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Today's episode is brought
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Welcome to Many Happy Returns,
0:14
where we aim to make you
0:16
a better investor. I'm Roman, and
0:18
I'm Michael. Liz trust as many
0:20
budgets has become a bogeyman for
0:23
all physical policy. And once again,
0:25
guilt yields rose following the autumn
0:27
budget as markets absorb sharp rises
0:29
in investment, taxes and borrowing. Do
0:31
we really need to be scared
0:33
of the bond vigilantes? And in
0:36
today's dumb question of the week,
0:38
does public investment crowd out or
0:40
crowd in private sector activity? Okay,
0:44
let's get into it. So last week
0:46
we had the autumn budget, Labour's first
0:48
budget in 14 years, and it was
0:50
a big budget. Big increases in spending,
0:52
large tax rises, and a lot
0:55
of government borrowing penciled in for
0:57
the coming parliament. While the Chancellor
0:59
was speaking, all seemed pretty calm in
1:01
markets. But then, in the days that
1:03
followed, guilt eels did the thing everyone
1:06
doesn't want them to do and
1:08
started to creep upwards. And we saw
1:10
headlines which referenced bond
1:12
vigilant vigilantes. Here they are, they've come
1:14
to get us. But Romin, what is a
1:16
bond vigilante? Well the idea is
1:18
that there are bond investors who when they
1:21
see a budget come along and it has
1:23
policies which they think will hurt their
1:25
investment, they sell their government bonds
1:27
and they do it in large
1:30
size. So presumably these are institutional
1:32
investors who want to kind of
1:34
punish the government supposedly for their
1:37
policies. Inevitably we've got a
1:39
million headlines about the markets
1:41
on Halloween. But I'm a little
1:43
bit skeptical of these bond vigilantes.
1:45
Are they a real thing? Is
1:47
this a coordinated action by some
1:50
sort of shadowy cabal of bond
1:52
market investors? Well, I think if people
1:54
want conspiracy theories, this is the wrong
1:56
podcast. So I tune out right now.
1:58
But look, I think that... That's unlikely.
2:00
I think one of the things that
2:03
people really should bear in mind is
2:05
that bond investors will always act in
2:07
their own interest because that's their job.
2:09
If they're a fund manager and they
2:12
think that yields are going to rise,
2:14
well, they're going to sell some of
2:16
their guilt because they don't want to
2:18
take that hit or shorten duration, for
2:21
example. So really I wouldn't blame the
2:23
bond investors for doing what's rational for
2:25
bond investors to do, which is acting
2:28
in their own interest. It's kind of
2:30
like blaming a lion if you stick
2:32
your head into its jaws. You know,
2:34
it's going to eat you. There's no
2:37
question. So I don't think we should
2:39
blame bond investors. And I don't think
2:41
there's a compile of bond investors going
2:44
around trying to punish governments. It's just
2:46
them doing a rational thing. Do you
2:48
think Rachel Reeves did stick her head
2:50
into the metaphorical lion's jaws though? I
2:53
think she would reject that analogy. She
2:55
would say the UK needs investment, and
2:57
that means, at least in the short
3:00
term, borrowing more. I'd say it's kind
3:02
of the opposite. I feel as if
3:04
every government now is going to be
3:06
terrified of lions and simply shirking any
3:09
kind of increase in spending because they're
3:11
worried that they're going to get a
3:13
repeat of what Kwateng and trust managed.
3:15
But I think that's the wrong message
3:18
to take home and I think it's
3:20
going to actually be detrimental to growth
3:22
because people will be too scared to
3:25
do something really radical in order to
3:27
stimulate growth. Interesting. Because I think the
3:29
mini budget that Liz Truss had, where
3:31
we saw a really, really sharp rise
3:34
in guilt yields, and a kind of
3:36
doom loop which the Bank of England
3:38
had to save us from by stepping
3:41
into the market and buying gills, that
3:43
wasn't really an episode of bond vigilantism,
3:45
if you want to put it like
3:47
that. It was more the case that
3:50
she stumbled into a strange market where
3:52
British pension funds had done this liability
3:54
matching thing. and a rise in interest
3:57
rates meant they had to sell guilt
3:59
mechanically, and it created this kind of
4:01
death spiral. Like she lit the match,
4:03
but the explosion was not really the
4:06
free market. And in a sense, the
4:08
explosion had already happened. If you look
4:10
at UK guilt yields leading up to
4:12
that budget, they'd soared. And what that
4:15
mini budget did was simply to make
4:17
them soar a little bit more, actually
4:19
quite a lot more, because of this
4:22
LDI problem. but also because of the
4:24
rate of increase of guilt yields because
4:26
I think that budget was so poorly
4:28
telegraphed and so poorly designed. Remember this
4:31
was a time of high inflation, there
4:33
were unfunded tax cuts which of inflationary
4:35
of course, and they didn't have any
4:38
input from the OBR to give some
4:40
kind of veracity to the numbers. So
4:42
I think part of the problem was
4:44
that some people sold bonds initially very
4:47
rapidly. and then it got a second
4:49
win the sell-off because of the LDI
4:51
problems and the fact that people had
4:54
margin calls and they had to sell
4:56
guilt to fund those and then we
4:58
got this downward spiral. Thankfully that structure
5:00
of the pension market is no longer
5:03
there so you shouldn't get that doom
5:05
loop dynamic at least from that corner
5:07
of the market but weirdly I think
5:10
the mini budget from Liz Truss is
5:12
kind of a blessing and a curse
5:14
for chance for chancelors nowadays. It's a
5:16
curse in that... Bond markets are watching
5:19
UK budgets very closely to see how
5:21
much they're going to borrow. But also
5:23
it's a blessing because even when we
5:25
get a bit of a negative reaction
5:28
like this time, everyone goes, well, it's
5:30
not as bad as Liz Trust the
5:32
lettuce. And if we look at the
5:35
yield change for this latest sell-off, it
5:37
isn't anywhere near as bad as it
5:39
was for the Quatine trust budget. So
5:41
for example, if we look at the
5:44
10-year guilt, and we track yields 20
5:46
days before and after the budget, There
5:48
was a 1.6 percentage point increase after
5:51
the Kwatang budget. Now it's early days,
5:53
we're only about a week into this,
5:55
and the UK tenure is currently about
5:57
25 basis points higher, so 0.25 percentage
6:00
points in other words. Is that the
6:02
way to measure it? Because I've seen
6:04
some people... saying yields now on the
6:07
10-year are higher than they were at
6:09
the time of Liz Trust. Surely this
6:11
is worse, but like you say, it's
6:13
the scale of the reaction, isn't it?
6:16
Rates are higher now across the world.
6:18
That's right. So that's not a UK
6:20
thing. That's a global phenomenon. Now I
6:22
have seen some people say that this
6:25
time round, it's all due to global
6:27
effects. It's the US election and yields
6:29
have pushed higher in the US and
6:32
across the world. But that's not true
6:34
either. It's somewhere in the middle right.
6:36
If you look at the spread of
6:38
guilt to Bunds, this is German government
6:41
bonds, they are at their highest now
6:43
since the Liz Trust mini budget, the
6:45
UK's borrowing costs relative to the rest
6:48
of the world have increased. Now what's
6:50
kind of interesting, if you look at
6:52
that spread, is that before that budget
6:54
it was around 100 basis points or
6:57
less. Then we got the Liz Trust
6:59
budget, it spiked above 200 basis points.
7:01
Briefly it dipped down. but then from
7:04
May onwards it spiked back up to
7:06
pretty much where it was previously and
7:08
it's been hovering at around 150 to
7:10
200 basis points ever since. So I
7:13
think this has only been a slight
7:15
increase to about 210 basis points from
7:17
about 160 before. So this seems to
7:19
be a new thing which is that
7:22
the UK treads that a spread to
7:24
Germany and it's a fairly large spread
7:26
compared to history. And weirdly I think
7:29
it's not all about the UK. the
7:31
German economy has real problems right now
7:33
and some deflationary dynamics which would depress
7:35
their interest rates. So it's kind of
7:38
like the German rates going down really
7:40
while the UK rates going up. But
7:42
I think it's fair to say the
7:45
Treasury was a little bit surprised that
7:47
the market did react negatively. And I
7:49
say that because Rachel Reeves made an
7:51
unscheduled appearance on Bloomberg TV, which is
7:54
unusual for a Chancellor and she reinforced
7:56
that her number one commitment, I quote,
7:58
is economic and fiscal stability. They maybe
8:01
were a little worried that they rushed
8:03
the Chancellor in front of the cameras.
8:05
Yeah, I think it's good that she...
8:07
did that because it's clear that they
8:10
have to say something to keep yields
8:12
down. What they didn't say is there's
8:14
more to come. I was equating saying
8:16
the day after the mini budget. Yeah
8:19
they didn't pour fuel on the fire
8:21
and they'd been very clear in their
8:23
messaging all through right so I don't
8:26
think there were many surprises. So I'm
8:28
surprised actually that the yield increase was
8:30
that large given the size of the
8:32
spending increase and how careful they've been.
8:35
not to let debt get to a
8:37
huge level relative to GDP. So they've
8:39
still got these really strong fiscal rules.
8:42
Well, let's talk through that, because, Robin,
8:44
this might be a rare case where
8:46
you and I disagree. Because I watched
8:48
your YouTube reaction video to the budget,
8:51
which was really good. And to sort
8:53
of misquote you slightly, you said something
8:55
like, Rachel Reeves didn't do enough, right?
8:58
She should have borrowed more, the markets
9:00
are relatively tame in reaction, this show
9:02
she could have gone further and invested
9:04
more. But when I look at the
9:07
figures, she is investing quite a lot
9:09
more than was planned previously. So spending
9:11
is budgeted to increase by 70 billion
9:13
pounds annually. And the stat that blows
9:16
my mind is that if you look
9:18
at total public spending, so this includes
9:20
the day-to-day expenditure and the investment, by
9:23
the end of this Parliament, that is
9:25
forecast to be around 44% of GDP.
9:27
If you compare that to before the
9:29
pandemic, that's 5 percentage points higher. That's
9:32
a massive increase in the size of
9:34
the state as a share of the
9:36
economy. But if you look at other
9:39
huge spending increases in the past, if
9:41
you look at what's really required to
9:43
take a country which is effectively not
9:45
growing, which is pretty much where we
9:48
are, growth has been so poor, and
9:50
if you look at wage growth over
9:52
the last decade, again, there's been hardly
9:55
any real wage growth. Well, it takes
9:57
a really big kick to turn that
9:59
around. And okay, this is a big
10:01
budget, but I think it could have
10:04
been bigger bigger. a market response in
10:06
my opinion is that it is fairly
10:08
muted. I think they could have gone.
10:10
further in terms of debt issuance. But
10:13
look, it is positive. And I think
10:15
the fact that they actually care about
10:17
growth and they've made a huge spending
10:20
increase in order to start it is
10:22
a positive. Don't get me wrong. I
10:24
just think in terms of degree, they
10:26
could have gone even further. But could
10:29
they? So you said they changed the
10:31
fiscal rules, which is true. So the
10:33
first fiscal rule says day-to-day spending has
10:36
to be met by tax revenues. That's
10:38
kind of uncontroversial. But then the big
10:40
change was to the second fiscal rule,
10:42
where Rachel Reeves adopted a different measure
10:45
of public debt. So it moved from
10:47
just a plain measure of public sector
10:49
net debt, less the Bank of England
10:52
liabilities, to something called persnuffle, which is
10:54
public sector net financial liabilities, which basically
10:56
allows you to offset some of the
10:58
government's future revenue from financial assets, things
11:01
like student loans, against the debt that
11:03
they're taking out. And this is a
11:05
looser fiscal rule. this allows you to
11:08
borrow more it flat as the public
11:10
finances because you're looking at some of
11:12
the assets and not just the debt.
11:14
But even with this looser rule, the
11:17
headroom on it according to the OBR
11:19
is almost non-existent so just 16 billion
11:21
by the end of the forecast period.
11:23
So to say she could have borrowed
11:26
more, well yes she could of course
11:28
she could but she'd have had to
11:30
have an even looser fiscal rule to
11:33
be allowed to do that and I
11:35
think that would have been a risk.
11:37
But that's what I think she should
11:39
have done. I think she should have
11:42
said, look, this five-year target is bullshit,
11:44
because if you want your country to
11:46
grow, thinking over five-year terms is, I
11:49
think, unrealistic. I think you should have
11:51
an even longer-term view. And of course,
11:53
if you're a politician, you think in
11:55
five-year chunks, because you're not going to
11:58
get reelected. So that was the worry,
12:00
I think. Ten-year person for you. Yeah,
12:02
I think Pentennia pus snuffle would be
12:05
much better than five. I actually think
12:07
you might be onto something there, but
12:09
I can see why they do it
12:11
in five-year chunk. and they're actually going
12:14
to start reducing it to a three-year
12:16
target because that is the period over
12:18
which a government does a detailed budget
12:20
and you get this weird fiction really
12:23
in budgets where they front-load everything all
12:25
the spending it's front-loaded so it looks
12:27
like the departments we've got lots of
12:30
money over the next three years but
12:32
then for the two years at the
12:34
end of the forecast period where they
12:36
don't have to like line-by-line say what
12:39
they're going to spend they're going to
12:41
be way less those two years. All
12:43
chancellors do this. So she's going to
12:46
try and avoid that in the future
12:48
by moving to a three-year target. And
12:50
fuel duties is the standard joke here,
12:52
isn't it? They always say they're going
12:55
to put it back up, but of
12:57
course they never do. Yeah, we've had
12:59
fuel duties frozen temporarily for 14 years,
13:02
but they're budgeting in them to rise
13:04
in real terms in all future periods,
13:06
as did conservative chancellers. And it never
13:08
happens. And the OBR in their report
13:11
has some relatively sarcastic commentary saying things
13:13
like, we cannot rely on these revenues.
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slash pension graft. So going back to
13:45
the market reaction, we've said on one
13:47
hand it's nowhere near as bad as
13:49
following Liz Trust's mini budget, but it's
13:52
also not nothing. Something's happened in markets,
13:54
something's happened in markets in markets. and
13:56
they have reprised UK borrowing costs. Is
13:59
that a rational reaction? Is what the
14:01
Chancellor unveiled sufficiently... expansionary or costly to
14:03
mean that government borrowing costs should have
14:05
gone up by 30 basis points? I
14:08
think it's always helpful to place these
14:10
things in a context of what's the
14:12
better investment for investors. Now at the
14:14
moment you've still got 4.95% on Sonia.
14:17
So if you're in a money market
14:19
fund you can earn more than the
14:21
entire guilt yield curve. So gilts are
14:24
just not attractive for your average investor
14:26
in the UK retail investors at least.
14:28
you can earn more by just plunk
14:30
it in a money market fund and
14:33
waiting. So that means that there isn't
14:35
a level of support at the moment
14:37
at least until the Bank of England
14:40
starts to lower that short-term rate. Now,
14:42
was the market reaction rational? It's difficult
14:44
to say what the market was pricing
14:46
in. I don't think there's a credit
14:49
risk premium here. I think what we're
14:51
talking about is pricing in perhaps higher
14:53
growth. that's certainly one aspect of it
14:56
at the long end of the curve.
14:58
So maybe the market was actually believing
15:00
what was going to happen. Certainly there's
15:02
a degree of inflation expectations. We saw
15:05
inflation expectations increase and that's also priced
15:07
in at the long end of the
15:09
curve. That increases yield too. So I
15:11
think it was a combination of those
15:14
two. Maybe a bit more inflation than
15:16
growth expectations. And if you look at
15:18
the one year past of the curve.
15:21
That's moved up quite a bit because
15:23
what people now expect is at the
15:25
Bank of England will have to keep
15:27
rates higher for longer and yields rose
15:30
at the one year past of the
15:32
curve in anticipation of that. Yeah I
15:34
agree with you. I saw a lot
15:37
of commentary saying well this is a
15:39
negative verdict from markets on the budget.
15:41
Markets don't like it. I don't think
15:43
that's true. I think that's a misreading
15:46
of the situation. I'd see this more
15:48
as markets just pricing in the cost
15:50
of the budget. The government's going to
15:53
borrow more. a lot more, to be
15:55
frank, and that means probably a little
15:57
bit higher interest rates and inflation. That
15:59
has costs for the economy, and it
16:02
has benefits, there's a genuine trade. off
16:04
there and so markets go, rates are
16:06
going to be higher. It's not a
16:08
bad verdict, it's not saying we're going
16:11
to go into this death spiral and
16:13
rates are going to soar to the
16:15
sky. It's just saying you've made this
16:18
choice, you're going to go for growth
16:20
at the expense of a little bit
16:22
higher inflation and rates. Well this is
16:24
what it's going to cost you from
16:27
the bond market. And again if we
16:29
compare the one year yield and compare
16:31
it with the quatting budget, it moves
16:34
up about 80 basis points the one
16:36
year yield. And so far at least
16:38
for the Reeves budget, it's moved up
16:40
49 basis points. So about five eights
16:43
as much. That's a much closer reaction
16:45
to what we got with the Guatang
16:47
budget. And I think that's based on
16:50
this expectation of inflation. If you look
16:52
at the forecast from the Office for
16:54
Budget Responsibility, the OBR, they did up
16:56
their forecast for inflation and interest rates,
16:59
but not by much. So they said
17:01
bank rate would be roughly a quarter
17:03
of a percentage point higher over the
17:06
period. versus their previous forecast, and they
17:08
expect inflation to pick up to 2.6%
17:10
next year. And it's important to stress
17:12
this is versus the previous forecast, that
17:15
expectation around bank rate. So it's not
17:17
that rates are going to go up
17:19
from here. They still expect the Bank
17:21
of England to cut. It's just that
17:24
they'll cut a little bit less or
17:26
a little bit more slowly. But I
17:28
don't want to be too complacent. Like
17:31
I think this budget does represent a
17:33
genuine gamble, and there are risks here.
17:35
So the first one we've mentioned is
17:37
that there is very little headroom against
17:40
those fiscal targets, the fiscal rules that
17:42
the Chancellor has set. And in fact,
17:44
the OBR estimates that there's only a
17:47
54% chance that the government will hit
17:49
its fiscal mandate. So maybe that's one
17:51
reason that the markets have demanded a
17:53
higher yield for guilt, is that there's
17:56
a reasonable chance here, a coin flip
17:58
maybe, that the government's going to have
18:00
to come back and borrow more money
18:03
than they've said. Because they have committed
18:05
to certain things which they haven't specified
18:07
a date for it, things like increasing
18:09
defence. spending to 2.5% of GDP. That's
18:12
going to be really tricky to do
18:14
unless they get considerable growth ahead. They
18:16
haven't said when they're going to do
18:18
it, they just said at some future
18:21
fiscal event, which is pretty vague. But
18:23
if something like interest rates increase, that
18:25
increases the debt servicing cost, well, there
18:28
goes your fiscal headroom. And that's not
18:30
always under the government's control. But there's
18:32
another risk here, which again we kind
18:34
of touched on, which is the front
18:37
loading of spending. So if you look
18:39
at the budget. Day-to-day public service funding
18:41
is set to be almost 5% higher
18:44
this year than last year, and then
18:46
they've budgeted for it to grow another
18:48
3.1% in real terms next year. But
18:50
after that, for the last three years
18:53
of the Parliament, they've only budgeted in
18:55
a rise of 1.3% per year. That
18:57
seems tough given how threadbare public services
19:00
have been over the last 10 years.
19:02
And if that's unrealistic, unrealistic, if they
19:04
do have to spend more money to
19:06
stop real terms cuts to some departments.
19:09
Because remember, health spending is going to
19:11
have to rise by more than that.
19:13
As is welfare spending, probably. So that
19:15
would mean real terms cuts to a
19:18
lot of departments. So to avoid that,
19:20
they'd either need more tax rises, which
19:22
they haven't talked about, or they need
19:25
to go to the bond market and
19:27
sell more bonds. Yeah, the big gamble
19:29
here is growth. If they don't get
19:31
the growth, they're in real trouble, because
19:34
they've assumed they're going to get the
19:36
growth. And it may not materialise, or
19:38
at least it might take longer than
19:41
people expect, because a lot of these
19:43
effects are very long term. If you
19:45
improve infrastructure, it takes a while for
19:47
that to feed through into higher GDP
19:50
growth. And the OBR is negative on
19:52
growth. They forecast weak growth for this
19:54
whole parliament. There's a little bit of
19:57
a tick up over the next year
19:59
or two, as some of that front-loaded
20:01
spending comes into effect. But they don't
20:03
think this budget has a meaningful impact
20:06
on UK growth. by the end of
20:08
the five-year forecast. So the ABR is
20:10
forecasting that in 2030 at the end
20:12
of the period will have real terms
20:15
GDP growth of just 1.6% which would
20:17
be disappointing given how much money is
20:19
being spent here. Now I think one
20:22
of the things which I have issues
20:24
with is just using one forecast to
20:26
predict what's going to happen to UK
20:28
growth. Now we had a great conversation
20:31
with Sir David Spiegelholter. who has done
20:33
a huge amount to teach people about
20:35
basic statistics, inference, how statistics works, and
20:38
how modeling works, and a lot of
20:40
his work has been combining models and
20:42
trying to make your inferences better because
20:44
of that combination of different outlooks. And
20:47
I think one thing that the government
20:49
currently doesn't do is any kind of
20:51
model mixing, combining models, comparing different views,
20:54
to see what could happen in future.
20:56
And depending on just one forecast, the
20:58
OBR, I think is a step forward,
21:00
don't get me wrong, but I think
21:03
having multiple forecasts would be a better
21:05
way of doing it. Yeah, I really
21:07
enjoyed speaking to David, and the line
21:09
that sticks in my head from that
21:12
whole conversation is model combination is more
21:14
important than model choice, which is exactly
21:16
what you're saying here, because the OBR's
21:19
forecasts are pessimistic. And there are other
21:21
people forecasting what's going to happen as
21:23
a result of this budget who are
21:25
much more optimistic. The IMF is positive
21:28
and they see this budget as sustainably
21:30
raising revenue with a focus on boosting
21:32
growth, which is good. And I've seen
21:35
some research from Cast and Jung at
21:37
the Institute for Public Policy who forecast
21:39
significantly high growth in the OBR. So
21:41
I guess the question is why is
21:44
the OBR pessimistic, given that the government's
21:46
ramping up investment so much? Well if
21:48
you listen to what the government says
21:51
and what the OBR says, the phrase
21:53
that keeps on popping up from the
21:55
government is crowding in, whereas everything in
21:57
the OBR's report is crowding out of
22:00
private investment. That's a huge difference between
22:02
what the government... and what the OBR
22:04
says. The OBR doesn't say crowding in
22:06
once in their report. No, I read
22:09
that OBR report, and the first thing
22:11
that jumped out to me was that
22:13
you talk about maybe Reeves could have
22:16
borrowed more and invested more. That wouldn't
22:18
have made a difference to the growth
22:20
forecasts within this Parliament. Because their model
22:22
assumes the economy is near capacity right
22:25
now, unemployment's low, real wages are rising,
22:27
and demand is not particularly weak. they
22:29
basically offset any increase in public investment
22:32
against private sector activity. So yeah, Reeves
22:34
I don't think could have made these
22:36
forecasts look much better by ramping up
22:38
borrowing even more. But the thing is,
22:41
all of these assumptions are based on
22:43
something called the output gap, which is
22:45
the difference between current growth or projected
22:48
growth if you like, and a rate
22:50
at which you assume the economy could
22:52
grow. And basically, if you ask 10
22:54
different economies, you'll come up with 12
22:57
different answers on what the output gap
22:59
could be. If only we had a
23:01
prize-winning economist to speak to right now
23:04
and not. Steady. Don't be too modest.
23:06
You are a prize-winning economist now. Yeah,
23:08
because I love economics so much. Are
23:10
you going to have to stop slanging
23:13
economist off? No. But look, the overall
23:15
picture, I think, is one of an
23:17
OBR which is too gloomy. a very
23:19
strong set of assumptions in their outlook,
23:22
which is based on this view about
23:24
the output gap. And I think it
23:26
would add a lot if we had
23:29
other forecasters included into the forecast. Imagine
23:31
how controversial get though, if you sort
23:33
of override the OBR to some degree
23:35
by mixing in more optimistic models. Whether
23:38
markets are going to like that, I
23:40
don't know. I agree from a statistical
23:42
point of view, it makes sense to
23:45
have a range of forecasts. But economics
23:47
is so subjective that I think if
23:49
you don't have more than one model,
23:51
it's very misleading. But don't you think
23:54
the clues in the title right, office
23:56
for budget responsibility? That sort of implies
23:58
they should be a little bit pessimistic.
24:01
stick a little bit cautious and conservative
24:03
and not let the public finances have
24:05
too much of a risk of runaway
24:07
debt. Yeah I think that's true but
24:10
if you're going to ask Eor his
24:12
opinion on what the budget's going to
24:14
mean you want to ask Tigger as
24:16
well. I like that I'd ask I'd
24:19
ask owl. Owl as well but not
24:21
poo I mean he's just so stupid.
24:23
But even if we are only asking
24:26
Eor I want Eor. to be competent.
24:28
And there was a pretty big oversight
24:30
from the OBR, which did materially affect
24:32
what Reeves was allowed to do in
24:35
the budget. So, as we said, she
24:37
changed the fiscal rules to a kind
24:39
of looser on this personuffle thing. And
24:42
ahead of the budget, everyone said, if
24:44
she does this, it's going to buy
24:46
her a huge amount of headroom, something
24:48
like 50 to 60 billion pounds of
24:51
headroom. And everyone was saying, if she
24:53
spends that all at once, markets are
24:55
going to freak out. And then we
24:58
came to the budget and she did
25:00
change the fiscal rules and there was
25:02
no headroom left. Did she spend all
25:04
this money? A crazy amount of money?
25:07
Well, no she didn't. And the reason
25:09
why is because the OBR said, oops,
25:11
my bad, that 60 billion I said
25:13
last time was going to be the
25:16
headroom. It's actually more like 40 billion.
25:18
Sorry, there's 18 billion missing. And when
25:20
I say they owned up to it,
25:23
they squirled it away in a little
25:25
footnote at the bottom of one of
25:27
their pages. It took Bloomberg to point
25:29
it out, didn't it? Yeah, that was
25:32
awful. But maybe that's one of the
25:34
reasons why the market reaction was relatively
25:36
negative, is that they saw the fiscal
25:39
target change and yet there's no headroom
25:41
left. Yeah, that was atrocious. And the
25:43
fact that it was just a footnote,
25:45
they should have fessed up big time.
25:48
But I couldn't believe that it wasn't
25:50
even in headlines even in headlines after
25:52
that. But coming back to the mixture
25:55
of forecasts, I think the other notable
25:57
one was from Moody's, which was quite
25:59
pessimistic. Yeah, I think that... added to
26:01
the worry a little bit, didn't it?
26:04
Moody said, in our view, the increase
26:06
in borrowing, which is in part supported
26:08
by a new measure of debt under
26:10
the fiscal framework, will pose an additional
26:13
challenge for what are already difficult fiscal
26:15
consolidation prospects. They're basically saying that there
26:17
is a risk that debt could get
26:20
out of control here, if growth doesn't
26:22
come. Yeah, so I'd say that's a
26:24
bit pigletish and still a bit miserable.
26:26
Because if you look at what the
26:29
US has done. and they've got quite
26:31
a lot of crowding in. Moving chip
26:33
manufacturing back to the US that's employed
26:36
lots of people, thousands of people, and
26:38
I think it's a very positive thing
26:40
for the US to do. Plus they've
26:42
got all of the infrastructure spending which
26:45
has also boosted their growth. A large
26:47
part of that, if you look at
26:49
some of the analysis of it, is
26:52
due to crowding in. So they haven't
26:54
seen huge amounts of crowding out, they
26:56
have seen crowding in. So they've created
26:58
these incentives for companies to invest, that's
27:01
part of it, but also direct subsidies.
27:03
So that's what I think has been
27:05
very effective in the United States, and
27:07
I think we can replicate that here
27:10
too. But if you ask the Office
27:12
for Budget Responsibility, they'll just say, well,
27:14
it'll take ages to pay off. Yeah,
27:17
and when you say ages, really, we
27:19
do mean ages. So they forecast. a
27:21
1.4% boost to annual GDP growth. Wohoo,
27:23
that's pretty damn good, but not really
27:26
kicking in for almost 50 years, like
27:28
the 2070s they think you'll get up
27:30
to 1.4% boost. And if you look
27:33
at the graph, there's a massive error
27:35
around that. Which is fair, like who
27:37
knows right? And I don't want to
27:39
be too negative on the OBR. I
27:42
don't think it's out of the question
27:44
at all that we have weak growth
27:46
going forward. Like we've had weak growth
27:49
for the last 15 years for the
27:51
financial crisis since the financial crisis. To
27:53
believe it's going to change now, I
27:55
think comes down to do you think
27:58
the government is going to spend that
28:00
money well. Just looking at those seven
28:02
pillars of growth that we've announced, I
28:05
think, yeah, that sounds quite promising. It's
28:07
a sort of Keynesian wish list. Any
28:09
Keynesian will say, yeah, that's the stuff
28:11
which should fix the growth problem. I
28:14
saw that Kier Stammer was asked, well,
28:16
why is the OBR's growth forecast weak?
28:18
And he basically said, well, all the
28:20
reforms we're bringing in are entrained, but
28:23
haven't been modeled yet by the OBR.
28:25
And the big one being planning reform,
28:27
where Starmer says, and I quote, a
28:30
big build. could become as transformative for
28:32
working people as the big bang was
28:34
for the city of London in the
28:36
1980s. Plus I think devolving some of
28:39
the decisions to local governments to regional
28:41
mayors I think that's a good idea
28:43
because they've probably got a better idea
28:46
of how to spend it than central
28:48
government. So a lot of it I
28:50
think is not tangible not something you
28:52
could enter into a model but I
28:55
think promising. There would also be a
28:57
lot of upside from tax reform and
28:59
simplification. deregulation of certain industries may be
29:02
and you know the big one which
29:04
we're never allowed to speak about closer
29:06
trade links with the EU would be
29:08
helpful. Which they won't go whole hog
29:11
with of course because that would reverse
29:13
Brexit but they are taking baby steps
29:15
in that direction. But in terms of
29:17
public investment I think there's a thinner
29:20
line between day-to-day spending and investment spending
29:22
that you might imagine. Labour is obviously
29:24
going to come under pressure from unions.
29:27
and NIMBs and lots of other narrow
29:29
interest groups to direct a little bit
29:31
of cash their way or to stymie
29:33
the reforms, they need to find a
29:36
way of spending that money to boost
29:38
productivity and to get the private sector
29:40
to come with them. That's the big
29:43
challenge. And moreover, they need to find
29:45
a way to keep the market on
29:47
side because although we've been a bit
29:49
dismissive of bond vigilantes today, they can
29:52
cause a problem if your borrowing costs
29:54
do rise fast fast. then obviously you're
29:56
going to breach your fiscal rules because
29:59
your debt servicing costs will be really
30:01
high and you just won't be able
30:03
to borrow to fix the problems. I
30:05
mean, look back on the sovereign debt
30:08
crisis in Europe, and I think the
30:10
peripheral spreads widening was justified. There was
30:12
profit spending, and people didn't care about
30:14
debt to GDP, but markets did. So
30:17
I think this error correction mechanism that
30:19
you get in the bond market is
30:21
not necessarily a bad one, and I
30:24
think it's a rational one from the
30:26
point of view of the bond investors,
30:28
and it keeps governments in check, which
30:30
itself is a good thing. But if
30:33
you do get a dose of bond
30:35
vigilantes, then the aftermath can be incredibly
30:37
painful and very long-lasting. I was looking
30:40
at a graph of unemployment in Greece
30:42
recently and it was very high for
30:44
such a long time. So I think
30:46
it's difficult to overestimate how much pain
30:49
economic pain Greece has felt as a
30:51
result of those economic decisions in the
30:53
early 2010s. So once you do fall
30:56
foul of them, Yeah, you can certainly
30:58
feel the pain. And this is a
31:00
very powerful force. Feels like we've not
31:02
thought about that force for quite a
31:05
long time, since the sovereign debt crisis
31:07
in Europe probably. Is that because QE,
31:09
quantitative easing, kind of killed off the
31:11
bond vigilantes, right? If the central bank
31:14
is buying bucket loads of the government's
31:16
debt, well, bond vigilantes don't really have
31:18
enough fire power to push up yields.
31:21
But now central banks are selling government
31:23
debt. We've got QT the opposite. Does
31:25
that give more of an opening to
31:27
bond vigilante if they believe the government's
31:30
being too profligate? I think so. But
31:32
only if they very rapidly sell. And
31:34
of course you're assuming that bond vigilantes
31:37
exist. I'm not convinced they do. You've
31:39
just got boring fund managers sitting on
31:41
a pile of debt just thinking, oh,
31:43
am I going to lose more money
31:46
on these guilt? I know that you're
31:48
not a bond vigilante. You're kind of
31:50
the opposite, right? You were hoping guilt
31:53
yields rise further so you could buy
31:55
bonds. Yeah, I was hoping there was
31:57
going to be a big sell-off in
31:59
guilt, but it was a... very disappointing.
32:02
It was tiny in magnitude and it's
32:04
still not attractive relative to something like
32:06
a money market fund. So yeah, I
32:08
just was very disappointed. I thought this
32:11
would be an opportunity to fill my
32:13
boots with guilt, but no. For governments
32:15
looking for a new head of
32:17
the Bank of England, someone who
32:20
will institute fish depression. Robin is
32:22
yeah, no, you're going to step
32:24
in, by by by. But I think that's
32:26
a natural safety valve if you reach
32:28
something like 5%? then yeah at that
32:30
point it becomes really attractive to
32:33
buy gills and that would probably
32:35
slow the sell off considerably. Now
32:37
you've probably noticed that
32:39
we've been talking about whether it's
32:41
worthwhile buying gills and a question
32:43
that crops up a lot at
32:45
the moment is when it's going
32:48
to be worthwhile switching from money
32:50
market funds to gills. Join that
32:52
conversation, discuss it with us and
32:54
you can do that as part
32:56
of our membership. to learn more
32:58
just go to pensioncraft.com slash membership.
33:00
Okay, today's dumb question of
33:03
the week. Does public investment
33:05
crowd out or crowd in
33:07
private sector activity? Now we've
33:09
said that in terms of modeling
33:11
the implications of this budget
33:14
on growth, the key question is
33:16
whether you believe an increase in
33:18
spending from the government is
33:20
going to squash the private sector
33:22
or actually boost the private
33:25
sector. What do you reckon? So let's
33:27
begin with what crowding out and crowding
33:29
in is. Perhaps we should have said
33:31
that earlier. But the idea is that
33:34
if the government spends a certain amount
33:36
of money on the economy, the
33:38
question is, will the private sector
33:40
also chip in? Or having seen that
33:43
the government's spending on this
33:45
infrastructure say, will they stop spending?
33:47
So they'll be crowded out. And
33:49
there's a big debate about which of
33:52
those happens. Clearly the OBR
33:54
favours the crowding out
33:56
hypothesis. If you look at the White
33:58
House and the US. seeing what's happened
34:01
with their stimulus. Yes, it
34:03
seems as if the private sector
34:05
has crowded in and spent in
34:08
infrastructure alongside the government, but it's
34:10
not a clear-cut thing. But it really
34:12
boils down to working out whether
34:14
the economy is running it close to
34:16
capacity. And that itself depends on
34:18
something called the output gap. Yeah,
34:20
I think it's fair to say there's evidence
34:23
for both these things. They can both
34:25
happen. It could be crowding out and
34:27
they could be crowding in, depending on...
34:29
where we are in the economic cycle,
34:31
and whether there's room in the
34:33
economy in effect for the government
34:35
to spend more without having to
34:37
suck resources away from the private
34:40
sector. So let's take the scenario where
34:42
the economy is at or near capacity.
34:44
If the government increases public
34:46
spending, how does that cause crowding
34:48
out? Well one way is it
34:51
generates higher interest rates, which as
34:53
we know depresses private sector investment,
34:55
as an aside there. private savings in
34:57
the economy are more likely to be
35:00
going into buying government bonds rather than
35:02
funding private sector investment with
35:04
higher rates. There's also increased competition
35:06
from the government for resources, for
35:08
workers, for one, for raw materials,
35:10
all this stuff, and therefore there's
35:12
less for the private sector to work with.
35:14
And also if the government's piling into certain
35:17
markets, like if they set up a state
35:19
bank or a state healthcare system, these things
35:21
might be good, but there's therefore increased
35:24
competition competition against... private
35:26
companies in those sectors. So that's
35:28
the kind of theory of crowding
35:30
out. Those kind of effects working
35:32
together to mean that the government captures
35:35
a bigger share of the economy
35:37
at the expense of the private sector.
35:39
Now the idea with crowding in is
35:41
that it assumes that there is some
35:43
kind of output gap. In other words,
35:46
actual GDP is well below something called
35:48
potential GDP, you wonder. Well,
35:50
it's something which is estimated
35:53
by economists. based on historic
35:55
rates of growth. You might
35:57
also look at things like...
36:00
capital stock, how much of existing
36:02
capacity is utilized. You could look
36:04
at the labour force, you could
36:06
look at wage growth. All of
36:08
these things would factor in to
36:10
this measurement of potential output, but
36:12
it is a very difficult thing
36:14
to estimate and there won't be
36:16
agreement on what the actual number
36:18
is. So that's why I think
36:20
anchoring your expectations about growth on
36:22
an imaginary number is difficult and
36:24
problematic and you need more than
36:26
one model to estimate it. But
36:29
let's assume that there is an
36:31
output gap and the economy is
36:33
running below capacity, maybe we're in
36:35
a recession, or a period of
36:37
very weak growth. What's this crowding
36:39
in then? So the idea here
36:41
is that companies will not be
36:43
operating at full capacity and that
36:45
there will be people in the
36:47
labour force who they can employ
36:49
to increase their output. And that
36:51
means that the stimulus will have
36:53
a bigger multiplier effect, if you
36:55
like. So every pound or dollar
36:57
that the government spends will have
36:59
a bigger effect on growth. So
37:01
that's the idea around a kind
37:03
of macro stimulus. There's more money
37:05
in consumers' pockets and in a
37:07
period of weak demand. That's good.
37:10
It's not going to lead to
37:12
very high inflation. And the other
37:14
side of the coin, I guess,
37:16
is that if the government spends
37:18
on building better infrastructure, things like
37:20
roads, energy infrastructure... broadband, all this
37:22
stuff, then that can improve productivity
37:24
and make businesses more efficient effectively
37:26
and can help grow the economy.
37:28
And there's also an element of
37:30
confidence here, so if you do
37:32
get the government spending, that can
37:34
improve business confidence and consumer confidence,
37:36
and that makes businesses and consumers
37:38
spend more, that's a little bit
37:40
more of a psychological animal-spirity type
37:42
argument. But I guess the question
37:44
of... Will you get crowding out
37:46
or crowding in? If we believe
37:48
it comes down to this assessment
37:51
of the economy and whether there
37:53
is spare capacity, whether there is
37:55
slack in the economy, that is
37:57
a judgment call. very hard to
37:59
make. It's interesting that the OBR's
38:01
model, when you look at real
38:03
wage growth, is forecasting it to
38:05
be very poor still. They said
38:07
the last parliament was basically the
38:09
worst real wage growth on record.
38:11
They think this parliament is going
38:13
to be the second worst. It's
38:15
just marginally better. We'll see, I
38:17
guess. I mean, let's hope the
38:19
OBR's wrong in that, but I
38:21
don't want to be too harsh
38:23
on them. Like, who knows? Economics
38:25
is not an exact science. But
38:27
I think the wrong response to
38:29
uncertainty is to do nothing and
38:32
that simply wouldn't have been acceptable
38:34
and things I think probably would
38:36
have got worse in terms of
38:38
infrastructure in the UK. And if
38:40
you live here, you realise how
38:42
bad things are. Even if it
38:44
all goes wrong, at least we'll
38:46
have a fast way to get
38:48
to crew. Thank
38:50
you for joining us for many
38:52
happy returns. Do send us your
38:54
questions no matter how dumb at
38:56
the email address, MHR, at pensioncraft.com.
38:59
And do remember to check out
39:01
pensioncraft.com for all the information about
39:03
our membership and investment coaching options.
39:05
Many happy returns is a pension
39:07
craft production. Co-hosted and executive produced
39:09
by Romen Akiza and Michael Pew.
39:11
This podcast is for informational and
39:13
entertainment purposes and is not financial
39:16
advice. We do not provide recommendations
39:18
or endorse any decision to buy,
39:20
sell or hold any security. We
39:22
cannot be held responsible for any
39:24
actions listeners may take and investors
39:26
are encouraged to seek independent financial
39:28
advice.
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