What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

Released Monday, 14th April 2025
 1 person rated this episode
What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

What to Do When the Market Punches You in the Face

Monday, 14th April 2025
 1 person rated this episode
Rate Episode

Episode Transcript

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0:00

Hello and welcome to the Stansbury

0:03

Investor Hour. I'm Dan Ferris. I'm

0:05

the editor of Extreme Value and

0:07

the Ferris report both published by

0:10

Stansbury Research. And I'm Corey McLaughlin,

0:12

editor of the Stansbury Daily Digest.

0:15

Today we talk with Chris Mayer

0:17

of Woodlock House Family Capital. I've

0:19

known Chris for decades now. He's

0:22

a great guy and a brilliant

0:24

investor. Please take notes. This is

0:27

one of the folks I really,

0:29

really want you to learn

0:31

something from. Okay, so

0:33

get out your pen,

0:36

get out your paper,

0:38

type on your computer

0:40

wherever you take notes,

0:42

get ready to do

0:45

it. All right, so

0:47

let's do it right now.

0:49

Let's talk with Chris Mayer.

0:51

including the collapse of Lehman

0:53

Brothers in 2008 and the

0:55

peak of the NASDAQ in

0:57

2021. Now he has a new major announcement

0:59

about a crisis that could soon threaten

1:02

the U.S. economy and can soon

1:04

bankrupt millions of citizens. As

1:06

he puts it, there is something happening

1:08

in this country, something much bigger than

1:10

you may yet realize and millions are

1:12

about to be blindsided unless they

1:15

take the right steps now. Find out

1:17

what's coming and how to protect

1:19

your portfolio by going to wwww.

1:21

American Dark Day.com. and sign up

1:23

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1:26

last time the US economy

1:28

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1:31

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1:33

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1:35

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1:37

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1:40

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1:42

potentially grow your holdings

1:44

many times over at

1:47

www. American Dark Day.com. Yes, it

1:49

has. It's been a long time,

1:51

Dan. How you doing? Yeah, it's

1:54

been, I just checked. It's been

1:56

since August of 2021 here on

1:58

the podcast. Wow. lots happened

2:00

since Yeah, I mean a lot's

2:03

happened since like you know last

2:05

Monday markets. That's like two bare

2:07

markets ago That's right It's been

2:09

a busy time hectic time for

2:11

investors and it's getting more hectic

2:13

every day it seems But I

2:16

thought you know I was thinking

2:18

about that how we should start this

2:20

out because you and I have so

2:23

much history we could we could start

2:25

it a million different ways, but

2:27

Since it has been almost four whole

2:29

years, I wonder if you would

2:31

indulge me and begin by reminding

2:33

our listeners what your core investing

2:36

principles are, including your code that

2:38

you've told us about before. Because

2:40

I think that's a really good

2:42

thing. I hope they take notes

2:45

when you talk about code. Yeah,

2:47

so that was an acronym that I

2:49

developed that kind of capture some... principles

2:51

I wanted in the investments I looked

2:53

for. So the C was for cheap.

2:56

So basically you're looking for something

2:58

that is going to be worth a

3:00

lot more in the future. And that's

3:02

kind of fundamental. And the O is

3:04

for owner-operator. I'm investing in companies where

3:06

they're skin in the game, where the

3:08

management team or board or somebody owns

3:10

a lot of stock. And that's probably

3:12

one of the most important ones, especially

3:14

over a long period of time,

3:16

get those incentives aligned. The D was

3:19

for disclosures, which was just... Are the

3:21

public disclosures good enough for

3:23

me to understand what's going on?

3:26

Is it not overly complicated or

3:28

the red flags in the way the

3:30

companies organize? So that covers that

3:32

kind of thing. And then E

3:34

is for excellent financial condition, which

3:36

covers the balance sheet, financial strength.

3:39

So for me, I don't invest

3:41

in companies that have any financial

3:43

leverage or have minimal financial leverage.

3:45

And they all kind of work

3:48

in. Sink, you know, you need all those things

3:50

together. So those are the core principles,

3:52

but the basic idea too is to hold

3:54

on to these things for a long time.

3:56

So there's very little turnover in my portfolios,

3:59

buy and hold. And yeah, that's it

4:01

in nutshell. Yeah, I think the incentives

4:03

you talked about, the incentives play into

4:05

the other three, don't they? Well, the

4:07

other two, anyway, the disclosures and the

4:09

excellent financial condition, because when you're handling

4:11

your own money, you know, you don't

4:14

want to lie about it and get

4:16

in trouble and you... That's it. That's

4:18

it. So when you have that, I

4:20

sometimes say like that part of it

4:22

is the most important. The alignment in

4:24

the skin of the game because that

4:27

covers a lot of other things, you

4:29

know, you know, I have to worry

4:31

about as much. And it's true that, you know,

4:33

there's a lot of empirical studies

4:35

about this as well, but companies

4:38

where there's, let's say, family controlled

4:40

companies where there's a family that

4:42

owns a large percentage of stock,

4:44

those companies tend to be less

4:46

leverage than their peers. studied those

4:49

companies as a separate group, although

4:51

when I happen upon them I

4:53

say, oh, okay, that's good. But

4:55

since you're focused on them, have

4:57

you noticed a tendency to

4:59

sort of allocate capital in

5:02

a more careful long-term manner,

5:04

like doing the right thing

5:06

when everybody's panicking and not

5:08

doing the wrong thing when

5:10

everybody's euphoric, that kind of thing?

5:12

Yeah, I would say that's definitely

5:15

true. Of course, there's

5:17

always exceptions on both

5:19

sides, but as a general

5:21

rule, definitely. If you have, if

5:23

you own a lot of stock,

5:25

you're less likely to dilute yourself

5:27

by selling shares. You are also

5:30

more likely to invest when

5:32

others are fearful. So when

5:34

a hired hand really sees no particular

5:37

upside to... sticking his or

5:39

her neck out in investing when things

5:41

are bad. The owner, thinking much longer

5:43

term, will be more likely to do

5:46

that. So you definitely see that. There's

5:48

anecdotal evidence about that, that those

5:50

kind of firms invest countercyclically. That's

5:52

a big one. The lack of

5:54

dilution we talked about, that's another

5:57

big one. So yeah, and the other thing

5:59

I think comes up. to is focus on

6:01

R&D, so a lot of times these

6:03

companies will invest more heavily in research

6:05

things that don't pay off for years

6:08

to come, right? That's again where that

6:10

long-term mindset comes into play. So there's

6:12

a lot of things that it leaks

6:15

into and I think over time I've

6:17

come to appreciate more and more how

6:19

powerful that is because it also affects

6:21

how you incentivize people, how you pay

6:24

them. So a lot of times these

6:26

longer term family oriented, family oriented. companies

6:28

they're just that better at keeping good

6:31

people paying them. I know for a

6:33

specific example like Brown and Brown is

6:35

a company I think you have in

6:38

the portfolio too if you I'm not

6:40

sure if you still have it but

6:42

I've had it since inception my fun

6:44

and I think you started buying shares

6:47

around 25 and it was 125 until

6:49

recently it still might be like 110

6:51

or something but that's the company where

6:54

you know the Brown family owns

6:56

a significant amount of stock and the CEO

6:59

is the grandson of the founder and there's

7:01

a certain ethos there about how they think

7:03

about incentives and and there's lots of stories

7:05

of people who've gotten wealthy there as well

7:08

becoming shareholders of Brown and Brown. People have

7:10

worked there, sold the Brown and Brown, stayed

7:12

on and so that kind of legacy, those

7:15

things I really look for and those tend

7:17

to be marks of very successful companies. It's

7:19

cool, I have to say. It's cool

7:21

to find companies where in extreme value

7:24

I often like to start out the

7:26

report by discussing the history of the

7:28

company when I find that it has

7:30

something to do, that it bears upon

7:33

how they're behaving today. That's gold to

7:35

me because... when things change and they

7:37

you know they they get a different

7:39

type of management team and then they're

7:42

not doing so great for a while

7:44

and then they come back and they

7:46

get another managing oh we're doing better

7:48

now it's it sort of muddies the

7:50

waters for me a little bit but

7:53

you know I deal with it but

7:55

I like it when there's a straight

7:57

line from the founding to the present

7:59

in terms of the management continuity. It

8:02

just gives me a sense of conviction

8:04

that I don't think I can really

8:06

get any other way. Like I've got

8:08

these two high conviction sort of natural

8:11

resource plays. The last place you'd ever

8:13

want to get conviction because I know

8:15

the management teams and I'm really highly

8:17

confident they're going to behave well through

8:20

the cycles and they have. They behave

8:22

brilliantly through the cycles. And yeah, I

8:24

mean, companies do have a kind of

8:26

DNA and that gets set really early

8:29

and persists for a long time. Absolutely

8:31

can be messed up, but it takes

8:33

time. And if you do have that

8:35

kind of continuity, yeah, that's a good

8:38

sign. Yes, and it doesn't have to

8:40

be family memory. It could be like

8:42

Costco, right? Absolutely. No, it could be,

8:44

you know, ranks from within and you

8:47

see it in different ways. You could

8:49

look at, you know, sometimes I'll look

8:51

at like turnover and that's an interesting

8:53

thing because sometimes you'll see like a

8:55

top performer in industry, let's say like

8:58

old dominion freight lines, which is in

9:00

trucking, which is an industry, which is

9:02

notoriously difficult to find drivers, I mean

9:04

their turnover is. far less than the

9:07

industry average. And they train most of

9:09

their own drivers. And it's the way

9:11

they manage it too when times get

9:13

tough. They don't let go of their

9:16

drivers. You know, they keep their drivers,

9:18

but maybe they have them work on

9:20

the docks for a little while. They

9:22

still pay them the same amount. They're

9:25

still treated well, but they still have

9:27

them. So when that demand rebounds, they

9:29

can put those people back as drivers.

9:31

That's again, that's also a family run

9:34

organization. Was family founded by a family,

9:36

but has since kind of stepped away.

9:38

You still have that culture and you

9:40

still have that people have been promoted

9:43

to executive offices, CEO and so forth,

9:45

have been there for 20 years or

9:47

longer. So again, to your point about

9:49

there being kind of a, like a

9:52

golden thread from the founding onto the

9:54

present. Yeah. Is this something that you

9:56

discovered on your own or do you

9:58

have, you know, were you influenced before

10:00

you even started investing other people's money

10:03

and before you were in finance? Like

10:05

where does this, where does this knowledge

10:07

of this come from? Yeah, that's a

10:09

great question. I mean, I think it's

10:12

like slowly built up over time because

10:14

I started my career in financing banking,

10:16

as you know, corporate banking. And in

10:18

that world, you know, the business is

10:21

very well. And we always did these

10:23

deals, we'd have personal guarantees. You know,

10:25

the founders of the businesses would have

10:27

to sign on the loan personally, that

10:30

they were responsible for paying it if

10:32

it didn't work out. You know, we

10:34

could in theory go after their personal

10:36

assets. So I just saw the power

10:39

of that over a long period of

10:41

time, especially when sometimes when things would

10:43

go south. And I saw retain that.

10:45

And then I know, you know, he's

10:48

an obscure, not as well-known. financial writer,

10:50

but Martin Sosnoff wrote a couple of

10:52

books that are long at a print

10:54

that I that I really like. One

10:57

was called Humbel on Wall Street, which

10:59

came out in I think 77 or

11:01

something, not 78. And the other one

11:03

was a silent investor, silent loser, which

11:06

came out in I think they're in

11:08

the 80s. But again, out of print,

11:10

but this is a point he would

11:12

emphasize all the time, is the power

11:14

of having management skin in the game

11:17

and one of his phrases was entrepreneurial

11:19

instinct equates with insider ownership. It's one

11:21

of those things I always remember. Which

11:23

she's always taught and emphasized this aspect

11:26

of. Is that EI EO? Yeah. Yeah,

11:28

it is. It's an EI. EI. EI.

11:30

EI. I never know. I will never

11:32

forget that. Yeah, I never realize that.

11:35

I don't think equates. Yeah, so there

11:37

you go. But that was another influence

11:39

along the way. And then yeah, then

11:41

my own personal experience, I remember particularly

11:44

through like the OA crisis, you know,

11:46

you'd see some of these. teams that

11:48

didn't have skin in the game would,

11:50

you know, I thought they were a

11:53

little quick to raising capital and maybe

11:55

a more creative team that had skin

11:57

in the game might have worked a

11:59

little harder before going to the market

12:02

and raising capital at such, you know,

12:04

unattractive times. Little things like that. So

12:06

it was a combination of a lot

12:08

of influence influences in reading experience that

12:11

have got me here. Well, Chris, I

12:13

promise I'm paying attention, but I couldn't

12:15

help going immediately to Amazon and looking

12:17

for Sauce on Wall Street. is apparently

12:19

a collectible item. It starts at $116

12:22

to copy. Okay, that's not that bad.

12:24

I've actually, I've actually seen it higher.

12:26

I think I've, I think I've made

12:28

the market for, yeah, I think I've

12:31

made the market for that book. Maybe

12:33

it's come down along with everything else.

12:35

Yeah. So, yeah. I met him before

12:37

too. I went, I don't know when

12:40

I. wrote my news was writing my

12:42

newsletter way back when I visited his

12:44

office and he was very generous. He

12:46

spent over an hour with me. He

12:49

loves to talk about art. He's very

12:51

much into art and he likes to

12:53

draw lessons from the art markets to

12:55

the stock market. He's got lots of

12:58

stories where he bought certain paintings and

13:00

left them alone for a long period

13:02

of time and were worth a lot

13:04

of money. So as you can see

13:07

that's probably very applicable to investing, you

13:09

know, where... You know, we see the

13:11

prices all the time, but if you

13:13

just kind of bought something softed away,

13:16

then it might be a better outcome

13:18

for a lot of people. Similar to

13:20

art. Yeah, you know, it's, that lesson

13:22

comes from all directions and all strategies,

13:24

even the, you know, the tale of

13:27

Jesse Livermore. I forget what it's called

13:29

now. Yeah. You know, that famous book

13:31

about Jesse Livermore, that where, where they

13:33

don't name him explicitly. Right right right

13:36

the fever and You know he says

13:38

my my I always made my money

13:40

in the sitting not in the buying

13:42

or selling right? The sitting he said.

13:45

So even that guy who traded his

13:47

way to like three or four bankruptcies

13:49

or something knew that making money was

13:51

about just sitting on a position that's

13:54

working you know and and with you

13:56

it's sitting on a business that works

13:58

right right over the long term right

14:00

I mean this is one of the

14:03

things always fascinates me about investing generally

14:05

like if you just look at businesses

14:07

and I know this is in Thomas

14:09

Phelps original 100 to 1 in the

14:12

stock market and he did this with

14:14

like Pfizer was his example and he

14:16

just had some basic financial deals like

14:18

net income sales, ROE, like earnings per

14:21

share, really basic stuff. And it was

14:23

every year, I don't know, like a

14:25

20 years ban, he put these numbers

14:27

on. And if you just looked at

14:30

that, of course you'd never sell it,

14:32

you know, okay, yeah, it didn't mean

14:34

that it went every year, you know,

14:36

you know, sometimes. You know, maybe then

14:38

income was down a little for that

14:41

year, but it was still perfectly within

14:43

a band of expectations, returns were good,

14:45

turn on equity and all that was

14:47

good. Of course, you would have left

14:50

it low. But, you know, stock price

14:52

was all over the place during this

14:54

time, you know, cut half and up

14:56

down, and if you've just left it

14:59

alone, you're up like 25X or something

15:01

more than that, you know, it's crazy.

15:03

And I see that even in stocks

15:05

of my own portfolio of my own

15:08

portfolio portfolio, I mean, share with them

15:10

some examples and just in the seven

15:12

years I've had my fund you know

15:14

there have been stocks where if you

15:17

look at our overall IRR over a

15:19

five or six year period it's like

15:21

21% compounded but in the midst of

15:23

that you know I just suffer a

15:26

45% decline a 55% drop in one

15:28

case you know it's astounding but again

15:30

if you just looked at the business

15:32

you would never see that the one

15:35

that fell 45% actually increased earnings per

15:37

share every year that we've owned it.

15:39

So if you just looked at the

15:41

business. And he's looked at the sales,

15:43

he looked at the rates per share,

15:46

he looked at margins. He would never

15:48

have guessed that somewhere in that run

15:50

there was a 45% drawdown from peak

15:52

to drop. But if you just left

15:55

it alone, you've got about a double

15:57

in five years. So, which is perfectly

15:59

fine. Yeah, and

16:01

Chris, you of course wrote a great

16:04

book too here. One I read a

16:06

long time ago, a hundred baggers, where

16:08

you talk about a lot of this,

16:11

a lot of these ideas. Yeah, and

16:13

that came right out of the book.

16:15

That was the inspiration, was to update

16:18

that what he did. So that's how

16:20

that came about. Yeah, and I was

16:22

looking back through it once I knew

16:25

you were coming on. I had, you

16:27

know. earmarked some pages back when I

16:29

first read it. And the first one

16:31

I got to was when you tell

16:34

the story about monster. I know you've

16:36

probably talked about this a lot, but

16:38

just the, and then I remember reading

16:41

that for the first time and kind

16:43

of being blown away by it, because

16:45

that's one of the names that. I

16:48

think a lot of casual investors hear

16:50

about me, not when they see these

16:52

long lists of top returning stocks over

16:55

the last 10, 20 years or whatever,

16:57

but monster. And I was wondering if

16:59

you could just use that, maybe as

17:02

a brief example of why that company

17:04

turned out the way it did. Yeah,

17:06

well, I always remember the great thing

17:09

about monster, and that particular example, is

17:11

that you had years to buy it

17:13

and still make 100 times your money.

17:16

And it was evident like in the

17:18

financials, you know, it was very clear

17:20

in this company, it was, you saw

17:23

very large, you know, fat margins, big

17:25

growth, and it was, it was years,

17:27

it was going along like this, so

17:30

you had a chance to buy it

17:32

during all that time. It was like

17:34

right out there in the open, but

17:37

sometimes, you know, it's not always the

17:39

case, but this, you know, you could

17:41

really just see it, and you had

17:44

so much time, Many more times than

17:46

just a hundred. I think it was

17:48

up. I don't know 700 times at

17:51

some point in it and maybe not

17:53

more than that now I don't I

17:55

don't remember but So the lesson there

17:57

is when you find a really great

18:00

business, you know, you have a lot

18:02

more time than you think. You know,

18:04

it could be just think if you

18:07

had looked at Monster and it was

18:09

up 10X and you thought, well, you

18:11

know, I've missed it. That would have

18:14

been a shame, right? But focusing just

18:16

on the business, it had huge, you

18:18

know, what we call, Tam, total addressable

18:21

market. That's the other thing about Monster.

18:23

And, you know, it was making deals

18:25

with... distributors and so there was definitely

18:28

a story there that you could follow

18:30

but what other thing that was interesting

18:32

about Master was there was quite a

18:35

bit of skepticism about it for a

18:37

long time and And in the book

18:39

I pointed out I think there was

18:42

a value investors club right up. It

18:44

was very negative on on that stock

18:46

and the competitive position of it. So

18:49

even though it had these large very

18:51

thick margins and on paper was doing

18:53

very well, there was still a lot

18:56

of skepticism about the durability of that.

18:58

So those are some things that come

19:00

out on that case study, but that

19:03

was one of the interesting ones for

19:05

sure. Yeah, when I think of energy

19:07

drinks, of course, Red Bull was the

19:10

ultimate example. And the classic story, you

19:12

know, that it goes around about that

19:14

is that people tasted it. Yeah, that's

19:17

right. And it's terrible. If you've ever

19:19

tasted, it's terrible. That's exactly right. I

19:21

remember that, that's part of it too.

19:23

People look at it, they taste it,

19:26

it was terrible. Yeah, it was like,

19:28

nobody's gonna drink this, right? Yeah, that's

19:30

right. And everybody drinks the damn stuff.

19:33

I mean, I don't get it. Yeah,

19:35

I don't first, we get it. So,

19:37

right. Yes, that's one of those things

19:40

where maybe the Peter Lynch style of,

19:42

you know, trying the product itself didn't

19:44

help you. No, no, it kept you

19:47

away from a huge, huge winner. Yeah.

19:49

Wow. I mean, they're the only one

19:51

if you watch Formula and racing. They're

19:54

the only one with two teams in

19:56

the field. And, you know, they're. Very

19:58

few, there are only 10 teams. Right.

20:01

Of course, the other thing about Monster,

20:03

and this is true of all these

20:05

big winners, is that it suffered multiple

20:08

drawdowns. And I know in the book,

20:10

I remember I went through it, I

20:12

had a little, I think I had

20:15

a little heat map where I showed

20:17

them, and I mean, it dropped 40%

20:19

multiple times during its run. So, I

20:22

mean, one of the, I'd say like

20:24

two big lessons at a book that

20:26

I've learned about these long-term winners. One

20:29

is they all go through those periods

20:31

where you have, where you have these

20:33

massive, where you have these massive, where

20:36

you have these massive. you know, getting

20:38

cut, cutting half type drawdowns, even Berkshire

20:40

has been cut in half at least

20:43

three different times. But you also had

20:45

long stretches aboard them, which is also,

20:47

I think, just as bad. It's just

20:49

as tough, maybe tougher to hold on

20:52

to a stock that goes nowhere for

20:54

five, six, seven years. I mean, that's

20:56

hard. And there were a lot of

20:59

times that happened. I've done this with

21:01

my stocks as well, where I've gone

21:03

back and I've actually, I think it

21:06

was brown and brown. I did one

21:08

of these case studies studies studies on

21:10

where in a 16-year stretch, it was

21:13

up. I don't remember the numbers now.

21:15

It was up a good bit many

21:17

times, but there was a six-year stretch

21:20

in that where it went nowhere from

21:22

peak to peak. So, you know, that's

21:24

hard. You know, when you're watching other

21:27

stocks, you're in your looking at other

21:29

stocks, there's always something going up. I

21:31

mean, Berkshire was the best performing stock

21:34

in that study, and it had a

21:36

seven-year run where it went nowhere in

21:38

like the late 90s, like the late

21:41

90s, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:43

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:45

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:48

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:50

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:52

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:55

like, like, like, like, like, like, like,

21:57

like, like, like, like, 200% during that

21:59

time of Berkshire went nowhere. That's tough

22:02

to hold, but that was the best

22:04

performing stock in the study. So you

22:06

can imagine, you know, some of the

22:09

other top performers that weren't quite the

22:11

best, have longer stretches of underperformance. And

22:13

it's just, you know, kind of normal,

22:15

natural. You have to get used to

22:18

it if you're going to be a

22:20

long tour investor and make these really

22:22

good returns. This calls to mind the

22:25

great quote of William Goldman. Right? Nobody

22:27

knows anything. He was talking about Hollywood.

22:29

But nobody knows anything. Nobody knows anything

22:32

about the price of securities, the direction

22:34

of the... price of securities. Nobody does

22:36

anything about it. And if you make

22:39

decisions based on it, well, you know,

22:41

you're making a decision based on something

22:43

you yourself do not know and that

22:46

nobody knows. It's not how you do

22:48

it. Right. I mean, over the very

22:50

long term we know that stock prices

22:53

generally will follow the business performance, right?

22:55

You're not going to create a great

22:57

business like Costco or something and not

23:00

have the stock go up over time.

23:02

There are stretches, of course, that can

23:04

go on days, weeks, months, years where

23:07

they can be decoupled. And that can

23:09

be very frustrating. And great fantastic businesses

23:11

like Costco, if we're going to stick

23:14

with that exam, they can become extraordinarily

23:16

cheap and still be a fantastic business.

23:18

They can become extraordinarily overvalued. And if

23:21

you buy at that peak, you're not

23:23

going to perform for a long time.

23:25

But the business keeps chugging. It's just

23:28

like, you know, it's got to be

23:30

intensely frustrating, you know, for people to

23:32

look at that and be expected to

23:35

not do anything. So we often wind

23:37

up here in these discussions where we

23:39

have to admit that it's investing is,

23:41

I would say it's technically not extraordinarily

23:44

difficult, but it is emotionally downright near

23:46

impossible for most people. totally agree. I

23:48

mean sometimes I think that's my role

23:51

like the biggest service I provide for

23:53

my investors is just getting them just

23:55

stick in there and just leave it

23:58

alone and you know and be kind

24:00

of like yeah almost like a shrink

24:02

telling you know giving them bucking them

24:05

up when times are bad and and

24:07

not letting them you know give up

24:09

so but yeah I totally agree you

24:12

know just like the basic principles of

24:14

it are pretty simple if you just

24:16

You know, buying a basket of great

24:19

businesses leaving them alone or even you

24:21

only have to do that. You just

24:23

buy... index funding and you leave it

24:26

alone, that part's not so difficult, but

24:28

the emotional toll and the ability to

24:30

resist doing something and that's the thing.

24:33

People want to do something and the

24:35

ability to resist that is that's hard

24:37

and the emotions. So going through it

24:40

like we're going through it now, you

24:42

know, things are in free falls, it

24:44

looks like some kind of economic catastrophe

24:47

that's unfolding before our eyes. But we've

24:49

been here before and I think, you

24:51

know, again, if you have that multi-year

24:54

outlook, you look out five years or

24:56

so, this is going to be another

24:58

blip, plus like COVID, just like other

25:00

things we've seen happen before. Yeah, yep,

25:03

nothing new under the sun. Chris, I,

25:05

before we hit record on this, I

25:07

was asking you about the books on

25:10

the shelf up behind you. You are

25:12

an avid reader of philosophy. Yes. Does

25:14

this have any, you know, is this,

25:17

is this a hobby or does it

25:19

integrate with investing at all? Well, that's

25:21

good question. I mean, I started it

25:24

just kind of as a hobby and

25:26

as an interest, but of course it

25:28

plays in everything in life. I mean,

25:31

not just investing, but everything. So it

25:33

is kind of, it is very important.

25:35

And yeah, I mean, I'm... you know,

25:38

taking that more philosophical outlook about things,

25:40

I think it makes it easier to

25:42

go through those difficult periods for sure.

25:45

And different philosophers have different things to

25:47

teach you. Yeah. Yeah. Yep. You better

25:49

be philosophical about it when you're getting,

25:52

you know, you're getting beat up like,

25:54

you know, Trump tariff tantrum. Right. That's

25:56

right. This too shall pass. That's it.

25:59

I mean, you know, I think lots

26:01

of different things with these philosophy learned.

26:03

different things. I mean, you know, the

26:06

pragmatic philosophers teach you different ways to

26:08

think about things. Plateness are different. So

26:10

yeah, I really enjoy reading a lot

26:13

of these different things and thinking about

26:15

them. And then, yeah, they spill over

26:17

inevitably until what I'm doing. Is there

26:20

one that really sort of speaks to

26:22

you as a market philosopher who didn't

26:24

know he was one, let's say? Well,

26:26

you know, I've written a couple of

26:29

books. Yeah, I was just thinking that.

26:31

Just thinking to him, that I've written

26:33

a couple books about Krasibsky, of course,

26:36

so he's, yeah, he, there's a lot

26:38

in there that you can apply to

26:40

markets. And of course, he didn't know

26:43

it at all, whether he didn't address

26:45

that audience at all, which was the

26:47

perfect avenue for me to write my

26:50

book. How do you know? Which I

26:52

did. And I wasn't the first one

26:54

that tried to you that either, somebody

26:57

else who tried it in 19. I

26:59

forget the date now was at 19,

27:01

late 50s or early 60s or someone

27:04

else tried to write a book and

27:06

it was actually McGee, the same guy

27:08

who wrote the book on technical analysis,

27:11

the Bible technical analysis. But he wrote

27:13

a book, it was called General Semantics

27:15

on Wall Street. I remember that was

27:18

the first edition and I always chuckled

27:20

because that didn't last very long. And

27:22

there was a second printing that came

27:25

last very long and there was a

27:27

second printing that came out. on a

27:29

selling. Yeah, you put over the chairs.

27:32

Yeah, it's like a great degree for

27:34

the second edition. Yeah, right. And so

27:36

wait a worse book title. On Woodlock

27:39

Family House, Woodlock House Family Capital, I

27:41

see, Hunter Baggers, invest like a deal

27:43

maker, how do you know in World

27:46

Right Side Up? Is, are you saying

27:48

World Right Side Up is also influenced

27:50

by? Qurisibsky? No, it has had two

27:52

books. The other one I wrote was

27:55

not, probably not even on my website.

27:57

It's a book I wrote published by

27:59

the Institute of General Samandix, which is.

28:02

Corsipsky's Institute that he started in the

28:04

1930s. And that book is called Dear

28:06

Fellow Time Binder. Oh, I have that

28:09

on the shelf. That, yeah. Yeah, yeah.

28:11

I forgot. How do you know, it's

28:13

also now published by the Institute of

28:16

General Sematics as well. So those are

28:18

the two books that are really directly,

28:20

you know, related to Crisipsky. All right.

28:23

I just, I want to make sure

28:25

I have the complete works of Chris,

28:27

Mer, Mer. You want to talk about

28:30

a stock or two that you like

28:32

now? We can do that, I don't

28:34

care. Or maybe I could ask you

28:37

to talk about Swedish companies, just to

28:39

say a few words about Swedish companies.

28:41

Yes, so I got interested in Sweden

28:44

because there were all these winners from

28:46

over there. So, you know, I'm doing

28:48

these, not only these hundred baggers study

28:51

I did, but then others. studies I've

28:53

read, I've been reading, and I get

28:55

interested in this kind of thing, well,

28:58

you know, these top performers. And I

29:00

came across a chart where there are

29:02

a bunch of Swedish companies that outperform

29:05

Berkshire. I wish I could kept the

29:07

original chart that I found, and it

29:09

wasn't like from inception, but it was

29:12

over like a 20-year period of time

29:14

or something like that. And there were

29:16

these, you know, for lack of a

29:18

better word, kind of holding companies, companies

29:21

that grew a lot through acquisition. I

29:23

was like, wow, what are these things?

29:25

And so, yeah, I started to investigate

29:28

more in Sweden and turns out there

29:30

are a lot of winners. There's a

29:32

very good market. The, in fact, I

29:35

saw a study not long ago which

29:37

looked at stocks that had gone up

29:39

at least 1,000% in the last decade

29:42

and of that population, Sweden had contributed

29:44

something like 20 companies to that, to

29:46

that population, which was like a four

29:49

and a half percent. It was way

29:51

oversized based on the market cap. So

29:53

it was the big ones. It was

29:56

like the US, China, India, and I

29:58

think. Japan, but the fifth most contributor

30:00

was from Sweden was Sweden. Who knew

30:03

that there were even 20 publicly traded

30:05

Swedish companies at all? There's only like

30:07

10 million Swedes, but they produced a

30:10

number of these winners. So yeah, so

30:12

you know, like Lifco is an example.

30:14

This one I own and I was

30:17

the first, my first purchase in Sweden

30:19

and it came in 2021. And yeah,

30:21

it's a really great company. It's half

30:24

owned by Carl Bennet and other insiders

30:26

own some stock too. So you have

30:28

this skin in the game element, not

30:31

leverage. They do a lot of different

30:33

things. So it's a holding company. They

30:35

have over 200 different businesses. Some of

30:38

it they do like dental supply, so

30:40

like the cement that goes in your

30:42

teeth when you go to the dentist,

30:44

get fillings and things, they make that.

30:47

They have all these other industrial parts

30:49

and segment fittings and things that they

30:51

make. So it's a very broad. the

30:54

first by business, they take that cashful

30:56

and they reinvest and they buy other

30:58

businesses and they just can't keep going.

31:01

So it's kind of like in the

31:03

US, maybe the closest kind of equivalent

31:05

would be something like a Danahair or

31:08

a roper, you know, these kind of

31:10

businesses that they grow primarily through acquiring

31:12

other small niche industrial businesses. So it's

31:15

one this very decentralized model, which is

31:17

a very Swedish thing that's decentralized. They

31:19

call them this, they're called Swedish serial

31:22

acquireers, that's what people call them. I

31:24

don't, not necessarily that fond of that

31:26

name, but that's what it is. I

31:29

prefer to think of them more as

31:31

they're buying and building businesses kind of,

31:33

you know, as they go along. But

31:36

yeah, I mean, lifco has been, and

31:38

by the way, it's also global, it's

31:40

not like it's just a Swedish Swedish

31:43

thing. So they're, so they're, do business

31:45

all over the business all over the

31:47

business all over the business all over

31:50

the world. But it's a very solid

31:52

solid business generates lots of cash and

31:54

then they reinvest a good chunk of

31:57

it and generate good returns on capital

31:59

and And it's a machine. I mean,

32:01

they've been doing this now. If you

32:04

look, I think it went public in

32:06

2000. Well, I don't remember now. 14,

32:08

or maybe a little earlier. But I

32:10

mean, it's been a great, great winner

32:13

on the stock market. And so that's

32:15

one, one example. And there's other smaller

32:17

ones, too. So you can kind of,

32:20

you know, if you poke around, you

32:22

can find ones that are a little

32:24

earlier in the curve. I'm on the

32:27

board of one of these small publicly

32:29

traded companies. So, and I want to

32:31

talk my book too much, but it's

32:34

also an interesting one called Technion. TEQ

32:36

is the ticker over there. And similar

32:38

to a lifco except much earlier on,

32:41

so there are only 30 businesses there

32:43

around 30. We've spent some acquisitions this

32:45

year. So, I mean, that's the kind

32:48

of thing you can find over there.

32:50

And it's been very interesting. And again,

32:52

lots of skin in the game, all

32:55

these companies are own. The owners, the

32:57

management team are owners, own a good

32:59

bit of stock, they're not leverage, generate

33:02

cash, all the beautiful things we like

33:04

about businesses. They seem to exhibit. So,

33:06

interesting. I make make trip to Sweden

33:09

in a year. I go at least

33:11

three or four times a year. Last

33:13

year, probably went more than that. And

33:16

that's a good market deficient. And again,

33:18

everyone speaks English. They disclosures are all

33:20

in English. So the disclosures are good.

33:23

And it's a good market that way.

33:26

Very interesting and only 10 million people

33:28

and all those winners. There must be

33:30

something in the water in Sweden Yeah,

33:33

well, you know, there was there's a

33:35

lot of theories about this but one

33:37

is there was this company called Bergman

33:39

and Beving that got started in the

33:42

early 1900s and Fast forward they've they

33:44

were the first one that kind of

33:46

discovered the power this decentralized model and

33:48

then buying other small industrials and you're

33:51

kind of reinvesting and doing that and

33:53

So they were so successful and then

33:55

they had spinouts. So, you know, ad

33:57

tech and logarhons or spinouts of Bergman

34:00

and Beving. and they've been very successful.

34:02

So I call it kind of like

34:04

the Silicon Valley effect. It was like,

34:06

you know, you just had these tech

34:09

businesses that start happen to be successful

34:11

in Silicon Valley and it just tracks

34:13

talent there and copycats. And now we

34:16

associate Silicon Valley as being, you know,

34:18

a tech haven or center. And this

34:20

kind of similar thing happened there. They

34:22

had this model. It was very successful.

34:25

other people sort of copied it, drew

34:27

similar talent there, and so now there's

34:29

a proliferation of these kind of models

34:31

there that have all been very successful.

34:34

I have a question that I forgot

34:36

to ask you earlier when we were

34:38

talking about the code, if you don't

34:40

mind just quickly backtracking that before we

34:43

move on. I wonder, have you ever

34:45

or would you ever own a company

34:47

like Transdime, which is a levered company?

34:49

But you know, they've been, Nick Howley

34:52

is a brilliant, brilliant guy and had

34:54

a fantastic idea and has executed on

34:56

it quite brilliantly and does some of

34:58

these things that you're talking about. Absolutely.

35:01

But, but he pursues this, you know,

35:03

he likes the private equity sort of

35:05

model and he pursues that, you know,

35:08

with reference to leverage, dividend policy and

35:10

just the way he thinks about the

35:12

business. Would you ever own that? That's

35:14

a great, great question. I've looked at

35:17

it many times and then I would

35:19

say no. I mean, I, you know,

35:21

Trans-Dime, the kind of counter to Trans-Dime

35:23

is HICO. I own HIGO, which is

35:26

a similar, I mean, they're often put

35:28

in the same bucket of their different

35:30

businesses, but, and they've both been very

35:32

successful. HICO has done it with very

35:35

little leverage. and transient with eye watering

35:37

leverage for me. Yeah. But I cannot

35:39

deny, you know, they've been successful. It's

35:41

like I tell people, you know, sometimes

35:44

this just comes down to personal preference.

35:46

It's like, do you like deep dish

35:48

pizza or New York style pizza? It

35:50

doesn't mean ones. Right, you know, one's

35:53

wrong. So Transdime has a formula. It's

35:55

very successful. And I don't deny that

35:57

it's been very successful. And I expect

36:00

it will be successful. But it's just

36:02

not much fully- There's an interesting philosophical-

36:04

Sorry, sorry, there's, I didn't mean to

36:06

interrupt, but there's an interesting philosophical point

36:09

here for me. As you say, it

36:11

is a personal preference. It's partially about

36:13

investing in things that you understand and

36:15

you understand, you understand, you know, you

36:18

know, founders who don't like a lot

36:20

of leverage a lot of leverage a

36:22

lot of leverage, is great. I love

36:24

that idea. But I wonder how much

36:27

can I ever understand Transdime because, you

36:29

know, a lot of leverage, things can

36:31

happen that you can anticipate. And so

36:33

how much can you ever really know?

36:36

Even if they're brilliant, they have a

36:38

great track record, they have a culture

36:40

that has really executed very well. And

36:42

I wonder, you know, Because I have

36:45

it in the extreme value portfolio. I

36:47

think they're brilliant. I think they've done

36:49

a great thing. I do have that

36:52

straight line from the founding to the

36:54

present moment that I often like to

36:56

see. But I scratch my head about

36:58

the leverage now and then because I

37:01

think how much, you know, they've done

37:03

it the whole time. But you and

37:05

I both know that distaste for leverage

37:07

and the, you know, wanting the well

37:10

financed business, it's about all the things

37:12

that you don't know can happen. the

37:14

things you may have to ride out

37:16

so I'm I'm in a philosophical quandary

37:19

about it constantly just right not a

37:21

question just you know no I mean

37:23

that's I mean that's I mean that's

37:25

I mean I also say like I'll

37:28

tell people like you have to come

37:30

up with some sort of investment philosophies

37:32

you have to have some principles and

37:35

then you have to recognize because these

37:37

principles will also help you filter out

37:39

the investment universe as you know there's

37:41

tens of thousands of securities we have

37:44

to have some way to get to

37:46

some manageable number that we can work

37:48

on. And so you have to also

37:50

recognize that whatever principles you choose are...

37:53

filters you choose, you're going to miss

37:55

out some great winners. You know, my

37:57

aversion to leverage means I've missed out

37:59

on some fantastic winners, you know, or

38:02

the owner operator thing. There have been

38:04

some great winners where management team has

38:06

had very little skin in the game,

38:08

the way I would define it. But

38:11

I'm okay with that, because I'm looking

38:13

at it as something that is a

38:15

long term that I have to repeat

38:17

again and again and again and again.

38:20

And like you say, I mean, there

38:22

are going to be times when... It's

38:24

going to be very uncomfortable to be

38:27

leveraged. We both have been through the

38:29

2008 crisis. And in that period of

38:31

time, even in OK balance, he became

38:33

a problem very quickly. So I would

38:36

rather not have to deal with that.

38:38

Also, it folds into a lot of

38:40

other things on how you do investing.

38:42

I run a very concentrated portfolio. I

38:45

have 12 stocks at the top five

38:47

or half of it. In the top

38:49

three, I think, or about 33 percent.

38:51

You know, about 11% to or about

38:54

11, yeah, around 11% the top three

38:56

each. So, you know, I'm not going

38:58

to, when you have a structure like

39:00

that versus the structure where you have

39:03

30 stocks, you know, you can, you

39:05

think about it a little differently maybe.

39:07

Some things you can't put in a

39:09

concentrated portfolio, but you might put in

39:12

a portfolio with 30, you know, there

39:14

are different ways that you have risk

39:16

management things in a different way, so,

39:19

you know, it all kind of fits

39:21

together, as one way I would think

39:23

about it, I would think about it

39:25

too. Yeah, and having those principles, right,

39:28

is so important in times like, like

39:30

we're going through right now, right? Like,

39:32

you know, when you're, maybe we're flirting

39:34

with the bare market territory here. I've

39:37

been hearing from people that I haven't

39:39

heard from in a long time asking

39:41

about the stock market, so I know

39:43

that that's a panicky, well, fearful time,

39:46

obviously, and I think just... Right that

39:48

just having those principles right is that

39:50

part of how you get through these

39:52

these time periods Yeah, well I would

39:55

also say like from now Absolutely, absolutely.

39:57

And I would say times like this

39:59

is when people then tend to abandon

40:01

those principles. So it's easy to follow

40:04

the principles when everything is going well.

40:06

The test of any principle is, you

40:08

stick with it when it, when the

40:11

thing is getting nasty. And that's the

40:13

challenge. Right, don't tell me your risk

40:15

tolerance. Show it to me at times

40:17

like this, right? I was like one

40:20

of my favorite Mike Tyson quotes. He

40:22

says, you know, everyone's got a plan

40:24

until they get hit in the mouth.

40:26

Everyone's got investment principles till the first

40:29

bear market comes around. That's right. Yeah.

40:31

Yep. Yeah. It's all a learning experience.

40:33

Then you find out who you really

40:35

are. It's just like, as you say,

40:38

it's like anything else in life. You

40:40

know, you find out who you are

40:42

under pressure. Yes. And many people are

40:44

under pressure right now. Yeah, it's a

40:47

great way to learn about yourself. And

40:49

that you have to make your philosophy.

40:51

Your investment philosophy and principles have to

40:53

match your own. you know

40:56

personality what you know about yourself

40:58

you know I know like there's

41:00

some business I'm just uncomfortable owning

41:02

I mean I'm you know like

41:04

most retailers I'm just uncomfortable without

41:06

model I don't you know and

41:08

I know that when things get

41:10

bad I have a hard time

41:12

holding it so I've learned so

41:14

over time I've seen it and

41:16

I what things I mistakes I've

41:18

made and so I try to

41:20

put myself in situations where I'm

41:22

not going to be forced in

41:25

that corner again you know so

41:27

you if you're Always thinking about

41:29

that, I think that's a good

41:31

guiding light too. You know, there's

41:33

some things that if you're just

41:35

not comfortable with, then that's fine.

41:37

You just don't own those things.

41:39

It's lots of other fish in

41:41

the sea. Right, it's the, it's

41:43

Buffett's circle of competence. You know,

41:45

there's a clear boundary beyond which

41:47

you'd probably be better off, you

41:49

know, not going beyond it. I

41:51

would say my circle of competence

41:53

over time has gotten small. It's

41:55

like the number of things I

41:57

really want to own. You would

42:00

think it would get wider, like

42:02

you'd learn more and you'd want

42:04

it. No, actually it gets smaller

42:06

because the number of things I

42:08

really want to... it's just yeah

42:10

you get more picky I guess.

42:12

Right but it's but actually I

42:14

would say in describing that evolution

42:16

the circle of competence becomes clearer

42:18

because I'll only speak for myself

42:20

Chris because I look back and

42:22

I said well I thought that

42:24

one was inside it but it's

42:26

outside it so yeah I can

42:28

see how you say it's getting

42:30

smaller but you know clear may

42:32

be a better way to put

42:34

it actually. I like this never

42:37

really inside the circle to begin

42:39

with. I was just you know

42:41

wandering in the wilderness thinking I

42:43

knew something that I didn't know.

42:45

Well then I remember I have

42:47

a memory I don't know this

42:49

doesn't necessarily make us look great

42:51

but it's probably valuable for our

42:53

listeners anyway. One of the first

42:55

things you and I worked on

42:57

together. Yeah. I want to hear

42:59

this. One of the first things

43:01

we worked on together was like

43:03

reinsurers and we went to Bermuda

43:05

and we met with all these

43:07

reinsurers and we did a bunch

43:09

of research on that and I

43:11

don't know I'm sure Dan agrees

43:14

now but in retrospect I'm like

43:16

we didn't know we had no

43:18

business being there I mean we

43:20

were way out of our yeah

43:22

that's one of the successful investments

43:24

I think for either of us

43:26

so we learned I mean well

43:28

I was flat on Oh God,

43:30

I can't remember the name of

43:32

the company. I blocked it all

43:34

out. Yeah, I, no, you had

43:36

one that was okay. It was

43:38

like partners or something. I remember

43:40

Ryan was like Scottishry, which was

43:42

a disaster. I got out of

43:44

it before completely unfolded, but there

43:46

are, yeah, didn't work. Yep. Yeah,

43:48

I, I wish I could remember.

43:51

We did have a good time

43:53

in Bermuda, but we met with

43:55

a lot of companies, but it

43:57

was, we had a lot of

43:59

fish stew. Yeah, and yeah, Fish-Doo,

44:01

that was the best part of

44:03

it, was Bermuda Fish-Doo. We met

44:05

with that one particular fellow who

44:07

I felt taught us more about

44:09

reinsurance than any other human being

44:11

I've ever encountered in my life.

44:13

And I don't remember his name,

44:15

but I remember the company and

44:17

actually an extreme value. I'm trying

44:19

to look through the portfolio quickly.

44:21

He... I wish we could remember.

44:23

We're going to frustrate our listeners

44:26

by trying to remember, but we

44:28

actually sort of made a small

44:30

single digit profit as I recall

44:32

on that company, which I'm sorry

44:34

I can't find it right now.

44:36

And he just taught us, you

44:38

know, I'll never forget the lesson

44:40

he taught us about. these risks

44:42

with the geographical zones. He taught

44:44

us about hurricane hazel, you know,

44:46

started out in like lesser Antilles

44:48

or some place and killed a

44:50

bunch of people in, I think

44:52

it was Haiti or Cuba or

44:54

somebody, maybe Haiti, and then it

44:56

made landfall in the Carolinas and

44:58

went and killed 80 people in

45:00

Toronto. And those aren't in the

45:03

same geographical zone. So if you're

45:05

writing X percent of your net

45:07

worth as these companies do, You

45:09

were way over your skis there

45:11

on that hurricane hazel deal. So,

45:13

you know, the lesson there was,

45:15

you know, don't draw the zone

45:17

like everybody else. You know, you

45:19

got to know what you're doing

45:21

when you draw the zone, which

45:23

is a crazy thing. Okay, now

45:25

we got to know weather patterns.

45:27

You know, it just got more

45:29

and more complicated so that you

45:31

could never say that you really

45:33

knew anything. Well, that's I think,

45:35

that's, I think, yeah, that's the

45:37

key takeaway for me for that

45:40

now, is he just got more

45:42

and more complicated and you can

45:44

never be sure that you really

45:46

knew anything. And that pretty much

45:48

sums up to me as well.

45:50

Yeah. And it's, you know, it's

45:52

classic, classic Charlie Mungerism, right, the

45:54

two hard pile. You know, and

45:56

that was a long time ago,

45:58

by the way. That was like

46:00

2004 or 2005, something like that.

46:02

So I mean, he's evolved as

46:04

investors since, but that's an example.

46:06

Yeah, I also lied. We lost

46:08

14% on it in extreme by

46:10

I found IPC holdings. I PC.

46:12

That was it. Yep. Held it

46:14

for 223 days and lost 14%.

46:17

Which is probably a fantastic result

46:19

on average. Exactly. For a re-insure.

46:21

Yes. It's like to run destiny

46:23

reinsurance companies, you have to be

46:25

Warren Buffett. You don't have to

46:27

be like him. You have to

46:29

be him. You have to be

46:31

him. You know. And he had

46:33

his problems with him as well

46:35

too. So let's, you know. Now

46:37

General Re wasn't exactly the greatest

46:39

thing, you know. Well, you learned

46:41

and had some good fish stew.

46:43

Yeah, we did. You know, the

46:45

fish stew was worth the trip,

46:47

I think. And if readers bought

46:49

the stock and lost 14% but

46:51

went and had the fish stew,

46:54

I'm going to call it break

46:56

even. So. Yeah. All right. You

46:58

got any other names that you

47:00

think. teach a good lesson for

47:02

listeners or that you're excited about

47:04

like right now. Yeah, I mean

47:06

I have to tell listeners Chris

47:08

is not like the excited about

47:10

right now pick kind of a

47:12

guy if I'm you know he's

47:14

he's the guy you want to

47:16

go to these long-term lessons for

47:18

so so you know right put

47:20

that in your notes too. Yeah.

47:22

I mean one of the things

47:24

I I mean, yeah, I mean

47:26

right now is a lot there's

47:29

I would buy almost everything. I

47:31

mean, because everything's down so much,

47:33

but you know, I've been gotten

47:35

a lot more excited about a

47:37

company called Lumine Group, L-U-M-I-N-E, and

47:39

it's a spin-off of Constellation software.

47:41

Oh, really? Nice. Yeah, yeah, and

47:43

I've owned it since the spin.

47:45

average is around probably 17 or

47:47

something like that. It's 40, 40

47:49

dollars around right now. But they,

47:51

I mean, they're, they're like a.

47:53

35% return on invested capital over

47:55

the last three years. They've invested

47:57

in a ton of money, and

47:59

I think that it's just gonna

48:01

be a surge in free cash

48:03

flow here in the next couple

48:06

of years. So I think that's

48:08

one I'm particularly excited about. It's

48:10

a lot of growth. The other

48:12

one is kind of a sister

48:14

company that would be called Topicus.

48:16

What's called Topicus? And that's also

48:18

one that should have a. big

48:20

surge in free cash loss also

48:22

spin-off from consolation. And I've owned

48:24

that one since the beginning as

48:26

well that added to it, but

48:28

I think both those are pretty

48:30

timely right now because, again, they've

48:32

made all these investments. They've deployed

48:34

in a lot of capital last

48:36

year, particularly for Topicus. And, you

48:38

know, if you just do kind

48:40

of back of the envelope math

48:43

based on returns they've gotten in

48:45

the past when they deploy capital,

48:47

you know, they're making 25 percent

48:49

or so returns on this capital.

48:51

and you project that forward, there's

48:53

going to be a big surge

48:55

in free cash flow this year

48:57

and next year. And I don't

48:59

think the market quite fully appreciates

49:01

it yet. But yeah, those are

49:03

ones that I would expect to

49:05

own for a lot of years.

49:07

So like you just said, Dan,

49:09

I'm not saying by right now,

49:11

like then you're going to make

49:13

a return in three months and

49:15

sell it. These are really good

49:17

businesses that should. compound capital high

49:20

rates for a long time. All

49:22

right, so before we get to

49:24

our final question, I have the

49:26

penultimate question for you. Okay. Or

49:28

maybe it's a comment and you

49:30

could expound a little bit on

49:32

this is for our listener. Please

49:34

notice that we are talking with

49:36

Chris in the midst of the

49:38

Donald Trump tariff tantrum and the

49:40

market is down substantially, you know,

49:42

and it's wildly... volatile from day

49:44

to day, you know, it's red

49:46

and it's green and it's up

49:48

and it's down. And you have

49:50

not heard Chris mention that one

49:52

single time. Why, Chris, why have

49:55

we not heard you mention that

49:57

one single time? Yeah, that's a

49:59

good point to make. I think

50:01

right now, I saw just this

50:03

morning that we are, it's a

50:05

fourth worst start to the US

50:07

market in history. History being 21st

50:09

century and 20th century. Yeah, I

50:11

think the top two are like

50:13

from the 1930s and then the

50:15

third worst was 2020. And now

50:17

we're the fourth, which is kind

50:19

of amazing. But I mean one

50:21

reason why is because It doesn't

50:23

change anything that I'm doing like

50:25

I haven't you know Really touched

50:27

the portfolio this year as far

50:29

as selling anything or and I

50:32

don't anticipate doing anything So for

50:34

me, I mean, I don't want

50:36

to say it's a non-event. It's

50:38

important things are happening, but it's

50:40

not like making me want to

50:42

run out and sell my stocks

50:44

or you know make a switch

50:46

somehow so that that's probably the

50:48

biggest reason it's not it's not

50:50

in the actual category for me

50:52

it's not at least not yet

50:54

yeah that I can see not

50:56

wait wait a minute that was

50:58

interesting it's not in the actual

51:00

category for me what do you

51:02

mean like an actionable category like

51:04

an actionable okay I see I'm

51:06

sorry I didn't hear you okay

51:09

it's not an actionable category of

51:11

news information. Right. I mean, because

51:13

when I'm looking, because I'm studying

51:15

these businesses primarily, and so it's

51:17

not, you know, I'm not going

51:19

to, like I said, I'm not

51:21

going to run out and sell

51:23

any of these businesses because they're

51:25

down, you know, whatever, 15% or

51:27

whatever it is from their eyes.

51:29

And of all the stuff we've

51:31

been talking about, I mean, this

51:33

is really normal for equity investors.

51:35

It's just these things happen from

51:37

time to time. and we've had

51:39

more in our share of it

51:41

late then. lately than usual. I

51:43

was thinking about this the other

51:46

day, I was saying this is

51:48

my seventh year running the fund

51:50

and I've already had three bare

51:52

markets in that time, which is

51:54

unusual. That's a lot of bare

51:56

markets. Usually I have like one,

51:58

you know. So, but it is

52:00

still normal when you take the

52:02

longer view. I mean, it's, yep.

52:04

So, as you said before, this

52:06

two shall pass. Yeah. All right,

52:08

so let's, with the penultimate question

52:10

out of the way, let's do

52:12

the final question, which is the

52:14

same for every guest, no matter

52:16

what the topic, even if it's

52:18

a non-financial topic, same identical question.

52:21

If you've already said the answer,

52:23

please feel free to repeat it.

52:25

And the final question is simply,

52:27

it's for our listener's sake, if

52:29

you could leave them with one

52:31

final idea, one final takeaway, what

52:33

would it be? We'll say something

52:35

along these lines is The key

52:37

word for all of this investing

52:39

is patience And if I could

52:41

boil it down the one thing

52:43

it'd be that you have to

52:45

be patient It's like You know

52:47

when you plant You know flowers

52:49

or something or vegetables you don't

52:51

expect immediate results. You have to

52:53

give it time you plant the

52:55

tree you know you you have

52:58

to give a time to grow

53:00

and then they're going to be

53:02

good growing seasons and bad growing

53:04

seasons and it's going to be

53:06

winters and the springs and you

53:08

don't pull it out you know

53:10

or you have to give you

53:12

give a time. So I think

53:14

the biggest thing for any investment

53:16

strategy principles or however you decide

53:18

to tackle the problem is you

53:20

have to find ways to cultivate

53:22

that patience. And there are lots

53:24

of ways to do it. I

53:26

mean, I gave him one little

53:28

crutch I like is that coffee

53:30

can portfolio. Dan, you know about

53:32

this. If you Google it, the

53:35

coffee can portfolio will come right

53:37

up as an article. called by.

53:39

It came out in 1980s, but

53:41

the basic idea is you create

53:43

a portfolio with the intention that

53:45

you're not going to look at

53:47

it for like 10 years, just

53:49

leave it alone and see what

53:51

the results are. And there's been

53:53

lots of like people have run

53:55

these different experiments and but invariably

53:57

what happens is you have some

53:59

something in there that's a huge

54:01

winner. And you have a few

54:03

things that don't work out, maybe

54:05

have a zero or two, and

54:07

then you have a couple things

54:09

that are mediocre, then you have

54:12

a couple of really good performers.

54:14

And by the end result is

54:16

that it's much better than if

54:18

you had been messing with it

54:20

the whole time. So that's my

54:22

key lesson. Find a way to

54:24

cultivate patience with your investments. And

54:26

I think you'll be happier just

54:28

in life generally. Be less worried

54:30

about stuff. Especially with. Trump tariffs

54:32

and all the other things that

54:34

go on. So that's my that's

54:36

my parting thought. Excellent. Yeah, I

54:38

hope people take you up on

54:40

that. I think it's Robert Kirby

54:42

was the guy who wrote the

54:44

article and he described two clients

54:46

who were husband and wife and

54:49

they had both taken the the

54:51

buy advice of the same advisor

54:53

in separate accounts. The husband never

54:55

sold anything and the wife took

54:57

the sell advice and the husband

54:59

upon his death, she found out.

55:01

He had dramatically outperformed and wound

55:03

up with the portfolio you described,

55:05

you know, the zeros, the mediocre,

55:07

the really good, and the phenomenal

55:09

outperformers. Really interesting. I think there

55:11

was one stock in there that

55:13

was worth more than the wife's

55:15

account entirely. Right, that was the

55:17

Xerox and its spin-offs, I think.

55:19

Yeah, yeah, so it's a lesson.

55:21

Yep. And it seems like you're

55:24

pursuing something like that. You've got

55:26

your, you know, your big winners

55:28

and their spinoffs that you're home.

55:30

Yes, I do. Yeah, that's right.

55:32

All right. So we got another.

55:34

coffee canner sitting right here folks

55:36

you should learn all you can

55:38

from him. It's always a pleasure

55:40

to talk with you Chris. Thanks

55:42

for being here. Yep great talking

55:44

to you Dan, great talking to

55:46

you Corey, thanks for having me

55:48

on and yeah the pleasure. Always

55:50

a pleasure to talk with my

55:52

old friend Chris Mayor. I think

55:54

we've known each other for more

55:56

than 20 years at this point

55:58

and he's taught me a lot

56:01

frankly. Really grateful to have him

56:03

as a friend and as he

56:05

made clear at the end there

56:07

He's taught me a lot about

56:09

patience and focusing on your circle

56:11

of competence and all the things

56:13

that he discussed during the interview

56:15

Really good thinker and a good

56:17

guy to listen to right now

56:19

Yes, exactly what I was just

56:21

gonna say good voice of reason

56:23

a calm voice to listen to

56:25

right now. It's like exactly what

56:27

you if you're in this actually

56:29

for long-term investing it's exactly the

56:31

kind of advice you would want

56:33

to listen to I think and

56:35

I want to hear I want

56:38

to hear from somebody who has

56:40

looked at all of these things

56:42

in depth and what makes great

56:44

long-term winners and he obviously has

56:46

a hundred baggers is the book

56:48

that I've read from him that

56:50

when you get to the end

56:52

of it that you're just like

56:54

okay now I feel I feel

56:56

I feel good about Yeah. You

56:58

know, having this approach, if you

57:00

want to take that approach that

57:02

he outlines in the book, and

57:04

I think it pays off in

57:06

times like these where you're just,

57:08

there's a lot of, a lot

57:10

of noise out there, a lot

57:12

of fear, but he's obviously, you

57:15

know, and you too, and just

57:17

been there before and seen this,

57:19

so it's not exactly this, but

57:21

these moves, right? Right, right. One

57:23

last thing I do want listeners

57:25

to take away is that the...

57:27

the conviction to hold through these

57:29

things really comes directly from the

57:31

things that Chris was talking about

57:33

that he understands and that And

57:35

he relies on the code, you

57:37

know, the cheap and ownership and

57:39

disclosures and excellent financial condition. When

57:41

he finds those things, that's how

57:43

he gets the conviction to hold

57:45

on through all of these, you

57:47

know, bare markets of things that

57:50

he's had to deal with in

57:52

seven years of managing other people's

57:54

money, which have been really a

57:56

turbulent seven years, as he pointed

57:58

out. and people wonder, you know,

58:00

how do you do it? How

58:02

do you hold on? Well, you

58:04

hold on by knowing who you

58:06

are and knowing what's in your

58:08

circle of competence and sticking to

58:10

it. Simply put, it's probably more

58:12

complicated than that, but we wanted

58:14

to put it as simple as

58:16

possible. So, yeah, that was a

58:18

lot of fun. And that's another

58:20

interview and that's another episode of

58:22

the Stanisbury Investor Hour. I hope

58:24

you enjoyed it as much as

58:27

we really truly did. We do

58:29

provide a transcript for every episode.

58:31

Just go to www. investorhour.com, click

58:33

on the episode you want, scroll

58:35

all the way down, click on

58:37

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58:39

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58:41

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58:43

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58:45

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58:47

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