0:01

This is NatSec

0:03

Matters. I'm

0:07

host Andrew Shapiro with Beacon Global

0:10

Strategies. Today, I'm joined by Iris

0:12

Ferguson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

0:14

Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience in the

0:16

Biden Administration. In her

0:18

capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary, she

0:20

authored the Arctic Strategies for the Department of

0:22

Defense and the Air Force. Ms.

0:25

Ferguson previously served at the Department of Commerce

0:27

and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ms.

0:29

Ferguson joins us today for a discussion about

0:32

Arctic security, where we assess the United

0:34

States' current role in the Arctic and the

0:36

region's rising strategic importance. Stay with

0:38

us as we speak with Iris first. Iris,

0:48

thank you for joining That Tech Matters. Yeah,

0:51

pleasure to be here. Thanks for the

0:53

invite. So today we're going to

0:55

talk a little bit about Arctic policy

0:57

and your experience in it. and

0:59

then talk about some of the current

1:01

policy issues regarding Arctic policy, particularly

1:03

in the United States and

1:05

among other Arctic powers. So

1:07

to start off, can you share how you

1:09

got involved in Arctic issues and what initially

1:11

drew you to this area?

1:13

Thanks for that question. I

1:16

first encountered Arctic issues when I

1:18

was actually working on the Senate Foreign

1:20

Relations Committee. quite a

1:22

while ago, when we were trying

1:24

to pass the Law of the Sea

1:26

Treaty back in 2007, eight

1:29

-time frame, was one of

1:31

the last efforts of Congress to

1:33

try to push that treaty through. And

1:35

as we were getting ready for

1:37

hearings, I remember

1:39

the... were planting

1:41

a flag near

1:43

the North Pole to try to exert

1:45

sovereignty. And so as I started to

1:47

research that area more, it

1:50

became very clear that it was

1:52

really an area that we, the

1:54

US, needed to be taking seriously,

1:56

that we had sovereignty issues at

1:58

play, but also that the Arctic

2:00

has so many It's like a prism in

2:02

a sense, and then it has so

2:04

many different angles that you can look at,

2:06

whether it be environmental or geopolitics, some

2:08

of the hard security issues like homeland defense,

2:10

but also international angles and working with

2:12

allies and partners. And it's just

2:14

such a really fascinating region to

2:16

invest time in. And if you've ever

2:19

read any Arctic Explorer books, many

2:21

of the explorers kind of have a

2:23

part of their books where they

2:25

talk about why they've fallen in love

2:27

with the region, that it's kind

2:29

of captivates their fascinations, that there's a

2:31

beauty of the landscape and the

2:33

people that kind of sinks into you.

2:35

And I think that that spell

2:38

has also been cast on me as

2:40

well. Well, it certainly was an

2:42

area that has risen in importance over

2:44

the last decade. I

2:46

remember during the Obama

2:48

administration over a decade ago,

2:50

Secretary of State Hillary

2:52

Clinton said that the Arctic

2:55

was an area of

2:57

increasing strategic importance. From

2:59

your perspective, how is US

3:01

policy toward the Arctic involved since

3:03

then, especially in terms of

3:05

defense strategy, but also more broadly?

3:07

You're absolutely right that the region

3:09

has changed pretty dramatically in the

3:11

last 10 to 20 years in

3:14

particular. A lot of

3:16

that is fundamentally due to climate change.

3:18

The region is transforming and warming

3:20

at some four times the rest of

3:22

the world, and that's allowing for

3:24

increased physical access. of increased

3:26

economic opportunity, changing of sea

3:28

routes, of course, but also

3:31

for increased security access. And

3:33

so as the United States perspective

3:35

and the security interests of the United

3:37

States, you think we were able to

3:39

sort of treat the Arctic as a

3:42

little bit of exceptional, a bit of

3:44

a strategic buffer over time. We were

3:46

really heavily focused, especially some 10 years

3:48

ago on the Middle East, and we

3:50

were able to kind of

3:52

think that the Arctic is taking

3:54

care of because of this buffer, but

3:56

with the changing physical environment also

3:59

coupled with some of the changing technologies

4:01

of our competitors or adversaries and

4:03

their ability to actually reach the homeland

4:05

and reach our interests, we've had

4:07

to kind of recalibrate how we're thinking

4:09

about our interests in the region. There

4:12

are real sincere homeland security interests

4:14

for the Arctic, for the U .S.

4:17

perspective. We have a lot of our

4:19

strategic missile warning and missile defense,

4:21

which are becoming increasingly complicated due to

4:23

some of this technology innovation from

4:25

partners, whether it be hypersonics or cruise

4:27

missiles. We have pretty

4:29

robust air bases in

4:31

particular up in Alaska. We've

4:34

got a lot of space situational

4:36

awareness assets, including in Pitific and

4:38

Greenland, where you just saw Vice

4:40

President Vance going to visit. So

4:43

there's been a fundamental shift to

4:45

think in the US thinking about how

4:47

do we protect those interests? How

4:49

do we ensure that we're securing our

4:51

own territory while also trying to

4:53

keep the region stable and secure? The

4:56

sense that Arctic exceptionalism is

4:58

over, I think, is pretty pervasive

5:00

throughout many of our Arctic

5:03

partners as well, and thinking that

5:05

we can no longer just

5:07

think about this as an environmental

5:09

problem only. It needs to

5:11

be a security problem as well.

5:13

You mentioned that climate change

5:15

is leading to greater accessibility to

5:17

the Arctic. What

5:19

do we think is the

5:21

timeline for ships being able

5:23

to traverse the Arctic? Is

5:27

the US planning for that? Is

5:29

it thinking about what we

5:31

need in order to confront that

5:33

future? Yeah, I mean, I

5:35

think it's really important that... folks

5:37

understand that there are various different routes

5:39

across the Arctic. And it's like

5:42

diving a little bit into the details

5:44

here. But there are three primary

5:46

shipping routes that are often talked about.

5:48

The first is the Northern Sea

5:50

Route around Russia, which is the most

5:52

heavily trafficked. It's open, kind of

5:54

relatively ice free between June and September

5:56

timeframe. Then there's

5:58

the Northwest Passage Canada,

6:00

which has much more ice

6:02

to it, also has some 36

6:05

1000 islands to navigate. It's

6:07

a little bit more of a

6:09

complex route. And then there's

6:11

a transpolar route, which is really the game -changing

6:13

route, which goes across the North Pole. The

6:16

scientific estimates are anywhere between

6:18

the next 20 years to even

6:20

as early as 2040 that

6:22

that could be ice -free. But

6:24

that's why you see increasing levels

6:27

of interest. from shipping companies,

6:29

but also from our competitors in

6:31

particular, China and Russia,

6:33

and really trying to invest heavily

6:35

in some of their ice -capable

6:37

hardened ships. Does the U .S.

6:39

need to be investing in

6:42

more icebreakers and in more capacity

6:44

for navigating and protecting interests

6:46

in that region? Absolutely. But

6:48

I will say that our environment

6:50

in and around the Arctic is very

6:52

different depending on where you sit. And

6:55

so, like I said, Russia has been able

6:57

to navigate the northern sea route for quite

6:59

some time, not only because they have icebreakers,

7:01

but also because it's a little bit warmer,

7:03

especially on the western side, because of the

7:05

Gulf Stream. And there's

7:07

some speculation that as

7:10

these areas that were

7:12

formerly under permafrost unfreeze,

7:14

There may be some

7:16

attempts at securing areas

7:18

for resource extraction. Is

7:21

that something that's in the far

7:23

future, in the near future, and

7:25

are we the United States taking

7:27

that into account in our own

7:29

planning? Yeah, I think it's now

7:31

in many ways. opportunity

7:34

in the resource space is

7:36

kind of unfolding in front of

7:38

our eyes. Certainly, you

7:40

know, Russia has significant

7:42

investment in extracting of resources.

7:46

Some 20 % of their GDP

7:48

comes from the Arctic and the

7:50

vast majority of that is

7:52

from resource extraction, including around the

7:54

Ual Peninsula, but also increasingly

7:56

on the eastern side of Russia

7:58

as well as around mining

8:00

interests. There are a lot of

8:02

interests that we potentially have as the

8:04

United States and in and around Alaska,

8:06

and also in concert with some of

8:08

our allies and partners in looking at

8:10

our resourcing. But one of the challenges

8:12

that we have is that it's not

8:14

necessarily been explored or mapped as effectively

8:16

as it would need to. And it's

8:18

also really expensive to do some of

8:20

this extraction and do so in a

8:22

way that's environmentally sound. And

8:24

so there's a lot of, I think,

8:26

upfront investment that we need to

8:28

be making in terms of mapping and

8:30

thinking about the infrastructure required, you

8:33

would need to actually pull these resources

8:35

out of the ground and make use of

8:37

them. I think everyone agrees that there's

8:39

a lot of potential there, but it's how

8:41

you go about doing it and how

8:43

you can effectively map opportunity. That's

8:45

the first order of business. As

8:48

deputy assistant

8:51

secretary at DOD,

8:53

You were focused on Arctic issues. What

8:56

were some of the things that you

8:58

were working on? Was it mostly focused

9:00

on Alaska and the role that it

9:02

plays? How

9:04

does the Pentagon think about the

9:06

Arctic back when you were there

9:08

and going forward? Yeah. Well, I

9:10

think it's evolving. I talked a

9:12

little bit about how the region

9:14

is kind of gaining and strategic

9:16

importance in some of the calculus

9:18

that's going into play in terms

9:20

of security interests. But

9:22

before my office existed, I had

9:24

the privilege of being the first Deputy

9:26

Assistant Secretary of Defense for the

9:29

Arctic and Global Resilience. And

9:31

there really wasn't an integrator within

9:33

the department, like looking at all

9:35

of the various interests that the

9:37

department has. And that includes with

9:39

the combatant commands, and the

9:41

services, and with our allies and partners.

9:44

the combatant commands is actually, it's quite tricky

9:46

because of the overlapping interests of the

9:48

combatant commands that all could have meet at

9:50

the top of the world. You have

9:52

North Com, which thinks about homeland defense issues.

9:55

You have U -Com, which is traditionally thinking

9:57

about the European theater, of course, and

9:59

then you have Indo -Paycom, which owns and

10:01

operates many of the assets that we rely

10:03

upon in the Arctic, but are often

10:05

thinking further south. And so trying

10:07

to create a collective interest amongst

10:09

the combatant commands was a heavy emphasis

10:12

that we had. We also put out a new

10:14

DOD, Arctic Strategy, which really

10:16

talked about the changing strategic environment that

10:18

was taking place for the department

10:21

and tried to outline some of the

10:23

potential investment priorities. And then

10:25

we also worked really closely with our

10:27

allies and partners because it's incredibly challenging

10:29

to operate in that region alone. And

10:31

really, we all have a lot of vested

10:33

interests together. When I

10:35

always started that job, we didn't have

10:37

a forum for talking about security

10:39

interests at all. In

10:42

fact, the Arctic Council, which is

10:44

excess primarily for safety and for

10:46

scientific activity, doesn't allow for the

10:48

conversation on security interests. And so

10:50

we created a new forum called

10:52

the Arctic Security Policy Roundtable where

10:54

I could talk to my counterparts

10:56

in the various Arctic Allied nations

10:58

about security interests for the first

11:00

time. Happy to say that that

11:02

forum is still continuing. But

11:04

just to show kind of the

11:06

broad swath of efforts that we undertook

11:08

that were really kind of the

11:10

first ever of its kind. I

11:13

think we laid the foundation pretty

11:15

well for the ongoing years. In

11:18

terms of investment that needs

11:20

to be made to prepare for

11:22

the coming changes in the

11:24

Arctic, what did the

11:26

Biden administration do in terms

11:28

of ice breakers or other

11:30

types of capabilities? What

11:33

do you think we need to

11:35

do to be ready for the challenges

11:37

that we're going to face going

11:39

forward? Yeah, well, I

11:41

think that one of the challenges

11:44

of the Arctic region, and I

11:46

think this transcends administrations, is its

11:48

relative prioritization in the resourcing matrix.

11:50

I think it's really easy to

11:52

talk about. resourcing, but

11:55

very hard sometimes to execute,

11:57

especially when you're faced with

11:59

a lot of competing priorities

12:01

and real -time conflicts that

12:03

emerged inevitably across any administration. But

12:06

one of the things that we

12:08

laid out in our Department of Defense

12:10

strategy and also in the White

12:12

House also put out a national strategy

12:14

for the Arctic region, where security

12:16

was the first parameter and the first

12:18

topic, which is again a signal

12:20

to the importance that the administration was

12:22

thinking about. the issue. We

12:24

really focused in the

12:26

DOD strategy on domain awareness in particular, and

12:28

I know that that's a little bit of

12:31

a wonky term, but it's basically, can you

12:33

see threats? Can you identify threats that are

12:35

coming? Do you have

12:37

the right command and control for

12:39

assets and communications architectures? Do

12:41

you have the right weather forecasting

12:43

to be able to do

12:45

not only current operations, but future

12:47

operations? And so we made

12:49

some pretty select investments in some

12:51

of our seeing infrastructure and

12:53

in addition to our communications infrastructure.

12:56

I think we've created the glide path

12:58

for us to do more and

13:00

I'm actually encouraged by a lot of

13:02

the conversation today around the homeland

13:04

defense architecture and thinking about different sensor

13:06

technologies to include not only ground

13:09

base layer and over with their Heismarie

13:11

radar, but also space base layers

13:13

too that can see and detect some

13:15

of the more advanced missiles that

13:17

needs to be kind of an all

13:19

-encompassing approach. In terms of

13:21

the physical, actual like platform assets,

13:24

There was a lot of work

13:26

to make sure that we had

13:28

the right power projection. capacity

13:30

within Alaska, including the

13:32

final bed down of

13:34

the F -35s in

13:36

Alaska. And there was

13:39

initial conversations around how we can

13:41

kickstart our icebreaker fleet. I think

13:43

it's very well known that the

13:45

U .S. has been languishing in terms

13:47

of building icebreakers for quite some

13:49

time. And that's probably symptomatic of

13:51

a larger issue around shipbuilding. But

13:54

one of the things that Biden

13:56

administration did was create something called

13:58

the ice pact, which was a

14:00

unique collaborative effort between the US,

14:02

Canada, and Finland to start to

14:04

share best practices and technologies in

14:07

labor around building icebreakers so that

14:09

we can actually start building them

14:11

and putting them in the water

14:13

in the sooner than later time

14:15

frame. You've mentioned Alaska

14:17

a few times, and Alaska obviously makes

14:19

the United States an Arctic power. And

14:22

it's also home to, as

14:24

you mentioned, our power projection

14:26

and we have missiles there. What do

14:28

you see is the role of

14:30

Alaska going forward? Will there be deeper

14:32

investment in Alaska? Is

14:34

the Pentagon thinking long term

14:37

about how Alaska plays into

14:39

our Arctic strategy? Yeah,

14:41

absolutely. I think Alaska

14:43

is... one of the cornerstone

14:45

of our national security.

14:47

And I think it's undersung,

14:49

certainly the Alaska delegation

14:51

talks about it frequently, but

14:53

I think it's undersung

14:55

in DC. There is

14:57

so much at play in Alaska.

15:00

There was a famous quote from an

15:02

airman called Billy Mitchell that said,

15:04

Alaska is the center of the world

15:06

for national security for all intents

15:08

and purposes. And I think that's apt.

15:11

Where it sits strategically, if you just look at a

15:13

map, you can see how important and it is from

15:15

the top down. The flight

15:17

times to Europe, the flight times

15:20

even to the Indo -Pacific are closer

15:22

than you see. then from

15:24

the west coast. And I don't think

15:26

that most Americans think about it

15:28

that way because we're used to seeing

15:30

a map that goes from east

15:32

to west instead of thinking of it

15:35

as a globe in a sense.

15:37

And so I do think that there's

15:39

real opportunity for further investment in

15:41

Alaska for investment, not only in the

15:43

military infrastructure, but also potentially in

15:45

infrastructure that's dual use. There's long been

15:48

discussion of trying to... deep water

15:50

port at Nome that there's in the

15:52

process of building because there is

15:54

no deep water port along the kind

15:56

of northern, central northern

15:58

part of Alaska, which you're seeing

16:00

increased activity and along that

16:02

Bering Strait. We should be thinking

16:04

about infrastructure that has dual

16:07

use purposes for both civil. civilian

16:09

use but also potentially military

16:11

should the need arise. You also

16:13

heard in recent posture testimony

16:15

about the opportunity to open old

16:18

Cold War -era bases that were

16:20

previously closed and along the

16:22

Aleutian Islands just for the ability

16:24

for us to have increased

16:26

opportunity for naval access. We

16:28

have one base that's open right

16:30

now along the Aleutian Islands called Shimi

16:32

at the very, very, very end.

16:34

And it's a really critical location for

16:36

us, but it's also a vulnerability

16:38

because how it's used as a divert

16:40

location too, just even when you're

16:42

flying across, just having a place to

16:44

land in the event of emergencies,

16:46

having more options like that would be

16:48

very useful to us militarily. And

16:50

I think Alaska provides a lot of

16:53

really important opportunity. Let's

16:55

move on to some of the other

16:57

Arctic powers and how they're approaching

16:59

the Arctic, starting most obviously with Russia.

17:02

Our neighbor in

17:05

Alaska has a

17:07

significant amount of its land

17:09

mass is in the Arctic. From

17:12

your vantage point, what are the

17:14

key strategic objectives behind Russia's actions

17:16

in the Arctic? Yeah, you know,

17:18

so the Arctic makes up a

17:20

significant amount of their GDP, I

17:22

think, you know, 20 to almost a

17:24

quarter of it. And I think that they

17:26

largely think about the Arctic region as

17:28

in terms of both a treasure trust and

17:31

also a fortress. They've

17:33

been recently refurbishing cold

17:35

war -era bases. They've

17:38

been making significant investments in and

17:40

along the northern sea route to

17:42

really invest in that northern sea

17:44

route and try to capitalize on

17:46

the opportunity that exists. Militarily,

17:49

I think there was an assumption that

17:51

the war in Ukraine would have put

17:53

a dent in some of their Arctic

17:55

activity. And I think it's slowed some

17:57

of it, but despite the heavy attrition

17:59

that we've seen, they still

18:01

have many of their strategic assets in

18:03

place, certainly in and around the Kola

18:05

peninsula. They're also very interested in projecting

18:07

their second strike capabilities, of course, that

18:10

are there. They're really

18:12

wanting to make sure that the economic

18:14

development that they invest in is also

18:16

secure. of the military

18:18

infrastructure you see them investing in

18:20

is about anti -access and area

18:22

denial. And they also want to make sure

18:24

that if there's a conflict with NATO, that

18:26

they're able to still operate. So

18:28

they're always kind of looking for

18:31

opportunity, I think, to bolster their

18:33

positioning in the region. And they

18:35

really want to be seen as

18:37

the preeminent Arctic power. One

18:39

other thing that they've been, I

18:41

think, investing in, you think often people

18:44

think about the... interest in the

18:46

Western sphere, but we've seen increasing amounts

18:48

of investments in the eastern side

18:50

of the Arctic, including in their most

18:52

eastern province, Chukotka, which is, I

18:54

think, new -ish. Just

18:56

several years ago, they built the world's

18:59

first floating nuclear plant, which is

19:01

a feat, of course, in engineering, but

19:03

it was stationed outside of a

19:05

town of 4 ,000, but yet has

19:07

the capacity to serve 100 ,000. That's

19:10

quite... signaling in terms of

19:12

what their ambitions for developing the

19:14

region and especially developing the

19:16

region that's closer to Alaska. In

19:19

terms of the US response,

19:22

what do you think are the

19:24

most effective strategies to counter Russia's

19:26

expanding influence in the Arctic without

19:28

escalating tensions with them? Yeah,

19:30

I think, you know, trying

19:32

to not escalate is, I

19:34

think, really important. It's always

19:37

a tricky balance, but deterrence

19:39

matters, and I think being

19:41

present matters. Some of

19:43

the ways that we have done

19:45

that over time, you know, they

19:47

often do bomber runs, often around

19:49

the coast of Alaska, and often

19:51

probing the air defense zone off

19:53

of Alaska, we meet them. And

19:55

NORAD fighters meet those bombers to

19:57

ensure that they know we're there,

19:59

that we can see them, that

20:02

we don't allow and we aren't

20:04

accepting of incursions into our sovereignty.

20:06

I think continuing to be able

20:08

to do that is really critical,

20:10

showing that kind of where

20:13

our lines are for

20:15

security and increasingly showing up

20:17

to show what that

20:19

means. And that includes where

20:21

we see lines and

20:23

challenges. of them cooperating with

20:25

the Chinese. And

20:28

that's what we've seen

20:30

over the last summer, where

20:32

we saw increasing alignment militarily

20:34

between the Russians and the

20:36

Chinese off the coast

20:38

of Alaska, like unprecedented and

20:40

unlike anywhere else in the

20:42

world, where we have seen

20:44

naval operations, also bomber

20:46

campaigns together, also Coast Guard

20:49

operations together. That's significant

20:51

signaling and that's what causes

20:53

certainly the Pentagon to pay

20:55

attention, but also making

20:57

sure that we're able to

20:59

be responsive to those activities

21:01

and know that they're coming

21:03

will be increasingly important for

21:06

the foreseeable future. We're going

21:08

to take a quick break and we'll be right back

21:10

with more of our discussion with Iris Ferguson. Beacon

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clients tackle their toughest challenges. Let's

21:52

move on to China

21:54

and how it approaches the

21:56

Arctic. It's positioning itself

21:58

as a, quote, near Arctic

22:00

state, and it's actively pursuing

22:02

its interests in the region. How

22:04

do you view China's strategic objectives in the

22:06

Arctic? Yeah, you

22:08

know, China has long

22:11

been interested in Being

22:13

a part of the governance of

22:15

the Arctic region, they've been an

22:17

observer to the Arctic Council for

22:19

quite some time. They see the

22:21

clear economic potential that exists within

22:23

the region and the reduction of

22:25

shipping time should the trans -polar

22:27

route in particular open. back up. They

22:30

also see the geographic opportunities

22:32

that exist, and if they

22:34

were able to get a

22:36

position in a holding in

22:38

some of the Arctic nations,

22:40

so that would help their

22:42

broad projection capabilities. They've tried

22:44

to acquire several old bases

22:46

that we had in Greenland,

22:48

in addition to making forays

22:50

into other Arctic nations, including

22:52

as recently as Norway, near

22:54

Kierkenes, trying to access some

22:56

of the deep water ports.

22:58

They're often going into what

23:00

are arguably less economically sound

23:02

communities and trying to make

23:04

overtures so that they can

23:06

gain a positioning there. They

23:09

also are really interested in scientific

23:11

diplomacy, which also could have dual use

23:13

implications of some of the work,

23:15

the research that we were seeing them

23:18

do around oceanographic and bathymetric data

23:20

could certainly be used for submarines. Of

23:22

course, there are interesting ground stations

23:24

for satellites could also be used for

23:26

military purposes. So, you know,

23:28

I think for the Pentagon really kind of

23:30

having an eyes wide open up thinking about

23:33

what their motivations are and where they're really.

23:37

seeing potential opportunity for themselves and us

23:39

being able to work with allies

23:41

and partners and having them have a

23:43

more transparent look at what their

23:45

real intentions are. But also us, again,

23:47

being able to show up where

23:49

we have our own red lines. And

23:51

I would say our own red

23:53

lines are certainly where they're operating militarily

23:55

in and around our coastline. Some

23:57

argue that China's presence in the Arctic

23:59

is part of a broader strategy

24:01

to exert influence over global trade. How

24:03

does this dynamic impact US national

24:05

security interests in the region? Yeah, I

24:07

would agree with that, that I

24:10

think that they see opportunity in the

24:12

geography and how, like I said,

24:14

that it would decrease shipping time significantly

24:16

from going around Africa or going

24:18

through the Suez Canal should those routes

24:20

open up. If that

24:22

comes to pass and there's

24:24

increasing levels of commercial activity

24:26

in and around the Arctic,

24:28

ocean, then it becomes an

24:31

equally important role for our

24:33

Navy to be playing in

24:35

protecting sea lines of navigation,

24:37

just like we do in

24:39

the Indo -Pacific and throughout the

24:41

rest of the world. our

24:44

ability to be able to show up

24:46

and protect the rules -based order, protect

24:48

sea lines and navigation is going to

24:50

be increasingly important as that ocean opens

24:53

up. I think we have a little

24:55

bit of time to prepare, but we

24:57

need to be making some of these

24:59

investments and strategic decisions now instead of

25:01

when it's too late. Let's move

25:03

on to Canada, our neighbor

25:05

to the north, which is long

25:07

-held territorial claims in the Arctic.

25:09

Does Canada face challenges, asserting

25:11

their sovereignty in the region? And

25:14

how does that impact U .S.-Canada relations? Yeah,

25:16

you know, Canada has been a really

25:18

close partner in our, you know, one

25:20

of the United States' closest allies for

25:23

a long time. The role that they

25:25

play in NORAD, in particular, in

25:27

our Homeland Defense architecture, and

25:29

the way that we work together, hand

25:31

and glove, and thinking about air defense

25:33

in particular and threats that could come

25:35

over the pole and into the U .S.

25:37

homeland cannot be understated. So I want

25:39

to really champion the role that NORAD

25:42

has played in protecting not only Canadian

25:44

interests but also U .S. interests and

25:46

that I think that it will continue

25:48

to play. One of the

25:50

challenges that Canada has is that only

25:52

less than 1 % of their population

25:54

lives in the Arctic. Yet it

25:56

houses the largest coastline in the Arctic,

25:58

of any Arctic state. They

26:01

have the North West Passage, which

26:03

has immense opportunity, but it's very

26:05

challenging to navigate with the 36

26:07

,000 islands and that being relatively

26:09

ice -locked. They, I think, have a

26:11

lot of potential to develop

26:13

parts of their Arctic region that

26:15

have both benefits for the local

26:17

community, but also for defense interests.

26:20

When doing so, hand

26:22

and glove will be critical

26:24

to their success. There's

26:26

a unique political moment I feel like

26:28

Canada has to be able to make

26:30

those investments now. I think anyone that's

26:32

watched Canadian politics and knows about their

26:34

role in NATO recognizes that they've been

26:36

underinvesting in some of their security interests,

26:39

not only for themselves, but also for

26:41

the interests of NATO. I

26:43

do there's a unique moment in

26:45

time where there is broad domestic

26:47

political. I think approval for

26:49

investment in the Arctic region,

26:51

which could also bolster their own

26:53

security interests and also bolster

26:55

collectively are the US interests if

26:57

they were able to follow

26:59

through with them. The recent announcement

27:02

that Canada made with the

27:04

Australians in purchasing their over -the -horizon

27:06

radar is a really interesting

27:08

example of how they're trying to

27:10

become first movers themselves in

27:12

investing in their own security, and

27:14

that would have broader downstream.

27:16

effects, I think, for the US

27:18

and also for NATO. You've

27:20

talked about the cooperation between the

27:22

US and Canada. NORAD

27:24

is a joint venture between

27:26

the two countries. Is

27:29

there anything that the US can learn

27:31

from Canada's approach to Arctic security and cooperation?

27:34

Yeah, well, I think that Canada

27:36

has kind of put themselves

27:38

in a position of like forced

27:40

collaboration in some ways where

27:43

they work really hand in glove

27:45

with many partners to get

27:47

the assets that they need, whether

27:49

it be acquiring new submarines

27:51

or thinking about different styles of

27:53

platforms or looking at the

27:55

new missile defense architecture, for example.

27:58

I think sometimes dependency

28:00

can be a

28:03

helpful and

28:05

a helpful signal towards

28:07

further cooperation. And I

28:09

think looking at how They've

28:13

approached broad partnership in that

28:15

it's a necessity in some ways,

28:18

could be helpful for the

28:20

United States because in the Arctic

28:22

in particular, you really cannot

28:24

go it alone. Even

28:26

if we wanted to do

28:28

everything ourselves, what it

28:30

just is so cost prohibitive

28:32

and challenging. It's also a

28:34

really tricky environment to navigate.

28:36

You really want to be

28:38

depending upon individual. like

28:40

silos of excellence in building a

28:43

broader collaborative picture in order to

28:45

have the greatest security at large

28:47

for not only for us, but

28:49

also for our allies and partners.

28:51

And that, of course, creates a

28:53

deterrent effect to our adversaries when

28:55

we're all working with one another.

28:58

So I think to the extent

29:00

that we're taking notes from Canada,

29:02

it could be in how they

29:04

think about cooperation at large and

29:06

the unique attributes that can come

29:08

from broad collaboration. You made

29:11

a really important point, which

29:13

is the Arctic is so

29:15

vast and the resources required

29:17

are so large that it's

29:19

impossible for the US to

29:21

do it alone. We

29:23

need to work with partners

29:25

and allies in order to pursue

29:27

our Arctic interests. Can

29:29

you run through which partners and allies

29:32

you think it's important for us

29:34

to work with? you know,

29:36

Finland and Norway come to mind, but

29:38

are there others who you think

29:40

it's important for the US to be

29:42

coordinating with in order to get

29:44

the maximum impact from its Arctic policy?

29:46

Absolutely. I mean, first and foremost,

29:48

it's the Arctic allies, right?

29:51

So that's Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden,

29:54

Denmark, and then Iceland, and

29:56

working collaboratively with

29:59

them in advancing

30:01

our interest heads again back to why

30:03

we built this Arctic Security Policy Roundtable

30:05

was to bring these countries together so

30:07

we could have a common understanding of

30:09

the threat picture, which is different in

30:11

our various regions, but also has, it's

30:13

important for us to have eyes wide

30:15

open understanding of what each of us

30:18

are seeing in our own backyard and

30:20

how we are, maybe we can make

30:22

investments together. Maybe we can find cold

30:24

weather equipment that could, that

30:26

we could all go in on together.

30:28

Or is there a unique opportunity for us

30:30

to all save money by investing in

30:32

the same missile defense apparatus or communications architecture.

30:35

I think there's a lot of

30:37

opportunity that exists within this alignment

30:39

of the Arctic allies, which are

30:41

not only geopolitically aligned, as we

30:44

understand and know, but they also

30:46

have money. And they also

30:48

have very strong militaries for the

30:50

most part. And so where we're

30:52

able to leverage one another's capabilities, a

30:55

no -brainer from my perspective. And

30:57

it follows, I think, as well,

30:59

what the recent Secretary of Defense

31:01

Hegseth has said around empowering allies.

31:03

Where we can empower allies that

31:05

helped us as well should be

31:07

something that we should explore. So

31:10

in addition to the Arctic

31:12

allies, the UK I think is

31:14

a really important player. They

31:16

have unique special forces arrangements with

31:18

the US and Norway and

31:20

have long been very active in

31:22

high north security conversations. France

31:25

plays a really interesting role in

31:27

addition to Germany. And

31:29

the Netherlands also has been an

31:31

interesting player and one that's been wanting

31:33

to invest more in Arctic security

31:36

efforts as well. And of course, we

31:38

haven't really talked about NATO, but

31:40

NATO itself is another

31:42

really critical player in how

31:44

Arctic security and Arctic

31:46

policy is being shaped prior

31:48

to Finland and Sweden. joining

31:52

NATO. I think

31:54

that the Arctic kind of sort of registered

31:56

at NATO, but I don't think it

31:58

really fully registered as an opportunity. Now

32:01

that the aperture has opened

32:03

for NATO, I do think

32:05

there's real possibility

32:07

for capability development in and

32:10

amongst our NATO partners. So

32:12

the opportunity within NATO is

32:14

really profound as they look

32:16

to create new regional plans

32:18

and think about the broad

32:20

investment possible as nations are

32:22

investing in the Arctic. Can

32:24

that also go towards their

32:27

contributions? I think we'll see how that

32:29

plays out over the next couple of years. pretty

32:31

strong game -changing scenario to have

32:33

Finland and Sweden joining and

32:36

having the alliance as a whole

32:38

be looking at security interests

32:40

in the Arctic that also of

32:42

course protects the alliance. Yeah,

32:44

it's an important point that you

32:46

make, which is Finland and

32:48

Sweden are recent additions to NATO.

32:51

They have their Arctic

32:53

powers themselves, and it

32:55

offers an opportunity for coordination

32:58

and planning. that didn't exist

33:00

before they were members, and hopefully

33:02

NATO will take advantage of that. Are

33:04

you seeing any evidence that that started,

33:06

or is it something that you think

33:08

is an opportunity that they should look

33:10

to seize? Yeah, I am seeing evidence

33:12

that it's starting. And I think that

33:14

you can see it by the rhetoric

33:17

coming out of the international staff at

33:19

NATO. You can also see

33:21

it in venues like the Munich Security

33:23

Conference, where you have NATO officials

33:25

talking about the Arctic in a way

33:27

that's more profound and specific than

33:29

in the past. And again, I think

33:31

it's based off of, it's like

33:33

any bureaucracy, right? Everybody wants to do

33:35

the strategy than the plan. Somebody

33:37

wants to get ahead of the planning.

33:40

But as plans are inevitably including

33:42

different parts of territory, then inevitably

33:44

you're going to have to resource

33:46

and build capabilities to protect that

33:48

territory. So I think it's a

33:50

natural progression, of course. But I

33:53

do see there to be an

33:55

uptick of interest in and around

33:57

NATO and actually diving into some

33:59

of these really important details that

34:01

can actually get to the capabilities

34:03

needed. One other thing

34:05

I should say in terms of the

34:07

allies and partners and the opportunity

34:09

with other allies and partners is that,

34:11

you know, we really have been

34:13

focusing a little bit on the European

34:15

side of the Arctic. But if

34:17

you look at the Indo -Pacific side

34:19

of the Arctic, which that's really where

34:21

U .S. interests are heavy with and

34:24

around Alaska, I think there's an

34:26

opportunity for us to think more creatively

34:28

around our Indo -Pacific alliances and protecting

34:30

our interests in and around the

34:32

Arctic. One of the things that in

34:34

the Pentagon, you know, we've had

34:36

some wake -up calls around the activity

34:39

between Russia and China militarily across

34:41

the coast of Alaska and having to

34:43

pull assets all the way up

34:45

from Hawaii to respond. It's doable, but

34:47

it's a challenge. Can we be

34:49

looking at some of our partners like

34:52

South Korea or Japan to also

34:54

exert some influence in and around the

34:56

region that also benefits us as

34:58

a whole and starting to think a

35:00

little bit more about the unique

35:02

side of the Indo -Pacific side of

35:04

the Arctic, not just the European

35:06

side of the Arctic? Well, we

35:09

would be negligent if we had

35:11

an Arctic discussion, didn't discuss Greenland.

35:14

And while we don't want to delve into

35:16

the political points regarding Greenland, can

35:18

you explain why Greenland has become a

35:20

critical focal point for U .S. national

35:22

security, particularly in terms of its geographical

35:24

position and resources? Yeah. Greenland

35:26

is obviously super fascinating in

35:28

general. It

35:31

asks about Greenland. I always really encourage folks to

35:33

go visit. It's really close. It's closer for folks

35:35

on the East Coast to get to Greenland than

35:37

it is to get to California. So,

35:40

jump on a plane, nonstop

35:42

flights out of Newark right now

35:44

or over the course of

35:46

the summer. into

35:48

Newt Greenland, and you can actually go

35:50

see the island for yourself. Greenland,

35:52

by geography, if you look at a

35:54

map, it's actually part of the North

35:56

American continent. And so just inherently, geographically,

35:59

it's really important

36:01

for the United States.

36:03

We have an important space

36:06

base called Pitific and the

36:08

northwest corner of Greenland. It

36:10

performs really important missile defense. for

36:13

us in the same way that a

36:15

site in clear Alaska, kind of if

36:17

clear is the 10 o 'clock, then

36:19

PEDEFIC would be the 2 o 'clock performing

36:21

a missile defense warning in addition to

36:23

space situational awareness for the United States.

36:27

positioning of that base is really

36:29

critical. We also

36:31

have a really unique relationship

36:33

with the Greenlanders, which I

36:35

think is really important to

36:37

underscore. We showed up in

36:39

Greenland sort of unannounced in

36:41

the 1950s to build several

36:43

bases without a lot of

36:45

forewarning or agreement. And

36:47

we've been since then kind

36:50

of building on the trust

36:52

deficit that exists for us.

36:54

And I think we were

36:56

in a pretty good spot

36:58

where we left in the

37:00

Biden administration and really, I

37:02

would say, allowing

37:04

us to have our

37:07

security interests protected and an open

37:09

door for us to have more military

37:11

and security interests in the island

37:13

should we want it and need it.

37:15

And so I think it's really

37:17

important that as we think about Greenland,

37:19

we not only think about the

37:21

importance that it has, but also that

37:23

we are on an island based

37:25

off of a defense treaty that exists

37:28

between us and Denmark, but also

37:30

sort of at the will of the

37:32

Greenland population as well and just

37:34

understanding that our

37:36

security interests are also their

37:38

security interests and vice versa.

37:41

So having a bit of a

37:43

symbiotic relationship and I think

37:46

the Greenlandic people in particular, they're

37:48

really interested in economic investment.

37:50

They're interested in security, of course,

37:52

themselves and making sure that

37:54

their own livelihoods are protected and

37:57

that they have, they have

37:59

promise for the future as well.

38:01

But they also don't necessarily

38:03

want to be dictated to. So

38:06

just having that, I think that

38:08

in mind will be really critical for

38:10

U .S. security as well. Well, as

38:12

we wrap up, for those who

38:14

want to follow Arctic issues in particular

38:16

the U .S. government, obviously the Pentagon

38:18

is a key player. What

38:20

are the other stakeholders in the

38:23

U .S. government that you think

38:25

are worth monitoring in regards to

38:27

Arctic policy? Oh, Andrew, this is

38:29

a great question. I actually may

38:31

very shortly write an op -ed about

38:33

one of the challenges to Arctic

38:35

policy is personnel and that it

38:37

is kind of an evolve. It's

38:39

always someone's one -tenth of one

38:41

person's job. And so if that, and

38:44

so trying to create positions that

38:46

are very clear, that have this job

38:48

to integrate across their various departments

38:50

or across the whole of government, I

38:52

think is really critical to US

38:54

success. Some of the positions that exist

38:56

now are largely in the Department,

38:58

of course, the U .S. Ambassador position

39:00

for the Arctic region that was created

39:02

in the Biden administration. Seeing

39:04

who gets nominated for that position will

39:06

be critical. The senior

39:09

Arctic official office that exists

39:11

that handles the Arctic Council

39:13

affairs, that person in

39:15

that office is really critical. How

39:17

Coast Guard starts or continues to

39:19

think about the opportunity with icebreakers

39:22

and their role in the Arctic

39:24

region and who is kind of

39:26

the central player for that will

39:28

be really critical in addition to

39:30

DHS in general and thinking about

39:32

borders and how do we have

39:34

the right security for the borders

39:36

in and around Alaska to protect

39:38

our own interests. We'll

39:40

also be important to watch Department of

39:42

Transportation, of course, too, as you

39:45

think about shipping lanes and routes. And

39:47

then the NSC is the other

39:49

big... here where, you know, one of

39:51

the things that I think has

39:53

been challenging for the Arctic is not

39:55

necessarily having a central person at

39:57

the NSC. A lot of

39:59

this, the Arctic conversations have resided

40:01

in OSTP, which is the Office of

40:04

Science and Technology Policy. And it's

40:06

really important, right? But it's different, has

40:08

a different flavor when you start

40:10

to think about national security and having

40:12

someone in the national. Security Council

40:14

whose job is to think about Arctic

40:16

security would send a really strong

40:18

signal to the whole of government approach

40:20

that the US is actually taking

40:22

security interests seriously. So that's my

40:24

plug to this current administration to hopefully get

40:27

that position across the line. All right. Last

40:29

question, which is a little bit of a

40:31

curveball. We talked about the Arctic, but

40:33

was there any focus in

40:35

your job in the Antarctic

40:37

and are there security issues?

40:40

that are raised there. Mostly it's

40:42

for research. We have a

40:44

research facility down there, which we

40:46

fly people in and out

40:48

using US military assets. But

40:51

is there any thought being given at

40:53

the Pentagon and elsewhere in the US

40:55

government about security issues related to the

40:57

Antarctic? Absolutely. We

41:00

by proxy sort of did

41:02

Antarctica issues in my office.

41:05

I think that there's opportunity for

41:07

the renaming of our office at

41:09

some point because it suffers from

41:11

the same challenges, right, of having

41:13

many different overlapping seams. And

41:16

you need a kind of

41:18

an integrated approach to thinking

41:20

about an area that has

41:22

overlapping requirements being thrown at

41:24

it, in addition to how

41:26

we think about presence and

41:28

what security interests really are.

41:30

In Antarctica, it's

41:33

governed by treaty, and

41:35

there is no military

41:37

presence allowed, save for

41:39

transport of scientific efforts

41:42

and for, of course,

41:45

life and safety. You

41:48

know, as we think about what

41:50

our security interests are as United

41:53

States, ensuring that we still have

41:55

the ability to have scientific diplomacy

41:57

there, that we are still investing

41:59

in our infrastructure at McMurdo and

42:01

elsewhere in Antarctica, that we can

42:03

continue to show up. We have

42:06

the only ski -equipped aircraft, the

42:08

LC -130s, that can fly into Antarctica

42:10

in addition to Greenland. And so

42:12

continue to invest in those kind

42:14

of capabilities, has applicability for both

42:16

poles and this ways that ice

42:19

breaking capacity has applicability for both

42:21

the Arctic and for Antarctica. And

42:23

the same way that polar assets

42:25

have to be invested in with

42:27

specific intention, because many of

42:29

the geospatial satellites that go around

42:31

don't hit the poles. So we need

42:33

to be thinking about if we need

42:36

communications architectures in the north, we also

42:38

need them in the south and having

42:40

to think about those unique investments. So,

42:43

we did think about it

42:45

quite a bit, Andrew. And if

42:47

we'd had more time, we

42:49

may have gotten around to renaming

42:51

the office, but didn't quite

42:53

make it. Well, thank

42:55

you, Iris, for this fascinating discussion

42:57

about Arctic security. We very much

42:59

appreciate it. And it's an area

43:01

that's very much worth watching going

43:03

forward. Thank you again. Yeah. Thank

43:05

you. That

43:09

was Iris Ferguson. I'm

43:11

Andrew Shapiro. Please join us next

43:13

week for another episode of NatSec

43:15

Matters. NatSec

43:26

Matters is produced by Steve

43:28

Dorsey with assistance from Ashley Berry.

43:30

NatSec Matters is a production

43:32

of Beacon Global Strategies.