0:01

This is NatSec

0:03

Matters. I'm

0:07

host Andrew Shapiro with Beacon Global Strategies.

0:10

Today I'm joined by Ambassador Dennis Ross,

0:12

Counselor, and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at

0:14

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

0:16

For over 12 years, Ambassador Ross played

0:18

a leading role in shaping U .S.

0:20

policy towards the Middle East in both

0:22

the George H .W. Bush and Bill

0:24

Clinton administrations. He also served over two

0:26

years as a special assistant to President

0:28

Obama as National Security Council's senior director

0:31

for the Central Region. Ambassador Ross judges

0:33

today for a discussion of his new

0:35

book, Statecraft 2 .0, What America Needs

0:37

to Lead in a Multipolar World. where

0:39

he sheds light on how a historical

0:41

model of statecraft can shape U .S.

0:43

foreign policy toward modern securities challenges. Stay

0:45

with us as we speak with Dennis

0:47

Ross. Dennis,

0:53

thanks so much for joining us. We're really looking

0:55

forward to this discussion. Well, thanks for having me.

0:57

I'm looking forward to it as well. So

1:00

you've just published a book,

1:02

Statecraft 2 .0. We want to

1:04

get into what the book is

1:07

about and then how the books

1:09

a statecraft 2 .0, how it

1:11

applies to the current geopolitical situation

1:14

that we're in. So as

1:16

a starting point, talk about why

1:18

you wrote the book. One of the

1:20

things I've seen over time, both I

1:22

experienced as a practitioner and also as

1:24

a student, I saw

1:26

that frequently we fail to

1:28

marry objectives and means. And

1:31

it seems like the most obvious thing in

1:33

the world, why would you adopt any policy

1:35

if You didn't have clear objectives and

1:37

you didn't have the means to achieve the objectives. And

1:40

yet, as I said, I experienced

1:42

and as I not just

1:45

witnessed, but then saw in multiple cases, we

1:47

didn't do it. Why didn't we do it?

1:50

Usually because we adopted the wrong

1:52

objectives, variety of reasons

1:54

for why we adopt the wrong objectives. Sometimes

1:56

we adopt objectives because we don't

1:59

understand the situation we're getting into. You

2:01

look at the George W. Bush administration in

2:03

the war in Iraq, There

2:05

was a lack of understanding of what

2:07

we were getting into in Iraq. It's

2:10

not that there weren't people in the

2:12

administration who understood it, but the administration

2:14

after 9 -11 had a view of

2:16

the world and felt, you know, weak.

2:19

We have the military power to produce

2:21

a political outcome there to build democracy.

2:24

uh... in iraq and change the

2:26

region as a whole and we

2:28

didn't understand the sectarian nature of

2:30

iraq we didn't understand if we

2:32

went in there and we destroyed

2:35

for example we basically dismantled the

2:37

bath party and dismantled the iraqi

2:39

military we were creating a huge

2:41

vacuum so here was an example

2:43

of creating an objective that didn't

2:45

fit the circumstances and we were

2:47

never going to be able to

2:49

basically have the means on

2:52

our own or even with others that would allow

2:54

us to achieve the objective we set for ourselves.

2:56

So sometimes it's not understanding the situation. Sometimes

2:58

it's just a case of political pressures.

3:01

Push you to push a president to

3:03

adopt an objective that, again, may not

3:05

fit the situation or may not fit

3:08

what we're prepared to apply in terms

3:10

of means. President

3:12

Obama, when he adopted the red line,

3:15

the objective to basically say

3:17

Syria Can't use chemical

3:19

weapons, but there was a limit as

3:22

to what he was prepared to do

3:24

if they did And it was a

3:26

political set of pressures that produced that

3:28

just as it was a political set

3:31

of pressures a year earlier That led

3:33

the president to say haphazard has lost

3:35

legitimacy and he needs to leave But

3:38

we weren't prepared to apply the means

3:40

to ensure that he would and to

3:42

prevent a vacuum if he did Sometimes

3:45

you adopt objectives at such a

3:47

high level of generality, like the

3:50

equivalent of motherhood and apple pie,

3:52

that you don't know how to operationalize

3:55

it. And so you can't, you're not

3:57

able to do it. So there's a

3:59

variety of reasons why we don't adopt

4:01

the right objectives. And one

4:03

of the reasons I wanted to write the

4:05

book was to focus on the issue that

4:08

if you're going to adopt certain objectives, think

4:10

them through. Ask hard questions

4:12

about them. Make sure you

4:14

understand why you're adopting the

4:16

objectives. Oftentimes, if you have

4:18

really high stakes, you're

4:20

going to do what is necessary in the

4:23

eyes of the leaders who make this choice.

4:26

And if the stakes are that high, then you're going

4:28

to produce the means because you're prepared to pay a

4:30

price because the stakes are so high. In

4:33

the case of George H .W. Bush,

4:36

the Iraqi invasion and absorption

4:38

of Kuwait, He saw

4:40

as something that would shape what he

4:42

saw as a new world in the

4:45

aftermath of the Cold War. And

4:47

it would be a world where it wasn't the

4:49

rule of law or norms that would govern things.

4:51

It was the rule or the law of the

4:53

jungle. So he was

4:55

prepared. He said on day four, this

4:57

will not stand. I remember

5:00

being on a plane with Baker,

5:02

Secretary Baker, and he said,

5:04

well, We sure as hell better succeed

5:06

in the diplomacy because I'm telling you

5:08

my friend of 35 years just made

5:10

it clear we're going to war if

5:12

we don't succeed So it was clear

5:14

that he was prepared to apply the

5:16

means because the stakes were so high

5:18

Oftentimes if the stakes are lower feasibility

5:20

should shape the objective. So

5:22

my purpose here in focusing on this

5:25

was a to flag the idea that

5:27

what seems obvious is rarely done and

5:29

explain why. And the reason

5:31

I wrote the book is because the world

5:33

was completely different from the world in which

5:35

I wrote my first book on statecraft, which

5:38

was a world of basically I wrote in

5:40

2005 2006. That was a unipolar

5:42

world. Now we're in a multipolar

5:44

world. And we also

5:46

have not only a difference internationally,

5:48

we have a difference domestically. You

5:50

go back to 2006, yeah,

5:53

we had debates here, but there wasn't a

5:55

fundamental debate on what America's role in the

5:57

world should be. Now there's

5:59

a fundamental debate on what America's role

6:01

in the world should be. And we

6:03

don't have the kind of domestic consensus

6:06

that allows us to launch initiatives in

6:08

foreign policy and fail. Because every time

6:10

we fail, it erodes further the readiness

6:12

to play what I think is a

6:14

continuing requirement, which is American leadership. So

6:17

I wanted to basically say, okay, if

6:19

we need to practice statecraft far more

6:21

effectively because we no longer have the

6:23

luxury of getting it wrong, we won't

6:25

be able to sustain a certain kind

6:28

of position in the world. And that's

6:30

really what motivated me to write this.

6:32

You mentioned that you wrote your first

6:34

book on statecraft in a Unipolar world.

6:38

The world that we... living

6:40

in now is much different.

6:42

The geopolitical situation is much different

6:45

than those of us who are

6:47

trained in the 80s and 90s

6:49

experience. In the 80s, it

6:52

was a Cold War. An ideological

6:54

struggle with the Soviet Union. The

6:57

types of things that I was learning

6:59

in school were things like nuclear deterrence

7:01

theory, the importance of the

7:03

fold the gap. in Germany, then

7:06

the wall falls and the

7:08

Soviet Union breaks up, and

7:11

we have a unipolar world.

7:14

In a unipolar world, it's

7:16

a bit easier because as the

7:19

dominant power, you don't have challenges.

7:23

How is today's situation?

7:26

different for United States foreign policy.

7:29

And for those who have not ever experienced

7:31

anything like it in our lifetimes, how

7:34

should we be preparing for it? You

7:36

know, it's a wonderful question because I

7:39

think there's a tendency just to assume,

7:42

okay, just because it's a multi -polar world, it's

7:44

still basically what we've dealt with before. And the

7:46

answer is no, it isn't. In

7:48

the bipolar nature of the Cold War,

7:51

it wasn't only that we were focused

7:53

on issues like the folder gap and

7:55

and nuclear deterrence subjects that I also

7:57

basically studied in great depth. It's

8:00

that because it was bipolar,

8:03

it was suddenly, you had a large

8:05

part of the world that was with us, and

8:07

then you had a Soviet bloc. And

8:10

you really didn't have the gray areas. I

8:12

mean, yes, you had a non -aligned, but the non

8:14

-aligned were rarely actually non -aligned. They

8:16

would play, sometimes play the U .S. and

8:19

Soviet Union off each other to try to

8:21

get more from one or the other. But

8:23

typically, there was a non -aligned bloc that

8:25

always voted with the Soviets, for example, in

8:27

the UN. So you

8:29

had a world that you could structure everything around,

8:32

how do we deal with the Soviet threat? We

8:35

organized things domestically related to that. How

8:37

we spent on defense was related to

8:40

that. The mindset was entirely

8:42

related to that. When I was, for

8:44

example, I wrote a doctoral dissertation on

8:46

Soviet decision making, but I almost wrote

8:48

a doctoral dissertation on Soviet Middle Eastern

8:50

policy because everything kind of revolved around

8:53

how do we compete with the Soviets.

8:56

So that world's gone. And

8:58

then it gets replaced by a

9:00

unipolar world where we're dominant and

9:02

others have to respond to us.

9:05

Now suddenly we're in a

9:08

world where we have international

9:10

competitors starting with the Chinese.

9:12

Russia is still there. We

9:14

have regional competitors around North

9:17

Korea that constrain us. So

9:19

we're constrained by global competitors

9:21

and we're constrained by regional

9:24

competitors. We still

9:26

have built -in advantages such

9:28

as an alliance system that

9:30

neither Russia nor the Chinese

9:32

have. We may be in

9:34

the process of weakening that alliance system

9:37

right now. I hope not, but it

9:39

looks like it. And

9:41

what that means is, okay, we

9:43

don't have the same resources or

9:45

the same leverage that we used

9:47

to have, but we still face

9:50

challenges and constraints that fundamentally affect

9:52

our national security. So

9:54

we have to be able to do

9:56

and use all the tools we have

9:58

better. Now those

10:00

tools are not just diplomatic,

10:03

military, economic, intelligent, informational,

10:06

organizational, technology, and

10:09

so forth. They also

10:11

reflect how do you build your

10:13

soft power so there's a source

10:15

of attraction to you? Again, not

10:18

a strength of the Trump administration,

10:21

but also how do you frame issues

10:23

so that you, in a sense, sees

10:26

the initiative on an issue and everybody

10:28

responds to you? One of the examples

10:30

I use, German unification

10:32

and NATO, this was done

10:35

very well by the George H .W.

10:37

Bush administration. We frame four

10:39

principles at the very beginning of the rest

10:41

of the world, including the Soviets, responded to

10:43

us on, even though this was an issue

10:45

that had huge stakes for the Soviet Union

10:47

at the time. So we

10:49

need to think differently in terms of

10:52

how do we present to the world?

10:54

How do we frame issues? How do

10:56

we seize the initiative? And

10:59

it's not basically what I stated

11:01

or what you studied. So

11:03

it means one needs to think differently.

11:06

Again, If you think more

11:08

in terms of what are all the

11:10

tools or instruments we have at our

11:12

disposal to try to pursue our policies

11:14

or protect ourselves, you begin to

11:17

think differently. One of the things you,

11:19

by the way, you think about is you need a

11:21

whole of government efforts when you're dealing with an issue.

11:24

You need the Treasury Department. You need

11:26

the State Department. You need the intelligence

11:28

community. You need the military. You

11:31

need public diplomacy and who's responsible for

11:33

that. you need, you know, I've noted

11:35

the book at one point in terms

11:38

of dealing with lessons, it's important to

11:40

have a strong president, but we've also

11:42

seen strong presidents who can take the

11:45

wrong pathway. What's important

11:47

with a strong president is to ensure

11:49

that you have a management of the

11:51

whole of government and you don't have

11:53

parts of the government competing with each

11:55

other. So there's a coherence.

11:58

It seems, again, logical But Andrew,

12:00

you know from your own experience,

12:02

creating that kind of coherence is

12:04

never a given, and you really

12:06

have to work at it. So

12:08

it has to be part of

12:11

the consciousness from the beginning. During

12:13

the Cold War and in the

12:15

post -911 world, there was a

12:17

bipartisan consensus about our objectives. What

12:21

do you think our objectives are

12:23

now in this new era and

12:25

how that should be explained to

12:27

build that bipartisan consensus from this

12:29

new era. I start with the

12:31

issue that the world is a

12:34

whole lot less safe, a whole

12:36

lot less stable when there's no

12:38

American leadership. Partly

12:40

because no one else can

12:42

seize the initiative and organize

12:44

or mobilize against what are

12:47

threats to security or stability.

12:49

You need certain norms. The idea that big

12:52

nations don't gobble up small nations should be

12:54

a given, and yet we see that the

12:57

world doesn't necessarily fall along

12:59

that pattern when you see

13:01

Russia try to absorb Ukraine.

13:03

And at this point, Putin

13:05

is still notwithstanding what I

13:08

think are colossal losses he

13:10

suffered. Putin is

13:12

still, he wants an outcome where

13:14

basically there won't be an independent

13:16

sovereign Ukraine. If

13:19

we fall into a pattern

13:21

where there are no norms,

13:23

there are no limits, We're

13:25

going to find that we face more

13:27

and more threats. So for me, justifying

13:30

American leadership requires an explanation. Why

13:33

is it important? It's

13:35

because we want a world where we're

13:37

not constantly facing conflicts. We

13:39

want a world where there's some predictability.

13:41

We want a world where countries can

13:43

feel secure and not constantly threatened. And

13:46

we want a world where we don't

13:48

constantly have to think about, gee, we

13:50

have to mobilize everybody to stop conflict

13:53

because it's becoming more and more the

13:55

norm. I mean,

13:57

if Putin is successful in

13:59

this, others will draw lessons

14:01

from it. And we will then

14:03

have to deal with it. And we may say, well,

14:06

a lot of these threats aren't that close to our borders. Sooner

14:09

or later, they will be. Or sooner

14:11

or later, they'll be threats to us

14:13

in terms of you know things that

14:15

we don't inflict our own like disruption

14:17

of supply chains that are critical to

14:19

the well -being of the economy. So

14:22

the I start with a premise

14:25

that we're the notion of American

14:27

leadership remains important because no one

14:29

else can really play the role.

14:32

I remember President Obama saying at

14:34

one point if we don't if

14:36

we don't organize something it doesn't

14:39

get organized at all and And

14:41

that's, I think, the norm that

14:43

most presidents have discovered. We're

14:46

in a different situation now because

14:48

President Trump defines the role differently.

14:51

I don't think he sees American

14:54

leadership as being a key to

14:56

preserving a stable world, although I

14:58

do say I still think there's

15:00

a way to appeal to him,

15:02

not necessarily based on my construct,

15:04

but I would say this. When

15:06

I say you have to marry

15:08

objectives and means, And

15:10

in the past, when I'm sure you as well,

15:13

if I had to make a case to one

15:15

of the presidents I worked for about what

15:17

we should be doing, I went through all the

15:19

pros and cons. I went through the

15:21

nuanced arguments and I came out on a certain side.

15:25

President Trump is a reductionist, what I call

15:27

a reductionist. If you can go

15:29

in and you can explain, with

15:31

this objective, we win,

15:33

and with this objective, we lose,

15:36

then he's more likely to adopt

15:38

the right objective. So if he

15:40

understands that if Iran gets a

15:43

nuclear weapon, we lost. If

15:45

he understands that Ukraine losing its sovereignty,

15:48

we lost. Then you have more of

15:50

a potential to basically affect what we

15:52

do, even if it isn't based on

15:54

the premise there needs to be an

15:56

American leadership in the world. based on

15:59

the use of a strong alliance system

16:01

which adds to our strength, doesn't weaken

16:03

us, he may have a

16:05

different point of reference and he tends

16:07

in many ways to look at someone

16:10

who is attracted to a spheres of

16:12

influence approach. I actually approach this,

16:14

I actually describe in one of the chapters,

16:16

the debates over what America's role in the

16:18

world ought to be. I

16:20

go after, I'll say it this way,

16:22

I disagree with the spheres of influence

16:25

approach for two basic reasons. Number

16:27

one, Where does it start and

16:29

where does it stop? The idea,

16:31

for example, that you're going to recognize a

16:34

Russian sphere of influence or a Chinese sphere

16:36

of influence, they almost

16:38

by definition will constantly push

16:40

to expand it farther out.

16:43

So where does it stop? Inevitably,

16:45

there'll be a point of friction over where

16:48

it stops. Secondly, you basically

16:50

are dooming those countries and their

16:52

populations who live within those spheres

16:54

to a diktat from the Russians

16:57

and sooner or later You're likely

16:59

to see resistance that promotes conflict

17:01

there and what happens when that

17:03

takes place So I don't I

17:05

don't believe in the spheres of

17:08

influence approach though I think that's

17:10

the natural instinct President Trump has

17:12

and to be fair there are

17:14

serious people who believe in a

17:16

spheres of influence approach as well

17:19

they say look in the the

17:21

bipolar world of the of

17:24

the Cold War, things were relatively

17:26

stable because we recognized the Soviet sphere

17:28

of influence. Yes,

17:31

we did, except that

17:33

there were times when there were constant

17:35

challenges and you looked at areas where

17:38

maybe it wasn't so clear cut and

17:40

there was constant testing and that created

17:42

the potential for real risk of escalation.

17:44

It wasn't just the Cuban Missile Crisis

17:46

where they were testing in a sense

17:49

our sphere. It

17:51

was also you know, in the

17:53

mid 1980s, we came very close

17:55

to a nuclear war with the

17:57

Soviets, more through inadvertence

17:59

than anything else. But again, it

18:01

was they looked at what were

18:03

exercises we were running in NATO,

18:06

and then they were planning their

18:08

annual exercises, and we both misread

18:10

each other's exercises. And that was

18:12

within what might be described as

18:14

a sphere of influence. So I

18:16

don't see it as inherently stable

18:18

the way some do. Start

18:21

talking about how this applies in practice.

18:24

And I think the big

18:26

question is, how does the

18:28

United States react to China's

18:30

rise in power? And

18:33

there are a number of

18:35

folks who have been comparing

18:37

China to the Soviet Union

18:39

in terms of a peer

18:41

competitor and using Cold War

18:43

analogies. Do you think those

18:45

analogies work here or are

18:47

there differences that we should

18:49

be taking into account? I

18:52

see the differences more than I see the

18:54

similarities, not in terms of being a competitor,

18:56

even on a global basis. But

18:59

China is a much more

19:01

formidable competitor because they're an

19:04

economic competitor. And

19:07

Russia was not. Soviet Union

19:09

was not. The Soviets

19:11

were exclusively a military

19:13

competitor. But China

19:16

competes with us on an

19:18

economic plane in a dramatic

19:20

way. And so they're

19:22

much more formidable. It means their

19:24

means for developing their military capabilities

19:26

are also substantially greater, but also

19:29

their ability to try to attract

19:31

others. And they've sought to do

19:33

it through the Belt and Road Initiative. They

19:36

were very successful with that to begin

19:38

with, but then they produced enormous debt.

19:42

these countries that went into debt

19:44

to have China building their infrastructure

19:47

suddenly found that this was a

19:49

double -edged sword where they became

19:51

highly indebted, couldn't pay. The Chinese

19:54

were hesitant and quite reluctant to

19:56

reschedule debts or to forgive debts.

19:58

They have begun to to meet

20:01

out fewer and fewer kinds of

20:03

loans because of that, but

20:06

they were using not the military

20:08

to expand themselves. They were using

20:10

what was the Belt and Road

20:12

Initiative to try to do so.

20:15

We, I think, came late to the party in

20:17

terms of thinking about how to compete with that.

20:21

Now, I think one of the

20:23

concerns I have is that with

20:25

President Trump basically alienating a lot

20:28

of our allies, he is creating

20:30

openings for the Chinese. They don't

20:32

have to do a lot to

20:35

try to exploit them. We're

20:37

seeing allies who want to kind of hedge

20:40

their bets on the one hand, show they

20:42

have alternatives to us on the other, but

20:45

keep it within bounds because they

20:47

also, they look at China ultimately

20:49

as being a competitor, not

20:51

as someone who is committed

20:53

to the kind of alliance

20:55

system and stability and basic

20:57

norms internationally that most of

20:59

our allies actually embrace. Ray

21:02

Mouson wrote a book

21:05

about this Thucydides trap

21:07

about how rising powers

21:09

often come into conflict

21:12

with the status quo

21:14

power. Does

21:17

that concern you? And how

21:19

do you think we should

21:21

be addressing that challenge? I

21:24

am concerned because China also

21:27

has a kind of self

21:29

-image that they're their destiny

21:31

entitles them to play this

21:34

leading role and they perceive

21:36

us as somehow trying to

21:38

block their rise. There

21:41

are areas where there's a potential, real

21:43

potential for conflict, especially over Taiwan. We

21:47

require, there are those who

21:49

say because of that, the

21:52

right way to approach things

21:54

is to have containment. Basically,

21:57

Borrow a concept the George Kennan

21:59

concept from the Cold War and

22:01

apply it to the Chinese and

22:03

that sooner or later just as

22:05

the the contradictions within the Soviet

22:07

system sooner or later we're gonna

22:09

Manifest themselves and bring down that

22:12

system the contradictions on the Chinese

22:14

side will also Manifest themselves over

22:16

time I'm not there's a part

22:18

of me that accepts it, but

22:20

there's a there's another part of

22:22

me that says I

22:24

think it sharpens the nature of the

22:26

competition with the Chinese because they see

22:28

it as a deliberate effort to prevent

22:31

their rise. Part of the

22:33

problem is whatever we do, when we

22:35

look like we're trying to mobilize others

22:37

to join with us, they will read

22:39

as a threat trying to prevent their

22:42

rise. So there's a certain level at

22:44

which we will never be able to

22:46

satisfy the Chinese. But

22:48

what I write in the book

22:51

is I don't embrace the containment

22:53

approach and I don't embrace the

22:55

pure engagement approach. The pure engagement

22:58

approach is one that we can

23:00

reassure the Chinese by engaging them

23:02

to the point where they will

23:05

become less of a threat to

23:07

us. And I don't think

23:09

that either because I think basically Certainly

23:12

with this present Xi certainly has a

23:14

self -image and a sense of destiny

23:16

and a sense that because they're on

23:18

the rise nothing can really stop them.

23:20

Although, as I also note in the

23:22

book, he has

23:24

created such structural problems

23:27

within China. Because he

23:29

wants the party's dominance

23:31

and control. Because

23:34

he basically emasculated those like

23:36

Jack Ma, who was the

23:38

huge entrepreneurs who were the

23:41

engine of private growth within

23:43

China. He's created structural

23:45

problems that limit what they can do.

23:48

I come out with what I call, some

23:50

people call, competitive cooperation.

23:54

And what I mean by that

23:56

is, You need what is a

23:58

hybrid approach, which is both an

24:01

approach to deterrence with China. So

24:03

they know the cost if they

24:05

really press the limits. But

24:08

there's also a readiness to engage,

24:10

to show the benefits of cooperation.

24:13

And partly I say this because there are issues

24:16

where the two of us need each other, whether

24:18

we like it or not. We're

24:20

finding now in this trade war, we're both

24:22

going to be hurt by it. Sooner

24:25

or later, if President

24:27

Trump is about using tariffs not

24:29

to change the structure of the

24:31

American economy and bring manufacturing back

24:34

here in a way which I

24:36

think is unlikely, but

24:38

instead to produce better terms

24:40

of trade, then we can

24:42

come out of this. But

24:45

we need, we have a mutual need

24:47

when it comes to the economy. There's

24:49

a mutual dependency, the notion that we'll

24:51

decouple from China and we won't pay

24:53

a price, we'll both pay a big

24:55

price. We'll both be worse off if

24:57

we decouple. So number one,

24:59

we need each other on the economy. Number

25:02

two, climate change. Again,

25:04

it may not be a priority for

25:06

this administration. Sooner or later, the

25:08

realities of what's happening are going to impose

25:11

themselves. You know, you go back

25:13

to 2015, 2015

25:15

in the climate conference, there was

25:17

an agreement that we wanted to

25:20

limit the increase in temperature to

25:22

two degrees Celsius by the end

25:24

of the century. The next year,

25:26

the agreement was to limit it

25:29

to 1 .5. Last

25:31

year, we were at 1 .5 already, not till the

25:33

end of the century. Why do I raise it? Because

25:36

we can't deal with climate change

25:38

unless the US and China are

25:40

on the same page. We will

25:42

both suffer. We will both lose

25:45

in a way where the cost

25:47

will be extremely high for both

25:49

of us. So here's another area.

25:51

Non -proliferation, terrorism,

25:54

pandemics, these are all issues that

25:57

can't be handled on a unilateral

25:59

basis, have to be handled on

26:01

a multilateral basis, and the US

26:03

and China can take the lead

26:05

on this. One of the things

26:08

I suggest, aside from more formal

26:10

mechanisms, I also suggest some back

26:12

channels back channels and I've been

26:14

part of them multiple times back

26:17

channels are those where you basically

26:19

can try out ideas and they're

26:21

not committing back channels are those

26:23

where you you build a level

26:25

of confidence that you wouldn't create

26:28

otherwise back channels allow you to

26:30

try out ideas to test possibilities

26:32

if you only have formal settings

26:34

you never do that You don't

26:36

feel free enough to do that.

26:39

There's always a fear that what's

26:41

going to happen is that you're

26:43

going to be, you

26:45

know, whatever you say becomes a

26:48

commitment. So with China,

26:50

one of the things I would like

26:52

to do, in addition to creating certain

26:54

back channels so you can try to

26:56

forge some understandings, I would like us

26:58

in all of our bilateral meetings to

27:00

start with the areas where we have

27:03

a common interest. Instead of starting with

27:05

the areas where we're competing

27:07

and have problems with each other, they're

27:10

not going to go away. They're going to be there anyway. Try

27:13

to create agendas where you start

27:15

with where you have common needs.

27:18

And I'm not suggesting we're going to

27:20

be singing kumbaya together overnight, but I

27:23

am suggesting you begin to condition each

27:25

other to a habit of saying, okay,

27:27

here are the areas where we have

27:29

common interest in, let's begin working on

27:32

them. And you create that as a

27:34

frame of reference for when you then

27:36

deal with where you compete. And

27:39

where we have to start with deterrence, but

27:41

you have to be able to, I think,

27:43

put it in a context where the Chinese

27:45

won't interpret everything as a threat, and we

27:48

won't interpret everything they do in response necessarily

27:50

as a threat. There are

27:52

some who are arguing that

27:54

the China threat is so

27:57

important that we should be

27:59

reducing our involvement in other

28:01

areas of the world, that

28:04

we should be recruiting Russia as

28:06

a partner, that we should be

28:08

not as active in the Middle

28:11

East. What

28:13

do you think of those

28:16

arguments? How are those linked

28:18

into the overall global security

28:21

posture of the United States?

28:24

I fully recognize those arguments. I

28:27

understand the logic behind the arguments

28:29

as well. but I'm able

28:31

to restrain my enthusiasm for them. I

28:34

start with the premise, those

28:36

who think that you can do a

28:38

kind of reverse Nixon -Kissinger, where

28:41

in 1969, Kissinger wrote

28:43

about, we saw that

28:46

the difference there, and President Nixon and

28:48

I understood, we had

28:50

to somehow bring China into

28:52

an international order and not

28:55

keep it outside. The

28:58

problem with trying to apply

29:00

that to the Russians is

29:02

Russia and China together Today

29:04

both believe Their main mission

29:06

is to cooperate so that

29:08

the US is shaping the

29:10

international order and the rules

29:12

of the international order It

29:14

was very interesting and I

29:16

also noticed in the China

29:18

chapter very for the first

29:20

two weeks after Putin went

29:23

into Ukraine there

29:25

was a kind of open debate, at least

29:27

open discussion in China. And

29:29

there was one of the leading academic

29:31

in Shanghai wrote a piece where it

29:33

said, China needed to separate itself from

29:36

Russia and what it did. This

29:38

was going to lose all of China's soft power.

29:40

They were going to get lumped in with the

29:42

Russians. It went against

29:44

everything that China was trying to

29:47

create in terms of its posture

29:49

on the world scene. And

29:51

after two weeks, all that disappeared.

29:54

and she made a basic decision

29:56

and picked up on the theme

29:58

that he and Putin had emphasized

30:01

when they had met shortly before

30:03

Russia went into Ukraine, and that

30:05

was an unlimited partnership. I'm

30:08

quoting the unlimited partnership. So

30:11

those who think that

30:13

you can separate Russia

30:15

from China don't understand

30:17

Putin, don't understand

30:19

Xi, don't understand Putin's

30:22

aspirations, which We see,

30:24

even though the price has been enormous

30:26

for the Russians, we don't

30:28

see any retreat from what

30:30

he wants. He still wants,

30:32

still talking about the root

30:34

causes of the conflict, which

30:36

he regards as being a

30:39

changed geopolitical security architecture with

30:41

an independent Ukraine. And

30:43

so to think that somehow we're able to separate

30:45

the Russians from the Chinese, I

30:47

think is an illusion. Now

30:50

the Middle East, you could

30:52

make a stronger case because

30:54

and then go back to

30:56

the whole concept of rebalancing.

30:58

It's understandable at one level,

31:00

but I'll go back to

31:02

1988 when I was briefing

31:04

Jim Baker prior to his

31:06

confirmation hearings to be Secretary

31:08

of State. He said

31:11

to me in famous last words, I'm not going to fly

31:13

around the Middle East the way George Schultz did. And

31:15

of course, he ended up flying around the Middle

31:18

East vastly more than George Schultz ever did. And

31:21

at the time, I said to him, you may

31:23

think you can ignore the Middle East, but the

31:25

Middle East won't ignore you. So

31:28

unless you want to be responding to

31:30

what the Middle East imposes on us,

31:32

it's always better to trying to be

31:34

shape, shaping events there, not always reacting

31:37

to them. Somehow we have

31:39

to find a way to try to

31:41

strike some greater balance. But it then

31:43

comes back to, I think, how

31:46

you develop local partnerships and

31:48

use them more effectively. I

31:51

do think one of the things, again, I write

31:53

about in the book, we have

31:55

had a tendency to look at

31:57

military interventions as either we nothing

32:00

or we put 150 ,000 troops

32:02

on the ground and there's a

32:04

whole gradation of steps in between

32:06

that you can follow. Having

32:09

local partners who are serious enough

32:11

and prepared to defend themselves allows

32:13

you to do To

32:15

support them and do something but not

32:18

have to be totally consumed by it

32:20

in the near term I think we

32:22

probably have to we have to get

32:24

through what we're gonna do with Iran

32:26

one way or the other I do

32:28

think a deal is possible because of

32:30

the Iranian vulnerability, but we can talk

32:32

about what I think that deal should

32:34

be but I think at this stage

32:36

in America that would withdraw from the

32:39

Middle East would find out sooner or

32:41

later would have to be back in

32:43

there in a much bigger way. I

32:45

give the example of Syria. President

32:48

Obama looked at Syria and he always

32:50

saw Iraq. So he didn't want to

32:52

get sucked into Syria. And

32:55

yet, because of what Assad

32:57

was doing on the ground, In

33:00

the end, the assault on

33:02

Sunnis ended up creating ISIS

33:04

as the protector of Sunnis,

33:06

and we ended up carrying

33:08

out thousands of sorties into

33:10

Syria to fight ISIS. In

33:13

the end, ironically, we succeeded against them

33:15

because we had a local partner, the

33:17

Syrian Democratic Forces. And

33:19

they were the ones who rooted

33:22

out ISIS from Raqqa. They lost

33:24

11 ,000 dead doing that. We

33:26

partnered with them. We provided them,

33:29

as you know, we provided them

33:31

air support. We provided them intelligence,

33:33

logistic support. We put

33:35

spotters on the ground. We put advisors

33:37

with some of their units. But

33:40

we lost six people. They lost 11 ,000.

33:43

They were prepared to fight for themselves.

33:45

So identifying... partners who are prepared to

33:47

fight for themselves and have the credibility

33:50

to do so, allows you to maintain

33:52

a presence, but it doesn't have to

33:54

be of the same size and character.

33:56

We're going to take a quick break

33:58

and we'll be right back with more

34:01

of our discussion with Ambassador Dennis Ross.

34:04

Beacon Global Strategies is the

34:06

premier national security advisory firm.

34:08

Beacon works side by side

34:11

with leading companies to help

34:13

them understand national security policy,

34:15

geopolitical risk, global technology policy,

34:17

and federal procurement trends. Beacon's

34:20

insight gives business leaders the decision

34:23

advantage. Founded in 2013,

34:25

Beacon develops and supports the

34:27

execution of bespoke strategies to

34:29

mitigate business risk, drive growth,

34:31

and navigate a complex geopolitical

34:33

environment. With a bipartisan team

34:36

in decades of experience, Beacon

34:38

provides global perspective to help

34:40

clients tackle their toughest challenges.

34:43

You mentioned this unlimited partnership

34:45

between Russia and China that

34:47

President Xi referenced. Yeah.

34:49

Both Russia and China are

34:52

engaged in gray war activities

34:54

against the United States using

34:56

cyber attacks, propaganda,

35:00

bots, and social media.

35:05

would Statecraft 2 .0 address those

35:07

types of threats that Russia and

35:10

China are opposing that are not

35:12

over. They are deniable, but still

35:14

having a tremendous impact on our

35:17

economy and on our political culture.

35:19

Again, this is a reminder that

35:21

we're facing very different kinds of

35:24

threats than we ever faced before.

35:27

That means you also have to develop a different

35:29

set of tools than you ever developed before. I

35:31

do talk about cyber in the last

35:34

chapter. One of the interesting

35:36

things about cyber and gets back to our

35:38

earlier discussion. We were

35:40

both students of nuclear

35:42

deterrence. And ultimately,

35:45

we focus much more on deterrence through

35:47

punishment than we did deterrence through denial.

35:50

Deternance through denial focuses on

35:52

we can defeat your forces,

35:55

therefore you won't attack. Deternance

35:57

through punishment is it's not worth the price

36:00

because the price you're going to pay for

36:02

the attack. In cyber, I think we have

36:04

to think much more about the turns through

36:06

denial. We have to show

36:08

and we can do it. We can

36:11

do it in ways that by We

36:13

can penetrate their systems and in a

36:15

way where we can let them know

36:18

we have penetrated their systems that They

36:20

can alert them to how much they

36:22

have to lose When they you know

36:25

one of the things that we should

36:27

be doing with Putin and even with

36:29

she at certain points we should be

36:32

revealing how much Putin's personal wealth

36:35

is. We can let them know

36:37

in advance. These are the kind of things we're prepared to do.

36:39

If we see you continue to do this, here are the kind

36:41

of things we're gonna do to you. So

36:44

it's a combination of deterrence through

36:46

punishment and deterrence through denial. That

36:49

I think is part of

36:51

what we have to do

36:53

when we're dealing with these

36:55

much more subtle threats that

36:57

are profoundly threatening but aren't

36:59

so easy to see. We

37:01

have to raise, we

37:03

have to show them what we can also

37:06

do that they won't want to see, but

37:08

we also have to show them how much,

37:10

not just how much they have to lose,

37:12

but how much we could disrupt them in

37:14

a way that they won't want to see.

37:16

So there has to be, again, you

37:19

need channels of communication always. And

37:22

sometimes it's to convey

37:24

threats in private. Sometimes

37:27

you don't want to make the threats in public

37:29

because then you put the other side in the

37:31

corner and then you never want to put someone

37:33

in the corner. So basically they

37:35

feel they don't have a choice. You

37:38

don't want to limit choices. You want

37:40

them to have choices just like we

37:42

want to have choices, but you also

37:44

want them to understand how much we

37:46

can do and what they stand to

37:48

lose. And that's where I said deterrence

37:50

through denial as well as deterrence through

37:52

punishment. Number one, number two, And

37:55

this sort of gets to what I was talking about,

37:57

we could expose what they don't want exposed, personal

38:00

wealth, especially, you

38:02

know, the, we

38:05

saw at times, we

38:07

saw at times Putin's

38:09

sensitivity to this, when,

38:14

you know, the, his, his mansions

38:16

with the gold toilets were exposed.

38:18

We didn't do the exposing of

38:20

it, but we could do that.

38:22

And he should know. those are

38:24

the kind of things that we

38:27

could do. Exposure is

38:29

an important part of a tool, and

38:31

it gets back to the issue of

38:33

we have to use media much more

38:36

effectively than we have. You think about,

38:38

again, going back to the 80s and

38:40

90s, we had

38:42

the US Information Agency,

38:46

we had US libraries, these US libraries

38:48

all over the world. We were presenting

38:50

ourselves you

38:53

know now we now we

38:55

can't even have radio liberty

38:57

we're doing away with all

38:59

her we're doing away with

39:01

certain public forms of media

39:03

clearly in a world of

39:05

social media where younger people

39:07

get their news from tiktok

39:10

then you have to think

39:12

about much more effectively how

39:14

do you operate in that

39:16

space how do you frame

39:19

certain narratives and what's the

39:21

best way to ensure they

39:23

go viral. You

39:25

need people who are expert in

39:27

this but who are also, they

39:29

know the substance well enough to

39:31

come up with what would be

39:33

the right kind of message with

39:35

the social media gurus who know

39:37

how to turn something into a

39:39

viral, a kind

39:42

of viral exposure.

39:44

So, again, there

39:47

are new tools, but calls for new

39:49

specialties, new people who know how to

39:51

do these things to be able to

39:53

exercise them and implement them. Turning

39:55

back to the Middle East, in

39:59

the aftermath of the

40:01

war in Gaza, it's

40:03

taken a turn that I don't think

40:05

anybody would have predicted at the beginning

40:08

with the fall of the Syrian Assad

40:10

regime. Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon,

40:13

Iran seems weakened afterwards, and Turkey

40:15

seems on the Ascended. The

40:18

sides that people are taking are

40:20

somewhat surprising. They were reporting that

40:23

the Israelis would prefer in his

40:25

US -Russian cooperation in Syria to

40:28

block out the Turks, who are

40:30

an idol ally of ours. How

40:33

should the US be thinking

40:36

about this new world in

40:38

the Middle East where there's

40:41

been dramatic change in the

40:43

relative influence of the different

40:45

powers. So let

40:47

me come at this one in a couple of different ways.

40:50

First, one thing the

40:52

Israelis have succeeded in doing is they changed

40:55

the regional balance of power in a fundamental

40:57

way using military force. That

41:00

is significant. It has implications and we should have a

41:02

strategy to try to take advantage of it. One

41:05

of the problems with the

41:08

current Israeli government is the

41:10

military has been remarkably successful

41:12

in terms of weakening Hamas,

41:14

but not destroying it because

41:16

that was never an option.

41:20

Decimating Hezbollah and the decimation of

41:22

Hezbollah is what led to the

41:24

collapse of the Assad regime, which

41:27

means the whole Iranian concept of

41:29

forward defense is gone. destroying

41:32

the Iranian air defense, so

41:35

the Iranians are profoundly vulnerable,

41:38

all these things created a new

41:40

regional balance of power. But

41:43

there was no strategy to take advantage of it.

41:46

Klausowitz said that war is

41:49

a continuation of politics by

41:51

different means. And

41:53

what is needed is, okay, what's the political,

41:55

sorry, what are the political objectives you can

41:58

now pursue? In light of

42:00

that now you raised the

42:02

issue of Syria and Turkey

42:04

and Israel being concerned not

42:07

wanting to suddenly Be have

42:09

a point of friction and

42:11

conflict with with the Turks

42:13

within Syria. So suddenly Russia,

42:15

you know, apparently the Israeli

42:17

one point I think Ron

42:19

Dürmer went to Moscow to

42:22

see Putin to talk about

42:24

not getting out of Syria

42:26

and I would rather

42:28

see us brokering understandings there.

42:31

It's very interesting.

42:33

The Saudis want

42:35

us to recognize

42:37

that Ahmed al

42:39

-Sharah, formerly known

42:41

as Jolani, is

42:44

someone who represents actually a

42:46

pragmatist. He's given up his

42:49

ideological leanings. He used to

42:51

be part of ISIS. He

42:53

used to be part of

42:55

al -Qaeda. They

42:58

say he is no more. They're

43:01

not saying don't test him, but

43:03

they're saying see there's a possibility

43:05

there in which case develop an

43:08

approach where an independent Syria can

43:10

actually take on a very different

43:12

coloration, in which case it's not

43:14

necessarily the province of the Turks,

43:17

even though they clearly have influence

43:19

with them. I would like to

43:21

see us broker an understanding there.

43:24

test Shahr in the process. I

43:26

don't think we can just take

43:28

as a given that he's had

43:30

this transformation, so to speak, on

43:32

the road to Damascus. I

43:36

think that we should test it. But

43:39

I also think that the U

43:41

.S., lasting U .S. wants is

43:43

a conflict between Turkey and Israel

43:45

in Syria. So we ought to

43:47

focus on how you broker understandings

43:50

there to avoid that. Having

43:53

the Russians remain in Syria. I

43:55

don't think is the best outcome

43:57

That's not the way to produce.

44:00

I think what is an understanding

44:02

there Turkey has always been a

44:04

historic competitor with the Iranians And

44:07

they see themselves kind of taking

44:09

the Iranian place within Syria Now

44:11

there are parts of northern Syria

44:14

that Turkey has never given up

44:16

its claims to and that has

44:18

to be part of the discussions

44:21

clearly But I would say,

44:23

let's look at Syria still as more

44:26

of an opportunity than a problem. And

44:28

if you look at it as an

44:30

opportunity, and you think about how do

44:32

we take advantage of that potential opportunity?

44:35

So yes, we're dealing in a very different

44:37

Middle East right now. But

44:39

to think that the Iranians won't try

44:42

to reconstitute is not to understand the

44:44

Iranians, not to take advantage of the

44:46

moment by trying to create a set

44:48

of understanding, starting with what would be

44:52

Real regional integration. You

44:55

know, a lot was done in term

44:57

by SENTCOM, in terms

44:59

of creating military integration. Still a

45:01

long ways to go, but a

45:03

lot was done. And

45:06

this is an argument, if you could

45:08

get Saudi normalization with Israel, which won't

45:10

happen without an end to the war

45:12

in Gaza, and it won't

45:14

happen without something on the Palestinians, which

45:16

we can get into. If

45:20

you get the regional integration

45:22

politically and militarily, that's

45:25

also the surest way to limit what

45:27

the opportunities are for Iran. Iran

45:29

doesn't tend to create the conflicts in the

45:31

region, but they always exploit the conflicts in

45:34

the region. But now Iran

45:36

has its own internal problems, quite apart

45:38

from the vulnerabilities I described. And

45:41

there's a debate within Iran over,

45:43

look at all the money we

45:45

gave to these different proxies And

45:47

look at how they effectively collapsed

45:49

and look at how they got

45:52

us into trouble And there's clearly

45:54

a debate going on and I

45:56

think this is an anticipation for

45:58

what will be succession within Iran

46:00

I'm not a believer in regime

46:02

change because I don't think we

46:05

can ever do it But I

46:07

am a believer in taking advantage

46:09

of opportunities when they're there I

46:11

have a very long chapter on

46:13

Iran in the in the book

46:15

and one of the things I

46:18

suggest is the Iranians have always

46:20

wanted to avoid direct conflict with

46:22

us. We need to

46:24

think about how we use that reality.

46:26

We need to think about how we

46:28

use that vulnerability to think about what

46:30

are the opportunities at the moment as

46:33

well. We have a region, as I

46:35

said, you start with a change, regional

46:37

balance of power, just because there's been

46:39

a change now doesn't mean it's going

46:41

to be there forever. One of

46:43

the things I say in terms of lessons, you

46:46

have moments. I say

46:48

that timing is to statecraft what location

46:50

is to real estate. And

46:53

when you have those moments, that's when you have

46:55

to think through, all right, how do we take

46:57

advantage of it? In the Middle East

46:59

right now, there actually is a moment, but if

47:01

we don't take advantage of it, the one thing

47:04

we can almost count on is that when it's

47:06

lost, we're gonna find that

47:08

things might end up being quite different

47:10

than we had hoped for. You mentioned

47:13

that it may be an opportune time

47:15

to strike a deal with Iran

47:17

to eliminate their nuclear program, and there

47:19

have been reports that there have been

47:22

direct discussions between US negotiators and the

47:24

Iranians. What would a

47:26

good outcome look like? I

47:28

think for me, the

47:30

outcome should be the Iranians give

47:32

up their nuclear weapons option. By

47:35

the way, that doesn't necessarily mean they have

47:38

to give up enrichment. Of course, from

47:40

a nuclear nonproliferation standpoint, the best approach would

47:42

be they give up enrichment, they get

47:44

their fuel from the outside. I

47:47

suspect that the Iranians will not

47:49

agree to that short of the

47:51

US using force against them. So

47:54

I think we have to threaten the use

47:56

of force if there's not a diplomatic outcome.

47:59

But I think an outcome where

48:01

basically they scale back the size

48:03

of their nuclear infrastructure. Let's

48:06

say you limit the number of centrifuges to

48:08

less than a thousand. Let's

48:10

say they can't enrich above 5%.

48:13

Let's say they ship out all

48:15

the highly enriched uranium at 60%,

48:17

which right now the IEA says

48:19

six bombs worth at that amount.

48:22

I think there's another five bombs worth at

48:24

20%. All that has to be shipped out.

48:27

They can retain less than

48:30

a bombs worth of low

48:32

enriched uranium and stockpile of

48:34

that. There has to be

48:37

real monitoring that the term

48:39

unfettered was always used before.

48:42

There has to be a consequence if

48:44

they don't allow that and it has

48:46

to be declared and undeclared sites just

48:48

as in the additional protocol as it

48:50

calls for. I think

48:53

that might actually be achievable

48:55

right now given where

48:57

they are. One of the things I show in the Iran chapter,

49:00

the idea that they never give them the pressure

49:03

ignores history because in fact they do give them

49:05

the pressure. It doesn't mean you

49:07

get exactly what they want, but I point

49:09

out for example, the

49:12

original Supreme Leader,

49:14

Khomeini, said they would

49:16

fight the Iraq war, however long

49:18

it took, and we

49:21

began reflagging ships to oil

49:23

tankers to stop them from

49:25

being attacked by by the

49:28

Iranians we ended up Destroying

49:30

their parts of their Navy

49:32

their oil platforms and inadvertently

49:35

mistakenly shot down on Sudan

49:37

airliner and he suddenly declared

49:39

a ceasefire in 2003 when

49:42

Three weeks after we'd gone

49:44

into Iraq and Saddam Hussein

49:46

was out They came with

49:49

a proposal about suspending

49:51

enrichment and ending all military

49:53

support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

49:56

This is what they came with because they thought they

49:58

were next. The Biden

50:00

administration, after three,

50:02

we lose three soldiers

50:04

at Tower 22 in

50:06

Northern Jordan to a

50:08

drone from Qutayb Hezbollah,

50:11

an Iranian proxy. The

50:13

Biden administration did 85 different targets

50:16

in Iraq, suddenly Israel

50:18

Khani, the head of the Quds

50:20

forces, shows up in the BRAC,

50:22

in Baghdad, and all

50:24

the attacks stopped for the next

50:26

six months. They thought they

50:28

were next. Even in the

50:30

Obama administration, they said, we will not negotiate

50:33

on the nuclear issue so long as we're

50:35

under sanction. The administration tripled

50:37

down on the sanctions, and they negotiated. Stream

50:40

leaders said it was not

50:42

decent to negotiate with the

50:45

Trump administration. But

50:47

obviously they're negotiating now. It doesn't

50:49

mean it's simple to get an

50:51

agreement But it means they know

50:53

their vulnerability in the outside and

50:56

they know the conditions on the

50:58

inside Here is a country that

51:00

produces natural gas and oil And

51:02

it has constant shortages of electricity

51:04

So it has to shut down

51:06

government business and schools it has

51:09

to in a lot of the

51:11

provinces For several hours a day.

51:13

There's no water availability You

51:16

know the the currency is

51:18

Right now the exchange rate

51:20

is it was like the

51:22

official rate is 42 ,000

51:24

to their 40 ,000 rail

51:26

to the dollar the the

51:28

actual exchange rate is a

51:30

million forty thousand to the

51:32

dollar so they need an

51:34

agreement Now they won't make

51:36

it easy. You know, they

51:38

are very tough when it

51:40

comes to negotiating It's not

51:42

going to be simple But

51:45

it's clear they want an

51:47

agreement. And we just

51:49

have to be clear enough in our objective. This

51:51

gets back to the essence of the good statecraft.

51:54

What is our objective? You

51:56

know, right now I don't know what the

51:58

administration's objective is because Mike Waltz says it's

52:00

dismantling their whole nuclear infrastructure, which

52:02

they say they won't engage on.

52:06

And we've had two rounds. So it's clearly

52:08

that wasn't on the table because we wouldn't

52:10

suddenly be having take experts

52:12

meet and then having a third round.

52:15

And Anarachi is saying that after

52:17

the second round in Rome, that

52:19

we're pretty close on agreeing on

52:21

principles and goals. Well, that doesn't

52:24

sound like dismantling their whole nuclear

52:26

infrastructure. It doesn't even sound like

52:28

eliminating their enrichment. So

52:31

again, let's

52:34

settle on what is,

52:36

I think, what should

52:38

be the objective. Should

52:40

the support for groups like the Houthis

52:42

and groups in Iraq should the end

52:45

of that support be part of the

52:47

egyptus? I think it

52:49

can be I Think it can be

52:51

it certainly look. There's a logic to

52:53

it because you can say to them

52:55

Let's say it's not part of the

52:57

agreement, but you then have a side

52:59

understanding Okay, we're not going to force

53:01

you to put this in agreement because

53:03

that may be a bridge too far

53:05

for them But I would say this

53:07

they need to understand If

53:09

you want real sanctions relief and

53:12

you're providing that support inevitably, that's

53:14

going to create a problem where,

53:17

you know, you're not going to, it's going

53:19

to, it will make it impossible even for

53:22

the private sector to feel confident that they

53:24

could go in there because you're going to

53:26

trigger the kinds of actions that sooner or

53:28

later will produce a sanctions response. So

53:31

they, even if you don't make it part

53:33

of the formal agreement, I think it has

53:35

to be part of an understanding that they

53:38

need to understand this the effect of life.

53:40

you will not get the kind of relief

53:42

you want and the outside investment you say

53:45

you want. You will not get it. Banks

53:47

will not do it. If

53:49

you're still funneling money to these groups,

53:52

you know, banks are not going to take the

53:54

risk. So it needs to be part of the

53:56

discussion. I would say part of the understanding there

53:59

should be no illusions. You

54:01

plant that, you make it clear

54:03

now, even if you don't necessarily

54:05

make it part of a formal

54:07

agreement. Last question on the Middle

54:10

East, the Trump administration is very

54:12

proud that during his first term,

54:14

the administration negotiated the Abraham records

54:16

between Israel and the UAE and

54:19

other Arab countries, and they really

54:21

wanted to make progress on Saudi

54:23

Arabia. And as you

54:26

pointed out earlier, that will

54:28

require progress on the Palestinian

54:30

issue, which has eluded multiple

54:32

administrations for decades. What

54:36

do you think the US role

54:38

can or should be and is

54:40

progress possible to get to an

54:43

agreement between Israel, Saudi Arabia or

54:45

is both Israeli and Palestinian politics

54:47

right now make that a bridge

54:50

too far? If one

54:52

is saying you have to commit

54:54

to producing a Palestinian state soon,

54:56

that's a bridge too far. For

54:58

a couple of reasons. On the

55:00

Israeli side, this is with the

55:02

exception of a small percentage on

55:04

the left. Most Israelis think when

55:06

they hear Palestinians state they think

55:09

Hamas will run it But Palestinians

55:11

too they it's not just that

55:13

they don't have their act together

55:15

It's also if you without reform

55:17

on the Palestinian Authority you'd have

55:19

a failed state So let's there

55:21

need to be when the Saudis

55:23

say there needs to be a

55:25

credible pathway to a Palestinian state

55:27

a it shouldn't be time limited

55:30

it should be conditions related and

55:32

And it should be, if you create a set

55:34

of conditions on their side, for example, no

55:37

independent militias. Can't have a state if you

55:39

have independent militias. Can't have a

55:41

state if it's going to align with Iran or rejectionists.

55:45

Can't have a state that would be a failed

55:47

state because it lacks reform. We

55:50

could be saying to the Saudis, as

55:52

an example, if we

55:54

talk about a credible pathway to a state, we're prepared

55:56

to work with the Israelis on what can be an

55:58

approach. And if there are going to

56:00

be obligations on the side of the of the Palestinians,

56:02

there have to be obligations on the side of the

56:05

Israelis. Israel can't, you can't

56:07

have minister Smotridge basically creating realities

56:09

in the ground that make it

56:11

impossible to ever have a Palestinian

56:13

state. So you can't be requiring

56:16

something of the Palestinians and nothing

56:18

of the Israelis. But you

56:20

also have to require something of the Arabs

56:22

and say, look, you want a Palestinian state,

56:24

then it's up to you to produce the

56:26

reform. within the Palestinian

56:29

Authority. Because a

56:31

Palestinian state cannot emerge out of

56:33

the current PA in the best

56:35

case because it will be a

56:37

failed state. George

56:39

W. Bush, when he changed

56:41

the formal policy of the

56:43

United States on Palestinian statehood,

56:46

when we did the Clinton parameters of which

56:48

I was the prime drafter, We

56:51

would have produced a Palestinian state, but

56:53

not as American policy This was a

56:56

bridging proposal based on the request of

56:58

the Israelis and the Palestinians for us

57:00

to bridge their differences and President Clinton

57:03

said if this isn't accepted it leaves

57:05

when I leave office So it wasn't

57:07

formally part of our we weren't changing

57:10

the position in the United States George

57:12

W. Bush did You know he declared

57:14

support for a Palestinian state, but then

57:16

he said in June of 2002, but

57:19

a Palestinian state cannot be built on

57:21

the basis of terror and corruption. And

57:24

so it is up to the Arabs. If

57:27

they say they want a credible pathway

57:29

to a Palestinian state, then it's up to

57:31

them to play the role in terms of

57:33

producing on the Palestinian side, the

57:36

kind of reform that would be necessary.

57:38

You look at Saudi Arabia, look at

57:40

the UAE and what they've done in

57:42

terms of internal transformation, they

57:44

could take the lead in terms of that. I

57:47

know that Mahmoud Abbas, Abu

57:50

Mazen, looks to the

57:52

Saudis and will not say no to

57:54

them. So there is a

57:56

role for them to play just as there's a role

57:58

for us to play, but we have to be realistic

58:00

and it has to be rooted in the current reality.

58:03

Things can change. There

58:05

will be a political reckoning that's going to come

58:07

with Israel. It's only a

58:09

matter of time. There will also be a state

58:12

inquiry of commission at some point. That will all

58:14

be part of dealing with one of the things

58:16

that frankly has never been dealt with. In

58:19

Israel, there's never been a

58:21

serious debate about what the relationship with

58:24

Palestinians should be. Also didn't

58:26

produce that debate. You had

58:28

Rabin in Paris making a

58:31

decision. You had the opposition.

58:33

They didn't debate it. When

58:35

Sharon pulled out of Gaza

58:38

in September of 2005, there

58:41

was opposition. There

58:44

was no debate. The opposition was such

58:46

that he created a new party. He

58:48

left Lee could inform Kadima. So

58:51

there is a need and it can come

58:53

as a part of the state inquiry commission

58:55

because they will debate the issue of this,

58:57

what was known as the concept here, which

59:00

was, okay, we can be focused very heavily

59:02

on, okay, we can, we can stabilize things

59:04

with Hamas because they have a stake in

59:06

not having a war with us turned out

59:09

to be wrong. But it was the idea

59:11

that you could be You could have a

59:13

separate Palestinian administration in Gaza from the one

59:15

in the West Bank, and it could be

59:18

led by Hamas. And that was clearly wrong.

59:21

So this is going to, there'll be

59:23

a debate over that. It's going to

59:25

have to come. There needs to be

59:27

soul searching on the Palestinian side, which

59:29

frankly, there really never has been. But

59:32

again, the Arabs could actually contribute to that in a way

59:34

that happened in the past. Final question.

59:37

You made a convincing argument about

59:39

how American you know, needs to

59:41

lead in a multipolar world. In

59:44

Washington, that always comes into play

59:46

in terms of institutions. Many

59:49

of our national security status, we know,

59:51

was built during the Cold War era,

59:53

and then it was refined after 9

59:56

-11. And

59:58

what changes do you think we

1:00:00

should be thinking about in this

1:00:02

time where we're going to need

1:00:04

to think differently about how America

1:00:07

approaches the world? I come

1:00:09

back to How do you

1:00:11

create a whole of government approaches

1:00:13

to these kinds of challenges? Because

1:00:15

they're not the traditional national security

1:00:17

challenges. They require

1:00:19

a different approach. Certainly

1:00:21

cyber, I think, requires

1:00:23

its own kind of

1:00:26

independent structure, which was

1:00:28

created to some extent

1:00:30

in the Biden administration.

1:00:32

I'm not so sure what it's going to be

1:00:35

in the Trump administration. I

1:00:38

won't get into that, but I will say, you

1:00:41

know, the nature of these challenges,

1:00:44

take, for example, climate

1:00:46

change. Climate change is a

1:00:48

different kind of national security

1:00:51

challenge. It's not

1:00:53

just the issue of migration. It's

1:00:55

going to be the conflict over

1:00:57

water, especially in the Middle East,

1:00:59

where the shortages are profound, where

1:01:01

Iran, we can actually help the

1:01:03

Iranians. One of the ways to

1:01:05

maybe get a deal is also

1:01:07

to offer them help. on water

1:01:09

because they will not be able

1:01:11

to sustain their population as it

1:01:13

currently is based on their approach

1:01:15

to water and their existing water

1:01:17

availability. The point is there are

1:01:19

all sorts of new triggers for

1:01:21

conflict and unless you create a

1:01:23

structure that can deal with the

1:01:25

new challenges as well, is

1:01:28

it the EPA, is it the

1:01:30

Department of Energy, How

1:01:32

do they get folded into an

1:01:35

approach that deals with national security

1:01:37

interests? I mean, do you make

1:01:39

it part of the NSE structure? I

1:01:42

mean, if I were redesigning things, I probably

1:01:44

would. Simply because

1:01:46

it allows more direction from the White

1:01:48

House, but then you need people who

1:01:50

can implement. As you

1:01:52

know, the NSE should be giving direction, but

1:01:54

it can't implement. It's never going to be

1:01:56

large enough to implement. So

1:01:59

this is how You

1:02:02

different parts of the State

1:02:04

Department. you elevate different

1:02:06

parts of the government that have

1:02:08

the technical expertise, you

1:02:11

put it under some kind of

1:02:13

White House umbrella. These

1:02:15

are some of the things I

1:02:17

think will be required in a world

1:02:20

that not only is more challenging

1:02:22

because we have more challengers, but in

1:02:24

a world that's more challenging because the

1:02:26

national security threats don't take the

1:02:28

traditional forms only. Well, Dennis, thank you

1:02:30

so much for coming on to the

1:02:33

podcast to discuss your book, Statecraft 2 .0,

1:02:35

What America Needs to Lead in a Multi -Polar

1:02:37

World. It was a fascinating discussion.

1:02:39

Thank you so much. Thanks for having

1:02:41

me. That

1:02:44

was Ambassador Dennis Ross. I'm Andrew Shapiro.

1:02:47

Please join us next week

1:02:49

for another episode of Batsack Matters. NatSec

1:03:01

Matters is produced by Steve

1:03:03

Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry.

1:03:06

Matt Sack Matters is a production

1:03:08

of Beacon Global Strategies.