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everyone, welcome to the March 2025
1:01
Ask Me Anything edition of the
1:03
Mindscape podcast. I'm your host Sean
1:05
Carroll. Before diving in to the
1:07
AMAs, I want to mention two
1:09
announcement kind of things, not really
1:11
announcements, two things, one announcement and
1:13
one reflection, if you want to put
1:15
it that way. The announcement is,
1:17
we have winners for this year's
1:19
Mindscape Big Picture Scholarship. I hope I've
1:22
been flogging this enough, probably I
1:24
haven't, but this has been going
1:26
on for a few years now.
1:28
It's at bold.org, so it's going
1:30
to keep going on. It's
1:32
not ended, so you can
1:34
still contribute. We solicit donations
1:36
from mindscape listeners to help
1:38
undergraduate university students achieve their
1:40
dreams of studying big picture
1:42
ideas down the road. So
1:44
this is hosted by bold.org,
1:46
which has scholarships and all
1:48
kinds of things. If you
1:51
go to bold.org/scholarships slash mindscape,
1:53
you can find hours and
1:55
contribute to it. You can
1:57
just go to our podcast
1:59
homepage. proposterousuniverse.com/podcast. In the right hand
2:01
column, there's a link that says
2:03
Minescape Big Picture Scholarship. Click on
2:05
it and you get all
2:07
the info. So we've been super
2:09
successful. Thank you so much for
2:11
contributing. We've been very successful at
2:14
getting donations so much so that
2:16
each year the current plan
2:18
is we can give two scholarships
2:20
worth $20 ,000 each, which is
2:22
not enough to send someone to
2:24
college entirely, but makes a big
2:26
difference to someone who's just trying
2:28
to pay that tuition for school,
2:30
especially if you're not
2:32
planning to go in some
2:35
area that is super
2:37
financially remunerative down the road.
2:39
And I'm very happy
2:41
to announce this year's winners.
2:43
One winner is Jillian
2:45
Kate from, she's already a
2:47
undergraduate enrolled at Auburn
2:49
University and she's studying biochemistry,
2:51
biophysics, molecular biology with
2:53
the goal of becoming a
2:55
college professor and doing
2:57
research in those areas. And
2:59
one line that caught my eye
3:01
from her application was that she's already
3:03
planning not only to be a
3:05
professor, but what kinds of courses she's
3:07
going to teach as a professor.
3:09
So Jillian says, my goal is to
3:11
one day teach biology in a
3:13
southeastern university. And when I teach introductory
3:15
courses, I hope to intertwine creativity,
3:17
philosophy and art into my lectures and
3:19
course content. That certainly sounds something
3:21
like something we could use more of
3:23
in academia. So I'm all in
3:25
favor of that. Other winner is Miles
3:27
Webb, who is a senior in
3:29
high school and looking at different universities
3:31
to go to wants to study computer
3:33
engineering, material science, chemistry and physics.
3:35
And one of the lines in his
3:38
application was a dream of mine
3:40
is to become the first black Nobel
3:42
Prize winner in physics. Part of
3:44
me says, you know, I hope you're
3:46
not miles because I hope someone
3:48
else is even before you get there.
3:50
But if miles is the first
3:52
black Nobel Prize winner in physics, I
3:54
hope he gives a shout out
3:56
to mindscape listeners in his Nobel Prize
3:58
acceptance speech because because we have
4:00
given them a little bit of
4:02
a boost in paying for that
4:04
college education along the way. Again,
4:06
very many sincere thanks to all
4:08
the listeners because you are the
4:10
ones who contribute and it really
4:13
does make a difference to students,
4:15
especially in times of uncertainty when
4:17
it comes to higher education, scientific
4:19
research, things like that. The other
4:21
announcement, which is not an announcement
4:23
but a little reflection, is that
4:25
in last week's episode, I did
4:27
the theory of cocktails with Kevin
4:29
Peterson, a bit of a
4:31
change of pace, but we're allowed to
4:33
have fun here at the podcast. We
4:35
don't to be serious all the time.
4:37
And the thing we did at
4:39
the end of the podcast, if you'll
4:41
remember, is that we invented on the
4:44
spot, I say we, but it was
4:46
really Kevin, invented a Minescape cocktail, the
4:48
Minescape Petricor Negroni. Petricor is a word
4:50
having to do with that smell
4:52
in the forest after it rains. So
4:54
Kevin came up with a great idea,
4:56
except that it was difficult to pull
4:58
off for the typical home bartender. Negroni,
5:00
for those of you who
5:02
don't know, is one part
5:05
gin, one part something Campari
5:08
-esque, something bitter like that, and amaro,
5:10
I guess, in general. And then
5:12
one part sweet vermouth, red vermouth. So
5:14
the specific ingredients that matter is,
5:16
you know, what kind of gin, what
5:18
kind of vermouth, what kind of
5:20
amaro do you use? And Kevin came
5:22
up with Antica Formula Vermouth, which
5:24
is a very standard, you know, it's
5:26
one of the ones you can
5:28
easily get, typically, in the liquor
5:31
stores. It's what I generally use
5:33
when I'm using that kind of
5:35
vermouth in cocktails. For the amaro,
5:37
he suggested St. George Bruto Americano,
5:39
which I'd never heard of. St.
5:41
George, I knew quite well as
5:43
a gin producer, and I didn't
5:45
know that they made sort of
5:47
a Campari substitute. But now I
5:49
do, and it's amazing. It's really,
5:51
really wonderful. It's a little bit
5:53
smoother than real Campari. Opera roll
5:55
is the other thing that people
5:57
often substitute for Campari. But I
5:59
like the same. Georgia's brutal Americano better than
6:01
either one of them. So that's a
6:04
real discovery. And it does have that
6:06
little bit of herbaceousness in it that
6:08
we were looking for in our cocktail.
6:10
But then for the gin, Kevin's suggestion
6:13
was to distill our own gin from
6:15
vetiver, which is a type of grass
6:17
that is. hard to find. It's in
6:19
Haiti and maybe in India, something like
6:21
that. It's not easy to find a
6:24
vetiver. It's also not easy to distill
6:26
your own gin. So I'm not at
6:28
that level of cocktail wizardry. And I
6:30
asked him for maybe an off-the-shelf replacement
6:33
option. So he suggested moletto. gin, which
6:35
I had not been aware of, and
6:37
now I am. So I actually, when
6:39
we did the podcast and I recorded
6:42
the intro, etc., I hadn't made the
6:44
cocktail, but now I have, and I'm
6:46
here to report to you that it
6:49
was very good. So the issue with
6:51
the mulleto gin is the gimmick that
6:53
they have. You know, gin is sort
6:55
of flavored. Vodka, flavored neutral spirit of
6:58
some sort, and the flavors are supposed
7:00
to be various botanicals, largely juniper, but
7:02
then the individual character of the gin
7:04
comes from exactly which botanicals you use.
7:07
And Moleto uses tomatoes, among other things,
7:09
to flavor their gin. And I got
7:11
a say, I didn't say it to
7:14
Kevin in the moment, but I was
7:16
instantly thinking and was still thinking, that
7:18
sounds terrible. Like, I like tomatoes in
7:20
the right context, but in gin might
7:23
not be that context. And when I
7:25
got it, I managed to, you know,
7:27
shake up a bottle and it arrived
7:29
and indeed, it's not mostly made of
7:31
tomatoes, it's made of some grain, but
7:34
then there's a tomato essence in there
7:36
and you open it up and it
7:38
kind of smells like tomato juice. Like
7:40
it's a very noticeable tomato smell. And
7:42
I was very skeptical about this, but
7:44
I thought, you know, look, he knows
7:46
what he's doing. I bet this is
7:48
one of those things that when you
7:50
put it into the cocktail, it's not
7:52
going to smell to me at all.
7:54
It's going to be mixed in in
7:56
a particular way. And indeed, that's exactly
7:58
what happened. So I don't know. whether
8:00
I would drink Moleto gin straight.
8:02
I haven't tried yet. Maybe it
8:04
would be good in the right
8:07
circumstances with a grilled cheese sandwich,
8:09
perhaps. I really don't know. But
8:11
in the cocktail, it was very
8:13
good. And it did, in fact,
8:15
completely satisfy the requirements of giving
8:18
you that foresty, piney, herbaceous kind
8:20
of feel. In fact, maybe I
8:22
could add a drop of my
8:24
pine. bidders that I got on
8:26
the shelf there. Maybe that could
8:29
like juiced up a little bit.
8:31
Anyway, I can give a positive
8:33
recommendation to the Mindscape Petricor Negroni.
8:35
I think that it works. For
8:37
those of you who are into
8:40
that kind of thing. I would
8:42
hesitate to try to come up
8:44
with a mocktail version, but it
8:46
would definitely involve tomato juice somehow,
8:49
which I don't know whether that
8:51
would be a good thing. Anyway,
8:53
many thanks as always to Mindscape
8:55
listeners, especially patron supporters. The monthly
8:57
AMA is supported by patron supporters,
9:00
if you join on patron.com/Sean M.
9:02
Carroll, then you get ad-free versions
9:04
of the podcast, and you get
9:06
to ask questions for the AMAs,
9:08
and you get my little tiny
9:11
reflections after each episode. As usual,
9:13
too many questions to answer all
9:15
of them, but they're all good.
9:17
Keep asking them. Someone said, like,
9:19
can we keep asking questions even
9:22
if we if we tried once
9:24
and didn't get selected? Can we
9:26
ask the next question the same
9:28
question next time? Absolutely yes. I
9:30
mean, it might even slightly increase
9:33
your chances of getting selected. You
9:35
know, I do. Try to select
9:37
questions that are new to me,
9:39
that have something interesting to say
9:41
about, that are relatively short, that
9:44
I think will be interesting to
9:46
listeners. So there's a lot of
9:48
criteria that go in there, even
9:50
some really good questions I can't
9:52
answer just because of bandwidth reasons.
9:55
But I appreciate your understanding in
9:57
that matter. And with that, let's
9:59
go. Julian
10:07
Mark starts us off with a priority
10:10
question. Remember that priority questions are ones
10:12
that patron supporters are allowed to ask
10:14
once. per their lifetime, at least, you
10:16
know, their initial lifetime here on Earth,
10:19
who knows, with cyclic universe models, and
10:21
I will try my best to answer
10:23
it. So, sometimes that best is okay,
10:25
sometimes it's not, but, you know, that's
10:27
the risk that you run here. The
10:30
question is, if I were floating somewhere
10:32
between our sun and the closest star,
10:34
would I be able to see my
10:36
own hands? In other words, are the
10:38
stars in our galaxy bright enough to
10:41
illuminate any object in interstellar and, if
10:43
you're right? next to it. Well, this
10:45
is a question more about your ability
10:47
to see, or at least as much
10:50
about your ability to see as it
10:52
is about astronomy, so I don't actually
10:54
know the answer. My suspicion is it
10:56
would look pretty dark to you. It's
10:59
not that much different than just saying
11:01
what What do things look like if
11:03
you're outside on a clear moonless night
11:05
in an area where there is no
11:08
artificial illumination, right? You can certainly
11:10
see stars. In fact, you can
11:12
see the Milky Way galaxy surrounding
11:14
you. It would be kind of
11:17
cool, but that's probably not enough
11:19
to reflect light off of your
11:21
hands and see them unless your
11:23
vision just is really, really good,
11:25
I suppose. That's my guess. James
11:27
Heath says, I really enjoyed your solo
11:30
episode on science funding specifically when you
11:32
said that the current administration is not
11:34
thinking seriously about what they're cutting. Do
11:36
you think we need to touch the
11:38
hot stove and suffer consequences to remember
11:40
why government funding of science vaccines, alliances
11:42
with Europe really matter? I want to
11:44
know where this... phrase of touching the
11:46
hot stove came from, like suddenly it's
11:49
everywhere on the internet, like I guess
11:51
I can figure out what it means,
11:53
but it just suddenly appeared in all
11:55
my social media feeds all at once.
11:57
I don't know where it came from. Well,
11:59
you know... Do we need to do
12:01
that? No, we should be smart
12:03
enough to know that funding science
12:05
vaccines and protecting alliances with Europe
12:08
really matter. That should not be
12:10
something we need to... test and
12:12
remember like, oh yes, these things
12:14
actually solved real problems that we
12:16
faced with. All the evidence you
12:18
need that the cutting is not
12:20
being done in any sensible way
12:23
comes from the fact that so
12:25
many things have been cut and
12:27
then uncut. So many people have
12:29
been fired and then rehired right
12:31
away. So much damage has been
12:33
done and to important things with
12:35
respect to health and science and
12:37
national defense and national security that
12:39
they're clearly not. paying attention. The
12:42
most recent one was they put
12:44
up for sale a building that
12:46
is used by the CIA for
12:48
secret operations that was supposed to
12:50
be secret. I mean it's not
12:52
the best secret in the world
12:54
but you know they just listed
12:56
it for for soon being sold
12:58
by the General Services Administration. You
13:00
know, they're very excited about cutting things, but
13:02
they're doing enormous damage. It's like saying, you
13:05
know, you know you have a tumor in
13:07
your body, so I'm just going to start
13:09
cutting things open and taking things out. Eventually
13:12
we'll find that tumor. No sensible person thinks
13:14
that this is the right thing to do.
13:16
And part of it is that... You might
13:18
think, well, if you make a
13:20
mistake, we'll just fix it, but
13:23
some of these things are not
13:25
fixable. The United States is supposed
13:27
to have a reputation as a
13:29
relatively reliable international partner. All that
13:31
talks about tariffs being put on
13:33
and then taken off has done
13:36
irreparable damage to that reputation that
13:38
we've had. People in Europe and
13:40
in Asia and elsewhere are absolutely
13:42
realizing that they cannot rely on
13:44
the United States for protection for
13:47
military support. or anything like that,
13:49
so they're gonna have to beef up
13:51
their own defenses. And there's a certain
13:53
attitude that says, well, they should defend
13:55
themselves, but you know, as far as
13:57
the United States is concerned, it really.
14:00
serves the United States' interest to
14:02
be in charge of all that,
14:04
because they might not always agree
14:06
with decisions that other places make.
14:08
I mean, maybe a multipolar world
14:10
is better in some ways. I
14:12
absolutely could see the argument for
14:14
that. The real, very obvious, huge
14:16
disadvantage to me is that some
14:18
of these other countries are going
14:20
to develop nuclear weapons. And the
14:22
more countries that have nuclear weapons,
14:24
the worse we are. worse we
14:26
all are because the greater chance
14:28
that someone uses them either intentionally
14:30
or by mistake or they lose
14:32
it or whatever. So none of
14:34
this is good. It's all bad
14:36
and it's not something that is
14:38
going to be easy to fix.
14:41
Dennis Cooperberg says, in the big
14:43
picture a crucial claim is made.
14:45
The laws of physics underlying everyday
14:47
life are completely known. This strikes
14:49
me as both highly plausible and
14:51
surprisingly almost never mentioned elsewhere. How
14:53
widely accepted would you say this
14:55
claim is among physicists or more
14:57
generally among those well-versed in modern
14:59
physics? Well, I've said this before,
15:01
but basically, when I explain the
15:03
claim to my fellow physicists, they
15:05
think for about five seconds and
15:07
go, yeah, I guess that's true.
15:10
So I don't think it's something
15:12
that they think about. You know,
15:14
scientists are kind of laser focused
15:16
on pushing beyond what we already
15:18
know into regimes that we don't
15:20
yet understand. So the typical theoretical
15:22
particle physicists spend their time thinking
15:24
about amplitudes or supersymmetry or. brains
15:27
or hidden symmetries in quantum field
15:29
theory or quantum gravity or whatever it
15:31
is, things that we don't understand very
15:33
well. So, and also of course the
15:35
fact that we understand the laws of
15:38
physics well enough doesn't really have a
15:40
huge impact on the higher emergent levels,
15:42
whether it be chemistry or biology or
15:45
whatever. It has some impact because you
15:47
might otherwise... wonder whether you're when you
15:49
know studying a chemical reaction and it
15:51
doesn't happen at the rate that you
15:54
expected it to if you didn't know
15:56
about underlying laws of physics you might say
15:58
well oh maybe there's like a a new particle
16:00
or a new field somehow involved that
16:02
is changing the reaction rates. That is
16:05
not the way to go, given what
16:07
we understand about effective field theory. So
16:09
instead, people look for much more mundane
16:12
chemical reasons for those kinds of things
16:14
and they find them. So I think
16:16
it is something that is not controversial
16:18
in the sense that there's a lot
16:21
of people out there who deny it
16:23
within the physics community, but it's not
16:25
also something that people think about that
16:27
much. And again, as I should always
16:30
add, it's, it could, it might not
16:32
be true, right? That's, I always try
16:34
to phrase it as, given everything we
16:37
know, this is absolutely what is the
16:39
most sensible thing to believe as good
16:41
basians, but who knows, you know, we
16:43
could be missing something deep. in quantum
16:46
mechanics. I don't think that that's a
16:48
very likely place to find anything new,
16:50
but other people disagree about that.
16:52
Radolfo Hansen says, I've heard you
16:55
speak positively about capitalism in the
16:57
past. Given increasing evidence in forcible
16:59
cooperative frameworks, outperform their competitive counterparts,
17:02
would you consider alternatives allow us
17:04
to step away from the negative
17:06
some game we are currently running
17:08
to a positive someone? Well, lot
17:11
to unpack here. I don't know
17:13
what that evidence is that you're
17:15
pointing to the increasing evidence about
17:18
enforceable cooperative frameworks. I'm not exactly
17:20
sure what is meant by enforceable
17:22
cooperative frameworks. I will certainly consider
17:24
alternatives. I'll always consider alternatives, but
17:27
I do think a lot of
17:29
alternatives are sort of influenced by
17:31
wishful thinking or by unrealistic expectations.
17:33
Capitalism, I think, is very very
17:35
effective at certain things, very very
17:37
harmful in other ways, and I'm
17:40
in favor of fixing it and
17:42
ameliorating the bad effects rather than
17:44
trying something completely different until we
17:46
really do get evidence that something
17:48
completely different would be better. Finally,
17:50
I don't quite agree with the
17:53
negative some game versus positive some
17:55
game. Like, there's no reason intrinsically
17:57
why capitalism has to be negative
17:59
some... game. Indeed, I think that
18:01
one could easily make an
18:03
argument that standards of living and
18:06
health and other very basic
18:08
measures have improved over years, even
18:10
for most of the less
18:12
well -off people in capitalist societies.
18:14
Not to undersell any of the
18:16
real problems under capitalism, but
18:18
there's no, again, intrinsic reason why
18:21
it's a negative sum game.
18:23
The whole idea is that you
18:25
incentivize people to be productive
18:27
and productivity makes everybody better off.
18:30
So I think that capitalism
18:32
plus a very strong taxation
18:34
and social safety net system
18:36
would actually be very obviously
18:39
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18:41
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month. That's BetterHelp H -E
19:41
-L -p.com/Mindscape. Okay
19:45
we have two questions I'm gonna group
19:47
together. They're both a little vague
19:49
so maybe that's a good reason to
19:51
group them together. One is from
19:53
Yazan al -Hajari who says, Kepler wrote,
19:55
metaphors are my truthful masters. One should
19:58
make good use of them. In
20:00
science, metaphors shape our understanding black
20:02
holes as cosmic sinks, entropy is
20:04
disorder, just as thought experiments stretch
20:06
logic to reveal deep truths. Science
20:08
fiction blends both inspiring real discoveries.
20:10
How do you see the role
20:12
of metaphor and thought experiments in
20:14
science? Are they essential tools for
20:16
discovery? Or should we be cautious
20:18
of their limits? And has any
20:20
metaphor, thought experiment or sci-fi story
20:22
ever influenced the way you think
20:24
about physics? And then Nanou asks...
20:26
When you were learning physics or
20:28
cosmology over the years, did you
20:30
incorporate your imagination? If you did
20:33
and still do when you think
20:35
about those ideas, what images does
20:37
your brain generate? So to take
20:39
the second question first from NANU,
20:41
I mean, yeah, you definitely incorporate
20:43
your imagination. I might hesitate here
20:45
because maybe you mean something different
20:47
by incorporating one's imagination than I
20:49
might mean. imagination is that just
20:51
a supernupor important part of all
20:53
of science because you're trying as
20:56
we just mentioned to push beyond
20:58
what we know to suggest ideas
21:00
for doing better than our current
21:02
theoretical models do and that is
21:04
a fundamentally act. So you say,
21:06
what images does your brain generate,
21:09
implying that imagination is somehow associated
21:11
with images in the brain? That's
21:13
one kind of imagination, but there's
21:15
other kind of imagination. You can
21:17
imagine equations. You can imagine structural
21:20
relations between different parts of the
21:22
physical world or something like that.
21:24
So imagination is absolutely centrally crucial.
21:26
And indeed, we don't understand it.
21:28
very well. We don't really understand
21:31
how it is that the human
21:33
brain comes parts of the physical
21:35
world or something like that. So
21:37
imagination is absolutely centrally crucial and
21:39
indeed we don't understand it very
21:41
well. We don't really understand how
21:43
it is that the human brain
21:45
comes up with hypotheses scientifically and
21:48
this is becoming a more directly relevant
21:50
question in the age of AI where you
21:52
might say, well I'm going to... Imagine building
21:54
an AI that will do science in the
21:56
same way that theoretical physicists do, and we
21:59
don't really know how. don't even really
22:01
have any expectations for whether that's
22:03
easy or hard or whatever so
22:05
it's becoming a very down-to-earth kind
22:07
of question. For Yuzan's question you
22:09
know what is the role of
22:11
metaphor and thought experiments it's super
22:13
crucial as a matter of empirical
22:15
fact so I don't necessarily think
22:17
that it's you need to have
22:19
thought experiments or metaphor. I could
22:21
imagine a kind of science that
22:23
was just much more straightforward and
22:25
literal, but I don't think it
22:27
would be as productive, at least
22:29
for we human beings. We human
22:31
beings definitely think in terms of
22:33
images and metaphors. I mean, one
22:35
that I like to use is
22:37
when I talk about Hilbert space,
22:39
the space of all possible quantum
22:41
states of a system in very...
22:43
commonly thought of examples. Hilbert space
22:45
is a vector space that is
22:47
infinite dimensional. In some very realistic
22:49
examples, it's still very, very big,
22:51
right? Ten to the ten to
22:53
the hundred dimensional or some crazy
22:55
number like that, right? So there's
22:57
no possible way that any human
22:59
being can actually visualize all of
23:01
those dimensions of Hilbert space in
23:03
their head. And yet we visualize
23:05
a little bit and we use
23:07
tools like reducing the number from
23:09
infinity to three. the number of
23:11
dimensions of Hilbert space, and we
23:13
make a little picture of it,
23:15
like a three-dimensional vector space. That's...
23:17
Not really a metaphor, it's just
23:19
a sort of a simplification. It's
23:21
helpful in some ways, and it's
23:23
misleading in other ways because things
23:25
become different when you have a
23:27
very very large dimensional vector space
23:29
compared to a very very small
23:31
dimensional vector space. But it's absolutely
23:33
crucial for most of us. Others,
23:35
maybe it's not crucial. Like maybe
23:37
you just memorize the rules of
23:39
a vector space. You say, oh,
23:41
a vector is helpful in some
23:43
ways. and it's misleading in other
23:46
ways because things become different when
23:48
you have a very very large
23:50
dimensional vector space compared to a
23:52
very very small dimensional vector space.
23:54
But it's absolutely crucial for most
23:56
of us. Others, maybe it's not
23:58
crucial. Like, maybe you just memorize
24:00
the rules of a vector space.
24:02
You say, oh, a vector is
24:04
something you can add to other
24:06
vectors and scale by real numbers
24:08
or complex numbers or something like
24:10
that. Everyone who understands vector spaces
24:12
knows those rules, but what I'm
24:14
saying is maybe someone only knows
24:16
those rules and doesn't ever think
24:18
about vectors as little arrows, right?
24:20
That would be fine. You could
24:22
do it that way. I always
24:24
think that science is something that...
24:26
benefits from a diverse set of
24:28
approaches, because the space of possible
24:30
ideas is very, very large, and
24:32
no matter how brilliant you are,
24:34
if you sort of have your
24:36
particular way of moving forward in
24:38
the space of ideas, you're bound
24:40
to miss some good ones. We're
24:42
all bound to miss some good
24:44
ones, and that's why you need
24:46
lots of people with lots of
24:48
different kinds of ideas, and you
24:50
need to support them, even though
24:52
they're not doing things exactly the
24:54
way that you want to be
24:56
doing them. And that is the
24:58
difficult thing to do. Are there
25:00
any metaphors, thought experiments, ever influencing
25:02
the way I think about physics?
25:04
I mean, sure, but I would
25:06
separate out those three things. Those
25:08
are very different things. Metaphors, thought
25:10
experiments, sci-fi stories. I don't think
25:12
that sci-fi stories have really influenced
25:14
the way I think about physics.
25:16
Maybe the closest is, you know,
25:18
time travel stories that tried to
25:20
make everything completely logically consistent. provide
25:22
a nice way to think about
25:24
that, because I do think that
25:26
if time travel were possible, it
25:28
would be logically consistent. It's not
25:30
a major part of my scientific
25:32
research, though, so most other science
25:34
fiction stories do not talk about
25:37
the kinds of science that I
25:39
personally am invested in. For thought
25:41
experiments, yes, I mean, thought experiments
25:43
are everything. We're always doing sort
25:45
of spherical cows, you know, imagining
25:47
if this is true, then what
25:49
would happen? That's really the bread
25:51
and butter of what theoretical physicistsists
25:53
do for a living. metaphors it's
25:55
harder you know we I'm always
25:57
skeptical of metaphors. You know, many
25:59
of you will know my long-standing
26:01
antipathy for thinking of the universe
26:03
as a balloon being blown up.
26:05
That's a metaphor, right? You know,
26:07
take a balloon, put some dots
26:09
on it with a marker, blow
26:11
it up, and say, oh look,
26:13
it's kind of like the expanding
26:15
universe, and the dots are moving
26:17
apart from each other like galaxies
26:19
are, which is... explaining something correctly,
26:21
but also getting other things very
26:23
very wrong. In that picture of
26:25
the balloon blowing up, not only
26:27
do the dots get further away
26:29
from each other, the individual dots
26:31
get bigger. and individual galaxies don't
26:33
get bigger. When you're blowing the
26:35
balloon up there is an obvious
26:37
inside and outside and in the
26:39
universe there is not. So you
26:41
can use metaphors and they're very
26:43
helpful but they are all so
26:45
dangerous and so you got to
26:47
keep your what's about you understanding
26:49
exactly what the limitations of the
26:51
metaphor are supposed to be. Mark
26:54
Sleight says, how should a layman
26:56
understand the temperature of the cosmic
26:58
microwave background radiation? Is this the
27:00
temperature a thermometer in space would
27:03
show? If it only absorbed the
27:05
microwave background and no other photons
27:07
or particle collisions? Yes, that's exactly
27:09
what it is. I mean, that
27:11
is more or less what we
27:13
measure. We have a telescope. Here
27:15
on Earth, we have a radio
27:18
telescope, right? Like, I mean, the
27:20
original one, it was in New
27:22
Jersey, but now we have more
27:24
advanced telescopes, but it's not that
27:26
hard, if you know what you're
27:28
doing, to go up on the
27:30
top of a building in your
27:32
random urban area in the United
27:35
States and put up a telescope
27:37
that can detect the cosmic microwave
27:39
background. And not only do you
27:41
detect detect photons in the radio
27:43
band coming from the CMB, but
27:45
you can, if you're good, measure
27:47
the spectrum. and the spectrum takes
27:50
the form of a black body
27:52
with a certain temperature. So that's
27:54
the temperature. It really is literally
27:56
what you're doing. Even though there
27:58
are other photons there, you build
28:00
a detector that is not sensitive
28:02
to the other photons, only to
28:04
those in a certain direction and
28:07
in a certain wavelength range, and
28:09
you detect the CMB, and you
28:11
figure out its temperature. It's really
28:13
just gas of photons bumping into
28:15
you. Anonymous says, I think democracy
28:17
only makes sense for groups of
28:19
people who share a common ontology.
28:22
If the primary concern of one
28:24
group is to secure themselves an
28:26
entrance ticket to a type of
28:28
heaven, the other group does not
28:30
believe in. The minority group needlessly
28:32
suffers. A decision between building a
28:34
dam or an airport with a
28:36
limited budget can effectively be guided
28:39
by the outcome of a popular
28:41
vote, whereas a decision on abortion
28:43
rights hinges on whether a fetus
28:45
has a soul. Given that a
28:47
majority of the population is unwilling
28:49
to reassess their ontological commitments, the
28:51
divide often results in a hostage
28:54
situation. What are your thoughts on
28:56
this? Well, I think this is
28:58
a real and very well-known problem
29:00
in democracy. We've discussed it before
29:02
on the podcast, the idea that...
29:04
A democracy is supposed to allow
29:06
for people with different value systems
29:08
to coexist together, but their value
29:11
systems have to overlap enough to
29:13
make democracy work. And in the
29:15
case of abortion or something like
29:17
that... Well, let's just try to
29:19
be the more general principle here.
29:21
In the case where someone, two
29:23
sets of people, have very different
29:26
ideas about the morality, the sort
29:28
of fundamental morality of some kind
29:30
of action, this is where democracy
29:32
is always going to get in
29:34
trouble. It's not that it can't
29:36
work, right? Like, whether it's abortion
29:38
or the death penalty or going
29:40
to war with some other country,
29:43
you can personally say, look, I
29:45
don't believe in the moral correctness
29:47
of this. I do, however, believe
29:49
in the democratic process. So what's
29:51
going to happen is I'm going
29:53
to accept that the democratic process
29:55
has led to an outcome that
29:58
I don't like, and I'm going
30:00
to protest it, and I'm going
30:02
to vote against it, and I'm
30:04
going to try to convince other
30:06
people on the other side to
30:08
come to my side, but that's
30:10
the best I can do, because
30:13
I'm part of the democracy, and
30:15
I'm subject to decisions that democracy
30:17
makes. That is inevitable, and I
30:19
think that we can easily imagine
30:21
groups of people who would not
30:23
work well, who would not function
30:25
in a functioning democracy together. You
30:27
have to imagine that the people
30:30
in the democracy are committed enough
30:32
to the values of democracy. You
30:34
know, there was a... a little
30:36
plot that I just reposted on
30:38
Blue Sky the other day. There
30:40
was a survey of values or
30:42
something like that in political parties
30:45
in the Western world. Not even
30:47
the Western world, in the world,
30:49
I guess. And they plotted them
30:51
on two axes, whether a political
30:53
party was overall liberal or conservative
30:55
in values. And then also their
30:57
importance that a political party put
30:59
on international cooperation. And you know,
31:02
we can debate. where you should
31:04
be on that plot. Are you
31:06
in favor of international cooperation? Are
31:08
you not? Are you liberal or
31:10
conservative? Are you not? That's a
31:12
very... very much up for debate,
31:14
up for grabs, that's fine. What
31:17
was interesting is that, you know,
31:19
they plotted to different countries, the
31:21
United States, the UK, Norway, Italy,
31:23
China, Turkey, Russia, and they plotted
31:25
where there was a functioning democracy,
31:27
they plotted both what the left
31:29
leaning party where they landed on
31:31
this two-dimensional plot and the right
31:34
leaning party. And there's a group
31:36
of countries and parties grouped together
31:38
that roughly speaking is either more
31:40
liberal than conservative or at least
31:42
close to neutral and more interested
31:44
in international cooperation than not or
31:46
close to neutral on that also
31:49
and includes all of the parties
31:51
right and left in countries that
31:53
we know in love as Western
31:55
liberal democracies you know the European
31:57
countries Canada or whatever except for
31:59
the right-wing party in the United
32:01
States, which is off that off
32:03
of the group of Western democracy
32:06
parties right next to China, Turkey,
32:08
and Russia, which are not democracies
32:10
at all. In other words, what
32:12
it's saying is the Republican Party
32:14
in the United States is now
32:16
closer to Russia, China, and Turkey
32:18
in its political values than it
32:21
is to any other party in
32:23
Western liberal democracies. Okay? Now maybe
32:25
there is some... room to argue
32:27
about the particular methodology of
32:29
that Survey that they did
32:31
fine go ahead and do
32:33
that But the point is
32:36
One can imagine a large
32:38
group of people in a
32:40
country abandoning what we think
32:42
of as democratic values, and
32:44
I think that that's more
32:47
the problem than people disagreeing
32:49
about a little bit of
32:51
morality because of their ontological
32:53
differences Stone R. Carroll, no
32:55
relation as far as I know,
32:58
says what are your thoughts on
33:00
the physical foundations of mathematics? It
33:02
is interesting that the universe has
33:05
produced a possibility for us to
33:07
reason about these abstract mathematical objects
33:09
and deduce objective truths about them.
33:12
For example, to me, if Zermelo
33:14
Frankel axioms are true, then one
33:16
plus one equals two is undeniably
33:19
true. Are these truths fundamental, independent
33:21
of the physical reality? Are they
33:23
emergent? What's in your opinion the
33:25
most compelling view? So I am
33:27
not an expert on this stuff.
33:30
I have grappled with it. I
33:32
have tried to get a more
33:34
nuanced understanding, but I am left
33:36
unconvinced in any of the arguments
33:38
either way. But so I can
33:40
tell you my feelings, okay, but
33:42
I'm not going to be held
33:44
to saying, you have to defend
33:46
these feelings because I... feel the
33:48
force of the countervailing arguments. I'm
33:50
not a mathematical realist, okay? I
33:52
don't think that we should think
33:55
of mathematical objects as being real,
33:57
at least not in the same
33:59
sense. as we think about physical
34:01
things as being real. So I
34:03
think that physical things are real,
34:05
or at least the physical world
34:07
is real. We divide it up
34:09
into sub things, and that's our
34:12
move, not the universe's move. And
34:14
it turns out, maybe it didn't
34:16
have to turn out this way,
34:18
but it turns out that there
34:20
are patterns inherent in the sort
34:22
of instantiation of physical reality that
34:24
are describable by what we call
34:26
mathematics. Okay, one plus one equals
34:28
two is one way of saying
34:30
that every time I have one
34:32
coffee cup and another coffee cup,
34:34
now I have two coffee cups
34:36
and et cetera. There's sort of
34:38
a physical understanding of what that
34:40
means. And when you get into
34:43
the more wild areas of mathematics
34:45
with transfinite numbers and things like
34:47
that, maybe there isn't any physical
34:49
instantiation of that, and maybe it
34:51
sort of doesn't matter. So I
34:53
think where it really becomes, we
34:55
had this conversation on the podcast
34:57
not too long ago with Joel
34:59
David Hamkins, so you're welcome to
35:01
check that out. In a previous
35:03
discussion with Justin Clark Doan that
35:05
touched on these things, there
35:08
are, it is a well
35:10
known fact in post 20th century
35:12
mathematics, or I guess post
35:15
19th century mathematics that you can
35:17
easily write down axiom systems
35:19
that are very similar to each
35:21
other, but differ in one
35:23
axiom, and whether or not that
35:25
axiom is there, or the
35:27
opposite of that axiom is there,
35:29
or that axiom is neither
35:31
there nor not there, all of
35:33
those are consistent systems, right?
35:35
Like the continuum hypothesis, the existence
35:37
of infinite numbers that are
35:39
larger than the number of countable
35:41
numbers, the integers, but smaller
35:43
than the number of real numbers.
35:45
Is that true or false?
35:47
Well, you can choose. You can
35:49
pick an axiom to include
35:52
or not to include. And to
35:54
me, that means like clearly
35:56
these things are not objectively real.
35:58
There are ways that we
36:00
are constructing systems ourselves that turn
36:02
out to be super duper... useful
36:04
for discussing physical reality. For what it's worth I do have
36:06
a paper where I express these feelings. It is called reality
36:08
realism. You're welcome to check it out. Yusuf
36:10
says, do you think taking more
36:12
abstract math courses is beneficial for
36:14
a physics student wanting to pursue
36:16
higher education in physics? For example,
36:18
classes like real analysis, topology, and
36:20
abstract algebra. I'm curious if you
36:23
think being trained in upper level
36:25
math courses is beneficial for people
36:27
doing not just theoretical research but
36:29
experimental. Well, I think it's a
36:31
cost-benefit analysis question. All else being
36:33
equal, yes, it is absolutely useful
36:35
to take those courses. It's also
36:37
useful to learn foreign languages and
36:39
to learn programming languages and to
36:41
appreciate the history and philosophy both
36:43
of science and other things. Maybe
36:45
it's beneficial to take classes in
36:47
literature or poetry because it makes
36:49
you a more eloquent explainer of
36:51
your science. So there's lots of
36:54
things that could be beneficial. Whether
36:56
or not taking a class in real
36:58
analysis, for example, for those of you
37:00
who don't know, real analysis is like
37:02
the fancy pants way of saying calculus.
37:05
But it gets very, very fancy, so
37:07
you almost don't recognize it anymore. Like
37:09
once you take seriously the number of
37:11
numbers on the real line, things go
37:14
pretty wild. And a lot of your
37:16
common sensical ways of thinking about math
37:18
break down, so you have to like
37:20
stick with what the axioms are actually
37:23
telling you, and then that's... That's a
37:25
step along the way to becoming
37:27
a more rigorous mathematician. Physicists generally
37:29
don't care about any of that
37:32
stuff. Generally, sometimes they might. But
37:34
generally, you just do an integral.
37:36
You're not worried too much about
37:39
all the higher level details of
37:41
proving that it converges or whatever.
37:43
Some areas in quantum field theory,
37:46
where you really try to prove
37:48
careful theorems, then you need some
37:50
functional analysis, real analysis, real analysis.
37:53
topological considerations and so
37:55
forth. But that's, you know, a
37:57
tiny little subset of physics, even
37:59
theoretical. physics, like most theoretical physicists,
38:01
if you want to calculate the
38:04
scattering amplitude of two electrons into
38:06
two photons or whatever, okay, you
38:08
don't need any of that fancy
38:10
math to do that. I think
38:12
it's good training because it stretches
38:14
your brain. It really is, mathematics
38:16
is the most rigorous I count
38:18
mathematics and sort of logic together
38:20
in a set of things that
38:22
say like here's a set of
38:24
axioms, what can you prove? And
38:26
that way of thinking is really
38:29
good exercise. It's a good calisthenics
38:31
for your brain, okay? But the
38:33
actual substance of what you learn,
38:35
you know, about some theorem, about,
38:37
you know, contractability of a certain
38:39
space or whatever, will be... unlikely
38:41
to be directly useful to you
38:43
in your physics research. And again,
38:45
it could be if you're one
38:47
of those supermathematical physicists, but you're
38:49
asking in general, and I think
38:51
that most physicists learn the math
38:53
they need as they go, rather
38:56
than learning math classes. And the
38:58
other thing is... Mathematicians are doing
39:00
math for different reasons than physicists
39:02
are. Physicists want to get the
39:04
answer and they want to put
39:06
it to work. You know, when
39:08
I was in grad school and
39:10
it dawned on me from taking
39:12
quantum field theory classes, etc. that
39:14
the idea of group theory and
39:16
Lee groups and Lee algebras and
39:18
representations was really important. I sat
39:21
in on a class in the
39:23
math department on the groups and
39:25
the algebras and it was entirely
39:27
a waste of time. It was,
39:29
you know, like theorem lemma proof,
39:31
you know, showing that something could
39:33
be diagonalizable or representation was faithful
39:35
or whatever it was, and as
39:37
a physicist, you would just look
39:39
it up. you just say, oh,
39:41
is this true? Okay, it is.
39:43
All right, I'm going to move
39:45
on, right? And very elaborate methods
39:48
of proving these things. So what
39:50
you want out of these mathematical
39:52
concepts is different as a mathematician,
39:54
and that's fine. But don't think,
39:56
I guess, is the short answer
39:58
that you need to take fancy
40:00
math classes to be a very
40:02
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restrictions may apply. Astro Nobel says,
40:56
I hear a lot of people,
40:58
scientists and laymen alike, talk with
41:00
confidence about the existence of extraterrestrial
41:02
life and the chances to find
41:05
it in the near future. I
41:07
have the impression that proper Bayesian
41:09
reasoning is not applied most of
41:11
the time, and that expectations are
41:13
often mixed with hope and wishful
41:15
thinking. No matter what we find
41:17
or fail to find, credences are
41:19
never lowered. Why are people so
41:21
reluctant to admit that new results
41:23
indicate that life may not exist
41:25
outside the earth at all? How
41:27
should a good Bayesian reason about
41:30
this? Well, I think that the
41:32
thing about Bayesianism, of which I'm
41:34
a big fan, is the following.
41:36
You admit that you start your
41:38
investigation with prior credences, right? You
41:40
have priors for something being true,
41:42
and then you update them when
41:44
new evidence comes in. And... The
41:46
way that you update them is
41:48
on the basis of what are
41:50
called likelihood functions. Given all the
41:52
different possible theories, under which theory
41:54
would, no, under each theory I
41:57
should say, would the new information
41:59
be probable or improbable? and conditions
42:01
under which the information you're
42:03
getting is probable would increase
42:05
in their credences and that's
42:08
given you your posterior not
42:10
your prior people keep calling it
42:12
a prior even after it's been
42:14
updated but that is you know
42:17
technically not correct so The big
42:19
worry about Bayesian reasoning is what
42:21
if we start with very very
42:23
different priors, which is allowed by
42:26
the rules of Bayesianism, and then
42:28
you require enormous overwhelming evidence in
42:30
the form of likelihood functions to
42:32
converge on a common answer. There
42:35
are theorems that assure us that
42:37
if we get enough evidence, we
42:39
will always converge on the common answer,
42:41
but... You can easily find yourself in
42:44
a situation where, number one, priors are
42:46
very different, and number two, there's just
42:48
not enough evidence to move them very
42:50
much. I think that's the situation we're
42:53
in right now with life on other
42:55
planets. We have the fact that we
42:57
exist. Some people take our existence to
43:00
say you should have a prior that
43:02
life is actually pretty ubiquitous, that it's
43:04
easy to make. You'll keep being told
43:06
that life arose relatively quickly here on
43:09
earth, even though it might have
43:11
been hundreds of millions of years,
43:13
still relatively quickly compared to the
43:15
billions of years that we've been
43:17
around. and therefore the argument goes
43:20
your prior should be large. Other
43:22
people will say, well, I have
43:24
a prior that it's very small,
43:26
I have evidence that we haven't
43:28
met any other civilizations yet, and
43:31
that decreases my prior to an
43:33
even lower number, and that's both
43:35
perfectly fine. There's a lot of
43:37
evidence, and none of it is...
43:39
definitive, I guess. I mean, there's a
43:42
lot of evidence in some sense. What
43:44
I mean is there's a lot of
43:46
different kinds of evidence. There's evidence from
43:48
biochemistry and thinking about the origin of
43:50
life. There's evidence that we've looked for
43:52
a lot of planets, and we found
43:54
a lot of planets, right? So
43:56
whatever your credence is that life on
43:59
other planets exist, based purely on the
44:01
number of planets we found, it's very
44:03
reasonable that it should be higher now
44:05
than it was before. Based on the
44:07
fact that none of them have stood
44:10
up and said, hi, your credence should
44:12
be lower than it was before, and
44:14
there's a battle going on. So I
44:16
just don't think that the evidence is
44:18
strong enough in any way to... really
44:21
be upset if people still have credences
44:23
that are very different than yours. That's
44:25
why I'm very, very open-minded about this
44:27
particular question. The credences are just not
44:30
pinned very close to zero or one.
44:32
Chris Mason says, how do you feel
44:34
about the 76ers season so far? Disappointed
44:36
or as expected. So I'm not sure
44:38
if Chris is teasing me a little
44:41
bit here, but for those of you
44:43
basketball fans out there, my team, the
44:45
Philadelphia 76ers, went into the season with
44:47
enormously high expectations, having two superstars on
44:49
the team, Joelle Embed and Tyres Maxie,
44:52
and getting a third superstar, Paul George,
44:54
as a free agent, and doing a
44:56
pretty good job of building out the
44:58
rest of the roster on very cheap.
45:00
contracts, etc. So expectations were very high
45:03
and it has been a complete unmitigated
45:05
disaster. And it's a weird, like it's
45:07
so disastrous this season that it's almost
45:09
inexplicable. You know, it's not really that
45:11
the team was ill-constructed. You know, the
45:14
obvious thing is there have been injuries,
45:16
especially to Joelle and Bede. If you,
45:18
I follow this too closely, so for
45:20
those of you who care, Joe Allenbeat
45:23
had a knee injury and... There's a
45:25
question of how do you get better
45:27
after the knee injury. He's had a
45:29
lot of injuries over the year, but
45:31
I think people hope and beat has
45:34
been shut down for the year. They're
45:36
gonna try other different strategies for getting
45:38
him better. I still, you know, I
45:40
recognize that I am not the general
45:42
manager of the team. I'm not the
45:45
coach of the team. I'm not a
45:47
player on the team. My job is
45:49
to enjoy the team's success. So I'm
45:51
going to continue to be optimistic that
45:53
next year, everyone's gonna be optimistic. to
45:56
happen. Peter Bamber says, you recently said
45:58
that for the first time you had
46:00
a thought about leaving the USA as
46:02
a consequence of political changes, though you
46:05
have no plans to do so. What
46:07
is the view amongst your friends and
46:09
colleagues on this topic? Well, look, I
46:11
think most people don't really want to
46:13
leave their... houses and their jobs, right?
46:16
Especially in academia, that's super hard to
46:18
do. If you're like a genius superstar,
46:20
then you can call up another university
46:22
and get a job offer, but most
46:24
people, you know, getting a job is
46:27
very difficult and very precious and you
46:29
hang on to it when you have
46:31
it, especially at a moment when funding
46:33
and things like that are very precarious.
46:35
It's super precarious here in the United
46:38
States, obviously. The president of John's... just
46:40
put out an email, which was overall,
46:42
I think, a pretty good email. Ron
46:44
Daniels is the president, and he was
46:46
sort of, he made the point, which
46:49
I hoped he would make, that we
46:51
still stand up for diversity and pluralism
46:53
here at Johns Hopkins, but he also
46:55
said, look, we're getting cut. by an
46:58
enormous amount and it might be a
47:00
devastating set of cuts coming down the
47:02
road, even though they don't know exactly
47:04
what they are yet. As I said,
47:06
because we have no idea what the
47:09
actual funding cuts are going to be,
47:11
so it's very hard to do planning
47:13
for the future. So that kind of
47:15
thing makes people worried, you know. Certainly
47:17
if I were a young person, if
47:20
I were looking at postdocs, and I
47:22
had a chance to go to a
47:24
country that was a little more reliable
47:26
in their funding of science, then I
47:28
would take that very, very seriously. But,
47:31
you know, as an old settled person,
47:33
you know, I'd rather, you know, just
47:35
stick around, and I think that that's...
47:37
basically what people think. I think that
47:40
a lot of young people, you know,
47:42
we're right now, it is early March,
47:44
which means that we're recruiting new grad
47:46
students and things like that. Some major
47:48
universities have already said we're not going
47:51
to accept any new graduate students this
47:53
year. Others have accepted grad students and
47:55
then rescinded the offer to them because
47:57
they just don't have. money. And this
47:59
is, it makes a very difficult time
48:02
of a young person's life even more
48:04
difficult in ways that, you know, my
48:06
heart breaks for them and I really
48:08
feel bad for them. Here at Hopkins,
48:10
we're thinking that we can just stick
48:13
with the number of grad students that
48:15
we've already accepted, so we're recruiting them,
48:17
and in fact, it looks like we're
48:19
going to do much better this year
48:21
at getting people to come to Hopkins
48:24
because we're better than average in terms
48:26
of... assuring the prospective grad students that
48:28
they will get a position when they
48:30
arrive. But if I had an option
48:33
to go somewhere else that, you know,
48:35
things were more reliable and I would
48:37
take that very, very seriously. I don't
48:39
yet know of any senior colleagues who
48:42
are saying, I'm picking up and leaving.
48:44
This is something that takes months or
48:46
years to really sink in to people.
48:49
So I don't think it's like that
48:51
anyone will snap their fingers and suddenly
48:53
will lose 10 percent of our scientists,
48:55
but... there's an accumulated effect that is
48:58
sort of difficult to discern from moment
49:00
to moment and it's many little
49:02
changes in outlook that add up to
49:04
a big effect. So I don't I
49:07
don't see in any exodus from the
49:09
United States right now but I think
49:11
the long-term effects are going to be
49:13
very very noticeable. Paulina Vino
49:15
says, do you think that agents made
49:18
up of conscious agents, for example
49:20
a company or a society, can themselves
49:22
have a conscious experience? What are
49:24
the caveats for this and how would
49:26
we know if say a corporation
49:28
or a country were conscious if we
49:31
can even know this? So I
49:33
think... I don't think it's useful to
49:35
think of countries as being conscious in
49:37
the same way that we human beings
49:40
are being conscious for a number of
49:42
reasons. I should mention that not everyone
49:44
agrees. Eric Schutzkable, who is a previous
49:47
mindscape guest, has written a paper saying
49:49
that if you are materialist about ontology
49:51
and you think that, you know, consciousness
49:53
is just an immersion property, both of
49:55
which are true for me, then you
49:57
should probably think that the United States
49:59
is conscious. which I don't think. But
50:01
my reason for thinking that is
50:03
not thinking that it's impossible in
50:05
principle, but I think that there
50:07
are questions of time scales and
50:09
integration that aren't quite... appreciated in
50:12
most discussions of what consciousness is.
50:14
When we think about consciousness, we
50:16
think about not just a person
50:18
contemplating themselves, we also think about
50:20
their interactions with other people, right?
50:22
And, you know, people just are
50:24
smaller and quicker than countries or
50:26
corporations. They can have a lot
50:28
of thoughts in a very short
50:30
period of time, and those thoughts
50:32
are kind of coherent. You know,
50:34
we know that in the brain
50:36
lots of incoherent things are going
50:38
on, lots of different parts of
50:40
the brain. are bouncing back and
50:42
forth and interacting with each other
50:45
much like a country or a
50:47
corporation. But in physics terms you
50:49
would say that the bouncing around
50:51
is tightly coupled, right? Like there's
50:53
part of your brain that's literally
50:55
right next to the other part
50:57
of your brain and very very
50:59
quickly exchanging information and coming to
51:01
some equilibrium or consensus or whatever
51:03
in ways that doesn't quite happen
51:05
for a country or a corporation.
51:07
So I think that you know
51:09
there are... details about what is
51:11
necessary to say that a group
51:13
is truly conscious that tend to
51:15
be absent in these dilute large-scale
51:17
things like countries or corporations. But
51:20
that's more or less a feeling.
51:22
There's nothing quantitative there. I'm open
51:24
to the possibility. I guess I
51:26
would need some operational. way of
51:28
thinking about it. What is the
51:30
difference that it makes to thinking
51:32
about the behavior of a country
51:34
or corporation to say that it
51:36
is conscious or not? I think
51:38
that when it comes to human
51:40
beings, we invent the concept of
51:42
consciousness because it is explanatory. It
51:44
helps us understand how people are
51:46
behaving. Oh, this person is conscious
51:48
of this happening and that's why
51:50
they did this other thing. Not
51:53
sure that that talk is very
51:55
useful when it comes to countries
51:57
or corporations, but, you know, maybe
51:59
in some circumstances it is. I'm
52:01
open to the possibility. Morrison Chady
52:03
or Chaddy says, when I was
52:05
in high school we were told
52:07
that the 19th century scientists were
52:09
looking for a medium which they
52:11
called ether in which light waves
52:13
would propagate. Eventually, the theory of
52:15
electromagnetism established that there was no
52:17
such medium. Yet I can't help
52:19
but think that the original view
52:21
was vindicated by quantum field theory.
52:23
Isn't the electron field of quantum
52:26
field theory the equivalent of ether?
52:28
No. It is not the equivalent
52:30
of ether. I have answered this
52:32
question or talked about it in
52:34
various times, but it's been a
52:36
while, so let's address it again.
52:38
The fields of quantum field theory
52:40
are just the quantum versions of
52:42
the fields of classical field theory.
52:44
So if you think that classical
52:46
electromagnetism, which is a classical field
52:48
theory, doesn't need ether, then you
52:50
think that quantum fields don't need
52:52
ether either. The point is that
52:54
either was supposed to be, like
52:56
you say, a medium in which
52:58
waves propagate. Whereas in contrast... Field
53:01
theory, classical or quantum, takes the
53:03
fields as the fundamental independent entities.
53:05
The waving electron field or the
53:07
waving electromagnetic field or the waving
53:09
Higgs field or whatever, none of
53:11
these are waves in something other
53:13
than themselves. Okay, so that's the
53:15
ontological difference. And there's also a
53:17
practical difference. The whole point of
53:19
the ether in 19th century physics
53:21
was to allow for there to
53:23
be a rest frame. with respect
53:25
to which you can measure your
53:27
motion, as opposed to the naive
53:29
reading of Maxwell's equations, which say
53:31
there is no universal rest frame.
53:34
So 19th century physicists went to
53:36
great lengths to sort of bend
53:38
over backwards and figure out how
53:40
you could reconcile the existence of
53:42
a rest frame determined by the
53:44
ether with the fact that you
53:46
couldn't observe it in any way
53:48
in Maxwell's equations. And that's how
53:50
they invented things like Lorentz transformations,
53:52
even before relativity came on the
53:54
scene. But in quantum field theory,
53:56
there's no rest frame. There's no
53:58
rest frame. Everything is. perfectly relativistically
54:00
invariant. So the whole point of
54:02
the ether is completely missing in
54:04
quantum field theory. So I don't
54:07
think that's an especially useful way
54:09
of thinking about things. Mark Foske says,
54:11
you have said that it's wrong to
54:13
think of the inside of a nucleon
54:15
as a dynamic place with lots of
54:17
quarks popping into and out of existence.
54:20
To the best of my understanding, it's
54:22
Matt Strassler who popularized that very view.
54:24
Can you think of something about how
54:26
a physicist could arrive at such a
54:28
So it's certainly not Matt who popularized
54:31
that view. That view has been around
54:33
forever. This is a very very common
54:35
way that physicists talk, as if the
54:37
vacuum state or a particular state of
54:39
a proton or neutron is actually
54:42
wildly fluctuating back and forth. And
54:44
I think it's just because people
54:46
don't have what I would call
54:49
the right. philosophical view of how
54:51
to think about quantum states. There's
54:53
a relationship between our classical way
54:56
of thinking and then what happens
54:58
when we quantize it. And people
55:00
kind of are reluctant to let
55:03
go of that classical way of
55:05
thinking. I think that if you
55:08
asked any physicist, is the quantum
55:10
state of a proton in its
55:12
lowest energy state? Is it static?
55:14
Or is it dynamical? Right? So
55:16
as a literal question, you know,
55:18
there's a quantum state, sie, a
55:20
vector in Hilbert space, that represents
55:22
a single proton, alone in the
55:24
universe, in its lowest energy state,
55:26
and just ask them, is that
55:28
static or not? If they thought
55:30
about it carefully, they would tell
55:33
you is static, right? So the
55:35
question is, is that all that is
55:37
going on? If you were somehow... to observe
55:39
what is happening inside the proton over and
55:41
over again. So you make a measurement of
55:43
the proton that excites it because you're interacting
55:45
with it so it's no longer in its
55:47
ground state, but okay, now you let it
55:50
settle back down and you measure it again,
55:52
you let it settle back down and you
55:54
measure it again, or you just measure a
55:56
million protons separately, each in their ground states.
55:58
You would see different answers. Every time you
56:01
measure it, because that's the nature
56:03
of quantum mechanics, and there is
56:05
a really strong impulse when you
56:07
measure something over and over again
56:09
and see it moving around from
56:11
measurement to measurement, to think that
56:13
it's moving around when you're not
56:15
measuring it. But if you take
56:17
the point of view that the
56:19
quantum state is what really exists,
56:21
that's just not true. So I
56:23
think it's a very common view.
56:25
I think that physicists have avoided
56:27
talking to philosophers for a long
56:29
time and haven't thought about this
56:31
very carefully, but I'm going to
56:33
do my part to change their
56:35
minds. Tariq says, would you be
56:37
able to talk about information conservation
56:39
from a few perspectives to try
56:41
to help clarify what information actually
56:43
means in this context, particularly at
56:45
the quantum level, and in the
56:47
context of many worlds and why
56:49
there is such a strong perspective
56:51
that it must be conserved. A
56:54
common example that's given is if
56:56
a book is burned and you
56:58
gathered all the energy, smoke ashes,
57:00
etc. You could in principle reconstruct
57:02
the book in all respects. Binding
57:04
glue all the way down to
57:06
every atom and its state. If
57:08
they were radioactive elements in the
57:10
ink and they were decaying randomly,
57:12
as the book was burned, how
57:14
could all this be unambiguously reversible
57:16
in principle, and I don't expect
57:18
such a machine to be built,
57:20
such that no information is lost?
57:22
Yeah, I mean when you talk
57:24
about information conservation in general in
57:26
physics Let's first be clear about
57:28
what we mean by information because
57:30
lots of different people mean different
57:32
things I'm not going to go
57:34
through all the different definitions, but
57:36
the relevant one here is the
57:38
data that you require to precisely
57:40
specify the physical state of a
57:42
system So in good old classical
57:44
mechanics you imagine you have some
57:47
number of degrees of freedom, maybe
57:49
they're particles points of a field
57:51
in space, and typically the relevant
57:53
parts of information you need to
57:55
specify the state are the position,
57:57
the configuration of those degrees of
57:59
freedom, and the momentum of those
58:01
degrees of freedom, whether it's a
58:03
particle or a field or whatever.
58:05
In quantum mechanics, the state of
58:07
the entire system is generally specified
58:09
by the quantum state, the wave
58:11
function, whatever you want to call
58:13
it, the vector in Hilbert space.
58:15
There's details there about, you know,
58:17
maybe you could think of a
58:19
density operator which indicates a distribution
58:21
over possible quantum states as more
58:23
general, but that's not the point
58:25
right here. We can think of
58:27
everything as just a quantum state.
58:29
So if you give the wave
58:31
function, you've given the information, and
58:33
the statement of information conservation is
58:35
just that the amount of information
58:37
you need to specify the state
58:40
at one moment in time is
58:42
preserved over time. So if I
58:44
give you the equation, the information
58:46
to specify the state at one
58:48
moment, and I use the Schrodinger
58:50
equation to evolve it forward in
58:52
time. I can also go backward.
58:54
The information that was in the
58:56
original state is preserved. It's modified
58:58
by the fact that it's evolving
59:00
under the Schurner equation, but it's
59:02
still there. If you know the
59:04
Schurner equation, you can figure out
59:06
from the future state what the
59:08
past state was. Now, quantum mechanics.
59:10
raises a complication here because there's
59:12
such a thing called measurement. The
59:14
way that we usually talk about
59:16
quantum mechanics is there are two
59:18
different ways that a quantum state
59:20
can evolve. When you're not measuring
59:22
it, it evolves according to unitary
59:24
evolution, which is a fancy way
59:26
of saying it obeys the shorteninger
59:28
equation. But when you measure it,
59:30
the wave function collapses. Of course,
59:32
in many worlds, you interpret that
59:35
measurement event as actually just a
59:37
branching of the wave function. so
59:39
that the wave function as a
59:41
whole just does unitary evolution. But
59:43
inside a branch, which is where
59:45
actually observers live, they do not
59:47
see unitary evolution. They see wave
59:49
functions collapsing when measurement is done.
59:51
But of course, there's a more
59:53
sophisticated notion of what measurement means
59:55
in many worlds. It doesn't actually
59:57
require any conscious being to measure
59:59
it. It just requires... decoherence and
1:00:01
branching of the wave function. So, whether
1:00:03
or not information is conserved just
1:00:05
depends on what kind of evolution
1:00:08
you're talking about. In the overall
1:00:10
unitary evolution of the wave function
1:00:12
in many worlds, information is conserved.
1:00:14
In Copenhagen or objective collapse models,
1:00:16
it would not be. conserved. But
1:00:18
from the perspective of an observer
1:00:21
in a branch, that information is
1:00:23
completely lost because you do not
1:00:25
see the entire wave function of
1:00:27
the universe. So if you burn
1:00:29
a book or burn something else
1:00:31
in a fire and try to
1:00:34
collect all the information about it,
1:00:36
and like you say, in the
1:00:38
process there's some radioactive decay in
1:00:40
the wave function of the universe
1:00:42
branches, then there is no way.
1:00:44
in principle or in practice for
1:00:46
you to accumulate all the information
1:00:48
that was in the book ahead
1:00:50
of time. The statement is that
1:00:52
it's there in the wave function
1:00:54
of the universe, but that's very
1:00:56
different than saying you can actually
1:00:58
recover it somehow. So those kinds
1:01:00
of thoughts experiments are always a
1:01:03
little bit unrealistic and in fact
1:01:05
are super duper unrealistic if you
1:01:07
believe in branching of the wave
1:01:09
function. But it's just a statement
1:01:11
about the unitary evolution part of
1:01:14
quantum mechanics, not a statement about
1:01:16
measurement. Everyone knows that in measurement
1:01:18
information is not conserved. Nicola
1:01:20
Ivanov says, my question is about
1:01:22
possible information loss. See what I
1:01:24
did there? I put these questions
1:01:26
right next to each other because
1:01:28
they make sense together. Possible information
1:01:30
loss for a hypothetical observer when
1:01:33
our universe eventually enters the phase
1:01:35
of the dissiter vacuum. Are degrees
1:01:37
of freedom of the universal wave
1:01:39
function inaccessible hidden behind the dissiter
1:01:41
cosmological horizon for a hypothetical observer?
1:01:43
Or do they remain scrambled at
1:01:45
the cosmological horizon and somehow recoverable
1:01:47
in principle similarly to a black
1:01:49
hole horizon? Yeah, nobody knows that
1:01:51
is not something that is understood
1:01:53
for those of you who are
1:01:56
not familiar with this story You
1:01:58
know our universe is accelerating discovered
1:02:00
in 1998 and we attribute that
1:02:02
to dark energy pushing the universe
1:02:04
apart. We don't know exactly what
1:02:06
the dark energy is, but the
1:02:08
leading candidate is simply a cosmological
1:02:10
constant, a constant amount of energy
1:02:12
density. And if that's true, that
1:02:14
can stay like constant forever and
1:02:16
it will push our universe apart
1:02:19
forever and our universe will settle
1:02:21
down into a... cold, desolate, empty
1:02:23
state called dissiter space with nothing
1:02:25
in it other than the vacuum
1:02:27
energy, the cosmological constant, the dark
1:02:29
energy that is pushing the universe
1:02:31
apart. in that case we will
1:02:33
have a horizon around us, much
1:02:35
like a black hole has a
1:02:37
horizon, but in this case we
1:02:39
are looking at the horizon from
1:02:41
inside, and there's no singularity associated
1:02:43
with it. It's just a horizon
1:02:45
in the sense that if something
1:02:47
goes outside the horizon, then from
1:02:49
our point of view, it can
1:02:51
never come back. It is separated
1:02:53
by faster than speed of light
1:02:55
barrier. in the context of information
1:02:57
conservation, would you, would it be
1:02:59
right to think of things that
1:03:01
are inside our desiter observable universe
1:03:03
as going outside and being lost
1:03:05
forever? Or can they somehow eventually
1:03:08
come back? I think that the
1:03:10
simple understanding is that they're lost
1:03:12
forever. And the real difference with
1:03:14
the black hole case is that
1:03:16
a black, so there's a similarity
1:03:18
first, I should say. Again, for
1:03:20
those of you who aren't familiar,
1:03:22
both a black hole horizon and
1:03:24
a decider horizon have a temperature
1:03:26
and they have an entropy. This
1:03:28
is all very, very similar calculations.
1:03:30
When Hawking and Beckenstein first figured
1:03:32
out the stuff about black holes,
1:03:34
Hawking and Gary Gibbons soon thereafter
1:03:36
showed that the same kind of
1:03:38
thing is true for the horizon
1:03:40
and decider space. So there's a
1:03:42
temperature, there's radiation. The radiation for
1:03:44
our real world would be very,
1:03:46
very, very cold. You know, if
1:03:48
it's about... three degrees Kelvin outside
1:03:50
in the cosmic microwave background right
1:03:52
now. The eventual dissiter temperature would
1:03:54
be something like 10. to the
1:03:57
minus 30 Kelvin very roughly speaking.
1:03:59
So the point is it's much
1:04:01
much much much much lower. But
1:04:03
in principle it's there. So you
1:04:05
might ask can we get that
1:04:07
information back? The difference is black
1:04:09
holes evaporate. Decider space doesn't. as
1:04:11
far as we know. So black
1:04:13
holes don't last forever. Before we
1:04:15
knew about black hole evaporation, Allah
1:04:17
Hawking, people didn't worry that much
1:04:19
about information loss because you say,
1:04:21
well, I've thrown some information into
1:04:23
the black hole, I can't get
1:04:25
it back, but it's still in
1:04:27
there. Right? So I'm not that
1:04:29
worried about it. Whereas once you
1:04:31
know the black hole can evaporate,
1:04:33
now you're like, oh, well, it's,
1:04:35
there's no more black hole after
1:04:37
it's evaporated. There's nowhere for that
1:04:39
information to be. It must have
1:04:41
returned to us in the radiation.
1:04:43
Maybe, maybe not. You know, we
1:04:46
think that that's the nice way
1:04:48
to think about unitary evolution, as
1:04:50
just explained. But of course, we
1:04:52
don't know the ultimate laws of
1:04:54
physics yet. Decider space, however, is
1:04:56
forever. It's the attractor solution. It's
1:04:58
the equilibrium solution. It's the highest
1:05:00
entropy state the universe can be
1:05:02
in. So as far as we
1:05:04
know, that horizon just stays there.
1:05:06
And there's no sense in which
1:05:08
the information that goes beyond the
1:05:10
horizon needs to come back to
1:05:12
our observable universe. That's not to
1:05:14
say it doesn't. You know, we
1:05:16
don't. there is an open question
1:05:18
about whether or not we should
1:05:20
think of dissiter space as a
1:05:22
finite number of degrees of freedom
1:05:24
inside the horizon and an infinite
1:05:26
number outside or as a finite
1:05:28
number of degrees in degrees of
1:05:30
freedom inside the horizon and everything
1:05:32
outside is just sort of a
1:05:35
mirage. Everything that we're thinking about
1:05:37
as being outside the horizon is
1:05:39
actually encoded on the horizon and
1:05:41
there's only a finite number of
1:05:43
degrees of freedom to the whole
1:05:45
shebang. Okay, we don't know because
1:05:47
there's lots of things we don't
1:05:49
know about quantum gravity, holography, things
1:05:51
like that. But I think that
1:05:53
the easy way to think about
1:05:55
it until there's some strong evidence
1:05:57
otherwise is that the information just
1:05:59
leaves us when it crosses the
1:06:01
dissiter horizon and we're never going
1:06:03
to get it back. It's out
1:06:05
there, but we're never going to
1:06:07
be able to see it ourselves.
1:06:09
Water says, if special relativity says
1:06:11
there is no universal now, how
1:06:13
does many worlds know how to
1:06:15
split? Or when to split, sorry.
1:06:17
Many worlds is very smart. It
1:06:19
knows lots of things. I think
1:06:21
that this is an example where
1:06:24
I'm going to invoke the thing
1:06:26
that I often say, which is
1:06:28
that the idea of branching. in
1:06:30
many worlds is made up by
1:06:32
human beings. The laws of physics
1:06:34
are simply that the universe obeys
1:06:36
the Schrodinger equation. The universe is
1:06:38
described mathematically as a wave function
1:06:40
or a vector in Hilbert space,
1:06:42
and it obeys a Schrodinger equation.
1:06:44
There's nowhere in there any mention
1:06:46
in the fundamental... description of what
1:06:48
many worlds is of branches or
1:06:50
splits or anything like that. Those
1:06:52
are higher level emergent phenomena. That's
1:06:54
why David Wallace's book, former Mindscape
1:06:56
guest David Wallace, his famous book
1:06:58
about many worlds, is called the
1:07:00
emergent multiverse. And the thing about
1:07:02
emergent things is we choose to
1:07:04
define them by throwing away information,
1:07:06
right? By coarse graining or whatever,
1:07:08
by making some choices about what
1:07:10
information matters to us and what
1:07:13
doesn't. Typically in emergence and things
1:07:15
like the emergence of a fluid
1:07:17
description from a bunch of molecules,
1:07:19
there's more or less a unique
1:07:21
way. to throw away that information
1:07:23
to do the course graining. In
1:07:25
the case of the branching of
1:07:27
the wave function that's not true.
1:07:29
We can choose to let the
1:07:31
branching happen in all sorts of
1:07:33
different ways. So some people think
1:07:35
that branching should be thought of
1:07:37
as only happening inside a light
1:07:39
cone. I'm not a big fan
1:07:41
of that because I don't think
1:07:43
that light cones are fundamental. I
1:07:45
think that quantum gravity exists and
1:07:47
you should take advantage of that.
1:07:49
So what I like to say
1:07:51
is, you can do the branching
1:07:53
whatever way makes sense to you
1:07:55
as long as compatible with observationalational
1:07:57
with observationalational outcomes. In particular, in
1:07:59
terms of special relativity, saying that
1:08:02
different people are going to choose
1:08:04
different reference frames, that's just a
1:08:06
way of saying that I can
1:08:08
do the branching differently, depending on
1:08:10
what reference frame I'm in. And
1:08:12
the point is, it makes zero
1:08:14
difference to any observational outcome, how
1:08:16
you do the branching. There's no
1:08:18
right way to do it. There's
1:08:20
no implication. If I'm here and
1:08:22
I have a spin and it's
1:08:24
entangled with some spin very far
1:08:26
away, and I'm going to measure
1:08:28
it. I might use a language
1:08:30
that said, oh, the wave function of
1:08:32
the other spin collapses now in my
1:08:35
reference frame. But nobody cares what I
1:08:37
what my now is what reference frame
1:08:39
I'm in because there's no observable effect
1:08:41
at the other spin There eventually will
1:08:43
be when they measure it But that's
1:08:46
true no matter when I do it
1:08:48
or even if I'm working in a
1:08:50
frame where they measure it before me
1:08:52
the answers are all exactly the same
1:08:54
So it's completely a matter of convention
1:08:57
how we choose to describe that branching
1:08:59
process Ken Wolf says, I
1:09:01
recall you saying that you were very
1:09:03
disappointed with the transformation of Twitter into
1:09:05
X. What I have heard is that
1:09:07
under X freedom of speech was protected
1:09:09
all but unconditionally, with protection from unsavility
1:09:11
or downright harassment being almost entirely sacrificed
1:09:13
as a result. Is that your experience
1:09:15
or was there something else at play?
1:09:17
Well I think there's lots going on.
1:09:19
I don't actually spend a lot of
1:09:21
time on X anymore, so I'm not
1:09:24
going to try out a whole bunch
1:09:26
of evidence for what it's like there,
1:09:28
but when I do go there, because
1:09:30
I do post the new podcast every
1:09:32
day, every week when it comes out,
1:09:34
it's just mess. It's just unpleasant. People
1:09:36
are mean, people are jerks to each
1:09:39
other, there's an enormous amount of spam
1:09:41
and bots, and that's just not rewarding
1:09:43
for me. There's a lot of people
1:09:46
who are still there, who are still
1:09:48
there. And I wish that they were
1:09:50
on Blue Sky where I am, but
1:09:52
that's okay. We don't need one single
1:09:55
social media site for everybody. That's fine.
1:09:57
On Blue Sky, I enjoy talking to
1:09:59
people. It reminds me of what
1:10:01
Twitter used to be. There's always
1:10:03
jerks, right? There's always people, but
1:10:06
it's easy to ban people and
1:10:08
easy to block them and move
1:10:10
on. Whereas on Twitter, that's almost
1:10:12
all I do is block people
1:10:14
and very rarely get constructive engagement.
1:10:17
So yeah. So I just moved
1:10:19
over to Blue Sky, and Blue
1:10:21
Sky for various reasons is more...
1:10:23
shielded from potential future capture by
1:10:25
bad actors. We'll see if that's
1:10:28
true or not, but for the
1:10:30
moment that's true right now. Connor
1:10:32
Schaffrin says, I hope this question
1:10:34
isn't too much of a bummer,
1:10:36
but I'm just curious, how bad
1:10:39
do you think things will get
1:10:41
in the next four years? Yeah,
1:10:43
I don't know. I've mentioned before
1:10:45
that my track record for making
1:10:48
political predictions used to be very
1:10:50
good, and then starting in 2016,
1:10:52
it became very bad. So recognizing
1:10:54
my own limitations, I'm not about
1:10:56
making predictions, because my predictions have
1:10:59
been pretty reliably wrong for the
1:11:01
last decade. It could get very
1:11:03
bad. I mean, I guess... It
1:11:05
is useful to understand, even if
1:11:07
you don't want to make a
1:11:10
prediction, the range of possible outcomes,
1:11:12
right? And that includes the best
1:11:14
possible and the worst possible outcomes.
1:11:16
In my own personal view, I
1:11:18
do not think that Donald Trump
1:11:21
is a good president. I think
1:11:23
that the things he is doing
1:11:25
to the United States and to
1:11:27
the world order and to the
1:11:29
progress of science and academia are
1:11:32
terrible and bad. If you think
1:11:34
differently, you will obviously have different
1:11:36
answers to this question, just so
1:11:38
you know that that's where I'm
1:11:41
coming from. So to me, the
1:11:43
best possible outcome is the courts
1:11:45
and the rest of the governmental
1:11:47
system. constrain the Trump administration from
1:11:49
giving into their worst impulses. They
1:11:52
try to preserve most scientific funding,
1:11:54
most freedom of the press and
1:11:56
universities and so forth, all of
1:11:58
which are under threat right now,
1:12:00
to try to mostly, you know,
1:12:03
somehow or another, we don't. do
1:12:05
too much damage to our international
1:12:07
standing and alliances. That would be
1:12:09
the best possible outcome and then
1:12:11
in four years people are tired
1:12:14
of this and they throw the
1:12:16
bums out. That seems like very
1:12:18
very rosy right now. I don't
1:12:20
think it's not going to be
1:12:22
business as usual. It's not it's
1:12:25
already not business as usual. Literally
1:12:27
as I'm recording this they just
1:12:29
announced that they've cut off stipends
1:12:31
to full bright scholars. Full bright
1:12:33
scholars are you know it's a...
1:12:36
for college students who want to
1:12:38
spend a year abroad, sometimes they're
1:12:40
in the United States, but they're
1:12:42
doing something, you know, for a
1:12:45
year, something interesting because they want
1:12:47
a competition and they show that
1:12:49
they're some of the best, most
1:12:51
promising scholars we have and this
1:12:53
is their... tiny salary that they
1:12:56
pay rent on and buy groceries
1:12:58
with and suddenly the government says,
1:13:00
oh, actually we changed our mind,
1:13:02
we're not going to give that
1:13:04
to you. And they might be
1:13:07
stuck in another country or something
1:13:09
like that. This is just unconscionably
1:13:11
bad behavior on the part of
1:13:13
our government. And it's a very
1:13:15
tiny thing compared to other things
1:13:18
that they're doing, but it shows
1:13:20
how little they care about real
1:13:22
human beings and some of the
1:13:24
best human beings that we have.
1:13:26
So the worst side, the worst
1:13:29
case scenario is... that the rest
1:13:31
of the governmental apparatus lets them
1:13:33
get along, go along with their
1:13:35
plans to break everything. We essentially
1:13:38
become pariahs on the international scene
1:13:40
because Canada and Australia and Europe
1:13:42
and Japan and so forth no
1:13:44
longer think of us as reliable
1:13:46
partners and they form their own
1:13:49
organizations that exclude us. The economy
1:13:51
completely collapses because we are... firing
1:13:53
in an enormous number of government
1:13:55
workers which leads to huge amounts
1:13:57
of unemployment and then we cut
1:14:00
taxes for very rich people while
1:14:02
not doing anything for non-rich people
1:14:04
and we cut Social Security and
1:14:06
Medicaid so that very poor people
1:14:08
are worse off and we put
1:14:11
on tariffs that lead to trade
1:14:13
wars so there's enormous inflation that
1:14:15
we're going to have to be
1:14:17
faced with. All of these... are
1:14:19
super plausible. They're happening, right? Like
1:14:22
we're not making this up right
1:14:24
now. And potentially worse than that
1:14:26
is that the political system will
1:14:28
be undermined. You know, there's this
1:14:31
long-standing pattern where people on that
1:14:33
side of things make a joke
1:14:35
about something terrible and then they
1:14:37
actually do it. And right now
1:14:39
they're joking about getting Trump a
1:14:42
third term in 2028. So let's
1:14:44
just to... put the fear of
1:14:46
God into you as it were.
1:14:48
Trump became president in 2017 and
1:14:50
he's become president again now in
1:14:53
2025 and he's the same person
1:14:55
that he was but the amount
1:14:57
of damage and the swiftness that
1:14:59
he's with which he's doing the
1:15:01
damage has been ramped up enormously
1:15:04
now. Back then, he was still
1:15:06
rained in by certain expectations, right?
1:15:08
By having certain ideas of like
1:15:10
having regular old people in the
1:15:12
cabinet or in government organizations. That's
1:15:15
completely gone. Now his cabinet is
1:15:17
full of Fox News hosts and
1:15:19
loyalists who don't know anything about
1:15:21
the agencies that they're leading, but
1:15:23
they're very very loyal to Donald
1:15:26
Trump. So there's an enormous ramping
1:15:28
up of the boldness and brazenness,
1:15:30
right? Okay, keep that in mind.
1:15:32
And then think about the fact
1:15:35
that in 2020, he lost an
1:15:37
election and refused to give up
1:15:39
power. He tried his best to
1:15:41
overturn the election results and eventually
1:15:43
led to January 6th, the riot
1:15:46
taking over the U.S. capital. So
1:15:48
the sensible thing to believe is
1:15:50
that 2024, sorry, five years, three
1:15:52
years from now. So 2028. you
1:15:54
can imagine will be as much
1:15:57
worse than 2020 was as 2025
1:15:59
right now is worse than 2017
1:16:01
was. so much more brazenness, so
1:16:03
much more relying on complete control
1:16:05
of all the leavers of government
1:16:08
and having loyalists in place, you
1:16:10
know, of all the things that
1:16:12
he's done, there's things that, you
1:16:14
know, are very obvious, like tariffs
1:16:16
and things like that, that people
1:16:19
get worked up about, but the
1:16:21
complete purges of independent agency leaders
1:16:23
and... people in inspector generals were
1:16:25
supposed to control corruption and things
1:16:28
like that those people are all
1:16:30
fired right so the number of
1:16:32
things he can get away with
1:16:34
now or in 2028 are enormously
1:16:36
larger than what he could get
1:16:39
away with in 2020. So that's
1:16:41
the worst case scenario. Like, usually
1:16:43
you talk to political scientists when
1:16:45
you get like crazy political ideas
1:16:47
in your head. You talk to
1:16:50
professional political scientists and they talk
1:16:52
you down. Like, oh no, it's
1:16:54
not that bad. If you right
1:16:56
now talk to professional political scientists,
1:16:58
they will tell you, 90% of
1:17:01
them will tell you, it can
1:17:03
be much worse than you think.
1:17:05
Like, whatever crazy dream you have
1:17:07
about democracy collapsing, the Constitution being
1:17:09
overthrown, no more actual elections with
1:17:12
undetermined outcomes ahead of time, all
1:17:14
that could go. That's the worst
1:17:16
case scenario. And I think we
1:17:18
need to take that seriously. People
1:17:21
are certainly talking about that. So
1:17:23
I hope it doesn't go that
1:17:25
bad. And, you know, this is
1:17:27
not even to get into... measles
1:17:29
outbreaks and other disease outbreaks and
1:17:32
universities collapsing. We already see universities
1:17:34
stopping letting new students in because
1:17:36
they can't afford it. New graduate
1:17:38
students at a lot of major
1:17:40
universities. The amount of bad that
1:17:43
it can be is really really
1:17:45
really bad so I think that
1:17:47
even though the range of possibilities
1:17:49
is still broad it's prudent to
1:17:51
plan for the worst and to
1:17:54
see what we can do to
1:17:56
prevent it. Justin Proctor says I
1:17:58
have to fly back to... East
1:18:00
to visit families. as someone who
1:18:02
does a lot of traveling for
1:18:05
work, do you feel as safe
1:18:07
flying now after the recent cuts
1:18:09
to the FAA and increase in
1:18:11
collisions and near collisions as before?
1:18:13
Well, no, certainly not as safe
1:18:16
as before, but still pretty darn
1:18:18
safe. I have no problems flying.
1:18:20
Flying until very recently was actually
1:18:22
super duper safe. You know, congratulations
1:18:25
to the FAA and to the
1:18:27
airline industry, etc. the idea of
1:18:29
taking a giant metal bird and
1:18:31
flinging it across the country seems
1:18:33
a little dicey but we don't
1:18:36
really have air crashes anymore because
1:18:38
we have built in an enormous
1:18:40
amount of safety is much safer
1:18:42
than driving a car or something
1:18:44
like that. But yes, one of
1:18:47
the very bad things that is
1:18:49
going on right now is cutting
1:18:51
people from the FAA. generally degrading
1:18:53
our ability to take care of
1:18:55
these things, shifting from well-established procedures
1:18:58
to letting Elon Musk's company be
1:19:00
in charge of things, it's not
1:19:02
as safe. And I think that
1:19:04
on the one hand, it's kind
1:19:06
of like climate change, right? Like,
1:19:09
you know the climate change is
1:19:11
going to increase the number of
1:19:13
unpredictable bad things happening. But when
1:19:15
you get a specific unpredictable bad
1:19:18
thing, you can't very easily just
1:19:20
say, oh, climate change did it,
1:19:22
right? You can say climate change
1:19:24
increase the chances of that happening,
1:19:26
but it's hard to get it
1:19:29
a very, very specific correlation there,
1:19:31
causal relationship there. Exactly the same
1:19:33
thing with the plane crashes that
1:19:35
we've seen and the close calls
1:19:37
on runways that we've seen. It's
1:19:40
been a little scary for some
1:19:42
people. Some people I know personally
1:19:44
have been in one of these
1:19:46
situations where the plane was landing
1:19:48
and had to actually stop landing
1:19:51
and zoom off because there was
1:19:53
by mistake another plane on the
1:19:55
runway just in the last couple
1:19:57
weeks. It's not, it's very very
1:19:59
difficult to directly associate these. these
1:20:02
events with the degradation of the
1:20:04
Federal Aviation Administration, but it is
1:20:06
not surprising that the rate of
1:20:08
those events has gone up. It's
1:20:10
still pretty low though. If we're
1:20:13
honest about it, it's still pretty
1:20:15
low right now. So I'm still
1:20:17
very willing to hop on a
1:20:19
plane. If it gets worse, then
1:20:22
that could conceivably change. Chris
1:20:24
says at some point a few
1:20:26
episodes back you made an often
1:20:28
comment about how the locality of
1:20:30
physical laws was an astonishing or
1:20:32
least unnecessary property and could be
1:20:34
viewed as a type of fine
1:20:37
tuning. I'm confused how locality can
1:20:39
be viewed as surprising. What would
1:20:41
a universe with non-local interactions look
1:20:43
like? If we'd evolve in such
1:20:45
a universe wouldn't we have a
1:20:47
different notion of distance such that
1:20:49
physical laws appear to respect our
1:20:51
idea of locality? What does distance
1:20:53
even mean if not the metric
1:20:56
that determines which things can interact?
1:20:58
Well, yeah, this is a very
1:21:00
good question. Sorry if I wasn't
1:21:02
clear about it before, but the
1:21:04
important part of this question is,
1:21:06
wouldn't you say, if we devolve
1:21:08
in a universe with non-local interactions,
1:21:10
wouldn't we just have a different
1:21:12
notion of locality, such that the
1:21:14
physical laws appear to respect those
1:21:17
different laws? So the implication there
1:21:19
is that given any set of
1:21:21
interactions, it must be possible to
1:21:23
organize them so that things interact
1:21:25
readily when they're near... nearby under
1:21:27
some definition of locality, but not
1:21:29
when they're far away under some
1:21:31
definition of locality. But the mathematical
1:21:33
fact is there's no reason that
1:21:36
that kind of organization must apply
1:21:38
to hypothetical laws of physics. If
1:21:40
you think about locality as we
1:21:42
have it in the real world,
1:21:44
given that the real world is
1:21:46
governed by quantum field theory to
1:21:48
a good approximation, we can sort
1:21:50
of chop up the world into
1:21:52
regions of space, you know, little...
1:21:54
tiny one cubic nanometer regions, okay,
1:21:57
like little boxes all over the
1:21:59
world. And according to the rules
1:22:01
of quantum field theory, Each little
1:22:03
box will interact directly under the
1:22:05
laws of physics with its nearest
1:22:07
neighbor boxes. Okay? It doesn't interact
1:22:09
directly with boxes far away at
1:22:11
all or even a little bit
1:22:13
away, even one centimeter away. It
1:22:16
only interacts indirectly via the boxes
1:22:18
in between. Okay? That's locality. That's
1:22:20
what locality is. And... I can easily
1:22:22
imagine different laws of physics in
1:22:24
which every box interacts directly and
1:22:26
strongly with every other box. That
1:22:29
would be entirely different than the
1:22:31
laws of physics that we have
1:22:33
right now, and there wouldn't necessarily
1:22:35
be any way to organize some
1:22:38
things such that it looked local.
1:22:40
This is even a proven result.
1:22:42
There's a paper called locality from
1:22:45
the spectrum. by Jordan-Kottler at all,
1:22:47
and they showed that a generic
1:22:49
set of laws of physics isn't
1:22:51
local at all. So it is sort
1:22:54
of a mathematical fact that in the
1:22:56
space of all possible laws, ones that
1:22:58
admit some notion of locality are a
1:23:00
tiny subset. Of course you're right that
1:23:02
the notion of locality isn't given to
1:23:05
you by God ahead of time. If
1:23:07
you do have some laws of physics
1:23:09
that allow for the existence of some
1:23:11
notion of locality, you can go and
1:23:13
find it, right? And then you can
1:23:15
do your best. But it's not at
1:23:18
all something that is necessary under
1:23:20
any possible laws of physics. Pete
1:23:22
Harlan says, I've heard you say
1:23:24
that effective field theories choose a
1:23:26
cutoff for maximum energies in order
1:23:28
not to blow up. Does anyone
1:23:31
think that there actually is a
1:23:33
theoretical limit on maximum energy? Yeah,
1:23:35
sure. Plenty of theories do that.
1:23:37
The sort of most straightforward way
1:23:39
to do that is to really
1:23:41
imagine that there is a smallest
1:23:43
distance, right? That there is some...
1:23:45
minimal length scale in nature. Because
1:23:48
you know that in whenever you
1:23:50
have a field theory, if your
1:23:52
wavelength is shorter, the energy of
1:23:54
the wave that you're thinking about
1:23:57
is higher. So short wavelengths correspond
1:23:59
to high... energies, so if there's
1:24:01
a shortest possible wavelength, there is a
1:24:03
maximum possible energy. And plenty of approaches
1:24:05
to quantum gravity try to do that.
1:24:07
Arguably loop quantum gravity tries to do
1:24:10
that. I think that that way of
1:24:12
doing quantum gravity is not right. It
1:24:14
takes locality too seriously, and it's not
1:24:16
going to be able to... to recover
1:24:18
holography black hole information conservation, things like
1:24:21
that. Now maybe those things aren't true.
1:24:23
So, okay, maybe that does actually work,
1:24:25
but I think that there's good reason
1:24:27
to think that those things are true.
1:24:29
So relying too heavily on locality, I
1:24:32
don't think is the way to go.
1:24:34
But in a very different way, string
1:24:36
theory has a kind of maximum energy
1:24:38
because there's the plank scale or the
1:24:40
string scale. There's a kind of duality,
1:24:43
and this is very vague because it
1:24:45
happens under some circumstances, but not others,
1:24:47
but just to give you an idea,
1:24:49
if you have string theory and there's
1:24:51
an extra dimension in the shape of
1:24:53
a circle, you can imagine wrapping a
1:24:56
string around the circle, right? And you
1:24:58
can imagine wrapping it once or twice
1:25:00
or three times or whatever, or you
1:25:02
can imagine taking a string and not
1:25:04
wrapping it around the circle, but letting
1:25:07
it travel. around the circle with a
1:25:09
certain momentum. It turns out that there's
1:25:11
a duality where you can trade one
1:25:13
for the other. Having a string moving
1:25:15
really fast is kind of like having
1:25:18
it wrapped around in some, there's some
1:25:20
map between those possibilities anyway. So basically,
1:25:22
this is, I'm not doing a very
1:25:24
good job of explaining this, but the
1:25:26
upshot is that if you try to
1:25:29
imagine scattering two strings at super duper
1:25:31
high energy, it turns into the equivalent
1:25:33
of a low energy. interaction in some
1:25:35
other perspective, some other point of view.
1:25:37
It's not quite a hard cutoff on
1:25:39
maximum energy because that probably wouldn't work
1:25:42
anyway, but it's sort of effectively that.
1:25:44
You know, you can't be too naive
1:25:46
about this because energy is not a
1:25:48
larynx invariant concept. The energy that a
1:25:50
particle has depends on the reference frame
1:25:53
in which you're measuring it. So you
1:25:55
have to be a little more subtle
1:25:57
about talking about a theoretical limit on
1:25:59
the... scattering the energy that is exchanged
1:26:01
from one particle to another in the
1:26:04
center of mass frame or something like
1:26:06
that. But yeah, so you can imagine
1:26:08
that. All of this is very far
1:26:10
away from how we use effective field
1:26:12
theories in the real world, because in
1:26:14
the real world, in the real world
1:26:17
in the sense of actual effective field
1:26:19
theories used to make predictions in nuclear
1:26:21
physics or something like that, the cutoffs
1:26:23
that we use are far, far below,
1:26:25
the plank scale or anything to do
1:26:28
with quantum gravity. The
1:26:30
great deceiver says, I haven't heard
1:26:32
you talk too much about the
1:26:34
large-scale structure of the universe, filaments
1:26:36
and super voids and all that
1:26:38
fun stuff. I was wondering if
1:26:40
the galactic clustering, in terms of
1:26:42
these immense filaments, comes out of
1:26:44
GR and its math or even
1:26:46
other theories models like inflation. Yeah,
1:26:48
it basically does, but of course
1:26:50
there are details that are going
1:26:52
to matter. The story is that
1:26:54
we have from inflation or from
1:26:56
some other... theory of initial conditions,
1:26:58
whatever that turns out to be,
1:27:00
the early universe is pretty smooth
1:27:02
but not exactly smooth. So there
1:27:04
are fluctuations with different amounts of
1:27:06
noticeability on different length scales, but
1:27:08
on every length scale there are
1:27:10
some kinds of fluctuations and they're
1:27:12
generally small in the early universe.
1:27:14
One part in 10 to the
1:27:16
5, so a hundred thousandth. So
1:27:18
if there's a region of space
1:27:20
that has a hundred thousand particles,
1:27:22
the region next to it might
1:27:24
have a hundred thousand and one
1:27:26
or 99, nine hundred nine parts.
1:27:28
right? That's the kind of fluctuation
1:27:30
we're talking about. And then over
1:27:32
time, as the universe expands and
1:27:34
dilutes, gravity pulls together matter from
1:27:36
the slightly over-dense regions by pulling
1:27:38
matter out of the slightly under-dense
1:27:40
regions, so the universe becomes more
1:27:43
contrasty and it becomes more lumpy
1:27:45
in some regions, emptier in other
1:27:47
regions. That's exactly what is predicted
1:27:49
by general relativity plus cosmology plus
1:27:51
initial conditions, and that's exactly what
1:27:53
we see. in the universe today.
1:27:55
Now the details happen because you
1:27:57
know you have dark matter and
1:27:59
you have ordinary matter and you
1:28:01
have magnetic fields and you have
1:28:03
light in the universe heating things
1:28:05
up and you have x-rays and
1:28:07
you have supernovae exploding and injecting
1:28:09
energy into the world around them.
1:28:11
So the whole thing is kind
1:28:13
of a mess. It's what is
1:28:15
called gastrophysics by theoretical physicists who
1:28:17
find it a little frustrating. But
1:28:19
having said all that we try
1:28:21
to do our best, we do
1:28:23
pencil and paper, we do simulations,
1:28:25
we collect as much data as
1:28:27
we can. There is right now
1:28:29
a slight mismatch. between what you
1:28:31
predict the clustering of galaxies to
1:28:33
be in the current universe from
1:28:35
what we see at early times,
1:28:37
from the microwave background, etc. You
1:28:39
make a prediction and it's not
1:28:41
quite right. This is called the
1:28:43
S... You may have heard of
1:28:45
the Hubble tension. We talked to
1:28:47
Adam Reese on the podcast some
1:28:49
time ago. If you infer the
1:28:51
current Hubble constant by looking at
1:28:53
the microwave background versus if you
1:28:55
measure the current Hubble constant directly,
1:28:57
you get slightly different answers with
1:28:59
a statistically significant difference. And the
1:29:01
same thing is true for the
1:29:03
amount of clustering. And it's called
1:29:05
S8 because that's just S sub
1:29:07
8 is the number that you
1:29:09
use to have the best constrained
1:29:11
characterization of how much clustering there
1:29:13
is in the current. universe. Maybe
1:29:15
it will go away when data
1:29:17
becomes better. Maybe it's signal that
1:29:19
something really interesting is going on.
1:29:21
That's why we do science because
1:29:23
we don't know ahead of time.
1:29:25
David Maxwell says, your chat with
1:29:27
Blaiseggari Yarkas added to my growing
1:29:29
impression that life at its most
1:29:31
basic is, if not inevitable, highly
1:29:33
likely in any environment that permits
1:29:35
enough complexity. How have your credences
1:29:37
changed over time? Is any Fermi
1:29:39
paradox bottleneck at abiogenesis, multi-cellularity, sentions,
1:29:41
or somewhere else? You know I
1:29:44
do think that Blaze's results increased
1:29:46
my credence that some kind of
1:29:48
life is easier to get started
1:29:50
or more likely to get started
1:29:52
than you might have thought. But
1:29:54
if you might have thought that
1:29:56
that number was incredibly small to
1:29:58
begin with and maybe it didn't
1:30:00
really do a lot to update
1:30:02
your credences. Again, I'm actually pretty
1:30:04
open-minded about this. I do tend
1:30:06
to think that there are not
1:30:08
hyper-advised technological civilizations here in our
1:30:10
Milky Way galaxy for the simple
1:30:12
reason that it would have been
1:30:14
too easy to notice them already
1:30:16
and we haven't. That could be
1:30:18
wrong. There could be some reason
1:30:20
why they're hiding from us. But
1:30:22
it's much easier for me to
1:30:24
imagine that they're just not there,
1:30:26
either because life is rare or
1:30:28
complex life is rare or something
1:30:30
like that. But I'm open to all
1:30:32
those possibilities. Maybe life is ubiquitous, but
1:30:34
it never becomes complex, or just typically
1:30:36
it takes a trillion years to become
1:30:38
complex and the universe hasn't been around
1:30:40
long enough for that to happen. Tim
1:30:43
Converse says, one possible explanation of the
1:30:45
Fermi paradox is that life or intelligent
1:30:48
life is super rare and extremely unlikely
1:30:50
to arise. Maybe I should have, maybe
1:30:52
I thought of grouping these together, but
1:30:54
just didn't pull it off. If this
1:30:56
were true and it turned out that
1:30:58
say we are the only exemplar in
1:31:00
10 to the 23 star systems, would
1:31:03
it undercut a scientific approach to the
1:31:05
origins of life that prefers likely explanations
1:31:07
of what we see? Rarity like that
1:31:09
would seem to open the door to
1:31:11
boltsman brain-like starting events. of RNA occurring
1:31:13
by chance. Could a journal reviewer of
1:31:16
the future say, if you're proposed mechanisms
1:31:18
for the origin of life or intelligent
1:31:20
life or correct, then we would expect
1:31:23
life or intelligent life to be common,
1:31:25
but it is not common so we
1:31:27
recommend rejection? Well... Yes, my general answer
1:31:29
to the question is yes. I'm made
1:31:32
uncomfortable by the invocation of boltsman brain-like
1:31:34
things because boltsman brains are truly truly
1:31:36
truly truly truly truly unlikely You know
1:31:38
there's you got to do the math
1:31:41
here and you got to say that
1:31:43
the actual boltsman brains are just very
1:31:45
very unlikely So I think what you
1:31:47
mean is in order for life to
1:31:49
start did there need to be something
1:31:52
that was simply a random fluctuation that
1:31:54
under ordinary circumstances we would think is
1:31:56
very unlikely but because the universe is
1:31:58
big enough it happened to have occurred. And
1:32:01
yeah, I think that's absolutely a
1:32:03
possible thing to ultimately come out
1:32:05
as true. That's why I don't
1:32:07
put a lot of evidentiary value
1:32:09
on the fact that we exist
1:32:12
here. There is truly an anthropic
1:32:14
consideration. We wouldn't be having this
1:32:16
conversation unless we existed. So the
1:32:18
fact that we exist does count
1:32:21
as evidence that life is possible.
1:32:23
but it really gives zero impact
1:32:25
on how likely life is. It
1:32:27
doesn't help us distinguish between the
1:32:30
hypothesis where life happens on 10%
1:32:32
of habitable worlds in the universe
1:32:34
and the hypothesis where life happens
1:32:36
on 10 to the minus 100
1:32:38
habitable worlds in the universe. They're
1:32:41
both completely consistent with us being
1:32:43
here, so there's no evidence one
1:32:45
way or the other. If we
1:32:47
improve our understanding of biochemistry and
1:32:50
geology and all those things, to
1:32:52
say that under conditions that typically
1:32:54
occur on a planet in our
1:32:56
observable universe, the chance of life
1:32:58
starting is 10 to the minus
1:33:01
100, then indeed any new theory
1:33:03
that implied that the chances were
1:33:05
much greater than that would be...
1:33:07
counter-indicated would be ruled out if
1:33:10
you want to put it that
1:33:12
way, but I don't think it's
1:33:14
anything special about life or Fermi
1:33:16
paradox or anything like that here
1:33:18
It's just saying that if your
1:33:21
theory is making predictions that are
1:33:23
completely violated by the world in
1:33:25
which we live Your theory is
1:33:27
not going to get a lot
1:33:30
of traction Anonymous says, have
1:33:32
you ever had a million dollar
1:33:34
year? I just want to know
1:33:36
that my boy Sean is securing
1:33:38
the bag. I have not been
1:33:40
securing the bag that well. Look,
1:33:42
I'm doing fine. I don't, you
1:33:45
know, we don't go into personal
1:33:47
details here, but I've certainly never
1:33:49
complained compared to many people in
1:33:51
the world about how much money
1:33:53
I'm making or anything like that,
1:33:55
but a million dollars in a
1:33:57
year is not something that I
1:33:59
have ever gotten or I've ever
1:34:01
threatened to get or ever expected
1:34:03
to get in my life. But
1:34:06
that's okay, you know, you can
1:34:08
do pretty well with less than
1:34:10
a million dollars a year. Roland
1:34:12
Weber says, how do we know
1:34:14
that gravity was strong near the
1:34:16
Big Bang? Is that a prediction
1:34:18
from running models of the universe
1:34:20
backwards in time and hitting singularities
1:34:22
or do we have direct evidence?
1:34:24
Is that even a valid distinction
1:34:27
or does everything we can observe
1:34:29
today have to be processed through
1:34:31
models and projected back in time
1:34:33
to tell us about the state
1:34:35
of the universe near the Big
1:34:37
Bang? Well, to say that gravity
1:34:39
is strong, there's two different... possible
1:34:41
construals there. One is that as
1:34:43
a force between two particles, gravity
1:34:45
was stronger near the Big Bang.
1:34:47
And that's false. At least we
1:34:50
have no evidence of that. We
1:34:52
have very good evidence that the
1:34:54
strength of gravity in terms of
1:34:56
Newton's constant was more or less
1:34:58
the same, to within 10% of
1:35:00
its current value a minute after
1:35:02
the Big Bang, during Big Bang
1:35:04
nucleosynthesis. When people, including myself, say
1:35:06
that gravity was strong near the
1:35:08
Big Bang, what you mean is
1:35:11
not... on a particle-by-particle basis, you
1:35:13
just mean that there's a lot
1:35:15
more density of particles. So gravity
1:35:17
is stronger on Jupiter than on
1:35:19
Earth, because Jupiter is more massive,
1:35:21
not because Newton's constant is different.
1:35:23
In the early universe, we have
1:35:25
super-duper practically irrefutable evidence that the
1:35:27
density of matter was very, very
1:35:29
high. So in that sense, gravity
1:35:32
was just strong. You don't need
1:35:34
anything fancy. To say that that's
1:35:36
true, you just need to understand
1:35:38
the fact that the universe is
1:35:40
expanding plus ordinary general relativity. Dario
1:35:42
Kubler says for an isotropic photon,
1:35:44
isotropic photon source, the received signal
1:35:46
intensity at a given distance is
1:35:48
modulated by the mass distribution along
1:35:50
the optical path. This implies that
1:35:53
the perceived brightness of distance sources,
1:35:55
particularly a cosmological distances, may be
1:35:57
influenced by mass distributions beyond our
1:35:59
observable horizon, potentially impacting brightness estimations.
1:36:01
Could this phenomenon introduce systematic errors
1:36:03
in the standardized luminosity of type
1:36:05
1A supernov? thereby affecting cosmological distance
1:36:07
measurements and ultimately our understanding of
1:36:09
the universe is accelerated expansion. In
1:36:11
principle, yes, this is a very
1:36:13
well-known phenomenon. This is gravitational lensing.
1:36:16
There are different regimes in which
1:36:18
gravitational lensing can happen, so there's
1:36:20
weak lensing and strong lensing. Strong
1:36:22
lensing is... roughly speaking, when you
1:36:24
have a gravitating source that is
1:36:26
so strong that it creates multiple
1:36:28
images of a source in the
1:36:30
background. And when you have strong
1:36:32
lensing, the total luminosity that you're
1:36:34
measuring can be dramatically changed by
1:36:37
that event. But strong lensing is
1:36:39
relatively rare. It happens, but astronomers
1:36:41
are very happy when they see
1:36:43
it. It leads to beautiful pictures.
1:36:45
You can just Google strong gravitational
1:36:47
lens, get all these multiple images,
1:36:49
etc. But it's the rarer thing.
1:36:51
The more interesting thing is weak
1:36:53
gravitational lensing, which as you might
1:36:55
expect is weaker, but also more
1:36:58
ubiquitous. It's everywhere. So plenty of
1:37:00
people have done research on asking
1:37:02
the question, what is the effect
1:37:04
of weak gravitational lensing on the
1:37:06
inferred brightness of distant supernovae? The
1:37:08
answer is not that much. It's
1:37:10
weak, right? And you know, overall
1:37:12
balances out. Sometimes you increase the
1:37:14
brightness a little bit, sometimes you
1:37:16
decrease it, but there's very very
1:37:19
strong evidence that for whatever reasons,
1:37:21
once you apply a certain correction
1:37:23
relative to the time it takes
1:37:25
the supernova to increase and then
1:37:27
decrease in brightness, Type 1A supernovae
1:37:29
at fixed red shifts all have
1:37:31
the same brightness. So there can't
1:37:33
be a huge effect of lensing
1:37:35
because sometimes it would increase the
1:37:37
brightness, sometimes it would decrease it,
1:37:39
and that simply is not seen
1:37:42
in the data. And that's consistent
1:37:44
with the theoretical predictions, so I
1:37:46
think that that is pretty much
1:37:48
under control. Reese Johns says, could
1:37:50
Laplace's demon know next? No. I
1:37:52
think maybe this isn't always clear.
1:37:54
Maybe I don't even say it
1:37:56
because it's just so clear to
1:37:58
me that I don't bother. Laplace's
1:38:00
demon doesn't live in the universe.
1:38:03
Even if you imagine, it's just
1:38:05
a thought experiment, it's not true,
1:38:07
but if you imagine the thought
1:38:09
experiment where there is a demon
1:38:11
with a vast intelligence who knows
1:38:13
everything in the universe well enough
1:38:15
to predict what will happen next,
1:38:17
You can't imagine that that demon
1:38:19
is part of the universe, a
1:38:21
subset of the universe, right? Because
1:38:24
it can't have enough storage capacity
1:38:26
in its brain to keep track
1:38:28
of literally everything defining itself plus
1:38:30
everything defining the rest of the world.
1:38:32
So in any construal of what Laplace's
1:38:34
demon is, it has to be outside.
1:38:36
of the universe, it can't be part
1:38:38
of it. So in particular when we
1:38:40
say Laplace's demon knows what's going to
1:38:42
happen next in the universe, that does
1:38:44
not include Laplace's demon itself. Laplace's demon
1:38:46
can't even interact with the universe because
1:38:48
if it could, it would have to
1:38:50
be considered to be part of it
1:38:52
and it wouldn't be able to make
1:38:54
those predictions. EMB asks a
1:38:56
stupid procedural question. Is it okay when you
1:38:58
have these AMAs to re-ask a question that
1:39:01
you didn't pick for a previous EMA? This
1:39:03
is a bit thorny because there's no way
1:39:05
to know if you didn't pick it previously
1:39:07
for time or just because it wasn't a
1:39:10
good question. This of course excludes priority questions.
1:39:12
So I mentioned this in the intro, and
1:39:14
so I hope it's clear. Of course it's
1:39:16
okay. You're welcome to ask whatever questions you
1:39:18
want. Go ahead. And I might even pick
1:39:21
them. But you're right. I do not go
1:39:23
through all the questions that are
1:39:25
not picked and provide explanations as
1:39:28
to why I didn't do it.
1:39:30
But hopefully, you know, through my
1:39:32
explicit instructions, plus abstracting from what
1:39:35
kinds of questions I do pick,
1:39:37
you can kind of get a
1:39:39
feeling for what kind of
1:39:41
questions get answered. You know, it is
1:39:44
a fine line. Like, I don't... answer
1:39:46
too many super personal questions, although I
1:39:48
did the how much money I make
1:39:50
one just as a joke a little
1:39:52
bit there, even though I told the
1:39:54
truth, but it was a very vague
1:39:56
truth. I don't, you know, do a
1:39:58
lot of homeworky type questions. Imagine this
1:40:00
spaceship is going at 0.99% of the
1:40:03
speed of light? Like yeah, no, that's
1:40:05
that's just not interesting to me. Something
1:40:07
that you can get more easily by,
1:40:09
you know, asking chat GPT, I think
1:40:11
is kind of a waste of my
1:40:14
time. I don't. It's a weird quirk
1:40:16
of me and I don't want to
1:40:18
blame anybody else, but I don't love
1:40:20
questions that like ask me about my
1:40:22
favorite X or like the one person
1:40:25
I wanted to meet in history or
1:40:27
you know things like that. Like I
1:40:29
just don't think that way. That's not
1:40:31
how I how I roll. And also
1:40:33
I don't like questions that I think
1:40:36
I've asked been answered many times before
1:40:38
or questions that are too long or
1:40:40
questions that are secretly trying to make
1:40:42
an argument rather than ask a question.
1:40:44
Imagine that you're having a conversation with
1:40:47
me and you want my opinion about
1:40:49
something, or you want a little bit
1:40:51
of clarification that goes beyond what you
1:40:53
could easily find on the internet. Those
1:40:55
are the questions that I think it's
1:40:58
most likely for me to pick. Short
1:41:00
versions of those. Dim Gienizos says, occasionally
1:41:02
an academic discipline originates from a non-rigorous
1:41:04
foundation. For example, Newton's study of derivatives
1:41:06
and infinitesimals were not on a rigorous
1:41:09
mathematical footing for over 100 years until
1:41:11
the advent of real analysis, which we've
1:41:13
already mentioned earlier, in the 1800s. However,
1:41:15
calculus was incredibly useful in the interim.
1:41:18
What are the most promising areas of
1:41:20
science that you believe are worth entertaining
1:41:22
even though they lack agreement with experiment?
1:41:24
Well, what just happened there in the
1:41:26
last sentence of this question? So, the
1:41:29
first part was about a rigorous mathematical
1:41:31
foundation. Then the question at the end
1:41:33
was about agreement with experiment. These are
1:41:35
two very, very different things. I think
1:41:37
that if you were to actually leaf
1:41:40
through almost all of physics and chemistry
1:41:42
and biology, which are all in their
1:41:44
ways highly mathematical, Almost none of them
1:41:46
would reach the level of rigorous mathematical
1:41:48
justification that we have in the best
1:41:51
pure math research. Scientists just like to
1:41:53
get to the answer, right? They like
1:41:55
to zoom ahead without rigorous mathematical justification.
1:41:57
Lacking agreement with experiment is an entirely
1:41:59
different thing. I'm not going to give
1:42:02
you a very good answer to this
1:42:04
because the phrase lack agreement with experiment
1:42:06
is a little bit too loose. Does
1:42:08
that mean... disagreeing with experiment? Does it
1:42:10
mean not yet making testable predictions that
1:42:13
we've been able to measure? Does it
1:42:15
mean just being too vague to even
1:42:17
talk about experiment? Does it mean having
1:42:19
made predictions that we don't have the
1:42:21
technology to test yet? All these are
1:42:24
possible and all these are going to
1:42:26
be very different. But you know, I
1:42:28
think that science is a messy thing
1:42:30
and we make progress by inventing theories.
1:42:32
gradually and trying to confront them with
1:42:35
experiment as best we can. I think
1:42:37
that sometimes people, both inside and outside,
1:42:39
but especially outside of professional science, fetishize,
1:42:41
like unless you can tomorrow do an
1:42:44
experiment that rules out or proves your
1:42:46
theory, it's not worth entertaining. That's just
1:42:48
entirely unrealistic about how science actually works.
1:42:50
Fell Trash says, do you see any
1:42:52
silver lining in the end of the
1:42:55
USFG as the leader of the free
1:42:57
world? For example, I'm not sure what
1:42:59
USFG means. I'm going to take it
1:43:01
to be something about the United States.
1:43:03
For example, the veil being lifted on
1:43:06
US exceptionalism. Clearly the matter in which
1:43:08
it's being done is unlawful and moral
1:43:10
and dumb, but what good might come
1:43:12
of it. I think it's stretching to
1:43:14
think much good might come of it.
1:43:17
You know, I never believed in U.S.
1:43:19
exceptionalism. I don't think many people believe
1:43:21
in U.S. exceptionalism. That's the kind of
1:43:23
thing that a politician might refer to
1:43:25
just as sort of a speech to
1:43:28
get hearts racing and, you know, make
1:43:30
people feel good about themselves. I don't
1:43:32
think that the world has really bought
1:43:34
into much of an idea of U.S.
1:43:36
exceptionalism. You know, correct me if I'm
1:43:39
wrong, but that's been my impression. I
1:43:41
think that the United States has for
1:43:43
a certain number of decades served as
1:43:45
a something like a good example for
1:43:47
a lot of countries in the sense
1:43:50
that we've had democratic elections, that we've
1:43:52
been relatively materially prosperous, that we've tried
1:43:54
to do some good things in the
1:43:56
world, with all the footnotes that say
1:43:58
we've done some terrible things in the
1:44:01
world, that our democracy has been very
1:44:03
flawed in various ways, that our prosperity
1:44:05
has not been shared universally. That's fine,
1:44:07
but I do think that as an
1:44:09
example to live up to, I would
1:44:12
like the United States to be doing
1:44:14
the best it possibly can. and the
1:44:16
fact that the United States starts doing
1:44:18
badly, I don't think that makes the
1:44:21
world a better place. I do think
1:44:23
that... Maybe it's good if other countries
1:44:25
in the world don't rely on leadership
1:44:27
from one particular country. A multipolar world
1:44:29
would be good in that case. I
1:44:32
have no special desire for the United
1:44:34
States to be the boss of the
1:44:36
world, certainly. That's the last thing I
1:44:38
want. But I don't want someone else
1:44:40
to be the boss of the world
1:44:43
either. And you might say I want
1:44:45
a multipolar world, but it's hard to
1:44:47
pull off because various countries are going
1:44:49
to want to be the boss, right?
1:44:51
So... I don't know. I think that
1:44:54
I would like every country to succeed
1:44:56
and be free and democratic and prosperous,
1:44:58
and that includes the United States as
1:45:00
well as everybody else. Eric says, looking
1:45:02
at websites like scale of universe.com, I
1:45:05
notice that the interesting bits like life
1:45:07
are roughly in the middle of the
1:45:09
biggest and smallest things. Is there some
1:45:11
general principle from complexity theory that would
1:45:13
make that so? I think roughly there
1:45:16
is, for one thing, you had to
1:45:18
be very careful about this claim that
1:45:20
the interesting bits are in the middle.
1:45:22
It's a very, very rough idea, right?
1:45:24
Because the smallest things, what do you
1:45:27
mean by the smallest things? Do you
1:45:29
mean an atom? Do you mean a
1:45:31
proton? Do you mean the plank scale?
1:45:33
Those are very, very different in size.
1:45:35
So it is only a very, very
1:45:38
rough guideline. But given that, I think
1:45:40
there are good reasons to expect that
1:45:42
the most small things
1:45:44
just can't be that
1:45:46
complex. There's not
1:45:49
enough room for them
1:45:51
to be complex.
1:45:53
I talk about this
1:45:55
actually in Quanta
1:45:58
and Fields in the
1:46:00
most recent book
1:46:02
because of the feature
1:46:04
of field theory
1:46:06
that we already have
1:46:09
mentioned. When you
1:46:11
try to make something
1:46:13
small in quantum
1:46:15
mechanics or field theory,
1:46:17
you increase its
1:46:20
energy. So if you
1:46:22
try to do interesting things inside an
1:46:24
atom or a proton or whatever,
1:46:26
you can only do that by adding
1:46:28
more energy than is already there.
1:46:30
And that generally means that the thing
1:46:32
just decays right away into something
1:46:34
of lower energy. So if you're very
1:46:36
small, and this is even true
1:46:38
in a sort of less dramatic sense
1:46:40
for medium small things like molecules
1:46:42
or whatever, there just isn't that much
1:46:44
room to have things arranged in
1:46:47
interesting ways to have too many moving
1:46:49
parts to be complex. On the
1:46:51
largest scales, there's just simply a matter of
1:46:53
time as we were talking about before
1:46:55
for countries being conscious. The
1:46:58
universe that we
1:47:00
observe is billions of light years
1:47:02
across. That means it takes billions
1:47:04
of years for a signal to
1:47:06
travel from one side to the
1:47:08
other. There is not enough time
1:47:10
for many interesting interactions to have
1:47:13
happened on very large scale things
1:47:15
that would let you settle into
1:47:17
some interestingly complex configuration. There's an
1:47:19
analogous thing you can say about
1:47:21
low entropy and high entropy in
1:47:23
very, very low entropy situations. You
1:47:25
can't be complex because there's not
1:47:28
enough room and not enough states that
1:47:30
look that way. In very,
1:47:32
very high entropy situations you are in
1:47:34
equilibrium and everything is smooth and
1:47:36
boring. So I think that it's not
1:47:38
a rigorous theorem, but there are
1:47:41
general reasons to expect that complexity falls
1:47:43
in the middle of these various
1:47:45
extremes. Jameson
1:47:47
says is there any reason at all to
1:47:49
find solace in the block universe? For example,
1:47:51
should it be comforting? Should it be a
1:47:53
comforting thought when dealing with the death of
1:47:55
a loved one that in some other equally
1:47:57
real past moment of time circumstances are different? I
1:48:01
don't see why it would be
1:48:03
comforting. No, I don't think that
1:48:05
that's a source of solace. I
1:48:07
mean, compared to presentism, I guess,
1:48:09
I don't think that the block
1:48:11
universe is more... comforting in any
1:48:13
way. There's a famous quote by
1:48:15
Einstein that disagrees with me here
1:48:17
saying that you know time is
1:48:19
just an illusion all moments are
1:48:21
equally real. He was trying to
1:48:23
console the I think the widow
1:48:25
or Marshall Grossman or something like
1:48:27
that. But it's a bit of
1:48:30
you know rhetoric. I don't think
1:48:32
it's very rigorous. The fact that
1:48:34
I treat moments of the past
1:48:36
and future as ontologically real has
1:48:38
no impact on how I think
1:48:40
about a loved one who has
1:48:42
just passed away. Like they were
1:48:44
always in the past, they were
1:48:46
always in the future, that doesn't
1:48:48
provide me with much solace. What
1:48:50
matters to me is what's going
1:48:52
on now. I think it's better
1:48:54
to accept what is happening in
1:48:56
the present and what might happen
1:48:58
in the future than to take
1:49:00
some weird metaphysical solace in a
1:49:03
view, a perspective on which... elements
1:49:05
of time, which moments of time
1:49:07
count as truly real. Roe says
1:49:09
Microsoft claims to have invented a
1:49:11
new state of matter, the world's
1:49:13
first topo conductor. This revolutionary class
1:49:15
materials enables us to create topological
1:49:17
superconductivity, a new state of matter
1:49:19
that previously existed only in theory.
1:49:21
Is this a real thing or
1:49:23
is it marketing BS? I'm not
1:49:25
an expert on the particular technology
1:49:27
here. The experts that I know
1:49:29
are very widely dismissive of this.
1:49:31
And it's not that hard to
1:49:33
see why they are dismissive of
1:49:36
it. A paper was written by
1:49:38
the Microsoft research team that seems
1:49:40
to be, as far as I
1:49:42
can tell, pretty careful. You know,
1:49:44
they tried to make this topological
1:49:46
configuration that might help us build
1:49:48
tolerant cubits someday down the road.
1:49:50
But they said very clearly they're
1:49:52
not sure whether they succeeded in
1:49:54
making it. And then there was
1:49:56
a press release that entirely, as
1:49:58
far as I can tell, misrepresented
1:50:00
what was the paper that way
1:50:02
overclaimed what actually happened. So in
1:50:04
between the scientists doing the work
1:50:06
and the general public hearing about
1:50:09
it, there was science that was
1:50:11
done, but a certain amount of
1:50:13
marketing BS absolutely, apparently did inject
1:50:15
itself along the way. Reese Johns says,
1:50:17
doesn't it get boring teaching students
1:50:19
the same material every year? Well,
1:50:21
I haven't been teaching students the
1:50:23
same material every year for quite
1:50:25
a long time. In my three
1:50:27
years at Hopkins so far, I've
1:50:29
taught six different courses. Never one
1:50:32
repeating. Next year, I'm hoping to
1:50:34
teach what is a repeat of
1:50:36
my philosophy of physics course from
1:50:38
a couple years ago, but... No, even
1:50:40
if I were teaching it the same material
1:50:42
every year, I don't think it really gets
1:50:44
boring. For one thing, it's a year apart.
1:50:47
A year is a pretty long period of
1:50:49
time. If another thing, you can continue to
1:50:51
get better at it. You can kind of
1:50:53
think about how to teach the material, what
1:50:55
things to include. For a third thing, the
1:50:57
students are different, right? So it's a different
1:51:00
slight experience every time. So of all the
1:51:02
things to fret about being an academic or
1:51:04
professor, teaching the same thing over and over
1:51:06
and over and over again. It's not high
1:51:08
on my list. Peter Newell says, in Newtonian
1:51:10
mechanics, I would argue that the Earth
1:51:12
orbits the Sun and not the other
1:51:15
way around, because you can construct an
1:51:17
inertial reference frame where the Earth basically
1:51:19
goes around the Sun at least on
1:51:21
the timescale of years. However, in GR,
1:51:24
the concept of a global inertial reference
1:51:26
frame doesn't really exist, so the argument
1:51:28
might break down. Here's my question. Can
1:51:30
I make an argument valid in GR
1:51:32
framework simply by asserting that Newtonian gravity
1:51:35
is the regime of GR that adequately
1:51:37
describes the situation? Sure, you can make
1:51:39
an argument, you're allowed to make
1:51:41
such an argument. I mean, basically,
1:51:43
I think that you have the
1:51:46
right facts of what the theories
1:51:48
are saying, but you're sort of,
1:51:50
as I've seen other people do,
1:51:52
clinging to the idea that, but
1:51:54
come on, really, we know that
1:51:57
the earth goes around the sun. And
1:51:59
the fact... that if you're careful
1:52:01
about what the words goes around
1:52:03
means and you're careful about how
1:52:05
we think about these things in
1:52:07
general relativity, that is not an
1:52:10
objectively true statement. There are reference
1:52:12
frames in which we describe the
1:52:14
earth as going around the sun,
1:52:16
reference frames in which we describe
1:52:18
the sun as going around the
1:52:20
earth. There is also, as you
1:52:22
point out, a Newtonian limit to
1:52:25
general relativity, and that Newtonian limit
1:52:27
is a very good approximation in
1:52:29
the solar system. And there you
1:52:31
have absolute space and time in
1:52:33
that Newtonian regime. And you can
1:52:35
make more objective statements like the
1:52:37
center of mass of the earth -moon
1:52:40
system, the barycenter around which things
1:52:42
orbit is deep within the sun,
1:52:44
not deep within the earth. So
1:52:46
there is a sense in which
1:52:48
it is objectively true, in that
1:52:50
case, that the earth goes around
1:52:52
the sun. So you can concatenate
1:52:55
these things to go from general
1:52:57
relativity to Newtonian gravity to the
1:52:59
sense in which the earth goes
1:53:01
around the sun. Or you can
1:53:03
just face up to the fact
1:53:05
that we understand the universe better
1:53:07
and the concept of one thing
1:53:10
in space objectively going around the
1:53:12
other is not perfectly well defined.
1:53:14
It's an approximation that helps us
1:53:16
under certain circumstances. So by all
1:53:18
means, refer to it when we
1:53:20
all agree on what's going on.
1:53:22
But I don't get the, there's
1:53:25
an impulse, I'm not necessarily saying
1:53:27
you have it, but there's an
1:53:29
impulse in certain circles to sort
1:53:31
of really insist that there has
1:53:33
to be some objective sense in
1:53:35
which this is absolutely true. And
1:53:37
I think that that's not quite
1:53:40
the right way to think about
1:53:42
it. Rad Antonov says, In Quentin
1:53:44
Fields, the approach in the early
1:53:46
chapters is predominantly wave function focused
1:53:48
as opposed to matrix mechanics, commutator
1:53:50
algebra, and operators as generators of
1:53:52
translations or rotations. That you adopt
1:53:55
this approach for pedagogical reasons or
1:53:57
is it a reflection of a
1:53:59
philosophical view? It's not a reflection
1:54:01
of a philosophical view. It is
1:54:03
the way that I think is
1:54:05
easier to think about these things
1:54:07
in a wide variety of circumstances.
1:54:10
For those of you who don't
1:54:12
know, you know, in quantum mechanics, going back to Heisenberg versus
1:54:14
Schrodinger, there's kind of two different ways. In fact, there's an infinite
1:54:16
number of ways, but there's two major ways to encapsulate the dynamics
1:54:18
of the system. One is to say I have a quantum state,
1:54:20
that's usually the way you hear me talking, and it obeys the
1:54:22
Schrodinger equation. So the quantum state evolves with time. And then I
1:54:25
can do things, as you know, observationally. to the quantum state. I
1:54:27
can measure a position, measure a momentum, or whatever. And I would
1:54:29
say that, oh, if a particle's moving, if there's
1:54:31
like a little wave packet that is
1:54:33
localized, then it has momentum in some
1:54:35
direction, then if I measure it at
1:54:38
this point versus another point, it will
1:54:40
have moved to left or whatever. but
1:54:42
there's an equally good way of doing
1:54:44
it, which is the Heisenberg kind of
1:54:46
way of doing it, where you don't
1:54:49
have states that evolve with time. You
1:54:51
just have the quantum state period, but
1:54:53
you have the operators, the observables, evolve
1:54:55
with time. So you just, instead of
1:54:58
saying... The observable position is a fact.
1:55:00
It does the same thing to any
1:55:02
quantum state, but the quantum states change.
1:55:04
You're saying the quantum state is a
1:55:07
fact. It is the same quantum state
1:55:09
for everything, but the observables change. It's
1:55:11
completely equivalent, and there's literally a mathematical
1:55:14
procedure to go back and forth. But
1:55:16
I do think that especially because of
1:55:18
how we think about classical mechanics, for
1:55:21
me and for many people, thinking about
1:55:23
the Schrodinger evolving quantum state way of
1:55:25
talking about things is just more natural.
1:55:28
So that's why I decided to talk
1:55:30
about it that way. I'm not trying
1:55:32
in these books which are meant for
1:55:34
a popular audience to talk about every
1:55:36
possible way of doing quantum mechanics. Hussein
1:55:39
asks a priority question. Given the political
1:55:41
climate that we live in, you've made
1:55:43
it a point to dedicate time on
1:55:45
your podcast to uplift and emphasize the
1:55:47
importance of having an objective mainstream media
1:55:49
for maintaining a healthy democratic society. However,
1:55:51
over the past 16 months, my faith
1:55:53
in the mainstream media has been significantly
1:55:56
eroded. This has been largely due to
1:55:58
the media's coverage of the war. slash
1:56:00
genocide in Gaza. I understand that this
1:56:02
is only one war in one place,
1:56:04
that the media is covering, however I
1:56:07
cannot help it separate the bias that
1:56:09
I perceive they've engaged in in their
1:56:11
coverage on Gaza and apply it to
1:56:14
the rest of their coverage. In short,
1:56:16
I can't get myself to take the
1:56:18
mainstream media as a source of authority
1:56:21
anymore. Am I wrong in how I've
1:56:23
reacted to the media's coverage? Well, you're
1:56:25
not completely wrong. There's something there, but
1:56:27
I don't. ever think it should be
1:56:30
thought of as a source of authority,
1:56:32
right? I don't, I think that was,
1:56:34
if the hope was that there's some
1:56:37
media outlet that is simply authoritative and
1:56:39
always correct and we can trust it
1:56:41
a hundred percent, I was just never
1:56:44
tended to think that way. So nothing
1:56:46
has changed for me. The things that
1:56:48
we think of as mainstream media outlets,
1:56:51
absolutely have their blind spots and their
1:56:53
biases. I don't think it's very plausible
1:56:55
to deny that that's true. But that's...
1:56:57
beside the point of whether or not
1:57:00
we would like to have an objective
1:57:02
mainstream media. I was not making the
1:57:04
argument ever that the mainstream media that
1:57:07
we have now is ideal or even
1:57:09
all that great. I was just saying
1:57:11
that it would be better to live
1:57:14
in a world where there were trustworthy,
1:57:16
objective mainstream media outlets that we could
1:57:18
have as reliable sources of facts to
1:57:21
the extent that is possible. That is
1:57:23
not something that exists. is an ideal
1:57:25
to which I think it is worth
1:57:27
moving. And therefore, the thing to do
1:57:30
is not to give up on the
1:57:32
idea of objective mainstream media. It is
1:57:34
to try to make the mainstream media
1:57:37
better, more objective, and more reliable. The
1:57:39
other thing, of course, is that if
1:57:41
you say, well, I don't like the
1:57:44
mainstream media, What is the alternative to
1:57:46
the mainstream media? And the answer is
1:57:48
almost always things that are much more
1:57:51
biased in one way or the other.
1:57:53
You might like their biases better. And
1:57:55
sometimes that's fine for certain specialized things,
1:57:57
for certain sort of opinion-based things, or
1:58:00
activism-based things. it makes perfect sense to
1:58:02
not worry about being objective and to
1:58:04
get your information from someone who aligns
1:58:07
with your pre-existing points of view on
1:58:09
things. But that's again a separate thing
1:58:11
and you better admit that if you're
1:58:14
getting all of your information from bias
1:58:16
sources intentionally, then you're going to have
1:58:18
to correct for those biases at some
1:58:20
point or another. Leon Enriquez says in
1:58:23
episode 304 James Evans mentions abductive discoveries
1:58:25
that come from the surprise and experimental
1:58:27
results that that experimental results can produce
1:58:30
on a scientist. He are used based
1:58:32
on C. as perse's ideas. By the
1:58:34
way, if you ever see C.S. perse's
1:58:37
name spelled, it looks like pierce, but
1:58:39
it's pronounced perse, I promise you. Based
1:58:41
on C.S. purses' ideas, then maybe the
1:58:44
resources for those discoveries can come from
1:58:46
other fields different from where the surprise
1:58:48
happens. In my musicology field, I find
1:58:50
a lot of truth to this. Is
1:58:53
this something you've tried successfully in your
1:58:55
field of theoretical physics? If so, what,
1:58:57
and if not why? Well, yeah, I
1:59:00
mean, you see the fruits of that
1:59:02
attempt in the podcast that you are
1:59:04
listening to. Part of my motivation for
1:59:07
doing Mindscape is to be myself personally
1:59:09
exposed to a whole bunch of ideas
1:59:11
from a whole bunch of different corners,
1:59:14
different fields, different perspectives, and so forth.
1:59:16
I could make a lot more money
1:59:18
just doing a physics podcast, you know,
1:59:20
physics news of the day or, you
1:59:23
know, spicy opinions about physics things. That
1:59:25
would be more popular. There's no question
1:59:27
about that, but it would be much
1:59:30
less useful for me. So I want
1:59:32
to hear and learn from all these
1:59:34
different fields. Obviously, I'm literally a member
1:59:37
of a philosophy department, so that is
1:59:39
a different field that has helped me
1:59:41
out a lot, but in different ways
1:59:43
there's other fields that help a lot
1:59:46
also. So I think that it's not...
1:59:48
To me, that's not a surprising thing.
1:59:50
You know, the overall piece of wisdom
1:59:53
is that the space of ideas and
1:59:55
the space of possibilities are very, very
1:59:57
large and there's no possible way for
2:00:00
a human being to think of every
2:00:02
possibility. idea or to contemplate every possible
2:00:04
possibility. We need to choose strategies for
2:00:07
working our way through these ultimately large
2:00:09
spaces, and one of them is to
2:00:11
keep being jostled by ideas from outside
2:00:13
our comfort zone. I think that's a
2:00:16
good thing to do. Nicholas Katsantonus says,
2:00:18
how can you explain and if possible
2:00:20
conceptualize how the exchange of particles leads
2:00:23
to attractive forces? Two negatively charged electrons
2:00:25
exchanging electrons exchanging photons analogized by imagining
2:00:27
two people, one throwing a ball at
2:00:30
one another and being pushed in the
2:00:32
opposite direction by throwing, but also catching.
2:00:34
That real-world example, in my understanding, is
2:00:37
explained by contact forces which themselves are
2:00:39
related to electrodynamics in exchange of particles.
2:00:41
So the analogy seems to be an
2:00:43
accessible one, but nonetheless an analogy doesn't
2:00:46
offer a true explanation. How can we
2:00:48
understand the exchange of particles leads to
2:00:50
attraction like a proton and electron coming
2:00:53
together due to opposite electric charges? Well,
2:00:55
it is not a very good analogy.
2:00:57
It is, you know, it might help
2:01:00
you a little bit, but not too
2:01:02
much. The truth is that the... force
2:01:04
between protons and electrons in a static
2:01:06
situation, i.e. an electron that is bound
2:01:09
to the nucleus of an atom, is
2:01:11
very very difficult to understand as an
2:01:13
exchange of particles. You can do it.
2:01:16
There are ways to do it, but
2:01:18
the number of particles being exchanged is
2:01:20
infinite, and there are subtleties there. It
2:01:23
is easier to understand it as a
2:01:25
static electromagnetic field than as an exchange
2:01:27
of particles. If you are scattering dynamically
2:01:30
two particles off of each other, then
2:01:32
it's easier to understand that as an
2:01:34
exchange of photons. But they are virtual
2:01:36
photons. They are not real photons. And
2:01:39
that... changes things in important ways. I
2:01:41
talk about this also in quantum and
2:01:43
fields. The fact that they're not real
2:01:46
is true. They're not real. They're virtual
2:01:48
particles, which is a way of talking
2:01:50
about the action of the underlying quantum
2:01:53
fields, using particle-like language, even though they're
2:01:55
not real particles. And all of this
2:01:57
is a war. up to say if
2:02:00
you want to use the analogy of
2:02:02
two people throwing a baseball back and
2:02:04
forth to each other, the relevant baseball
2:02:06
has to have negative momentum. So if
2:02:09
you think about conservation of momentum, if
2:02:11
I am on a frictionless surface or
2:02:13
on roller skates or whatever, and I
2:02:16
throw a ball in one direction, conservation
2:02:18
of momentum means I move in the
2:02:20
other direction. As long as, the thing
2:02:23
I'm throwing has a positive momentum. If
2:02:25
the thing I'm throwing has a negative
2:02:27
momentum, then to conserve momentum, I need
2:02:29
to start moving in the same direction.
2:02:32
as the direction in which I've thrown
2:02:34
the ball. And you go through the
2:02:36
math and indeed, for attractive forces, the
2:02:39
virtual particles have negative momentum when they're
2:02:41
being exchanged. And if you say, but
2:02:43
particles don't have negative momentum, the answer
2:02:46
is, real particles don't have negative momentum,
2:02:48
but virtual particles have no problem with
2:02:50
that at all. Michael Kramer says if
2:02:53
Einstein had not developed general relativity when
2:02:55
he did, how soon would it have
2:02:57
been developed? Well, we don't know. I
2:02:59
don't think it would have taken that
2:03:02
long, like it wouldn't have taken 50
2:03:04
or 100 years. We already had all
2:03:06
the tools, right? We had Riemannian geometry.
2:03:09
We had special relativity. It's possible, for
2:03:11
example, that Minkowski, or Minkovsky, to be
2:03:13
a little bit more correct, would have
2:03:16
developed it. Herman Minkowski, of course, um...
2:03:18
was the first to promote the idea
2:03:20
of thinking about relativity in terms of
2:03:23
space time, and he was a mathematician.
2:03:25
He had actually taught Einstein. So it
2:03:27
was 1907, two years after Einstein's special
2:03:29
relativity papers, that Minkowski first said, we
2:03:32
should think about it in terms of
2:03:34
space time. Einstein eventually settled on general
2:03:36
relativity in 1915, but Minkowski passed away
2:03:39
in 1909. So he didn't really get
2:03:41
a chance to follow up on his
2:03:43
insight that we should think about things
2:03:46
in terms of space time. Maybe he
2:03:48
would have come up with it. But
2:03:50
you know, it's an interesting fact about
2:03:53
the progress of physics, that the progress
2:03:55
of physics on theoretical physics, is usually
2:03:57
led by physicists, not by mathematicians, with
2:03:59
overwhelming problems. Not that it's impossible to
2:04:02
imagine mathematicians doing it, but when we
2:04:04
think back to how general relativity came
2:04:06
about and there were real mathematical issues
2:04:09
there and a lot of important steps
2:04:11
were taken by mathematicians. Binkovsky is one,
2:04:13
David Hilbert of course is another, but
2:04:16
still was a physicist. It was Albert
2:04:18
Einstein who actually put it together because
2:04:20
that physics insight... about the principle of
2:04:22
equivalents and how gravity works and things
2:04:25
like that. That's the bread and butter
2:04:27
of physicists, not mathematicians. The question is,
2:04:29
was there any other physicist who would
2:04:32
have thought the same way as Einstein?
2:04:34
There were certainly physicists who had the
2:04:36
same mathematical chops that Einstein did, but
2:04:39
the physical insight that he had was
2:04:41
unmatched since Galileo, basically, and still been
2:04:43
unmatched since. So it might have taken
2:04:46
a while, but the tools were there,
2:04:48
so I don't think it would have
2:04:50
taken too long. Jonathan Bird
2:04:52
says, in physics and philosophy Werner
2:04:55
Heisenberg said, the world thus appears
2:04:57
as a complicated tissue of events
2:04:59
in which connections of different kinds
2:05:01
alternate or overlap or combine and
2:05:03
thereby determine the texture of the
2:05:05
whole. The word texture is refreshing
2:05:07
and sensual. It even feels unscientific,
2:05:10
but maybe that is a philosophical
2:05:12
problem that Heisenberg is trying to
2:05:14
get at. I'd love to hear
2:05:16
what you think about the texture
2:05:18
of the universe and the role
2:05:20
of literary emotional language in describing
2:05:22
it. Well, you know, I'm all
2:05:24
in favor of literary emotional language.
2:05:27
It's too bad that some of
2:05:29
the best physicists in the world
2:05:31
aren't the best describers or poets
2:05:33
or writers in the world. I
2:05:35
think that helps. It prevents a
2:05:37
lot of people from really feeling
2:05:39
what we physicists feel about the
2:05:41
universe in a way that I
2:05:44
would like them to be able
2:05:46
to do. Having said that, so
2:05:48
even though I'm all in favor
2:05:50
of that kind of move... Heisenberg
2:05:52
in particular in this particular passage
2:05:54
is is trying to sell you
2:05:56
something that I don't believe in.
2:05:59
This is you know Heisenberg was
2:06:01
at least as much as Neil's
2:06:03
bore the champion of the Copenhagen
2:06:05
interpretation of quantum mechanics. And it's
2:06:07
an interesting story. You know, John
2:06:09
Wheeler was another of Neil's Boer's
2:06:11
echleights. And Wheeler was, despite being
2:06:13
Hugh Everett's thesis advisor, Wheeler was
2:06:16
really an advocate of the Copenhagen
2:06:18
interpretation of quantum mechanics. And his
2:06:20
Wheeler's famous paper, It From Bit,
2:06:22
that's not the name of the
2:06:24
paper, but the quote that is
2:06:26
remembered from the paper, is It
2:06:28
From Bit. It makes people... think
2:06:31
that Wheeler was saying that reality
2:06:33
is really made of information. And
2:06:35
indeed, there's a whole large effort
2:06:37
right now called it from Cupid,
2:06:39
where we say, well, it's really
2:06:41
quantum information, not classical information that
2:06:43
is doing the work. But that's
2:06:45
not what Wheeler was on about.
2:06:48
That is not his point. His
2:06:50
point being a Copenhagen person is
2:06:52
that what really exists... is not
2:06:54
a wave function or anything like
2:06:56
that. What really exists are the
2:06:58
measurement outcomes. Done by various measurements.
2:07:00
Like before you do the measurement,
2:07:02
this is a very Heisenbergian point.
2:07:05
Wheeler was trying to say like
2:07:07
before you do that measurement, there
2:07:09
isn't any it. Right? And when
2:07:11
you do the measurement in quantum
2:07:13
mechanics, he tried to make an
2:07:15
argument that quantum outcomes are necessarily
2:07:17
discrete. That's not obvious because things
2:07:20
like position of momentum and conventional
2:07:22
quantum mechanics are continuous, but he
2:07:24
took as the paradigm the measurement
2:07:26
of a spin and you get
2:07:28
a yes-no answer. So... John Wheeler
2:07:30
knew about quantum mechanics. He could
2:07:32
have invented it from cubit himself,
2:07:34
but he didn't because he was
2:07:37
making a different point than that.
2:07:39
And that's the point Heisenberg is
2:07:41
making. When he says a complicated
2:07:43
tissue of events, that's not just
2:07:45
poetic language. He means measurement outcomes.
2:07:47
When you're not looking at it,
2:07:49
the thing doesn't exist. That is
2:07:52
the Copenhagen point of view, or
2:07:54
at least there's no sense of
2:07:56
existence that we can objectively talk
2:07:58
about. We should only talk about,
2:08:00
says the Copenhagen interpretation, the results
2:08:02
of measurement. and that's the point
2:08:04
that Heisenberg is aiming at here.
2:08:06
Henry Jacob says multiplying integers is
2:08:09
easy, factoring integers is hard. There's
2:08:11
a directionality. Can this be, can
2:08:13
this difficulty be interpreted entropically, and
2:08:15
does it have any bearing outside
2:08:17
math such as in physics? You
2:08:19
know, I don't actually know. So
2:08:21
you say, can it be interpreted
2:08:24
entropically? And I guess the question
2:08:26
is, is there a colorful analogy
2:08:28
between the two things? Entropy increases.
2:08:30
It's easy to go one way
2:08:32
rather than the other way. certain
2:08:34
mathematical processes are easy one way
2:08:36
not the other way? Or is
2:08:38
there like a really hardcore connection?
2:08:41
Can you derive one from the
2:08:43
other or something like that? This
2:08:45
statement that multiplying in is easy
2:08:47
factoring is hard. This is a
2:08:49
specific example of a more general
2:08:51
idea, as I'm sure Henry you
2:08:53
probably know, but in complexity theory,
2:08:55
like we talked with Scott Aronson
2:08:58
on the podcast some time ago.
2:09:00
One separates problems one can ask
2:09:02
into different levels of complexity and
2:09:04
there is the set of problems
2:09:06
P that are easy to solve,
2:09:08
relatively speaking. There's a set of
2:09:10
problems N.P. And N.P. is not
2:09:13
defined as problems that are hard
2:09:15
to solve. It's defined as problems
2:09:17
whose... prospective answers are easy to
2:09:19
check. Okay? So maybe there are
2:09:21
problems that are hard to solve,
2:09:23
but it's easy to check an
2:09:25
answer. Maybe there's not. That's the
2:09:27
P versus N.P. question. But most
2:09:30
mathematicians, logicians, philosophers think that P
2:09:32
and N.P. are in fact not
2:09:34
equal to each other, which is
2:09:36
a way of saying I believe
2:09:38
there are problems that are hard
2:09:40
to solve, but it's easy to
2:09:42
check a supposed solution. So that
2:09:45
isn't a directionality, an asymmetry between
2:09:47
solving and checking in general. And
2:09:49
there's other things in math that
2:09:51
are like that. Differentiation is kind
2:09:53
of easy, integration is kind of
2:09:55
hard. I don't want to say
2:09:57
that that is the same thing
2:09:59
as entropy increasing. over time. I
2:10:02
don't see why it has to
2:10:04
be, but maybe I've certainly suggested
2:10:06
myself that they sound similar in
2:10:08
some ways. Is that similarity deeper?
2:10:10
I truly don't know. Gary
2:10:13
Miller says in your October 2024
2:10:15
AMA you mentioned James the Just
2:10:17
as likely being a real person. Do
2:10:19
you think that there was historical Jesus
2:10:21
someone you could meet if you traveled
2:10:24
back 2000 years or is Jesus primarily
2:10:26
a retelling of earlier mythological figures? So
2:10:28
James the Just for those of you
2:10:31
who don't know was Jesus's brother and
2:10:33
he was a leader of the
2:10:35
Jerusalem Christians after Jesus was crucified and
2:10:37
there is you know enough... evidence in
2:10:40
the archaeological slash historical records to say
2:10:42
that James existed maybe arguably more than
2:10:44
Jesus. But of course that all depends
2:10:47
on what you think about the New
2:10:49
Testament. The books in the New Testament
2:10:51
are not eyewitness accounts. The earliest books
2:10:54
in the New Testament were written by
2:10:56
Paul and Paul never met Jesus. Paul
2:10:58
never, you know... got to know about
2:11:01
Christianity until after Jesus had already
2:11:03
been crucified. So there's nothing in the
2:11:05
in the New Testament that is an
2:11:07
eyewitness testimony. The Gospels, we believe, are
2:11:10
things that were written down decades after
2:11:12
the fact. They were passed down as
2:11:14
oral traditions before they were written down.
2:11:17
So it's not completely crazy to ask
2:11:19
whether or not Jesus could have been
2:11:21
completely made up. Like there's no such
2:11:24
person as Jesus or not, because we
2:11:26
don't have eyewitness testimony. But I
2:11:28
think that there's plenty of other kinds
2:11:30
of other kinds of testimony. unless you
2:11:33
believe that all of history is completely
2:11:35
unreliable, there's plenty of reasons to think
2:11:37
that Jesus existed. There's very little reason
2:11:40
to think that any quote attributed to
2:11:42
Jesus in the Gospels is very believable,
2:11:45
right? These are supposed to be words
2:11:47
handed down by oral traditions through decades
2:11:49
from person to person. The chance of
2:11:52
distortion or even outright fabrication are
2:11:54
very very large. So I would not
2:11:56
put a lot of credence in any
2:11:58
specific claim about what happened to Jesus
2:12:01
or what he said. but I think
2:12:03
that he almost certainly did exist. Ramone
2:12:05
Van Fleet says, how do you feel
2:12:08
about the ethics surrounding NBA player trades?
2:12:10
I've always found it somewhat curious that
2:12:12
a player can essentially be forced to
2:12:15
move to a new state, work for
2:12:17
a new employer, and leave friends and
2:12:19
family behind without any say in
2:12:21
the matter. I get that the counter
2:12:24
argument is that they're millionaires, and if
2:12:26
they want to do something else they
2:12:28
can, but it still strikes me as
2:12:31
something that we wouldn't be legal in
2:12:33
almost any other setting. You know, I
2:12:35
think it's a reasonable question to ask,
2:12:38
but I think there's another fact in
2:12:40
addition to the fact that they get
2:12:42
paid handsomely for moving around, which is
2:12:45
that you kind of need some
2:12:47
system like that. Even though we have
2:12:49
individual NBA teams, the kind of money-making
2:12:51
entity is the league, not the team.
2:12:54
I mean, de facto, that's not true.
2:12:56
De facto individual teams earn money, but
2:12:58
one team by itself. without a league
2:13:01
to play in, wouldn't earn any money,
2:13:03
okay? You need some kind of cooperative
2:13:05
agreement among many teams. And as part
2:13:08
of having revenues and having competitive balance,
2:13:10
etc., they have the idea of
2:13:12
making trades. I don't think that many...
2:13:14
players have even argued that there just
2:13:17
shouldn't be trades at all. It's interesting
2:13:19
to contemplate what that would be like
2:13:21
if there weren't trades. There's various ways
2:13:24
to imagine tweaking the system, but there
2:13:26
are often trades that benefit everybody, as
2:13:28
perhaps you know, there's certain times when
2:13:31
players demand to be traded, right? And
2:13:33
maybe that benefits both the team and
2:13:36
the player. So I think the system
2:13:38
is very far from perfect, but
2:13:40
something like the system makes sense to
2:13:42
me. Alexander Kondratzki says, one
2:13:45
aspect of quantum measurement has been
2:13:47
bothering me so please correct my
2:13:49
chain of reasoning. It seems that
2:13:51
measurement collapses or slices the wave
2:13:53
function to some eigenstate, but isn't
2:13:55
that dependent on a choice of
2:13:57
basis? Spin-up of an electron is
2:13:59
relative to what you consider. up?
2:14:01
At a fundamental level, how do
2:14:03
we force a basis when we
2:14:06
make a measurement in a laboratory?
2:14:08
Well, the answer is that we
2:14:10
choose what it is, we're going
2:14:12
to measure. So, for example, the
2:14:14
classic example of a quantum measurement
2:14:16
is the Stern-Gurlock experiment. This is
2:14:18
where you send a spinning particle
2:14:20
through an inhomogeneous magnetic field. So
2:14:22
a straight magnetic field wouldn't do
2:14:24
anything, but a magnetic field which
2:14:26
sort of pinched in one direction.
2:14:29
interacts with the spinning particle in
2:14:31
a way that if the spin
2:14:33
is up in the direction that
2:14:35
you've arranged your magnetic field then
2:14:37
the particles deflected up and if
2:14:39
it's pointed down then it's deflected
2:14:41
down and it is a fact
2:14:43
of quantum mechanics that you might
2:14:45
think well what if it's spinning
2:14:47
halfway in between what if it's
2:14:50
spinning perpendicular to the magnetic field
2:14:52
the miracle of quantum mechanics is
2:14:54
that a perpendicularly oriented spin is
2:14:56
a superposition, can be thought of
2:14:58
as a superposition, of a vertically
2:15:00
up and a vertically down, oriented
2:15:02
spin, and those two components get
2:15:04
separated by interacting with the magnetic
2:15:06
field. But you chose to orient
2:15:08
your magnetic field up and down.
2:15:11
You could also choose to orient
2:15:13
it left and right or whatever.
2:15:15
And that would correspond to measuring
2:15:17
a different fact about the spin,
2:15:19
the X-pin or the Y-spin, rather
2:15:21
than the up-up-spin or down-spin, okay?
2:15:23
So it's just a fact of
2:15:25
physics. real physical measurements happen because
2:15:27
you have an apparatus and some
2:15:29
object that are interacting with the
2:15:31
system you're measuring in some very
2:15:34
particular way and what that particular
2:15:36
field but you chose to orient
2:15:38
your magnetic field up and down
2:15:40
you could also choose to orient
2:15:42
it left and right or whatever
2:15:44
and that would correspond to measuring
2:15:46
a different fact about the spin
2:15:48
the X-pin or the Y-spin rather
2:15:50
than the upspin or downspin okay
2:15:52
so It's just a fact of
2:15:55
physics, like real physical measurements happen.
2:15:57
because you have an apparatus and
2:15:59
some object that are interacting with
2:16:01
the system you're measuring in some
2:16:03
very particular way. And what that
2:16:05
particular way is and what your
2:16:07
apparatus is doing tells me whether
2:16:09
I'm measuring the vertical spin or
2:16:11
the horizontal spin or am I
2:16:13
measuring position or momentum or whatever.
2:16:16
All these different things are measured
2:16:18
using different actual experiments. So it's
2:16:20
not like the rules of quantum
2:16:22
mechanics force it on us. It's
2:16:24
our choice of experiment forces it
2:16:26
on us. Enrique Areola says, regarding
2:16:28
the second law of thermodynamics, wouldn't black hole radiation be
2:16:30
a violation of this law, given that black holes have
2:16:32
the highest entropy possible? And that their radiation leads to
2:16:35
their eventual disappearance, which means that entropy would essentially decrease?
2:16:37
So no, because black holes do not have the highest
2:16:39
entropy possible. I kind of rained on about this in
2:16:41
my first trade book from eternity to here. In fact,
2:16:43
I upset Roger Penrose. Roger Penrose was nice enough to
2:16:45
blurb the book. But he has made this statement that
2:16:48
black holes have the highest entry possible, and it's not
2:16:50
true, and he knows it's not true. They have the
2:16:52
highest entropy possible in a given region of space. But
2:16:54
when they evaporate, when they dissolve into particles that are
2:16:56
radiated away by a hawking radiation, the particles that carry
2:16:58
away the energy are spread over a much larger region
2:17:01
of space. And you can calculate what the entropy is
2:17:03
of all the hawking radiation and is larger than the...
2:17:05
initial entropy of the black hole. It's just not squeezed
2:17:07
into a small region of space. So I pointed out
2:17:09
in the book that Penrose was wrong about this and
2:17:11
he asked me to change the phrasing to be something
2:17:14
that indicated that he knew that all along, which is
2:17:16
probably true, so I can't really complain. Dave Whipp says,
2:17:18
if I pick a few points on the edge of
2:17:20
a circle, an attempt to draw lines to the center,
2:17:22
most likely they will be at a triangle or some
2:17:24
other polygon. It's really hard to draw them precisely to
2:17:27
meet at a point. Yet the story of Hubble is
2:17:29
that when we observed a handful of galaxies moving away
2:17:31
from us, and then plotting the movement in reverse concludes
2:17:33
universe must have started from
2:17:35
a point of infinite density
2:17:37
period. What leads the conclusion
2:17:40
that radial lines must have
2:17:42
started classically from a singular
2:17:44
point rather than at some
2:17:46
region that simply was smaller
2:17:48
than today but finite? Is
2:17:50
this pop story overly simplified?
2:17:53
This is a perfectly good
2:17:55
question, and I get to
2:17:57
talk about Roger Penrose once
2:17:59
again. If the particles in
2:18:01
the universe didn't have any
2:18:03
forces acting on them, in
2:18:06
particular didn't have gravity acting
2:18:08
on them, then indeed they
2:18:10
would move on straight lines,
2:18:12
and it would be really,
2:18:14
really strange indeed to imagine
2:18:16
we could extrapolate them backward
2:18:19
to a singularity. But they
2:18:21
do have gravity acting on
2:18:23
them, and even in Newtonian
2:18:25
gravity they would come close
2:18:27
but ultimately miss each other.
2:18:29
But general relativity is different.
2:18:32
General relativity becomes stronger when
2:18:34
things become very, very dense.
2:18:36
That's why you can make
2:18:38
black holes and things like
2:18:40
that. And so it was
2:18:42
Penrose who first proved a
2:18:45
theorem that was extrapolated to
2:18:47
the cosmological case by Stephen
2:18:49
Hawking. But the theorem basically
2:18:51
says if you have enough
2:18:53
energy density in a region
2:18:55
and it obeys certain conditions
2:18:58
that are mathematically straightforward to
2:19:00
write down, then you will
2:19:02
inevitably have a singularity. This
2:19:04
is a feature of general
2:19:06
relativity. Now, general relativity might
2:19:08
not be right, who knows,
2:19:11
at large energies or something
2:19:13
like that where quantum mechanics
2:19:15
kicks in. But I think
2:19:17
it is, that's why Roger
2:19:19
Penrose won the Nobel Prize
2:19:21
for proving that singularities in
2:19:24
black holes, and also for
2:19:26
that matter in the past
2:19:28
at what we call the
2:19:30
Big Bang, are a prediction
2:19:32
of classical general relativity. Philip
2:19:34
Rothlin says, I asked GPT
2:19:37
to analyze all previously asked
2:19:39
questions in all AMAs to
2:19:41
identify recurring topics and determine
2:19:43
your areas of expertise. Based
2:19:45
on this analysis, I wanted
2:19:47
GPT to generate a fresh,
2:19:50
insightful question that has not
2:19:52
yet been asked, but aligns
2:19:54
with your knowledge. Here's the
2:19:56
question it came up with.
2:19:58
Many of your discussions revolve
2:20:00
around AI. However, one aspect
2:20:03
that hasn't yet been deeply
2:20:05
explored. how AI intersects with emerging fields like neuroscience
2:20:07
or ethics. What are some underappreciated insights or challenges at
2:20:09
this intersection that you find particularly compelling? So I
2:20:11
don't think GPD did a very good
2:20:13
job at this one. Sorry, Philip. I
2:20:16
don't think it's your fault. But, uh...
2:20:18
Of all the things to ask me
2:20:20
about, AI is a weird one, especially
2:20:22
because, you know, I have certain things
2:20:24
I feel strong about AI, but many
2:20:26
things I don't, because I try to
2:20:28
keep track of what I am not
2:20:31
an expert in. Specifically, you know, how,
2:20:33
and also the form of the question
2:20:35
isn't the best. You know, this is...
2:20:37
repeating back to the previous question about,
2:20:39
you know, can we ask questions over
2:20:42
and over again, this kind of very
2:20:44
vague open-ended question is sub-ideal. It's okay,
2:20:46
but just saying like, what underappreciated insights
2:20:48
or challenges do you find particularly compelling?
2:20:50
That's exactly the kind of question I'm
2:20:52
unlikely to answer because it's a little
2:20:54
bit too vague. If you have your
2:20:56
favorite insider challenge that you would like
2:20:59
me to comment on, you're more likely
2:21:01
to get... me to answer that kind
2:21:03
of question. I don't know. So the
2:21:05
answer is I don't know. So I
2:21:07
probably wouldn't pick this question. I'm picking
2:21:09
the question because of the cute AI
2:21:12
framing of it, but the actual question
2:21:14
being asked, I probably wouldn't pick, because
2:21:16
I don't have any special, anything especially
2:21:18
interesting to say about that, especially ethics.
2:21:21
I'm not sure why AI would have,
2:21:23
I mean, obviously there's questions about ethics
2:21:25
of AI, of, you know, could we
2:21:27
imagine building an AI that was conscious
2:21:30
and had agency and deserved rights? Those
2:21:32
are interesting questions. My answer to that
2:21:34
is we can imagine it, but we're
2:21:37
not close to doing it. But the
2:21:39
existence of AI as being something that
2:21:41
we would use to explore ethics, I'm
2:21:43
really not sure why that would happen.
2:21:46
Colin Small says you talked at
2:21:48
lengths about your love for basketball
2:21:50
as a fan, but do you
2:21:52
play basketball as well? Does Sean
2:21:54
Carroll dunk can Sean Carroll splash
2:21:57
threes? So anyone can splash threes
2:21:59
given enough... time, given enough opportunities.
2:22:01
No, I'm not very good at playing
2:22:03
basketball these days. I am of a
2:22:05
certain age where my basketball playing days
2:22:07
are largely behind me. I mean, I
2:22:09
could, but it's just that my environment
2:22:12
does not lend itself to doing that
2:22:14
very easily. I'm not so decrepit that
2:22:16
I cannot get out there on a
2:22:18
basketball court, but as a matter of
2:22:20
fact, it's been a long time since
2:22:23
I have. When I was an undergraduate
2:22:25
and even more so when I was
2:22:27
a graduate student, I was playing quite
2:22:29
regularly. And I was entirely mediocre. I
2:22:31
was, you know, in our set of
2:22:34
astronomers who made up our intramural basketball
2:22:36
team, which I was on. I was
2:22:38
not a star, nor was I the
2:22:40
worst player on the team. There was
2:22:42
no dunking involved, certainly not on a
2:22:45
regulation rim anyway. The only interesting thing
2:22:47
I can say about that is that
2:22:49
there's a chance, and I truly don't
2:22:51
know if it's true, but there's a
2:22:53
chance that I once played basketball against
2:22:56
Barack Obama. I wouldn't have known it
2:22:58
at the time, but we had an
2:23:00
intramural basketball team, and I was a
2:23:02
grad student between 88 and 93, and
2:23:04
I think that my first three years
2:23:07
there at Harvard... coincided with Barack Obama's
2:23:09
law school career at Harvard, and we
2:23:11
definitely played intramural teams from the law
2:23:13
school, and he was a basketball player.
2:23:15
So it's completely possible that I guarded
2:23:18
Barack Obama once, but I have no
2:23:20
recollection of it right now. Sorry about
2:23:22
that. Ben Lloyd says, you've talked briefly
2:23:24
a few times about the idea of
2:23:26
bubble universes being a plausible answer as
2:23:29
to how we think about this unusual
2:23:31
low entropy at the Big Bang. Do
2:23:33
you think this hypothesis is not talked
2:23:35
about enough? And if so, why? I
2:23:37
know Stephen Hawking was a proponent of
2:23:40
it, but I don't see many other
2:23:42
physicists talking about it. I'm guessing that's
2:23:44
due to it being hard to get
2:23:46
lots of empirical evidence for at the
2:23:48
moment. Also, and maybe this is a
2:23:51
silly question... But how does this hypothesis
2:23:53
align with other prevailing theories such as
2:23:55
cyclic models and inflation? Is there a
2:23:57
potential for overlap or are these theories
2:23:59
generally considered to be mutually exclusive? Well
2:24:02
certainly the way that Jennifer Chen and
2:24:04
I... imagined it in our paper from
2:24:06
2004, we use inflation as part of
2:24:08
the story, but it's not a traditional
2:24:10
eternal inflation model or a cyclic model
2:24:13
for the simple reason that those ideas,
2:24:15
again the traditional version of those ideas,
2:24:17
have an arrow of time that points
2:24:19
in the same direction for all eternity.
2:24:21
So you have to bake it in.
2:24:24
You are not explaining why there's an
2:24:26
arrow of time. You're just putting it
2:24:28
in to your hypothesis. Our attempt was
2:24:30
to explain why there's an arrow of
2:24:32
time and the way that we did
2:24:35
it was to have the arrow point
2:24:37
toward the future and point toward the
2:24:39
far far past early in the pre-big
2:24:41
bang scenario. So I think that it...
2:24:43
I would be happy if there was
2:24:46
more talk about this scenario, but you
2:24:48
know, it is based on highly speculative
2:24:50
ill-understood physics in our particular version of
2:24:52
it. I am working on a paper
2:24:54
about this scenario right now to sort
2:24:57
of push it forward, but there's a
2:24:59
lot we don't know. So, and that's
2:25:01
perfectly fine. You know, scientists will... make
2:25:03
choices about what to work on, and
2:25:05
it's not just because a question is
2:25:08
interesting, but also because they think they
2:25:10
can make progress on the question. That's
2:25:12
a perfectly legitimate idea for scientists to
2:25:14
have. I personally think that this question
2:25:16
is much more interesting than the average
2:25:19
person, because I'm very aware of this
2:25:21
arrow of time issue that I think
2:25:23
other people are not paying enough attention
2:25:25
to. Rob Patro says, Doge and
2:25:27
the administration have made it clear, I think, that
2:25:30
the assault on science is not just an effort
2:25:32
to cut costs, but an effort to either destroy
2:25:34
science outright in America or to diminish and censor
2:25:36
it to such an extent that it becomes unrecognizable,
2:25:39
imperiling American scientific excellence in our national security in
2:25:41
one fell swoop. As a scientist, I'm someone at
2:25:43
a loss what to do in this brave new
2:25:45
world. My question to you is twofold. What should
2:25:47
scientists be doing to help salvage what we can
2:25:50
of our institutions and the systems that have made
2:25:52
America a world leader? Along the same lines,
2:25:54
and if it does make
2:25:56
sense to think about
2:25:59
abandoning ship for a country
2:26:01
with administration that doesn't
2:26:03
view scientists as the enemy,
2:26:05
but rather a national
2:26:07
resource. You
2:26:10
know, I don't quite want
2:26:12
to agree with the premise
2:26:14
of the question right away.
2:26:16
So I don't think that
2:26:18
they made it clear that
2:26:20
it is an effort to
2:26:22
destroy science outright in America.
2:26:24
I think that's an overly
2:26:26
simplistic way of putting it.
2:26:28
There's some aspect of it.
2:26:31
I mean, there's no question
2:26:33
that various members of the
2:26:35
administration, most obviously JD Vance,
2:26:37
the vice president, but others
2:26:39
as well, have taken an
2:26:41
explicitly anti -academic, anti -intellectual point
2:26:43
of view on things. Vance
2:26:45
has said, professors are the
2:26:47
enemy, universities are the enemy,
2:26:49
etc. And I think it's
2:26:51
unmistakable that certain aspects of
2:26:53
university existence and life are
2:26:55
looked down upon by the
2:26:57
administration. But honestly, I think
2:26:59
that, you know, you can't
2:27:01
undersell the idea that it's
2:27:03
not even that intentional what
2:27:05
they're doing. What they want
2:27:07
to do is cut costs
2:27:09
and there's an attitude that
2:27:11
they know better than everybody
2:27:13
else. It's a fundamentally anti
2:27:15
-expertise philosophy, right? Like the
2:27:17
idea that there are people
2:27:19
who know a lot about
2:27:21
things and, you know, should
2:27:23
be trusted with the hardest
2:27:25
decisions is anathema to the
2:27:27
people who are running the
2:27:29
country right now. And it's
2:27:31
in part a reflection of
2:27:33
a Silicon Valley ethos. It's
2:27:35
not hard to dig up
2:27:37
quotes by Silicon Valley leaders
2:27:39
disparaging the idea of reading
2:27:41
books in favor of, you
2:27:43
know, everything interesting should be
2:27:45
put in a blog post
2:27:47
or something like that, right?
2:27:49
The idea of like hard
2:27:51
earned, very careful expert level
2:27:53
knowledge is just not something
2:27:55
that is respected. So they
2:27:57
don't see why they should
2:27:59
spend all this money on
2:28:01
science and education and things
2:28:03
like that. It's really just
2:28:05
a matter of whipping the
2:28:07
workers to work harder. That's
2:28:09
what we really need. Right? So, of
2:28:11
course, de facto these align. At the end of the
2:28:13
day, you end up destroying science, destroying trust in science,
2:28:15
destroying trust in the United States from scientists abroad and
2:28:17
so forth. As far as when and if it makes
2:28:19
sense to think about abandoning ship, you know, you can
2:28:21
always think about it. That's a very personal decision. As
2:28:23
I've said before, my inclination is always to stay and
2:28:25
fight and to make things better, but... You can
2:28:27
imagine things becoming so bad
2:28:30
or opportunities arising elsewhere that
2:28:32
you might want to do
2:28:34
that. I can't offer any
2:28:37
individual advice. What can scientists
2:28:39
do? You know, I honestly don't
2:28:41
know a lot. We're not a
2:28:43
lot of the electorate. I think
2:28:45
that we can try. Yeah, I
2:28:47
guess... The reason I'm hesitating is
2:28:49
because there's obviously things to do,
2:28:52
but they're all kind of vague
2:28:54
and none of them are immediately
2:28:56
effectual. I think that scientists need
2:28:58
to get more support from the
2:29:00
world. We need to be a
2:29:02
little bit less insular and focused
2:29:04
on talking to each other and
2:29:06
more devoted to talking to people
2:29:09
outside, both science, but also academia
2:29:11
or our political perspectives or
2:29:13
what have you. people on
2:29:15
the street need to be
2:29:18
convinced of the importance of
2:29:20
science, and to be convinced
2:29:22
of the importance of intellectual
2:29:24
life more broadly. Scientists are
2:29:27
just as able to have
2:29:29
internecine... battles, you know, disparaging
2:29:31
other departments in the university
2:29:33
as anyone else is. And
2:29:36
I think that we need
2:29:38
to understand that we are
2:29:40
on the same side overall in
2:29:42
this, and I think that we
2:29:44
need to reinvigorate not just respect
2:29:46
for education, but also education.
2:29:48
We need to make higher
2:29:50
education cheaper and more prevalent,
2:29:52
so that people understand what's
2:29:55
going on a little bit
2:29:57
better. Part of that is
2:29:59
as straightforward as decreasing the
2:30:01
debt that students come out of
2:30:03
college with, right? Making it more
2:30:05
accessible by letting more people in
2:30:07
and letting it be more affordable
2:30:09
to more people. And then of
2:30:11
course I think that, you know,
2:30:13
universities can't, as people very often
2:30:15
said, cannot acquiesce prematurely. There's this
2:30:18
very, very embarrassing thing that it
2:30:20
just happens with Columbia University. You
2:30:22
might know that... Columbia was at
2:30:24
the center of accusations of anti-Semitism
2:30:26
because there were protests on Colombia's
2:30:28
campus against Israel's war in Gaza,
2:30:30
and I did not follow that
2:30:32
very very carefully myself, but I
2:30:35
have zero doubt that some people
2:30:37
at some point involved in those
2:30:39
protests said anti-Semitic things. and I'm
2:30:41
not in favor of being anti-Semitic
2:30:43
or supporting anti-Semitism. I am in
2:30:45
favor of allowing protests on campus,
2:30:47
and so it's the university's job
2:30:49
to balance these values and allow
2:30:51
people to speak their minds without
2:30:54
being threatening or racist or anything
2:30:56
like that. So Columbia... had a
2:30:58
lot of protests and for whatever
2:31:00
reasons, again I don't know, I
2:31:02
haven't been following it too carefully,
2:31:04
they were the epicenter of criticism
2:31:06
by Republicans in Congress for allowing
2:31:08
these things to go forward. And
2:31:10
so the university, so the administration
2:31:13
just... canceled or threatened to cancel,
2:31:15
you never know with this administration
2:31:17
whether they're actually doing something or
2:31:19
just blustering about doing something, but
2:31:21
they threatened to cancel $400 million
2:31:23
worth of grant money to Columbia.
2:31:25
And in response, Columbia basically completely
2:31:27
folded and said, oh, well, we're
2:31:29
sorry and we'll try to do
2:31:32
better. And I think that that's,
2:31:34
it's just a strategic mistake. It's
2:31:36
both a values-based mistake. We shouldn't
2:31:38
be those people. We should be
2:31:40
better than that. But it's also
2:31:42
as an absolutely practical matter a
2:31:44
mistake because It's not like the
2:31:46
people who are trying to cut
2:31:49
money to universities will hear you
2:31:51
grovel and say, oh, okay, I
2:31:53
changed my mind, you get your
2:31:55
money back. There's no amount of
2:31:57
groveling that will get the money
2:31:59
back. So long-wind the way of
2:32:01
saying, I think universities need to
2:32:03
stand up. They need to be
2:32:05
very, very clear about their support
2:32:08
for free speech, for intellectual inquiry,
2:32:10
for science, for the humanities, for
2:32:12
everything else that we're supposed to
2:32:14
stand for as institutes of higher
2:32:16
education. Will that help? Maybe it
2:32:18
will help down the road. I
2:32:20
don't know what the short-term effects
2:32:22
will be. Mark V. says, you've
2:32:24
mentioned that advanced civilizations could try
2:32:27
to make contact through long-lasting objects.
2:32:29
Imagine such a civilization had visited
2:32:31
Earth around the time land vertebrates
2:32:33
with eyes had evolved. They had
2:32:35
also determined that our moon was
2:32:37
a promising geologically stable location to
2:32:39
place such an object. Moreover, the
2:32:41
civilization was capable of modifying the
2:32:43
surface of the moon to draw
2:32:46
a large-scale message that would be
2:32:48
visible from Earth. Assuming they prioritized
2:32:50
geological stability in long-term visibility, what
2:32:52
kind of symbols or patterns might
2:32:54
they create to ensure their message
2:32:56
is noticeable as intentional communication. Well,
2:32:58
it wouldn't be that hard, right?
2:33:00
I mean, you could just like
2:33:03
write a bullseye or a little,
2:33:05
you know, cartoon image of an
2:33:07
atom or something like that. Or
2:33:09
you could be more clever and
2:33:11
do something like we had on
2:33:13
the Voyager spacecraft, right? The Golden
2:33:15
Record thing that tried to have
2:33:17
little symbols representing where we are
2:33:19
in the cosmos and things like
2:33:22
that. So there's many things that
2:33:24
you could do. But I think
2:33:26
that that's not really the way
2:33:28
that I would think. I think
2:33:30
that's a pretty kind of kind
2:33:32
of... dumb way for the aliens
2:33:34
to leave a message for us.
2:33:36
I mean, remember it's hard to
2:33:38
conceptualize this, but we're imagining civilizations
2:33:41
that are enormously more technologically advanced
2:33:43
than us. They could do better
2:33:45
than paint the moon. They could
2:33:47
invent, you know, in... long lasting
2:33:49
machines, self-reparing, running on solar power,
2:33:51
you know, etc. that could repaint
2:33:53
the moon every three days, right?
2:33:55
They could send us signals in
2:33:58
all sorts of ways. You know,
2:34:00
again, I think that whatever the
2:34:02
aliens wanted to do, they could
2:34:04
do it. So either they haven't
2:34:06
done that? or they, and this
2:34:08
way that I'm thinking of, you
2:34:10
know, could be triggered by certain
2:34:12
signals in the earth, you know,
2:34:14
global warming, or the detonation of
2:34:17
nuclear warheads, or radio waves indicating
2:34:19
advanced technology, right? I mean, there's
2:34:21
all sorts of ways that they
2:34:23
could trigger some... machine that they
2:34:25
had left behind in the solar
2:34:27
system to sort of come to
2:34:29
life and give us messages. So
2:34:31
either they haven't wanted to do
2:34:33
that, or you know, maybe they're
2:34:36
waiting for more advancement than we
2:34:38
have. Maybe they have a little
2:34:40
trigger that says, wait until we
2:34:42
hear radio waves and then wait
2:34:44
another 10,000 years. Right? Who knows?
2:34:46
I really don't know. I think
2:34:48
if aliens want to talk to
2:34:50
us, it wouldn't be hard to
2:34:52
notice. Benjamin Zand says, do you
2:34:55
have any plans to host to
2:34:57
organize another moving Naturalism Forward seminar
2:34:59
like you did in 2012? We
2:35:01
know you're busy, but you can
2:35:03
count on support for Mindscape listeners.
2:35:05
Yeah, you know, that's something that
2:35:07
would be one among many, many
2:35:09
fun things that one could do.
2:35:12
I don't have any plans to
2:35:14
do that. For those of you
2:35:16
who don't know, in 2012 we
2:35:18
got together a small group of
2:35:20
people in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and the
2:35:22
idea was to get-together people who
2:35:24
were... naturalists in many different fields,
2:35:26
naturalists in the sense of not
2:35:28
like studying plants, but not theists,
2:35:31
okay, so bait the atheists, and
2:35:33
rather than figure it, talk about,
2:35:35
you know, ways of combating theism
2:35:37
or intelligent design or whatever, it
2:35:39
agree that we all are on
2:35:41
the same boat in the same
2:35:43
track with this. question, but there's
2:35:45
still questions that remain unanswered that
2:35:47
we need to think about moving
2:35:50
forward with. So we talked about
2:35:52
consciousness and free will and morality
2:35:54
and things like that. It was
2:35:56
really, it was quite, I think
2:35:58
it was quite a success. I
2:36:00
mean, maybe you could always be
2:36:02
more successful. We didn't ask anyone
2:36:04
to write a document or a
2:36:06
paper or anything, but we did
2:36:09
videotape everything and they're all quite
2:36:11
well edited and on YouTube. For
2:36:13
whatever reason, the YouTube videos never
2:36:15
took off. They never got a
2:36:17
lot of... hits. I will try
2:36:19
to remember to put a link
2:36:21
in the show notes to the
2:36:23
Moving Naturalism Forward videos. But doing
2:36:26
it again, well, it was a
2:36:28
special event. There were people there
2:36:30
who are no longer with us,
2:36:32
like Dan Dennett and Stephen Weinberg.
2:36:34
And it would be a different
2:36:36
group of people, obviously, but I
2:36:38
think there's other things to be
2:36:40
done. Like I did that. In
2:36:42
fact, David Wallace and I have
2:36:45
talked a lot about a moving
2:36:47
Everett Forward conference, where we get
2:36:49
people who are only allowed to
2:36:51
come if you're a believer in
2:36:53
the ever interpretation of quantum mechanics,
2:36:55
and we admit that there's lots
2:36:57
of questions unanswered yet, and we
2:36:59
work on answering them. But who
2:37:01
knows whether that will happen? There's
2:37:04
a lot of things that we
2:37:06
need to do. Ask me after
2:37:08
I've done. Tom S asks a
2:37:10
priority question. I've been bothered by
2:37:12
this question since the early 90s.
2:37:14
It involves special relativity. Given that
2:37:16
a photon does not experience time,
2:37:18
it should also be... the distance
2:37:20
traveled from the photon's frame of
2:37:23
reference is zero. In essence, to
2:37:25
the photon, it is simply jumping
2:37:27
from one atom to an adjacent
2:37:29
atom. Since no time elapses for
2:37:31
the photon, since leaving the source
2:37:33
atom and being at the destination
2:37:35
atom, the destination atom had to
2:37:37
be fixed when the photon left
2:37:40
the source. So from my frame
2:37:42
of reference, I walked into my
2:37:44
backyard at night, stare up into
2:37:46
the sky, and a photon from
2:37:48
a star a thousand years away
2:37:50
strikes my eye. would suggest to
2:37:52
me that there is no free
2:37:54
will. I had no choice but
2:37:56
to be born and walk out
2:37:59
at them. the destination atom had
2:38:01
to be fixed when the photon
2:38:03
left the source. What does the
2:38:05
word when mean in that question?
2:38:07
Because the whole point of relativity
2:38:09
is that dividing up space time
2:38:11
into space and time is different
2:38:13
for different observers. What you mean
2:38:15
is in the photons frame of
2:38:17
reference, the atom is in the
2:38:19
same... time in some null coordinates
2:38:21
as when the photon left the
2:38:24
source. But not in mine, right?
2:38:26
Not in the frame of reference
2:38:28
of the thing that emitted the
2:38:30
photon in the first place. There,
2:38:32
the thing was set up long
2:38:34
before it was absorbed. Okay? So
2:38:36
this is a prospective relative question
2:38:38
and different people are going to
2:38:40
say different things about it. Really,
2:38:42
I think the issue here is
2:38:44
not anything about special relativity or
2:38:46
photons. It's just about determinism. If
2:38:48
you believe that the world is
2:38:50
deterministic, then you know what happens
2:38:53
now and you're going to be
2:38:55
able to, you know that what
2:38:57
happens now will enable you to
2:38:59
predict what happens in the future.
2:39:01
Even as an indeterministic person, since
2:39:03
I think the quantum mechanics exists,
2:39:05
I am a block universe person,
2:39:07
so there is a fact of the
2:39:09
matter about what will happen in the
2:39:11
future, even though I don't know what
2:39:13
it is. And then of course the
2:39:15
question is, does this have any bearing
2:39:17
at all on the question of free
2:39:19
will? That's a longer... conversation that I've
2:39:21
talked about many different places, but I
2:39:23
think of free will as perfectly compatible
2:39:25
with determinism because I'm a compatibleist. I
2:39:27
think that free will is a higher
2:39:29
level emergent phenomenon, at least in the
2:39:31
way that I think about people making
2:39:33
choices. If you want to define free
2:39:35
will as the ability to violate the
2:39:37
laws of physics in a libertarian sense,
2:39:40
then I don't believe in that. So
2:39:42
you really, I would suggest if you
2:39:44
care about these questions, really dig into
2:39:46
the issues of compatibleism and the meaning
2:39:48
of free will. You know, talk to
2:39:51
or listen to the podcast I did
2:39:53
with Jan Nismayel or Dan Dennett or
2:39:55
one of the various people that we
2:39:57
went over that question with. Kelly
2:40:00
Hoogland says, I was listening to an
2:40:02
episode of Radio Lab, which is a
2:40:04
science storytelling podcast. In this episode, they
2:40:06
were briefly explaining quantum entanglement. Without giving
2:40:08
you any direct quotes, given that the
2:40:11
words in the way that I think
2:40:13
about people making choices. If you want
2:40:15
to define free will as the ability
2:40:17
to violate the laws of physics, in
2:40:19
a libertarian sense, then I don't believe
2:40:21
in that. So you really, I would
2:40:23
suggest if you care about these questions,
2:40:26
really dig into the issues of compatibleism
2:40:28
and the meaning of free will. You
2:40:30
know, talk to or listen to the
2:40:32
podcast I did with in Anismail or
2:40:34
Dan Dennett or one of the various
2:40:36
people that we went over that question
2:40:39
with. Kelly Hoogland says, I
2:40:41
was listening to an episode of
2:40:43
Radio Lab, which is a science
2:40:45
storytelling podcast. In this episode, they
2:40:47
were briefly explaining quantum entanglement. Without
2:40:49
giving you any direct quotes, given
2:40:51
that the words observer or superposition
2:40:53
were not used once, how good
2:40:55
a job could they have done?
2:40:57
I think you didn't give me
2:40:59
quite enough information to tell you
2:41:01
how good a job they could
2:41:03
have done. Certainly, if the question
2:41:05
is secretly, can one... adequately explain
2:41:07
entanglement without using words or equivalent
2:41:09
words to observer and superposition, I
2:41:11
don't think that the word observer
2:41:13
or observation or measurement plays any
2:41:15
role at all in explaining entanglement.
2:41:17
I don't think that's what entanglement
2:41:19
is about. But I would think
2:41:21
that, since I am in ever
2:41:23
ready and never ready, in this
2:41:25
don't think that measurements or observations
2:41:27
are special things, it's all just
2:41:29
the wave function obeying the Schrodinger
2:41:31
equation at the end of the
2:41:33
day. The word superposition is harder
2:41:35
to avoid when you're talking about
2:41:37
entanglement. To explain entanglement, when I
2:41:39
explain it, I first have to
2:41:41
say if there's a spin, a
2:41:43
particle with spin, it can be
2:41:45
in a superposition of spin-up and
2:41:47
spin-down, for example. And if you
2:41:49
have two spins, it's not true
2:41:52
that they are just separately in
2:41:54
superpositions of spin-up and spin-down. They
2:41:56
are in superpositions of an entangled
2:41:58
superposition. They can be entangled superposition.
2:42:00
One of them is up, the
2:42:02
other is down, if the other
2:42:04
one is down, if the first
2:42:06
one is down, the other one
2:42:08
is up. So could you explain
2:42:10
that without using the word or
2:42:12
concept of superposition? That would be
2:42:14
very, very difficult. I mean, somehow
2:42:16
to explain entanglement, you have to
2:42:18
get across the idea of what
2:42:20
a quantum state is. That's why
2:42:22
observations don't matter how I observe
2:42:24
the quantum state. What really matters
2:42:26
is what quantum states are. And
2:42:28
you don't need to use the
2:42:30
word superposition in explaining what quantum
2:42:32
states are, but given that we
2:42:34
usually start by thinking about classical
2:42:36
observable phenomena, it is traditionally easiest
2:42:38
to talk about superpositions when we
2:42:40
do that. Rory Cochran says, I
2:42:42
keep coming back in my mind
2:42:44
to what I feel like is
2:42:46
a clash between your December 2023
2:42:48
immortality address, in which you conclude
2:42:50
that humanity is doomed because the
2:42:52
universe is headed for a heat
2:42:54
death in city space, and David
2:42:56
Deutsch's ideas in the beginning of
2:42:58
infinity in which he says words
2:43:00
to the effect that any problem
2:43:02
can in principle be solved once
2:43:04
the knowledge of how to do
2:43:06
it is discovered, with the only
2:43:08
limit being whether or not the
2:43:10
solution is prohibited by the law
2:43:12
of physics. be done about the
2:43:14
looming key death of the universe?
2:43:16
Can we say for certain that
2:43:18
humans or intelligent life could never
2:43:20
work out some novel piece of
2:43:22
universe? Some engineering perhaps with elegantly
2:43:25
placed black holes or little big
2:43:27
bangs or something? If we can't
2:43:29
rule it out then there's hope
2:43:31
for immortality yet. Well, I hope
2:43:33
that if you are a long-time
2:43:35
listener of Mindscape, you know that
2:43:37
questions about categorically saying things and
2:43:39
being certain about things are always
2:43:41
met with, no, we cannot categorically
2:43:43
say things, we cannot be certain
2:43:45
about things. That's just not how
2:43:47
the way things work. We can
2:43:49
make provisional statements subject to certain
2:43:51
assumptions. So... If you assume, as
2:43:53
I tried to assume in the
2:43:55
talk about immortality, that we really
2:43:57
are going to live in dissiter
2:43:59
space with a forever eternal cosmological
2:44:01
constant that will never decay, and
2:44:03
you assume that our... understanding of
2:44:05
what it means to reach equilibrium
2:44:07
in a thermodynamic system is more
2:44:09
or less correct, and you agree
2:44:11
that thinking in any real substantive
2:44:13
sense increases entropy and requires an
2:44:15
out of equilibrium condition, then it
2:44:17
is just a fact that the
2:44:19
laws of physics, even up to
2:44:21
David Deutsch's way of thinking about
2:44:23
it, prohibit immortality. in this universe.
2:44:25
Now of course all those assumptions
2:44:27
could be wrong in one way
2:44:29
or another. After all we could
2:44:31
be living in a simulation. for
2:44:33
all we know, right? And we
2:44:35
might think of it as very
2:44:37
unlikely, but could be, it's possible,
2:44:39
it's possible to cause module constant
2:44:41
will go away, it's possible that
2:44:43
the universe will reclapse, who knows?
2:44:45
There's many hopes that you could
2:44:47
hold out for, but I'd like
2:44:49
to think that it's useful to
2:44:51
think through our best understanding of
2:44:53
the universe and to try to
2:44:55
figure out what is compatible and
2:44:58
incompatible with that understanding, even admitting
2:45:00
that that that understanding might need
2:45:02
to be modified someday. Arminio Maginzini
2:45:04
says, the gravity waves we have
2:45:06
detected have been created by the
2:45:08
collision of black holes and neutron
2:45:10
stars. Are these the only objects
2:45:12
that produce gravity waves, or are
2:45:14
these the only objects that LIGO
2:45:16
can detect? That is, is LIGO
2:45:18
incapable of detecting weaker waves? Mostly,
2:45:20
it's incapable of detecting weaker waves.
2:45:22
There's plenty of other ways to
2:45:24
make gravitational waves, but it's not
2:45:26
just a matter of weakness. It's
2:45:28
also a matter of frequency, right?
2:45:30
Just like there are telescopes that
2:45:32
look at... visible light and different
2:45:34
telescopes that look at radio waves
2:45:36
and different telescopes that look at
2:45:38
x-rays, gravitational wave observatories have a
2:45:40
bandwidth. They have a region of
2:45:42
the gravitational wave spectrum to which
2:45:44
they are sensitive. So, for example,
2:45:46
we are pretty sure that there's
2:45:48
lots of gravitational waves being made
2:45:50
by spinning neutron stars, or spinning
2:45:52
white dwarfs for that matter, possibly
2:45:54
by supernova explosions, almost certainly by
2:45:56
medium-sized black holes spiraling into supermassive
2:45:58
black holes in our... galaxy and
2:46:00
elsewhere. We think that all these
2:46:02
are out there. There might even
2:46:04
be a cosmic gravitational wave background
2:46:06
from the early universe for all
2:46:08
that we know. But LIGO is
2:46:10
just not sensitive to the relevant
2:46:12
bands for those kinds of things.
2:46:14
I think we have a shot
2:46:16
at the supernovae. I forget, actually.
2:46:18
But Lego is sensitive to, you
2:46:20
know, relatively quick gravitational wave frequencies,
2:46:22
so you need to pack a
2:46:24
lot of matter and energy into
2:46:26
a relatively small region of space
2:46:29
to have it move quickly enough
2:46:31
to emit those frequencies and... you
2:46:33
also need to be heavy enough
2:46:35
to give off gravitational waves that
2:46:37
are detectably strong. So if you
2:46:39
put those two requirements together relatively
2:46:41
quick and therefore small, but also
2:46:43
very, very massive, you're more or
2:46:45
less left with inspiring black holes
2:46:47
and or neutron stars. Ethan Richardson
2:46:49
says in the midst of all
2:46:51
the real-world turmoil and... and horror,
2:46:53
how about a softball I've been
2:46:55
mean to ask since I learned
2:46:57
your cat's names years ago? As
2:46:59
a lifelong Shakespeare fan and one
2:47:01
lucky enough to have had the
2:47:03
opportunity to play Caliban, as a
2:47:05
senior in high school, I'd love
2:47:07
to know more about your own
2:47:09
relationship to his work. Things such
2:47:11
as your favorite plays, quotes, is
2:47:13
he really the goat, the greatest
2:47:15
of all time, and if you
2:47:17
cared a way in, as a
2:47:19
good Bayesian, on why some folks
2:47:21
are so invested in the notion
2:47:23
that he didn't write his plays.
2:47:25
So yeah, Ariel and Caliban, as
2:47:27
many of you know, are named
2:47:29
after characters in The Tempest by
2:47:31
Shakespeare. Puck is also named after
2:47:33
a... character famously in Midsummer Night's
2:47:35
Dream. And yeah, you know, Shakespeare,
2:47:37
is he the greatest of all
2:47:39
time? I think that he has
2:47:41
a better claim than anybody else,
2:47:43
okay? But I would absolutely respect
2:47:45
people for thinking that they like
2:47:47
somebody else different. I don't think
2:47:49
that there is an absolute ranking
2:47:51
of greatness in authors. Shakespeare is
2:47:53
kind of special, I think, kind
2:47:55
of unique in his ability to
2:47:57
write poetic... language that is just
2:47:59
very vivid and imaginative and especially
2:48:02
in coming up with new words.
2:48:04
I once went to a performance
2:48:06
of Hamlet in Washington, D.C. by
2:48:08
a Russian theater troop that specialized
2:48:10
in silent. performances. So they had
2:48:12
a version of Hamlet with no
2:48:14
words. And you know, it was
2:48:16
fine, but a lot of me
2:48:18
is thinking like that's entirely besides
2:48:20
the point. Like Shakespeare is not
2:48:22
celebrated for his plots. That's just
2:48:24
not his strong point. I mean,
2:48:26
they're pretty good. Some of the
2:48:28
plots, they can be heartbreaking in
2:48:30
sections, etc. But really, you're there
2:48:32
for the language. And when you
2:48:34
literally take away the language, I
2:48:36
think that you're probably not... showing
2:48:38
off the plays in the best
2:48:40
light. Favorite plays and so forth.
2:48:42
I like the tempest. I like
2:48:44
some of the classics, Macbeth and
2:48:46
Hamlet and so forth. I find
2:48:48
Othello heartbreaking, too much to really
2:48:50
enjoy. Julia Caesar is one that
2:48:52
I really like. I was exposed
2:48:54
to that relatively early. I like
2:48:56
the dramas more in the comedies.
2:48:58
I think the sort of slapstick
2:49:00
comedy of errors, mistaking twins for
2:49:02
each other kind of Shakespeare loves
2:49:04
in his comedies. or not my
2:49:06
style. So I'm a drama kind
2:49:08
of guy on that. Why are
2:49:10
some folks invested in the notion
2:49:12
he didn't write his plays? Yeah,
2:49:14
people like conspiracies and fun mysteries
2:49:16
and things like that. There's no
2:49:18
good evidence for it. I mean,
2:49:20
maybe there is some argument not...
2:49:22
for Shakespeare not being the author
2:49:24
of his plays, but for why
2:49:26
people are so interested in it,
2:49:28
there is sort of an almost
2:49:30
class-based argument, because Shakespeare was relatively
2:49:32
uneducated. He was somewhat educated, but
2:49:35
he wasn't like super aristocratic hoity-to-hoity,
2:49:37
and there's a certain set of
2:49:39
people who think that he was
2:49:41
so good with language that he
2:49:43
must have been aristocratic in hoity-to-to-dee-so,
2:49:45
so they want to attribute his
2:49:47
plays to some aristocrat. Obviously, I
2:49:49
don't think that's a very compelling.
2:49:51
logical train of thought there. All
2:49:53
right, my voice is going as
2:49:55
you might notice. here so we're
2:49:57
going to reach the end. We're
2:49:59
not quite at the end yet,
2:50:01
but only a few more questions
2:50:03
left. Mark Schoyern says, do you
2:50:05
still have your BMW I3? In
2:50:07
general, has your experience with an
2:50:09
electric car been good? Yeah, we
2:50:11
still have the I3. It's convenient.
2:50:13
It's perfect for our purposes, which
2:50:15
is that we have two cars,
2:50:17
and if we really need to
2:50:19
go a long way, we can
2:50:21
get in the gas-powered car. The
2:50:23
I-3, for those of you who
2:50:25
don't know, is a tiny little
2:50:27
car. It's very, very well-designed, so
2:50:29
that it's actually pretty good space inside,
2:50:31
even though it's tiny on the outside.
2:50:33
It's kind of similar to a mini,
2:50:35
if you know what that looks like.
2:50:37
And it was always meant as a
2:50:39
to totaling around... town car. It was
2:50:41
never meant to take you very far.
2:50:43
It's for commuting and things like that.
2:50:45
So Jennifer, I don't drive very much.
2:50:47
She works from home. I can walk
2:50:49
to work, right? So we don't need
2:50:51
a car to take us very far.
2:50:53
And the I-3 is perfect for getting
2:50:55
around town. It's the car we usually
2:50:58
drive from place to place. and also
2:51:00
they just they had fun like I
2:51:02
don't know I don't know what happened
2:51:04
but the BMW designers when they decided
2:51:06
to enter the electric car game had
2:51:09
fun with it they came out with
2:51:11
two cars the I-3 which is like
2:51:13
this little tiny thing that maneuvers really
2:51:15
great and it's kind of fun to
2:51:18
drive because it's so sporty and and
2:51:20
and interestingly designed from the inside like
2:51:22
our I-3 has a interior design package
2:51:25
that uses carbon fiber and fabric and
2:51:27
metal and everything and it's just very
2:51:29
very interesting compared to the vast
2:51:31
majority of interior car designs. And
2:51:33
then the other one they made was
2:51:36
the I-8, which was like this hyper
2:51:38
sports car kind of thing, which apparently
2:51:40
was very expensive and very difficult to
2:51:42
get in and out of, so I
2:51:44
never have driven one, I don't know.
2:51:47
But then, you know, they canceled both
2:51:49
of those and are now making a
2:51:51
very bland selection of BMW sedans and
2:51:53
crossover SUVs, just like everybody else. So
2:51:56
what can you do? The electric car
2:51:58
experience itself has been wonderful. You know,
2:52:00
you don't need to go to the gas
2:52:02
station. We just charge our car in our
2:52:04
garage every night, so we don't even need
2:52:06
to worry about charging stations or anything like
2:52:08
that, because we're not taking it on road
2:52:11
trips. There's a certain amount of, you know,
2:52:13
it's a relatively new technology compared to internal
2:52:15
combustion engines. So we've had to get the
2:52:17
battery replaced, even though there's less than 20,000
2:52:19
miles on the car. But overall, very, very
2:52:21
happy with that I'm hoping that given how
2:52:23
little we drive it, it, it, it will
2:52:25
last another 20 years, it will last another
2:52:28
20 years, easy. Fonke Town
2:52:30
says in episode 305 of Liliana
2:52:32
Mason you talked about media provocateurs
2:52:34
stroking anger and leveraging status threat
2:52:36
to get people to vote a
2:52:38
certain way. I'd like to know
2:52:40
if you have an opinion about
2:52:42
some of those big-name pundits as
2:52:44
to whether or not they actually
2:52:46
believe what they are saying or
2:52:48
rather driven by ego wanting to
2:52:50
be influential monetary gain or something
2:52:52
else entirely. Well, you know, it's
2:52:54
kind of a vague question because
2:52:56
of course the... category of big-name
2:52:58
pundits covers a lot of ground.
2:53:00
And you know, I think that
2:53:03
I would prefer to not... if
2:53:05
I can avoid it, attribute bad
2:53:07
faith to people whose job is
2:53:09
punditry. You know, like Ezra Klein
2:53:11
is someone who we had on
2:53:13
the podcast, and I think we
2:53:15
had a very interesting discussion of
2:53:17
the origin of polarization, and he's
2:53:19
very big in the pundit game
2:53:21
right now, and sometimes people on
2:53:23
the more or less liberal side
2:53:25
of the ledger who Ezra is
2:53:27
also on that side of the
2:53:29
ledger, but they accuse him of
2:53:31
being too sympathetic to centrism in
2:53:33
various ways. I think that's literally
2:53:35
just who he is. I think
2:53:37
he's always been that way. I
2:53:39
known Ezra for a long time
2:53:42
because he and I joined the
2:53:44
blogosphere near the same time in
2:53:46
the early 2000s, and we both
2:53:48
had relatively small time blogs, but
2:53:50
there weren't that many blogs, so
2:53:52
we read each other. And he
2:53:54
was very young at the time,
2:53:56
obviously, and he just always. was
2:53:58
like that. He's not making it
2:54:00
up to get more clicks or
2:54:02
a better job. anything like that.
2:54:04
He's an institutionalist by nature. He's
2:54:06
a liberal institutionalist, but nevertheless an
2:54:08
institutionalist. And I think that a
2:54:10
lot of people who are big-name
2:54:12
pundits are like that. They're not
2:54:14
really playing a game. They're showing
2:54:16
you who they are. Not everyone.
2:54:18
Of course, some people are entirely
2:54:20
cynical, etc. Believe me. But I
2:54:23
think that your first guess should
2:54:25
be that people are just being
2:54:27
honest. Some people are notoriously inconsistent
2:54:29
or hypocritical, but again, I think
2:54:31
that your first guess should be
2:54:33
is that that's just who they
2:54:35
are. Like, they don't have coherent
2:54:37
thoughts in their brains, and they're
2:54:39
saying one thing one day and
2:54:41
something else the other day, not
2:54:43
because they're especially cynical or for
2:54:45
monetary gain. It's just, at the
2:54:47
moment, they think that's true, right?
2:54:49
You know, that's not true for
2:54:51
everybody. That's not the case for
2:54:53
everybody, but I think that that
2:54:55
should be your first... Your priors
2:54:57
should be large, that that is
2:54:59
what is going on, before we
2:55:02
leap right to associating nefarious purposes
2:55:04
to what people are saying. Bran
2:55:06
Muffin says, could ER equals EPR
2:55:08
be established to the same level
2:55:10
of rigor as ADSCFT? What implications
2:55:12
would such a proof have for
2:55:14
the field? So for those of
2:55:16
you who don't know, ER equals
2:55:18
EPR is an idea that connects
2:55:20
the geometry of space time with
2:55:22
quantum entanglement. And it came out,
2:55:24
it's due to one Maltesana and
2:55:26
Lenny Suskind, and it came out
2:55:28
in the context of ADSCFT, the
2:55:30
boundary bulk correspondence relating holographically field
2:55:32
theory without gravity, to a bulk
2:55:34
theory in one more dimension with
2:55:36
gravity. And so what Maltesina and
2:55:38
Suskind noticed is that... if you
2:55:41
have basically two copies of an
2:55:43
ADSCFT, right? So you have two
2:55:45
CFTs, and both of them could,
2:55:47
depending on the quantum states inside
2:55:49
them, have a bulk anti-decider space
2:55:51
emerge holographically, but if you entangled
2:55:53
the two CFTs. If you entangled
2:55:55
them by a lot, what you
2:55:57
would see is essentially a wormhole
2:55:59
connecting them. That would be the
2:56:01
single emergent geometry. So ER is
2:56:03
Einstein and Rosen. Those are the
2:56:05
folks who first really wrote about
2:56:07
worm holes in the context of
2:56:09
the short-chil solution. This is back
2:56:11
in 1935. And then EPR is
2:56:13
Einstein Fodolski in Rosen. Same guys
2:56:15
plus. Boris Padulski writing about entanglement
2:56:17
in the same year, 1935. So
2:56:20
two papers in the same year
2:56:22
by almost the same authors with
2:56:24
normally nothing to do with each
2:56:26
other, and Malda Saini and Suscan
2:56:28
said, maybe they do have something
2:56:30
to do with each other. Maybe
2:56:32
in a holographic sense, there's some
2:56:34
connection between entanglement and the geometry
2:56:36
of space time in particular wormholes.
2:56:38
And they extrapolated it boldly like
2:56:40
great scientists will do. And they
2:56:42
said, if I just have... two
2:56:44
particles entangled with each other, maybe
2:56:46
there is some sense in which
2:56:48
there is a microscopic non-traversable wormhole
2:56:50
connecting them. That's the ER equals
2:56:52
EPR conjecture. So I really haven't
2:56:54
followed the details of discussion of
2:56:56
ER equals EPR a lot. So
2:56:59
don't trust my impressions, but I'll
2:57:01
give you the impressions that I
2:57:03
have from sort of halfway knowing
2:57:05
about it, which is that it
2:57:07
works really well if you have
2:57:09
a huge amount of entanglement as
2:57:11
in the original construction with, you
2:57:13
know, an entire field theory entangled
2:57:15
with a whole nother field theory
2:57:17
where we understand the ADSCFT wormhole
2:57:19
that would connect them, it's much
2:57:21
less clear what the conjecture even
2:57:23
is when you have just a
2:57:25
tiny amount of entanglement, like one
2:57:27
particle entangled with one other particle.
2:57:29
It's not supposed to be that
2:57:31
there's a wormhole that you could
2:57:33
literally travel through connecting these two
2:57:35
particles, so it's not clear to
2:57:38
me what it does mean. And
2:57:40
there are other people who understand
2:57:42
it much better than I do,
2:57:44
so we should ask them. But
2:57:46
I think that it has led
2:57:48
to people thinking about entanglement and
2:57:50
geometry in interesting ways. Yes, we
2:57:52
would like to have a rigorous,
2:57:54
well, you say, can it be
2:57:56
established? I think it's not even
2:57:58
a matter of establishing, it's a
2:58:00
matter of defining it, of formulating
2:58:02
the conjecture in such a way
2:58:04
that it could even be checked
2:58:06
rigorously. But I don't think that
2:58:08
we have that firm foundation or
2:58:10
are close to it right now.
2:58:12
All right, final question is from
2:58:14
Marie Rosskew, who says, you said
2:58:16
several months ago on Robin Ince's
2:58:19
BBC podcast that looking at the
2:58:21
Milky Way can make you dizzy.
2:58:23
I wonder if you have ever
2:58:25
felt dizzy or anxious or even
2:58:27
depressed out of too much knowledge.
2:58:29
I'm in my 40s and I've
2:58:31
always loved to study. I have
2:58:33
just finished your book The Biggest
2:58:35
Ideas in the Universe, Space Time
2:58:37
and Motion, and jump straight into
2:58:39
the quanta and fields, and I
2:58:41
find it so fascinating. But then
2:58:43
people, like my mom, often tell
2:58:45
me that one day I will
2:58:47
go crazy as a result of
2:58:49
all the knowledge. So, um... Two
2:58:51
things. One is the milky way
2:58:53
making me dizzy is really a
2:58:55
straightforward physical response, not a wow,
2:58:58
the cosmos is so big kind
2:59:00
of response. It's not about thinking,
2:59:02
it's about like I am on
2:59:04
the edge of a giant disc
2:59:06
that is spinning. And I know
2:59:08
intellectually of course that it's spinning
2:59:10
very slowly and I shouldn't be
2:59:12
dizzy, but there you go. You
2:59:14
know, the mind is a mysterious
2:59:16
thing. As to whether or not
2:59:18
you should be dizzy or anxious
2:59:20
about too much knowledge, I am
2:59:22
certainly in no danger of that.
2:59:24
I know nobody on earth who
2:59:26
is in danger of being overly
2:59:28
anxious or depressed by knowing too
2:59:30
many things. I tend to think
2:59:32
that it's mostly the other way
2:59:34
around that people become anxious because
2:59:37
they don't know enough things. The
2:59:39
number, no matter how many things
2:59:41
you learn, the number of things
2:59:43
that you don't know, the things
2:59:45
that you have yet to learn,
2:59:47
is always enormously, enormously greater than
2:59:49
the number of things you know.
2:59:51
So even if you're worried that
2:59:53
someday it is possible to know
2:59:55
too much, I am here to
2:59:57
tell you that day is nowhere
2:59:59
close.
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