India Is Transforming. But Into What?

India Is Transforming. But Into What?

Released Tuesday, 12th December 2023
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India Is Transforming. But Into What?

India Is Transforming. But Into What?

India Is Transforming. But Into What?

India Is Transforming. But Into What?

Tuesday, 12th December 2023
Good episode? Give it some love!
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0:00

This podcast is supported by the

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today. From

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New York Times Opinion, this is The

0:40

Ezra Klein Show. Hey,

0:56

it is Ezra. I'm thrilled

0:58

today to have this fantastic conversation from

1:00

my colleague at Times Opinion, the co-host

1:03

of Matter of Opinion, our cousin podcast,

1:05

Lydia Palgreen, on one of the other

1:07

foreign affairs stories we've wanted to cover

1:09

more and that deserves a lot

1:12

of attention, which is rising illiberalism in India.

1:23

Fifteen years ago, I moved to New Delhi as a

1:25

correspondent for The New York Times. It

1:27

was a heady moment. After years of uncertain

1:29

growth, the country seemed primed for a kind

1:31

of rapid economic expansion that could vault its

1:34

billion-plus people out of poverty, just as China

1:36

had. But unlike China, India

1:38

was a boisterous beacon of democracy,

1:40

secularism, and freedom. India

1:42

today has fulfilled a lot of the promises I heard when

1:44

I was there. It became

1:46

the world's most populous country this year. According

1:49

to the World Bank, India's economy is one of the fastest

1:51

growing in the world. The country

1:53

even hosted the G20 in September. At

1:55

the same time, there's been a clear erosion of

1:58

democracy. The state has stoked violence. against

2:00

religious minorities, Prime Minister

2:02

Narendra Modi and his administration, have

2:04

silenced both critics and independent institutions.

2:07

And Indian government officials have been linked

2:09

to two assassination plots against Sikh activists

2:11

in Canada and the United States, a

2:14

pretty stunning diplomatic scandal that puts new

2:16

stress on India's relationship with the West.

2:19

So looking back in 2023, it's

2:21

clear that India has risen, but not quite

2:23

in the way we necessarily expected. So

2:26

I asked Pratap Banu Mehta to walk me through what

2:28

has happened to Indian democracy and what it means for

2:30

the rest of the world. Mehta

2:32

is a professor at Princeton University. He

2:35

has written widely on political theory and is the

2:37

author of The Burden of Democracy. He

2:39

has a regular column at the Indian Express where

2:42

he makes sense of Indian and global affairs. We

2:45

talked back in early October, but I think his

2:47

insights have only become more relevant. As

2:50

always, you can email the show at

2:52

Ezra Klein show at nytimes.com. Here's

2:54

Pratap Banu Mehta. Pratap

3:00

Banu Mehta, wonderful to be here with you.

3:03

Thank you very much. It's wonderful to see you as well.

3:06

So it's been a while. You

3:08

know, I lived in Delhi from 2009 to 2013. And

3:10

in that time, you

3:14

were really an indispensable guide for me in

3:17

trying to understand the extraordinary place that

3:19

is India. I'm just curious, how's life

3:21

for you in India these days? Well,

3:24

there's never a dull moment in India. That's

3:27

for sure. You know, it's a

3:29

cliche about India that you always experience India as

3:31

a paradox. And I think the paradox of this

3:33

moment is clearly India's

3:35

political significance, economic significance,

3:39

cultural creativity is kind of as

3:41

vibrant as ever. On

3:43

the other hand, the science for Indian

3:45

democracy are looking very ominous indeed. I

3:48

co edited a big Oxford Handbook of the Indian

3:50

Constitution. I have to say now when I go

3:52

to class, I say I cannot tell you what

3:54

the Constitution of India is. I

3:56

cannot tell you if you go with the habeas corpus

3:58

case to the Supreme Court. Court, whether it will

4:01

be heard. I cannot

4:03

tell you when opposition politicians

4:05

are being targeted by

4:07

the government for tax reasons, they will

4:09

actually get the same fair relief from

4:11

the Supreme Court. So

4:13

there is a sense of kind of dread

4:16

about where this democracy is heading. And I

4:18

think we have to register both of those kind of

4:21

emotions at the same time. We're going

4:23

to talk a lot about democracy. It's

4:25

a sort of line that we all

4:27

hear. India is the world's largest democracy.

4:29

It's been a democracy almost without interruption

4:32

since its independence. That sort of uniqueness

4:34

and boldness of the experiment. I mean,

4:36

you cannot visit India and not be

4:39

profoundly moved by what is

4:41

being attempted. I mean, I'm wary

4:43

of exceptionalism, but you know, I

4:45

think never in human history has

4:47

a more ambitious experiment in coexistence

4:49

through government by common

4:52

consent been attempted. So maybe

4:54

a good place to start is just to ground

4:56

us in some history. Tell me a

4:58

little bit about the history of India

5:01

as a democracy and what

5:03

India has had to learn from being the

5:05

world's largest democracy. Look,

5:07

I mean, Indian elections were probably more important

5:09

to us than religions. And I think there

5:11

still remain. I mean, there's a certain kind

5:13

of vibrancy, a

5:16

sense of diversity

5:18

dealing with difference. And

5:21

I think India's nationalist movement's greatness

5:23

was that it actually recognized that

5:26

the only way you could hold India together

5:29

was if it was a

5:31

product of widespread consensus across

5:34

religions, across communities, across caste,

5:36

across classes. I think

5:38

that was in a sense, I think it's

5:40

instinctive grasp of what democracy is. So

5:43

one story you can tell about Indian democracy is

5:45

that a lot of the

5:47

constituent parts or groups in society don't

5:50

actually have to be democratic. I mean, they

5:53

can be internally sometimes quite intolerant, they can

5:55

be quite conservative. And yet

5:57

the balance of social power among

6:00

amongst groups, amongst caste, regions,

6:03

is such that no single group

6:06

or no single identity can hope

6:08

to dominate without generating

6:10

some kind of resistance and backlash.

6:14

And we always used to say

6:16

that India's politics was fated to

6:18

a certain kind of centrism, precisely

6:20

for this reason, that there wasn't going

6:23

to ever be a single identity force

6:26

that could command sufficient

6:28

power to be able to govern India

6:30

as a whole. In fact, the joke used to

6:32

be that any party that governed India would have

6:34

to look like the Congress party, or maybe a

6:37

better version of the Congress party. The Congress party,

6:39

the party that was started

6:41

by Mahatma Gandhi, and just give us a little

6:43

bit of the history of the Congress party. Well,

6:45

it was actually started by, I mean, officially its

6:47

founder is A.O. Hume. But

6:49

it's Mahatma Gandhi that actually gave the

6:51

party its modern form. He converted that

6:53

party into a mass movement, and

6:56

really of extraordinary portions, what

6:58

he managed to do, I think quite significantly, was not

7:01

just forge a mass movement, but

7:03

create an imagination of modern

7:06

India, where each of

7:08

its constituent parts would find

7:10

its fullest expression. So

7:12

for example, he was a political genius.

7:14

Each state had a linguistic unit, which

7:16

then became the basis for how India

7:18

dealt with the language question later on.

7:21

We created this brilliant compromise that

7:23

there would be official linked language

7:26

English, aspirationally, Hindi

7:28

as a kind of national language, but

7:31

each state would be able to

7:33

use their own language, Tamil, Bengali,

7:35

so on and so forth, Malayalam. And

7:38

it avoided the fate of so

7:40

many postcolonial countries that

7:42

experienced civil wars or got divided on

7:44

the basis of language. And

7:46

I think that really was an

7:49

extraordinary political innovation. It

7:51

was an anti-colonial movement, but

7:53

it was an enormously cosmopolitan

7:55

movement in its aspirations, founded

7:58

in a much more authentic. perception of

8:00

rights, free expression, recognizing

8:03

individuality and dignity, and

8:06

a pursuit of politics through nonviolent

8:08

means, which is not an insignificant

8:10

contribution in the context

8:12

of so many postcolonial movements. India was

8:14

one of the few nationalist movements that

8:17

avoided both the extremes of left

8:19

violence and the extremes of right

8:22

violence. And I think

8:24

that Gandhi's an extraordinary contribution. I

8:27

think one of the remarkable things about the

8:29

Indian nationalist movement, when I compare it to

8:31

other nationalist movements, is it

8:33

is a movement for self-determination, but it

8:35

has very little resentment against the idea

8:38

of the West. In

8:40

fact, I sometimes feel that our postcolonial

8:42

movement now carries much more of a

8:44

sense of resentment than our

8:46

anti-colonial nationalist movement did. It's

8:48

interesting because for me as a correspondent, I moved

8:50

to India from West Africa. I

8:53

had been raised in East Africa and had spent

8:55

my childhood in West Africa as well. So

8:57

I had this deep sense of India

8:59

as this kind of beacon of what

9:01

a large

9:04

polyglot, multi-religious,

9:06

multi-ethnic nation could

9:08

be. And it's worth

9:10

just dwelling for a moment on the violence

9:12

and difficulty of India's birth. It was born

9:15

out of the partition of the British Raj.

9:17

It was a colony of Britain at the

9:19

time. Can you just talk

9:21

a little bit about how these ideas

9:23

came out of that experience of the

9:26

horrors of partition? I'm

9:28

glad you raised the issue of partition, which

9:30

is, I think, one of the most kind

9:32

of decisive events in modern South Asian, I

9:35

think, history. India always

9:37

thought it could be the exception

9:39

to the European experience. The process

9:42

of the formation of nation states

9:44

everywhere, including in Europe

9:46

and North America, has

9:48

been an extraordinarily violent,

9:50

exclusionary and majoritarian movement.

9:53

There is almost no exception to this, I think.

9:56

And the aspiration of the nationalist movement was that,

9:58

look, can we... forge a

10:00

new kind of identity that doesn't

10:03

repeat the mistakes of Europe. Now,

10:06

partition was the first shock to

10:08

this aspiration because in some senses,

10:10

partition was premised on

10:12

something like the European idea of a

10:14

nation state. There must be some single

10:17

identity that actually binds the nation. In

10:19

the case for the demand for Pakistan,

10:21

it's the idea of a kind of

10:23

Muslim homeland in South Asia. And

10:26

since that, since Pakistan actually came

10:28

as a deep shock to that

10:30

nationalist project, I mean, you

10:33

know, that image of Gandhi in a

10:35

sense, grieving at independence, because

10:37

he saw India's independence as a failure. It

10:39

was born out of violence. He

10:41

saw it as a rebuke to that extraordinary

10:43

project that the nationalist movement had tried to

10:46

create. And it would

10:48

have been very easy for India founders to never

10:50

said, look, India has been already

10:52

divided on religious grounds. Let

10:55

us complete the task of partition, declare

10:57

in India a Hindu state. And yes,

11:00

Muslims can live here, but we should be

11:02

absolutely no doubt that the logic of partition

11:05

is actually the creation of a Hindu state

11:07

in India. And Muslims are

11:09

the largest minority, but

11:12

they're very significant, right? I mean, what

11:14

is the percentage proportion between Hindus and

11:16

Muslims in India? It's a very sizable

11:18

minority. You're looking at about, you know,

11:20

200 million, 200 billion people. And

11:24

I think what is remarkable is that despite

11:26

partition, they actually, I think, continued with that

11:28

project of trying to create an Indian exceptionalism.

11:31

I think Jawaharlal Nehru, he was India's first

11:33

prime minister and really in some sense, the

11:35

founder of India's democracy in some ways. I

11:38

think the two deep ideas that he

11:41

had, if you read his books like Discovery of

11:43

India and stuff. So one was

11:45

this idea of India as a palimpsest

11:47

of all of the world civilizations. India

11:50

is a Hindu country. It's a Muslim country. It's

11:52

a Christian country. It's an

11:55

Asian power, but it's also an enlightenment

11:57

country. And that phrase you

11:59

use is over and over, India has

12:01

a palimpsest on which every civilization has

12:03

left a mark, but a palimpsest

12:06

which is that transformed each of those

12:08

civilizations and made it into its own.

12:11

I think that was a kind of

12:13

a deeply philosophical and I think profound

12:15

orientation to India. But

12:18

second, I think at a more practical level, that

12:21

India has such cross-cutting diversity

12:25

that if you privilege any

12:28

basis of identity as the basis

12:30

of nationhood, what

12:33

you risk is a great

12:35

deal of violence, expulsion and bloodletting.

12:37

So I think in a strange

12:40

way, partition actually just reinforce the

12:42

idea. Even what

12:44

remains of India cannot flourish

12:46

and survive unless it says

12:48

we are going to create

12:51

a kind of nation states that's very different

12:53

from anything that has happened in the world.

12:55

Yeah, you invoked Nehru and I think one

12:58

of his most famous and

13:00

historic speeches is the tryst

13:02

with destiny speech. What do

13:04

you think was India's tryst with destiny and what

13:06

is it today? Right.

13:09

So the first and most important one was

13:13

actually overcoming poverty

13:16

and the extraordinary levels

13:18

of human misery and

13:20

oppression that this

13:22

society had internally experienced,

13:24

particularly through the institution of caste.

13:27

This is the sort of the undergirding

13:29

system of people being born into a

13:31

particular community and that forming a social

13:34

hierarchy. Absolutely, a social hierarchy which you

13:36

could not escape, a social hierarchy that

13:38

was in some senses deeply

13:40

oppressive and particularly if you were at the

13:42

bottom end of that social hierarchy, Dalits,

13:44

untouchables, as we used to be called

13:46

in those days, the bottom 20%. It

13:50

really would rank up there with slavery.

13:52

I mean, we can always kind of

13:54

nuance these comparisons intellectually, but there's just

13:56

no getting around what a moral abomination

13:58

it was. In

14:00

some senses, the Indian state was embarking for the

14:02

first time on this project of saying, look,

14:05

we need a model of development

14:07

that can overcome the tyranny of

14:09

this compulsory identity that is called

14:11

caste. And so I think this

14:13

idea, which is important in the

14:15

Indian constitution of the idea of

14:18

liberty, equality, fraternity, in

14:20

conditions that are otherwise

14:22

were deemed to be inhospitable

14:24

to them, India gained

14:27

universal suffrage at

14:29

a moment where it was one of the poorest countries in

14:31

the world. So if you look at levels

14:33

of economic development at which countries get

14:35

universal suffrage, India gets it

14:37

at the lowest level of economic development. It

14:40

was one of the least educated countries in the world. And

14:43

yet this enormous hope that through constitutional

14:46

politics, you could actually overcome

14:48

this scourge of poverty and

14:50

at least social inequality. I

14:54

think the second thing that I think is very

14:56

remarkable to me about the tryst with destiny speech

14:58

and the Indian constitution and the preamble to the

15:00

Indian constitution is

15:04

God knows Nehru and the

15:06

founding generation fully understood that

15:09

God, history and identity

15:11

matter to Indians. I mean,

15:13

you can't imagine this country in some senses

15:15

without a deep religious and

15:17

spiritual engagement, without deep contestation over

15:20

history and identities proliferate. I mean,

15:22

people bear them on their sleeves.

15:25

But that in order for these

15:27

identities to flourish, in order for

15:29

that cultural heritage to come alive,

15:32

it was very important that the political

15:34

social contract not

15:36

be burdened with the weight of

15:39

God, history or identity. So

15:41

people don't feel

15:44

that they have to be

15:46

benchmarked to a

15:48

single identity or access of loyalty.

15:51

So yes, God will flourish, but God will

15:53

flourish. I mean, India's idea

15:55

of secularism wasn't that religion would be

15:57

marginalized. It would be that.

16:00

it would be put on a basis

16:03

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16:06

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18:12

looking at the past few years and you

18:14

see the way in which India is sort

18:16

of meeting this kind of truce with destiny,

18:18

right? India is by most

18:20

accounts now the most populous country in the

18:22

world over out, you know, outstripping China. And

18:25

for me, the GDP expanded by 7.8% last quarter. India

18:29

hosted the G20, a very important

18:31

gathering of global leaders. And you're seeing

18:34

India kind of step up to its

18:36

place on the global stage, but it's

18:38

happening at a time when the sort

18:40

of internal contradictions and tensions is, I

18:43

think, really coming to bear. So

18:45

maybe this is a good time for us

18:48

to turn to Narendra Modi and spend some

18:50

time talking about who he is, where he

18:52

came from, and maybe focus on a couple

18:54

of key moments. And I think one key moment

18:57

for me certainly is the 2002

18:59

riots in Gujarat. So

19:04

I think the three most important

19:06

things to bear in

19:08

mind about Narendra Modi, who is an extraordinary

19:10

political figure. I mean, just as an analytical

19:13

proposition, you don't have to endorse his politics

19:15

to recognize what

19:17

a transformative figure he has

19:19

been. So the first most important

19:21

thing is that he is a

19:23

member of and

19:25

had much of his political and

19:28

cultural upbringing in

19:30

an organization called the RSS, the

19:32

Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh, which was founded

19:34

in the 1920s. And

19:38

the RSS has had one

19:40

core objective, which

19:42

is the creation

19:44

of a Hindu

19:46

political consciousness that

19:49

India has been subjugated to what they

19:51

call a thousand year period of slavery.

19:54

They regard even Mughal India, for example, as

19:56

a period of slavery. Their

20:00

political commitment is to create

20:02

a form of Hindu consciousness

20:05

and identity such that Hindus

20:07

are never subjugated again and

20:09

have a political straight and

20:11

instrument of their own. So

20:14

this straightforward political

20:17

objective has been, the Rayan Ramodi

20:19

is in a sense guiding Steehar.

20:22

Everything he does in some senses flows

20:25

from realizing this political

20:28

objective. An economic policy,

20:30

right, making India an economically developed nation

20:32

is in some senses part

20:35

of an instrument to achieve

20:37

this objective. I

20:39

think the second thing about him, which I think

20:42

in the Indian context is remarkable, is

20:44

he's a completely self-made politician

20:47

and leader. Biographically

20:49

he's from India's less

20:51

privileged caste and

20:54

had absolutely no

20:56

privileges, either economic,

20:59

social or political

21:01

that usually mark the

21:03

political careers of so many Indians. And

21:06

what this allowed him to do was two

21:08

things which are really quite central to his

21:10

success. One is

21:12

to produce a kind of instinctive

21:14

identification with large masses of people.

21:17

The political party represents the Bharti

21:19

Janta Party used to be accused

21:22

of being largely an upper caste

21:24

party or sort of privileged traders,

21:26

privileged Brahmins. He

21:28

single-handedly transformed that party

21:32

into a party that has a much

21:34

wider social base now. He managed

21:36

to run and still runs on this plank that

21:39

what kept India back, particularly over

21:41

the last 20, 30 years,

21:45

was the fact that India was

21:47

being ruled by something like a

21:49

dynastic Anshan regime. The

21:52

Congress Party was dominated by

21:54

the Nehru Gandhi family in some ways. And

21:57

so when he speaks of corruption, he doesn't...

22:00

He's not just referring to the fact that,

22:02

you know, there might have been sort of

22:04

monetary corruption. He's actually just

22:06

referring to the fact that Indian

22:08

democracy had acquired the characteristic of

22:10

being something like a closed club.

22:13

And he has in some senses opened

22:15

the gates of this politics to

22:18

ordinary Indians, to

22:20

languages they speak. So for

22:22

example, he's a very gifted orator in Hindi.

22:25

The BJP is much more comfortable in the

22:27

vernaculars than the Congress Party is. So

22:30

he would represent that old

22:32

complex as a privileged elite

22:34

with a narrow social base

22:37

against whom his kind of persona stands.

22:39

And I think

22:41

the third thing about him, which I think goes

22:44

back to his days in Gujarat, is

22:46

in Gujarat he acquired the reputation

22:48

for both being

22:50

an effective administrator on the one hand. And

22:52

the second thing, of course, he was known

22:54

for his conduct during the 2002 Gujarat riots.

22:59

What happened in these riots? This

23:01

is very contested. And

23:03

I think one has to go back to the

23:06

late 80s, early 90s, where

23:08

the Bharati Janta Party, which

23:10

Mr. Modi represents, launched

23:13

a agitation for

23:16

reclaiming what

23:18

they called was the site of the

23:20

birthplace of Lord Ram, where a mosque

23:23

had been built in the

23:25

16th century. And the BJP's demand

23:27

has been that this should in some senses be returned to

23:29

the Hindus. And they

23:31

created a mass movement. Now

23:34

what that mass movement did was

23:36

that it in a

23:38

sense created pockets of Hindu Muslim

23:40

tension all across India, because in

23:42

some senses these rallies were quite

23:45

aggressive. They really were

23:47

signposting the fact that a

23:49

Hindu movement was arriving to claim India

23:52

for Hindus. One

23:54

of the results of that mass movement was

23:56

the tearing down of the Babri Masjid. Ayodhya.

24:00

Now this movement was actually

24:03

trying to collect volunteers

24:07

and collect actually literally bricks

24:09

from different parts of India to take

24:12

to Ayodhya as a kind of symbolic

24:14

gesture of kind of building you know

24:16

these be used to build temple. Now

24:20

as this movement is going on intentions

24:22

are on the rise. A train in

24:24

Godhra was set on fire and

24:27

roughly around 50 of these volunteers

24:31

in the volunteers that were going to

24:33

Ayodhya was killed. This

24:35

immediately set off a

24:37

set of now what the BJP

24:40

would call retaliatory violence. This

24:42

violence was directed at Muslim

24:45

residents in Gujarat. Absolutely and about

24:47

2,000 people died and it was

24:49

absolutely gruesome violence. I mean it

24:51

really it's just you know it's

24:53

just it's just very hard to

24:56

describe. Yeah neighbors set upon neighbors.

24:58

Neighbors set upon each other. Now

25:01

his role so

25:03

there is a range of positions in this.

25:06

One of course holds him directly

25:08

responsible for instigating the retaliatory

25:10

violence. There was

25:13

a commission of inquiry and for

25:15

what it's worth that commission of inquiry absolved

25:19

him of that charge. I mean

25:21

that's again for what it's

25:23

worth. But we

25:26

do know in India that

25:28

if the state is committed

25:30

to stopping violence it

25:33

can actually stop it fairly quickly.

25:35

You know you can bring the

25:37

law enforcement agencies out. The

25:40

army can be called out and

25:42

I think the political question mark over

25:44

Narendra Modi whatever you think may be

25:47

the direct instructions he may or may

25:49

not have given is that

25:51

this was clearly a massive

25:55

abdication or responsibility on part

25:58

of the chief minister. state.

26:01

This violence could have been stopped and

26:03

there is no excuse, no excuse. No

26:05

matter how deep the

26:07

passions run, no matter how widespread the

26:10

desire for revenge is, there is absolutely

26:12

no excuse for the scale of violence

26:14

that actually took place in Gujarat. The

26:17

fact that he was accused of

26:20

formatting this violence by the Congress

26:22

party, he had been denied a

26:24

visa to the United States, as you know, till he

26:26

became Prime Minister. I think that

26:29

convinced him that the

26:31

entire world is a kind of gigantic

26:34

conspiracy out to get Hindus. I

26:36

mean, and that conspiratorial mindset is

26:39

actually very, very central to the

26:41

BJP analysis thinking about the rest

26:43

of the world. That somehow

26:45

there has been this global conspiracy since, you

26:47

know, I don't know, maybe 900 AD to

26:50

keep Hindus as a political community

26:52

down. And the fact

26:54

that people were accusing him of formatting this

26:56

violence was just another element in that conspiracy.

26:59

So it was completely turned on its head.

27:02

And I hate to say this,

27:04

but there is a sense in which I think

27:06

there was a significant number of Hindus who

27:09

began to radically subscribe to this

27:11

much more radical and aggressive message

27:14

that the

27:16

BJP was going to be much

27:18

more aggressive in protecting

27:22

Hindus, if you want to put it creatively, or

27:25

aggressively targeting minorities.

27:29

I think that message went out loud and

27:31

clear from that Gujarat experience. The

27:34

sense that violence can

27:36

pay long term

27:38

dividends for Hindu nationalism

27:40

as a movement. It became

27:42

a central plank of the BJP. I mean, till

27:44

2002, there always used to be this

27:49

sense that you

27:51

could not win a national election

27:54

only with the votes of Hindus. That

27:57

somehow you'd always have to stitch a broad coalition. I

28:00

think Narendra Modi managed

28:03

to convince his party, and that has

28:05

been their electoral strategy, that

28:07

they could come to power only

28:10

with Hindu votes. And in fact,

28:12

you could actually increase your share

28:14

of Hindu votes, consolidate a Hindu

28:16

constituency if you

28:18

were to clearly send a

28:20

signal that you were going

28:22

to politically marginalize Muslims.

28:25

But then 2009, there's another election. This

28:28

is the moment that I land in

28:30

India. And I think you're right that

28:32

this fire has been lit around Hindu

28:34

nationalism. But at the same time, there

28:36

was a sense that India had a,

28:38

you know, a teetotaling economist as its

28:41

prime minister, that India's tryst with destiny

28:43

is about to be fulfilled. It felt

28:45

like a moment. And the

28:47

thing that I remember particularly was a sense

28:50

that the sectarian divides

28:52

felt much less alive.

28:55

One of the first stories that I did was I actually

28:57

went to the city of Ayodhya, where the Babri

28:59

Masjid Mosque was. And it was

29:01

striking to me how the temperature at

29:03

that place was basically just, you know,

29:05

room temperature. And you had this,

29:07

you know, kind of too busy

29:10

to hate India moving forward, you

29:12

know, we're joining the global economy

29:14

where, you know, and that

29:16

was very much the vibe when I got there. And

29:19

there was a sense that Narendra Modi, no chance he could

29:21

be prime minister. The guy can't even go to the United

29:23

States. And the BJP seemed like

29:25

they were nowhere. And you

29:28

know, Congress was ascendant. And boy,

29:30

were we wrong. So

29:32

walk me through what happened. How did

29:34

Modi go from being an international pariah

29:36

to prime minister of the world's largest

29:39

democracy? I think, you know, as

29:41

I said at the beginning of the show, this

29:44

sense we had of a kind of India

29:46

fated to a certain kind of centrism actually

29:49

made all of us complacent that a

29:51

force like Narendra Modi or at least

29:53

a very radical Hindu nationalist ideology could

29:55

never be dominant or if it even

29:57

came to power, it would have to allow us to be

29:59

dominant. with other kinds of groups to

30:01

moderate its stance. So I

30:04

think what happened post 2009 is

30:06

I think a bunch of things. So

30:08

the first is of course the

30:10

2009 financial crisis globally, right, which

30:13

is a pivotal moment in

30:15

democracies across the world, because India

30:17

was going at 8%. And

30:20

it was a nice place to be

30:22

you're going at 8% the state was

30:24

getting enough resources to begin to build

30:26

out slightly more ambitious welfare state, something

30:29

Narendra Modi has then sought to accelerate.

30:33

And yet what the 2009 financial

30:35

crisis did, at least in

30:37

the Indian context was two things. One,

30:39

it actually did expose the

30:42

corruption at the heart of

30:45

that growth regime. You know, lots of

30:47

projects kind of suddenly seem unviable to

30:50

people. And there is an

30:52

anti corruption movement, which kind of paved

30:54

the way for saying, look, this

30:57

old regime, this ancient regime headed

30:59

by the Congress, this coalition government,

31:02

it may have done us some good,

31:04

but now it is a

31:06

corrupt, torturing regime. India

31:09

has a moment, an opportunity

31:11

here, but it is actually frittering

31:13

it away because of a weak

31:16

government. In fact, the slogan

31:18

Narendra Modi used was policy paralysis. So 2014,

31:20

he ran largely on

31:24

this plank, I'm going to

31:26

overcome this paralysis, I'm a strong decisive leader,

31:28

look at my record in Gujarat. And

31:31

he ran against plutocracy. But plutocracy in

31:33

this very generalized sense, you know, this

31:35

is a kind of old corrupt ancient

31:37

regime. And like I

31:40

think politics elsewhere, it was

31:42

the implosion of the alternative, the internal

31:44

implosion of the Congress Party, that

31:47

created much more of the space that

31:49

somehow it had lost this will to fight this

31:52

will to govern. There was

31:54

very little communication mass, very little mass mobilization,

31:56

it just had lost, you know, all the

31:58

kind of The

32:01

second thing that I think happened,

32:04

and this may take some explaining,

32:06

but I actually do think it

32:08

is important. So the

32:11

BJP's primary base is

32:15

in North India. It has

32:17

now expanded. So it is a

32:19

genuinely pan-Indian party, but its core

32:21

political support is

32:24

drawn from North India, and particularly the largest

32:26

state in North India, which is Uttar Pradesh,

32:28

which is the size of

32:30

Brazil, I think, in terms of population

32:32

or something. In

32:35

North India, English does

32:38

remain a language of privilege.

32:41

So Hindi and the vernacular languages

32:44

are important, but they are the

32:47

languages of culture. They are the languages

32:49

of the past. They

32:51

might be the register of

32:54

emotions in some ways. We

32:57

might kind of curse each other, but the language of

32:59

the future is English. If

33:06

you want to get access to social privilege

33:09

and if you want to get access to

33:11

the production of knowledge, and

33:13

particularly future knowledge, science, technology,

33:16

medicine, law, you

33:18

have to have English, or at least be

33:20

fluent in it. Our

33:23

education system actually produced large

33:25

masses of students, young people,

33:28

who are kind

33:30

of linguistically stranded. They're linguistically stranded

33:32

in the sense that they are

33:34

fluent in the vernaculars, but

33:37

actually will find it difficult to compete

33:39

in the cutting edge of English, that

33:42

we have a form of

33:45

language competence that does not make us full

33:47

participants in this

33:49

privileged social structure. What

33:52

it has done is that it

33:54

made it very easy to

33:56

mobilize this kind of resentment

33:59

against an entrenched elite.

34:01

When you were in Delhi, you went to Khan Market a

34:04

lot, I'm sure. I mean, it's a great place

34:06

to hang out with bookshelf, coffee shops. Restaurants, yep.

34:09

Mr. Modi frequently uses

34:12

this phrase, I stand against

34:14

the Khan Market gang. It's

34:17

a brilliant piece of political

34:19

communication because everybody instinctively recognizes

34:23

that it refers to the

34:25

narrow social privileges of an elite.

34:29

And so I think what he was able

34:31

to tap into, apart from his kind of

34:33

caste identification, is that

34:35

I actually stand for something that is

34:37

much more authentic and connected. Our

34:41

heritage, our languages, do not

34:43

just have to be about the past. Now,

34:46

quite what he does with his education policies is

34:48

another matter. But I think

34:50

that sense of, I think, Rizanthi

34:52

Mohr, that India was being governed

34:54

by a small exclusive elite. I

34:57

think he managed to give that voice

34:59

and expression very powerfully. And

35:02

because of his uniqueness in some

35:04

senses, his own biography, his

35:07

own extraordinary communicative skills, I

35:09

think he was in a sense able to tap

35:12

into that. And I think

35:14

more than the specifics of Hindu nationalism, it's

35:16

this particular trope that I

35:20

am rescuing India from a small

35:22

elite out of touch that

35:25

I think still resonates very powerfully. Yeah.

35:27

And I think it's not just an elite

35:29

that's out of touch, it's an elite that

35:32

is looking outward. And there's something about the

35:34

sort of return to the vernacular that's saying,

35:36

no, no, no, the real strength of India

35:38

lies within. And we will engage with the

35:41

rest of the world on our own terms.

35:43

So, Modi gets elected in 2014. His first

35:45

term, to my mind, as

35:48

I followed it, seemed mostly

35:50

to be focused on these economic issues.

35:52

There were some cultural issues focusing on

35:54

hygiene and toilets. I mean, what a

35:56

lot of people maybe don't know about

35:58

India is that the lack of

36:00

clean water and access to toilets is a

36:02

huge public health issue, you know, holding people

36:05

back in a lot of ways. There

36:07

were a lot of just sort of fundamental development issues that he

36:09

focused on. But it seems to me

36:11

that it wasn't until he was reelected, that

36:13

his government was reelected in 2019, that you

36:16

really started to see the clause come

36:19

out. And you've written, I think, quite

36:21

powerfully on this, on the government's policy

36:23

in Kashmir, because there was a very

36:25

sharp change. And I'll quote you, the

36:28

BJP thinks it's going to Indianize Kashmir,

36:30

but instead, what we will see is

36:33

potentially the Kashmirization of India.

36:36

Tell me about what happened in Kashmir and what

36:38

you meant by that idea, that Kashmirization

36:40

of India. Right. Gosh. So,

36:43

you know, Kashmir has

36:46

historically been one

36:48

of the deepest failures of Indian democracy.

36:50

So when India became

36:52

independent, there was a whole bunch of

36:54

princely states that

36:57

had to take the decision of whether to

36:59

exceed to India, whether to exceed to Pakistan

37:01

or potentially even remain independent. I mean, most

37:03

of them weren't viable, but at least in

37:06

theory, that was an option. Now,

37:09

Kashmir was one of the

37:11

last holdouts. It had a Hindu

37:13

Raja, but its population was

37:15

majority Muslim. But interestingly,

37:18

one of the most kind of

37:20

secularized and led by a radical

37:23

leftist Sheikh Abdullah. And

37:26

Pakistan decided to

37:28

force Kashmir's hand by

37:30

actually invading Kashmir. And

37:33

India said it could help only if the

37:35

Maharaja signed an instrumental succession

37:39

joining India and Kashmir joined India.

37:41

Pakistan never recognized the legitimacy of

37:44

that extension. And there's a long

37:46

history of Pakistan

37:48

fermenting active terrorist and

37:50

militant violence in Kashmir for much

37:52

of the 20th century. And

37:55

just to put a fine point on

37:57

it, I mean, this Himalayan province. one

38:00

of the most beautiful places on

38:03

Earth. I've been there many times

38:05

and it's extraordinary. But you're talking

38:07

about a flashpoint between two nuclear

38:09

armed countries, right, Pakistan and India.

38:12

And it's a very explosive situation.

38:14

I mean, I just wanted to underscore how

38:16

sort of tender and fragile the status of Kashmir

38:19

is. It is, and unfortunately, I think it

38:21

was a failure for Indian democracy. Kashmir

38:24

also had special status in the

38:26

Indian Constitution. According to

38:28

the terms of accession, the

38:30

Indian state was going to conduct Kashmir's

38:32

foreign policy. There'd be a minimum set

38:34

of common laws, but Kashmir was supposed

38:36

to have a great deal of autonomy

38:39

in terms of governing its own affairs. But

38:42

unfortunately, I think the

38:45

Indian state's relationship with Kashmir

38:47

got securitized very early on.

38:50

I mean, every political protest, every kind

38:52

of political dissension was being looked at

38:55

through this prism of, are

38:57

there really kind of courts, secessionists in

38:59

place, right? Kashmir is the only

39:02

state in India where there was a sense

39:04

that the elections were not entirely free and

39:06

fair. It's constantly interfering

39:08

in elections. It is

39:10

putting Kashmir internally under the state of siege.

39:13

Pakistan is actively, in some senses,

39:16

formatting violent and terrorist groups. Even

39:19

when it was open for tourism, it

39:22

became an immensely militarized place,

39:24

about half a million troops,

39:26

guarding kind of Kashmiri security checkpoints. There was

39:29

a sense of great sense of siege about

39:31

Kashmir. Yeah, and it's this

39:33

place, there's this beautiful lake and people

39:35

stay in houseboats and you've got the

39:37

amazing Himalayan skyline. But there was this

39:40

sense that you were stopped and asked

39:42

for identification constantly, flying in

39:44

and out of the airport. You

39:46

felt a sense of

39:49

surveillance. And this is

39:51

for an outsider, for my many

39:53

Kashmiri friends and particularly journalists, this

39:55

sense of being surveilled and having

39:59

your rights curtailed was really, really

40:01

powerful. And so what did Modi do

40:03

in 2019? So

40:06

one of the RSS's

40:08

planks, the organization

40:10

that Modi belongs to, was that

40:12

if you actually wanted the integration

40:15

of Kashmir into India, Article 370

40:18

had to go. That would be

40:20

a constitutional statement that Kashmir is a

40:22

part of India, just like any other

40:24

part. And it would also send a

40:26

signal to Pakistan that we are not

40:28

even thinking that this is disputed territory. I mean,

40:30

just forget about it. And

40:32

this has been part of BJP's manifesto

40:34

forever. I mean, so at one level,

40:36

there was no surprise. I mean, I

40:38

think we just never took them literally

40:40

in some ways, right? So

40:43

what they did was they

40:45

basically revoked Article 370.

40:47

And on the grounds that

40:51

Kashmir needs to be a state

40:53

like any other state in the

40:55

Indian Union, no special

40:57

privileges. And

41:00

the government's view was we are going

41:02

to restore administrative order. So we are

41:04

going to clamp down on militants. We

41:07

are going to attract investment by

41:09

creating law and order. And

41:12

to be honest, it has had

41:14

mixed results. I mean, the government can

41:16

claim that at least the outbreak of

41:18

violence has not been as bad as

41:21

many had feared, many of us had feared actually. But

41:25

it still remains the case that

41:27

there are still pockets of militancy.

41:30

And there is still a

41:32

significant clamp down on

41:35

civil liberties, on reporting on Kashmir, on the

41:37

free movement of

41:39

journalists in Kashmir. If you're

41:41

a journalist in Kashmir, you really have

41:44

an impossible task ahead of you. Even

41:46

outside of Kashmir, most

41:48

Indian mainstream papers will not

41:51

carry stories critical of what's

41:53

happening in Kashmir. Now,

41:55

what I mean by the Kashmirization of India,

41:57

I mean, partly, of course, you know, it's

41:59

a call of was sort

42:01

of a pre-decure kind of provocation. But unfortunately,

42:03

I think the grain of truth in this

42:05

was that what

42:08

the government was trying to demonstrate in

42:10

Kashmir was that a

42:14

strong repressive surveillance state

42:18

was going to be

42:20

the more effective means of

42:23

integrating Indian citizens into

42:25

the state, rather than

42:27

a faith in democracy, pluralism,

42:29

and open society. And

42:32

many of the practices that we

42:35

experimented on in Kashmir, detailed

42:38

surveillance, preventive

42:40

detention, the idea

42:43

of expanding the remit of

42:45

who you hold under suspicion,

42:48

that those practices of the state

42:50

would become much more generalized and

42:53

be replicated elsewhere in India. You

42:56

can see that in a state like

42:59

UP, where the Chief Minister is very

43:01

popular, but one of

43:03

his characteristic modes of governance is a

43:05

form of vigilante justice. If

43:08

you are suspected, and the

43:10

key word here is suspected, and particularly

43:12

if you're a member of the minority community, of

43:15

let's say even participating in a protest, your

43:18

house can become in bulldozers without due process. So

43:22

this arsenal of repression

43:24

and looking upon the

43:26

citizens as objects of

43:28

presumptive distrust, that's

43:31

really what the Indian state did in Kashmir at the end of

43:33

the day. That is

43:35

becoming a much more generalized practice

43:38

of governance, I think

43:40

across India. It's interesting

43:42

because I'm always trying to kind of check

43:44

my own assumptions here because, you

43:46

know, the people that I talk to, my friends, they're journalists,

43:48

they're people who are in kind

43:51

of activist communities or politics

43:53

adjacent. And the report that I hear

43:55

from them about sort of

43:57

the general mood across India is very much.

44:00

what you're describing, this kind of

44:02

cashmerization. Muslims have felt

44:04

the sort of the first brunt of it.

44:06

But anybody seeking to live a different kind

44:08

of life or to report honestly on what's

44:11

happening in the country and, you know, is

44:13

ultimately feeling the sharp end of that stick.

44:16

But the thing that you sort of balance that up again

44:18

is that I think really

44:20

striking popularity of Narendra Modi. And my

44:23

friend, the journalist from here, Sharma, wrote in

44:25

2019, after Modi's party

44:27

was reelected, he said, we do

44:30

not live in Modi's India. We live

44:32

in India's India. And the reason so

44:34

many Indians adore Modi is because he

44:36

represents their preferred conception of the Indian

44:38

state and the Indian nation. And it

44:41

reminded me of something that you wrote, which is that

44:44

tyranny can be the stepchild of democracy,

44:46

which is a great paraphrase from Plato.

44:49

The theory that, you know, you

44:51

could build a majoritarian project on

44:53

the votes of Hindus alone, it's

44:56

clearly working. No, it

44:59

is clearly working. So look, you

45:02

know, if you want to take a hopeful story, and the

45:04

opposition will keep reminding you of this, they will keep saying

45:06

something like 60% of Indians

45:08

still don't vote for the BJP. In

45:11

a first pass the post system,

45:13

parliamentary system, roughly about

45:15

38 to 40% of the

45:17

world can actually get your pretty dominant majority

45:19

in parliament. But there

45:21

is a lesson in that. And the

45:23

lesson is that, like everywhere in the

45:25

world, that ethnic

45:28

majoritarian forces have come to

45:30

power. It is largely

45:32

because the forces arrayed against

45:35

them have failed to credibly

45:37

unite on a coherent platform.

45:40

So the center and left in India, you

45:42

know, 20 different ways, but

45:44

I think more deeply, I think, and

45:46

I actually do think the cultural transformation

45:49

that I see of India is truly

45:51

astonishing. Large sections of

45:53

India's elites in particular, right,

45:56

those who are most

45:58

powerful. place

46:01

to resist this. I

46:04

think their ideological conversion to

46:06

this project is

46:08

actually quite significant. If you look

46:11

at the Indian media landscape, it's

46:14

one thing to say that the

46:16

media does not criticize government. Maybe

46:18

they fear reprisals. Often

46:21

the owners of media might fear

46:23

reprisals. But what you are

46:25

seeing in the Indian media is

46:27

actually something much more than simply

46:30

complying with the state. It

46:32

is actually creating and disseminating

46:34

structures of hate, fully

46:37

funded by the most

46:39

powerful echelons of Indian

46:41

capital. This is

46:44

going way beyond we fear the state and

46:46

we will not criticize it. There

46:48

is almost like a positive investment

46:50

in that information order, day

46:52

in and day out. It's actually unbearable to

46:55

read many of the regional papers

46:57

these days. English media you see

46:59

somewhat little less of it, but

47:01

it stays there or on television

47:03

media for example. The Indian Supreme

47:05

Court, really an extraordinary

47:07

puzzle. We used to say in 2009, the years

47:09

you were here, that

47:12

the Indian Supreme Court had become one of the

47:14

most powerful courts in the world. In fact, the

47:17

criticism of the Indian Supreme Court was it pretty

47:19

much did what it wanted meddled in, whichever

47:22

issue it wanted, far

47:25

beyond its jurisdictional competence. One

47:28

of the most disappointing things has been the near

47:32

abdication of the Supreme Court in

47:35

protecting basic civil liberties. The

47:38

extent of it is so mind boggling that

47:41

you have got to think that deep

47:43

down there is a kind of some kind of

47:46

allegiance to this project that is

47:48

actually surfacing. It's not simply held

47:50

together by fear of reprisal.

47:53

So for those of us who grew up

47:55

in India, I have not seen an elite

47:58

discourse that so

48:01

openly participates, revels

48:03

in disseminating hate,

48:06

as I see at this moment in India, not even

48:08

at the height of the temple movement in the 1990s.

48:13

The one most important function of

48:15

the leader is to be at least

48:18

able to articulate a norm. This

48:22

is right, this is wrong, this is what

48:24

we accept, this is what we don't. It's

48:26

a measure of how far India has

48:28

come that the leadership

48:31

is not only unwilling to articulate

48:33

this norm, it

48:35

is often dog whistling about

48:38

targeting minorities. We

48:41

had this extraordinary scene in parliament where

48:43

a senior leader of the BJP in

48:47

parliament said something of

48:49

one of the few Muslim MPs

48:51

in parliament that you

48:53

could not even say with censored

48:55

speech. It's the

48:57

kind of thing you'd expect out of

49:00

a text called Mein Kampf. In

49:03

the Indian parliament, senior BJP leader,

49:06

he has been rewarded. You

49:08

are now empowering a

49:11

set of people, an ideology,

49:15

and sending out a signal that if you want

49:17

to move up in this political system, you

49:20

have to engage in acts

49:22

of hate or violence

49:25

or commit yourself publicly to this

49:28

project. I mean, this is

49:30

completely unprecedented. This is a

49:32

shattering of the norms. This

49:57

podcast is supported by the ACLU. The

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ACLU needs your support to continue

50:02

defending the rights of all people

50:04

nationwide. Right now, our freedoms are

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under attack. People are traveling hundreds

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of miles to find abortion care.

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Puerto Rico, the ACLU is taking

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these attacks head-on. Protect

50:27

everyone's rights. Donate at

50:29

aclu.org today. It's

50:39

really striking to me that we've gotten

50:41

to this place now where

50:44

you have India kind of

50:46

emerging on the global stage as such a critical

50:48

player because there are

50:51

big, powerful countries like the United

50:53

States but also others that

50:55

are seeking India to take its place

50:57

on the global stage as a counterweight

50:59

to China. What recommends it

51:02

for that role is precisely the fact

51:04

that it sees itself, it

51:06

describes itself and is seen by others

51:08

as a secular,

51:10

pluralistic democracy. So there's this

51:13

tremendous irony that at

51:15

precisely the moment you're seeking a democratic counterweight

51:17

to China, the obvious candidate

51:19

for that role, its

51:21

democracy is, from what we've discussed,

51:23

seems really deeply imperiled. No,

51:26

it is. And, you know, if you

51:28

look at India's projection

51:30

abroad, one of Mr. Modi's

51:32

favorite tropes these days, India is the

51:34

mother of all democracies. I

51:37

mean, that's the kind of tagline and a

51:39

kind of guru to the world. But

51:41

it is a performance. This

51:44

government's diagnosis, and Trump's election may

51:46

have something to do with it,

51:48

the way in which the kind

51:50

of world changed post-Trump, is that

51:52

there is not going to

51:54

be any penalty for

51:57

India's actions domestically.

52:00

And to be fair to them, their

52:02

reading of the international system has been just right.

52:05

That somehow they think in the end

52:07

the United States is strategic imperative, rather

52:10

than its imperative in democracy and

52:12

pluralism will actually trump

52:15

their engagement with India. By

52:18

the way, it's also happening in

52:20

the moment where the exemplarity

52:23

and authority of

52:25

almost all democratic countries around the world

52:27

is also at its lowest. I

52:30

can't remember a time where the prestige

52:32

and authority of American democracy was so

52:34

low. It's almost even in

52:37

this state, many Indians are willing to say, oh,

52:39

now we can talk back to the United States.

52:42

So there is no exemplarity and

52:44

authority left to that idea in

52:46

the international system, I think. And

52:50

this goes to one of the fundamental tenets

52:52

of Hindu nationalism as

52:54

a ideology. Their

52:58

diagnosis of India's success

53:00

and failure is very different from

53:02

at least mine, possibly yours

53:04

and most of the world's. The

53:07

two figures in Indian history,

53:11

they hate the most, they revile the most

53:13

are Gautam Buddha and

53:16

Mahatma Gandhi. I mean,

53:18

this is a party that openly

53:20

celebrates Mahatma Gandhi's

53:22

assassin. And

53:25

there is almost this sense

53:27

of embarrassment they have that somehow

53:29

this whole talk of nonviolence actually

53:31

made us weak. It

53:33

made us less respected in the world. America

53:37

took Pakistan more seriously because it created trouble

53:39

in the international system. We never were taken

53:41

seriously, which again, I think is a pretty

53:43

bizarre reading of history actually, but it

53:46

is a kind of political style whose core

53:50

is defined by a certain

53:52

kind of fascination with violence

53:54

and aggression. The

53:57

other has to be created in

53:59

order for this. Hindu

54:01

existential crisis to actually reap

54:04

political dividends. So it

54:06

can be Muslims, it can be secular

54:08

intellectuals, it can be liberals, it can

54:10

be George Soros. God knows why George

54:13

Soros in the Indian context, but... There,

54:15

too, huh? Oh, absolutely. I mean, it's... In

54:18

fact, today the BJP has just put out

54:21

a big political ad, which basically describes the

54:23

Congress party as a film being produced by

54:25

George Soros. So

54:28

in that sense, the

54:30

core of sensibility rests

54:33

on the idea of a kind

54:35

of perpetual Hindu victimhood. One

54:37

place where you sort of see this playing out, and

54:40

obviously this has been very, very big in the news,

54:42

is Canada's assertion that

54:44

India assassinated a Sikh

54:47

activist who is a Canadian citizen in

54:50

Canada. There's a lot of questions about

54:52

what exactly happened here. If

54:54

India is actually responsible for this

54:56

assassination, it's a huge violation of

54:58

international norms, but even

55:00

if they weren't directly involved in it,

55:03

it almost seems to play the game that India

55:05

wants to play on the global stage to

55:07

create the perception that India has

55:10

that capacity and will act as

55:12

it wishes on the

55:14

global stage without deference to the

55:16

kind of quote-unquote rules-based order. Yeah,

55:18

no, I think that's exactly right. What

55:21

is striking sitting in India looking at it is

55:25

how much the political machine of the

55:27

BJP is trying to milk this occasion.

55:29

It's almost like we

55:31

didn't do it, but

55:34

we are capable and it's been a great thing. But if we

55:36

did. It's truly

55:38

actually astonishing how much it

55:42

has been fed into part of that narrative

55:44

of bravado in some ways. You

55:47

know, it's interesting. There's another narrative that I

55:49

hear sort of bubbling along underneath all of

55:51

this, which is I think there's a

55:53

sense in the United States that perhaps we

55:55

were mistaken in how we managed our relationship

55:57

with China. The idea that, you know,

55:59

you. bring China under your wing, you

56:02

integrate them into the global economic system,

56:04

you see

56:06

prosperity rise, you create the linkages that make

56:08

it harder for a country to kind of

56:10

go off on its own. I think

56:13

there's a feeling, well, was that a mistake? Did

56:15

we sort of create the conditions for China to

56:17

become this incredibly powerful country? And now it's, of

56:19

course, our main geopolitical rival. And you hear in

56:22

some quarters a question of like, are we doing

56:24

the same thing again with India? And I wonder

56:26

what you make of that question. And

56:28

I have to be candid, I think sitting in Asia, you know,

56:32

this idea that somehow you

56:34

could structure a global development

56:36

process that shuts

56:39

out countries like China or India

56:42

just sounds so remarkably full of

56:44

hubris and presumption. And, you

56:47

know, I mean, the fact

56:49

that China's integration into

56:51

the global economy actually lifted millions

56:53

and millions of people out of

56:55

poverty, I don't think is

56:58

a human achievement to be sneered at. But the

57:01

idea that India and China could be

57:03

shut out in some

57:05

senses from being competitors or

57:07

participating in the global food,

57:09

science, technology development, frankly,

57:12

I don't think it's even practical

57:14

terms on. In fact, that

57:16

kind of assertion plays exactly into the hands

57:18

of nationalists everywhere. I mean,

57:21

even those who don't support authority

57:23

in governments, you know, when they

57:25

hear a statement like, oh, actually, what the United States

57:27

is going to do is structure the world economy in

57:29

a way in which it retains primacy

57:33

forever. It doesn't

57:35

matter what the authority or democratic right, you're

57:37

not going to particularly push. So I actually

57:40

think it I actually think that the United

57:42

States is on sale. I think I think

57:44

this way of posing the question is I

57:46

think a slightly self defeating one.

57:48

I mean, the easiest

57:50

way of reinforcing

57:53

the conspiratorial mindset of

57:55

Hindu nationalism is

57:57

to actually prove what they have been all

58:00

saying that the world is out to get in

58:02

line is to place it under siege. And

58:04

also I think particularly at a moment in

58:06

world history where it's very hard

58:08

for the United States or

58:12

any other country to pull

58:14

this policy off as if this were a

58:16

matter of principle and conviction. I mean

58:20

how many authoritarian regimes are you going

58:22

to exclude, not do business

58:24

with, right? So I actually

58:27

think if you make

58:29

people's development and democracy

58:31

a tool of geostrategic

58:33

politics, you end up

58:35

doing both geostrategic politics and the cause

58:37

of democracy and development great harm. I

58:40

mean many Indians often talk about this, you know, should

58:43

the Biden administration be doing more? You

58:46

know, they don't have to roll out the red

58:48

carpet. They can say the truth sometimes. I mean

58:50

it can be a perfectly candid relationship. But

58:53

I don't think there is an option but

58:55

to engage with India and I think both in

58:57

some senses will be better off

59:00

it. I also strongly believe that not

59:02

to take away anything from American power but I

59:05

actually think the United States' role

59:08

in how Indian democracy develops

59:11

will be miniscule at most. This

59:14

is a struggle that Indians will

59:16

have to undertake internally. I

59:18

mean maybe most of us are still complacent. The

59:21

way in which violence is being enacted

59:23

in Indian democracy still feels like in

59:26

drips and dribbles. I mean most of us can

59:29

still go around our daily business thinking

59:31

this is not going to affect us but

59:35

most of us still hope and still believe,

59:37

I mean otherwise we won't even be having

59:39

this conversation, that yes

59:41

the signs look ominous for Indian

59:43

democracy but at some

59:46

point will come a threshold

59:49

where ordinary Indians begin to

59:51

say that look this is

59:53

not us. Now

59:55

what that threshold is is an open question but

59:57

I actually do believe that that threshold will be

59:59

reached. and you will find

1:00:01

Indian society reacting appropriately. I

1:00:04

think that is a very good and

1:00:06

hopeful note to perhaps wrap up our

1:00:08

conversation on. And you

1:00:10

know, as a person who loves and

1:00:12

admires India very much, I very

1:00:15

much want to believe in

1:00:17

that prognosis. And you know, next year is an

1:00:19

election year. It'll be interesting to see what happens.

1:00:21

I think most people think that the BJP will

1:00:23

come back. But lots

1:00:26

of things can happen. The world

1:00:28

spins on. So at the

1:00:30

end of every episode of the Ezra Klein

1:00:32

Show, we ask our guests to recommend some

1:00:34

books. Could you recommend three

1:00:36

books that our listeners could

1:00:38

benefit from to understand India

1:00:41

democracy and the world better? Okay,

1:00:44

so I'll go with a couple of

1:00:46

unusual choices. One which is

1:00:49

not recent is I actually

1:00:51

still think reading V.S.

1:00:54

Naipaul's India trilogy,

1:00:56

which is now one book. I

1:00:59

think he and partly

1:01:01

because he himself was such

1:01:04

a complicated and many ways awful

1:01:06

characters. I think he

1:01:09

actually saw the moral psychology of

1:01:11

what's happening in various Indian social

1:01:13

movements. I think much more clearly

1:01:15

than I think many first

1:01:18

liberals and constitutionalists have recognized

1:01:20

this theme of India

1:01:23

thinking of itself as a wounded civilization

1:01:26

and now trying to kind of claim

1:01:28

something of that itself through this path

1:01:30

of violence and Hindu nationalism. Besides,

1:01:33

I mean, he's a wonderful writer to

1:01:35

read. I think the second

1:01:37

book I pick is a recent book

1:01:39

by Shiv Shankar Menon. The

1:01:42

title is India in Asian Geopolitics.

1:01:45

But it's really about India's place in the world, incredibly

1:01:48

well written, but also somebody who's

1:01:50

both a deep historian and has

1:01:53

had the benefit of having a ring-sized seat.

1:01:55

I think it's the single best book on

1:01:57

India's place in the world. The

1:02:00

third I would recommend, I mean

1:02:02

this is a sort of slightly more

1:02:04

kind of quirky recommendation,

1:02:08

is a book

1:02:10

by Snigdha Poonam called

1:02:12

The Dreamers. This

1:02:15

is a book that kind of captures

1:02:17

the craziness and the

1:02:19

contradictory textures of this

1:02:22

kind of young educated India, right?

1:02:24

I mean some of those linguistically

1:02:26

sanded people we talk about, the

1:02:28

IT hackers, you know, the would-be

1:02:31

Indian idols, I mean the Indian

1:02:33

version of American Idol, the music

1:02:35

program. It does have kind of

1:02:37

enough of those sort of quirky life biographies

1:02:40

to make it an interesting introduction

1:02:42

to India beneath the surface

1:02:45

of these large themes of

1:02:47

politics and economics. Those

1:02:49

are all wonderful, wonderful recommendations. Chris

1:02:52

Hoppanumesa, thank you so much for being with us.

1:02:55

Thank you so much and good luck to both our democracies.

1:02:58

Amen to that. This

1:03:07

episode of the Ezra Klein Show was produced

1:03:09

by Roland Hu. Fact-checking

1:03:11

by Michelle Harris. Mixing by

1:03:13

a theme Shapiro. Our senior engineer

1:03:15

is Jeff Gelt. Our senior editor

1:03:17

is Claire Gordon. The show's

1:03:20

production team also includes Emmepha Agawu

1:03:22

and Kristen Lin. Original

1:03:24

music by Isaac Jones. Audience

1:03:26

strategy by Christina Similoski and Shannon

1:03:28

Busta. The executive producer of

1:03:31

New York Times opinion audio is Annie Rose

1:03:33

Strasser. This

1:03:40

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