0:00

I'm Dan Kurtz-Feland and this

0:02

is the Foreign Affairs interview.

0:04

As long as Trump is the most popular

0:06

Republican, as long as he is

0:08

more popular within Republican ranks, than

0:11

anyone who opposes him, you're not

0:13

going to see defection. It's because

0:15

no one's experienced this kind of

0:18

authoritarianism before that they sort of

0:20

figure can't happen to them. A

0:22

month into Donald Trump's second term

0:25

in office, many are alarmed by

0:27

what they see as emerging signs

0:29

of democratic erosion. In a new

0:32

essay called The Path to American

0:34

Authoritarianism, the scholars Stephen Levitzki and

0:36

Lucan Way make the case that

0:39

such alarm is justified, that the

0:41

administration's early moves could herald an

0:43

irreversible transformation of the US political

0:45

system with major implications for global

0:48

democracy. drawing on their research on

0:50

democratic decline worldwide, Levitsky and Way

0:52

argue that the United States faces

0:55

a particular kind of risk that

0:57

many observers miss, a form of

0:59

competitive authoritarianism in which elections continue

1:02

with a state apparatus is weaponized

1:04

against opposition. They spoke with senior

1:06

editor E. Fairbanks about the global

1:08

playbook for authoritarian regimes and the

1:11

stakes for U.S. democracy. Hi,

1:17

Lucan. Hi, Steve. It's a real pleasure

1:20

to have you. And I'm really excited

1:22

to talk about your piece. You wrote

1:24

for our recent issue, The Path to

1:26

American authoritarianism. And you made the case

1:28

in that piece that, and I'm quoting

1:30

you here, American democracy will

1:33

likely break down during

1:35

the second Trump administration

1:37

in the sense that it will cease

1:39

to meet standard criteria for liberal

1:41

democracy. And you argue in the

1:43

piece that No matter how much distaste

1:45

some American voters may feel for

1:47

Trump, they may not have understood what was

1:50

coming this term because, and you wrote,

1:52

the breakdown of democracy in the

1:54

United States will not give rise

1:56

to a classic dictatorship in which

1:59

elections are a shame. and opposition forces

2:01

are locked up, Trump will

2:03

not be able to rewrite the

2:05

Constitution, but contemporary authoritarianism

2:07

does not require the

2:09

destruction of the constitutional

2:11

order. So can you

2:13

walk us through this new form

2:16

of what you call competitive

2:18

authoritarianism or elected autocracy that's

2:21

really emerged since the Cold

2:23

War? Maybe Steve you can tell us

2:25

about that and why that's emerged.

2:27

Competitive authoritarian regimes

2:29

are regimes that are

2:31

actually competitive in the

2:33

sense that there are

2:35

multi-party elections. There is,

2:37

the opposition is legal,

2:39

the opposition is above

2:42

board and competes seriously for

2:44

power. And once a while even

2:46

wins, I would say Poland

2:49

in 2023 is an example

2:51

of the opposition winning in

2:54

a competitive authoritarian election. So

2:56

from a bit of a

2:58

distance, competitive authoritarian regimes

3:01

may look democratic. But

3:03

they're not democratic, because

3:05

systematic weaponization

3:07

and abuse of the state, of

3:10

the machinery of government, and

3:12

its deployment against critics

3:14

and rivals, tilts the

3:16

playing field against the opposition.

3:18

So competition is real, but

3:20

it's not fair. There are abusive

3:23

power in every democracy.

3:25

There are civil liberties violations

3:27

in every democracy, but

3:29

in competitive authoritarian regimes,

3:31

it's systematic enough that it

3:33

begins to tilt the playing field

3:36

against the opposition. As you mentioned,

3:38

this is mostly a post-cold war

3:40

phenomena. There have been competitive authoritarian

3:43

regimes at other times in history,

3:45

but they became much, much more

3:47

widespread after the collapse of communism,

3:49

because beginning in the late 1980s,

3:51

and I would say even still

3:53

today, Electoral regimes, competitive elections

3:56

are really the most globally

3:58

legitimate political. arrangement.

4:00

It's really hard, it's really costly

4:03

to just shove aside elections entirely

4:05

and rule with a single party

4:07

as in the communist era or

4:09

with the military like Pinochet or

4:12

Franco. There are some such regimes

4:14

but there's still much much less

4:16

common. It's still much more legitimate

4:19

to hold elections and so the

4:21

majority of new autocracies that

4:23

have been born in the 21st century

4:25

have been this, have been competitive

4:28

authoritarian regimes, elected governments, that

4:30

abused power until the playing

4:32

field against arrivals. You know,

4:34

in the 1970s, almost all of authoritarian

4:36

regimes were kind of formal in the

4:38

sense that there was no elections to

4:41

the top executive. It was, you know,

4:43

formal, single-party rule. Now, close to 80%

4:45

of autocracies of authoritarian regimes have some

4:48

sort of multi-candidated elections for the executive.

4:50

So it's really become, in some ways

4:52

the modal form of authoritarianism. since the

4:54

end of the Cold War, even today.

4:57

I think we have the sense in

4:59

the United States. Maybe we're a little

5:01

bit behind in our way of thinking,

5:03

or a little stuck in the Cold

5:06

War, and we think of these dictatorships

5:08

where opposition parties are locked up and

5:10

that really have repressive features.

5:12

And people that I have spoken to,

5:15

they say, well, you know, Trump has

5:17

all these kinds of limitations and look

5:19

at his first term. He promised a

5:21

lot. He had certain, you know, big

5:23

goals and in the end he wasn't

5:25

able to break the system. We had

5:27

Biden, it seemed like a sort

5:30

of normal presidency. You argue in

5:32

your piece that this second term is

5:34

really different from the first and why

5:36

is that? Maybe Lucan. And the first

5:39

term when Trump was the first

5:41

elected in 2016, you know, really

5:43

no one expected him to win.

5:45

He was himself quite surprised. He

5:47

had, you know, just undertaken the kind

5:49

of hostile takeover of the Republican

5:52

Party. He had virtually no allies

5:54

in the party and so he

5:56

was basically forced to rely on many

5:58

establishment figures who shared basic

6:00

commitments to the democratic system. And

6:02

he also had no plan coming

6:05

in. He was very ad hoc.

6:07

And as a result, many of

6:09

his kind of worst instincts were

6:11

held in check. Various efforts to

6:13

prosecute people like John Kerry and

6:15

Hillary Clinton sort of never really

6:18

saw the light of day in

6:20

large part because career government officials

6:22

basically nixed them before they could

6:24

sort of take shape. Now it's a

6:26

really different situation he's had eight years

6:29

to, you know, establish a stunning

6:31

degree of control over the Republican

6:33

Party. I mean, the Republican Party

6:35

now is just willing to basically

6:38

do anything he tells them to.

6:40

And as a result, the kind

6:42

of transformation I think has been

6:44

stunning. And I just want to add

6:46

here that this piece was written, you

6:48

know, a few weeks ago. It feels to

6:50

me very optimistic in some ways, if

6:53

I had to rewrite it. I think

6:55

most Steve and I are kind of

6:57

much less confident. in the sort of

6:59

core features of the democratic system

7:01

than we were. Just to reiterate, Trump

7:03

came in with no team and no

7:06

plan the first time around in 2017

7:08

and he did not control the Republican

7:10

Party. And so he governed

7:12

with conservative technocrats and more

7:15

or less mainstream Republican politicians

7:17

and they constrained him. None

7:19

of that is true anymore. He completely

7:22

owns the Republican Party. There was

7:24

no dissent. There is no check

7:26

from the Republican Party. The

7:28

entire House of Representatives, led

7:30

by Republicans, has abdicated and

7:33

stepped aside. And Trump is

7:35

governing with loyalists, not with either

7:37

skilled technocrats or Republican

7:40

politicians. He's governing with

7:42

loyalists. There are no adults in

7:44

the room. There are no checks on his

7:46

behavior. Which is not to say he'll get

7:48

away with everything he wants to get

7:50

away with, but he is much, much

7:52

greater room to maneuver. then he had

7:55

the first term. Yeah, on one

7:57

hand there's this amazing sense

7:59

that Even observers, foreign observers,

8:01

I'm sitting down here in

8:04

South Africa, South Africans who've

8:06

been quite targeted by Trump,

8:08

Americans, are very shocked by what's

8:10

actually transpired in his first

8:13

few weeks. And yet, on the

8:15

other hand, the really fascinating thing

8:17

about your piece is that it shows

8:19

there's a real blueprint that he's following.

8:21

In other words, there could have been

8:24

an expectation of... some

8:26

of what he's done if you really

8:28

understood this regime form that you guys

8:30

lay out. So let's just sketch that

8:33

out. You begin by really

8:35

describing the very granular ways

8:37

that authoritarians who

8:39

enter in a competitive system

8:41

who still have elections begin

8:43

by purging the civil service.

8:46

Why is that so important?

8:48

Yeah, I mean, so basically, even

8:50

in a country like the United

8:52

States, which is relatively less The

8:54

government just has enormous power over

8:56

people's lives. It can sort of

8:58

arrest you, it can investigate you,

9:00

it audits you, it can tax

9:02

you. For businesses, it's enormously important

9:05

in terms of providing contracts, in

9:07

terms of regulating fast sectors of

9:09

the economy. So leaders just have

9:11

enormous power to attack opposition and

9:13

undermine their ability to compete in

9:15

democratic system, which is why all

9:17

modern democracies, you know, the United

9:19

States in the late 19th and

9:22

early 20th centuries, developed a series

9:24

of measures that basically restricted the

9:26

ability of politicians to politicize

9:28

the state. They kind of created

9:30

an arms-length relationship between many of

9:33

the bureaucrats who make core decisions

9:35

that are important for everyday lives,

9:37

like tax audit and partisanship. And

9:40

this was basically what kept democracy

9:42

intact for the last century. And

9:44

so this has begun to change, and

9:46

this is the most important impediment

9:48

to kind of creating an authoritarian

9:51

regime, and this is why in

9:53

countries like Hungary and Turkey and

9:55

India, populists have come to power and

9:57

this has been, they first had to

9:59

attack. this sort of independent

10:02

bureaucracy because it's

10:04

the most important

10:06

impediment to creating

10:08

an authoritarian regime.

10:10

So in many

10:12

ways, as we

10:14

say in the piece, these

10:17

bureaucrats, there's sort of

10:19

unsexy bureaucrats, are really

10:21

on the front lines

10:24

of preserving democracy today.

10:26

weapon available is the

10:28

state itself. You wield

10:30

the state against your opponents.

10:32

That can be done in

10:34

a constitutional way. That doesn't, in

10:37

most cases, violate the Constitution.

10:39

That's all true. There is an

10:41

established pattern. You could look at

10:43

what Orban, what Uvachavas, what

10:45

Erdogan did, and predict it.

10:48

But there's another reason why the

10:50

establishment ought not to have been shocked

10:52

in 2024, 2025. Trump said he was

10:54

going to do all of this. And

10:56

the Republican Party has been

10:59

clear, has been crystal clear

11:01

since 2020-21 that it is

11:04

willing to acquiesce to,

11:06

if not support, an authoritarian

11:08

project. I'm not exaggerating.

11:11

Donald Trump tried to overturn

11:13

the results of the 2020

11:16

election and block a peaceful

11:18

transfer of power, and

11:20

the Republican Party decided

11:22

to nominate him for

11:25

president again. Donald Trump

11:27

promised to do, with a partial

11:29

exception of the Doge stuff, promised to

11:31

do every single one of the things

11:33

that he's doing, lawsuits against the

11:35

press, wielding the IRS and the

11:37

Justice Department against the Pronis. He

11:39

told us he was going to

11:42

do this. So how the

11:44

establishment was shocked that this is

11:46

going on, quite frankly, is beyond me.

11:48

You said it's beyond you. I mean,

11:50

I was going to ask you, Steve. Why

11:52

do you think that Americans... And even some

11:54

observers of the United States had such

11:56

a hard time envisioning this. One thing

11:58

you say in your piece is that some

12:01

elements of this have happened

12:03

in US history before. For

12:05

instance, Nixon politicized the IRS

12:07

to go after his political

12:09

enemies. You give the example

12:12

of the Jim Crow South where,

12:14

to put it generously, law enforcement

12:16

actors turned a blind eye

12:18

to really serious efforts to

12:21

prevent black citizens to vote

12:23

and therefore tilted the electoral

12:25

playing field in their favor.

12:27

And yet you present this.

12:29

period is really different and also,

12:31

and I wonder what you think maybe

12:33

the closest example is if people

12:36

are really struggling to fire up

12:38

their imaginations or if that's even

12:40

what's needed. Why is it so

12:42

hard? You know, it is true

12:44

that some of this we've seen

12:46

before, I mean, the most obvious

12:49

example is Richard Nixon in the

12:51

1970s, but I also think it's

12:53

really important to understand that we

12:55

are in a completely different era

12:57

than we were in the 1970s.

12:59

that Republican senators would convict him

13:01

after his impeachment by the House.

13:03

None of this is the case

13:05

now. Trump faces literally no

13:07

restrictions on his activity. There's

13:09

really sort of no checks on

13:11

his power, which is quite different

13:13

from what it's been in the past.

13:16

And I think basically part of what's

13:18

going on is one that just, you know,

13:20

I think that United States, we just

13:22

have not experienced this in the modern

13:24

era and there was a kind of

13:27

false sense of complacency that was created

13:29

by the failure of Trump in his

13:31

first term, which I think he failed

13:33

because the context was quite different than

13:35

as we've just talked about. I also

13:37

think it's similar to with vaccines right

13:39

now. There's sort of a lot of

13:41

the opposition to vaccines as a function

13:44

that people have never experienced measles. They've

13:46

never experienced a lot of these polio

13:48

and horrible diseases. And I think it's

13:50

because you know no one's experience this

13:52

kind of authoritarianism before

13:54

that they sort of figure can't happen to

13:56

them and so I think you know as a

13:59

result of this complacency but also sort of

14:01

active support on the part of

14:03

the Republican Party, we're in a

14:05

kind of particularly dangerous moment right

14:07

now. That's an excellent point,

14:09

but it's worse than that. It's as if

14:12

not only people not experienced

14:14

polio or measles, but we act

14:16

as if it never happened in

14:18

the United States before. So one

14:20

reason why we're in the mess

14:22

that we're in... in terms of

14:24

public expectations and the public's inability

14:26

to come to grips with what's

14:29

happening is that Americans have a

14:31

really strong tendency to whitewash our

14:33

past, right? Most Americans don't

14:35

know or think about

14:37

reconstruction. Most Americans have never

14:40

thought about the fact that the

14:42

U.S. South was under single-party

14:44

authoritarian rule for 80 years.

14:46

We don't think about the fact

14:49

that the... red scares and McCarthyism

14:51

were serious violations of

14:53

civil liberties. And that

14:55

we were by contemporary measures,

14:58

by mainstream contemporary measures, not

15:00

a full democratic regime until

15:03

1965 in this country. So if we

15:05

took seriously some of the

15:07

democratic deficits that we had in the

15:09

past, it might be easier to come

15:12

to terms. One other point though, this

15:14

is unusual territory. No

15:16

democracy even remotely as

15:18

rich. or as old as US

15:20

democracies ever broken down. No democracy

15:22

over the age of 50 has

15:25

ever died. Ever. And even if

15:27

you take the birth date of

15:29

US democracies 1965, we're above 50. And

15:31

so old risk democracies

15:33

never die. And that's

15:35

another reason for complacency.

15:37

Yeah, so if you look at a lot of

15:39

the social scientists who rely on historical

15:41

data, basically say there's a zero percent

15:44

chance. of democratic breakdown in the United

15:46

States, which is just patently ridiculous. I

15:48

mean, it is a really, I think

15:50

Steve and I have talked about this

15:53

a lot, this is really a kind

15:55

of, in many ways, a stunning failure

15:57

of political science to really not.

16:00

this at all, and I think we're sort of

16:02

still kind of grappling with that. So

16:04

you talk about, and to be a

16:06

bit reductive, people must read your

16:08

essay, but kind of three ways,

16:10

sequentially, that authoritarian figures that rise

16:12

to the top of a democratic

16:14

regime, transform this regime into something,

16:16

and it's really important to stress,

16:19

I think, that you're talking about

16:21

the United States becoming effectively a

16:23

different regime form, and you're really

16:25

trying to say this is happening.

16:28

It's already happening. We're in the

16:30

middle of it, and we really

16:32

need to grapple with that. And

16:34

those three ways are first

16:37

the weaponization of the

16:39

bureaucracy by prosecuting using

16:41

the law, defamation suits,

16:44

lawsuits, investigations of opposition groups,

16:46

and to tilt the playing

16:48

field such that it still

16:50

looks like there is a

16:52

game, but you can't play

16:54

it fairly. And then, of

16:56

course, doing this. purge of the

16:59

civil service and putting in

17:01

loyalists. But the third component

17:03

that I think there's some attention

17:05

on, but maybe not enough,

17:08

is co-optation. So not

17:10

only negative pressure that

17:12

an authoritarian will put on

17:14

their opponents and critics, but

17:17

using the state, using the

17:19

bureaucracy to create

17:21

inducements to comply for business,

17:23

for anybody who might be opposed to

17:25

the regime. walk us through a little

17:28

bit how that works and give us

17:30

an example or two of another

17:32

country in which that's been an effective

17:35

way to consolidate a party's

17:37

advantage. Yeah, so I think you know one one

17:39

useful place to start is by

17:41

looking at the media sector in

17:43

the United States, you know, the

17:45

first kind of initial competitive authoritarianism

17:47

has really been felt most of,

17:49

you know, most clearly in the

17:51

media. And the problem really comes

17:53

down to the fact that in the

17:56

sort of modern economy in the

17:58

United States, media companies are part

18:00

of larger. conglomerates that have interests

18:02

in a wide variety of

18:04

areas, aerospace, Amazon, and others

18:06

that are deeply affected by

18:08

federal decision making. As a

18:10

result, these companies are incredibly vulnerable

18:13

to pressure by Trump, right? But

18:15

more broadly, the sort of, you

18:17

know, the ways in which business

18:20

can benefit from good relations with

18:22

Trump have convinced a massive number

18:24

of businesses to go in and

18:27

sort of openly alive. with the

18:29

Trump administration. Michelle Goldberg called this

18:31

and we quote this in the

18:33

piece, the great compensation. And this

18:35

is, you know, hugely disturbing and

18:38

I think sort of what you've seen

18:40

is what Timothy Snyder calls obedience

18:42

in advance. So even before Trump

18:44

came to power, they were already

18:46

sort of lining up behind Trump.

18:48

And I think the most immediate

18:50

impacts will see as you see,

18:52

you know, these number of settlements

18:54

made between ABC and very likely

18:56

CBS. that are almost certainly going

18:58

to result in kind of a

19:00

kind of self-censorship by the media

19:02

and sort of mitigation of criticism

19:04

of the Trump administration during this

19:07

term. So I actually find that

19:09

that is something that is already

19:11

occurring right now. These are settlements

19:13

of defamation suits that the companies

19:15

almost certainly would have won, but

19:17

because the parent companies had other

19:19

economic interests at play that

19:21

could be threatened by the

19:23

Trump administration. They decided to settle,

19:26

which is a major concession

19:28

by the media in terms

19:30

of shrinking the space for

19:32

free press. We'll be back after

19:34

a short break. It's not enough

19:37

to have data. You need

19:39

to know how to use

19:41

it. Transform data into actionable

19:43

insights with a four-course graduate

19:46

certificate and competitive business intelligence

19:48

from Georgetown University. You'll explore

19:50

benchmarking strategies, communication tactics, business

19:52

intelligence, and big data analytics

19:55

through this 12-credit program. Later,

19:57

those credits can be applied toward our

19:59

33 credits. did you know

20:01

that foreign affairs has

20:03

an app? Customizable settings

20:05

allow. Did you know

20:08

that foreign affairs has

20:10

an app? Customizable

20:12

settings allow readers

20:14

to listen to professionally

20:17

narrated audio of articles.

20:19

Create playlists, save your

20:22

favorite articles, save your

20:24

favorite articles, read in

20:27

night mode and more.

20:29

Just search for foreign

20:32

affairs in your app

20:34

store and start reading

20:36

wherever you are. Download the

20:39

app today. So, you know,

20:41

a remarkable thing about

20:43

your piece is that between

20:45

when we finalized the text

20:48

and when Trump came into

20:50

office in his first

20:52

couple weeks, a whole lot

20:55

of the things that you

20:57

described. effort to fire mass

21:00

numbers of civil servants, various

21:02

types of threats against the

21:05

media, capitulation, new capitulations by

21:07

media organizations have occurred,

21:09

is there anything in this

21:12

template of competitive authoritarianism

21:14

that you've considered in

21:17

other countries' context that

21:19

we haven't seen yet, but

21:21

that you expect will be coming?

21:23

Yeah, well, one thing I worry

21:25

a lot about. And what you

21:28

see, not in all competitive authoritarian

21:30

regimes, but in some competitive

21:32

authoritarian regimes, is

21:34

the use of political sugary.

21:37

Threats of violence, gangs, militias,

21:39

armed groups, sometimes heavily

21:42

armed sometimes not, but the

21:44

use of political intimidation

21:47

on the ground to silence civil

21:49

society actors and to threaten

21:52

politicians. And they do it

21:54

shielded shielded by the judiciary so

21:56

they're engaging in illegal behavior nowhere

21:58

is it legal to you know, go

22:00

beat up opposition at rallies. But if

22:03

the attorney general or the prosecutors

22:05

of the Justice Department give

22:07

you a wink, then turn a,

22:09

are willing to turn a blind

22:11

eye, which often happens in competitive

22:14

authoritarian regimes, then these guys get

22:16

a certain free reign. They get

22:18

a blank check to engage in

22:21

intimidation politics. That seems far-fetched,

22:23

but it is precisely what

22:25

happened in the US South during

22:27

and after reconstruction. And

22:30

given that the US already has

22:32

a large and armed extremist

22:34

fringe, given that the level

22:36

of threats against politicians

22:38

and judges and prosecutors

22:40

has already skyrocketed in

22:43

recent years, and particularly

22:46

given the huge wink that Donald

22:48

Trump gave by pardoning almost

22:51

all of the January 6th

22:53

insurrectionists, that's

22:55

something... that we see another competitive

22:57

authoritarian regimes that I think could

22:59

easily happen here and is quite

23:02

terrifying. Yeah, you know, competitive authoritarian regimes sort

23:04

of rely not just on the formal

23:06

agents, the police and the like, but

23:08

on sort of football clubs and other

23:10

kind of vigilantes to sort of be

23:12

up protesters and provide a kind of

23:14

a veneer of plausible deniability to the

23:16

regime. And this is kind of stuff

23:18

that, as Steve mentioned, already kind

23:21

of infects the system, it's as

23:23

we mentioned in the piece. probably

23:25

explains why some Republicans opposed

23:27

impeachment after in 2021 when the

23:29

grounds for impeachment were just utterly obvious.

23:31

I would add that we're sort of

23:33

now almost in this period, we can talk

23:35

about this, the Democratic parties in some

23:37

ways kind of shell-shocked, you know, there

23:40

really hasn't been opposition, you know, at

23:42

least on the streets, and as a

23:44

result, I think partly, you know, that's

23:46

kind of kept violence down because there

23:48

hasn't been kind of... vociferous opposition

23:50

but when it does emerge I think we're

23:52

going to see much more of this kind

23:54

of vigilante violence. I want to talk about Democrats

23:57

because that's a big focus the end of

23:59

your piece or opposition let's say

24:01

but first Republicans a lot

24:03

of people that I talked to

24:05

seem to be putting a lot of

24:07

hope in the possibility of an

24:09

emerging overtime Republican opposition so

24:12

intra-group let's take the resignation

24:14

of Danielle Sassoon the acting

24:16

US attorney for the Southern

24:18

District of New York former

24:21

clerk for Antonin Scalia she

24:23

stepped down rather than follow

24:25

this very abnormal requests to dismiss

24:28

charges against the New York mayor

24:30

as a quid pro quo and

24:32

people can kind of lift these

24:34

up and say well at some point you

24:36

know Trump's own party they're

24:38

just gonna have had enough they're

24:41

gonna think this won't work

24:43

for us in the long-term

24:45

electorally you know and they'll

24:47

break with him based on

24:49

your experience looking at other

24:51

contemporary competitive authoritarian regimes, is

24:53

this something to hold out for?

24:55

I mean, I think this is certainly,

24:57

if you look at the breakdown of

24:59

competitive authoritarian regimes, it very often happens

25:01

from within the ruling coalition. And I

25:03

mean, I certainly hope that's right. I

25:05

think both Steve and I can see

25:08

why Steve is shaking his head, quite

25:10

skeptical that this is going to happen. I

25:12

mean, the career costs to people doing

25:14

this is just so enormous. You look

25:16

at sort of Cheney and Kinsijer and

25:19

what they've had to go through these

25:21

or two Republican courageously came out in

25:23

opposition to Trump. It's just kind of

25:25

hard to imagine that many would follow

25:28

that path. And I think it's basically,

25:30

if you look at other competitive authoritarian

25:32

regimes, they've really had large

25:35

scale defections or mass defections

25:37

from the ruling coalition when

25:39

the government is incredibly unpopular, when

25:42

there's sort of the sense that

25:44

there's a danger to one's career

25:46

and sort of livelihood by sort

25:49

of remaining loyal, right? And right now,

25:51

you know, very far from that in

25:53

the United States. I just find it

25:55

really hard to imagine. There have been

25:57

a lot of the old assumes since

25:59

2016. been a drippage of

26:01

principled conservatives who stood

26:04

up for the rule of law and

26:06

stood up for the Constitution, stood up

26:08

for democracy, and as they can point

26:11

it out, every single one of them

26:13

has seen their, at least

26:15

their immediate careers prospects completely

26:18

destroyed. As long as that's the case,

26:20

as long as it is highly likely

26:22

that opposition, internal opposition

26:25

to Trump, will be a career killer.

26:27

You cannot expect large

26:29

numbers of Republicans to

26:31

do it. And in fact, the

26:34

Overton window continues to shift in

26:36

an authoritarian direction, right?

26:38

It was unthinkable in early

26:40

2021, it was unthinkable to allow

26:43

Cash Patel to take a major

26:45

position in the administration. Now

26:47

it looks like he's going to

26:50

be FBI director. This is a

26:52

party that has completely Trump-ized

26:54

and if Trump were to

26:56

become highly unpopular Then he

26:59

will suffer defections, but as long

27:01

as Trump is the most

27:03

popular Republican as long as he

27:06

is more popular within Republican

27:08

ranks Than anyone who opposes

27:11

him You're not going to

27:13

see defection and I think we're

27:15

far from it and your peace one

27:17

of the things that distinguishes

27:19

the US maybe a little bit from

27:21

some other, some other competitive authoritarian

27:24

regimes is the degree of

27:26

political polarization in the sort

27:28

of stasis of party identification.

27:30

And in one sense, that's a

27:32

bit protective, you talk about how

27:34

much damage and how much change

27:36

a person with an 80% approval

27:38

rate riding in can do. And

27:41

you know that one of the

27:43

potential sources of resilience in the

27:45

United States is that Trump

27:47

is I think covering just below 50 and

27:49

can't barely crack that number. He doesn't

27:52

have that level of support. But on

27:54

the other hand, it seems very, very

27:56

difficult for him to drop to 20,

27:59

15 percent. as you see in

28:01

some other places because of this

28:03

just incredible rigidity of this two-party

28:06

system. Give us a quick picture.

28:08

So let's say, come 2028, presuming

28:10

that Trump does not find

28:12

a way to give himself

28:14

a third term, he can't

28:16

redo the Constitution, so he

28:18

can't run again. It's a

28:21

competitive election between Democrats and

28:23

Republicans for both branches of

28:25

the Congress and the executive,

28:27

given what could be entrenched

28:29

of... Trump's authoritarian aims

28:31

over the next four years,

28:33

how might that feel different,

28:36

that election, that type

28:38

of democratic experience than

28:40

it did even for us

28:43

in 2024? It'll depend on a

28:45

number of things. First of all,

28:47

will there be a level

28:49

of sort of grassroots

28:52

intimidation of voters and election

28:54

workers? We could be an

28:56

environment where that remains relatively

28:59

rare, like in recent elections,

29:02

or that could be stepped

29:04

up. You know, the Trump

29:06

administration could make it clear that

29:08

voter intimidation tactics, maybe

29:10

not quite as violent

29:12

as the 1870s in the US

29:15

South, but voter intimidation tactics

29:17

are encouraged or allowed, that

29:19

that could change the vote. And the

29:21

other thing we don't know is just...

29:23

how much the government's use

29:26

of carrots and sticks in

29:28

terms of economic and regulatory

29:30

policy, just how much of

29:33

the private sector arm the

29:35

government's going to be able

29:37

to twist. So my expectation,

29:39

and I hope I'm right, my

29:42

expectation is despite the

29:44

co-optation and the bullying

29:46

of a large number of CEOs

29:49

and wealthy Americans, there will

29:51

still be a fair number. of wealthy

29:54

Americans willing to finance

29:56

Gavin Newsom or Josh

29:58

Shapiro, whomever the Democratic

30:00

Party candidate is. But it's at

30:03

this point not impossible, not even

30:05

that difficult to imagine a world

30:07

where anybody, any individual,

30:09

any upper middle-class American

30:12

thinking about writing a check to

30:14

a Democratic candidate has to think

30:16

twice because maybe it's going to

30:18

increase the likelihood of an IRS

30:20

audit. We're pretty sure the playing field's

30:23

going to tilt a little bit. We're

30:25

not sure how much. My guess, I'm still

30:27

fairly optimistic that we have a big

30:29

and wealthy enough private sector, a big

30:31

and wealthy enough upper middle class, that

30:33

it's not going to make the

30:36

election non-competitive, but it's impossible, at

30:38

least for me, to anticipate just

30:40

how far that level of intimidation

30:42

and co-emptation is going to go. I mean,

30:45

I think another way of putting it is

30:47

I think both of us are quite confident that

30:49

there will be a lot of abuse

30:51

and efforts to intimidate the opposition. I

30:53

think that's, you know. I'd be very surprised if

30:55

that did not happen. You know, if we did

30:58

not live in a world in which people did

31:00

think twice about sort of going into opposition

31:02

to the Trump administration, but I

31:04

think we're a little bit more

31:06

optimistic is whether that intimidation will

31:08

be successful in actually weakening in

31:10

any dramatic way the Democratic Party.

31:12

I think that sort of one

31:14

of the core differences between the

31:16

United States and places like Hungary

31:18

and Turkey is just a much

31:20

more developed capitalist economy. Wealth is

31:22

far more distributed across society. the

31:25

legal system is much stronger, the

31:27

institutions are much stronger, so really

31:29

it's much harder for even someone

31:31

like Trump who's, you know, died

31:33

in the world, autocrat, and basically

31:35

willing to almost do anything to

31:37

be successful. So I think we

31:39

have to distinguish between sort of

31:41

his abuse of power versus the impact

31:44

of that abuse of power. You do right

31:46

very insightfully and in a

31:48

complex way about how the many

31:50

facets on which opposition can

31:52

become enervated and exhausted and

31:54

overwhelmed and unfocused, particularly I

31:57

was struck by this line in

31:59

your piece. The depletion of societal

32:01

opposition to authoritarianism may be

32:03

worse than it appears in

32:05

any given time already. We

32:07

can observe when key political

32:09

players sideline themselves, when politicians

32:11

retire, when university presidents resign,

32:13

but it is harder to

32:15

see the opposition that might

32:17

have materialized in a less

32:19

threatening environment, but never did. The

32:21

young lawyers who decide not to run

32:24

for office, the countless citizens who decide

32:26

not to join a protest, and so on.

32:28

I want you to talk about... sources

32:30

of optimism, sources of

32:33

hope, and how a

32:35

good opposition might

32:37

organize itself to preserve

32:40

the United States democratic

32:43

culture. But do

32:45

you notice any of

32:47

this weariness in yourself or

32:49

in people you know? Right.

32:52

There's a mix of

32:54

fear and exhaustion

32:56

and resignation. in some

32:58

cases just sheer pragmatism

33:01

that different mixes for

33:03

different people but there are

33:05

a number of forces a

33:07

number of emotional forces

33:09

pushing us toward the sideline you

33:12

know in my case I feel

33:14

like there are many times each

33:16

day I think to myself I

33:18

spent eight years doing this and

33:20

for for for what right for

33:23

what and it is exhausting

33:25

And then to get back

33:27

to your point, Eve, when

33:29

you see other people around

33:31

you, people who are more

33:33

powerful, wealthier, better positioned, better

33:36

able to defend themselves

33:38

than you are, Jeff Basos is in

33:40

a much better position

33:42

than I am. When I see

33:44

Jeff Basos and Mark Zookerberg

33:47

getting on their knees, and

33:49

when you see newspapers folding

33:51

and CEOs who you know know

33:54

know better. Politicians who

33:56

you know know better surrendering. It can

33:58

be paralyzing. It can be... It's hard

34:00

to get up out of bed

34:02

in the morning and continue to

34:05

fight for democracy when you know

34:07

Jeff Basos and his billions have

34:09

given up. And this collective

34:11

action problem that we have is

34:14

that each individual, each individual

34:16

civil society leader, every

34:19

university president, every

34:21

CEO, every editor, every parent

34:23

company of a major media

34:26

outlet, has to take care of

34:28

their shareholders. their university make sure

34:30

that they don't face frivolous

34:32

lawsuits that can be costly

34:34

that they don't face investigations

34:37

tax charges they've got to

34:39

take care of themselves in their

34:41

organizations and there's a strong

34:43

tendency when you're worried about the

34:46

bottom line when there are maybe

34:48

billions of dollars at stake or

34:50

an endowment tax coming or a

34:52

costly defamation suit coming

34:54

or an investigation coming there

34:56

are strong incentives to just okay

34:58

You know, I'm going to take care

35:01

of myself, I'm just going to step

35:03

to the sideline for a year or

35:05

two. But when everybody does that,

35:07

the democracy movement overall,

35:10

civil society overall, is

35:12

badly weakened. How does a

35:14

person resist some of these very

35:16

powerful forces? Because there is a

35:19

depiction in your piece. The

35:21

state is like a Titanic. It's

35:23

a gigantic mechanism that

35:25

carries a tremendous weight. against

35:27

it and the senses that

35:30

every individual would have a

35:32

hard time swimming against that current.

35:34

Have you seen anything thus far

35:37

that's giving you specific

35:39

optimism? Well, I think it's important

35:41

to emphasize that there's

35:44

more opposition now going on

35:46

than sort of many of us appreciate.

35:48

I think there's a lot of

35:50

it being done through the legal

35:53

system with the 19 attorney generals

35:55

who filed suit against the...

35:57

various actions by Doge and

35:59

Moss. very early days. I just want

36:01

to emphasize that it's still very early days.

36:04

And it's early days in two ways. One,

36:06

that the legal process is kind of working

36:08

itself out and you know, but it's also

36:10

early days in terms of we haven't yet

36:13

seen the full impact of Trump's behavior. And

36:15

I think that's where I think some of

36:17

my biggest optimism comes in the

36:19

fact that, you know, people like Trump are

36:22

just very bad at governing and at

36:24

dealing with sort of core problems

36:26

that people care about. like you

36:28

know the economy and national security

36:30

or sort of or airplanes not

36:32

running into each other and things

36:34

like that so i think that

36:36

his kind of fire hose of

36:38

firing officials and stuff is almost

36:40

certainly going to lead to you

36:42

know a variety of catastrophic outcomes

36:44

and decrease this popularity but also

36:47

sort of i think kind of wake

36:49

a lot of the population up

36:51

in terms of reviving their outrage

36:53

at this activity and so i

36:55

think that is you know hope

36:57

that this kind of sense of

36:59

malaise that we're seeing in this

37:01

kind of passivity is potentially

37:03

short-lived? There is a

37:06

pervasive allegation by Trump

37:08

himself and by Musk

37:10

and by Vance and by

37:12

prominent American Republicans who are

37:14

now in power that what

37:16

they are doing in fact

37:19

is undoing the Democrats'

37:21

weaponization of the

37:23

state. that it was

37:25

the left that was the

37:28

Democrats, you know, Barack Obama

37:30

weaponized the IRS. So many

37:33

allegations on this front.

37:35

How do you think about

37:37

that if you do? How does

37:39

one grapple with that counterclaim?

37:41

So what I do

37:43

is I look to

37:46

Freedom House reports or

37:48

other international organizations whose

37:50

job it is to measure democracy

37:53

and authoritarianism.

37:55

If they're not reporting

37:58

that the Democrats weaponize

38:00

the state and that both parties

38:03

are assaulting democratic institutions.

38:06

Don't take JD Vance's word for

38:08

it. Find a reputable organization

38:10

or a reputable scholar

38:13

of political regimes who claims

38:15

that there was a weaponization

38:17

of the state, a systematic

38:20

weaponization, is a

38:22

comparable weaponization of the state

38:24

under previous democratic

38:26

institutions. administrations

38:30

and then we can talk

38:32

seriously. Until then, this is consistent

38:35

with what virtually

38:37

all authoritarian's do when

38:39

they purge the state. You have

38:41

to justify purging and packing

38:43

the state. I mean, Trump may

38:46

be willing to just say he

38:48

wants to do it, but it's

38:50

a pretty illegitimate thing to come

38:52

in and fire people left and

38:55

right and replace them. with

38:57

hacks. You need to justify

38:59

it. And authoritarians, when they

39:01

weaponize the state, invariably,

39:03

almost without exception, claim

39:06

that the state has been somehow

39:08

subverted or infiltrated by

39:10

dangerous elements of some sort.

39:12

Right. To give you an example, I

39:14

mean, sort of, Mr. Orban and

39:17

Hungary, he came to power, again,

39:19

second time in 2010, and immediately

39:22

made the argument that the state

39:24

was controlled by communists. from the

39:26

1980s, which was just patently false,

39:29

but that was his sort of excuse

39:31

for undertaking a major attack on

39:33

the independent bureaucracy. This is, again,

39:35

from the same playbook, really, that

39:37

autocrats, you see, as Steve says,

39:39

in other cases. And I think

39:41

you just have to look like,

39:43

where are those claims made? If

39:45

they're only made on Fox News

39:47

or by, you know, leaders of

39:49

the public and party, then you

39:52

can pretty much dismiss them.

39:54

There's an effort to

39:56

create an authoritarian

39:59

system. of the United

40:01

States government. What will be

40:03

the evidence that the United

40:05

States, that its opposition, that

40:07

its culture is dealing with

40:10

this relatively well, comparatively,

40:12

and that it's not? What would the

40:15

former look like? So one thing, I

40:17

think in a sense, a

40:19

constitutional crisis is a relatively

40:21

better outcome on the sense that

40:23

if you see actual courts not

40:26

accepting Trump's actions as legal. I mean,

40:28

that is already kind of a healthy outcome.

40:30

It still may end up being that Trump,

40:32

I mean, the thing that I worry more

40:34

than when we first wrote this article was

40:37

that Trump could just decide to ignore the

40:39

law at all and just sort of engage

40:41

in this activity. But I still think that

40:43

some kind of resistance or some kind of

40:46

constitutional crisis is actually, to me, an optimistic

40:48

outcome in some ways. Where to face

40:50

right now, where the only people

40:52

willing to stand up to Trump

40:55

are Danielle Sassoon and the

40:57

minister who spoke to Trump

40:59

in DC about mercy. But when

41:01

it becomes first acceptable

41:04

and second eventually

41:06

cool to stand up to Trump,

41:08

we'll be in a better place. And

41:10

I think that there's a good

41:12

chance that that will happen. U.S.

41:15

democracy for all of

41:17

its incredible weaknesses, dysfunction

41:19

and vulnerabilities is going to

41:21

be hard to kill outright.

41:24

There's a lot of opposition out

41:26

there. It will probably take a self

41:28

goal by Trump, a mistake or two

41:30

by Trump, and that will happen, for

41:32

there be a little blood in the

41:34

water. And once there's a little blood

41:37

in the water, I think you'll see

41:39

greater opposition. I think this is quite,

41:41

quite likely to happen. I would just,

41:43

you know, add to that. I mean, you

41:45

saw this incredibly depressing. great

41:48

capitulation of much of the business sector

41:50

almost immediately after Trump was elected. These

41:52

are not loyal people to Trump. The

41:54

minute they put their finger in the

41:57

wind and things are blowing away from

41:59

Trump. I could easily imagine

42:01

these people abandoning them just as

42:03

quickly as they went to him.

42:06

Stephen One sentence, is there

42:08

any temptation for the opposition

42:10

in competitive authoritarian regimes to

42:12

lose itself a little bit

42:14

or lose its commitments by

42:16

feeling that now the game

42:19

theory has changed, the playing field

42:21

has changed, and it has to

42:23

imitate the originator of an

42:25

authoritarian culture? Yeah, look, it's

42:27

really hard. You see this over and

42:29

over again, whether it's Venezuela or

42:32

Hungary or Poland for a while

42:34

or Turkey, oppositions are widely criticized

42:36

from the outside, by themselves, they

42:38

question themselves, because it's a couple

42:41

of things. First of all, it's

42:43

hard. I mean, the thing about

42:45

an uneven playing field is if

42:47

you're in the opposition, you're going

42:50

uphill. It's hard to compete. That's

42:52

why it's competitive authoritarianism

42:55

and not democracy. It's hard

42:57

to compete against an incumbent

43:00

government that's wielding machinery of

43:02

government against opponents. And secondly,

43:04

in many of these cases,

43:06

certainly the United States, the incumbent

43:09

has rapidly and unexpectedly

43:11

changed the rules of the game.

43:13

Politicians in both parties, but particularly

43:16

the Democratic Party, have been doing politics

43:18

the same way their whole life. I

43:20

mean, maybe they learned how to tweet

43:22

in the last decade, but Schumer's

43:24

been doing politics a long time.

43:26

Nancy Pelosi's been doing politics a

43:29

long time. The entire Democratic

43:31

Party's leadership knows one way

43:34

of doing politics. And politics

43:36

are changing on a number

43:38

of dimensions. Some are

43:40

authoritarian. Others just have to

43:42

do with the changes in media

43:44

technology, the attention economy. So there's

43:47

a lot of change going on.

43:49

And when that change is going on,

43:51

and you're fighting an uphill

43:53

battle, That leads to a lot of

43:55

self-down. There will be a lot of criticism,

43:57

a lot of self-criticism, a lot of debate.

44:00

A lot of debate that may seem

44:02

like needless debate, I'm not sure

44:04

that's necessarily a terrible

44:06

thing. Democrats do need to

44:08

learn how to adapt to politics in

44:10

the 2020s. You know, they may have

44:12

to engage in a little more attention

44:14

economy politics. They may have to

44:16

get on Rogan a bit more

44:18

or whatever, but there will be a

44:21

more serious debate, and there is a more

44:23

serious debate, about how dirty

44:25

should the Democrats play. Should they

44:27

be willing to play hardball? against

44:30

or even engaging in

44:32

authoritarian behavior against Trump.

44:34

That's a very, very difficult set

44:36

of questions. But it is a

44:38

set of questions that oppositions everywhere

44:41

had to figure out, okay, you

44:43

know, what are, do we cross these lines too?

44:45

Do we take off the gloves? Do we cheat?

44:47

Do we bend the rules? Do we

44:50

play hardball? Those are a difficult set

44:52

of choices that the Democratic

44:54

Party has to make. And there's

44:56

no clear answer. granular

44:58

pressions that I think

45:00

was born of really

45:02

deep comparative thinking and

45:04

offered a really, really different

45:07

and deeper take on

45:09

a very extensively covered

45:11

moment and future. So thank

45:13

you so much for joining

45:15

us. It was great to

45:17

speak with you. Thanks for

45:19

having this on. Thank

45:26

you for listening. You can find

45:28

the articles that we discussed on

45:30

today's show at foreign affairs.com. The

45:32

Foreign Affairs interview is produced by

45:34

Julia Fleming Dresser, Molly McEnany, Ben

45:36

Metzner, and Caroline Wilcox. Our audio

45:38

engineer is Todd Yeager. Our theme

45:40

music was written and performed by

45:42

Robin Hilton. Make sure you subscribe

45:44

to the show wherever you listen

45:46

to podcasts, and if you like

45:48

what you heard, please take a

45:50

minute to rate and review it.

45:52

We release a new show every

45:55

other Thursday. Thanks again for tuning

45:57

in.