35:43
a good argument, but there's classified
35:45
information that I just can't reveal, but
35:47
you don't have access to that disproves what you're
35:50
saying. It's always the Trump
35:52
card. And I think Gary has a very
35:54
strongly deliberative sense of what democracy is all
35:56
about. I think it's that maneuver, the ability
35:58
to kind of instantly. shut down debate
36:00
because not all the facts are
36:03
on the table and access to facts can
36:05
be so strongly regulated
36:07
and denied punitively that makes
36:09
bomb power such a threat
36:11
to democracy in Gary's sense.
36:14
I think it's worth giving some details
36:16
here, especially for listeners who might not
36:18
have seen Oppenheimer. In particular,
36:20
there was an episode that Wills
36:22
describes that I have to say,
36:25
my dislike of Harry Truman, this book
36:27
ratchets that up because he does
36:30
come across as kind of a
36:32
simpleton, you know, and not a
36:34
very morally serious person who seemed
36:37
to truly be grappling with the gravity
36:40
of this moment and the powers that have been placed
36:42
in his hand. In
36:44
the immortal words of Matt Crisman,
36:46
Suleim Oppenheimer depicts Truman as a
36:49
demonic hick, which
36:51
I think is in some ways also how
36:53
Truman comes across in this book. Yeah,
36:56
Wills describes Truman saying he
36:58
didn't lose any sleep over dropping the
37:00
bomb. That is so appalling
37:02
to me. Like,
37:05
just almost unimaginable. But the
37:07
point you mentioned just a
37:09
moment ago about it was
37:11
Oppenheimer's skepticism about, you
37:13
know, beyond the atom bombs dropped on
37:16
Japan, right, the kind of next generation
37:18
of, in this book it's often referred
37:20
to as like the super bomb. The
37:22
super, that's the code word. Yeah. But
37:25
so Oppenheimer's skepticism about that, Wills describes
37:27
this meeting between Truman and Oppenheimer, when
37:30
Oppenheimer says he just felt like he had
37:32
blood on his hands for his role in
37:34
developing the bomb. And when Oppenheimer left the
37:36
room then, Truman turned to Dean Atchison and
37:38
said, I don't want to see that son
37:41
of a bitch ever again in this office.
37:43
Yeah. You know? It's
37:45
a central moment in the movie, and it is really an
37:48
interesting thing. I'd be interested in what you guys think about
37:50
that kind of question of culpability, Truman
37:52
versus Oppenheimer, and maybe thinking
37:54
about it in terms that Gary Wills might think
37:56
about it. Because one thing I did notice about
37:58
this book, something that just kept coming up
38:00
is that it does seem to me
38:03
that something that really bugs wills is
38:05
when powerful men don't take responsibility for
38:07
the things that they write or advocate
38:09
for. So there's the whole
38:12
George Kennan stuff in the beginning. George
38:14
Kennan comes to wistfully regret
38:16
the high dudgeon of the rhetoric of
38:19
the long telegram in the article he
38:21
wrote in Foreign Affairs that set the
38:23
Cold War in motion. This regret after
38:25
the fact of things that you did
38:27
and said that shaped the world in
38:29
the image of those words is not
38:31
admirable to wills. Likewise Kissinger coming to
38:33
regret pushing Nixon to go hard after
38:35
Ellsberg. I mean you can't really trust
38:38
anything Kissinger says about something involving his
38:40
culpability but it's so not exonerating this
38:42
kind of rueful looking back that these
38:44
powerful men do later on. Wills is
38:46
sort of implicit position. It's like powerful
38:48
men should just be more careful about
38:51
what they advocate for, regretting it later
38:53
once it's had its effect on the
38:55
world. And the lives of the global
38:57
community is no great virtue to him.
38:59
And so I wonder if like even
39:02
Oppenheimer's hand-wringing was not particularly admirable to
39:04
wills. Well I think that that's exactly
39:06
part of what he finds so objectionable
39:08
about bomb power is the way that
39:11
it makes it so hard to take
39:14
responsibility to exercise discretion.
39:16
I mean the irony in
39:18
a really sort of perverted way it's
39:21
true that from a certain point of
39:23
view there was no decision for Truman
39:26
to regret. And
39:28
this is a theme that other
39:30
historians of that pivotal moment in
39:32
1945 has really emphasized that
39:34
there was never a decision
39:36
to drop the bomb. It
39:39
was inevitable. Everyone took it for granted.
39:41
It was like a machine moving
39:43
forward. Of course there were lots of decisions,
39:46
micro-level decisions made along the way and it
39:48
by no means removes deep
39:50
moral culpability from a whole range
39:52
of actors. But this sense of
39:54
inertia, what are we supposed to
39:56
do? Not drop the bomb? That
39:58
idea was just we
42:00
never really came back
42:02
to a peacetime footing. As he puts
42:04
it, no conversion, meaning conversion after a
42:07
war, was so continually
42:09
military as that after the
42:11
Second World War. The bomb ensured
42:14
that. This was, as I just
42:16
quoted, a piece to be based on a weapon.
42:19
We never stopped the militarism and
42:22
kind of organizing our society around
42:25
killing people, destroying other nations,
42:28
and supposedly guarding our national security.
42:31
I think that's exactly right. And I think what
42:33
the early chapters of this book do very powerfully
42:35
is to show the extent
42:37
to which, you know, he was
42:39
recently reported in Israeli media, this
42:42
conversation between Netanyahu and Biden,
42:44
where Netanyahu essentially says,
42:46
well, he can kill all these
42:48
civilians because you guys dropped the
42:50
bomb. And Biden says
42:53
something like, you know, well, yes, we
42:55
dropped the bomb, but then we set
42:57
up all these institutions in the post-war
42:59
era to ensure that the bomb would never be
43:02
used again. And Gary just
43:04
shows that that is absolutely not the
43:06
case. The actual opposite
43:08
of the truth that so
43:10
much of US geopolitics
43:12
after the war, the whole
43:15
strategic center of gravity of
43:17
American empire building in the aftermath
43:20
of the war was to actually
43:22
construct an infrastructure to
43:24
enable the sustained and
43:26
global threat of nuclear weapons,
43:28
because he really emphasizes the
43:30
immense logistical difficulties of dropping
43:32
the bomb on Japan in
43:35
the first place. And, you
43:37
know, so much of US base building
43:40
construction of a US military presence
43:43
everywhere is to ensure
43:45
that the logistical difficulties can be surmounted
43:48
in a moment's notice, that the threat
43:50
of dropping the bomb is a live
43:52
option at any given moment. I have
43:55
a passage from Ellsberg on this point
43:57
that I think is really effective. Ellsberg
43:59
said... this is in his book, The Doomsday
44:02
Machine. He says, during the 2016 presidential
44:04
campaign, Trump was reported to
44:06
have asked a foreign policy advisor about nuclear
44:08
weapons, if we have them, why can't
44:11
we use them? Correct answer,
44:13
we do. Contrary to
44:15
the cliche that no nuclear weapons have
44:17
been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, US
44:19
presidents have used our nuclear weapons
44:22
dozens of times in crises, mostly
44:24
in secret from the American public, though not
44:27
from adversaries. They have used
44:29
them in the precise way that a gun
44:31
is used when it is pointed at someone
44:33
in a confrontation whether or not
44:35
the trigger is pulled. To get
44:37
one's way without pulling the trigger is a
44:39
major purpose for owning the gun. And
44:42
I think that that's exactly the sensibility
44:45
that animates the early chapters of bomb
44:47
power, the sense that the
44:49
construction of this this vast apparatus
44:52
had nothing to do with nuclear
44:54
safety, one of the
44:56
most Orwellian, euphemisms of the Cold
44:58
War period, it was actually to
45:00
create the infrastructure of nuclear threat.
45:03
And that threat was consciously and
45:05
deliberately deployed to a horrifying extent
45:07
again and again. He does
45:10
so much to say about this. And I
45:12
just want to impress upon listeners that what
45:14
we're describing, Wills does not present it
45:16
as kind of like, airy
45:18
theory, right, or speculation. It's a
45:21
very concrete book. In fact, it's
45:23
written almost unlike any of
45:25
his other books, it's only about 200
45:27
pages. It's an extraordinarily dense book. I
45:29
actually remember one of my
45:31
parents reading this book in
45:33
the car driving from Chicago
45:35
back to our family in Cleveland, and
45:38
saying something like, I usually like reading
45:40
Gary's writing, but this is almost
45:43
unreadable. Because the sheer density
45:45
of information and dry bureaucratic
45:48
detail that suffuses this book
45:50
is overwhelming. It's fair to
45:52
say that Gary comes with receipts, as we
45:54
say these days right in this book, you
45:57
know, lists of actions that
45:59
the executive branch took or statutes
46:01
executive orders that wars prosecuted who's
46:04
done assassination attempts there's a few
46:06
of these details I've just wanted
46:08
to kind of put out there
46:11
one of which was you can't
46:13
overstate the fact that the
46:15
development of the bomb meant
46:17
almost total reorganization especially the executive
46:20
branch but the military as well
46:23
and he describes how I thought
46:25
very fascinatingly our concept of the
46:27
president is being commander in chief
46:29
that for the first 150 years or
46:31
125 years of American history commander in
46:34
chief was not something really
46:37
played up as like a descriptor
46:39
or title of the president
46:41
the president wasn't saluted by the army
46:44
Reagan started that right points
46:46
out if I remember it really
46:48
was a term that was used
46:50
in military conflicts to refer to
46:52
someone who is designated as the
46:55
commander of a certain theater of a war
46:58
it might not be the person who's in charge of
47:00
the whole war not necessarily that the
47:02
top-ranking general it's just that in a
47:05
certain situation there's a person there who
47:07
then is in a certain position
47:09
in the command system which is
47:12
a temporary designation and not
47:14
you're in charge of the entire military the
47:16
term did not carry the
47:18
emphasis that it does now on
47:21
him being the ultimate decider about
47:23
military matters well and even beyond
47:25
military matters I mean I think
47:27
that Gary really sort of calls
47:29
bullshit on the total insanity
47:31
of the way that this term is
47:33
often deployed I mean when people say
47:35
commander in chief they often mean dictator
47:38
if he chooses to be like
47:40
not only does it refer to this sort
47:42
of absolute authority over
47:44
all military matters the ability to
47:47
initiate war even though that
47:49
power is relegated explicitly to Congress and
47:51
the Constitution but there's almost this sense
47:53
of commander in chief means for Bush
47:55
it to decide her people talk
47:57
about your commander in chief and this is
48:00
something he really goes to great lengths to
48:02
say, the president is no civilians commander in
48:04
chief. Right, exactly. He actually
48:06
describes writing that op-ed for the
48:09
New York Times where he says
48:11
that in all the hate mail he
48:13
got. How dare you disrespecting the military
48:15
and your commander in chief? Yeah, your
48:17
commander in chief. That's something
48:20
that has just entered our political
48:22
vernacular, but the idea is totally
48:24
horrifying. The president is not any
48:26
civilians commander in chief. What are you talking about?
48:28
The only way to construe that idea is
48:30
in this really creepy dictatorial way. That
48:32
actually is often to fact. At the
48:34
end of the book, Gary ties it
48:36
to the more or less wiretapping of
48:39
civilians. If you
48:41
think the president is commander in
48:43
chief over everyone, then yeah, of
48:45
course the president has the ability
48:47
to monitor civilian behavior and private
48:49
activity. The slippery slope,
48:51
he shows it's not just a
48:54
logical matter, but it's
48:56
really how materially it's played out.
48:58
Yes. I just want to impress this upon listeners.
49:01
We're in a season, right, of
49:03
primary debates and pretty soon, unbelievably,
49:06
we'll be in a presidential election year. Doesn't
49:08
seem possible. Speaking
49:10
of demonic forces. Yes, but
49:12
seriously, just listen to
49:14
the rhetoric of Trump and
49:17
Biden and at this point, anyone else who's
49:19
running for president, when they say something like,
49:22
my number one priority or my
49:24
main task as president and commander
49:26
in chief is to keep you
49:29
safe. Adopting
49:31
the most important aspect of being
49:33
president, commander in chief permanently, one
49:36
reason that goes so wrong, it
49:38
really becomes clear when Gary spells
49:41
out the ways in which the
49:44
logic of bomb power, there's no
49:47
natural end to it. It
49:49
just kind of metastasizes and
49:52
necessitates America to be a
49:54
global empire. For example, this
49:56
is early in the book in a chapter called the
49:58
care and keeping of the bomb. Great title for
50:00
a chapter. After the war,
50:02
arrangements of this sort would be multiplied
50:05
a thousand times as the
50:07
Strategic Air Command, which was started
50:09
anew after World War II to
50:12
deal specifically with our atomic weapons,
50:15
set up bases in foreign countries
50:17
for the servicing of its nuclear
50:19
cargo planes, which operated on a
50:21
24-hour basis every day. Besides
50:23
strategically located bases, a steady supply of
50:25
oil had to be secured to keep
50:27
our air empire running at peak efficiency.
50:30
Then, when the arsenal was expanded
50:32
to include tactical nuclear forces, bases
50:34
for them had to be secured
50:37
around the world. With the advent
50:39
of ICBMs, observation and guidance satellites
50:41
had to be launched in space.
50:43
All this apparatus was directly descended
50:45
from General Groves' private air force,
50:48
the first nuclear delivery system. General
50:50
Groves, one of the people involved with writing
50:53
the Manhattan Project. I
50:55
think that kind of paragraph, you
50:57
just see what kind of follows from
50:59
bomb power and the kind of insatiable,
51:02
metastasizing demands
51:04
it makes on our government. I
51:07
found this an extremely powerful account
51:09
of American empire from an angle
51:11
that I hadn't really considered
51:14
before. Speaking of insatiable, metastasizing
51:16
forces, I mean, even though
51:19
Gary himself would definitely not take this
51:21
step, I think that it's possible to
51:23
harmonize this account with a
51:25
more kind of economically materialist sort of
51:28
Marxist account of the development of American
51:30
empire in the post-war period. Because
51:33
part of what makes this pill
51:35
go down so smooth is that every
51:38
step in the process in that paragraph that
51:40
you're just reading, a lot of money is
51:42
changing hands at each stage of this, the
51:45
extraction of oil, natural resources, the
51:47
building of all these submarines, the
51:49
missiles. I mean, part of the
51:52
reason why I think it's not
51:54
even a question for American
51:57
policymakers is because it's well
51:59
understood that. Going down the
52:01
bomb-powered road making this deal with the devil there
52:03
are a lot of people who are gonna make
52:05
a lot of money from this well look at
52:07
what people like Lindsey Graham are saying about Ukraine
52:09
funding or others are saying about totally
52:12
unfettered funding for Israel even
52:14
amid this war that even
52:16
now the bite administration admits
52:19
is Awful and terrible for
52:21
civilians Lindsey Graham will literally
52:23
say basically the Ukraine funding is good
52:25
for America because a lot of people
52:27
get to Get to work building the
52:30
missiles and weapons that we're sending
52:32
over there and that logic of
52:34
the military industrial side
52:36
of our imperial Projects
52:39
is just like always baked into the
52:41
cake and every so often it's stated
52:43
much more plainly than at other times
52:45
But of course like you know the
52:47
one kind of Keynesianism that survives in
52:49
America basically is military Keynesianism I
52:51
want to read one more short passage from the
52:54
chapter on the care and keeping of the
52:56
bomb Again kind of to give listeners a
52:59
sense of the way wills argues here and
53:01
Sam you kind of mentioned part of this
53:03
quote Earlier, it's a paragraph that
53:05
begins with Lodging the quote fate
53:07
of the world in one man with no
53:10
constitutional check on his actions caused
53:12
a violent break in our whole
53:14
Governmental system. This is the
53:16
key part. I want to pick up with
53:18
Presidents now have it as part of their
53:20
permanent assignment meaning that fate of the world
53:22
in their hands This was in effect a
53:24
quiet revolution It was
53:27
accepted under the impression that technology imposed
53:29
it as a harsh necessity In
53:32
case of nuclear attack on the United States
53:34
the president would not have time to consult
53:36
Congress or instruct the public He must respond
53:39
instantly which means that he must
53:41
have the whole scientific apparatus for
53:43
response on constant alert Accountable
53:46
only to him which looms still so
53:48
large I mean, I can't be the
53:50
only one who still his nightmares about
53:52
the sort of like red phone commercial
53:56
2016 presidential election. This is not somebody who
53:58
should be handed the nuclear codes, you
54:00
have to ask yourself, do I want
54:02
a person of that temperament control the
54:05
nuclear codes? And as of now,
54:07
I have to say no. In
54:10
every presidential campaign, the rhetoric is
54:13
always you are electing the person
54:15
who, without
54:17
any, you know, accountability or checks,
54:19
has the ability to decide whether
54:21
or not to destroy the world.
54:24
And this is just acceptable. Maybe the listeners have
54:26
already picked up on this. And this isn't the
54:29
only way that the logic operates. But one way
54:31
that it does is if you are investing this
54:33
person, the president, with the power to destroy the
54:35
entire world, then why shouldn't
54:37
you invest him with the power to torture
54:40
people abroad in CIA black
54:43
sites or assassinate individuals around
54:45
the world or topple governments?
54:47
Or even something much more mundane,
54:49
like eviscerating an executive branch regulatory
54:51
agency that Congress created. Yeah, exactly.
54:53
Like if this person is vested
54:56
with the authority and supposedly the
54:58
appropriate conscience to make a decision
55:00
about whether nuclear Holocaust will be
55:02
inflicted upon the planet Earth, then
55:04
of course they have the authority
55:07
and the moral competence to decide
55:09
whether to gut the EPA. I
55:11
mean, it is striking when you
55:13
really think back how
55:16
often the case against Trump
55:18
being elected president was
55:20
kind of litigated in the terms of
55:23
we can't have the sky as our commander in chief, right?
55:25
Is this the person we want as our commander in chief?
55:27
And just listen, listen to how
55:30
often candidates describe their responsibilities as
55:32
president as being the person you
55:34
trust with the nuclear codes. The
55:36
nuclear codes, yes. Which
55:38
is true, of course. The
55:40
idea of Donald Trump being able to
55:42
destroy the world at a moment's notice
55:44
is unthinkable. I mean, it's literally incomprehensible.
55:48
But of course the obvious implication is that this
55:50
is an incredibly fucked up state of affairs that
55:52
we don't need to tolerate. And one more point
55:54
I want to make here about one of those
55:57
moments where you think, ah, makes
56:00
sense, which is the
56:02
way bomb power being lodged
56:04
in the presidency specifically, it's
56:06
encouraged rather than the constitutional
56:08
kind of order of succession
56:11
like White House chiefs
56:13
of staff. There was this moment
56:15
where Wills is describing in the
56:17
70s Rumsfeld and Cheney being
56:19
taken to kind of undisclosed
56:21
location to kind of practice
56:24
their role in war games should
56:26
some kind of nuclear exchange unfold.
56:28
And it's like, what the hell
56:30
is the chief of staff doing
56:32
with any of this? But it
56:34
gets back to the logic of
56:36
bomb power being solely lodged in
56:39
the presidency and executive branch after
56:41
9-11. Dick Cheney, he's vice president, not chief
56:43
of staff, but you know, he gave the order
56:45
to shoot down that plane. And it didn't happen
56:47
because the plane crashed before then, it was taken
56:49
down before then. But he lied
56:51
and said, actually, you know, I'd cleared that
56:53
with Bush, we know that's a lie now.
56:56
And it's kind of if you're in the
56:58
White House or kind of in the inner
57:00
circle, the executive branch, whatever the constitutional line
57:02
of succession calls for, in
57:05
practice, it's basically a kind
57:07
of small coterie in the
57:09
White House, president, possibly the vice
57:11
president, depending if it's something like Cheney or not,
57:13
the White House chief of staff, that's
57:15
just controlling our nuclear weapons now,
57:18
like whatever the Constitution says, or
57:20
how we think that should unfold,
57:22
or how we imagine the Constitution
57:24
prescribing that unfold, in practice, it's
57:26
going to be like a crony
57:28
of the president who has the
57:30
nuclear codes. And the precise details,
57:32
importantly, for Gary's argument, are secret.
57:35
We don't actually know. And this
57:37
is another point that Ellsberg's revelations
57:40
in the 2010s, after
57:42
the publication of this book,
57:44
again, I think really corroborate
57:46
this discovery of exactly how
57:48
inscrutable and unaccountable the actual
57:51
decision making about nuclear use was. And
57:53
so again, this is from the Doomsday
57:56
Machine. As I discovered in my
57:58
command and control research in the late 50s, President
58:00
Eisenhower had secretly delegated authority
58:03
to initiate nuclear attacks to
58:05
his theater commanders under various
58:07
circumstances, including the outage of
58:09
communications with Washington, a daily
58:12
occurrence in the Pacific, or a
58:14
presidential incapacitation, which Eisenhower suffered twice.
58:17
And with his authorization, they
58:19
had in turn delegated this
58:21
initiative under comparable crisis conditions
58:23
to subordinate commanders. He
58:26
goes on to say that when Kennedy
58:28
was elected, he briefed Kennedy on how
58:30
unbelievably disastrous the system
58:32
was. And Kennedy totally
58:35
blew him off and decided to essentially continue
58:37
the same structure. So there's this kind of
58:39
like nesting doll of bomb power. The
58:42
president secretly delegates to his cronies, who
58:44
secretly delegate to their cronies, all the
58:46
way down to the point that you
58:48
have potentially a random guy
58:50
in the military who no one knows, who
58:52
through this convoluted bureaucratic series of events has
58:55
acquired the ability to initiate a nuclear strike.
58:57
I mean this is part of the animus
58:59
for Dr. Strangelove, Stanley Kubrick's great
59:01
satirical film. Right. Well, I would
59:03
like to talk a little bit
59:05
more about secrecy. There's two
59:08
things that I wanted to get at
59:10
here that Wills demonstrates so well about,
59:12
you know, how bomb power necessitates secrecy,
59:14
but then also what the purpose of
59:16
secrecy really is. There's one thing that
59:18
he says a few times, which I
59:20
think is just, it's great. It's so
59:22
clear once he presents it, which is that military
59:25
secrets, you know, they are justified
59:27
by the necessity of keeping them
59:30
from our enemies, right? Like our enemies must
59:32
not know about the sources and methods we
59:35
might use on them or that we are
59:37
using on them in terms of surveillance tools
59:39
and whatnot, drones or whatever. But really the
59:41
secrecy is not about fooling the enemy, who
59:44
tends to know what's going on, especially they're
59:46
being subject to military action. It's
59:48
for fooling Congress and the American people. And
59:50
he has that great moment where he describes
59:53
the Dunesbury cartoon. Yes. He says his favorite
59:55
Dunesbury cartoon from November 10th 1973, which is
59:57
when the quote-unquote
59:59
secret bombing of Cambodia was revealed
1:00:01
and in the comic you see
1:00:03
this Cambodian couple surrounded by rubble
1:00:06
and the American guy says, oh
1:00:08
you wretched soul did this happen
1:00:10
during the secret bombing? And the
1:00:12
guy responds, secret bombings? Boy
1:00:14
there wasn't any secret about them. Everyone here
1:00:16
knew. I said, look Martha
1:00:18
here come the bombs. And
1:00:20
she says, yeah he did say that. So
1:00:23
there's that which is like reducto ad absurdum you
1:00:25
know but it's so true. They talked about this
1:00:27
with the Bay of Pigs and the various efforts
1:00:30
to assassinate Castro too that Kennedy
1:00:32
initiated or performed which is that
1:00:34
like you know they all knew
1:00:36
that they were trying to
1:00:38
kill Castro and people around him and
1:00:40
people talked and blah blah blah they
1:00:42
knew about it but the American public
1:00:45
didn't know about it and it's about
1:00:47
regenerating that lack of accountability from the
1:00:49
public and from Congress. Classification it's really
1:00:51
it's raison d'etre. The other thing I
1:00:53
wanted to say is just
1:00:55
about how Will really does preempt a lot
1:00:58
of the discussions that we were gonna have
1:01:00
when the Snowden revelations came out
1:01:02
about overclassification. Matt knows this but
1:01:05
I worked with my boss Bart
1:01:07
Gelman on his book about Snowden
1:01:10
and spent several years just very immersed
1:01:12
in that story and in some of
1:01:14
the files, a lot of the
1:01:16
files. And I mean one of the hilarious
1:01:19
things is just how absurd actually the overclassification
1:01:21
is such that like Bart would always
1:01:23
tell this story about this document that he has
1:01:25
that's marked secret classified for
1:01:27
those with a certain level of security
1:01:30
clearance only which is a manual produced
1:01:32
by the Navy about doing laundry and
1:01:34
dry cleaning. So it
1:01:37
is considered a state secret which only
1:01:40
people with a certain level of classification
1:01:42
are allowed to see how
1:01:44
it's recommended to members of the Navy how they do
1:01:46
their laundry and there's absurd examples like that all over
1:01:48
the place. You know and that's silly
1:01:50
but I do want to just point out
1:01:53
because Will sort of gestures towards this logic
1:01:55
but I think it can be drawn out
1:01:57
even more about how secrecy and sort of
1:01:59
clearance system and classification, how distinctly
1:02:02
corrosive it is to the democratic
1:02:04
system. And this is something I thought about a lot
1:02:06
when we were working on the Snowden stuff, because
1:02:08
when the uses and the practices of
1:02:10
a program, say a surveillance tool, are
1:02:12
secret, its operators, the people
1:02:14
who use it, whether in the NSA
1:02:16
or the CIA, DNI, its operators can
1:02:18
always tell Congress and the public, look,
1:02:21
this thing is saving American lives. It's
1:02:23
totally crucial to American security. But
1:02:25
also because of the logical classification,
1:02:28
they can't and shouldn't reveal how
1:02:30
or when or why the program
1:02:32
has been so indispensable. Because
1:02:35
that would reveal its quote unquote sources and
1:02:37
methods and render it unuseful in the
1:02:39
future. So even when CIA and NSA
1:02:41
officials have to testify in front of
1:02:43
Congress, in front of the intelligence committees,
1:02:45
they usually can't reveal how
1:02:48
and when and why these programs are so
1:02:50
useful. They just assert it. And
1:02:52
the assertion has to be enough. Even when
1:02:54
they show small amounts of
1:02:56
classified material to a small set of
1:02:58
cleared congressmen, people who are usually
1:03:01
on the intelligence committee, which purport to demonstrate
1:03:03
the usefulness of this or that program, then
1:03:05
it's these guys who come out and tell the public
1:03:07
and the rest of Congress, well, look, it's true. I
1:03:10
saw the program is keeping us safe. I can't tell
1:03:12
you how, but it is. And of
1:03:14
course, there are all kinds of reasons not to take their word
1:03:16
for that either. It's obviously not
1:03:18
democratic for some secret cleric person who's
1:03:20
initiated into this world to come out
1:03:22
and tell you, yes, it's keeping you
1:03:24
safe, but we're not going to debate
1:03:26
it. But also, they may not be
1:03:28
really in a position to assess the
1:03:30
information curated for them by intelligence officials.
1:03:32
That certainly happens. These guys are not
1:03:34
all the smartest guys in the world, and
1:03:36
they're not certainly not necessarily super savvy
1:03:39
about how it certainly signals
1:03:41
intelligence works because it's so complicated now.
1:03:44
But then also the members of the
1:03:46
intelligence committee oversight committees, they tend to
1:03:48
be really well connected to the intelligence
1:03:50
committee. They represent districts where CIA and
1:03:53
NSA employees work. They tend
1:03:55
to get lots of money from military and
1:03:57
surveillance industries, and they might just be sympathetic
1:03:59
to code. over activity in general, that's why
1:04:01
they wanted to be on the Intelligence Committee.
1:04:03
It's a powerful place to be, you know,
1:04:05
you're on the inside. And of
1:04:07
course, a member of Congress, depending on his or
1:04:09
her position, just really might be much
1:04:11
more likely to like give the Intelligence Community the benefit
1:04:13
of the doubt because the Intelligence Community is always going
1:04:16
to tell Congress, if we don't have this tool anymore,
1:04:18
the next attack is going to be your fault if
1:04:20
you take it away from us. And
1:04:22
you know, like the general public and maybe the
1:04:24
rest of Congress, they might
1:04:26
assess the proper balance between
1:04:28
security and liberty, you know,
1:04:31
transparency and safety in
1:04:33
a different way if given the opportunity to
1:04:36
do so, but they're not given the opportunity
1:04:38
to do so. And I think that one
1:04:40
implication that comes out of that is that
1:04:42
overclassification isn't just about trivial
1:04:45
documents that are kept classified, but
1:04:47
often the most significant outrages in
1:04:50
classification are not really
1:04:52
grave matters. Or super embarrassing things
1:04:54
too, just awful things. Dan Ellsberg
1:04:57
tells the story of being
1:04:59
handed early in the Kennedy administration,
1:05:01
a memo marked
1:05:04
top secret for the President's eyes
1:05:06
only that presented the
1:05:08
Joint Chiefs estimate of
1:05:10
the immediate death toll from
1:05:13
a US nuclear first strike
1:05:16
on the Soviet Union, which estimated
1:05:18
instantly like essentially on the first
1:05:20
day, 275 million people dead. So
1:05:25
obviously that's not like laundry routines. But
1:05:27
from my point of view, that could
1:05:29
not be more important for us to
1:05:32
know exactly. And you can't
1:05:34
have a democracy if people don't
1:05:36
know that those are the stakes.
1:05:38
You genuinely cannot have, and this
1:05:40
is the implication of Wilson's argument,
1:05:42
you cannot have democratic oversight of
1:05:44
a secret program. You just can't.
1:05:47
I mean, you can see this absurdity with the
1:05:49
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court, which is a FISA
1:05:51
court, which is a secret court,
1:05:54
which authorizes blanket warrants for
1:05:56
surveillance inside the US when
1:05:58
it's connected to... quote-unquote
1:06:00
foreign intelligence information foreign powers or agents
1:06:02
of foreign powers suspected of espionage or
1:06:04
terrorism So these are the warrants for
1:06:07
domestic surveillance So it's it's presumed that
1:06:09
this person has a connection to a
1:06:11
foreign power They're in communication with foreign
1:06:13
powers the warrant has to meet a
1:06:15
plausibility level. That's less than reasonable doubt
1:06:17
It's more forgiving, but also this is
1:06:19
a court that operates in secret, right?
1:06:22
Like in practice we now know it
1:06:24
operates practically speaking as a rubber stamp
1:06:26
for these warrants Like I have some
1:06:28
statistics during the 25 years from 1979 to 2004 18,742
1:06:34
warrants were granted by the FISA court
1:06:36
only four were rejected and fewer than
1:06:39
200 requests had to be
1:06:41
modified Before they were accepted and most of
1:06:43
those happened once this started to become a
1:06:45
scandal during the Bush years I mean we
1:06:47
know that now it's not really providing scrutiny
1:06:50
But if we didn't know that if you assume maybe
1:06:52
sometimes they do reject these warrants They're not just a
1:06:54
rubber stamp The logic of
1:06:56
a secret court like it doesn't provide
1:06:59
oversight because we can't know it's a
1:07:01
black box We don't know really what
1:07:03
these warrants are for and why they're
1:07:05
justified They're being justified in secret to
1:07:08
people who'd make decisions in secret about
1:07:10
whether they're appropriate And then
1:07:12
this all extends as Will's shows from the
1:07:14
logic the original logic of the bomb You
1:07:17
know every so often something like Snowden comes along
1:07:19
and we have a big conversation about
1:07:21
this Reminded of this basic fact that
1:07:24
you can't have democratic oversight of secrets
1:07:26
But the logic of bomb power is such that as
1:07:29
you said Eric like the most Important
1:07:31
things that our government does that
1:07:34
have to do with life and death that
1:07:36
have to do with our freedom liberty Whether
1:07:38
or not our bodies and our minds
1:07:41
are being surveilled and sifted through by
1:07:43
the government These are precisely the things
1:07:45
that we are not allowed to have
1:07:48
any oversight or we're not allowed to know about and
1:07:50
we're not allowed Use our democratic
1:07:52
voice to oppose. I mean, it's just
1:07:54
this profound Hole in
1:07:56
the center of the delusion that we really
1:07:58
have about
1:10:00
America as a leading light of
1:10:03
freedom in the world, America's kind
1:10:06
of civilizational mission, all
1:10:08
of the sort of neoconservative justifications
1:10:11
for the state. I
1:10:13
mean, he just thinks that this is so unbelievably
1:10:16
hypocritical that the
1:10:18
notion that there's are any kind of higher principles
1:10:21
operating here are just absurd. And again,
1:10:23
this is a theme that runs throughout all of his writing.
1:10:25
I was recalling there's a 1975 essay that
1:10:29
he wrote in Esquire about a trip
1:10:31
that he took to Israel after the 1973 war,
1:10:34
where he says, ruefully,
1:10:38
Israel has made war glamorous again, a
1:10:40
hideous gift to bring us the new
1:10:43
chivalry. And I think that
1:10:45
that's, again, from this Augustinian perspective, the
1:10:47
idea that there's anything kind of divine
1:10:50
and moral elevated about
1:10:53
the operation of war. He
1:10:55
thinks that that is just an incredibly,
1:10:57
incredibly dangerous idea. And
1:11:00
I think he's right about that. I mean, again, the Augustinian
1:11:02
tradition has a just war theory
1:11:05
often, even if a war is
1:11:07
justifiable or inevitable in
1:11:10
some sense, investing it with a
1:11:12
kind of higher sense of righteousness, planes
1:11:14
have been crossed. There's
1:11:17
sort of two distinct levels of
1:11:19
reality that have been fused
1:11:22
in that investment of state power
1:11:24
and military force with this kind
1:11:27
of moral valence. And I think that's
1:11:29
very close to the heart of
1:11:31
Gary's spiritual and religious worldview. And
1:11:33
to me, it's admirable that he's
1:11:35
willing to draw those, I think,
1:11:37
clear political implications of those principles
1:11:40
for analyzing the post-war American state.
1:11:42
I kind of want to get
1:11:44
at something that might not be
1:11:46
Augustinian in particular, but I
1:11:48
think it is a part of the
1:11:50
kind of Catholic intellectual milieu
1:11:53
that Wills was engaged with. When
1:11:56
we were talking about his book
1:11:58
on the Kennedys, the Kennedy and
1:12:00
Prison. And I did bring up
1:12:02
a couple times this book of
1:12:04
his called, Baroon Choirs, written in
1:12:06
the 70s about radical religion, prophecy,
1:12:08
secularization, all that. And
1:12:10
I didn't really realize this, or I'm not sure
1:12:12
I would have picked up on maybe the importance
1:12:15
of this milieu for Wills's
1:12:17
thinking if I hadn't been an editor
1:12:19
at Commonweal. And that is
1:12:21
to say, an issue that becoming
1:12:24
Catholic changed my mind about,
1:12:27
or that because I kind
1:12:29
of immersed myself in a
1:12:31
particular Catholic tradition, I became
1:12:34
convicted about is the dropping
1:12:36
of the atom bombs on
1:12:38
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I
1:12:40
don't know. It's one of those things. I don't
1:12:42
know how often I thought about it. I think
1:12:44
for a long time, especially as a young conservative,
1:12:46
I just kind of accepted, OK, Truman
1:12:49
did this to save lives. We would have
1:12:51
had to invade. And the Japanese always
1:12:54
taught you they were sharpening sticks to
1:12:56
fight off invaders to their last
1:12:58
dying breath. And so we had to nuke them. And
1:13:00
I just kind of, for many years, accepted
1:13:03
that. And it was, I think, being
1:13:05
editor at Commonweal and really rethinking
1:13:07
some of these things, I appreciated Wills's
1:13:09
book more because of that. And
1:13:11
I specifically want to mention one
1:13:14
of the great kind of antagonists
1:13:16
of Truman's dropping of the atom
1:13:18
bombs was a Catholic philosopher named
1:13:21
Elizabeth Ansco. And I don't
1:13:24
agree with all of her positions. But there was
1:13:26
a point after Truman was president in the 50s,
1:13:28
1957, when Oxford was going to give him
1:13:32
an honorary degree, President Truman, that is.
1:13:35
And Anscombe opposed that decision
1:13:37
by Oxford because she had
1:13:39
really thought through the morality of the atom
1:13:42
bomb when it meant to drop it. This
1:13:44
was not acceptable. And so Truman should not
1:13:46
be given this award. It was a bit
1:13:48
of a controversy. But a few
1:13:50
years ago, back in 2020, George Weigel, a
1:13:53
right wing kind of neocon Catholic,
1:13:56
wrote some column for some reason defending the
1:13:59
bombing. of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And we published
1:14:01
a common wheel, it's called False Choices
1:14:04
by John Schlenkler and Mark Suva, both
1:14:06
philosophers. I just wanna read one bit
1:14:09
of it because I think
1:14:11
this gets at the backdrop to where
1:14:13
wheels is coming from. In
1:14:15
this piece, the writers mentioned that
1:14:17
Answam corresponded with people who had
1:14:21
gotten atom bomb sickness after the dropping
1:14:23
of the atom bombs in Japan. This
1:14:25
one guy in particular wrote to her and
1:14:28
he says, you know, I was pretty normal until 1947. And
1:14:31
then he was hospitalized for months at a time.
1:14:34
And this is what the writers then comment
1:14:37
on that correspondence. People like this
1:14:39
man, meaning the man who wrote to
1:14:41
Elizabeth Anscombe describing how the
1:14:43
dropping of the atom bomb had destroyed his health.
1:14:46
People like this man and like those
1:14:48
whose faces we see in photographs and
1:14:50
videos of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the
1:14:52
wake of what Weigel, again George Weigel
1:14:55
calls Truman's quote, terrible choice, are
1:14:57
made in the image and likeness of God. Such
1:15:00
is the teaching of our church. And
1:15:02
it is for this reason that we
1:15:04
are strictly forbidden to kill an innocent
1:15:06
human being, no matter the consequences of
1:15:08
not doing so. To
1:15:10
conduct a war by murderous means
1:15:13
is to call down God's vengeance
1:15:15
upon us. And I
1:15:17
think Gary Wills fears God. And
1:15:21
does not want God's vengeance to come
1:15:23
down upon us because of the
1:15:25
wickedness of this weapon. I would go even further.
1:15:28
I would say that in a way he thinks
1:15:30
that it has. I mean, perhaps the most Augustinian
1:15:32
part of this book actually is the extent to
1:15:34
which it's very much it's an
1:15:36
original sin narrative. It's a story of
1:15:38
original sin and of the wages of
1:15:40
sin which are death, which
1:15:42
has multiplied without end, without
1:15:44
bound, which ultimately leads, I
1:15:46
mean, Gary to a very pessimistic place.
1:15:48
I mean, you do have a sense
1:15:50
that he, like Augustine, he
1:15:52
thinks that this sin
1:15:54
is not necessarily in our
1:15:57
purely voluntary ability to atone
1:15:59
for. to expurg. I
1:16:01
mean, I think it's important, as does
1:16:03
Gary, to still fight anyways to do
1:16:05
the best that we can. But
1:16:07
I think that there is also something valuable
1:16:10
in that sense that we can never pretend
1:16:12
that the bombs weren't dropped in
1:16:14
act that morally grave has certain
1:16:17
fundamental consequences that we can't wish away.
1:16:19
And again, I think about
1:16:21
the remark of Netanyahu's that we discussed
1:16:23
earlier, the fact that the
1:16:26
United States put its moral impermeiture
1:16:28
on this act of extraordinary
1:16:31
civilian murder. That's a fact that we
1:16:33
can't pretend isn't out there. And Eric,
1:16:35
I just want to underscore and reiterate
1:16:37
your point about this book, Bomb Power,
1:16:39
kind of being in its own way
1:16:41
an original sin narrative in the sense
1:16:43
of, as we discussed
1:16:45
earlier, the very creation of
1:16:47
this weapon, the
1:16:50
origin story of it. From
1:16:52
that flowed all the
1:16:54
problems and lies and secrecy and
1:16:57
death and destruction that we've been
1:16:59
describing this entire episode, like
1:17:02
the seeds of destruction were sown in
1:17:04
the very moment the bomb was created
1:17:06
and the structures created around it to
1:17:09
produce it and allow it to be
1:17:11
used. You just see the
1:17:13
way they work themselves out over time again
1:17:15
and again in this book, kind of a
1:17:17
seed planted in the first pages of this
1:17:19
book in the Manhattan Project.
1:17:21
You see the inexorable working out
1:17:24
of them throughout this book. There
1:17:26
was a flaw from the beginning
1:17:28
that we can't paper over, we
1:17:31
can't expiate, we can't get around.
1:17:33
And because of the witness of
1:17:35
specifically Catholic thinkers like Anscombe,
1:17:38
like the Berican brothers, like
1:17:41
Gary Wills, like Dorothy Day, that
1:17:43
really influenced how I think about
1:17:45
this. And I lament that that
1:17:48
strain of Catholicism is almost
1:17:50
expired in the United States. You
1:17:52
see glimpses of it like, sorry
1:17:55
listeners, this is a little inside baseball, but
1:17:57
you might not be shocked to learn. I
1:17:59
don't love. many of the
1:18:01
bishops and archbishops and cardinals of the
1:18:03
American Church. One
1:18:05
of the people I truly,
1:18:07
truly admire is the
1:18:09
archbishop in New Mexico, John Wester,
1:18:12
who because, you know, so many of
1:18:14
the testing and research and
1:18:17
experiments around the development of the atom
1:18:19
bomb were in the Southwest. This
1:18:22
guy who's an archbishop in New Mexico,
1:18:24
he is an anti-nuclear activist.
1:18:27
He's written kind of, I don't
1:18:29
know what the equivalent of an encyclical is for
1:18:32
an archbishop, but you know, like a kind of
1:18:34
pastoral letter on abolishing nuclear
1:18:36
weapons. That tradition has
1:18:38
influenced me a lot, and
1:18:40
I think this is one of those books where
1:18:43
Wills' familiarity with,
1:18:46
and sometimes even involvement with, kind of Catholic
1:18:48
thinking about these things in that era is
1:18:50
really interesting, and I think you really see
1:18:52
the imprint of it in this book. Maybe
1:18:55
as a way of closing out, we forecasted earlier
1:18:57
that we were going to talk about this piece
1:18:59
that Eric wrote on Daniel Ellsberg
1:19:01
on the occasion of his death, and
1:19:04
as you guys were talking, I was thinking
1:19:06
about how a couple paragraphs in this piece
1:19:09
really kind of reflect precisely the kind of
1:19:11
moral quandary that you guys
1:19:13
are describing that Wills is pointing to
1:19:15
about how power corrupts and how our
1:19:18
fallenness necessitates certain kinds
1:19:20
of approaches to the problem
1:19:22
of power, and this is of course
1:19:24
Ellsberg translated through Eric Baker,
1:19:27
but it makes
1:19:29
Ellsberg sound like an Augustinian. I
1:19:32
also think this is a good place to close
1:19:34
out because I think that the way that Eric
1:19:36
talks about this in this piece does speak to
1:19:38
the kinds of moral quandaries
1:19:41
that our listeners might be more likely
1:19:43
to encounter than say, if they work
1:19:45
in the Department of State. Well,
1:19:47
maybe some people who work in the
1:19:49
Department of State are listening. You're right.
1:19:51
Ellsberg's example is an enduring challenge not
1:19:53
only to the resentful complacency of the
1:19:55
silent majority, but to a left that
1:19:57
has come increasingly to tolerate middle-class career-
1:20:00
compromise in the half-country since Ellsberg's
1:20:02
prosecution. It's not our fault exactly.
1:20:04
The unions were eviscerated, the black
1:20:06
revolutionaries were killed, the war resistors
1:20:08
were jailed, academics and nonprofit executives
1:20:11
filled the vacuum. That's
1:20:13
not to say that one can't be useful to
1:20:15
the cause with a PhD, thank God. As
1:20:18
evidence, witness the life of
1:20:20
one Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, but
1:20:22
it requires an uncommon ethos
1:20:24
of self- suspicion as Ellsberg
1:20:26
understood well. Then you quote
1:20:28
Ellsberg, I've come to realize the fear
1:20:30
of being cut out from the group of people
1:20:32
you respect and whose respect you want and normally
1:20:34
expect keeps people participating in anything no matter how
1:20:36
terrible. He said that in 2009, and you write
1:20:40
few of us are immune to that
1:20:42
fear and the rationalizations it brews in
1:20:44
the professional mind. You
1:20:46
go on, we shouldn't begrudge most people for wanting
1:20:48
to find a way to sleep at night, though
1:20:51
surely some could stand a bit more tossing
1:20:53
and turning. It is
1:20:55
more problematic when those rationalizations begin
1:20:58
to infect our collective reflection on
1:21:00
matters of political principle and strategy.
1:21:02
You say Ellsberg's fundamental insight was
1:21:05
not that it is impossible in
1:21:07
theory to use the machinery of
1:21:09
the American state to affect positive
1:21:11
change, but that people, smart well-intentioned
1:21:14
people especially, underestimate the moral confusion
1:21:16
that festers in the corridors of
1:21:18
power. DC bureaus are overflowing
1:21:20
with back slappers, happy to extol
1:21:22
the bravery of the most craven
1:21:24
political decision-making. The cafeterias all serve
1:21:27
lotus flowers for lunch. Soon you
1:21:29
forget even that there is something
1:21:31
you have forgotten. Well, thanks, Em.
1:21:33
Yeah, I mean obviously I'm bringing
1:21:35
my own perspective shaped by reading
1:21:37
people like Gary at a formative
1:21:39
age, but that is very much
1:21:41
also the sense that I've always
1:21:43
gotten from engaging with
1:21:46
Ellsberg's thought and
1:21:48
life, and I think that it's an
1:21:50
important supplement, I think, to the perspective
1:21:52
that Gary provides in Bomb Power, that
1:21:54
so much of the sense of inertia that
1:21:57
he describes is greased
1:21:59
in... away by the
1:22:01
social dynamics and the personal
1:22:03
self-satisfaction that I tried to
1:22:05
describe in that passage that
1:22:07
Ellsberg talked about so frequently,
1:22:09
that one of the biggest
1:22:11
impediments to tackling and dismantling
1:22:13
bomb power is the difficulty
1:22:16
of reckoning with the
1:22:18
sheer monstrosity of what
1:22:21
we've done, of what we've constructed, of what
1:22:23
this country has become. It's not
1:22:25
easy. And Matt opened us
1:22:27
off by talking about, in a
1:22:29
sense, just how hard it is to really
1:22:32
take this book, Bomb Power, seriously,
1:22:35
to fully take on the
1:22:37
depth and the radicalness of the
1:22:39
critique that it levels, because
1:22:42
we don't want to confront the
1:22:44
possibility that we've been
1:22:46
living in a, from a
1:22:48
certain perspective, a certain kind of
1:22:51
military dictatorship for, at this point,
1:22:53
the better part of a century. But
1:22:55
being willing to look at that reality
1:22:58
squarely in the face, I think that that has to
1:23:00
be the first step. We're going to do anything about
1:23:03
it. Yeah. We must
1:23:05
all cultivate, as you write, an uncommon ethos
1:23:07
of self-suspicion. Yeah. I
1:23:09
was thinking, too, Eric, as you were speaking, in
1:23:12
our, I think, our mailbag episode,
1:23:14
Sam, we briefly kind of
1:23:16
addressed the situation in Israel
1:23:18
and Palestine. And I
1:23:20
invoked Hitchens, specifically
1:23:22
his fondness for a line of
1:23:25
George Orwell's, which is a
1:23:27
power of facing, like
1:23:29
being able to face the reality
1:23:32
of a situation. A power
1:23:34
that Christopher might have lost at the end there. Yes.
1:23:37
Yeah. Yeah. Speaking
1:23:39
of someone who perhaps lacked in ethos of self-suspicion. Yes.
1:23:42
Yeah. No doubt about that. But
1:23:44
I would just say the listeners, I mean,
1:23:46
Wilson's book is radical, radical in the truest
1:23:49
sense of like getting to the root. That's
1:23:52
what this book does. And it's both
1:23:54
convicting and revealing, but also I
1:23:56
feel like it was
1:23:58
enormously helpful to me. me to
1:24:01
have articulated by someone as intelligent
1:24:03
and perceptive as wills, the
1:24:06
way so many of the problems we're grappling
1:24:08
with now follow not just
1:24:10
from electing this person rather than
1:24:13
that person, the deficiencies or failures
1:24:15
of a particular individual
1:24:17
who holds this office of, as
1:24:20
we now say, commander in chief,
1:24:22
but the kind of structural problems,
1:24:25
the nature of the actual problem
1:24:28
being structural and it being again
1:24:30
this decades long working out
1:24:32
a bomb power which was
1:24:34
conceived in secrecy and
1:24:36
used viciously. So
1:24:38
this is a rare book in the sense
1:24:40
of how many books do you read that
1:24:42
kind of radically perhaps
1:24:45
change your understanding and view of
1:24:48
a situation. I encourage everyone to
1:24:50
read this book. It really was
1:24:52
incredibly revealing and impactful. It's
1:24:55
troubling in the sense that you
1:24:57
realize the problem is so massive
1:24:59
and extensive and so deeply entangled
1:25:02
with so many processes
1:25:04
and institutions and bureaucracies and I
1:25:07
don't know what to do with it other than
1:25:09
pray for forgiveness and dedicate
1:25:12
yourself to trying to undo
1:25:14
this monstrosity. Amen. Yeah,
1:25:17
amen. This is what to
1:25:19
me does sort of like link the discussion
1:25:21
of this book in Ellsberg because in some
1:25:23
ways, yes, it's this
1:25:26
enormous structural problem. He
1:25:28
writes about the commander in chief being
1:25:31
at this point in the book Obama as
1:25:33
a self-entangling giant, the classic
1:25:35
Will's paradox. Even at
1:25:37
some point, the president himself is
1:25:40
entangled and trapped, but at
1:25:42
the same time, the example of Ellsberg
1:25:44
who we all admire and which
1:25:46
Eric has written so eloquently about that's
1:25:49
the example of individual moral
1:25:51
witness and moral
1:25:53
fortitude does still matter. The
1:25:56
structures are the structures, but Daniel Ellsberg did what he
1:25:59
did. encouraged to
1:26:01
go along, to get along, to stay in
1:26:03
the good graces of the people that they
1:26:05
admire who hired them who seem to be
1:26:07
estimable. But every once in a while, people
1:26:09
have to do something else, and they do.
1:26:11
It happens every day. It's happening right now
1:26:13
in the American government with staffers
1:26:16
protesting for a ceasefire of
1:26:18
people quitting from the Biden
1:26:20
administration, hopefully more would, about
1:26:22
the posture towards Israel's war.
1:26:24
And maybe as just the kind of amusing,
1:26:26
but I think revealing example of the
1:26:29
ways that Gary Wills embodied that same impulse
1:26:31
that you can't always just go along to
1:26:33
get along. I'm sure you guys are both
1:26:35
familiar with this story where he was, at
1:26:38
the beginning of the Obama administration, invited along
1:26:40
with other historians to come to the White
1:26:43
House to tell Obama how to be a
1:26:45
great president. And he said, if you
1:26:47
want to be a great president, you got to get out of Afghanistan.
1:26:49
It's going to be just like Vietnam. And
1:26:52
that wasn't taken very well. And he was not
1:26:54
invited back for the second meeting. But
1:26:57
sometimes you have to say that. back
1:27:02
to the party. Well, maybe we
1:27:04
should give Gary the last word here because
1:27:06
we read the first paragraph at the start
1:27:08
of the episode, but his last line here
1:27:10
is also, I think, a great
1:27:13
summary of what we've just been saying. He ends
1:27:15
it by saying, as Cyrano
1:27:17
said, one fights not only
1:27:19
in the hope of winning. Yeah,
1:27:22
that's right. Well, that
1:27:24
was a lot of fun. Yeah, indeed. Thank
1:27:28
you so much, Eric. Thanks so much for having
1:27:30
me on. Yeah, it was great and very meaningful
1:27:32
to be able to talk about this book. For
1:27:34
me too. Thanks, you guys. Thanks,
1:27:37
listeners. Catch you next time. Bye.
1:28:01
I'm
1:28:07
just a demon, I'm a
1:28:09
fool, I'm a mind, I'm
1:28:11
a crime, I'm a god,
1:28:13
I'm a son of a
1:28:15
whore.
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