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savings and more inspiring flavors. Welcome

1:08

to the Age of Napoleon. Episode

1:12

114, The Limits of Power. Thanks

1:18

for joining me. As

1:21

always, I'd like to start by inviting you

1:23

to join us on Patreon. I

1:26

just finished the 23rd of

1:28

our special patrons-only bonus episodes.

1:31

In a few weeks, it will be two

1:33

years since I started doing these. That

1:36

means there's almost two years of content waiting

1:38

for you for just $2 a month. And

1:42

of course, Patreon is the only

1:44

place to get ad-free versions of

1:46

the regular episodes. Anyway,

1:50

we left off last time in late July 1808 with

1:52

the surrender of a huge French column

1:57

under General Pierre DuPont after

1:59

the defeat at the Battle of

2:01

Bailén. All over

2:03

Spain, the new juntas were raising

2:06

armies, and laying the groundwork for

2:08

long-term resistance to the French. Napoleon's

2:12

plan to bring Spain fully

2:14

under French influence had blown

2:16

up in his face. Before

2:20

the fighting broke out, Napoleon said

2:22

of this intervention, if

2:25

I thought it would cost me 80,000 men,

2:27

I would not attempt it, but

2:29

it will cost me no more than 12,000. Only

2:34

a few weeks after the first battle of

2:36

the war, it was already double that number.

2:40

By the time the last French

2:42

soldier left Spain, his troops would

2:44

suffer around a quarter million casualties

2:46

in this theater of the war.

2:50

It's worth dwelling on the immediate

2:52

impact of the Battle of Bailén

2:54

within Spain. As I

2:57

mentioned last episode, roughly one in

2:59

five French soldiers in the country

3:01

were killed or captured by Castaños'

3:04

army. That had

3:06

important strategic implications, and

3:08

obviously it was a huge blow to

3:11

French morale. Bonaparte

3:13

ordered fresh reinforcements to Spain,

3:16

although these were more second-line

3:18

troops, mostly non-French and inexperienced,

3:21

taken from garrisons in Italy.

3:25

He wanted to bring the cream of

3:27

the Grande Armée to Spain, and personally

3:29

lead them against the Patriots, but

3:32

as we'll see later in this episode,

3:34

he needed to lay some diplomatic and

3:36

strategic groundwork before that would be possible.

3:40

Bonaparte also ordered a fresh

3:42

round of conscription. 160,000 young

3:44

Frenchmen would be called to

3:47

the colors. We've

3:49

seen this before, it was part

3:51

of Napoleon's standard response to a

3:53

military setback. At

3:55

this point in history, European demographics were

3:58

quite different than they are to today.

4:00

France was the most populous country in

4:03

Western Europe, and its population was very

4:05

young. 160,000 is

4:07

a big number, and these

4:10

periodic call-ups and the constant

4:12

casualties were taking a toll.

4:15

However, France could sustain

4:17

these losses, at least

4:19

for now. Napoleon

4:22

also removed General René Savaré

4:24

as overall commander of French

4:27

forces in Siberia. Savaré

4:29

had been an interim leader, brought

4:31

in to fill the position temporarily

4:33

after Marshal Miraz' breakdown. He had

4:36

been appointed before Bonaparte fully understood

4:39

the seriousness of the situation. He

4:42

was a capable person, but not well

4:44

suited to the role. His

4:46

replacement would be a familiar

4:48

figure, Marshal Michel Né, one

4:50

of the most famous and well-regarded commanders

4:53

in the whole French military. In

4:56

the meantime, the remaining French forces

4:58

in Spain had little choice but

5:00

to fall back towards France. As

5:04

we discussed last episode, they were

5:06

scattered across almost the entire country

5:09

in relatively small detachments, each trying

5:11

to maintain control over the local

5:13

area from the rising Patriot tide.

5:17

The disaster at Bailen, combined with

5:19

other setbacks in the opening weeks

5:21

of the war, proved this was

5:24

no longer tenable. All

5:26

around them, the Patriots grew

5:28

stronger, more confident, and better

5:30

organized. To remain scattered

5:32

across the country would simply be

5:34

inviting more defeats. And

5:37

so, most of the remaining French units

5:39

in Spain began to march towards the

5:41

Pyrenees. They would not

5:44

evacuate the country entirely, instead taking

5:46

up new positions in the north

5:48

and east, leaving most of

5:50

Spain under the rule of the Juntas.

5:54

Joseph Bonaparte, theoretically king of

5:57

Spain, was part of this

5:59

retreat. He fled his

6:01

capital of Madrid for a safer base

6:03

of operations in the city of Burgos.

6:07

The officers and officials around Joseph

6:09

commented that he showed strength of

6:11

character during this period, throwing himself

6:13

into the hard work of managing

6:16

the retreat, and acting

6:18

as a strong steady presence in

6:20

a headquarters that was now plagued

6:22

by doubt and confusion. According

6:26

to Joseph, he was doing a good job

6:28

of hiding his true feelings. His

6:30

letters to his brother from this period tell

6:32

a very different story. Quote,

6:36

This people is more determined at

6:38

its feelings of resentment than any

6:40

other in Europe. Your

6:42

majesty has no idea, because no one

6:44

will have told you how much your

6:46

name is hated here. Fever

6:49

is in the masses of the nation. The

6:52

voice of reason and conciliation can do

6:54

nothing. A Bonaparte will

6:56

only keep his throne by treating

6:58

the Spaniards as they themselves treated

7:00

the subjects of Montezuma. End

7:03

quote. Montezuma

7:06

being the Aztec emperor who

7:08

was overthrown by the Spanish

7:10

conquistadors. Napoleon

7:13

tried to reassure his brother. Quote,

7:16

It is not a question of dying,

7:19

but of living and being victorious, and

7:21

you are and you shall be. I

7:24

will reach the columns of Hercules in

7:27

Spain, but not the limits of my

7:29

power. End quote. The

7:32

columns of Hercules is an old-fashioned

7:35

poetic name for the Straits of

7:37

Gibraltar. In this context, it's more

7:39

of a shorthand for the furthest

7:42

reaches of Spain. On

7:45

the Spanish side, as you might imagine,

7:48

the news of the victory at Bailén

7:50

was treated with something approaching euphoria. The

7:54

Spanish patriots knew they were facing

7:56

long odds, but Bailén seemed

7:59

to be proof that victory was

8:01

possible. Some even

8:03

saw it as a sign that God was

8:05

on their side. In

8:08

the early phase of the war, many Spaniards

8:11

had been on the fence. The

8:14

French were massively unpopular,

8:16

but organized violent resistance

8:18

to the occupation seemed

8:20

futile. Bailen forced

8:22

some of those people to reconsider

8:24

their positions, and Mvni

8:27

came around to supporting the

8:29

Patriots, or even joining the

8:31

resistance themselves. The

8:34

prestige and legitimacy of the

8:36

Juntas and the Patriot armies

8:38

had grown exponentially overnight. At

8:41

Bailen, they had achieved something that the

8:44

governments of several of the great powers

8:46

had failed to do for nearly a

8:48

decade. Under these

8:51

circumstances, who could deny that this

8:53

was a movement to be taken

8:55

seriously? I would

8:57

imagine every officer and soldier in the

8:59

Spanish armies walked a little taller and

9:01

breathed a little easier after hearing the

9:03

news. There was new

9:06

confidence and a new sense of purpose among

9:08

the Patriots. They still

9:10

had a very long road to climb, but Bailen

9:12

had showed them that there was a viable route

9:14

to the summit. Some

9:18

felt Bailen had actually made the

9:20

Spanish too confident. I

9:23

don't think it's fair to call the battle a fluke.

9:25

Castaños had pursued a sound strategy,

9:27

and his men had fought well.

9:30

But there were some aspects of

9:33

the battle that were somewhat unique,

9:35

and would be difficult or impossible

9:37

to replicate. For

9:39

starters, most of the Spanish units

9:41

doing the hard fighting at Bailen

9:43

were trained regulars from the old

9:45

royal army. In fact,

9:48

they included some of the best

9:50

trained and best led of the

9:52

pre-war Spanish regiments. The

9:55

average Spanish soldier was an

9:57

untrained, poorly equipped volunteer. Would

10:00

the success at Bailen have been

10:03

possible with only the hastily raised

10:05

volunteer regiments that made up most

10:07

of the Patriot forces? Anything

10:10

is possible, but it certainly would have been

10:13

a lot more difficult. And

10:16

it's important to keep in mind that

10:18

DuPont's column did not represent the cream

10:20

of the French military. Most

10:23

of the units captured at Bailen

10:25

were second-line troops, who, under normal

10:27

circumstances, would not have been facing

10:29

the enemy in open battle. Almost

10:32

all had been raw recruits. Several

10:35

of DuPont's Swiss regiments had actually

10:37

defected to the Patriots, an

10:40

event which may have decided the battle,

10:42

and which was not likely to be

10:44

repeated in the future. The

10:47

French also suffered from poor leadership.

10:50

DuPont and his subordinates made

10:52

several questionable decisions, stopping

10:55

their march in an inhospitable,

10:57

exposed position, maintaining a huge,

10:59

ponderous baggage train, dividing their

11:01

forces in the face of

11:04

a larger enemy, and launching

11:06

their attacks on the crucial

11:08

position outside Bailen piecemeal rather

11:10

than marshalling all their forces

11:13

for a single decisive blow,

11:16

just to name a few of the

11:18

most glaring mistakes. Even

11:21

the best commanders are wrong sometimes,

11:23

and Castagnos and his army deserve

11:26

some credit for forcing those errors.

11:29

But I find it hard to imagine

11:31

the best French commanders making so many

11:33

grievous mistakes in the space of only

11:35

a few days. How

11:38

would the events at Bailen have

11:40

played out with Soult or Laan

11:42

or Davout or Napoleon himself in

11:45

command? But

11:47

despite these somewhat unique circumstances,

11:49

for the rest of the

11:51

war, every Spanish general would

11:54

dream of replicating Castagnos' success.

11:57

It has been argued by some that

11:59

these dreams of another bai

12:01

lan led Patriot generals to

12:03

take risks, trying to

12:05

win a decisive victory in open

12:07

battle when they would have been

12:09

better served opposing the French indirectly.

12:13

The Duke of Wellington himself would later

12:15

complain about this. Years

12:17

later, when he was leading a

12:20

mixed Anglo-Spanish army, he often had

12:22

to warn his Spanish allies that

12:24

they should not expect another bai

12:26

lan, to prevent them from

12:29

getting carried away in battle and seeking

12:31

the total destruction of the opposing French

12:33

army. After

12:36

bai lan, there was plenty of glory

12:38

and acclaim to be shared among the

12:40

Spanish officers. Many received

12:43

medals or promotions or both.

12:45

Castaños himself got a noble

12:47

title, becoming Duke of Bai

12:49

lan. One

12:51

of the heroes of the battle was a

12:53

young captain from one of the old line

12:55

regiments of the royal army. He

12:58

was a passionate convert to Enlightenment

13:00

liberalism, but he had joined the

13:03

Patriot movement with great enthusiasm, and

13:05

began distinguishing himself almost as soon

13:07

as the fighting began. His

13:11

fellow officers and the junta were so

13:13

impressed by his performance that he was

13:15

awarded a medal and promoted all the

13:17

way to Lieutenant Colonel, skipping the rank

13:19

of Major. At

13:22

this time in his life, he was

13:24

a committed Spanish Patriot. However, he had

13:26

not been born on the mainland. He

13:29

was a Creole from the province

13:31

of Corrientes in modern-day Argentina. Later

13:34

in life, he would be called by many

13:36

grand titles, Triumvir of the

13:38

Rio de la Plata, Protector of

13:41

Peru, and Liberator of America. But

13:44

in 1808, he was simply Lieutenant

13:46

Colonel José de San Martin. San

13:51

Martin would be far from the only

13:53

person in Latin America whose life would

13:55

be transformed by this new war. Soon,

13:58

there would be juntas, spades, and bringing up on

14:00

the other side of the Atlantic as well.

14:04

No one could have yet predicted it,

14:06

but this was the beginning of a

14:08

momentous chain of events that would take

14:10

decades to resolve and transform the map

14:12

of Latin America. We'll have

14:15

much more to say about this in future

14:17

episodes. Before

14:20

we stray too far from the Battle

14:22

of Bailen, it's worth discussing what happened

14:24

to the defeated French. After

14:27

the surrender, General Pierre DuPont, his

14:29

second-in-command General Dominique Vidal, and the

14:32

rest of the senior leadership, returned

14:34

to France. This

14:36

had all been worked out in the surrender

14:38

negotiations. The rank and

14:41

file went into captivity, but the

14:43

officers were immediately paroled. It

14:46

might not have been entirely fair, but

14:48

it was more or less standard procedure

14:50

for this type of surrender in this

14:52

era. DuPont

14:54

had requested that his men be

14:56

paroled as well, returned

14:58

to France after signing a written

15:01

promise not to bear arms against

15:03

Spain for some set period of

15:05

time. The Spanish had agreed. However,

15:09

they did not keep their word. As

15:12

I said last episode, the war

15:14

in Spain would be ugly and

15:16

brutal, and even in these early

15:18

stages that was already becoming evident.

15:21

The prisoners of Bailen were

15:24

kept in terrible conditions, subjected

15:26

to neglect and mistreatment by

15:28

their Spanish captors. Around

15:31

half died. By

15:35

contrast, the senior officers were very

15:37

lucky, although they didn't get away

15:39

unscathed either. Bonaparte

15:42

launched an exhaustive inquiry into

15:44

the defeat. DuPont's

15:47

column had to give lengthy

15:49

testimony, explaining their actions. As

15:52

a result of these proceedings, several

15:55

officers were officially reprimanded. A

15:58

few were temporarily suspended from their duties.

16:01

The two most senior leaders, Dupont

16:03

and Vidal, were stripped of their

16:05

ranks and honors, and imprisoned. After

16:09

several years of captivity, Vidal was

16:11

released and reinstated to the army

16:13

at his former rank. He

16:16

even regained command, although he didn't

16:18

have a chance to do much

16:20

before the Napoleonic Wars ended. Apparently,

16:23

he spent the rest of his

16:26

life trying to justify and explain

16:28

his actions at Bailen. Dupont

16:31

was treated more harshly. He

16:34

was imprisoned at the Chateau

16:36

de Joux, the same cold,

16:38

uncomfortable military prison where Toussaint

16:40

Louverture spent his last days.

16:44

Napoleon never granted Dupont clemency.

16:47

He was finally released and reinstated

16:49

after the restoration of the old

16:51

regime in 1814, probably

16:54

in part due to his conservative

16:56

politics. When Napoleon

16:58

briefly regained power in 1815, he fired Dupont

17:00

again. Seven

17:04

years later, he had still not

17:06

forgiven the humiliation of Bailen. Bonaparte

17:10

became practically obsessed with the battle.

17:12

He compiled all the reports on

17:14

Bailen and sent them to his

17:17

war minister, with a note that

17:19

read in part, quote, the

17:21

enclosed documents are for you alone.

17:24

Read them with a map and you

17:26

will be able to judge whether there

17:29

was anything so senseless, so stupid, and

17:31

so dastardly since the world was created.

17:34

Here are the mocks and

17:36

Hohenlohe's justified. One

17:39

can see clearly enough by Dupont's

17:41

own report that all that happened

17:44

resulted from his inconceivable folly, end

17:46

quote. Mach

17:49

and Hohenlohe refers to two of

17:51

the most incompetent enemy generals Napoleon

17:53

had ever faced, at

17:55

Ulm and Jena respectively. He

17:58

wanted to call the minister minister's attention

18:00

to this battle so that other

18:03

generals would not repeat DuPont's failure.

18:07

Months later, while reviewing troops,

18:09

Napoleon recognized General Francois Le

18:11

Gendre, DuPont's former chief of

18:13

staff, who had only recently

18:15

been reinstated to the army

18:17

after serving his suspension. Out

18:20

of the blue, the Emperor gave Le

18:22

Gendre a stern lecture on the subject

18:24

of Bailen, then dismissed

18:26

him before he could defend himself. Clearly,

18:29

the battle was a big sore spot

18:32

for Napoleon. He wanted to

18:34

make it clear that he expected a lot

18:36

more from his generals. And

18:39

for good reason. The news

18:42

of Bailen sent shockwaves across the

18:44

continent and beyond. It

18:47

had been years since a major

18:49

French force had been soundly beaten

18:51

on the battlefield. Both

18:53

of the last two wars between

18:56

the Great Powers, the wars of

18:58

the Third and Fourth Coelitions, had

19:00

seen total French victories, without a

19:02

single serious defeat. By

19:06

some measures, France hadn't suffered a

19:08

major setback on the battlefield since

19:10

Napoleon took power all the way

19:12

back in 1799, nearly a decade

19:14

earlier. Before

19:18

Bailen, some opponents of Napoleon's new

19:21

order had begun to despair. After

19:24

the Treaty of Tilsit, French

19:26

hegemony seemed almost unassailable. The

19:29

Empire's armies seemed invincible,

19:32

and Napoleon's ultimate triumph

19:34

inevitable. Bailen,

19:36

and the wider French failure

19:38

to pacify Spain, were hard

19:40

proof that things are not

19:42

always what they seem. Every

19:45

enemy of Napoleon took heart. It

19:48

was possible to defy France and

19:50

win. The Spanish had proved

19:53

it. As

19:55

Napoleon himself put it, quote, DuPaul

19:58

has covered our flags with infamous He

20:02

wanted to go to Spain himself,

20:04

to show the Spanish, and the

20:07

world, that Bailén was nothing but

20:09

a fluke, brought on by the

20:11

incompetence of second-rate leadership. If

20:14

Bonaparte himself led the crème of

20:16

the Grande Armée into Spain, backed

20:18

up by his best marshals, people

20:20

would quickly be reminded that the

20:23

French military was still the best

20:25

in the world. France's

20:27

flags would not remain covered in

20:29

infamy for long. But

20:32

there was a lot to do before that would be

20:35

possible. Napoleon had to deal

20:37

with the diplomatic fallout of this

20:39

setback. Only then would he

20:41

have a free hand to bring his best

20:43

troops to Spain, and teach the patriots a

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apply. Historians

21:36

sometimes talk about Bailán

21:38

in psychological or almost

21:40

spiritual terms. You

21:42

see variations on the same phrase

21:44

again and again. The

21:46

aura of invincibility had been

21:48

destroyed. That

21:51

was certainly true, but there was much more going

21:53

on here. This wasn't

21:55

purely in people's heads. The

21:57

Spanish Rebellion had profound practical

21:59

implications. implications. The

22:02

events of the past few months

22:04

had drastically changed the European strategic

22:06

picture. Remember, before Napoleon

22:08

had begun his meddling in Iberia,

22:10

Spain had been a French ally.

22:13

Now, almost the entire country was

22:16

firmly committed to the coalition. Only

22:19

a few months earlier, Britain lacked

22:21

any foothold on the continent, and

22:24

had consistently failed in all its

22:26

attempts to create one. As

22:28

we'll discuss next episode, the unfolding

22:31

chaos in Iberia had given the

22:33

Redcoats a perfect base of operations

22:35

on the European mainland. Thousands

22:38

of British troops had already landed

22:40

in Iberia, and more would follow.

22:44

Almost overnight, France's strategic position

22:46

had become far weaker. These

22:50

developments were followed with great interest

22:52

in every European capital, but probably

22:55

nowhere more so than Vienna. As

22:58

you might recall, the Austrians had set

23:00

out the last war. The

23:03

Habsburg armies had performed very poorly in

23:05

their last encounter with the French during

23:07

the War of the Third Coalition in

23:09

1805. General

23:11

Mach had been humiliated at Ulm,

23:13

Archduke Charles had been forced to

23:15

retreat in Italy, Napoleon

23:17

took Vienna without serious resistance,

23:20

and then won perhaps the

23:22

most dazzling victory of his

23:24

career at Austerlitz. These

23:28

defeats had cost Austria dearly. Obviously,

23:31

thousands of soldiers had been killed

23:33

or maimed, and the prestige of

23:35

the crown had been tarnished. But

23:38

they had also been forced to pay

23:40

a huge monetary indemnity to France, and

23:42

to make territorial and diplomatic

23:45

concessions. And

23:47

remember, this had been Austria's third defeat

23:49

at the hands of the French in

23:51

a decade. Three humiliating

23:54

treaties, three rounds of

23:56

concessions. One

23:59

of the worst blows. That actually come in

24:01

peace time. Napoleon's diplomatic maneuvering

24:03

and Germany had forced the Hapsburgs

24:05

to abolish the Holy Roman Empire.

24:08

And Eighty o six. As.

24:11

You might recall by this point,

24:13

Talleyrand believed the Austrians had had

24:15

enough. The. Great diplomat believed

24:17

all the major diplomatic flashpoints between

24:19

the two powers had now been

24:22

settled in Francis favor. He

24:24

also believed the future European

24:26

geopolitical order would need Austria

24:29

to serve as a bulwark

24:31

against the Ottoman Empire, a

24:33

counterbalance against the rise in

24:35

of Russia, and to maintain

24:37

order over central and south

24:39

Eastern Europe, an ethnically add

24:41

religiously diverse region which might

24:44

easily fall into chaos and

24:46

conflict is it wasn't united

24:48

under Habsburg rule. Tally.

24:51

Read believed the time had come

24:53

for Austria and France to set

24:55

aside their longstanding rivalry. Napoleon.

24:58

Wanted to forge a new

25:00

g A status quo for

25:02

the Continent and Totti Rand

25:04

couldn't see a stable equilibrium

25:06

emerge. and without Austria. Bonaparte.

25:10

Disagreed. He. Thought that

25:12

Austria was too weak to continue as

25:14

a major power and that the old

25:17

hatreds between France and Austria ran to

25:19

deep. He. Had real contempt

25:21

for the Hapsburgs. He. Considered

25:23

them incompetent at their

25:26

state, hopelessly backwards, In

25:29

the Emperor's view, day taught

25:31

with Austria was not possible

25:34

and probably not desirable either.

25:37

And. So Austria had stayed out

25:39

in the cold. Much. Of

25:42

the grand Army remained in Germany,

25:44

where they could easily be concentrated

25:46

to oppose any hostile move by

25:48

the Austrians. On

25:51

the other side of the border,

25:53

the Habsburg support huge resources into

25:55

rebuilding their military yet again. But

25:58

this time was different. As

26:01

you may recall from earlier

26:03

episodes, after past defeats, the

26:05

Habsburg military leadership had been

26:07

divided into two factions. There.

26:10

Was the old guard who wanted to

26:12

stick to tried and true methods. They

26:14

wanted the army to be rebuilt quickly

26:17

so we can be back in the

26:19

field, challenging the French as soon as

26:21

humanly possible. On. The

26:23

other side was the young guard. They

26:26

believed those tried and true methods were

26:28

actually a big part of the problem.

26:31

They. Saw the Habsburg military as

26:33

old fashioned and believed fundamental

26:35

reforms were needed if Austria

26:38

hoped to seriously challenge the

26:40

French ever again. Before.

26:43

The war of the Third Coalition,

26:45

the Old Guard had won the

26:47

argument to disastrous results. No.

26:49

Surprise Once Austria found itself

26:52

defeated again, Emperor Francis the

26:54

second, listened to young guard.

26:57

In. Particular of his own younger

26:59

brother, Archduke Charles, a leading

27:01

member of the Reform Saxon,

27:03

who was named Supreme Commander

27:05

of all Habsburg forces. And.

27:09

So when the new coalition came

27:11

calling and eighteen, oh six, the

27:13

Austrians turned them down. It

27:15

was a golden opportunity with Prussia

27:18

finally getting off the fence to

27:20

unite against Napoleon. But.

27:22

It hadn't even been a

27:24

year since Austerlitz, The Habsburg

27:26

military was still rebuilding and

27:28

in the midst of massive

27:31

ed very disruptive reforms. Given.

27:33

What had happened to the Prussians only a

27:36

few weeks later? the Austrians were probably will

27:38

leave say hadn't been ready to join the

27:40

war. News.

27:42

Of French disasters in Spain began

27:45

reaching Vienna in the mid summer

27:47

of eighty know it. By.

27:49

This point, Archduke Charles had been

27:51

rebuilding and reforming the Habsburg military

27:53

for two and a half years.

27:56

The Archduke at his clique of reformers

27:58

did not consider that. Complete

28:00

not by a long shot. However,

28:03

It was a very different

28:06

situation from eighteen assists. The

28:08

Habsburg military had made tremendous

28:10

strides. It. Was now

28:12

larger and better organized than ever

28:14

before. The. Archduke and also

28:16

led a complete overhaul of

28:19

doctrine and regulations. Perhaps

28:21

they still lagged a bit behind

28:23

the French. But. By eighteen?

28:25

Oh wait, this was unquestionably a

28:27

modern army and a very different

28:29

force from the one that had

28:32

performed a poorly back in eighty

28:34

know five. Perhaps.

28:36

Unsurprisingly, given their record against the

28:38

French, the policy makers in Vienna

28:41

had developed a bit of an

28:43

underdog mentality. They were very

28:45

aware of their rivals' strikes, and we're

28:47

not confident they could match them. They

28:51

knew that if they hoped to defeat

28:53

Napoleon, they would have to pick their

28:55

moment very carefully. Waits. Until

28:57

France was we tore distracted

28:59

then and only than making

29:01

their move. That.

29:03

Meant being judicious, not rushing

29:06

into war prematurely, as had

29:08

clearly happened, and eighteen of

29:10

five, but also not letting

29:12

opportunities pass by. With.

29:15

An enemy This moments of weakness

29:17

or distraction word not likely to

29:19

come around very often. As.

29:22

They followed the news coming out

29:24

of Iberia. Many within the Austrian

29:26

leadership began to suspect one of

29:29

those rare opportunities might soon arrive.

29:31

They began making preliminary

29:34

preparations for war. I

29:37

want to stress that these were

29:40

preliminary preparations. This was not

29:42

like World War One, in which

29:44

giving the general order to mobilize was

29:46

tantamount to a declaration of war. At.

29:49

The dawn of the nineteenth century,

29:51

the great powers could slowly each

29:54

towards for mobilization without fully committing

29:56

themselves at This is exactly what

29:58

the Austrians be the do. The.

30:01

French were not blind to these

30:03

developments. Austrian. Saber Rattling

30:06

presented a serious strategic problem

30:08

for Napoleon. The. War

30:10

in Iberia was being fought by

30:12

second line troops. He wanted to

30:14

bring the ground are may back

30:17

on campaign over the Pyrenees to

30:19

settle the Iberian problem as quickly

30:21

as possible. But most

30:23

of his best units were in

30:25

Germany. they had been placed There

30:27

are largely to deter any aggression

30:29

from the Hapsburgs. Pulling. Them

30:31

away just as the Austrians

30:33

began flexing, their muscles would

30:36

practically invite an invasion. This.

30:39

Partial mobilization of the Habsburg military

30:41

was a smart move by the

30:43

Austrians. They had put Napoleon in

30:45

a bond. He. Would have to

30:47

either leave his second line troops

30:49

in Spain to fend for themselves,

30:52

or open the entire eastern flank

30:54

of his empire up to invasion.

30:57

Napoleon. Would have to solve this problem

30:59

before he could even think about gathering. the

31:01

ground are made for an invasion of Spain.

31:04

Fortunately for him it's he believed he

31:06

had a solution at hand. Is

31:08

alliance with Emperor Alexander of

31:10

Russia. If the Austrians

31:12

believed to Russia would come to France's

31:15

defense in the event of an invasion,

31:17

They. Would be very unlikely to follow

31:20

through on their threats. Even

31:22

with the ground are may out

31:24

of Germany, the Hapsburgs would stand

31:26

little chance against the united forces

31:29

of France and Russia. Technically,

31:32

the implicit threat of Russian

31:34

intervention already existed. France.

31:37

And Russia were allies. And allies are

31:39

supposed to defend each other in the

31:41

event of aggression by a third party.

31:44

But. Napoleon would have been a fool to

31:46

trust the fate of his empire to a

31:48

piece of paper. He wouldn't

31:50

feel comfortable leading to ground.may over

31:53

the Pyrenees without specific assurances from

31:55

Alexander. and to get those he

31:57

would need to meet the yeah.

32:00

Russian Emperor face to face. There

32:03

were other good reasons to meet with Alexander.

32:06

As. Is often the case with a

32:08

big momentous treaty like the Treaty

32:10

of Till Sit, There were still

32:12

a few outstanding issues between the

32:14

two powers that had been overlooked

32:16

or not anticipated at the first

32:18

negotiation. Napoleon also wanted

32:21

to provide assurances that be

32:23

situation in Spain was only

32:25

a temporary setback, and to

32:27

make sure these recent changes

32:29

to the strategic picture had

32:31

damaged his relationship with the

32:33

Russians. And. So the to

32:35

sovereigns would meet for a second time.

32:38

The. City of Effort in Central Germany

32:40

was chosen as the venue. Above

32:43

all, Napoleon wanted to demonstrate

32:45

to Alexander that although the

32:47

umpires strategic outlook had dark

32:49

and slightly since they last

32:51

spoke, France remained the dominant

32:54

power and Europe. All.

32:56

The sovereigns of France's German allies

32:58

would be assembled. Theoretically.

33:01

This was a diplomatic congress as

33:03

they were all attendees on equal

33:05

footing with the to apres. But.

33:07

We all know how little Napoleon

33:10

listened to his minor allies. In

33:12

practice, they would be there as

33:14

reminders of Napoleon's power. He.

33:17

Was demonstrating of that with the snap

33:19

of a finger. He could summon half

33:21

the sovereigns of Europe at use the

33:23

merely as props if he saw fit.

33:27

See. Troops would be brought

33:29

from Paris to perform the most

33:31

popular plays from the French stage

33:34

to remind the assembled guests of

33:36

the umpires cultural and artistic greatness.

33:39

They. Would also be a to were

33:41

of the nearby battlefield of Gamer when

33:43

Napoleon had smashed the Prussians only two

33:45

years earlier. Just in case

33:48

anyone had forgotten about the Emperor's

33:50

greatest talents. Bonaparte.

33:52

Told his advisors quote i

33:54

wish to astonish Germany by

33:56

my splendor and quote. He.

33:58

wanted alexander to look beyond

34:01

the debacle in Spain and plead

34:03

the Empire's many strengths, to recapture

34:05

the feeling of Tilsit, when the

34:07

two emperors had been wrapped up

34:10

in mutual fascination, and

34:12

the two great powers had seemed

34:14

perfectly matched to dictate the continent's

34:16

future together, Russia ruling the East,

34:19

France, the West. The

34:22

meeting at Erfurt would be different. For

34:24

one thing, Alexander was different. The

34:27

young Russian emperor had come to

34:29

Tilsit after losing a war. He

34:31

had been braced to give up

34:33

territorial concessions to France. Napoleon

34:36

would not have the same leverage at

34:38

Erfurt. At that first

34:40

meeting, Alexander held a burning personal

34:42

curiosity about the French emperor. Napoleon

34:45

was the most famous character of

34:47

the age, and the central figure

34:49

of all European geopolitics. The

34:52

whole continent was speculating about him. What was

34:54

he really like? How had he been able

34:56

to accomplish so much in only a few

34:59

years? Not only

35:01

that, Alexander was relatively new to

35:03

the throne. Napoleon clearly

35:05

knew a great deal about wielding

35:07

power, and Alexander had a lot

35:10

to learn. After

35:12

hours and hours of conversation at

35:14

Tilsit over the course of days,

35:17

the Russian emperor's curiosity was sated.

35:20

Now he was ready to deal with

35:22

Napoleon as a fellow sovereign, rather than

35:24

as an inquisitive admirer. In the

35:27

years since Tilsit, the Russian nobility had

35:30

never warmed up to the French alliance.

35:33

In fact, Alexander was practically

35:35

alone in this policy, not

35:37

even his own family approved.

35:40

This fact had never been far

35:42

from his mind. He even worried

35:44

about being assassinated by anti-French members

35:46

of his own court. That

35:49

might sound a little far-fetched, but

35:51

then again, something similar had happened

35:53

to his father and predecessor just

35:55

seven years earlier. At

35:58

Erfurt, Napoleon's position would be weaker

36:00

in every conceivable way. His

36:03

armies had faltered, his strategic

36:05

vision for Europe was compromised,

36:08

and his Russian counterpart would be

36:10

less receptive. These

36:12

would be sensitive negotiations. Napoleon

36:16

made a somewhat unorthodox choice to

36:18

be his right-hand man at Erfurt,

36:20

not his foreign minister or his

36:22

chief of staff or his ambassador

36:25

to Russia, but a man who

36:27

had left the French foreign policy

36:29

establishment over his disagreements with Bonaparte.

36:32

Talleyrand Not

36:34

so long ago, Talleyrand and the

36:37

Emperor had agreed they could not

36:39

continue working so closely together, because

36:41

they no longer shared a vision

36:43

for the future of French diplomacy.

36:45

But on the other hand, these

36:48

talks at Erfurt were massively important.

36:50

Napoleon wanted his best foreign policy

36:53

expert by his side, and there

36:55

was little doubt in anyone's mind

36:57

that Talleyrand was the greatest diplomat

36:59

in France, possibly the whole

37:01

world. Bonaparte

37:05

ordered Talleyrand to draft a new

37:07

treaty, recommitting France and Russia to

37:09

their alliance, with particular mention of

37:12

their mutual hostility toward Great Britain

37:14

and a formal commitment from the

37:16

Russians to fight the Habsburgs if

37:19

they invaded the French Empire. Talleyrand

37:22

presented the Emperor with a draft

37:24

that didn't even mention Austria. According

37:27

to Talleyrand, Napoleon asked him, quote, "'How

37:30

can you have forgotten that? That

37:32

is the essential article. Are you

37:34

still pro-Austrian?'" end quote. Talleyrand

37:37

then replied, quote, "'A little,

37:40

Thier, but I think it would be

37:42

more correct to say that I am

37:44

never pro-Russian and always pro-French.'" end

37:46

quote. A clever dodge, but

37:49

clearly the two men were still not

37:51

seeing eye to eye. Talleyrand

37:54

had a lot invested in this conference.

37:57

As he put it, quote, "'Erfurt.'"

38:00

never has any name produced such

38:02

an impression on me as that

38:04

of this outlandish place. I

38:07

cannot think of it without fear and hope. The

38:10

fate of Europe, and the world,

38:12

the future of political power, and

38:14

perhaps of European civilization depends on

38:17

it." In

38:21

fact, Talleyrand had far more invested

38:23

in this conference than Napoleon knew.

38:26

The wily diplomat had come to

38:28

a fateful decision. He would

38:30

no longer act as Bonaparte's obedient

38:33

servant. As he

38:35

himself said to Napoleon, he had always

38:37

seen himself first and foremost as a

38:40

servant of France, not of

38:42

any particular government, and certainly not

38:44

of any particular individual. He

38:47

had come to believe his emperor was

38:49

no longer acting in France's best interests,

38:52

and so Talleyrand was resolved

38:54

to pursue his own course,

38:57

and try to do what he

38:59

believed was best for the country,

39:01

even if it meant acting against

39:03

Bonaparte. He

39:06

believed Napoleon needed to moderate

39:08

French foreign policy, stop antagonizing

39:11

the Austrians, stop throwing

39:13

his weight around on the world stage,

39:15

and above all, to accept that there

39:17

were limits to his power. Their

39:20

first would be an opportunity for Talleyrand

39:22

to meet face to face with Alexander.

39:25

He hoped to build a

39:27

relationship with the Russian emperor,

39:29

Napoleon's most important ally, and

39:32

then collaborate with Alexander to

39:34

impose limits on Napoleon's foreign

39:36

policy. It

39:38

was a dangerous move. If

39:40

Napoleon found out, he would certainly

39:42

see it as a personal betrayal,

39:44

probably even as treason. And,

39:47

of course, it was treason. Talleyrand

39:50

would always claim he was obeying higher

39:52

loyalties, to France and the French people,

39:55

to Europe and the people of Europe,

39:57

and, like all great diplomats, to stability

40:00

and the balance of power. But

40:03

by any reasonable legal standard, secret

40:05

collaboration with a foreign government made

40:07

him a traitor. Of

40:10

course, this was nothing new for Talleyrand. He

40:13

had broken bread with the radicals when he

40:15

served the King of France, and he had

40:17

maintained his connections to his royalist friends when

40:19

he served the Revolution. He

40:22

had associates and acquaintances in every

40:24

court in Europe, even in countries

40:26

that were fiercely hostile to France.

40:30

Some of this was simply being a good

40:32

diplomat. Even the bitterest

40:35

of enemies always make peace

40:37

eventually. These types of back-channel

40:39

communications and relationships with

40:41

people on the other side are

40:43

what make peace possible. And

40:45

I'm sure if Talleyrand had been caught, this

40:47

is exactly what he would have said. But

40:50

what he was planning at Erfurt

40:53

went far beyond simply building relationships.

40:56

He would be lying to Napoleon's

40:58

face and passing state secrets to

41:00

a foreign power. It

41:02

would be a real double-cross. Hello,

41:12

this is Matt from the Explorers Podcast. I

41:15

want to invite you to join me on the voyages and

41:17

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41:19

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on your podcast app. That's

41:47

the Explorers Podcast. The

41:51

Congress of Erfurt would begin in late

41:54

September 1808, about

41:56

two months after the disaster at

41:58

Bailén. arrived

42:00

first. He had been sent

42:02

ahead by Napoleon to make sure

42:04

all the details were just right,

42:06

and to lay the diplomatic groundwork.

42:09

Conveniently, this also allowed him to lay

42:12

his own groundwork for the betrayal of

42:14

the Emperor. Napoleon

42:16

arrived second. By

42:18

now, an impressive list of monarchs, nobles,

42:20

and other dignitaries were assembled at Erfurt,

42:23

and they all lined up to pay

42:25

their respects to the most powerful man

42:27

of the age. Calliran

42:29

had a front-row seat, and described what

42:31

he saw. The

42:34

Emperor entered Erfurt, September 28, 1808, at ten in

42:36

the morning. An immense crowd surrounded

42:41

the avenues leading to the palace. Everyone

42:44

wished to see, and would

42:46

approach, him who dispensed all.

42:48

Thrones, misery, fears, and hopes.

42:51

Augustus, Louis XIV, and Napoleon are

42:54

the men on whom the most praise has

42:57

ever been bestowed. Times and

42:59

talent gave different forms to these

43:01

praises, but they were, in reality,

43:03

the same thing. My

43:06

duties enabled me to see the

43:08

forced, simulated, or even sincere homage

43:10

which was rendered to Napoleon, more

43:13

than I could have done otherwise,

43:15

and gave it proportions which appeared

43:17

to me monstrous." As

43:21

you can see, Taliran seemed convinced

43:24

the acclaim showered on Napoleon was

43:26

insincere, deference to his power rather

43:28

than genuine respect. Then

43:31

again, perhaps he was wallowing in

43:33

cynicism to make his betrayal easier

43:35

to stomach. Alexander

43:38

and the Russian contingent arrived last.

43:41

Some close to the Russian Emperor had begged him

43:43

not to go. It had only

43:45

been a few months since Napoleon

43:48

had lured the Spanish royal family

43:50

to Bayonne, under the pretext of

43:52

a diplomatic summit, then practically took

43:54

them prisoner. Anti-French members of

43:56

the Russian court and the imperial family worried that

43:58

he had been killed. he might do

44:01

the same to Alexander. Among

44:03

the loudest of these voices was

44:05

his own mother, the Dowager Empress,

44:07

Maria Theodorovna. Alexander wrote

44:09

her a letter explaining his decision

44:11

to go to Erfurt. Quote,

44:14

The moment chosen for this meeting is such

44:17

that it impresses on me a duty not

44:19

to evade it. France

44:21

has to believe that her political

44:23

interest can be allied with that

44:25

of Russia. As soon as

44:28

France does not have this belief, she

44:30

will see Russia as no more than

44:32

an enemy that it will be in

44:34

her interest to destroy. Was

44:36

it not in Russia's interest to

44:38

go along with this fearful colossus,

44:40

with the sole truly dangerous enemy

44:43

Russia can have? End

44:45

quote. Perhaps

44:47

that is revealing of Alexander's attitudes,

44:49

but, on the other hand, he

44:51

was notorious for telling people what

44:53

they wanted to hear and keeping

44:55

his true feelings to himself. He

44:58

knew his mother was anti-French. Perhaps

45:01

he was simply playing to his

45:03

audience. When

45:06

Alexander arrived on the 28th, Bonaparte

45:08

and his entourage rode out to

45:10

meet the Russians. When

45:12

the two groups came within eyesight, the

45:14

emperors rushed forward, throwing their arms around

45:16

each other in a bear hug, like

45:19

old friends. I

45:21

think O'Russian relations may have cooled

45:23

slightly since Tilsit, but the two

45:25

sovereigns were at least still acting

45:27

like their friendship was strong. That

45:31

night, Talleyrand met privately with

45:33

Alexander. You might think

45:35

this had to be done in secret,

45:37

but Napoleon had actually ordered him to

45:39

spend as much time as possible with

45:41

the Russian emperor. Betraying Napoleon

45:44

was a dangerous game, but

45:46

the emperor's trust in Talleyrand

45:48

made it easy. Talleyrand was

45:51

able to meet with Alexander twice a

45:53

day during the Congress. At

45:55

first, their conversations were relatively

45:58

innocent. Talleyrand The was

46:00

feeling amat. Alexander. Was

46:02

almost as kg. But. After

46:04

a few days together tally were

46:07

to became convinced the Russian Emperor

46:09

would be receptive to his overtures.

46:12

The conversations became more serious. Finally

46:15

Tommy were dropped the mask and

46:17

spoke to Alexander directly. Quote.

46:20

Sire. It is indoor power to

46:22

save Europe and you will only do

46:24

so by refusing to give way to

46:26

Napoleon. The French people

46:29

are civilized. Their sovereign is

46:31

not. The sovereign of

46:33

Russia is civilized and his people

46:35

are not. The sovereign of

46:37

Russia should therefore be the ally

46:39

of the French people. And

46:42

close. To. Later

46:44

elaborated quote. The.

46:46

Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees,

46:48

or the conquest of France. The

46:50

rest are conquests of Napoleon. France

46:52

has nothing to do with some.

46:56

The. Interest of France demands that

46:58

the powers capable of raining

47:00

in Napoleon unite to erect

47:02

a dyke to check is

47:04

insatiable ambition. And called.

47:08

Tell the ranch. counseled Alexander

47:10

to hold from on all

47:12

of Napoleon's demands. Above all,

47:14

he implored him not to commit

47:16

Russia to war against Austria, which

47:19

was Napoleon's primary goal. Years.

47:21

Later in his memoirs, Talleyrand

47:24

explains that if Napoleon had

47:26

gotten Russian support against Austria

47:28

at this time quote. He.

47:30

Would under some pretext easily

47:33

invented, have sought a quarrel

47:35

with Austria. And. After a

47:37

few military successes he would have tried

47:39

to do with Austria as he had

47:41

done with Prussia and cloaked. In.

47:44

Other words, committing Russia to support

47:46

Napoleon in a war with Austria

47:48

would only have made conflict more

47:50

likely. Another. War would have

47:53

led to another punitive treaty

47:55

further weakening Austria, and in

47:57

doing so introducing even more

47:59

chaos. Onto the European Geopolitical

48:01

seen. Tally. Rand believed that

48:04

in the end, chaos serve to

48:06

no one. Meanwhile.

48:08

Napoleon was still hoping to recapture

48:11

the magic of Tills. It's. Just

48:13

like at their first meeting, he planned

48:15

to spend as much time as possible

48:18

one on one with Alexander. He

48:20

hoped to use the young Russian

48:23

Emperors fascination with him, their friendship,

48:25

and his personal magnetism to secure

48:27

the guarantees he needed. However,

48:31

he found Alexander impassive

48:33

and unreceptive. It. Seemed

48:35

the Russians had come to effort

48:37

hoping to secure more concessions from

48:39

France not to support their allies

48:42

in their time of need. At

48:45

one point, Napoleon deployed one

48:47

of his favorite negotiating tactics,

48:50

the angry Tantrum. T

48:52

through his had to the ground

48:54

and began stopping on it demanding

48:57

Russia honor the alliance and provide

48:59

guarantees against Austria. Alexander

49:02

responded cooley quote. You.

49:05

Are violence and I am stubborn.

49:08

With. Me anger gains nothing.

49:10

Let. Us talk and be reasonable

49:13

or I am leaving and quotes.

49:16

Perhaps. Bonaparte had gotten to

49:18

used to negotiating with people who

49:20

were weak at already under his

49:22

influence, people who had a genuine

49:25

reason to fear his displeasure. Alexander

49:28

had no such fear and

49:30

so this tantrum got Napoleon

49:32

nowhere. Bonaparte.

49:34

Lamented quote. Emperor

49:36

Alexander is as obstinate as

49:38

a clam. That. Infernal

49:41

Spanish business is costing me

49:43

dear and quote. Little.

49:47

Did he know that one of

49:49

his top advisors was counseling Alexander

49:51

to be as obstinate as possible?

49:54

By. This point in the conference,

49:56

Talleyrand had moved well beyond ceiling

49:59

Alexander out. At giving him

50:01

general advice. He. Was telling

50:03

the young Russian Emperor exactly how

50:05

to respond to each of Napoleon's

50:07

arguments before he made them. In.

50:10

Fact: Talleyrand gave Alexander so

50:12

much detailed information that he

50:14

had to take exhaustive notes.

50:17

Effectively, he was following

50:19

Tommy Rand's instructions. Whatever.

50:22

Else you can say about Tally Read

50:25

it is pretty impressive that he now

50:27

had both of the most powerful man

50:29

in the world hanging on his every

50:31

word, coming to him for advice and

50:34

even deferring to him to a degree.

50:37

Talleyrand. Was rich enough to

50:39

live in a great luxury, but

50:42

he was no great financier or

50:44

captain of industry. He didn't have

50:46

the kind of real economic power

50:49

that demands consideration from great monarchs.

50:52

He did have an impressive political

50:54

title counselor of state, but he

50:56

was just one member of that

50:58

body with no independent power. He

51:01

had no armies or ships under

51:03

his command. He. Had no great

51:06

mass of followers among the average

51:08

people. In fact, the public's

51:10

generally saw him as corrupt and

51:12

sinister. T. Himself probably

51:14

would have been first to admit that

51:16

he didn't have any great moral authority

51:18

either. All. Talleyrand really

51:21

had was his mind at his

51:23

reputation, and those were enough to

51:25

band the most powerful people in

51:27

the world to his. well, As

51:31

you might imagine, Napoleon was finding his

51:33

trip to airport. Zack's it to say

51:36

the least. But. It was not

51:38

all frustration and futility. The

51:40

Emperor finally got a chance to

51:43

meet one of the people he

51:45

most admired in the world, the

51:47

German writer and intellectual Johann Wolfgang

51:49

Von Good. So. Good.

51:51

So was fifty eight years old and

51:54

had been one of the most famous

51:56

at well respected intellectuals in Europe for

51:58

decades. now Napoleon had

52:00

been obsessed with his books, reading some

52:02

of them over and over again. He

52:05

claimed to have read Goethe's The

52:07

Sorrows of Young Werther seven times.

52:11

Amazingly, almost as soon as the

52:13

two men were introduced, Napoleon launched

52:16

into a criticism of Voltaire's play,

52:18

Muhammad, which Goethe had recently translated

52:20

into German. As you

52:23

know from past episodes, Napoleon was a

52:25

great admirer of Muhammad. Voltaire

52:27

had been an anti-clerical

52:29

Enlightenment deist, an avowed

52:31

enemy of all organized

52:33

religion. He considered all

52:35

self-proclaimed prophets to be charlatans, and

52:37

this is very much the theme

52:40

of the play. This

52:42

greatly offended Napoleon. He told

52:44

Goethe, quote, that is not a

52:46

good work. Voltaire has represented

52:49

the man who changed the history

52:51

of the world as a scoundrel

52:53

worthy of the gallows, end quote.

52:57

They then moved on to discuss Goethe's

52:59

own work. The great writer

53:02

would later recall, quote, Napoleon

53:04

then brought the conversation to The Sorrows

53:07

of Young Werther, which he must have

53:09

studied in detail. After

53:11

several perfectly appropriate observations, he mentioned

53:13

a specific part, and said to

53:16

me, why did you do

53:18

that? It is not natural. And

53:20

he spoke at length on this, and

53:22

with perfect accuracy. I listened

53:25

with a calm face, and I replied,

53:27

with a smile of satisfaction, that I

53:29

didn't know whether anyone had ever made

53:31

the same criticism, but that I found

53:33

it perfectly justified, and I

53:36

agreed that one could find fault

53:38

with the passage's lack of authenticity.

53:42

But, I added, a poet

53:44

can perhaps be excused for taking

53:46

refuge in an artifice which is

53:48

hard to spot when he wants

53:50

to produce certain effects that could

53:52

not be created simply and naturally.

53:55

The Emperor seemed to agree with me. He

53:58

returned to drama and made some very sensible

54:00

remarks, as a man who had observed

54:02

the tragic stage with a great deal

54:04

of attention, like a criminal judge, and

54:07

who felt very deeply how far the

54:09

French theatre had strayed from nature and

54:11

truth. He went on

54:13

to talk about fatalistic plays, of which

54:16

he disapproved, they belonged to the Dark

54:18

Ages. Why,

54:21

today, do they keep giving us

54:23

destiny, he said? Destiny is politics.

54:27

I must also note that in the

54:29

whole of our conversation I had admired

54:32

the variety of his affirmative replies and

54:34

gestures, because he was rarely

54:36

immobile when he listened. Sometimes

54:38

he made a meditative gesture with

54:41

his head and said, yes, or

54:43

that's right. Or,

54:45

if he had stated some idea, he

54:47

would most often add, and what

54:49

would Monsieur Guta think of that? Napoleon

54:55

then asked Guta some personal questions,

54:57

mostly about his family. Then

55:00

his aides began bringing business to

55:02

his attention, and the conversation was

55:04

over. You

55:06

might think this great celebrated genius

55:08

would have been a bit offended

55:10

by Napoleon's frank criticisms of his

55:12

work, but Guta took it in

55:15

stride. He had been

55:17

impressed by Bonaparte before their meeting, and

55:19

left with an even higher opinion. It

55:22

seems he was flattered that a

55:24

great man like Napoleon had read his

55:26

work closely enough to be able to

55:29

offer such thoughtful criticisms. Napoleon

55:32

must have been impressed as well,

55:34

because shortly after this meeting, Guta

55:36

was awarded the Medal of the

55:38

Legion of Honor, somewhat rare for

55:40

a non-Frenchman. The great

55:42

writer was deeply moved by this gesture, and

55:44

wore the medal for the rest of his

55:46

life. Even years

55:48

after Waterloo, when Napoleon's empire

55:50

was long gone, and public

55:53

opinion in Germany had very

55:55

much turned against Bonaparte, Guta

55:57

would continue proudly wearing that

55:59

medal. a token of esteem

56:01

from a man his countrymen saw

56:03

as their greatest enemy. In

56:07

his old age, Goethe said of the

56:09

emperor, quote, Napoleon was

56:11

the man, always enlightened,

56:13

always clear and decided, and

56:15

endowed with sufficient energy to

56:18

carry into effect whatever he

56:20

considered advantageous and necessary. His

56:23

life was the stride of the demigod,

56:25

from battle to battle and from victory

56:27

to victory. It

56:29

might well be said of him that he

56:31

was found in a state of continual enlightenment.

56:35

On this account, his destiny was more

56:37

brilliant than any the world had seen

56:39

before him, or, perhaps, we'll

56:41

ever see after him. End

56:44

quote. Perhaps

56:47

Goethe would have come away with a

56:49

different impression if he could see how

56:52

Talirand and Alexander were carrying on behind

56:54

Napoleon's back. The

56:56

Russian emperor remained immovable.

56:59

Napoleon flattered, begged, and raged.

57:02

He offered diplomatic and

57:04

even territorial concessions. He

57:07

gave Alexander a new horse. None

57:10

of it seemed to make an impression. Of

57:13

course, it was easy to ignore

57:15

Napoleon's bluster when you had one

57:17

of his top advisors informing you

57:19

that it was, in fact, nothing

57:21

but bluster. Even

57:24

the congress, Napoleon and Talirand

57:27

were conferring privately. The

57:29

emperor was even more intense than

57:31

usual. Clearly he had

57:33

something big on his mind. Talirand

57:36

would later recall their conversation.

57:38

Quote. His

57:41

agitation was remarkable. He

57:43

asked me questions without waiting for the

57:45

answer. He was trying to tell me

57:47

something. He said what he didn't

57:50

mean. At last he got

57:52

out the great word divorce.

57:55

End quote. We'll

57:58

discuss this in more detail in

58:00

a future episode. episode, but for

58:02

now suffice it to say that

58:04

by mid-1808 Napoleon was resolved to

58:06

divorce Josephine, his great love. He

58:09

wanted to remarry immediately, a political

58:12

marriage, fitting of a great monarch.

58:15

Specifically, he wanted to marry

58:17

one of Emperor Alexander's young

58:19

sisters, thus binding France and

58:21

Russia even closer together. The

58:25

fact that he brought this up now,

58:27

while he was in the middle of

58:29

negotiating with Alexander, makes me wonder if

58:31

he could sense that Alexander was drifting

58:33

away from him. That if

58:36

he hoped to keep Russia as an

58:38

ally in the long term, he needed

58:40

to do something drastic to shore up

58:42

the relationship. Talley

58:45

Rand informed Alexander of

58:47

this conversation almost immediately.

58:49

Alexander wrote to his mother

58:52

and told her to find suitable

58:54

fiances for his sisters immediately. By

58:57

the time Napoleon got around

58:59

to asking, both women would

59:01

be safely engaged to steady

59:03

men from well-established aristocratic families.

59:07

As the Congress drew to a close,

59:09

Napoleon kept up the pressure on Alexander.

59:12

The Russians would have to give him something. After

59:15

all, the two countries were still

59:17

allies, even if it hadn't really

59:19

seemed that way for the past few weeks. In

59:23

the end, Alexander did throw France

59:25

a few bones, but nothing

59:27

approaching what Napoleon had been hoping for.

59:31

On October 12, 1808, the

59:33

two sides agreed to the Convention

59:35

of Erfurt. Only

59:38

one of its fourteen clauses mentioned

59:40

Austria at all. The

59:42

relevant part of that clause reads,

59:45

quote, In case

59:47

Austria should engage in war against

59:49

France, the Emperor of Russia agrees

59:52

to declare himself against Austria and

59:54

to make common cause with France.

59:57

End quote. had

1:00:00

gone to Erfurt hoping to

1:00:02

secure a firm commitment from

1:00:04

Alexander. That language is anything

1:00:06

but firm. There is

1:00:08

no mention of declarations of

1:00:11

war, or deployments of soldiers,

1:00:13

or timetables, or anything tangible.

1:00:15

Practically speaking, Alexander hadn't committed

1:00:18

to anything at all. Napoleon

1:00:21

was so disappointed with the agreement that

1:00:23

he never actually got around to ratifying

1:00:26

it. He would have

1:00:28

been even more disappointed if he

1:00:30

knew that Alexander had already provided

1:00:32

secret assurances to the Austrians, telling

1:00:34

them he had no intention of

1:00:36

joining any future war between the

1:00:38

French Empire and the Habsburg realms.

1:00:42

It's impossible to know for certain

1:00:44

how much damage Taliran's betrayal had

1:00:46

done to Napoleon's cause. Perhaps

1:00:49

Alexander would have refused anyway, and

1:00:51

could have resisted the pressure without

1:00:53

any help. Personally,

1:00:56

I doubt he could have succeeded

1:00:58

so completely without Taliran. The

1:01:02

wily diplomat did not come

1:01:04

away from Erfurt empty-handed. In

1:01:06

exchange for his services, Alexander

1:01:09

promised a marriage between an

1:01:11

eminent Russian noblewoman and Taliran's

1:01:13

nephew and sole heir. In

1:01:16

his memoirs, Taliran closes his discussion

1:01:19

of the Congress this way, quote,

1:01:22

It was the last service I was able

1:01:25

to render Europe, as long as Napoleon continued

1:01:27

to reign, and this

1:01:29

service, in my opinion, I was

1:01:31

also rendering to himself personally, end

1:01:34

quote. That's

1:01:36

a very interesting sentence. Taliran

1:01:39

seems to have believed, or at

1:01:41

least claims to have believed, that

1:01:43

in betraying Napoleon, he was actually

1:01:46

doing him a favor. Taliran

1:01:48

wanted to use Alexander to create

1:01:51

a guardrail, to keep Napoleon from

1:01:53

careening off a cliff, and direct

1:01:55

him back to the righteous path.

1:01:59

His bonaparte had taken this disappointment

1:02:01

at the Congress to heart and

1:02:04

accepted certain limitations on his power,

1:02:06

both he and France would have

1:02:08

been better off, at least

1:02:11

so the argument goes. On

1:02:14

the other hand, maybe this

1:02:16

is just the type of

1:02:18

self-flattering, self-justifying story that intelligent

1:02:20

but unprincipled people like Talleyrand

1:02:23

tell themselves when they decide

1:02:25

the smart move is to

1:02:27

do something immoral. Those

1:02:31

words were all written after the

1:02:33

fact. Perhaps the most

1:02:36

obvious explanation is the correct one.

1:02:38

The past few months had shown

1:02:40

Talleyrand that, as strong as he

1:02:42

may have looked, Napoleon would not

1:02:44

be able to bring the war

1:02:46

to a successful conclusion. Better

1:02:49

to get on the winning side while the

1:02:51

getting was good. Over

1:02:53

the course of this show, we've seen a lot of

1:02:56

people try to stop Napoleon.

1:02:59

None of them have had much success. Now

1:03:02

he would have to contend with a

1:03:04

new kind of enemy, someone very close

1:03:06

to him, someone who had helped engineer

1:03:09

his rise to power, someone

1:03:11

he had relied upon for advice

1:03:13

for almost his entire political career,

1:03:16

and who still publicly claimed to be

1:03:18

on his side. Napoleon's

1:03:21

enemies suddenly had a very powerful

1:03:23

ally right at the heart of

1:03:25

the French government. Bonaparte's

1:03:29

foreign policy vision depended on

1:03:31

maintaining the alliance with Russia.

1:03:34

After Erfurt, that alliance seemed far

1:03:36

less secure than it had a

1:03:38

year earlier. He hoped

1:03:40

a strategic marriage would solve that

1:03:43

problem, but, as you've

1:03:45

heard, that door was already closing.

1:03:49

Almost overnight, the future of

1:03:51

Napoleon's new order seemed very

1:03:54

uncertain. Bonaparte

1:03:56

had failed to secure a strong

1:03:58

guarantee from the Russians to. That

1:04:00

his free hand to go to

1:04:02

Spain but France had been dishonored

1:04:04

at by learn and he could

1:04:07

not let that go unanswered. Free

1:04:10

hand or not Napoleon ordered most

1:04:12

of the ground are mae west

1:04:14

from it's bases in Germany. The

1:04:16

Emperor was going to Spain with the

1:04:19

greatest army in the world at his

1:04:21

best. Next.

1:04:23

Episode Will get caught up on

1:04:25

the military situation in Iberia at

1:04:27

see Napoleon himself and finally crossed

1:04:30

the Pyrenees. Before

1:04:32

we go I want to give a

1:04:34

quick personal message to to have my

1:04:36

oldest and dearest friends that an anna

1:04:38

Congratulations on your new baby! I'm so

1:04:40

excited for you and I know you're

1:04:42

going to be great parents! And

1:04:45

I hope you still have time to listen

1:04:47

to this show as new parents and are

1:04:49

actually hearing this message. Anywhere,

1:04:53

Until. Next time. Thanks for listening.