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0:58

before 10-7, the dominant narrative in Israel

1:00

was that there's no hope of a

1:02

two-state solution, not anytime soon, because

1:05

there isn't a partner for peace. I

1:08

think there are ways in which that's been true. I think

1:10

there are times in which that has been true. And

1:12

I think it's also a bit of a dodge. It absolves

1:15

Israel of responsibility for what it has

1:17

done to make sure there's not a

1:19

partner for peace. And

1:21

it has taken too much pressure

1:23

off of Israeli policy towards

1:25

Palestine in the present. It

1:29

allowed a lot of people to become comfortable with the

1:31

kind of stasis. And the

1:33

ones who weren't comfortable, the ones who

1:35

still had the power and

1:37

the energy to act, were

1:39

settlers in the West Bank, was

1:41

the radical right in Israel, who

1:44

have done everything in their power, explicitly,

1:46

they've said this explicitly, to try to

1:48

make any kind of two-state reality impossible.

1:51

And so Israel has been moving

1:53

towards what people call a one-state reality,

1:55

not the one state that the left sometimes

1:57

imagines, where you have equal rights across all

1:59

of Israel and Palestine, and it

2:01

becomes one multi-ethnic nation. But

2:04

the one state reality of apartheid, the

2:06

one state reality in which Israel does

2:08

have functional control over Gaza, over

2:11

the West Bank, but the people in

2:13

it do not have anything like real rights.

2:17

I would say, and I think this is a very common

2:19

view, that was a reality

2:22

before 10-7. And in that reality,

2:24

for years now, a group of

2:26

hundreds of former senior defense and

2:28

diplomatic officials in Israel have been

2:30

saying this is a catastrophe. That

2:33

it is a catastrophe for Israeli security, a

2:36

catastrophe for Israeli democracy, a catastrophe

2:38

for Israeli international standing, and a

2:41

catastrophe for Israel's soul. Their

2:44

warnings seem quite

2:46

prescient now. And

2:48

they've argued there was another

2:50

way. There was a huge amount Israel could

2:53

do on its own and should have been

2:55

doing. That if Israel is not going to

2:57

tip into a kind of single state that

2:59

it did not want and could not ultimately

3:01

defend, that the conditions

3:03

had to be created now

3:06

for something else to emerge in the future. One

3:09

of the people working on that project was Nimr

3:11

al-Novic. He's my guest today. Novik

3:14

was a top aide to Shimon Peres

3:16

when Peres was prime minister and vice

3:18

premier. In that role, Novik was

3:20

involved in all manner of negotiations with the

3:22

Palestinians, with the Arab world,

3:24

with the international community. He's

3:27

on the executive committee of commanders for Israel security,

3:29

which is a group I mentioned a minute ago.

3:31

And he's an Israel fellow at the Israel policy

3:33

forum. I want to talk

3:35

to him about those plans and how they

3:37

look now in light of the attacks on

3:39

10-7 and the war in Gaza, the

3:43

unimaginable horror of

3:45

being in Gaza, the amount of

3:47

grief and fury and vengeance that

3:50

is building there, that has built there.

3:54

And the question

3:56

that is inescapable, this war of the Arab world,

3:58

this war of the Arab world, this war of the Arab world, will

4:00

end. It has to end, hopefully

4:03

soon. Who

4:05

is going to govern Gaza? How can

4:07

they govern Gaza after this? We've

4:10

been hearing very different things on

4:12

that from Netanyahu, from

4:15

the US, from the Arab

4:17

world, but of course

4:19

there's a question of who will the Gazans allow

4:21

to govern them? And if Israel

4:23

is simply going to be occupying

4:25

Gaza indefinitely, that is going to

4:27

be a security risk and a

4:30

horror of its own. So I

4:33

want to talk about that day after

4:35

question, which of course is

4:37

being decided in different ways right now,

4:39

in this day, with the bombs dropping

4:42

and in a number

4:44

I found just shocking, about

4:47

80% of Gazans now displaced. I

4:50

want to talk with Nimrod about what

4:52

might be politically possible in Israel, given

4:54

the unpopularity of the current government

4:57

and the possibility that it could collapse in

4:59

the coming months or certainly in the coming

5:01

years. Before we go to the show, I

5:03

should mention we're still taking questions for the

5:05

Ask Me Anything, so you can

5:07

email us at ezraklineshow at nytimes.com.

5:15

Nimrod Novik, welcome to the show. Thanks

5:18

for having me. So I want to begin

5:20

with the document you helped write in November 2021. It's called

5:23

Initiative 2025. And

5:25

it had these two premises that I think

5:28

are important. One was that there was no

5:30

prospect for a two-state solution then or for

5:32

that matter now. And two is

5:34

that even so, there was still a lot that

5:36

Israel could and should do. So

5:38

tell me about what that proposal was

5:40

and what that coalition that you

5:42

were part of recommended. The

5:45

group that worked on it called Commanders

5:47

for Israel Security. It's

5:50

over 500 Israeli retired

5:52

generals, as well

5:54

as their equivalents from the Mossad, the

5:56

Shin Bet Internal Security, National

5:58

Security Council. the entire

6:01

Israeli security establishment. And

6:03

we formed a team, we felt

6:05

that the Israeli policy was

6:08

far too reactive and

6:10

far too conservative for

6:13

the good of the country, national security,

6:16

short and long term. We

6:18

had not anticipated the trauma

6:21

of October 7th, but we

6:23

certainly anticipated things getting from

6:25

bad to worse, unless Israel

6:27

changes course. So we

6:30

came up with a plan that suggested even

6:32

though a two state solution, as you said,

6:35

is not on this side of the horizon, but

6:37

given that eventually it's the

6:40

only solution that we believe

6:42

serves Israel's security and well-being

6:45

long term as a strong Jewish

6:47

democracy, we mapped

6:49

out what can and

6:51

should be done in the

6:53

coming two, three years to reverse

6:56

the slide towards

6:58

the disaster of a one state solution. Tell

7:02

me about that. How would you describe

7:04

what Israeli policy towards Palestinians, towards West

7:06

Bank and Gaza was in 2021 when

7:09

you wrote that? What

7:11

was the governing theory and why do

7:13

you believe it was going to slide

7:15

into what you call a one state

7:18

solution? There were

7:20

primary two governing concepts, if

7:22

you will, of the Israeli

7:25

policy, again, following its policy

7:27

is giving it more credit

7:30

than deserved. Israeli

7:32

governments have been reluctant to

7:34

determine the end game of

7:37

our relationship with the Palestinians. Where

7:40

do we want to see ourselves and them?

7:43

Two years, five years, 50 years from now. No

7:46

decision has been made since the

7:48

Oslo era. As a

7:50

result, what we've seen

7:52

was a policy based

7:55

on insisting on separating

7:58

the Gaza Strip. ruled

8:00

by Hamas from the West Bank, ruled

8:03

sort of by the Palestinian

8:05

Authority. Separation was

8:07

one principle, and the

8:09

other one was dubbed status quo,

8:12

even though it was an illusion, because

8:14

nothing was static about it. As

8:17

a matter of fact, creeping

8:19

annexation has been accelerating

8:23

under various governments, and

8:26

the prospect of

8:28

separating Israelis and Palestinians

8:31

into two-state reality was

8:33

becoming less and less possible.

8:36

The more territory was taken by

8:38

settlements, the more extreme

8:40

settlers were conducting

8:43

violent raids into

8:46

Palestinian civil populations. The

8:49

more the Palestinian Authority, internally

8:53

defective, becoming more

8:55

and more authoritarian, more

8:58

and more detached from

9:00

its own constituents, less

9:03

responsive, less capable

9:05

of governance, losing

9:08

control over large thoughts

9:10

of West Bank territory,

9:13

forcing the IDF to

9:15

enter more and more, and it

9:17

became a daily and nightly raids

9:20

into areas that were supposed to be controlled,

9:23

and law and order was supposed to

9:25

be maintained by the Palestinian Authority. It

9:28

was a slide into a state where

9:32

the Palestinian Authority would

9:35

cease to function as the

9:37

promise of the nucleus

9:40

of a Palestinian state. You

9:42

know, if you look at it today, it's

9:44

already perhaps the

9:46

municipal government of

9:49

the city of Ramallah rather than of the

9:51

West Bank, and weakening

9:54

the Palestinian Authority by choking

9:57

it financially, by not

9:59

allowing it. to demonstrate to its

10:01

people that it is the

10:03

vehicle that will bring them one day to their

10:06

aspiration of statehood on

10:09

the one hand. And making

10:11

sure that Hamas controls

10:13

Gaza, the two

10:16

tracks spelled

10:18

disaster. So I

10:21

must confess we had not anticipated that the

10:23

disaster will look the way it did

10:26

on October 7th. But we

10:29

certainly realized that the

10:31

policy in Gaza of

10:33

rounds of violence every year,

10:35

every two years, every 18

10:37

months, and buying off

10:41

relative tranquility by funding

10:43

Hamas through the auspices

10:45

of Qatar, allowing

10:48

it to arm

10:50

and rearm the inherent

10:52

contradictions in the policy

10:54

were quite apparent. And we

10:56

thought that it's time for Israel to change

10:58

course by taking the

11:00

initiative and reversing the policy both

11:03

on Gaza and the West Bank. So

11:05

one thing I have noticed is

11:08

that there are different versions

11:10

of the one state fear,

11:13

hope and expectation floating around.

11:16

There's a left wing one state solution

11:19

you'll hear about sometimes, right? A state

11:21

where everybody within the territory of what

11:23

is thought to be Israel and Palestine

11:25

will have equal rights. Everybody will vote. I call that

11:28

a little more utopic theory, but it is something

11:30

you hear on the left. There's

11:32

a right wing one state solution. I think

11:34

when you mentioned the finance minister, Basil

11:36

Smotrich, I think if

11:39

you read things he has written in the past,

11:41

he is looking for a one state solution.

11:43

He wants to crush Palestinian dreams of statehood and

11:46

repress Palestinians sufficiently that they stop

11:48

believing they can never have anything

11:50

better and eventually content themselves to

11:53

Israeli rule and live quietly

11:55

within that in order to gain better lives.

11:58

And then there's a kind of. I might call

12:00

it a realist one state idea, that there

12:03

is no more chance, there is

12:05

no more realism to two states. It would not

12:07

be possible to create functioning two states here. And

12:10

so whether it is a state

12:12

of equality or a state of inequality,

12:15

that a one state solution is all that

12:17

exists because Israel just simply has too much

12:19

control and does not have the political capacity

12:21

anymore to roll that control

12:24

back. And so this argument

12:26

would be, this is already done. There is no

12:28

plausible political horizon for a two state solution.

12:30

And the only question is what kind of one

12:32

state you're going to get. How

12:34

do you think about that? I'll

12:37

put it bluntly. I believe that a

12:40

two state solution is inevitable. Not

12:42

because we wish it, and not because it's nice.

12:46

Not because Palestinians deserve

12:48

self-determination, which they do,

12:50

but that's not a historic

12:53

imperative. I believe that the

12:55

two state solution is inevitable because

12:57

these two people are not going to

12:59

live happily ever after under one roof.

13:02

For that to happen, for the

13:04

two people to stay in one

13:07

state, one of two things have

13:09

to happen. Either

13:11

Israelis will agree

13:13

to grant Palestinian equal rights in

13:16

that one state, and therefore become

13:19

a minority or

13:21

at least a slim majority in

13:23

our own country. And that's never going

13:26

to happen. Israelis are not going

13:28

to agree to be less

13:30

than an overwhelming majority in

13:32

our own country. Or

13:34

Palestinians will agree forever to

13:37

forego equal rights, which

13:40

I suspect is

13:42

as unreasonable

13:44

expectation as the other.

13:47

So we will separate. The

13:50

question is, are we going to separate because

13:52

leaders led us there, or

13:55

because we bleed ourselves so

13:57

much and for so long? until

14:00

both peoples come to their senses

14:03

and go for the inevitable deal. Let

14:07

me key in on a word you just used, which is

14:09

separation. When I read some

14:11

of these documents, separation is an important word. I

14:13

think people hear and think about peace

14:16

deals and settlements, but separation is actually,

14:18

it seems to me, more

14:21

how this is spoken about politically in Israel. You

14:23

go back to Rabin's campaigns, where his slogan was,

14:25

take Gaza out of Tel Aviv. That's a

14:28

slogan of separation, not an argument for

14:30

peace. Tell me

14:32

about the language and the

14:34

ideal of separation and how that might be

14:36

different than some of the other ways it

14:38

gets spoken about. Civil

14:41

separation with overall security

14:43

control, continued security controls,

14:47

until a two-state

14:49

agreement, ashers in

14:51

alternative security arrangements, is

14:54

a concept that basically suggests reversing

14:58

the creeping annexation, which

15:00

is no longer creeping, it's now galloping. So

15:03

the idea is to start

15:06

reversing the slide towards

15:08

one state reality in

15:10

the opposite direction of

15:12

reducing the friction between the

15:15

two populations, increasing

15:17

the capacity of the PA to

15:20

perform while

15:23

maintaining the overall

15:26

security controlled by Israel

15:29

until a deal is struck. So

15:32

let me get into what you actually recommended

15:34

there, because I think something you got at

15:37

the end was important. You often hear when

15:39

you talk to people in Israel about different

15:41

paths that could be taken. Well,

15:43

we don't have anybody to negotiate with. The

15:45

Palestinian Authority doesn't have credibility. Hamas wants our

15:48

destruction. And the core premise

15:50

of the report is that there are things

15:52

Israel can do unilaterally, that it doesn't need

15:54

a partner to do things that will make

15:56

the situation better from its perspective and

15:59

create conditions. for deals in the future.

16:02

So tell me what is in Israel's

16:04

power here? What did you actually recommend

16:06

it do tangibly? It's

16:09

not a genetic deformation of the Palestinians

16:11

that they cannot govern themselves. This

16:14

is nonsense. We

16:16

had a period after the Second Intifada, the

16:18

year is 2007, 2008, where the Palestinian

16:22

Authority, there was a prime minister by

16:25

the name of Salam Fayyad. First he

16:27

was finance minister, later on prime minister,

16:30

who revitalized the

16:32

Palestinian Authority in a dramatic way. The

16:35

authority was on the rise. People

16:37

were proud in it, its

16:39

own population. They could have

16:42

won elections at that point. And

16:45

then Netanyahu was elected in 2009. Now, obviously

16:49

we are the strongest party. We

16:51

hold most of the cards by far. And

16:54

when we decide that we are going

16:56

to choke the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian

16:59

Authority will choke. If

17:01

we decide to give it space and

17:03

to give it the possibility of

17:06

demonstrating to its own constituency

17:08

that it can deliver, that

17:10

it can govern. Now,

17:12

the second trend that happened was

17:15

that the al-Hamud Abbas, President

17:17

Abbas, known as Abu

17:19

Mazen, the early Abu Mazen was

17:22

a very different person than

17:24

the late one with whom we're

17:27

dealing today. He became

17:29

increasingly non-democratic,

17:31

authoritarian, autocratic,

17:35

paranoid, removing from

17:37

his vicinity and from position of

17:39

power, all the best

17:41

and brightest that were working during

17:43

that era, during

17:45

competition. He exiled them either

17:47

out of politics or out

17:49

of the West Bank altogether.

17:52

Things went from bad to worse. Israel

17:55

doing its share in weakening the PA

17:58

and the PA leadership became more

18:01

claustrophobic, all these can

18:03

change. On

18:05

the Israeli side, what we

18:07

felt was essential was

18:10

allowing the Palestinian security

18:13

agencies to

18:15

perform their duty without

18:18

embarrassing them in front

18:20

of their own constituencies. They

18:23

used to be the pride and joy of

18:25

the Palestinian street. When they

18:27

walked into the street in the uniform, they

18:29

symbolized state and being. And

18:32

with time, our conduct presented

18:35

them as subcontractors of the Israeli

18:37

occupation. When there is no political

18:39

horizon, they are no

18:41

longer serving Palestinian national interests, they're

18:44

serving the Israeli occupation. And

18:47

with that morale goes down and performance goes

18:49

down. So one thing

18:51

was to strengthen the Palestinian

18:53

security agencies by virtue

18:55

of the way we treat them

18:58

and our conduct. We

19:00

suggested to expand the territory

19:03

that the Palestinian Authority controls. We

19:06

believe that nothing demonstrates

19:08

sincerity of a commitment to

19:11

a future to state

19:13

reality, then reversing

19:15

the annexation by

19:17

taking small chunks of the

19:19

West Bank that are now under

19:21

Israeli control, redesignating them and

19:24

turning them to Palestinian Authority control

19:26

specifically, and we mapped it out,

19:29

areas that allow for

19:31

continuity among Palestinian

19:34

areas. At the moment, the

19:37

West Bank is a Swiss cheese.

19:40

It's 169 islands of

19:44

Palestinian controlled areas surrounded

19:47

each by

19:49

Israeli controlled territory. So

19:52

we wanted to reduce that by half so

19:55

that continuity will have a

19:57

security law and order and

19:59

economic. well-being effect.

20:03

We suggested a host

20:05

of economic measures that

20:08

enable the Palestinian Authority to deliver

20:10

for the people, which is

20:12

the opposite of what's happening now

20:15

when our Minister of Finance is

20:17

choking the Palestinian Authority by

20:20

withholding funds that are theirs

20:23

by the agreement Israel collects taxes for

20:25

the Palestinian Authority, VAT and others,

20:28

and we are supposed to automatically transfer

20:31

them to the Palestinian Authority. It's the

20:33

main chunk of their budget. So

20:36

we recommended a host of economic

20:38

measures of that nature, security measures,

20:40

but the umbrella for

20:42

it all was supposed to be

20:44

a political horizon.

20:47

We believe that the Palestinian Authority cannot

20:49

have legitimacy in the eyes

20:51

of its own population and

20:54

therefore will not be able to function properly

20:56

if it is not perceived

21:00

to be the vehicle that is leading

21:02

the Palestinian people towards statehood, however long

21:04

it might take and however arduous the

21:07

road there, and therefore we recommended that

21:09

the government of Israel will

21:11

find a way, and we have some suggestions,

21:14

to indicate an Israeli

21:16

commitment to an eventual

21:18

two-state solution. you

21:34

This podcast is supported by MasterCard.

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the world, we're helping our partners

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at mastercard.com/NextGenSolutions. We're

22:01

talking in terms here that feel similar to how we

22:03

could have been talking a few months ago, a few

22:06

years ago. But right now you have

22:08

a full ground invasion of Gaza,

22:10

you have 87% of Gazans displaced according

22:14

to the UN, you

22:16

have polling among Palestinians showing a

22:18

rise in support for Hamas, and

22:21

you have Israel with, it seems to me, no real

22:24

theory of its way back out. Netanyahu says

22:26

the army will have to be in Gaza

22:28

until it finishes the job. That apparently means

22:30

destroying Hamas. I hear a lot of

22:32

disagreement from counterterrorism and military experts

22:35

as to whether or not that's actually possible.

22:38

But even once that is done, the Palestinian Authority

22:40

cannot just be installed by Israel.

22:42

That would not be credible to

22:44

Gazans. Netanyahu has come

22:46

out and said that he believes the creation

22:48

of the Palestinian Authority was a mistake, that

22:50

nothing in Gaza can be given back to

22:53

them, that there is not a sufficient difference

22:55

between them and Hamas. So

22:58

what do you understand is happening now? I

23:00

mean, I was reading back and preparing for this,

23:02

and I read this 2019 piece by

23:04

Commanders for Israel Security that, again, the group

23:06

you're part of, that was talking about Gaza.

23:09

And it warned then that, quote, a

23:11

military-only approach may lead to the reoccupation

23:13

of the Gaza Strip and to Israel's

23:15

retaking control over its 2 million residents

23:18

with no exit strategy in sight. Is

23:21

that not where Israel is now? Absolutely.

23:25

That's exactly where we are right now. Let

23:28

us assume the IDF,

23:30

the Israeli Defense Forces, are

23:32

able to accomplish the mission of

23:36

undoing Hamas

23:38

governance and

23:40

ability to threaten Israel by

23:44

demolishing its military capabilities.

23:47

We're not there yet, and I'm not

23:49

sure we'll get there for reasons that are not

23:51

up to us. Okay? We

23:54

do not have the time before

23:56

the international community says stop in

23:59

order to accomplish this objective, but let's assume that we

24:01

did. The

24:03

morning after strategy in

24:06

Washington as well as elsewhere,

24:08

including among commanders, commanders

24:10

for Israel security in Israel, we

24:13

all reached the same conclusion. The

24:15

only solution that

24:17

will allow Israel to exit the

24:20

Gaza Strip is the Palestinian

24:22

Authority. Now, nobody

24:24

is naive and nobody assumes, as you

24:26

said correctly, that the Palestinian

24:29

Authority in its current miserable state can

24:32

hardly control the West Bank, let alone Gaza.

24:36

And it will take years before

24:38

the PA can be

24:40

rehabilitated, revitalized, and

24:42

its symbolic role becomes substantive, and

24:45

it really runs the Gaza Strip. And

24:49

besides, it cannot walk

24:51

into Gaza on the shoulders

24:53

of the Israeli tank. It

24:56

will lose all credibility if it

24:58

does. And therefore, there's the need

25:00

for an interim something, some

25:03

third party interim arrangement

25:06

under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority.

25:09

And two, it's all within

25:11

the context of

25:13

a political horizon. What

25:17

they need initially, knowing

25:19

that the PA is incapable of doing

25:22

the job, they need the

25:24

PA to grant legitimacy to

25:27

whatever third party walks

25:29

into Gaza when the

25:32

IDF is phased out. It

25:34

has to be invited by the PA. It

25:37

has to be coordinated with the PA. Funding

25:40

for rehabilitation should go through the PA.

25:43

And here the Prime Minister, as you correctly

25:45

quoted, says, no,

25:48

no PA. No PA, there's

25:50

nobody. There's

25:52

nobody. And therefore, if

25:55

indeed he and this

25:58

government last for

26:00

more than a few months than

26:03

the prospects of

26:05

a prolonged Israeli occupation

26:08

of Gaza and need to

26:11

manage not just security

26:15

but civil affairs to

26:17

run the lives of 2.3 million

26:19

Palestinians from street

26:22

cleaning to schools and hospitals and

26:24

what have you seem

26:27

frighteningly realistic. We

26:29

say frightening but why would Israel not just do

26:31

that? Why would it not just decide, well it's

26:34

occupied and run Gaza before? It is

26:37

not trust that leaving it to the

26:39

PA to say nothing of

26:41

Hamas will keep it

26:43

safe. There are more

26:45

right-wing figures in Israel who want Israel to

26:47

run Gaza because they feel that that is

26:49

part of Israel attaining full control

26:52

over what they think of as greater Israel. So

26:55

why not just keep it? Why would that not

26:57

be what the Israeli government decides to do or

26:59

wants to do or if it does try to do

27:02

that why would you oppose that decision? We've

27:04

been there. We've been there

27:06

both in Gaza but another example is

27:09

an Israeli government that

27:11

instructed the IDF to

27:13

go into Lebanon for 48 hours and

27:18

it took a very courageous prime

27:20

minister named Ehud Barak to

27:23

get us out 18 years later. Prime

27:27

Minister Sharon who

27:29

took us out of Gaza in 2005 didn't do it

27:34

as a gesture to

27:36

the Palestinian Authority or Hamas. He

27:39

did it because the price of staying there was

27:42

far too high for

27:44

the Israeli public to be willing to

27:47

continue paying. He did

27:49

it the wrong way. He did it unilaterally.

27:52

He allowed Hamas to take credit for it

27:54

and that helped Hamas win the elections

27:57

thereafter. Never mind that. Palestinian

28:00

generation on the West Bank, the

28:03

popularity of Hamas is sky-high.

28:05

Why is that

28:08

so? Why wasn't it the case 10 years

28:10

ago? Why is that so? Because

28:13

Hamas seems the only one who

28:16

can do something about the Israeli occupation. They

28:20

supported the Palestinian Authority as

28:22

long as the Oslo process seemed

28:26

vibrant, seemed to offer

28:28

an end to

28:30

the occupation. But

28:33

to one generation after another of

28:35

Palestinians witness

28:37

an endless situation

28:40

that they want to put an end to. So

28:43

if negotiations or

28:45

moderation like the Palestinian Authority

28:47

is not rewarded, then

28:50

we'll go for an armed struggle. Sure,

28:53

if I were under occupation, I

28:55

would go for an armed struggle. So

28:59

it's not that I justify Hamas, God

29:01

forbid, but I blame

29:03

us for teaching

29:05

Palestinians the wrong lesson. For

29:08

a decade, Netanyahu policy was

29:11

to reward Hamas

29:14

after every round of violence.

29:17

More concessions, more easing

29:19

of the closure after every

29:22

round of violence. And at the

29:24

same time, the Palestinian Authority that

29:27

is being praised by the

29:29

Israeli security establishment for fighting

29:31

Hamas on the West Bank is

29:34

being choked in so many ways

29:37

rather than unable

29:40

to flourish. So yes,

29:42

we taught Palestinian a lesson that

29:45

the only language we understand is the

29:47

language of Hamas. I

29:49

can't myself imagine the fury of Gazans right

29:52

now, right? I can imagine many ways of

29:54

fury of Israelis. I know more Israelis, I'm

29:56

Jewish myself. But

29:58

when I look at the death toll... When

30:00

I look at the displacement, when I

30:02

look at the destruction, when I

30:04

look at how many people have lost

30:06

how much homes and family members and

30:08

jobs and livelihoods, I

30:12

think of what comes after this.

30:15

I mean, it's not like the population of

30:17

Gaza was well disposed to

30:19

Israelis before. But

30:23

it does seem to me that it

30:25

is hard to imagine the desire

30:28

for vengeance, for recapturing

30:30

just of dignity that

30:32

will follow this. And

30:34

one thing I really don't hear is

30:36

any theory of

30:39

what is to be done

30:41

with that, how that will in any way

30:43

be calmed or given

30:46

space or recognition. I

30:49

mean, this has always been bad, but I

30:51

think that there is a recognition

30:54

internationally, but also domestically in

30:56

Israel and in America, of

30:59

the power of Israeli grief after

31:01

10-7. And

31:03

I don't see any recognition of

31:05

the power of Palestinian grief, but

31:08

there is certainly a tsunami of

31:10

it building. How

31:13

do you think about that? First,

31:16

I completely agree with you. I

31:20

think that the consequences are

31:22

devastating. I think

31:24

the human misery in Gaza, I

31:26

can't even begin

31:28

to imagine how people feel. I

31:32

felt mistakes have

31:34

consequences. Let me put it this

31:36

way. I

31:39

have a lot of complaints to

31:42

all third parties. But

31:45

as an Israeli, I

31:47

channel my primary complaints

31:50

to my own government. With

31:53

all due respect to the others, mine

31:56

is supposed to serve my as a... Israeli

32:00

patriots' best interests,

32:03

the security, the well-being, and the future of

32:06

the country. We

32:08

hold most of the cards vis-à-vis Gaza and

32:11

vis-à-vis the West Bank. And

32:14

when we play our cards wrong, the

32:17

consequences are the ones

32:19

that you described. A

32:22

wrong policy of 15 years may

32:26

take 15 years to rectify. I

32:28

don't know. I have no idea.

32:31

We are in uncharted territory. This is all

32:33

unprecedented. Everything that has

32:35

happened over the last year, the

32:39

10 months of the

32:41

attempt by Netanyahu for a judicial

32:44

coup against democracy in

32:46

the country, the

32:48

response to it, unprecedented

32:51

demonstrations, the

32:54

enormous trauma of

32:56

10-7. When

32:58

it turns out that the government didn't

33:00

exist the morning after October

33:03

7th, and the

33:05

needs of the population were

33:07

met by the

33:09

same groups that protested the government

33:12

a few days earlier, all

33:15

of it is unprecedented, as is the

33:18

devastation of Gaza.

33:23

So when you deal with

33:26

something that is unprecedented, you don't have something

33:28

to fall back on and say, well,

33:32

this is how it's going to happen, how it's

33:34

going to transform. I have no idea. The

33:36

only thing that I can do

33:40

is try to advocate a different

33:43

course that I believe

33:45

that eventually will lead

33:47

to a different reality. This

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let's create. There

34:50

is a way in which it,

34:53

I think it's simply true

34:55

that a huge number of people,

34:58

Gaza specifically, but not only, Israelis

35:01

too, have paid

35:03

an unimaginable price for, among

35:05

other things, a tremendous intelligence

35:07

failure. I'd been following

35:10

the reporting on this and, you know, early

35:12

on it said that things like, Well,

35:14

people could see Hamas training exercises and,

35:17

you know, they had heard some chatter.

35:20

But more recently the reporting has been

35:22

that the Israeli intelligence services had gotten

35:24

their hands on functionally the plan here.

35:28

Somebody, somehow, had gotten Hamas's description

35:30

for planning something very much like

35:32

this. And this had been sent

35:34

up the chain and was dismissed

35:37

as aspirational, that they would never attempt something

35:39

like this. And then when they saw training

35:42

exercises that looked like the plan they already

35:44

had, they reported that and said,

35:46

This sure seems like they're training

35:48

to do the thing that we got

35:50

this information that they want to do.

35:54

And that was also dismissed. And

35:56

it actually seems kind of staggering to me.

36:00

that was not able to hone

36:02

its own intelligence correctly, to hear what its

36:04

intelligence was saying to it, is

36:07

still the one prosecuting this

36:10

war, and is still

36:12

trusted to know what the right response is. Because

36:14

it feels like there's this

36:16

alternative reality we could be living in, where the

36:19

right analysts were listened

36:21

to, and the relevant

36:23

IDF forces weren't pulled out of Gaza

36:25

to protect West Bank settlers. And

36:28

10-7 doesn't happen, or it happens at

36:30

a very, very, very limited scale. And

36:33

we're living in a very different reality today.

36:36

I'm curious how the politics of Israel are

36:38

absorbing these kinds of reports. Because when I

36:41

read this piece in The Times, and have

36:43

seen it reported elsewhere, I

36:45

was genuinely shocked. Yeah,

36:49

certainly. All the

36:51

heads of the security establishment

36:54

relevant to intelligence, the

36:56

chief of staff, the head

36:58

of the Shin Bet, the head of the IDF

37:01

military intelligence, all

37:03

of them took responsibility. The

37:06

one who repeatedly refuses to take

37:08

responsibility is the prime minister. So

37:11

that's one thing that happened. He's politicking

37:13

the war, preparing

37:16

for the investigation commission

37:18

the day after, preparing

37:20

his alibi, and doing almost

37:23

exclusively politics. The

37:25

reaction of the public is interesting. You

37:28

have something close to 80% of the public that

37:30

want him to go. There

37:32

is an overwhelming consensus

37:35

in the country that he has

37:37

to go. I ascribe

37:39

it not to

37:41

politics and not to

37:43

hate, but to

37:46

a healthy Jewish

37:48

survival instinct. If

37:52

you cannot trust the

37:55

prime minister to

37:57

conduct the war. with

38:01

exclusively national security

38:04

interest in mind. If

38:07

anybody in the public and so

38:09

many do suspect him of

38:11

a conflict of interest, of

38:15

injecting his legal

38:17

predicament, he should go. Even

38:21

if all those who are suspecting him are

38:24

wrong. But the very

38:26

fact that he gave them the

38:29

possibility of

38:31

even suspecting the Prime Minister

38:34

to conduct a war with a

38:36

conflict of interest, he

38:39

must go. I

38:42

want to pull out something you're saying there, because if you're

38:44

in Netanyahu, when

38:47

this war ends, you have a

38:49

series of quite, I think, terrifying

38:51

things waiting for you. First

38:53

is it you either resign or very likely

38:55

are defeated in disgrace who go

38:58

down to see Prime Minister who allowed this to

39:00

happen. You have, as

39:02

you mentioned, legal troubles, corruption investigations that could

39:04

leave you in jail. And

39:07

you have the end of your legacy.

39:09

I mean, Netanyahu, of course, understands himself

39:11

in a certain way and

39:14

does not want his final act to

39:17

be falling on the sword. For

39:19

this, does not want this to be the way he goes

39:21

down in history. And so I think if

39:23

you're him, he has a

39:25

real incentive to keep this going, to keep ratcheting

39:27

up the threat, to

39:30

keep holding himself up as a wartime leader

39:32

in the hopes that something about his conduct

39:35

in the war will change the

39:37

public's perception of him. And

39:40

Israel, the elections are

39:42

not the way they work in the U.S.

39:44

They're not cleanly scheduled in the same fashion.

39:48

And so the fact that he's the incentive

39:50

to potentially extend the war, he

39:52

also has something of the power to do it. So

39:55

what checks are there on him? I

39:58

share the suspicions. in

40:00

the analysis that you

40:02

so eloquently put out, I

40:05

was hoping, and I still am, that

40:09

the combination of

40:12

the two former chiefs of staff, Benny

40:15

Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot,

40:18

having joined the war cabinet,

40:22

and the fact that

40:24

they and the

40:26

defence establishment will

40:29

prevent irrelevant

40:32

considerations from affecting

40:34

decisions. That

40:36

was my hope. It still

40:38

is. I am beginning

40:41

to doubt that he is

40:43

not more sophisticated than all of them. We may

40:45

end up paying a price

40:48

for not insisting as a public on

40:52

him gone when

40:54

faithful decisions are made every day,

40:57

literally every day. So

41:01

I'm counting on Gantz

41:04

and Eisenkot and

41:07

the professionals at the

41:09

top of the IDF

41:11

and Mossad and Shin Bet

41:15

to see to it that

41:19

there's no mischief in

41:22

national security decision-making. Because

41:25

the system is very different there, for those

41:28

unfamiliar with it, how does an election happen

41:30

in Israel? What has to happen for

41:32

the Israeli public to have the opportunity to replace

41:35

Netanyahu? Whether

41:38

the Knesset runs its course for

41:40

years and then its

41:42

predetermined date, which

41:45

rarely happens in Israel in Israeli

41:47

politics, I don't remember

41:49

the last government that lasted that long,

41:53

or the Knesset votes itself out,

41:57

any elections are called for, or the

41:59

price of Prime Minister resigns and

42:03

with him the Knesset is

42:05

dismissed. But you

42:07

don't need elections to

42:09

have an alternative coalition. In

42:12

our system, it is

42:14

called constructive

42:16

non-confidence. If

42:20

a majority of the Knesset, which is 61

42:22

or more, votes

42:26

for another Prime Minister,

42:28

then a new coalition is formed. So

42:32

if today the opposition in the

42:34

Knesset is

42:37

56, which is five short

42:40

of the 61 minimum, theoretically

42:46

if you have five members of the Likud who say,

42:48

you know what, Bibi really got a go and

42:52

we are joining the constructive non-confidence

42:54

vote, then

42:56

Beni Gantz or Yairi Lapid or someone

42:58

else from the Likud may

43:01

form an alternative coalition without Netanyahu. Now

43:05

I'm presenting it more easy

43:08

than it really is in real life,

43:11

but others might bring down the government,

43:14

including some of his coalition partners

43:17

who see him collapsing in the

43:19

polls and the gentleman

43:21

who used to be the greatest asset, the

43:24

greatest political asset, is

43:26

becoming a great liability and

43:29

they are beginning to distance themselves from him,

43:32

distinguish themselves from his

43:35

policy and they

43:37

might bring the government down, including

43:40

one of the two lunatics, Smotrich

43:43

or Benghveer. Of the two,

43:46

my money is more Benghveer because

43:48

he is

43:50

both a strict thug,

43:53

not really an ideologue, he's

43:57

out for himself and

43:59

he fails. thinks that he's losing votes now

44:02

to Smotrich, who as

44:04

Minister of Finance is

44:06

implementing his horrible agenda.

44:09

While all eyes are on Gaza and

44:12

Lebanon, he

44:14

is doing horrible things on the

44:16

West Bank in implementing the

44:19

agenda, as you said, that he wrote in 2017,

44:21

his plan for making sure that

44:26

there is no two-state solution and that

44:28

there is one-state solution of

44:31

a close-to-apartheid nature where

44:34

Palestinians are deprived of the

44:36

right to vote for the Knesset. So

44:39

he has no reason to leave

44:41

because while everybody is busy, he's

44:43

doing his thing and

44:45

he's promoting his agenda in

44:48

a very impressive way, frighteningly

44:50

so. But Benkler

44:52

has already indicated to Netanyahu,

44:55

in more ways than one, that

44:58

he's distancing himself, distinguishing himself, and

45:00

if Netanyahu does something that

45:02

provides him with an excuse that

45:05

his base would applaud,

45:07

he's out. So

45:10

when you said a few minutes ago that

45:12

you think within a few months Netanyahu will

45:14

be out, that is the pathway you see,

45:16

that it's this sort of constructive alternative approach?

45:19

I'm less presumptuous than that. I

45:22

can see various scenarios and

45:25

I have no idea which one of them

45:27

will materialize. And

45:30

I see the driver,

45:34

unless it happens this way,

45:36

the way I described it, internal

45:38

Knesset by its own dynamics,

45:43

the driver might be double

45:45

the number of Israelis in the streets,

45:48

double the number that we had last year, I'm

45:51

sorry, earlier this year, when

45:53

we used to have anywhere between 250, 300,000 on every

45:56

Saturday night. which

46:00

is huge for a country

46:02

our size, it will double.

46:05

And it will not be led by the

46:07

leadership of the protest against

46:10

the judicial coup, but

46:13

rather by the families of

46:16

the victims and

46:19

the hostages of

46:22

October 7th. So

46:25

there's no doubt that a majority of Israelis

46:27

see 10-7 as a failure

46:29

of the government, a failure of Netanyahu, but

46:32

do they see it the way you do, as

46:34

a failure of the last

46:36

15 years of Israeli

46:38

drift towards the right

46:41

or towards apathy on Palestine?

46:45

Do they see it as an indictment

46:48

of facing to try to find some other

46:50

kind of solution, or

46:52

is it a view that we just need tougher security

46:54

and we need a more competent government, we should never

46:56

have missed the intelligence, right? You can imagine a way

46:59

this could be interpreted that says all

47:01

we got wrong was incompetence. It was

47:03

not a structural mistake that

47:05

should make us reengage with

47:07

a very different policy towards

47:09

Palestinians. I believe

47:11

that there are three layers to public

47:14

sentiment. Layer

47:16

one was

47:18

pre-October 7th, and

47:22

that was when you had a situation

47:24

when 60-65% of the public

47:28

opposed the judicial coup, and

47:31

Likud was declining in the polls.

47:35

You know that 60-65% in Israel is not the left. The

47:40

residual left is

47:42

negligible. 65%

47:45

bites deep into

47:47

the moderate right. And

47:50

that was one layer of people

47:52

were frightened by

47:55

the efforts to undermine our

47:58

democracy, visibly

48:00

in the service of

48:04

agendas that came

48:06

from the far fringes of

48:08

Israeli society, the most outrageous

48:12

of homophobic, of

48:15

annexationist, of messianic,

48:18

of anti-Arab, including Israeli

48:21

Arab citizens, of

48:23

anti-women, you name it.

48:25

The whole coalition of the

48:28

fringes that was brought together only

48:30

because they had one common denominator. They

48:34

were willing to provide Netanyahu

48:37

with legislated way out of

48:39

his legal predicament in return

48:41

for him allowing them to

48:44

pursue their crazy respective

48:47

agendas. All of

48:49

them needed the Supreme Court to be weakened,

48:52

so that was the initial common denominator,

48:55

of them all. So that was one

48:57

layer of where

48:59

this change from

49:02

Bibi king, which he was,

49:06

to selfish selling

49:09

us out, Bibi, came.

49:13

The second was the impact

49:15

of October 7, the

49:18

day, the occasion. Finally

49:21

it was Bibi build

49:23

the Hamas. This

49:26

monster was the

49:28

product of a

49:30

policy, deliberate policy, of

49:33

funding Hamas, $35 million

49:38

a month, coming in

49:40

suitcases. Every election

49:42

eve you said the previous

49:45

government failed to destroy Hamas,

49:47

you will. Then

49:50

you come to office time and time and time

49:52

again and you created that monster. So

49:54

that was October 7, that layer 2. Layer

49:58

3 is since... October

50:00

7th, when

50:04

it turned out that

50:06

not a single government

50:08

ministry was

50:11

able to rise to the occasion of

50:14

performing its duties for

50:18

the devastated population from the south,

50:21

from those evacuated from

50:23

the north, nothing.

50:28

It was all voluntary organizations

50:31

that organized the hotels

50:34

for those whose homes were burned

50:36

in the south and

50:39

for those evacuated from the north that

50:41

arranged for them. They left their homes

50:43

with nothing, everything burned. Clothes,

50:46

food, medicine, they organized

50:49

search and rescue in

50:52

day one, two, and three. They

50:55

brought in geniuses of high tech

50:58

to develop on the spot an

51:01

app that

51:04

searched and rescued people. They

51:06

organized the teams that went to the

51:08

field to

51:10

find those hiding somewhere.

51:13

You can't imagine

51:15

the magnitude of voluntary

51:19

energy that

51:22

rose to the occasion. And suddenly

51:25

people realize that

51:27

when a prime minister appoint

51:31

incompetent ministers

51:33

just because of loyalty and

51:35

legal problems and

51:38

those ministers appoint their

51:41

own hacks to

51:43

run their ministries and

51:46

they castrate the professionals.

51:50

And when this goes on for year

51:52

after year after year, then the

51:55

professionals get tired

51:59

of suggesting legitimate

52:02

proposals, reforms, whatever.

52:06

So suddenly the realization

52:08

of how his leadership

52:13

deformed the entire

52:15

government structure sunk

52:18

in. There is a

52:21

cumulative sense that

52:24

he is responsible for a major disaster

52:27

and therefore must go. When

52:30

you look at polls, his most likely successor

52:32

is Benny Gantz. How

52:34

does Gantz differ with Netanyahu in

52:38

his broad approach to Palestinian issues?

52:40

I would say

52:42

that Gantz

52:45

shares the

52:47

ideas promoted by

52:49

commanders for Israel security. Now

52:53

it tells you that once a

52:55

person is exposed to

52:58

national security at the highest ranks,

53:01

with very few exceptions, they

53:04

reach the same conclusions. It's

53:07

no brainer. If

53:09

we don't separate from the Palestinians, we're doomed.

53:12

There are seven million Jews between

53:15

the Mediterranean and the Jordan River and

53:17

seven million Arabs. Either

53:20

they separate or the

53:22

Zionist dream is over. So

53:25

the question is how to do it. How

53:28

to do it in a secure way, in a

53:30

careful way, with all kinds

53:32

of safety valves

53:35

in case things go wrong and so on.

53:38

So Benny Gantz shared

53:40

the same ideas. So

53:42

my question is not where is his heart or where

53:44

is his mind. The

53:46

question I ask myself is,

53:49

is he the leader to make it happen?

53:53

And I,

53:55

having watched so many leaders close

53:59

by and from a distance, we

54:02

cannot predict until one

54:04

is tested. He

54:07

has not been tested yet. If he

54:10

makes it to the premier ship, that

54:13

will be the moment that we will find out

54:16

if he is the one that will steer

54:18

the ship in

54:20

a reverse direction from where it is headed

54:23

now. I think one

54:25

question that brings up is whether or not,

54:27

forget the long-term horizon of a

54:30

two-state solution, the short-term horizon of

54:32

a revitalized Palestinian authority, a more

54:35

open and humane policy is what people want.

54:37

I mean, go all the way and you

54:39

know this history so much better than I

54:41

ever will. But after the

54:43

Oslo Accords, this moment of great hope, Rabin

54:46

is assassinated by a right-wing extremist

54:48

and then Shimon Peres, who is

54:51

your boss, loses the

54:53

election a few months later to Netanyahu.

54:56

Power has traded back and forth for some time, but now Netanyahu

54:58

has been back in power for quite some time,

55:00

returning again later on with a

55:03

very right-wing government. And

55:05

there's an argument that I hear from Palestinians

55:07

that the Israeli people don't want this. The

55:10

Israeli public reveals what it wants by

55:12

who it votes for and it has

55:14

repeatedly voted for Netanyahu and has been

55:17

accepting of even more right-wing

55:19

versions of Netanyahu than we initially saw. And

55:21

if you look at polls of young Israeli

55:23

Jews, they are more radical

55:25

and more conservative and more dismissive of

55:27

a two-state solution. How do

55:30

you see that side of it, the actual question

55:32

of what the Israeli public wants? You

55:36

know, commanders, we've been, for

55:38

quite a few years, we've been

55:41

commissioning public opinion polls for

55:43

ourselves to study the issues.

55:46

And since October 7th,

55:49

we've been discussing this with

55:52

a group that we trust in terms

55:54

of polling on a weekly basis

55:57

to try and understand what's the effect of

55:59

the trauma. is on Israeli

56:01

public opinion. I'd like

56:03

to say the following. First, in

56:06

a macro approach, over

56:08

the years, the

56:10

conclusion that Israelis

56:12

are sliding to the right on the

56:14

Palestinian issue was

56:17

an optical illusion. People

56:20

took voting patterns to

56:24

represent positions on issues, and

56:27

it has not been the case for many,

56:29

many years. Israelis

56:32

did not vote the Palestinian

56:34

issue. Israelis

56:36

voted primarily BBS, BBNO,

56:40

and maybe economy. The

56:43

Palestinian issue was number six in the minds

56:45

of the voter when he

56:47

entered the polling booth. And

56:50

you know better than I

56:52

that number six and number

56:55

five and number four and number three don't

56:58

determine one's voting

57:00

decision at the polls.

57:02

It's the number one and maybe two. Israelis

57:06

had good reasons to vote

57:08

for Netanyahu, who is a

57:10

master politician and an

57:13

exceptional campaigner with

57:15

whom I disagree on everything. But

57:17

I can understand why people

57:20

would vote for him more than

57:22

for his competitor. But

57:24

when you check positions on

57:27

the issues, you will

57:29

find at least a

57:31

plurality, if not a

57:33

majority, depends on the circumstances

57:35

and atmosphere of the time, of

57:38

the four options on

57:41

the Palestinian issue, which

57:43

are annexation, status

57:45

quo, civil

57:47

separation without a deal with

57:51

security control and

57:53

two-state solution. You

57:55

will find at least a plurality and mostly

57:57

a majority for the

57:59

two pregnancies. And

58:01

this is consistent for years. Now,

58:04

you ask them, how likely is this to happen

58:06

in your lifetime? And they

58:08

will tell you, no, it's not. Mostly

58:12

because the other side is not a partner. And

58:15

you have a mirror imaging of that on the Palestinian

58:17

side. It's not going to happen because of

58:19

the Israelis. But if we

58:21

had Israeli leadership that will

58:23

go for it, that decides

58:26

that for Israel's future we

58:29

have to separate from the Palestinians, they

58:32

will have a majority support for it. So

58:36

I don't believe that the

58:38

problem is the public, nor

58:40

do I believe that the core

58:42

issues of security,

58:45

settlements, Jerusalem, borders,

58:48

refugees are

58:51

insurmountable. I

58:53

think the problem is leadership. I

58:56

think that is the place to end. Always

58:58

our final question. What are three books you'd

59:00

recommend to the audience? I

59:03

was thinking of two books that are relevant to the moment. One

59:07

is CIA director,

59:10

William Bill Burns, The

59:13

Back Channel, which

59:15

is memoirs of

59:18

an exceptional diplomat,

59:22

but more than that. The

59:25

Lessons of the Importance

59:28

of Diplomacy, The

59:31

Failures Not to Deploy It, and

59:34

the Successes When It Is

59:36

Deployed Rightfully. The

59:38

second one, we just

59:40

mourned the passing of Henry

59:42

Kissinger, who

59:45

invented shuttle diplomacy, or

59:47

at least he invented the title of

59:49

shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Martin

59:53

Indic wrote an

59:55

exceptionally good book called

59:58

The Master of the Game. Henry

1:00:00

Kissinger and the art of Middle East diplomacy.

1:00:04

Nimrod Novik, thank you very much. Thank

1:00:06

you. This

1:00:19

episode of the Israel Clancho is produced

1:00:21

by Roland Hu. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris

1:00:23

with Mary-Marge Locker and Kate Sinclair. Our

1:00:25

senior engineer is Jeff Geld. Our senior

1:00:28

editor is Claire Gordon. The show's production

1:00:30

team also includes Emma Falgowu, Andy Galvin,

1:00:32

Roland Hu and Kristen Lin. Original music

1:00:34

by Isaac Jones. Audience strategy by Kristina

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Samuluski and Shannon Buska. The executive producer

1:00:38

of New York Times opinion audio is

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Andy Rose Strasser. And special thanks to

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