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Islamic terrorism. She is a She

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is a consultant for the Department

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of Defense and a fellow at the

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Alexander Hamilton Hamilton She joins us today

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0:32

the relationship between Iran and Al Iran and

0:34

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at UAV.com. Sarah, welcome to welcome

1:25

to Intelligence Matters. It's great to have

1:27

you on our show. so much you so

1:29

much for having me, Michael. I appreciate it. it. So

1:32

Sarah, as you know, we're

1:34

gonna talk about the relationship between

1:36

al-Qaeda Iran, which I am very

1:38

much looking forward to in

1:40

part to I spent a good

1:42

bit of my career, including when

1:45

I was deputy director I was

1:47

on this very question, so I'm

1:49

really looking forward to what

1:51

you have to say. really looking forward to

1:53

what you have to say. Get to that.

1:55

we get to that, I wonder, Sarah, wonder, Sarah,

1:57

if we could start by you

1:59

telling our about your background

2:01

in general and then how

2:03

you came to focus on

2:05

this important question of the

2:07

relationship between Iran and al-Qaeda.

2:09

Thank you so much Michael.

2:11

It's great to be here

2:14

joining you today to discuss

2:16

such an important question. So

2:18

I was born and raised

2:20

in Tripoli, Lebanon. Tripoli is

2:22

a Sunni-dominated city with the

2:24

country Lebanon under the influence

2:26

of Hezbollah in Iran. And

2:28

I witnessed firsthand the impact

2:30

and the operations and the

2:32

interactions between Sunni and Shia

2:34

militant groups from Hezbollah actions

2:36

in the South of Lebanon,

2:38

from Sunni groups affiliated with

2:40

al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

2:42

And this unique exposure sparked

2:44

my interest in trying to

2:46

understand the relationships between these

2:48

different actors, especially between al-Qaeda

2:50

and Iran. growing up in

2:52

that region and sharing similar

2:54

background to the Sunni and

2:56

militant groups and also being

2:58

under the influence of Iran

3:00

in that country, I grew

3:02

to question things on the

3:04

surface and to dig deeper

3:06

into trying to analyze their

3:08

strategies and their operational mindset.

3:10

And being in Lebanon, I

3:12

could see how they operate,

3:15

they think and they act.

3:17

which led me to further

3:19

focused on trying to dissect

3:21

the relationship between al-Qaeda and

3:23

Iran. And I ended up

3:25

focusing my entire research on

3:27

countering extremist behaviors and trying

3:29

to understand multi-groups behaviors, which

3:31

is why with my research

3:33

and my studies and the

3:35

company I'm starting and I

3:37

founded and leading, I also

3:39

focused for the State Department

3:41

of Defense and other private

3:43

sector and government agencies on

3:45

analyzing these threats and coming

3:47

up with strategies that preempts

3:49

them and neutralizes them. Sarah,

3:51

what were your formative years

3:53

in Lebanon? I grew up

3:55

in Lebanon and I came

3:57

here when I was 15,

3:59

but I going back and

4:01

forth, so the earlier 15

4:03

years of my life, I

4:05

was all in Lebanon, so

4:07

I could see, and especially

4:09

in Tripoli, which is a

4:11

high Sunni, with a fertile

4:13

ground of extremism, with, you

4:16

know, I saw the spillover

4:18

for the Syrian Civil War,

4:20

I saw Japahit Patasham there,

4:22

the Nusra Front, I saw

4:24

Hezbollah's militia clash with Sunni

4:26

militant groups in Tripoli, I

4:28

also saw how Iran, utilize

4:30

these proxies and uses them

4:32

within the Lebanese contacts. So

4:34

all of that made me,

4:36

and you know, after coming

4:38

to the US at 15

4:40

years old and seeing a

4:42

completely different world and the

4:44

freedoms and the liberties here,

4:46

I can't be very fond

4:48

of the US and I

4:50

dedicated my life here with

4:52

my studies and my research

4:54

on countering these type of

4:56

threats and understanding them and

4:58

helping the U.S. government, but

5:00

I kept going back and

5:02

forth to Lebanon. I was

5:04

actually just there in the

5:06

Middle East doing field work

5:08

in July and trying to

5:10

see how the Israeli Hamas

5:12

conflict and Israel Hezbollah conflict

5:14

with the October 7th attacks

5:17

altered the regional dynamics there

5:19

as well, and I kept

5:21

going back and forth seeing

5:23

how different the Syrian Civil

5:25

War, a hostage situation taking

5:27

with the Islamic State being

5:29

in Tripoli, and all of

5:31

these different dynamics led me

5:33

to focus on these groups

5:35

and actors. Yeah, great. All

5:37

right, let's take the Al-Qaeda-Iran

5:39

relationship, you know, step by

5:41

step, okay? And maybe the

5:43

place to start is to

5:45

walk us through Sarah, when

5:47

that relationship began, and then

5:49

take it to, you know,

5:51

walk us through the pre-911

5:53

period and take us right

5:55

up to 9-11 as a

5:57

first step. This is great.

5:59

Thank you. So in the

6:01

1990s, Iran surrounded by Sunni

6:03

states and scrutinized by the

6:05

West and Amid regional strife

6:07

in the region formed in

6:09

alignment with al-Qaeda. this isn't

6:11

very different from how it

6:13

was working with Hamas as

6:15

well, another Sunni militant group.

6:18

Despite the sonicia divide between

6:20

al-qaeda and Iran, Iran supported

6:22

al-qaeda and offered logistical aid,

6:24

safe havens, and even at

6:26

times training. memoir who was

6:28

the former bodyguard of Bin

6:30

Laden, he notes that during

6:32

these times the outlook of

6:34

Bin Laden and on Tehran

6:36

and he described it as

6:38

the enemy of my enemies,

6:40

my friends, where Bin Laden,

6:42

its focus of al-Qaeda was

6:44

primarily the United States and

6:46

there Bin Laden explained that

6:48

collaboration with Iran and its

6:50

proxies were tactical, not ideological

6:52

and they all both aimed

6:54

at targeting the US and

6:56

its allies. And during that

6:58

time, also, the bridge between

7:00

al-Qaeda and Iran and the

7:02

lynchman of these early dealings

7:04

was Mustapah Ahmed, who was

7:06

a former senior al-Qaeda associate,

7:08

and who is also a

7:10

father-in-law to Al-Adl, who would

7:12

now, later as we see,

7:14

now rise to become al-Qaeda's

7:16

presumed de facto leader. Mr.

7:19

Muhammad was very pragmatic. He

7:21

emphasized effective jihadist strategy over

7:23

doctrinal purity and rigidity in

7:25

ideology. And Al-Adl followed in

7:27

his footsteps in 1991, Al-Adus

7:29

pragmatic outlook and his willingness

7:31

to overlook sectarian differences led

7:33

him to manage the Iran-Al-Qaeda

7:35

relationship. During these times, he

7:37

organized training sessions and meetings

7:39

in Sudan and Lebanon that

7:41

brought together the most infamous

7:43

names and terrorism from Osama

7:45

bin Laden to Hamas, Ahmad

7:47

Yassin, to Hezbollah's Ahmad Mujah,

7:49

and the culmination of these

7:51

sessions and meetings, as we

7:53

saw, led to the 1998

7:55

U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya

7:57

and Tanzania, and the 2000

7:59

U. cool bombing in

8:02

Yemen. So with all of

8:04

that this is where it

8:06

laid the background as early

8:08

foundation laid the groundwork for

8:11

what comes after 9-11. And

8:14

did you ever come across

8:16

anything in your research that

8:18

suggested Iranian involvement in or

8:20

even Iranian foreknowledge of 9-11?

8:22

I just want to put

8:25

that out there and get

8:27

a, you know, clarity on

8:29

that question. I

8:31

have not come across Iranian knowledge

8:33

of 9-11, that they train and

8:36

help Al-Qaeda and fund some of

8:38

their operations, and that Hezbollah train

8:41

with Al-Qaeda as well, to enhance

8:43

their tactical expertise and the explosives

8:45

of the methods that they conducted

8:48

their operations. 100% they did, and

8:50

we've seen all of that, but

8:53

I haven't come across a direct

8:55

evidence that shows Iran knowing explicitly

8:57

that Al-Aida was conducting 9-11. Okay,

9:00

great. All right, then post 9-11,

9:02

so the second step here, right,

9:04

is post-9-11, really, you know, what

9:07

happened in the immediate post-9-11 period,

9:09

particularly as some of these people

9:12

had to get out of Afghanistan,

9:14

and then take us up to

9:16

kind of the mid-20-10s, right, when

9:19

things start to evolve again, and

9:21

we'll save that part. But take

9:24

us from 9-11 to say 2015

9:26

or so. Of course,

9:28

so after the 9-11 attacks,

9:31

Iran's support for al-Qaeda evolved

9:33

from passive to active. Iran

9:36

started offering al-Qaeda sanctuary funding

9:38

and strategic planning and welcomed

9:40

FLEA al-Qaeda members like Al-Adl.

9:43

But during that time, Iran

9:45

was strategic. It detained certain

9:47

al-Qaeda members to reduce the

9:50

international backlash, but it granted

9:52

some other al-Qaeda members relative

9:54

freedom like al-Adl. Around this

9:57

time, bin Laden was discussing

9:59

leadership and promotion

10:01

processes with Nasser al-Haiji in

10:03

communications. And Bin Laden notes

10:05

his concerns of Al-Adliz associations

10:07

with Iranian military officials, but

10:10

with all these concerns, Tehran

10:12

saw the value in those

10:14

ties and subjected him to

10:16

a loose form of house

10:18

arrest. This was the start

10:20

of Iran developing al-Qaeda as

10:22

a proxy. They extradited Nakhishi

10:24

back to Yemen where he

10:26

met his demise, but retained

10:28

Al-Adl and granted him carte

10:30

blanche to carry on with

10:32

his activities. And we saw

10:35

around it this time when

10:37

Al-Adl was in Iran. His

10:40

involvement in 2003, the Riyadh

10:42

bombing and the 2013 thwarted

10:44

train bombing in Toronto, demonstrates

10:46

his role in coordinating operations

10:48

with Iranian support. And also

10:50

on this time, while he

10:53

was in Iran, yes, while

10:55

he was in Iran. And

10:57

then the U.S. State Department

10:59

noted around that time that

11:01

Iran was reluctant to identify

11:03

the names of the people

11:06

of the senior al-Qaeda members

11:08

who were in territory and

11:10

also the Treasury Department exposed

11:12

a network that was aging

11:14

al-Qaida's activities in Middle Middle

11:16

East and Central Asia. But

11:19

there was a critical juncture

11:21

in that co-opting strategy of

11:23

Iran. Iran up at this

11:25

point was cooperating, was offering

11:27

passive that evolved into active

11:29

aid and support to al-Qaeda.

11:32

But 2003 came with the

11:34

U.S. invasion of Iraq and

11:36

shifted and tested Iran's co-opting

11:38

strategy. There, Iran was supporting

11:40

Iraqi Shia militia, but also

11:42

it was supporting and backing

11:44

Sunni factions, including al-Qaeda. Not

11:47

that in his memoir notes

11:49

that Iran facilitated Abbasad Khawi's

11:51

entry into Iraq, the former

11:53

leader of al-Qaeda and Iraq,

11:55

and Iran's aim at that

11:57

point was to destabilize the

12:00

and also start to integrate al-qaeda

12:03

more into its strategies. But as

12:05

we all know and saw,

12:07

Zarkawi's brutal anti-shade campaign clashed with

12:10

Iran's gold and also undermined

12:12

al-qaeda's standing. Initially, Bin Laden endorsed

12:14

Zawahidi's brutal tactics and announced

12:16

him as a leader for al-qaeda.

12:18

But his actions undermine al-Qaeda

12:20

standing, which led to internal criticism

12:23

within al-Qaeda, and also led

12:25

to Iran to shift from cooperation

12:27

to coercion. During that critical

12:29

time, many experts observed that Iran

12:32

heightened surveillance on al-Qaeda members

12:34

within its territory and also subjected

12:36

them to harsher conditions. We also

12:38

saw al-Adl during that period

12:40

become slightly quiet. We did not

12:43

hear any more about his

12:45

activities around this time. And also,

12:47

To Iran detained and started

12:49

to deport its people, 98% of

12:52

Arab fighters from its from

12:54

the country, and it foiled 75%

12:56

of al-qaeda's plans around that

12:58

time. To further exert its authority

13:01

and try to realign al-qaeda's

13:03

activities with its own goals, Iran

13:05

went as far as detaining

13:07

bin Laden, the bin Laden family

13:09

members, to exert control and to

13:12

push for a cessation of

13:14

attacks. on the Shia. And after

13:16

this time, we can see

13:18

that Iran's co-optive strategy was effective

13:21

in 2007, bin Laden described

13:23

al-Qaeda as its main artillery of

13:25

funds, personnel, and communication and

13:27

explicitly advised against its targeting. The

13:29

following year, in 2008, The

13:31

Lahiti creditedi credited the Iran Revolutionary

13:34

Guard with strengthening al-Qaeda and

13:36

Yemen, further showing how the balance

13:38

between cooperation and coercion and

13:40

Iran's strategy working. By the late

13:43

2010s, before we move into

13:45

the 2015 point, we can start

13:47

to see Iran pivoting to become

13:49

al-Qaeda's main patron. This was

13:51

established. Syria. In Syria, Tehran directed

13:54

al-Qaeda's operations to fragment opposition

13:56

forces and refocused attention on targeting

13:58

the West. Also, around that

14:00

time, post-2012, Musin El Padli, who

14:03

was leading the al-Qaeda's Iran

14:05

network, the Khorasangru, was released and

14:07

started directing fighters and resources

14:09

to Syria, intensifying attacks on Western

14:11

targets. This was all under

14:13

Tehran's command. And around that time,

14:16

both the Obama administration and

14:18

al-Al Qaeda figures verified this collaboration.

14:20

in 2018 even and this

14:22

is where we reached the 2015

14:25

where we can see a culmination

14:27

of Iran using al-qaeda as

14:29

a proxy and I'll stop there

14:32

Michael to see what you

14:34

know if you have any questions

14:36

on that before I delve

14:38

into the critical moment in 2015

14:40

where we saw this manifestation

14:42

of Iran's use of al-qaeda as

14:45

a proxy in Syria. I

14:47

just want to ask Sarah one

14:49

more question about this time

14:51

period, which is the Iranians must

14:54

have known, right, that they

14:56

were playing with fire here. They

14:58

clearly saw the upside to dealing

15:00

with al-Qaeda, and you've talked

15:02

about that. But at that time,

15:05

they had the US military

15:07

on two of its borders. And

15:09

they had seen us take

15:11

significant action both in Afghanistan and

15:14

in Iraq. And they must

15:16

have known, right, that if there

15:18

was another al-Qaeda attack on

15:20

the United States and if you

15:22

could tie it back in

15:24

any way to al-Qaeda officials in

15:27

Iran being part of that

15:29

attack, that they would be targeted.

15:31

How do you think they

15:33

thought about that? Iran's always been

15:36

strategic and the use of proxy

15:38

has been always central to

15:40

its foreign policy tool even going

15:43

back to the Sasanian Empire

15:45

back in Mesopotamia time to the

15:47

Fatimese Empire to the Sasanian

15:49

Empire and Iran likes to play

15:51

with that fire. takes high-risk,

15:53

high reward, it's strategic, but it

15:56

knows also, Michael, that both

15:58

Al Qaeda and Iran, if you

16:00

notice throughout this entire time

16:02

frame, even up until today, both

16:05

actors continue to deny the

16:07

relationship that they both have. And

16:09

while they do have a relationship,

16:11

and it is, it, it

16:13

manifests even stronger under specific conditions

16:16

and circumstances, they will continue

16:18

to deny it because it provides

16:20

them that cover, that plausible

16:22

deniability, knowing that if they both

16:25

keep denying it, there will

16:27

be no, while there's so much

16:29

evidence, there will be no

16:31

explicit tie between both, and nothing

16:33

will confirm that a relationship,

16:35

which they will both use to

16:38

their advantage. So if Iran

16:40

uses al-Qaeda to target the United

16:42

States or provide resources to

16:44

target its allies, Iran will continue

16:47

to say, oh, this was not

16:49

us. Same for al-Qaeda because

16:51

they both, they both, as we

16:53

use the Shiasseani divide to

16:55

our advantage as a US policy,

16:58

they also use it to

17:00

their advantage. They keep. emphasizing that,

17:02

oh, there's a Sunicia divide,

17:04

we do not work together as

17:07

a strategic cover to continue

17:09

to use it, even though if

17:11

that were, if they were

17:13

to attack, they will have to

17:16

use that and they will

17:18

continue to use that to ensure

17:20

that the US will not

17:22

get a specific, despite all the

17:24

evidence out there, there will no

17:27

be an explicit link linking.

17:29

These two, especially with the Sunicia

17:31

divide as well. Yeah. All

17:33

right. Take us from that specific

17:36

moment, right, to where we

17:38

are today. Walk us through that.

17:40

And, you know, both the

17:42

manifestations of the relationship today, what

17:44

is it? How do you

17:46

define it? the main characteristics of

17:49

it, and then the drivers,

17:51

right, both on the al-Qaeda side

17:53

and on the Iranian side

17:55

with respect to the rationale and

17:58

with respect to the people. you

18:01

know, because I know it's

18:03

important, right, who the people

18:05

are on both sides. So

18:07

walk us through all of

18:09

that. Perfect. So in 2015,

18:11

we see the culmination of

18:13

Iran's strategy of using al-Qaeda.

18:15

That around that time, the

18:17

Iran deployed actual al-Qaeda fighters.

18:19

including Abu Qayad al-Masri and

18:21

al-Hamad al-Masri from Iran via

18:23

the Khos force to Syria.

18:25

This is a clear deployment

18:27

strategy. This is a clear

18:29

using al-Qaeda fighters to its

18:31

own advantage to combat the

18:34

Islamic State to aid its

18:36

Syrian ally. And around that

18:38

time in 2018, United Nations

18:40

reports confirmed that the al-Qaeda

18:42

leaders in Iran were exerting

18:44

more control over operations in

18:46

Syria. Al-Adel specifically was challenging

18:48

of Muhammad Joulani's authority. He

18:50

was instigating shifts, breakaways, and

18:52

mergers among al-Qaeda-aligned groups in

18:54

Idlib, which furthered both the

18:56

Iran's and al-Qaeda's objectives in

18:58

the region, and also the

19:00

U.S. Treasury exposed efforts of

19:02

Iran supporting al-Qaeda activities in

19:04

Pakistan and Iraq. And then,

19:06

after the death of Zawahili

19:09

in 2022, this is where

19:11

Al-Qaeda and Iran's relationship even

19:13

shifted more, and this is

19:15

the time where Iran saw

19:17

the culmination of its efforts

19:19

when Saheladl came into full

19:21

view. Al-adil is pragmatic. He

19:23

had long-standing relationship with the

19:25

late Qasas al-imani of Iran's

19:27

Revolutionary Guard. He was also

19:29

writing letters that were posted

19:31

by Mustafa Ahmed on his

19:33

website where Al-adul addressed the

19:35

Muslim Uma. And he stated

19:37

that we are not enemies,

19:39

we are your partners in

19:41

changing the world. He was

19:43

trying to already unite the

19:46

Sunnis and the Shia, and

19:48

he had strong ties with

19:50

Iran, and Al-Adl became the

19:52

al-Qaeda-presumed factual leader. This was

19:54

perfect for Iran. And even

19:56

Bahri notes in his memoir

19:58

that Al-Adl even married an

20:00

Iranian as a boongous connections

20:02

whipped. Even after al-Qaeda negotiated

20:04

his release in 2015, Al-Adl

20:06

either chose to stay or

20:08

was compelled to remain, but

20:10

during these times in 20s,

20:12

between 2016 and 2022, Al-Adl

20:14

was orchestrating proxy conflicts in

20:16

the Middle East, aligning with

20:18

Iran's destabilizing efforts. We saw

20:21

him expand al-Qaeda's operations on

20:23

the Iran-Afghanistan border and establishing

20:25

new training camps, safe houses,

20:27

while coordinating leadership liaisons. Even

20:29

in 2020 and 2021, the

20:31

UN reported that there were

20:33

direct operational links between al-Qaeda

20:35

and Iran and Afghan operatives.

20:38

Around that time, also, the

20:40

Afghanistan United Front Organization not

20:42

too long ago published a

20:44

report where they detailed that

20:46

there was a 2021 meeting

20:48

in Tehran between Ismail Connie

20:50

of the Cuts Force, between

20:53

Saif Al-Adin, and Tehran and

20:55

Taliban representatives. That meeting allegedly

20:57

cemented the strategic pact between

20:59

al-Qaeda and the Iran Revolutionary

21:01

Guards aimed at targeting the

21:03

United States and its allies

21:05

and its interests. Shortly after

21:08

that, you notice, there was

21:10

a 2022 plot to assassinate

21:12

Israeli businessmen in Georgia, where

21:14

the evidence implicated Iran's revolutionary

21:16

guards and al-Qaeda operatives under

21:18

al-Adl's watch during that time,

21:20

which shows you the depth

21:23

of their operational relationship when

21:25

al-Adl is leading. But also,

21:27

if we move from Iran

21:29

and Afghanistan, we go now

21:31

to Yemen, where we can

21:33

also see how Al-Adl shifted

21:35

the organizational focus of the

21:38

group. Since 2022, when Zawahili

21:40

died and Al-Adl took over,

21:42

presumably, Al-Qaeda and Yemen stopped

21:44

attacking the Hutti's, and it's

21:46

now cooperating with the Shia

21:48

entity in joint military and

21:50

drone operations. Even with the

21:53

Hutti's training Al-Ada, Al-Al-Adah. Qaeda

21:55

Yemen operates its own drone

21:57

unit and also it's been

21:59

releasing propaganda that focuses on

22:01

targeting U.S. economic hubs and

22:03

expanding their naval operations just

22:05

as the Hatah attacks began

22:07

on the Red Sea. And

22:10

just for context, so that

22:12

people know, so Al Qaeda

22:14

in Yemen and the Houthis

22:16

at one point, we're actually

22:18

fighting each other. Yes, yes,

22:20

there were almost, there's so

22:22

many attacks between the two

22:25

groups in Yemen, over control,

22:27

over resources, over dominance and

22:29

power. But since 22, when

22:31

Alade took over and Zawahili

22:33

died, there was no more

22:35

attacks. The data shows that

22:37

attacks stopped. with experts and

22:40

people wondering why have their,

22:42

it's interesting that there's been

22:44

no attacks between the two

22:46

groups. And this is because

22:48

Saif Lad has been shifting

22:50

the focus of al-Qaeda on

22:52

joining a cooperation in coordination

22:55

with the Houthis to enhance

22:57

their tactical expertise in order

22:59

for both of them to

23:01

combat the West and the

23:03

US as a main ally.

23:05

And you can see also

23:07

how al-Al Qaeda starts to

23:10

align with Iran. Al-Qaeda and

23:12

Yemen, for example, started releasing

23:14

also more propaganda aiming at

23:16

Saudi Arabia as the Iran

23:18

and Riyadh were having tensions

23:20

between them. And the Hutti's

23:22

even around that time released

23:25

Al-Qaeda explosive experts, which is

23:27

a rare gesture that signifies

23:29

the only time that the

23:31

Iranian proxy would trust the

23:33

Sunni group enough to know

23:35

that they won't become the

23:37

next target of those explosive

23:39

experts. To lead you to

23:42

the more current right now,

23:44

the Hamas October 7th attack

23:46

further shifted those dynamics. There

23:48

are factors now to cement

23:50

the relation between al-Qaeda and

23:52

Iran even more. We have

23:54

first the Hamas October 7th

23:57

attack that bridged temporarily the

23:59

longstanding scenario. advised. We

24:01

have Saifla al coming into

24:03

view. We have also the

24:05

rise of the Islamic State

24:08

and the more attacks that

24:10

jeopardized both al-Qaeda's standing and

24:12

Iran's stakes and Iraq. And

24:14

I will go into each

24:16

one of them, starting with

24:18

Hamas as October 7. The

24:20

Palestinian cause. has always been

24:23

central in al-qaeda's narrative and

24:25

it's also been the central

24:27

in iran's strategic cover as

24:29

to why Hezbollah defends against

24:31

israel as to why irons

24:33

stands and uses proxies in

24:36

their region and we've also

24:38

seen that with the letter

24:40

of bin Laden on tic-toc

24:42

which got thousands of likes

24:44

and reiterates that the Palestinian

24:46

causes at the heart of

24:49

their jihad. That shared opposition

24:51

on Israel and Western influence

24:53

opens doors for collaboration between

24:55

al-Qaeda and Iran, which has

24:57

been the case in the

24:59

past. And we've seen that

25:01

with the attack, al-Qaeda hailed

25:04

the attack as a victory

25:06

for global jihad. We've seen

25:08

al-Qaida's branches from Yemen to

25:10

India rally in support of

25:12

Hamas calling for a Muslim

25:14

solidarity and a united jihad

25:17

against Israel. Aladdin even started

25:19

publishing propaganda naming the and

25:21

stating that Al-Qaeda stands as

25:23

one with Hamas in the

25:25

same fighting trench, which shows

25:27

you even more how the

25:29

two entities are starting to

25:32

further align and collaborate on

25:34

their mutual objectives. And on

25:36

June 11, the U.S. Intelligence

25:38

reported that At hut, these

25:40

are planning to arm a

25:42

Shabaab in Somalia, which is

25:45

a new development that further

25:47

shows you how Iran is

25:49

trying to integrate al-Qaeda even

25:51

more into its proxies. And

25:53

Al-ad has been publishing more

25:55

propaganda that is calling for

25:57

Muslim unity and an alliance

26:00

for the Islamic Uma between

26:02

the know, the Sunnis and

26:04

the Shia, he even states

26:06

that what unites us is

26:08

much greater than what unites

26:10

our enemies. And this suggests,

26:13

Michael, that under his leadership,

26:15

al-Qaeda is not just independent

26:17

but likely becoming a major

26:19

Iranian proxy force. We're talking

26:21

with Sarah Harmush about the

26:23

ties between Iran and al-Qaeda.

26:25

Beacon Global Strategies is the

26:28

premier national security advisory firm.

26:30

Beacon works side by side

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26:54

environment. With a bipartisan team

26:56

and decades of experience, Beacon

26:58

provides a global perspective to

27:00

help clients tackle their toughest

27:02

challenges. Has al-Qaeda conducted any

27:04

attacks at all against Westerners

27:06

with any sort of support

27:09

from Iran in the last

27:11

five years or so? Not

27:15

in the last five years,

27:17

we've seen al-qaeda conduct an

27:19

attack and claim the attack

27:21

with the latest one in

27:23

the Florida, the 2019 Pensacola

27:25

attack in Florida. And al-qaeda

27:27

claimed that attack at that

27:29

point, but since then al-qaeda

27:32

has not claimed any attacks,

27:34

but it's been the Islamic

27:36

State making headlines with the

27:38

attacks against Iran and against

27:40

Russia. which also actually Michael

27:42

adds to the relationship between

27:44

al-adl-l-a-l-l-n and al-qaeda it strengthens

27:47

the ties because they both

27:49

see now that they have

27:51

not only Israel and the

27:53

U.S. as enemies but there's

27:55

also the rise of the

27:57

Islamic State which threatens both

27:59

which at this point reinforces

28:01

the relationship between al-qaeda-al-adl-l-l-n and

28:04

Iran. we've seen them cooperate

28:06

more around that time. Sarah,

28:08

how do you think about

28:10

the threat to the West

28:12

posed by this relationship between

28:14

Iran and Al-Qaeda? How do

28:16

you think about that? The

28:19

threat is immense, is immense.

28:21

Michael, as we've seen in

28:23

the past, Iran's proxies are

28:25

can become powerful, campground in

28:27

the West, as we've seen

28:29

with Hezbollah's attacks on the

28:31

Marine barracks in Beirut, as

28:33

we've seen its sponsorship to

28:36

Hamas leading to the October

28:38

7th attacks. And as we've

28:40

seen, it's helped to the

28:42

Houthi, it perpetuates violence in

28:44

the Red Sea. So what

28:46

would happen if Iran starts

28:48

arming al-Alpida with state-of-the-art weaponry

28:51

and directs it towards the

28:53

U.S. I mean, al-qaeda's been

28:55

quiet, but it's not been

28:57

not doing anything. There's been

28:59

training, there's been camps, and

29:01

also you can see after

29:03

the declaration of Allahadah that

29:05

we are united and what

29:08

unites us more, what unites

29:10

our enemy, you start to

29:12

see that Iran and al-Qaeda

29:14

are acting in tandem, both

29:16

at that point issued statements

29:18

applauding U.S. campus movements against

29:20

U.S. support for Israel, and

29:23

as al-Adel was urging fighters

29:25

to come to consult in

29:27

Afghanistan, we saw Iran simultaneously

29:29

pressing the United States to

29:31

unfreeze Afghan financial assets. So

29:33

we're starting to see them

29:35

act in tandem of each

29:37

other, which is very interesting

29:40

and their collaboration in the

29:42

past has not culminated as

29:44

much as we've seen in

29:46

the recent two years because

29:48

of what's happening. So the

29:50

threat. to the west is

29:52

high. If al-Qaeda were to

29:55

conduct and staff, what's Iranian

29:57

support? But right now, also

29:59

as we've seen, with Hamas

30:01

and Hezbollah weakened from Israeli

30:03

operations. we know Iran's use

30:05

of proxy is central. This

30:07

is where al-Qaeda becomes a

30:09

prime candidate for Iran's use.

30:12

And with everything happening in

30:14

the Middle East, there is

30:16

an opportunity for an al-Qaeda

30:18

attack that would shift eyes

30:20

from Iran and Hamas and

30:22

Hezbollah. the

30:24

established yet secretive ties between al-qaeda

30:27

and iran comes become critical here

30:29

and al-qaeda becomes the the gap

30:31

that the the bridge that fills

30:33

the gap of the weakening of

30:35

Hamas and Hezbollah as proxies for

30:37

for Iran. So it can conduct

30:39

and as we are as a

30:41

country and as all the countries

30:44

distracted by so many things in

30:46

the world with the Israel Hamas

30:48

conflict with Russia's Ukraine conflict and

30:50

now with events in Syria and

30:52

now with events in Syria. Al-Qaeda

30:55

and Iran capitalize on that

30:58

on that distraction. They see

31:00

that as an opportunity and

31:02

maybe a prime opportunity to

31:04

strike, especially since they've had

31:06

the time since those trial

31:08

from Afghanistan to regroup, to

31:10

retrain, to rest strategize. And

31:12

we know both actors play

31:14

the long game, are very

31:17

strategic, and wait for the

31:19

right time to strike. So

31:21

it's a threat that we

31:23

should start focusing on and

31:25

trying to move beyond the

31:27

facade of the Cinitiata Vise,

31:29

which fluctuates and shifts depending

31:31

on the geopolitical context. They

31:34

are friends when they have

31:36

common enemies and that will

31:38

dissolve the Sunnisiyya divide and

31:40

I was in the Middle

31:42

East and I can see

31:44

that Sunnisiyya divide was non-existent

31:46

when I was there in

31:48

July because of the Israel

31:50

Hamas conflict and the Israel

31:53

Hezbollah conflict. And then once

31:55

that common enemy dissipates and

31:57

there's no mutual actor that

31:59

they want to combat they

32:01

can ship back to fighting

32:03

each other. you, right? This

32:05

is, this is, this is

32:07

worrisome. I also think about

32:09

it from the perspective of

32:12

Seth Alottal. We've talked about

32:14

him a lot. You know,

32:16

I agree with your description

32:18

of him. He is smart,

32:20

he is savvy, he's creative,

32:22

he's capable. I

32:25

have no doubt that he'll

32:27

want to return to the

32:29

fight against the West, in

32:31

particular the United States, and

32:33

I have no doubt that

32:35

he will want to kick

32:38

off that renewed fight with

32:40

a major attack. So I

32:42

think we need to pay

32:44

attention to this. Former Secretary

32:46

of State Mike Pompeo said

32:48

something interesting about this relationship

32:51

a few years ago. He

32:53

said al-Qaeda has a new

32:55

home base, the Islamic Republic

32:57

of Iran, and Pompeo was

32:59

criticized for saying that. But

33:01

what I'm hearing from you

33:03

is that there was a

33:06

really good reason for him

33:08

to say that. I agree

33:10

with you Michael and it's

33:12

funny because I ran into

33:14

former Secretary of State Mike

33:16

Pompeo and I actually told

33:19

him about my research on

33:21

al-Qaeda and Iran and to

33:23

ask about his statement and

33:25

he was criticized around that

33:27

time and he also discusses

33:29

in the statement that he

33:32

made their relationship specifically referencing

33:34

2015 and in the year

33:36

of 2015 we saw Iran

33:38

deploy al-qaeda fighters to Syria

33:40

to aid its ally which

33:42

was a manifestation of the

33:45

proxy type of relationship that

33:47

you'd have but he I'm

33:49

from the evidence and from

33:51

the research he was not

33:53

wrong it's it's the West

33:55

because now that you make

33:58

it a threat now we

34:00

have a new a new

34:02

problem to with that we

34:04

might not know how to

34:06

deal with and trying to

34:08

wish it away or just

34:10

focusing on Iran as an

34:13

actor separate from al-qaeda makes

34:15

CT, you know, counterterrorism strategies

34:17

easier, but also we killed

34:19

Well, Masad and Israeli operations

34:21

killed al- Ahmed al-Masadi in

34:23

Tehran in 2018, who was

34:26

one of the fighters who

34:28

were in Syria fighting the

34:30

Islamic State. So there has

34:32

to be some rationale of

34:34

why did we even target?

34:36

al-Qaeda leaders in Iran, in

34:39

Tehran. Yeah, yeah. So here's

34:41

a really important question, okay?

34:43

Safelodel, pre-9-11, was deeply involved

34:45

in al-qaeda's attempts to acquire

34:47

weapons of mass destruction. Have

34:49

you seen anything about a

34:52

current interest on his part

34:54

or al-qaeda's part in such

34:56

weapons? That's a great question,

34:58

Michael. It's interesting because I

35:00

did look into the nuclear

35:02

weapon program of al-qaeda. And

35:05

while I was looking into

35:07

the research in al-qaeda and

35:09

Iran specifically Saipahadl. Saipahl did

35:11

have around that time before

35:13

2003 or around 2003-2006, there

35:15

were attempts from Saipladl and

35:17

al-qada leadership to acquire nuclear

35:20

weapons from Russian and Chechen

35:22

fighters around that time. Or

35:24

at least at this time

35:26

material, at least in rich

35:28

uranium. Yes. Yes. In rich

35:30

uranium, at least. Yes. And

35:33

then after that, there was

35:35

no mention throughout the Al-Qaeda-Iran

35:37

relationship. However, three years ago,

35:39

during the 9-11 anniversary of

35:41

one of the anniversary of

35:43

Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda's attack, Al-Qaeda

35:46

published a book written by.

35:48

Muhammad Mosse. The book was

35:50

titled The 9-11 Attacks Between

35:52

Truth and Unstertainty. And Al-Qaeda

35:54

there, which was, it's a

35:56

fascinating book, Al-Qaeda lays the

35:59

entire rationale and thinking from

36:01

the origination of the idea

36:03

of 9-11 up until its

36:05

execution. And in that book,

36:07

Al-Qaeda states that it wants

36:09

to revive its nuclear weapons

36:11

program that now it has,

36:14

in Al-Qaeda's words, In terms,

36:16

it has a specialized research

36:18

and development unit focused on

36:20

chemical biological and nuclear weapons.

36:22

And we've seen before even,

36:24

and even in that book

36:27

Al-Qaeda mentions Russia's loose nukes.

36:29

It mentions Pakistan's nuclear facilities.

36:31

It also mentions how the

36:33

nuclear power plants in the

36:35

US are not that secure

36:37

and safe which it would

36:40

want to target. So in

36:42

words and in words and

36:44

ideas they've definitely said that

36:46

they've mentioned that and they

36:48

stated that and we can

36:50

be we can be skeptical

36:53

skeptical about what they say

36:55

Michael and what they publish

36:57

and what they do but

36:59

a reminder is Bin Laden

37:01

said he was going to

37:03

attack the United States and

37:06

he did and while we

37:08

We can take their words

37:10

at face value. We need

37:12

to start considering them and

37:14

just our strategic rationale or

37:16

even in our ideas that

37:18

if this is possible, then

37:21

what do we do? Yeah.

37:23

Sarah, let me ask you,

37:25

is there, in terms of

37:27

people who look at this

37:29

issue, the relationship between Iran

37:31

and al-Qaeda, is there agreements

37:34

on what that relationship looks

37:36

like or are there differences

37:38

of opinion? There

37:41

are definitely differences of opinion on

37:43

that relationship. There are many, there

37:45

are, there are, there are split.

37:48

Some argue that there is a

37:50

relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran. And

37:53

even as I've been researching and

37:55

working on this topic, I've seen

37:57

many times, many experts as they're

38:00

writing about the topics being like,

38:02

oh, it's so surprising that we

38:04

see Iran backing al-Qaeda affiliates in

38:07

Syria, well, it's, you know, they're

38:09

fighting the Assad regime, but Iran

38:11

was intentional. So there were experts

38:14

wondering about what is this relationship,

38:16

what is happening here, why is

38:18

Iran supporting al-Qaeda in Syria and

38:21

doing all of these things. And

38:23

then you've seen other, other, opinions

38:26

where the Sunnishia divide is so

38:28

prevalent to the other to the

38:30

other factions that they can't seem

38:33

a lot of experts seeing the

38:35

Sunnishia divides. They can't seem to

38:37

get past that divide and that

38:40

divide to them is something that

38:42

will not unite these groups that

38:44

won't bring them together. But to

38:47

tell you Michael, I mean, I'm

38:49

Muslim Sunni. And I was in

38:52

Lebanon in July, and I can

38:54

see Sunni people united with the

38:56

Shia people and even Hitler on

38:59

Israel and the West around that

39:01

time. So that semi-Shiadivide as someone

39:03

who comes from that region can

39:06

be dissolved temporarily, but it can

39:08

be fixed when there is a

39:10

bigger, more common enemy to the

39:13

community. So they're split on that.

39:16

There is, this is

39:18

what I think Washington

39:20

even struggled with, is

39:22

getting past the Senesciad

39:24

divide, and which leads

39:27

us to underestimate Iran's

39:29

ability to form partnerships

39:31

based on necessity not

39:33

shared religious ideals. Both

39:35

actors work together when

39:37

the ends justify the

39:39

means. And

39:41

you've written, you've written, sir, last

39:43

question, we're kind of running out

39:45

of time a little bit, but

39:47

last question, you've written that Washington

39:50

hasn't paid enough attention to this.

39:52

Can you talk about that a

39:54

little bit? Yes, definitely. I think

39:56

we, like I mentioned earlier, Michael,

39:58

we are distracted. We have so

40:00

much going on after spending 20

40:02

years on the global war on

40:05

and withdrawing from Afghanistan, no one

40:07

wants to talk about terrorism anymore

40:09

until the October 7 attacks happened.

40:11

But also the Sunishiad divide is

40:13

something that the West does not

40:15

seem to get past. It's this

40:17

struggle of understanding that for Iran

40:20

al-Qaeda, the ends do justify the

40:22

means and strategic partnerships do exist

40:24

past religious ideals. And the reality

40:26

is that They're both strategic and

40:28

in that geopolitical arena, pragmatism always

40:30

prevails over ideology. And I think

40:32

we need to start thinking about

40:35

this and realizing this threat before

40:37

there is another attack on the

40:39

US homeland or an allied country

40:41

and Iran supports it and we

40:43

don't want to acknowledge the evidence

40:45

to hold both actors accountable. Yeah.

40:48

Well, Sarah, it sounds to me

40:50

like in terms of the Trump

40:52

administration's approach to terrorism, right? Obviously,

40:54

the Islamic State is critical in

40:56

all of its manifestations, but also

40:58

there needs to be a significant

41:00

focus on al-Qaeda and its relationship

41:03

with Iran. I think that's what

41:05

I'm hearing at the end of

41:07

the day. 100% Michael, I definitely

41:09

agree with you. Well, thank you

41:11

so much, Sarah, for joining us.

41:13

It's been great to have you

41:15

on the show. Thank you so

41:18

much for having me, Michael. That

41:22

was Sarah Harmusch.

41:24

I'm Michael Morell.

41:27

Please join us

41:29

next week for

41:31

another episode of

41:33

Intelligence Matters. Intelligence

41:35

Matters is produced

41:38

by Steve Dorsey

41:40

with assistance from

41:42

Ashley Barry. Intelligence

41:44

Matters is a

41:47

production of Beacon

41:49

Global Strategies.