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today. From
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New York Times Opinion, this is The
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Ezra Klein Show. Hey,
0:56
it is Ezra. I'm thrilled
0:58
today to have this fantastic conversation from
1:00
my colleague at Times Opinion, the co-host
1:03
of Matter of Opinion, our cousin podcast,
1:05
Lydia Palgreen, on one of the other
1:07
foreign affairs stories we've wanted to cover
1:09
more and that deserves a lot
1:12
of attention, which is rising illiberalism in India.
1:23
Fifteen years ago, I moved to New Delhi as a
1:25
correspondent for The New York Times. It
1:27
was a heady moment. After years of uncertain
1:29
growth, the country seemed primed for a kind
1:31
of rapid economic expansion that could vault its
1:34
billion-plus people out of poverty, just as China
1:36
had. But unlike China, India
1:38
was a boisterous beacon of democracy,
1:40
secularism, and freedom. India
1:42
today has fulfilled a lot of the promises I heard when
1:44
I was there. It became
1:46
the world's most populous country this year. According
1:49
to the World Bank, India's economy is one of the fastest
1:51
growing in the world. The country
1:53
even hosted the G20 in September. At
1:55
the same time, there's been a clear erosion of
1:58
democracy. The state has stoked violence. against
2:00
religious minorities, Prime Minister
2:02
Narendra Modi and his administration, have
2:04
silenced both critics and independent institutions.
2:07
And Indian government officials have been linked
2:09
to two assassination plots against Sikh activists
2:11
in Canada and the United States, a
2:14
pretty stunning diplomatic scandal that puts new
2:16
stress on India's relationship with the West.
2:19
So looking back in 2023, it's
2:21
clear that India has risen, but not quite
2:23
in the way we necessarily expected. So
2:26
I asked Pratap Banu Mehta to walk me through what
2:28
has happened to Indian democracy and what it means for
2:30
the rest of the world. Mehta
2:32
is a professor at Princeton University. He
2:35
has written widely on political theory and is the
2:37
author of The Burden of Democracy. He
2:39
has a regular column at the Indian Express where
2:42
he makes sense of Indian and global affairs. We
2:45
talked back in early October, but I think his
2:47
insights have only become more relevant. As
2:50
always, you can email the show at
2:52
Ezra Klein show at nytimes.com. Here's
2:54
Pratap Banu Mehta. Pratap
3:00
Banu Mehta, wonderful to be here with you.
3:03
Thank you very much. It's wonderful to see you as well.
3:06
So it's been a while. You
3:08
know, I lived in Delhi from 2009 to 2013. And
3:10
in that time, you
3:14
were really an indispensable guide for me in
3:17
trying to understand the extraordinary place that
3:19
is India. I'm just curious, how's life
3:21
for you in India these days? Well,
3:24
there's never a dull moment in India. That's
3:27
for sure. You know, it's a
3:29
cliche about India that you always experience India as
3:31
a paradox. And I think the paradox of this
3:33
moment is clearly India's
3:35
political significance, economic significance,
3:39
cultural creativity is kind of as
3:41
vibrant as ever. On
3:43
the other hand, the science for Indian
3:45
democracy are looking very ominous indeed. I
3:48
co edited a big Oxford Handbook of the Indian
3:50
Constitution. I have to say now when I go
3:52
to class, I say I cannot tell you what
3:54
the Constitution of India is. I
3:56
cannot tell you if you go with the habeas corpus
3:58
case to the Supreme Court. Court, whether it will
4:01
be heard. I cannot
4:03
tell you when opposition politicians
4:05
are being targeted by
4:07
the government for tax reasons, they will
4:09
actually get the same fair relief from
4:11
the Supreme Court. So
4:13
there is a sense of kind of dread
4:16
about where this democracy is heading. And I
4:18
think we have to register both of those kind of
4:21
emotions at the same time. We're going
4:23
to talk a lot about democracy. It's
4:25
a sort of line that we all
4:27
hear. India is the world's largest democracy.
4:29
It's been a democracy almost without interruption
4:32
since its independence. That sort of uniqueness
4:34
and boldness of the experiment. I mean,
4:36
you cannot visit India and not be
4:39
profoundly moved by what is
4:41
being attempted. I mean, I'm wary
4:43
of exceptionalism, but you know, I
4:45
think never in human history has
4:47
a more ambitious experiment in coexistence
4:49
through government by common
4:52
consent been attempted. So maybe
4:54
a good place to start is just to ground
4:56
us in some history. Tell me a
4:58
little bit about the history of India
5:01
as a democracy and what
5:03
India has had to learn from being the
5:05
world's largest democracy. Look,
5:07
I mean, Indian elections were probably more important
5:09
to us than religions. And I think there
5:11
still remain. I mean, there's a certain kind
5:13
of vibrancy, a
5:16
sense of diversity
5:18
dealing with difference. And
5:21
I think India's nationalist movement's greatness
5:23
was that it actually recognized that
5:26
the only way you could hold India together
5:29
was if it was a
5:31
product of widespread consensus across
5:34
religions, across communities, across caste,
5:36
across classes. I think
5:38
that was in a sense, I think it's
5:40
instinctive grasp of what democracy is. So
5:43
one story you can tell about Indian democracy is
5:45
that a lot of the
5:47
constituent parts or groups in society don't
5:50
actually have to be democratic. I mean, they
5:53
can be internally sometimes quite intolerant, they can
5:55
be quite conservative. And yet
5:57
the balance of social power among
6:00
amongst groups, amongst caste, regions,
6:03
is such that no single group
6:06
or no single identity can hope
6:08
to dominate without generating
6:10
some kind of resistance and backlash.
6:14
And we always used to say
6:16
that India's politics was fated to
6:18
a certain kind of centrism, precisely
6:20
for this reason, that there wasn't going
6:23
to ever be a single identity force
6:26
that could command sufficient
6:28
power to be able to govern India
6:30
as a whole. In fact, the joke used to
6:32
be that any party that governed India would have
6:34
to look like the Congress party, or maybe a
6:37
better version of the Congress party. The Congress party,
6:39
the party that was started
6:41
by Mahatma Gandhi, and just give us a little
6:43
bit of the history of the Congress party. Well,
6:45
it was actually started by, I mean, officially its
6:47
founder is A.O. Hume. But
6:49
it's Mahatma Gandhi that actually gave the
6:51
party its modern form. He converted that
6:53
party into a mass movement, and
6:56
really of extraordinary portions, what
6:58
he managed to do, I think quite significantly, was not
7:01
just forge a mass movement, but
7:03
create an imagination of modern
7:06
India, where each of
7:08
its constituent parts would find
7:10
its fullest expression. So
7:12
for example, he was a political genius.
7:14
Each state had a linguistic unit, which
7:16
then became the basis for how India
7:18
dealt with the language question later on.
7:21
We created this brilliant compromise that
7:23
there would be official linked language
7:26
English, aspirationally, Hindi
7:28
as a kind of national language, but
7:31
each state would be able to
7:33
use their own language, Tamil, Bengali,
7:35
so on and so forth, Malayalam. And
7:38
it avoided the fate of so
7:40
many postcolonial countries that
7:42
experienced civil wars or got divided on
7:44
the basis of language. And
7:46
I think that really was an
7:49
extraordinary political innovation. It
7:51
was an anti-colonial movement, but
7:53
it was an enormously cosmopolitan
7:55
movement in its aspirations, founded
7:58
in a much more authentic. perception of
8:00
rights, free expression, recognizing
8:03
individuality and dignity, and
8:06
a pursuit of politics through nonviolent
8:08
means, which is not an insignificant
8:10
contribution in the context
8:12
of so many postcolonial movements. India was
8:14
one of the few nationalist movements that
8:17
avoided both the extremes of left
8:19
violence and the extremes of right
8:22
violence. And I think
8:24
that Gandhi's an extraordinary contribution. I
8:27
think one of the remarkable things about the
8:29
Indian nationalist movement, when I compare it to
8:31
other nationalist movements, is it
8:33
is a movement for self-determination, but it
8:35
has very little resentment against the idea
8:38
of the West. In
8:40
fact, I sometimes feel that our postcolonial
8:42
movement now carries much more of a
8:44
sense of resentment than our
8:46
anti-colonial nationalist movement did. It's
8:48
interesting because for me as a correspondent, I moved
8:50
to India from West Africa. I
8:53
had been raised in East Africa and had spent
8:55
my childhood in West Africa as well. So
8:57
I had this deep sense of India
8:59
as this kind of beacon of what
9:01
a large
9:04
polyglot, multi-religious,
9:06
multi-ethnic nation could
9:08
be. And it's worth
9:10
just dwelling for a moment on the violence
9:12
and difficulty of India's birth. It was born
9:15
out of the partition of the British Raj.
9:17
It was a colony of Britain at the
9:19
time. Can you just talk
9:21
a little bit about how these ideas
9:23
came out of that experience of the
9:26
horrors of partition? I'm
9:28
glad you raised the issue of partition, which
9:30
is, I think, one of the most kind
9:32
of decisive events in modern South Asian, I
9:35
think, history. India always
9:37
thought it could be the exception
9:39
to the European experience. The process
9:42
of the formation of nation states
9:44
everywhere, including in Europe
9:46
and North America, has
9:48
been an extraordinarily violent,
9:50
exclusionary and majoritarian movement.
9:53
There is almost no exception to this, I think.
9:56
And the aspiration of the nationalist movement was that,
9:58
look, can we... forge a
10:00
new kind of identity that doesn't
10:03
repeat the mistakes of Europe. Now,
10:06
partition was the first shock to
10:08
this aspiration because in some senses,
10:10
partition was premised on
10:12
something like the European idea of a
10:14
nation state. There must be some single
10:17
identity that actually binds the nation. In
10:19
the case for the demand for Pakistan,
10:21
it's the idea of a kind of
10:23
Muslim homeland in South Asia. And
10:26
since that, since Pakistan actually came
10:28
as a deep shock to that
10:30
nationalist project, I mean, you
10:33
know, that image of Gandhi in a
10:35
sense, grieving at independence, because
10:37
he saw India's independence as a failure. It
10:39
was born out of violence. He
10:41
saw it as a rebuke to that extraordinary
10:43
project that the nationalist movement had tried to
10:46
create. And it would
10:48
have been very easy for India founders to never
10:50
said, look, India has been already
10:52
divided on religious grounds. Let
10:55
us complete the task of partition, declare
10:57
in India a Hindu state. And yes,
11:00
Muslims can live here, but we should be
11:02
absolutely no doubt that the logic of partition
11:05
is actually the creation of a Hindu state
11:07
in India. And Muslims are
11:09
the largest minority, but
11:12
they're very significant, right? I mean, what
11:14
is the percentage proportion between Hindus and
11:16
Muslims in India? It's a very sizable
11:18
minority. You're looking at about, you know,
11:20
200 million, 200 billion people. And
11:24
I think what is remarkable is that despite
11:26
partition, they actually, I think, continued with that
11:28
project of trying to create an Indian exceptionalism.
11:31
I think Jawaharlal Nehru, he was India's first
11:33
prime minister and really in some sense, the
11:35
founder of India's democracy in some ways. I
11:38
think the two deep ideas that he
11:41
had, if you read his books like Discovery of
11:43
India and stuff. So one was
11:45
this idea of India as a palimpsest
11:47
of all of the world civilizations. India
11:50
is a Hindu country. It's a Muslim country. It's
11:52
a Christian country. It's an
11:55
Asian power, but it's also an enlightenment
11:57
country. And that phrase you
11:59
use is over and over, India has
12:01
a palimpsest on which every civilization has
12:03
left a mark, but a palimpsest
12:06
which is that transformed each of those
12:08
civilizations and made it into its own.
12:11
I think that was a kind of
12:13
a deeply philosophical and I think profound
12:15
orientation to India. But
12:18
second, I think at a more practical level, that
12:21
India has such cross-cutting diversity
12:25
that if you privilege any
12:28
basis of identity as the basis
12:30
of nationhood, what
12:33
you risk is a great
12:35
deal of violence, expulsion and bloodletting.
12:37
So I think in a strange
12:40
way, partition actually just reinforce the
12:42
idea. Even what
12:44
remains of India cannot flourish
12:46
and survive unless it says
12:48
we are going to create
12:51
a kind of nation states that's very different
12:53
from anything that has happened in the world.
12:55
Yeah, you invoked Nehru and I think one
12:58
of his most famous and
13:00
historic speeches is the tryst
13:02
with destiny speech. What do
13:04
you think was India's tryst with destiny and what
13:06
is it today? Right.
13:09
So the first and most important one was
13:13
actually overcoming poverty
13:16
and the extraordinary levels
13:18
of human misery and
13:20
oppression that this
13:22
society had internally experienced,
13:24
particularly through the institution of caste.
13:27
This is the sort of the undergirding
13:29
system of people being born into a
13:31
particular community and that forming a social
13:34
hierarchy. Absolutely, a social hierarchy which you
13:36
could not escape, a social hierarchy that
13:38
was in some senses deeply
13:40
oppressive and particularly if you were at the
13:42
bottom end of that social hierarchy, Dalits,
13:44
untouchables, as we used to be called
13:46
in those days, the bottom 20%. It
13:50
really would rank up there with slavery.
13:52
I mean, we can always kind of
13:54
nuance these comparisons intellectually, but there's just
13:56
no getting around what a moral abomination
13:58
it was. In
14:00
some senses, the Indian state was embarking for the
14:02
first time on this project of saying, look,
14:05
we need a model of development
14:07
that can overcome the tyranny of
14:09
this compulsory identity that is called
14:11
caste. And so I think this
14:13
idea, which is important in the
14:15
Indian constitution of the idea of
14:18
liberty, equality, fraternity, in
14:20
conditions that are otherwise
14:22
were deemed to be inhospitable
14:24
to them, India gained
14:27
universal suffrage at
14:29
a moment where it was one of the poorest countries in
14:31
the world. So if you look at levels
14:33
of economic development at which countries get
14:35
universal suffrage, India gets it
14:37
at the lowest level of economic development. It
14:40
was one of the least educated countries in the world. And
14:43
yet this enormous hope that through constitutional
14:46
politics, you could actually overcome
14:48
this scourge of poverty and
14:50
at least social inequality. I
14:54
think the second thing that I think is very
14:56
remarkable to me about the tryst with destiny speech
14:58
and the Indian constitution and the preamble to the
15:00
Indian constitution is
15:04
God knows Nehru and the
15:06
founding generation fully understood that
15:09
God, history and identity
15:11
matter to Indians. I mean,
15:13
you can't imagine this country in some senses
15:15
without a deep religious and
15:17
spiritual engagement, without deep contestation over
15:20
history and identities proliferate. I mean,
15:22
people bear them on their sleeves.
15:25
But that in order for these
15:27
identities to flourish, in order for
15:29
that cultural heritage to come alive,
15:32
it was very important that the political
15:34
social contract not
15:36
be burdened with the weight of
15:39
God, history or identity. So
15:41
people don't feel
15:44
that they have to be
15:46
benchmarked to a
15:48
single identity or access of loyalty.
15:51
So yes, God will flourish, but God will
15:53
flourish. I mean, India's idea
15:55
of secularism wasn't that religion would be
15:57
marginalized. It would be that.
16:00
it would be put on a basis
16:03
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18:12
looking at the past few years and you
18:14
see the way in which India is sort
18:16
of meeting this kind of truce with destiny,
18:18
right? India is by most
18:20
accounts now the most populous country in the
18:22
world over out, you know, outstripping China. And
18:25
for me, the GDP expanded by 7.8% last quarter. India
18:29
hosted the G20, a very important
18:31
gathering of global leaders. And you're seeing
18:34
India kind of step up to its
18:36
place on the global stage, but it's
18:38
happening at a time when the sort
18:40
of internal contradictions and tensions is, I
18:43
think, really coming to bear. So
18:45
maybe this is a good time for us
18:48
to turn to Narendra Modi and spend some
18:50
time talking about who he is, where he
18:52
came from, and maybe focus on a couple
18:54
of key moments. And I think one key moment
18:57
for me certainly is the 2002
18:59
riots in Gujarat. So
19:04
I think the three most important
19:06
things to bear in
19:08
mind about Narendra Modi, who is an extraordinary
19:10
political figure. I mean, just as an analytical
19:13
proposition, you don't have to endorse his politics
19:15
to recognize what
19:17
a transformative figure he has
19:19
been. So the first most important
19:21
thing is that he is a
19:23
member of and
19:25
had much of his political and
19:28
cultural upbringing in
19:30
an organization called the RSS, the
19:32
Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh, which was founded
19:34
in the 1920s. And
19:38
the RSS has had one
19:40
core objective, which
19:42
is the creation
19:44
of a Hindu
19:46
political consciousness that
19:49
India has been subjugated to what they
19:51
call a thousand year period of slavery.
19:54
They regard even Mughal India, for example, as
19:56
a period of slavery. Their
20:00
political commitment is to create
20:02
a form of Hindu consciousness
20:05
and identity such that Hindus
20:07
are never subjugated again and
20:09
have a political straight and
20:11
instrument of their own. So
20:14
this straightforward political
20:17
objective has been, the Rayan Ramodi
20:19
is in a sense guiding Steehar.
20:22
Everything he does in some senses flows
20:25
from realizing this political
20:28
objective. An economic policy,
20:30
right, making India an economically developed nation
20:32
is in some senses part
20:35
of an instrument to achieve
20:37
this objective. I
20:39
think the second thing about him, which I think
20:42
in the Indian context is remarkable, is
20:44
he's a completely self-made politician
20:47
and leader. Biographically
20:49
he's from India's less
20:51
privileged caste and
20:54
had absolutely no
20:56
privileges, either economic,
20:59
social or political
21:01
that usually mark the
21:03
political careers of so many Indians. And
21:06
what this allowed him to do was two
21:08
things which are really quite central to his
21:10
success. One is
21:12
to produce a kind of instinctive
21:14
identification with large masses of people.
21:17
The political party represents the Bharti
21:19
Janta Party used to be accused
21:22
of being largely an upper caste
21:24
party or sort of privileged traders,
21:26
privileged Brahmins. He
21:28
single-handedly transformed that party
21:32
into a party that has a much
21:34
wider social base now. He managed
21:36
to run and still runs on this plank that
21:39
what kept India back, particularly over
21:41
the last 20, 30 years,
21:45
was the fact that India was
21:47
being ruled by something like a
21:49
dynastic Anshan regime. The
21:52
Congress Party was dominated by
21:54
the Nehru Gandhi family in some ways. And
21:57
so when he speaks of corruption, he doesn't...
22:00
He's not just referring to the fact that,
22:02
you know, there might have been sort of
22:04
monetary corruption. He's actually just
22:06
referring to the fact that Indian
22:08
democracy had acquired the characteristic of
22:10
being something like a closed club.
22:13
And he has in some senses opened
22:15
the gates of this politics to
22:18
ordinary Indians, to
22:20
languages they speak. So for
22:22
example, he's a very gifted orator in Hindi.
22:25
The BJP is much more comfortable in the
22:27
vernaculars than the Congress Party is. So
22:30
he would represent that old
22:32
complex as a privileged elite
22:34
with a narrow social base
22:37
against whom his kind of persona stands.
22:39
And I think
22:41
the third thing about him, which I think goes
22:44
back to his days in Gujarat, is
22:46
in Gujarat he acquired the reputation
22:48
for both being
22:50
an effective administrator on the one hand. And
22:52
the second thing, of course, he was known
22:54
for his conduct during the 2002 Gujarat riots.
22:59
What happened in these riots? This
23:01
is very contested. And
23:03
I think one has to go back to the
23:06
late 80s, early 90s, where
23:08
the Bharati Janta Party, which
23:10
Mr. Modi represents, launched
23:13
a agitation for
23:16
reclaiming what
23:18
they called was the site of the
23:20
birthplace of Lord Ram, where a mosque
23:23
had been built in the
23:25
16th century. And the BJP's demand
23:27
has been that this should in some senses be returned to
23:29
the Hindus. And they
23:31
created a mass movement. Now
23:34
what that mass movement did was
23:36
that it in a
23:38
sense created pockets of Hindu Muslim
23:40
tension all across India, because in
23:42
some senses these rallies were quite
23:45
aggressive. They really were
23:47
signposting the fact that a
23:49
Hindu movement was arriving to claim India
23:52
for Hindus. One
23:54
of the results of that mass movement was
23:56
the tearing down of the Babri Masjid. Ayodhya.
24:00
Now this movement was actually
24:03
trying to collect volunteers
24:07
and collect actually literally bricks
24:09
from different parts of India to take
24:12
to Ayodhya as a kind of symbolic
24:14
gesture of kind of building you know
24:16
these be used to build temple. Now
24:20
as this movement is going on intentions
24:22
are on the rise. A train in
24:24
Godhra was set on fire and
24:27
roughly around 50 of these volunteers
24:31
in the volunteers that were going to
24:33
Ayodhya was killed. This
24:35
immediately set off a
24:37
set of now what the BJP
24:40
would call retaliatory violence. This
24:42
violence was directed at Muslim
24:45
residents in Gujarat. Absolutely and about
24:47
2,000 people died and it was
24:49
absolutely gruesome violence. I mean it
24:51
really it's just you know it's
24:53
just it's just very hard to
24:56
describe. Yeah neighbors set upon neighbors.
24:58
Neighbors set upon each other. Now
25:01
his role so
25:03
there is a range of positions in this.
25:06
One of course holds him directly
25:08
responsible for instigating the retaliatory
25:10
violence. There was
25:13
a commission of inquiry and for
25:15
what it's worth that commission of inquiry absolved
25:19
him of that charge. I mean
25:21
that's again for what it's
25:23
worth. But we
25:26
do know in India that
25:28
if the state is committed
25:30
to stopping violence it
25:33
can actually stop it fairly quickly.
25:35
You know you can bring the
25:37
law enforcement agencies out. The
25:40
army can be called out and
25:42
I think the political question mark over
25:44
Narendra Modi whatever you think may be
25:47
the direct instructions he may or may
25:49
not have given is that
25:51
this was clearly a massive
25:55
abdication or responsibility on part
25:58
of the chief minister. state.
26:01
This violence could have been stopped and
26:03
there is no excuse, no excuse. No
26:05
matter how deep the
26:07
passions run, no matter how widespread the
26:10
desire for revenge is, there is absolutely
26:12
no excuse for the scale of violence
26:14
that actually took place in Gujarat. The
26:17
fact that he was accused of
26:20
formatting this violence by the Congress
26:22
party, he had been denied a
26:24
visa to the United States, as you know, till he
26:26
became Prime Minister. I think that
26:29
convinced him that the
26:31
entire world is a kind of gigantic
26:34
conspiracy out to get Hindus. I
26:36
mean, and that conspiratorial mindset is
26:39
actually very, very central to the
26:41
BJP analysis thinking about the rest
26:43
of the world. That somehow
26:45
there has been this global conspiracy since, you
26:47
know, I don't know, maybe 900 AD to
26:50
keep Hindus as a political community
26:52
down. And the fact
26:54
that people were accusing him of formatting this
26:56
violence was just another element in that conspiracy.
26:59
So it was completely turned on its head.
27:02
And I hate to say this,
27:04
but there is a sense in which I think
27:06
there was a significant number of Hindus who
27:09
began to radically subscribe to this
27:11
much more radical and aggressive message
27:14
that the
27:16
BJP was going to be much
27:18
more aggressive in protecting
27:22
Hindus, if you want to put it creatively, or
27:25
aggressively targeting minorities.
27:29
I think that message went out loud and
27:31
clear from that Gujarat experience. The
27:34
sense that violence can
27:36
pay long term
27:38
dividends for Hindu nationalism
27:40
as a movement. It became
27:42
a central plank of the BJP. I mean, till
27:44
2002, there always used to be this
27:49
sense that you
27:51
could not win a national election
27:54
only with the votes of Hindus. That
27:57
somehow you'd always have to stitch a broad coalition. I
28:00
think Narendra Modi managed
28:03
to convince his party, and that has
28:05
been their electoral strategy, that
28:07
they could come to power only
28:10
with Hindu votes. And in fact,
28:12
you could actually increase your share
28:14
of Hindu votes, consolidate a Hindu
28:16
constituency if you
28:18
were to clearly send a
28:20
signal that you were going
28:22
to politically marginalize Muslims.
28:25
But then 2009, there's another election. This
28:28
is the moment that I land in
28:30
India. And I think you're right that
28:32
this fire has been lit around Hindu
28:34
nationalism. But at the same time, there
28:36
was a sense that India had a,
28:38
you know, a teetotaling economist as its
28:41
prime minister, that India's tryst with destiny
28:43
is about to be fulfilled. It felt
28:45
like a moment. And the
28:47
thing that I remember particularly was a sense
28:50
that the sectarian divides
28:52
felt much less alive.
28:55
One of the first stories that I did was I actually
28:57
went to the city of Ayodhya, where the Babri
28:59
Masjid Mosque was. And it was
29:01
striking to me how the temperature at
29:03
that place was basically just, you know,
29:05
room temperature. And you had this,
29:07
you know, kind of too busy
29:10
to hate India moving forward, you
29:12
know, we're joining the global economy
29:14
where, you know, and that
29:16
was very much the vibe when I got there. And
29:19
there was a sense that Narendra Modi, no chance he could
29:21
be prime minister. The guy can't even go to the United
29:23
States. And the BJP seemed like
29:25
they were nowhere. And you
29:28
know, Congress was ascendant. And boy,
29:30
were we wrong. So
29:32
walk me through what happened. How did
29:34
Modi go from being an international pariah
29:36
to prime minister of the world's largest
29:39
democracy? I think, you know, as
29:41
I said at the beginning of the show, this
29:44
sense we had of a kind of India
29:46
fated to a certain kind of centrism actually
29:49
made all of us complacent that a
29:51
force like Narendra Modi or at least
29:53
a very radical Hindu nationalist ideology could
29:55
never be dominant or if it even
29:57
came to power, it would have to allow us to be
29:59
dominant. with other kinds of groups to
30:01
moderate its stance. So I
30:04
think what happened post 2009 is
30:06
I think a bunch of things. So
30:08
the first is of course the
30:10
2009 financial crisis globally, right, which
30:13
is a pivotal moment in
30:15
democracies across the world, because India
30:17
was going at 8%. And
30:20
it was a nice place to be
30:22
you're going at 8% the state was
30:24
getting enough resources to begin to build
30:26
out slightly more ambitious welfare state, something
30:29
Narendra Modi has then sought to accelerate.
30:33
And yet what the 2009 financial
30:35
crisis did, at least in
30:37
the Indian context was two things. One,
30:39
it actually did expose the
30:42
corruption at the heart of
30:45
that growth regime. You know, lots of
30:47
projects kind of suddenly seem unviable to
30:50
people. And there is an
30:52
anti corruption movement, which kind of paved
30:54
the way for saying, look, this
30:57
old regime, this ancient regime headed
30:59
by the Congress, this coalition government,
31:02
it may have done us some good,
31:04
but now it is a
31:06
corrupt, torturing regime. India
31:09
has a moment, an opportunity
31:11
here, but it is actually frittering
31:13
it away because of a weak
31:16
government. In fact, the slogan
31:18
Narendra Modi used was policy paralysis. So 2014,
31:20
he ran largely on
31:24
this plank, I'm going to
31:26
overcome this paralysis, I'm a strong decisive leader,
31:28
look at my record in Gujarat. And
31:31
he ran against plutocracy. But plutocracy in
31:33
this very generalized sense, you know, this
31:35
is a kind of old corrupt ancient
31:37
regime. And like I
31:40
think politics elsewhere, it was
31:42
the implosion of the alternative, the internal
31:44
implosion of the Congress Party, that
31:47
created much more of the space that
31:49
somehow it had lost this will to fight this
31:52
will to govern. There was
31:54
very little communication mass, very little mass mobilization,
31:56
it just had lost, you know, all the
31:58
kind of The
32:01
second thing that I think happened,
32:04
and this may take some explaining,
32:06
but I actually do think it
32:08
is important. So the
32:11
BJP's primary base is
32:15
in North India. It has
32:17
now expanded. So it is a
32:19
genuinely pan-Indian party, but its core
32:21
political support is
32:24
drawn from North India, and particularly the largest
32:26
state in North India, which is Uttar Pradesh,
32:28
which is the size of
32:30
Brazil, I think, in terms of population
32:32
or something. In
32:35
North India, English does
32:38
remain a language of privilege.
32:41
So Hindi and the vernacular languages
32:44
are important, but they are the
32:47
languages of culture. They are the languages
32:49
of the past. They
32:51
might be the register of
32:54
emotions in some ways. We
32:57
might kind of curse each other, but the language of
32:59
the future is English. If
33:06
you want to get access to social privilege
33:09
and if you want to get access to
33:11
the production of knowledge, and
33:13
particularly future knowledge, science, technology,
33:16
medicine, law, you
33:18
have to have English, or at least be
33:20
fluent in it. Our
33:23
education system actually produced large
33:25
masses of students, young people,
33:28
who are kind
33:30
of linguistically stranded. They're linguistically stranded
33:32
in the sense that they are
33:34
fluent in the vernaculars, but
33:37
actually will find it difficult to compete
33:39
in the cutting edge of English, that
33:42
we have a form of
33:45
language competence that does not make us full
33:47
participants in this
33:49
privileged social structure. What
33:52
it has done is that it
33:54
made it very easy to
33:56
mobilize this kind of resentment
33:59
against an entrenched elite.
34:01
When you were in Delhi, you went to Khan Market a
34:04
lot, I'm sure. I mean, it's a great place
34:06
to hang out with bookshelf, coffee shops. Restaurants, yep.
34:09
Mr. Modi frequently uses
34:12
this phrase, I stand against
34:14
the Khan Market gang. It's
34:17
a brilliant piece of political
34:19
communication because everybody instinctively recognizes
34:23
that it refers to the
34:25
narrow social privileges of an elite.
34:29
And so I think what he was able
34:31
to tap into, apart from his kind of
34:33
caste identification, is that
34:35
I actually stand for something that is
34:37
much more authentic and connected. Our
34:41
heritage, our languages, do not
34:43
just have to be about the past. Now,
34:46
quite what he does with his education policies is
34:48
another matter. But I think
34:50
that sense of, I think, Rizanthi
34:52
Mohr, that India was being governed
34:54
by a small exclusive elite. I
34:57
think he managed to give that voice
34:59
and expression very powerfully. And
35:02
because of his uniqueness in some
35:04
senses, his own biography, his
35:07
own extraordinary communicative skills, I
35:09
think he was in a sense able to tap
35:12
into that. And I think
35:14
more than the specifics of Hindu nationalism, it's
35:16
this particular trope that I
35:20
am rescuing India from a small
35:22
elite out of touch that
35:25
I think still resonates very powerfully. Yeah.
35:27
And I think it's not just an elite
35:29
that's out of touch, it's an elite that
35:32
is looking outward. And there's something about the
35:34
sort of return to the vernacular that's saying,
35:36
no, no, no, the real strength of India
35:38
lies within. And we will engage with the
35:41
rest of the world on our own terms.
35:43
So, Modi gets elected in 2014. His first
35:45
term, to my mind, as
35:48
I followed it, seemed mostly
35:50
to be focused on these economic issues.
35:52
There were some cultural issues focusing on
35:54
hygiene and toilets. I mean, what a
35:56
lot of people maybe don't know about
35:58
India is that the lack of
36:00
clean water and access to toilets is a
36:02
huge public health issue, you know, holding people
36:05
back in a lot of ways. There
36:07
were a lot of just sort of fundamental development issues that he
36:09
focused on. But it seems to me
36:11
that it wasn't until he was reelected, that
36:13
his government was reelected in 2019, that you
36:16
really started to see the clause come
36:19
out. And you've written, I think, quite
36:21
powerfully on this, on the government's policy
36:23
in Kashmir, because there was a very
36:25
sharp change. And I'll quote you, the
36:28
BJP thinks it's going to Indianize Kashmir,
36:30
but instead, what we will see is
36:33
potentially the Kashmirization of India.
36:36
Tell me about what happened in Kashmir and what
36:38
you meant by that idea, that Kashmirization
36:40
of India. Right. Gosh. So,
36:43
you know, Kashmir has
36:46
historically been one
36:48
of the deepest failures of Indian democracy.
36:50
So when India became
36:52
independent, there was a whole bunch of
36:54
princely states that
36:57
had to take the decision of whether to
36:59
exceed to India, whether to exceed to Pakistan
37:01
or potentially even remain independent. I mean, most
37:03
of them weren't viable, but at least in
37:06
theory, that was an option. Now,
37:09
Kashmir was one of the
37:11
last holdouts. It had a Hindu
37:13
Raja, but its population was
37:15
majority Muslim. But interestingly,
37:18
one of the most kind of
37:20
secularized and led by a radical
37:23
leftist Sheikh Abdullah. And
37:26
Pakistan decided to
37:28
force Kashmir's hand by
37:30
actually invading Kashmir. And
37:33
India said it could help only if the
37:35
Maharaja signed an instrumental succession
37:39
joining India and Kashmir joined India.
37:41
Pakistan never recognized the legitimacy of
37:44
that extension. And there's a long
37:46
history of Pakistan
37:48
fermenting active terrorist and
37:50
militant violence in Kashmir for much
37:52
of the 20th century. And
37:55
just to put a fine point on
37:57
it, I mean, this Himalayan province. one
38:00
of the most beautiful places on
38:03
Earth. I've been there many times
38:05
and it's extraordinary. But you're talking
38:07
about a flashpoint between two nuclear
38:09
armed countries, right, Pakistan and India.
38:12
And it's a very explosive situation.
38:14
I mean, I just wanted to underscore how
38:16
sort of tender and fragile the status of Kashmir
38:19
is. It is, and unfortunately, I think it
38:21
was a failure for Indian democracy. Kashmir
38:24
also had special status in the
38:26
Indian Constitution. According to
38:28
the terms of accession, the
38:30
Indian state was going to conduct Kashmir's
38:32
foreign policy. There'd be a minimum set
38:34
of common laws, but Kashmir was supposed
38:36
to have a great deal of autonomy
38:39
in terms of governing its own affairs. But
38:42
unfortunately, I think the
38:45
Indian state's relationship with Kashmir
38:47
got securitized very early on.
38:50
I mean, every political protest, every kind
38:52
of political dissension was being looked at
38:55
through this prism of, are
38:57
there really kind of courts, secessionists in
38:59
place, right? Kashmir is the only
39:02
state in India where there was a sense
39:04
that the elections were not entirely free and
39:06
fair. It's constantly interfering
39:08
in elections. It is
39:10
putting Kashmir internally under the state of siege.
39:13
Pakistan is actively, in some senses,
39:16
formatting violent and terrorist groups. Even
39:19
when it was open for tourism, it
39:22
became an immensely militarized place,
39:24
about half a million troops,
39:26
guarding kind of Kashmiri security checkpoints. There was
39:29
a sense of great sense of siege about
39:31
Kashmir. Yeah, and it's this
39:33
place, there's this beautiful lake and people
39:35
stay in houseboats and you've got the
39:37
amazing Himalayan skyline. But there was this
39:40
sense that you were stopped and asked
39:42
for identification constantly, flying in
39:44
and out of the airport. You
39:46
felt a sense of
39:49
surveillance. And this is
39:51
for an outsider, for my many
39:53
Kashmiri friends and particularly journalists, this
39:55
sense of being surveilled and having
39:59
your rights curtailed was really, really
40:01
powerful. And so what did Modi do
40:03
in 2019? So
40:06
one of the RSS's
40:08
planks, the organization
40:10
that Modi belongs to, was that
40:12
if you actually wanted the integration
40:15
of Kashmir into India, Article 370
40:18
had to go. That would be
40:20
a constitutional statement that Kashmir is a
40:22
part of India, just like any other
40:24
part. And it would also send a
40:26
signal to Pakistan that we are not
40:28
even thinking that this is disputed territory. I mean,
40:30
just forget about it. And
40:32
this has been part of BJP's manifesto
40:34
forever. I mean, so at one level,
40:36
there was no surprise. I mean, I
40:38
think we just never took them literally
40:40
in some ways, right? So
40:43
what they did was they
40:45
basically revoked Article 370.
40:47
And on the grounds that
40:51
Kashmir needs to be a state
40:53
like any other state in the
40:55
Indian Union, no special
40:57
privileges. And
41:00
the government's view was we are going
41:02
to restore administrative order. So we are
41:04
going to clamp down on militants. We
41:07
are going to attract investment by
41:09
creating law and order. And
41:12
to be honest, it has had
41:14
mixed results. I mean, the government can
41:16
claim that at least the outbreak of
41:18
violence has not been as bad as
41:21
many had feared, many of us had feared actually. But
41:25
it still remains the case that
41:27
there are still pockets of militancy.
41:30
And there is still a
41:32
significant clamp down on
41:35
civil liberties, on reporting on Kashmir, on the
41:37
free movement of
41:39
journalists in Kashmir. If you're
41:41
a journalist in Kashmir, you really have
41:44
an impossible task ahead of you. Even
41:46
outside of Kashmir, most
41:48
Indian mainstream papers will not
41:51
carry stories critical of what's
41:53
happening in Kashmir. Now,
41:55
what I mean by the Kashmirization of India,
41:57
I mean, partly, of course, you know, it's
41:59
a call of was sort
42:01
of a pre-decure kind of provocation. But unfortunately,
42:03
I think the grain of truth in this
42:05
was that what
42:08
the government was trying to demonstrate in
42:10
Kashmir was that a
42:14
strong repressive surveillance state
42:18
was going to be
42:20
the more effective means of
42:23
integrating Indian citizens into
42:25
the state, rather than
42:27
a faith in democracy, pluralism,
42:29
and open society. And
42:32
many of the practices that we
42:35
experimented on in Kashmir, detailed
42:38
surveillance, preventive
42:40
detention, the idea
42:43
of expanding the remit of
42:45
who you hold under suspicion,
42:48
that those practices of the state
42:50
would become much more generalized and
42:53
be replicated elsewhere in India. You
42:56
can see that in a state like
42:59
UP, where the Chief Minister is very
43:01
popular, but one of
43:03
his characteristic modes of governance is a
43:05
form of vigilante justice. If
43:08
you are suspected, and the
43:10
key word here is suspected, and particularly
43:12
if you're a member of the minority community, of
43:15
let's say even participating in a protest, your
43:18
house can become in bulldozers without due process. So
43:22
this arsenal of repression
43:24
and looking upon the
43:26
citizens as objects of
43:28
presumptive distrust, that's
43:31
really what the Indian state did in Kashmir at the end of
43:33
the day. That is
43:35
becoming a much more generalized practice
43:38
of governance, I think
43:40
across India. It's interesting
43:42
because I'm always trying to kind of check
43:44
my own assumptions here because, you
43:46
know, the people that I talk to, my friends, they're journalists,
43:48
they're people who are in kind
43:51
of activist communities or politics
43:53
adjacent. And the report that I hear
43:55
from them about sort of
43:57
the general mood across India is very much.
44:00
what you're describing, this kind of
44:02
cashmerization. Muslims have felt
44:04
the sort of the first brunt of it.
44:06
But anybody seeking to live a different kind
44:08
of life or to report honestly on what's
44:11
happening in the country and, you know, is
44:13
ultimately feeling the sharp end of that stick.
44:16
But the thing that you sort of balance that up again
44:18
is that I think really
44:20
striking popularity of Narendra Modi. And my
44:23
friend, the journalist from here, Sharma, wrote in
44:25
2019, after Modi's party
44:27
was reelected, he said, we do
44:30
not live in Modi's India. We live
44:32
in India's India. And the reason so
44:34
many Indians adore Modi is because he
44:36
represents their preferred conception of the Indian
44:38
state and the Indian nation. And it
44:41
reminded me of something that you wrote, which is that
44:44
tyranny can be the stepchild of democracy,
44:46
which is a great paraphrase from Plato.
44:49
The theory that, you know, you
44:51
could build a majoritarian project on
44:53
the votes of Hindus alone, it's
44:56
clearly working. No, it
44:59
is clearly working. So look, you
45:02
know, if you want to take a hopeful story, and the
45:04
opposition will keep reminding you of this, they will keep saying
45:06
something like 60% of Indians
45:08
still don't vote for the BJP. In
45:11
a first pass the post system,
45:13
parliamentary system, roughly about
45:15
38 to 40% of the
45:17
world can actually get your pretty dominant majority
45:19
in parliament. But there
45:21
is a lesson in that. And the
45:23
lesson is that, like everywhere in the
45:25
world, that ethnic
45:28
majoritarian forces have come to
45:30
power. It is largely
45:32
because the forces arrayed against
45:35
them have failed to credibly
45:37
unite on a coherent platform.
45:40
So the center and left in India, you
45:42
know, 20 different ways, but
45:44
I think more deeply, I think, and
45:46
I actually do think the cultural transformation
45:49
that I see of India is truly
45:51
astonishing. Large sections of
45:53
India's elites in particular, right,
45:56
those who are most
45:58
powerful. place
46:01
to resist this. I
46:04
think their ideological conversion to
46:06
this project is
46:08
actually quite significant. If you look
46:11
at the Indian media landscape, it's
46:14
one thing to say that the
46:16
media does not criticize government. Maybe
46:18
they fear reprisals. Often
46:21
the owners of media might fear
46:23
reprisals. But what you are
46:25
seeing in the Indian media is
46:27
actually something much more than simply
46:30
complying with the state. It
46:32
is actually creating and disseminating
46:34
structures of hate, fully
46:37
funded by the most
46:39
powerful echelons of Indian
46:41
capital. This is
46:44
going way beyond we fear the state and
46:46
we will not criticize it. There
46:48
is almost like a positive investment
46:50
in that information order, day
46:52
in and day out. It's actually unbearable to
46:55
read many of the regional papers
46:57
these days. English media you see
46:59
somewhat little less of it, but
47:01
it stays there or on television
47:03
media for example. The Indian Supreme
47:05
Court, really an extraordinary
47:07
puzzle. We used to say in 2009, the years
47:09
you were here, that
47:12
the Indian Supreme Court had become one of the
47:14
most powerful courts in the world. In fact, the
47:17
criticism of the Indian Supreme Court was it pretty
47:19
much did what it wanted meddled in, whichever
47:22
issue it wanted, far
47:25
beyond its jurisdictional competence. One
47:28
of the most disappointing things has been the near
47:32
abdication of the Supreme Court in
47:35
protecting basic civil liberties. The
47:38
extent of it is so mind boggling that
47:41
you have got to think that deep
47:43
down there is a kind of some kind of
47:46
allegiance to this project that is
47:48
actually surfacing. It's not simply held
47:50
together by fear of reprisal.
47:53
So for those of us who grew up
47:55
in India, I have not seen an elite
47:58
discourse that so
48:01
openly participates, revels
48:03
in disseminating hate,
48:06
as I see at this moment in India, not even
48:08
at the height of the temple movement in the 1990s.
48:13
The one most important function of
48:15
the leader is to be at least
48:18
able to articulate a norm. This
48:22
is right, this is wrong, this is what
48:24
we accept, this is what we don't. It's
48:26
a measure of how far India has
48:28
come that the leadership
48:31
is not only unwilling to articulate
48:33
this norm, it
48:35
is often dog whistling about
48:38
targeting minorities. We
48:41
had this extraordinary scene in parliament where
48:43
a senior leader of the BJP in
48:47
parliament said something of
48:49
one of the few Muslim MPs
48:51
in parliament that you
48:53
could not even say with censored
48:55
speech. It's the
48:57
kind of thing you'd expect out of
49:00
a text called Mein Kampf. In
49:03
the Indian parliament, senior BJP leader,
49:06
he has been rewarded. You
49:08
are now empowering a
49:11
set of people, an ideology,
49:15
and sending out a signal that if you want
49:17
to move up in this political system, you
49:20
have to engage in acts
49:22
of hate or violence
49:25
or commit yourself publicly to this
49:28
project. I mean, this is
49:30
completely unprecedented. This is a
49:32
shattering of the norms. This
49:57
podcast is supported by the ACLU. The
50:00
ACLU needs your support to continue
50:02
defending the rights of all people
50:04
nationwide. Right now, our freedoms are
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under attack. People are traveling hundreds
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of miles to find abortion care.
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Transgender kids are banned from accessing
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critical health care. And our democracy
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is at stake as states pass
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50:23
Puerto Rico, the ACLU is taking
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these attacks head-on. Protect
50:27
everyone's rights. Donate at
50:29
aclu.org today. It's
50:39
really striking to me that we've gotten
50:41
to this place now where
50:44
you have India kind of
50:46
emerging on the global stage as such a critical
50:48
player because there are
50:51
big, powerful countries like the United
50:53
States but also others that
50:55
are seeking India to take its place
50:57
on the global stage as a counterweight
50:59
to China. What recommends it
51:02
for that role is precisely the fact
51:04
that it sees itself, it
51:06
describes itself and is seen by others
51:08
as a secular,
51:10
pluralistic democracy. So there's this
51:13
tremendous irony that at
51:15
precisely the moment you're seeking a democratic counterweight
51:17
to China, the obvious candidate
51:19
for that role, its
51:21
democracy is, from what we've discussed,
51:23
seems really deeply imperiled. No,
51:26
it is. And, you know, if you
51:28
look at India's projection
51:30
abroad, one of Mr. Modi's
51:32
favorite tropes these days, India is the
51:34
mother of all democracies. I
51:37
mean, that's the kind of tagline and a
51:39
kind of guru to the world. But
51:41
it is a performance. This
51:44
government's diagnosis, and Trump's election may
51:46
have something to do with it,
51:48
the way in which the kind
51:50
of world changed post-Trump, is that
51:52
there is not going to
51:54
be any penalty for
51:57
India's actions domestically.
52:00
And to be fair to them, their
52:02
reading of the international system has been just right.
52:05
That somehow they think in the end
52:07
the United States is strategic imperative, rather
52:10
than its imperative in democracy and
52:12
pluralism will actually trump
52:15
their engagement with India. By
52:18
the way, it's also happening in
52:20
the moment where the exemplarity
52:23
and authority of
52:25
almost all democratic countries around the world
52:27
is also at its lowest. I
52:30
can't remember a time where the prestige
52:32
and authority of American democracy was so
52:34
low. It's almost even in
52:37
this state, many Indians are willing to say, oh,
52:39
now we can talk back to the United States.
52:42
So there is no exemplarity and
52:44
authority left to that idea in
52:46
the international system, I think. And
52:50
this goes to one of the fundamental tenets
52:52
of Hindu nationalism as
52:54
a ideology. Their
52:58
diagnosis of India's success
53:00
and failure is very different from
53:02
at least mine, possibly yours
53:04
and most of the world's. The
53:07
two figures in Indian history,
53:11
they hate the most, they revile the most
53:13
are Gautam Buddha and
53:16
Mahatma Gandhi. I mean,
53:18
this is a party that openly
53:20
celebrates Mahatma Gandhi's
53:22
assassin. And
53:25
there is almost this sense
53:27
of embarrassment they have that somehow
53:29
this whole talk of nonviolence actually
53:31
made us weak. It
53:33
made us less respected in the world. America
53:37
took Pakistan more seriously because it created trouble
53:39
in the international system. We never were taken
53:41
seriously, which again, I think is a pretty
53:43
bizarre reading of history actually, but it
53:46
is a kind of political style whose core
53:50
is defined by a certain
53:52
kind of fascination with violence
53:54
and aggression. The
53:57
other has to be created in
53:59
order for this. Hindu
54:01
existential crisis to actually reap
54:04
political dividends. So it
54:06
can be Muslims, it can be secular
54:08
intellectuals, it can be liberals, it can
54:10
be George Soros. God knows why George
54:13
Soros in the Indian context, but... There,
54:15
too, huh? Oh, absolutely. I mean, it's... In
54:18
fact, today the BJP has just put out
54:21
a big political ad, which basically describes the
54:23
Congress party as a film being produced by
54:25
George Soros. So
54:28
in that sense, the
54:30
core of sensibility rests
54:33
on the idea of a kind
54:35
of perpetual Hindu victimhood. One
54:37
place where you sort of see this playing out, and
54:40
obviously this has been very, very big in the news,
54:42
is Canada's assertion that
54:44
India assassinated a Sikh
54:47
activist who is a Canadian citizen in
54:50
Canada. There's a lot of questions about
54:52
what exactly happened here. If
54:54
India is actually responsible for this
54:56
assassination, it's a huge violation of
54:58
international norms, but even
55:00
if they weren't directly involved in it,
55:03
it almost seems to play the game that India
55:05
wants to play on the global stage to
55:07
create the perception that India has
55:10
that capacity and will act as
55:12
it wishes on the
55:14
global stage without deference to the
55:16
kind of quote-unquote rules-based order. Yeah,
55:18
no, I think that's exactly right. What
55:21
is striking sitting in India looking at it is
55:25
how much the political machine of the
55:27
BJP is trying to milk this occasion.
55:29
It's almost like we
55:31
didn't do it, but
55:34
we are capable and it's been a great thing. But if we
55:36
did. It's truly
55:38
actually astonishing how much it
55:42
has been fed into part of that narrative
55:44
of bravado in some ways. You
55:47
know, it's interesting. There's another narrative that I
55:49
hear sort of bubbling along underneath all of
55:51
this, which is I think there's a
55:53
sense in the United States that perhaps we
55:55
were mistaken in how we managed our relationship
55:57
with China. The idea that, you know,
55:59
you. bring China under your wing, you
56:02
integrate them into the global economic system,
56:04
you see
56:06
prosperity rise, you create the linkages that make
56:08
it harder for a country to kind of
56:10
go off on its own. I think
56:13
there's a feeling, well, was that a mistake? Did
56:15
we sort of create the conditions for China to
56:17
become this incredibly powerful country? And now it's, of
56:19
course, our main geopolitical rival. And you hear in
56:22
some quarters a question of like, are we doing
56:24
the same thing again with India? And I wonder
56:26
what you make of that question. And
56:28
I have to be candid, I think sitting in Asia, you know,
56:32
this idea that somehow you
56:34
could structure a global development
56:36
process that shuts
56:39
out countries like China or India
56:42
just sounds so remarkably full of
56:44
hubris and presumption. And, you
56:47
know, I mean, the fact
56:49
that China's integration into
56:51
the global economy actually lifted millions
56:53
and millions of people out of
56:55
poverty, I don't think is
56:58
a human achievement to be sneered at. But the
57:01
idea that India and China could be
57:03
shut out in some
57:05
senses from being competitors or
57:07
participating in the global food,
57:09
science, technology development, frankly,
57:12
I don't think it's even practical
57:14
terms on. In fact, that
57:16
kind of assertion plays exactly into the hands
57:18
of nationalists everywhere. I mean,
57:21
even those who don't support authority
57:23
in governments, you know, when they
57:25
hear a statement like, oh, actually, what the United States
57:27
is going to do is structure the world economy in
57:29
a way in which it retains primacy
57:33
forever. It doesn't
57:35
matter what the authority or democratic right, you're
57:37
not going to particularly push. So I actually
57:40
think it I actually think that the United
57:42
States is on sale. I think I think
57:44
this way of posing the question is I
57:46
think a slightly self defeating one.
57:48
I mean, the easiest
57:50
way of reinforcing
57:53
the conspiratorial mindset of
57:55
Hindu nationalism is
57:57
to actually prove what they have been all
58:00
saying that the world is out to get in
58:02
line is to place it under siege. And
58:04
also I think particularly at a moment in
58:06
world history where it's very hard
58:08
for the United States or
58:12
any other country to pull
58:14
this policy off as if this were a
58:16
matter of principle and conviction. I mean
58:20
how many authoritarian regimes are you going
58:22
to exclude, not do business
58:24
with, right? So I actually
58:27
think if you make
58:29
people's development and democracy
58:31
a tool of geostrategic
58:33
politics, you end up
58:35
doing both geostrategic politics and the cause
58:37
of democracy and development great harm. I
58:40
mean many Indians often talk about this, you know, should
58:43
the Biden administration be doing more? You
58:46
know, they don't have to roll out the red
58:48
carpet. They can say the truth sometimes. I mean
58:50
it can be a perfectly candid relationship. But
58:53
I don't think there is an option but
58:55
to engage with India and I think both in
58:57
some senses will be better off
59:00
it. I also strongly believe that not
59:02
to take away anything from American power but I
59:05
actually think the United States' role
59:08
in how Indian democracy develops
59:11
will be miniscule at most. This
59:14
is a struggle that Indians will
59:16
have to undertake internally. I
59:18
mean maybe most of us are still complacent. The
59:21
way in which violence is being enacted
59:23
in Indian democracy still feels like in
59:26
drips and dribbles. I mean most of us can
59:29
still go around our daily business thinking
59:31
this is not going to affect us but
59:35
most of us still hope and still believe,
59:37
I mean otherwise we won't even be having
59:39
this conversation, that yes
59:41
the signs look ominous for Indian
59:43
democracy but at some
59:46
point will come a threshold
59:49
where ordinary Indians begin to
59:51
say that look this is
59:53
not us. Now
59:55
what that threshold is is an open question but
59:57
I actually do believe that that threshold will be
59:59
reached. and you will find
1:00:01
Indian society reacting appropriately. I
1:00:04
think that is a very good and
1:00:06
hopeful note to perhaps wrap up our
1:00:08
conversation on. And you
1:00:10
know, as a person who loves and
1:00:12
admires India very much, I very
1:00:15
much want to believe in
1:00:17
that prognosis. And you know, next year is an
1:00:19
election year. It'll be interesting to see what happens.
1:00:21
I think most people think that the BJP will
1:00:23
come back. But lots
1:00:26
of things can happen. The world
1:00:28
spins on. So at the
1:00:30
end of every episode of the Ezra Klein
1:00:32
Show, we ask our guests to recommend some
1:00:34
books. Could you recommend three
1:00:36
books that our listeners could
1:00:38
benefit from to understand India
1:00:41
democracy and the world better? Okay,
1:00:44
so I'll go with a couple of
1:00:46
unusual choices. One which is
1:00:49
not recent is I actually
1:00:51
still think reading V.S.
1:00:54
Naipaul's India trilogy,
1:00:56
which is now one book. I
1:00:59
think he and partly
1:01:01
because he himself was such
1:01:04
a complicated and many ways awful
1:01:06
characters. I think he
1:01:09
actually saw the moral psychology of
1:01:11
what's happening in various Indian social
1:01:13
movements. I think much more clearly
1:01:15
than I think many first
1:01:18
liberals and constitutionalists have recognized
1:01:20
this theme of India
1:01:23
thinking of itself as a wounded civilization
1:01:26
and now trying to kind of claim
1:01:28
something of that itself through this path
1:01:30
of violence and Hindu nationalism. Besides,
1:01:33
I mean, he's a wonderful writer to
1:01:35
read. I think the second
1:01:37
book I pick is a recent book
1:01:39
by Shiv Shankar Menon. The
1:01:42
title is India in Asian Geopolitics.
1:01:45
But it's really about India's place in the world, incredibly
1:01:48
well written, but also somebody who's
1:01:50
both a deep historian and has
1:01:53
had the benefit of having a ring-sized seat.
1:01:55
I think it's the single best book on
1:01:57
India's place in the world. The
1:02:00
third I would recommend, I mean
1:02:02
this is a sort of slightly more
1:02:04
kind of quirky recommendation,
1:02:08
is a book
1:02:10
by Snigdha Poonam called
1:02:12
The Dreamers. This
1:02:15
is a book that kind of captures
1:02:17
the craziness and the
1:02:19
contradictory textures of this
1:02:22
kind of young educated India, right?
1:02:24
I mean some of those linguistically
1:02:26
sanded people we talk about, the
1:02:28
IT hackers, you know, the would-be
1:02:31
Indian idols, I mean the Indian
1:02:33
version of American Idol, the music
1:02:35
program. It does have kind of
1:02:37
enough of those sort of quirky life biographies
1:02:40
to make it an interesting introduction
1:02:42
to India beneath the surface
1:02:45
of these large themes of
1:02:47
politics and economics. Those
1:02:49
are all wonderful, wonderful recommendations. Chris
1:02:52
Hoppanumesa, thank you so much for being with us.
1:02:55
Thank you so much and good luck to both our democracies.
1:02:58
Amen to that. This
1:03:07
episode of the Ezra Klein Show was produced
1:03:09
by Roland Hu. Fact-checking
1:03:11
by Michelle Harris. Mixing by
1:03:13
a theme Shapiro. Our senior engineer
1:03:15
is Jeff Gelt. Our senior editor
1:03:17
is Claire Gordon. The show's
1:03:20
production team also includes Emmepha Agawu
1:03:22
and Kristen Lin. Original
1:03:24
music by Isaac Jones. Audience
1:03:26
strategy by Christina Similoski and Shannon
1:03:28
Busta. The executive producer of
1:03:31
New York Times opinion audio is Annie Rose
1:03:33
Strasser. This
1:03:40
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