0:00

I'm Dan Kurtz-Felen and this

0:02

is the Foreign Affairs interview.

0:04

What Ukrainians are trying

0:06

to say that Ukrainian task is

0:08

not really to destroy Russia or

0:11

win over Russia as such, but

0:13

make everything possible that their mission

0:16

in Ukraine will fail. And their

0:18

mission is failing. After three years

0:20

of war, Ukraine is facing, Ukraine

0:23

is facing intense pressure from

0:25

Donald Trump to reach a

0:27

settlement with Russia. Trump has

0:29

engaged directly with Vladimir Putin

0:31

while calling Vladimir Zelenski a

0:33

dictator, his administration has sidelined

0:35

European allies while joining a

0:37

handful of Russian allies in

0:39

voting against a UN resolution

0:41

condemning Putin's aggression, and US

0:43

officials have pressured Ukraine in

0:45

designing over critical mineral resources.

0:47

And yet, despite this new geopolitical reality,

0:50

and despite month after month of

0:52

grueling fighting that has Russian forces

0:54

taking territory by the day, Ukrainians

0:56

themselves remain deeply resistant to accepting

0:58

an end to the war that

1:00

would sacrifice their country's territory and

1:02

its sovereignty. In a new essay

1:04

for foreign affairs, the Ukrainian journalist

1:06

Natalia Gumanyuk explains that this resistance

1:08

emerges not only out of a

1:10

sense of patriotism, but also she

1:12

writes, because they know there's little

1:14

chance of survival under Moscow's rule.

1:16

For years, Gumanuk has reported from

1:19

Ukraine's conflict zones, documenting

1:21

the brutality in trying

1:23

to understand the logic

1:26

of Russian occupation. She

1:28

spoke with senior editor

1:30

Hugh Aiken on February

1:32

21st about how Ukrainians

1:35

are reacting to the

1:37

shift in US policy,

1:39

what life is like

1:41

in the almost 20%

1:43

of their country under

1:46

Russian control, and

1:48

where Ukraine goes from

1:51

here. So much to talk

1:53

about today. I want to

1:55

get to your fascinating and

1:58

sobering new essay called Putin.

2:00

Ukraine, which is in the new

2:02

foreign affairs. But I thought we

2:04

should begin with the immediate situation,

2:06

such as it is by the

2:08

day, and what many commentators are

2:10

calling a startling, even shocking, break

2:13

in relations between Washington and Keith.

2:15

I should say we're recording on

2:17

Friday morning, February 21st. Obviously, the

2:19

situation may be different, even a

2:21

few days from now. But I

2:23

just wanted to put to you

2:25

What is the reaction now in

2:27

Kiev to some of these, some

2:29

of the drama of the last

2:32

few days? So I cannot say

2:34

that we are shocked because it's

2:36

like sometimes you have something in

2:38

your mind, the worse you don't

2:40

want to happen, so you don't

2:42

speak about it aloud. So... You

2:44

know we didn't want for quite

2:46

a few months to speak and

2:49

there were a lot of wishful

2:51

thinking that you know maybe something

2:53

good will happen with Donald Trump

2:55

but seriously for quite some time

2:57

Ukrainians and including Ukrainian leadership were

2:59

counting on the situation when there

3:01

would be a time when we

3:03

won't be able to count on

3:06

the US. So you know, so

3:08

it's not totally unexpected, but it's

3:10

not something you want to happen.

3:12

And I still think it's in

3:14

progress and think might be changing

3:16

because you really don't want fully

3:18

to lose the US support and

3:20

you really don't want to have

3:23

this divorce between the United States

3:25

and Europe. So it's... kind of

3:27

an interesting moment for Ukrainians that

3:29

they don't want fully alienate, don't

3:31

Trump and UN administration, because you

3:33

really understand how dependent Ukraine is

3:35

on the Western support, but at

3:37

the same time there is a

3:39

lot of determination, unexpectedly for me,

3:42

unity, because if you speak about

3:44

the most loud voices, they are

3:46

like, let's fight on our own.

3:48

You know, like the immediate reaction

3:50

is like, let's fight on our

3:52

own. will make it whatsoever, but

3:54

the most sobering voices would say,

3:56

like, let's try to figure out

3:59

how we can depend less on

4:01

the US, but, you know, still

4:03

not to break up fully. In

4:05

fact, you know, I was reminded,

4:07

sort of watching all of this

4:09

unfold, including, you know, today we're

4:11

already in a different place than

4:13

we were a few days ago.

4:16

Trump was calling Zilenski a dictator.

4:18

Now today it's, oh, will you

4:20

sign the minerals deal, whatever that

4:22

deal is, we don't really know.

4:24

But I was reminded of the

4:26

piece that you did right after

4:28

the US election in November, in

4:30

which you laid out the fact

4:33

that Ukrainians are quite used to

4:35

this, which is important to remember.

4:37

And I just wanted to read

4:39

a quote from that because I

4:41

think it's so prescient to what

4:43

is happening now. And you said,

4:45

Ukraine has many reasons to be

4:47

concerned about a second. Trump presidency.

4:50

Trump has not said how he

4:52

would end the war or even

4:54

under what conditions. In the background,

4:56

there is his longtime admiration for

4:58

Russian president Vladimir Putin, and Trump's

5:00

runnymate Jady Vance, who is one

5:02

of the first Republicans, to embrace

5:04

indifference to Ukraine as a policy

5:06

position. All this has led many

5:09

to fear that Washington, by far,

5:11

Q's biggest arms supplier, might cut

5:13

off the flow of aid or

5:15

even allow Moscow to dictate the

5:17

terms of peace. And then you

5:19

go on to say, but the

5:21

reality of the war has made

5:23

Ukrainians pragmatic. Setting aside Trump's campaign

5:26

rhetoric, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenski is

5:28

preparing to work with him. After

5:30

all Ukrainians live through the first

5:32

Trump administration and have some sense

5:34

of what they are getting. Deal

5:36

making and attempts to flatter Putin,

5:38

but also eventually a major sale

5:40

of lethal arms, including javelin anti-ante

5:43

tank weapons, which have been critical

5:45

in the fight against Russia. Selensky's

5:47

task is and will remain to

5:49

find ways to receive what his

5:51

government needs to defend the population

5:53

in the long run. And so,

5:55

you know, this is more or

5:57

less where we are today, is

6:00

it not? It is, but... I

6:02

remember prior to the campaign the

6:04

US rhetoric was not also very

6:06

good. I remember very well that

6:08

day during the campaign Ukrainian ambassador

6:10

was kind of accused of organizing

6:12

the partisan meeting when the Democrats

6:14

were... Zilenski visited one of

6:16

the military production in Pennsylvania, you

6:19

know, and there was even the

6:21

demand of the Republican Party leadership

6:23

in the Congress to fire the

6:25

Ukrainian ambassador. You know, and I

6:28

also remember that the Republicans didn't

6:30

want to meet with Zilenski at

6:32

that time, but somehow it worked

6:34

and Zilenski met Donald Trump. You

6:37

know, so it's like this... moments

6:39

when it's totally cut off than

6:41

something is happening, I think these

6:44

moments will be still ongoing, but

6:46

what is new, and I think not

6:48

that much for us, rather than for

6:50

Europe, is that quite a clear idea

6:53

that the relation between Europe and

6:55

Donald Trump and the United States

6:57

are not like... they were. You

6:59

know that there are a lot

7:01

of concern that the US won't

7:04

be backing up European allies. So

7:06

I do think it's a bit

7:08

more serious and the level of

7:10

flattering of Don't Trump with Russians

7:12

is quite, I won't say surprising,

7:14

but Trump directly quoting more

7:17

or less speaking in the

7:19

same words. Again, like it's not

7:21

something we couldn't expect, but

7:23

I wouldn't underestimate that. But

7:25

yes, I think Ukrainians are

7:27

used to that. Of course,

7:30

under the surface, we know that

7:32

much more serious negotiations are going

7:34

on with the actual negotiating team,

7:37

Keith Keller, meeting with Salenski yesterday,

7:39

I believe, and we have other

7:41

developments, so it's hard to tell

7:44

what on the surface really reflects

7:46

actual actions and what is more

7:49

kind of the rhetorical wave that

7:51

we've almost become used to now

7:53

driven by social media. So look

7:56

I shouldn't also maybe miss a

7:58

chance to say that If you

8:00

really speak about public opinion, yes,

8:03

quite a lot of people were

8:05

furious about the deal where the

8:07

US, to have like half of

8:09

the Ukrainian natural resources, we don't

8:12

know exactly what is in this

8:14

deal, but more or less it

8:16

sounded appalling, people didn't like the

8:19

tone, emotionally Ukrainians are more angry

8:21

than generally the, you know, political

8:23

leadership of Ukraine. saying. But yes,

8:25

we are in the moment when

8:28

we believe there could be decrease

8:30

of the American aid. And first

8:32

of all... With USAID there is

8:35

no any longer money, you know,

8:37

to be honest, like despite all

8:39

the courts and processes, it's clear

8:41

that part of the financial support

8:44

is not there already. It's kind

8:46

of happened. That is already there.

8:48

I think what we need to

8:51

speak is like whether the Ukraine

8:53

would be able, if the US

8:55

won't be given this aid, to

8:57

buy it even, like, you know,

9:00

like to ask Europeans to buy

9:02

that weapon. And I think that

9:04

is the real thing, because of

9:07

course we can speak a... about

9:09

the deal, about the settlement, but

9:11

there won't be any, you know,

9:14

no less intense fight on the

9:16

battleground. While there would be discussion

9:18

about the settlement and the peace

9:20

negotiation with Moscow, the major thing

9:23

for Ukraine would be still defending

9:25

itself from the Russian missiles and

9:27

we really need the patriots, we

9:30

really needs the ammunition for patriots

9:32

and other air defense, but also

9:34

on the front line. So it's

9:36

still the most kind of... critical

9:39

thing at this moment for Ukraine

9:41

to balance and try to fight

9:43

this war with decreased American aid.

9:46

Let's talk about that for a

9:48

moment. We are now at the

9:50

third anniversary of the full-scale invasion

9:52

and the actual frontline situation in

9:55

some ways has been somewhat lost

9:57

the last couple weeks. There was

9:59

a report even as this sort

10:02

of fight was playing out in

10:04

the media. There were reports. This

10:06

is past week that the Russian

10:08

offensive is slowing. I believe Ukrainian

10:11

forces retook a village near Prokovs.

10:13

And the drone defenses have had

10:15

a lot of success recently. Just

10:18

on the military side, where is

10:20

the current situation? So it looks

10:22

like it's better than half a

10:24

year ago, because I remember very

10:27

well the whole autumn, the discussion

10:29

was... You know, the Puckros school

10:31

be overtaken and then Russia would

10:34

be very close to the occupation

10:36

of the full Dunyetsk region, something

10:38

they really want because it's a

10:40

part of their special operation. But

10:43

indeed, I even had a chance

10:45

very briefly to meet one of

10:47

the commanders. of the ground forces

10:50

a couple of weeks ago, and

10:52

he said, like, for the last

10:54

two weeks, the situation here, Pokrovsk

10:56

is definitely improving. And that's what

10:59

we hear from the Western analysts

11:01

who are also saying that for

11:03

Russians to overtake the major towns

11:06

in, or even Pokrovsk in the

11:08

major towns in the East, they

11:10

will need like half a year

11:13

or year. So you know, it's

11:15

really slowed down. And that's why

11:17

I'm like really returning to this

11:19

point that, you know, the whole

11:22

discussion this week since the Munich

11:24

Security Conference, since the meeting in

11:26

Riyadh, was dominated by the fact

11:29

that Ukraine was not invited to

11:31

the talks in Saudi Arabia, it

11:33

was not on the table, the

11:35

Europeans were also not there. What

11:38

is the leverage of the US

11:40

to force Ukraine to the deal?

11:42

You know, I'm using this terminology

11:45

in force the deal... on Ukraine.

11:47

The leverage is of course military

11:49

aid because Ukrainians really don't want

11:51

the deal without the guarantee. So

11:54

I think that the Americans are

11:56

coming from the position that Ukrainians

11:58

will accept the deal whatsoever and

12:01

Ukrainians coming from the position we

12:03

won't accept the deal we don't

12:05

like. And there is some misunderstanding

12:07

in the media that you know

12:10

people are coming from two different

12:12

positions. Why I'm saying Ukrainians... won't

12:14

accept because Ukrainians won't accept anything

12:17

which doesn't provide any security guarantees

12:19

and they are not at all

12:21

discussed at this stage. They were

12:23

not there during the meeting of

12:26

Jade events with President Zilenski when

12:28

there was this discussion about the

12:30

minerals offered. There were kind of

12:33

demands from Ukraine or let's say

12:35

suggestion what Ukraine should give but

12:37

there was nothing about what... the

12:39

US will provide in return. And

12:42

if nothing is provided in return,

12:44

it means situation for Ukrainian isn't

12:46

improving. So there is no sense

12:49

even to consider it to be

12:51

a settlement. It won't be accepted

12:53

without any guarantees. And maybe this

12:56

brings us to your piece. I

12:58

mean, one of the opening conceits

13:00

of your essay, which seems very

13:02

important, is that we have this

13:05

sort of assumption in the West

13:07

that after three years. Ukraine must

13:09

be desperate for a deal. And

13:12

your point is actually no, you

13:14

know, no deal is better than

13:16

a bad deal and that given

13:18

all other realities without these crucial

13:21

guarantees, Ukraine is not going to

13:23

just stop fighting. But I think

13:25

the other crucial point that is

13:28

in your framing is that in

13:30

fact, There's a kind of disconnect

13:32

in how the West sees the

13:34

war now and what it is

13:37

like in Ukraine and not just

13:39

on the front lines but as

13:41

your pieces have continually pointed out

13:44

the civilian situation in Ukraine is

13:46

remarkably different than what might be

13:48

portrayed as a kind of total

13:50

war over a society and can

13:53

you just Give us a sense

13:55

of that now. Where are we

13:57

now after, you know, we're two-thirds

14:00

of the way through the third

14:02

winter of the war? So, indeed,

14:04

it's something very unusual, this abnormal

14:06

normalcy, and of course, as a

14:09

Ukrainian, I'm permanently living Kiev and,

14:11

you know, We have the air

14:13

strikes almost every night around the

14:16

country, so it's obviously tiring. There

14:18

is a level of devastation, and

14:20

20% of the country is occupied,

14:22

and some parts of the country

14:25

are destroyed, particularly on the frontline.

14:27

But since it's a big country,

14:29

the rest of it kind of

14:32

managed to leave... and function. So

14:34

for instance for the second year,

14:36

despite of the all-negative prognosis, we

14:38

didn't have any serious blackouts during

14:41

winter. You know, there was energy,

14:43

there was electricity, despite Russians are

14:45

shelling on the infrastructure all the

14:48

time. Obviously, not without the Western

14:50

financial support, including a huge European

14:52

ones. You know, Ukraine has... functioning

14:55

economy because the pensions are paid

14:57

health care system is working education

14:59

is there the bank system is

15:01

working yes we have curfew but

15:04

life is kind of normal in

15:06

most of the country of course

15:08

there is always a permanent risk

15:11

to die of the people who

15:13

are fighting in the frontline and

15:15

almost every Ukrainian has a family

15:17

member who is fighting but at

15:20

the same time modern technology and

15:22

generally the functioning state allows Ukrainians

15:24

kind of live as if the

15:27

war is not there, especially for

15:29

those who are further from the

15:31

frontline or in the big cities.

15:33

So I think I usually try

15:36

to explain it as a... Chances

15:38

of terrorist attacks. So you kind

15:40

of live your life as if

15:43

it's normal. And then there is

15:45

always a chance that the Russian

15:47

bomb would fall on your head

15:49

at night during the day. Would

15:52

it be in hospital? Would it

15:54

be in shopping mall? Would it

15:56

be elsewhere? But there is this

15:59

air defense alert. And what is

16:01

also missing in this point, that

16:03

Ukraine is today, let's say it

16:05

can fall easily. easily if there

16:08

are no money at all, but

16:10

somehow it's more stable. So compared

16:12

to zero production of weapon in

16:15

2022, today the Ukrainian government claims

16:17

40% of the weapon used in

16:19

the frontline is produced in Ukraine.

16:21

We were fully dependent, we had

16:24

almost nothing, now it's different. And

16:26

also people are kind of more

16:28

prepared to the risk, therefore... The

16:31

life like we have, despite all

16:33

the exhaustion, is definitely better than

16:35

the life under the Russian occupation,

16:37

which is something we couldn't even

16:40

imagine how bad it is in

16:42

2022. It's really the level of

16:44

the political repressions, the repressions against

16:47

the people is horrific, the crimes

16:49

which are committed under the occupation,

16:51

but also a prospect that if

16:54

we give up If we kind

16:56

of just freeze the conflict today,

16:58

then the Russians would attack in

17:00

a couple of years, then the

17:03

cities which were protected, like Kiev,

17:05

which didn't fail in 2022, you

17:07

know, which could have been occupied

17:10

because the Russian troops were really

17:12

close. If there is just a

17:14

settlement without the guarantees, then Kiev

17:16

could be in a situation like

17:19

Herzon, which had been occupied, or

17:21

like other territories. It's a very

17:23

clear choice, so what we have

17:26

is bad. You don't want to

17:28

have it, but it's so much

17:30

better that what the freeze without

17:32

guarantees or the Russian occupation will

17:35

bring that you opt for preserving

17:37

what we have. This brings us

17:39

to the heart of your peace,

17:42

and let's turn to that now,

17:44

because I think in Putin's Ukraine,

17:46

your essay, you do something which

17:48

is really... kind of remarkable at

17:51

this stage into the world, which

17:53

is I think you kind of

17:55

reconceptualize how we should think about

17:58

the world. And the

18:00

whole question of

18:02

occupation is interesting because

18:04

I think even for the

18:07

sort of military analysts, it has

18:09

been sort of to the

18:11

side of the main discussion of

18:13

the war. And we have

18:15

this kind of human rights perspective.

18:17

And this is of course

18:20

important and your own work

18:22

on this has been crucial.

18:24

Your organization, the Reckoning Project

18:26

is in fact doing human

18:28

rights documentation. So I think

18:30

it may be actually sort

18:32

of surprising knowing your

18:34

work that you are arguing actually

18:36

that the human rights perspective is kind

18:38

of missing the larger point. And

18:40

I'll just read this passage because

18:42

I think it neatly captures what

18:44

you're trying to say. And

18:46

you write, as many Ukrainians recognize

18:48

what observers in the West have

18:51

characterized as brutal excesses in

18:53

occupied areas, human rights abuses, political

18:55

repression and war crimes are in

18:57

fact a central part of

18:59

Russia's war strategy. The issue

19:01

is not merely what happens to

19:03

those under Russian rule, but how

19:05

Moscow has used its control of

19:07

significant numbers of Ukrainians to undermine

19:09

the stability of the whole country,

19:12

even without taking more territory.

19:14

And then you go on to

19:16

say, put simply Russian control

19:18

over any part of Ukraine subverts

19:20

and corrodes Ukrainian sovereignty everywhere. So

19:24

in a sense, you're saying

19:26

this is war strategy. It's

19:28

not excess, even kind of

19:30

systematic abuses are not just

19:32

wanton brutality. This is a

19:34

concerted part of what Russia

19:36

is trying to do to

19:38

achieve its larger goals in Ukraine.

19:40

Can you just sort of explain

19:42

what you're getting at? Yeah,

19:45

so there are two sides. So

19:47

indeed I've been working on the

19:49

war crimes documentation since 2022, but

19:51

since 2014, I've been reporting mainly

19:53

from the human rights perspective the

19:55

occupation of the Eastern Ukraine and

19:57

Crimea. Travelling to Crimea quite often

19:59

it was It's very very very hard

20:01

to raise awareness internationally about the

20:04

human rights abuses, repression of what's

20:06

going on in Crimea and the

20:08

Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainians knew well

20:10

what was going on. I think

20:13

we were all mistaken, including myself,

20:15

including a lot of Ukrainian human

20:17

rights defenders, because we were always

20:19

speaking about that as a political

20:22

repressions, and, you know, these two

20:24

words of real politics, of geopolitics,

20:26

sometimes, you know, the human rights

20:29

people consider to be very naive,

20:31

idealistic, the war is different, but

20:33

what we observed, that eight years

20:35

of the occupation of Crimea and

20:37

the Eastern Ukraine, was a preparation

20:39

by Russia to launch the bigger

20:42

war, to... use that territories as

20:44

a launch pad for the war,

20:46

militarize peninsula, accumulate the troops there,

20:48

and put behind the bars the

20:50

people who could be outspoken, not

20:52

because they're politically criticizing the Russian

20:54

regime and they didn't want to

20:57

have any dissent. They really, literally

20:59

wanted those people who on February

21:01

2022 could be... picking and telling

21:03

that you know, oh, the full-scale

21:06

invasion is there, the tanks are

21:08

on the border with the rest

21:10

of Ukraine, they were all behind

21:13

the bars. And the whole strategy

21:15

of... bringing the Russian population to

21:17

the occupied territories, putting the people

21:20

and mass in jail, torturing them,

21:22

beating them, and threatening against any

21:24

dissent, they were the part of

21:27

pacifying the territory so their military

21:29

can fight. And that's what

21:31

we really expect from the

21:33

occupied territories. So the clothes

21:35

they are to the rest

21:37

of the Ukraine, the more

21:39

territories they... control. The larger

21:41

chances are that in some

21:43

years the very similar territories

21:45

today of Hersohn region, southern

21:48

part of Idzaparizia region, would

21:50

be again used like the

21:52

launch pad further to attack

21:54

Harkif, to attack Nipro, to

21:56

attack Odessa, but also the

21:58

whole processes, administrative processes. giving

22:00

the Russian passport to the Ukrainian population.

22:02

It's all part of this strategy, how

22:05

to control the part of the territory

22:07

which could be used for waging even

22:09

the bigger war. But there is something

22:12

else, which is also very interesting, and

22:14

that's something which I heard from the

22:16

Russian side in Riyadh. You know, the

22:18

Europeans and people like myself who follow

22:21

the negotiations which were called Minsk agreement

22:23

too, but including, you know, French and

22:25

Germans recognize that what Russia is offering

22:28

today to the new American administration is

22:30

more or less something which was there

22:32

and which was discussed in a very

22:35

similar way for the last eight years.

22:37

Before 2022. Before 2022. It's really strikingly

22:39

similar to the Minsk. offers, we call

22:42

it minstrivis out Zilenski. You know, it's

22:44

really just almost the same, but at

22:46

that time there were discussion about the

22:49

elections in the occupied territories, where the

22:51

Russians could put their puppets and you

22:53

know, like, destroy Ukraine from within, control

22:56

it politically. And it's even amazing to

22:58

understand how they are literally offering almost

23:00

the same deal. It's too similar, but

23:02

in the largest scale, you know, with

23:05

more territories occupied. And why it works,

23:07

because the Americans, the current administration, was

23:09

not there. It's really fascinating how they

23:12

are not even trying to hide it.

23:14

It's a case of deja vu, you

23:16

might say. So there's a lot there.

23:19

I want to unpack this kind of

23:21

in several steps, because I think it's

23:23

really important to get clear on what

23:26

you're saying. Firstly... In a sense, we're

23:28

sort of mistaken when we talk about

23:30

the third anniversary, because this is really

23:33

an 11-year war. And I think as

23:35

your piece makes so clear, the Ukrainian

23:37

understanding of the war really begins with

23:40

2014, and specifically the occupation, which was

23:42

such a reality from that. moment and

23:44

you're reporting in Crimea and what you

23:46

actually call the Crimean toolkit that Russia

23:49

has developed in Crimea and in Eastern

23:51

Don Bass and we're now seeing kind

23:53

of amped up to a whole new

23:56

level in the territories that have been

23:58

occupied since 2022. But just first to

24:00

explain. that toolkit as you describe it

24:03

because I think we have this idea

24:05

in our head that occupation is just

24:07

a military force coming in and establishing

24:10

military rule over a territory. And in

24:12

fact, this has a whole series of

24:14

implications in how order is imposed and

24:17

what it actually means for the rest

24:19

of Ukraine and why is it that

24:21

the 80% of Ukraine that is free

24:24

today? nevertheless is acutely feeling the occupation

24:26

every day. So I think we still

24:28

need to differentiate the type of the

24:30

occupation which was happening before 2022, because

24:33

if before that, you know, it was

24:35

something we could expect that, you know,

24:37

journalists, Crimean indigenous population, which were always

24:40

not trustful in Russia, would be risking

24:42

their lives while staying in the occupation

24:44

because they were detained, they were, you

24:47

know, politically repressed. Everything Ukrainian was forbidden,

24:49

you know, the schools were rusified, the

24:51

Russians were preparing and teaching the children

24:54

in totally different narrative, you know, were

24:56

more or less really rusifying this population,

24:58

but creating the situation when the population

25:01

of the occupied territories could be drafted

25:03

to the army. But at the same

25:05

time, we could understand who were under

25:08

the attack. What happened after 2022? I

25:10

remember very well, the conversation which for

25:12

me described it very, very well. I

25:14

talk with the wife of one of

25:17

the survivors of the man in Berdianski,

25:19

the Parisia region near Marupul, who have

25:21

been detained and tortured and tortured. horribly

25:24

by the Russians and she really said

25:26

you know it's enough to have your

25:28

own opinion to be arrested and detained

25:31

it doesn't matter which opinion you should

25:33

have and now we can see that

25:35

anybody who is not openly supporting the

25:38

Russian occupation can be taken in prison,

25:40

can be violently treated. So I should

25:42

say within our project, the reckoning projects,

25:45

we have talked for over 500 survivors

25:47

of the war crimes. And half of

25:49

them are from the occupied territories. And

25:51

all people from the occupied territories, almost

25:54

all of them were at some moment

25:56

detained, beaten. tortured and dozens of them

25:58

electrocuted. So it's really the magnitude of

26:01

the violence used against the people is

26:03

drastic. But the second thing is the

26:05

social and political life. So indeed, you

26:08

know, it's not about even having a

26:10

Ukrainian flag. You can be... told that

26:12

once you used to have the Ukrainian

26:15

flag, that's already the reason to be

26:17

detained and be suspicious. But also, without

26:19

the Russian passport, for instance, you cannot

26:22

get the medical aid, including the urgent

26:24

medical aid. Or you can be threatened

26:26

that your children would be taken. You

26:29

need to cooperate with the Russian state

26:31

in some way. But also politically, these

26:33

territories are kind of in limbo. Some

26:35

of the parts of these territories, there

26:38

was no active battlefield for some time

26:40

there, but in some parts, because after

26:42

the first year, when Russians couldn't really

26:45

occupy any bigger town, what they were

26:47

doing, they literally were destroying the town,

26:49

and when the Ukrainian army had to

26:52

withdraw, they... were taking these areas but

26:54

they're not really rebuilding them properly and

26:56

people are really suffering there because there

26:59

is no you know proper schooling proper

27:01

health care but the people who are

27:03

brought from Russia, they receive preferences. You

27:06

said the people brought from Russia, because

27:08

I think this is another aspect of

27:10

the occupation that we in the West

27:13

have sort of lost sight of, and

27:15

that is the very significant program of

27:17

bringing in Russians to this territory. And

27:19

again, this goes back to Crimea. As

27:22

you say, I think, how are many,

27:24

is it 800,000, or it's quite a

27:26

large number who... were brought into Crimea

27:29

after 2014. And this, in a sense,

27:31

is a model for what's happening in

27:33

some areas of the new territories. Yes,

27:36

as you know, it's something which was

27:38

estimated after quite a few years that

27:40

in Crimea, which is overall, it's about

27:43

2 million people and up to 800,000

27:45

people were brought from Russia to the

27:47

peninsula, which also... you know, creates the

27:50

long-lasting problem because who will speak about

27:52

the public opinion in Crimea today? You

27:54

know, how we can define it if

27:57

it's not about the people who used

27:59

to live there before? And if the

28:01

same will happen in Marjupol, where also

28:03

people are moved from the rest of

28:06

Russia, so it's more or less erasing...

28:08

anything Ukrainian in the territories and creating

28:10

a long-lasting problem. So at the same

28:13

time for Ukrainians it's hard because if

28:15

you don't leave at that territories for

28:17

instance and you Let's say move to

28:20

Kiev or Harkiv or to a different

28:22

town, but you have your flat and

28:24

apartment there. There are cases when the

28:27

housing was taken away from people if

28:29

they didn't return to the occupied territories

28:31

and they were given to a different

28:34

people, to the newcomers. So it's extremely

28:36

complex and difficult life and it's also

28:38

about the difficult choices. Do you want

28:41

to leave this territory, abandoned this territory

28:43

and fully, you know, leave it?

28:45

for the loyal Russian

28:47

citizens. But also

28:50

the life there is

28:52

unlivable if you

28:54

are not openly supporting

28:57

the occupation. Of

28:59

course, a lot of

29:01

people live in

29:04

the occupation without supporting

29:06

the Russian regime.

29:08

But that's a huge

29:11

challenge. And you

29:13

know, who are the

29:15

people coming? It's

29:18

military, it's their families,

29:20

these are law

29:22

enforcement. So it's really

29:25

creating this territory

29:27

which could be hostile

29:29

to the Ukrainian

29:31

state. You know, it's

29:34

a complex issue.

29:36

How Ukraine should deal

29:38

with the population,

29:41

with the territories afterwards.

29:43

But I would

29:45

insist the time in

29:48

this regard is

29:50

not on our side.

29:52

The longer the

29:55

occupation lasts, so for

29:57

instance, we agree

29:59

for the freezing situation

30:02

as it is.

30:04

Within the couple of

30:06

years, children won't

30:09

go to the schools

30:11

where would be

30:13

any sign of the

30:15

Ukrainian language. Moreover,

30:18

you know, they are

30:20

taught a totally

30:22

different version of history

30:25

of what's going

30:27

on. So there is

30:29

also a huge

30:32

propaganda, brainwashing campaign. And

30:34

quite a lot

30:36

of people also have

30:39

forgotten how has

30:41

Russia changed since 2022?

30:43

You know, I've

30:46

been to Russia the

30:48

last time in

30:50

summer 2021, I have

30:53

friends and family

30:55

members. And we know

30:57

it's a different

30:59

country. I know a

31:02

lot of European

31:04

and American experts, they

31:06

had been to

31:09

Moscow. You know, it's

31:11

a vibrant city,

31:13

big, looks quite Western.

31:16

And again, like

31:18

I've been quite a

31:20

lot to Moscow

31:23

after 2014. It's very

31:25

different country today.

31:27

You know, the Russian

31:30

regime for quite

31:32

some time offered their

31:34

citizens, you know,

31:36

like we bring you

31:39

financial stability, something

31:41

like that, but do

31:43

not express your

31:46

opinion. Express your opinion

31:48

in kitchen or

31:50

whatsoever. After the full

31:53

scale invasion, it's

31:55

very ideological state. People

31:57

are prosecuted, they're

32:00

taken from their house.

32:02

You know, it's really more like North

32:04

Korea than we can imagine. The ideology

32:07

is in the schools, in the universities,

32:09

and that's why what is

32:11

being created in these

32:13

territories, it's really a

32:16

pretty drastic type of

32:18

regime, a kind of

32:20

world-lord military-type repressive territories,

32:23

which you really... don't

32:25

want to be there, me or anybody

32:27

whom I know out of my circle

32:29

knows that there is zero chance to

32:31

survive in the Russian occupation if we

32:33

stay there. For us, there is no chance.

32:35

I mean, one way of thinking about this,

32:37

there are actually two different

32:39

occupations happening. There's the occupation

32:42

of Ukrainians who are stuck

32:44

in these areas, this kind

32:46

of reign of terror, which

32:48

you described so well in

32:51

your piece. And then there's

32:53

the second occupation of these...

32:55

Russian communities which are essentially

32:57

being created on the ruins

33:00

in Marupu literally on the

33:02

ruins of this once very

33:04

large and flourishing city where

33:07

the population has been

33:09

largely destroyed. It's

33:11

quite an astonishing

33:13

story that has

33:15

happened sort of underneath

33:17

the actual sort

33:19

of top level of the war.

33:22

is not solving the problem,

33:24

the ceasefire, they're just like

33:26

keeping the situation as it

33:28

is. Because in the territory

33:31

occupied by Russia, first of

33:33

all Russia itself would accumulate

33:35

weapons, would still work with

33:37

all their partners in North

33:40

Korea or Iran or wherever

33:42

to... build their military economy to

33:44

produce more weapons to catch

33:46

up because they are also

33:48

exhausted. But at the same

33:50

time, there would be this

33:52

broadening the territory where the

33:54

Russians would be able to

33:57

do whatever they want, not

33:59

following any... but there will be

34:01

anybody to watch that. And again,

34:03

the closer to the rest of

34:06

the Ukrainian territory, the more fortified

34:08

the line would be, the more

34:10

soldiers they would have, because they're

34:12

disproportionately trying to mobilize the local

34:15

population. It cannot happen today, but

34:17

in future, of course, they would

34:19

use this population as well to

34:22

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35:29

negotiations because I think also

35:31

the way we think about

35:33

territory is essentially that is

35:35

the central thing is how

35:37

much territory would be on

35:39

each side of any ceasefire

35:41

and as you point out

35:43

in your piece it's not

35:45

about territory. It's about what

35:47

is happening on the territory.

35:49

And I think it's useful

35:51

to remember, as you point

35:53

out, that there are something

35:55

like 6 million Ukrainians under

35:57

the occupied areas. I mean,

35:59

it's a huge population, and

36:01

this is actually less than

36:03

the many more who have

36:05

been able to leave or

36:07

to go to the west.

36:09

And I guess the larger

36:12

question is here. What do

36:14

you see? playing out in

36:16

a kind of ceasefire that

36:18

does not provide the kinds

36:20

of guarantees that Ukrainians are

36:22

saying are absolutely essential? So

36:24

the most important part is

36:26

don't repetition. Let's say that

36:28

Ukraine would be less militarized

36:30

and then Russia attacks. So

36:32

for Ukraine, the most important

36:34

is being even stronger protected

36:36

than it is now. So

36:38

Russia, there would be this

36:40

level of deterrence, that the

36:42

Russians won't attack again. And

36:44

if they attack, we would

36:46

understand what will happen. I

36:48

think that now discussion is

36:50

really shifting too much about

36:52

very hypothetical idea about some

36:54

European troops on the ground

36:56

without clear understanding what they

36:58

should do there. But for

37:00

Ukraine, it's more about protecting

37:02

the sky, protecting the country,

37:04

having a superiority on air.

37:06

Because if Ukraine has superiority

37:08

on air, like usual NATO

37:10

army has, the Russians won't

37:12

be able to wage this

37:14

type of war, to be

37:16

honest. So it's not the

37:18

miraculous kind of solution which

37:20

doesn't exist. It's pretty simple.

37:22

So now coming to the

37:24

idea of Ukraine being part

37:26

of NATO. And by the

37:28

way, yes, reminding everybody that

37:30

just part of Germany was

37:32

accepted to NATO in 50s.

37:34

So I don't think it's

37:36

totally impossible. But we see

37:38

that there is no willingness

37:40

of the American president. I

37:42

won't. about the red lines

37:44

from the Russian side because

37:46

if we really speak about

37:48

the Russian red lines militarization

37:50

of Ukraine is also similarly

37:52

a red line for them

37:54

NATO is largely symbolic but

37:56

NATO is kind of the

37:58

cheapest option as long as

38:00

we start to list what

38:02

are the security guarantees you

38:04

start to write one two

38:06

three four and then you

38:08

understand that actually you inventing

38:10

the wheel and then there

38:12

is a question whether you

38:14

need to create something which

38:16

is very similar to NATO

38:18

just isn't called NATO, but

38:20

isn't like creating the systems

38:22

which duplicates each other, maybe

38:24

weakening current alliance? Again, but

38:26

I don't think that with

38:28

the Ukrainians the symbolic things

38:30

matter at this stage that

38:32

much. But there are not

38:35

yet on the discussion the

38:37

real things which won't allow

38:39

Russia to repeat this type

38:41

of war. Before we discuss

38:43

the real guarantees, everything else

38:45

doesn't look like serious discussion,

38:47

like real deal, like real

38:49

settlement. Indeed, maybe one of

38:51

the more important takeaways of

38:53

what is happening now is

38:55

that the most likely outcome

38:57

in the immediate near term

38:59

is more fighting and... how

39:01

should we think about that?

39:03

And I think it's helpful

39:05

to remember one of the

39:07

points you made in your

39:09

previous piece last summer after

39:11

the Kursk offensive, and that

39:13

offensive itself followed a major

39:15

Russian offensive, which we may

39:17

have forgotten now, but this

39:19

was a kind of a

39:21

failure that Russia tried to

39:23

take Harkiv. And as you

39:25

concluded in that piece, as

39:27

of the time he wrote

39:29

the piece, it seemed highly

39:31

unlikely that Russia would be

39:33

able to, not only not

39:35

to capture Harkiv, but any

39:37

other large Ukrainian city. And

39:39

that in itself seems quite

39:41

remarkable now. We can remember

39:43

that there was the failure

39:45

to take Kiev at the

39:47

start of the war. There

39:49

was the failure to occupy

39:51

Herzon, which was occupied for

39:53

nine months, but then lost.

39:55

Then the repeated failures to

39:57

take Kharkiv. And I just

39:59

wonder at this point, do

40:01

you stand by that? Do

40:03

you think that Russia is

40:05

actually unable to, in a

40:07

sense that what it is

40:09

fighting over is these areas

40:11

of occupation, but it has

40:13

not actually achieved these goals

40:15

that it set out to?

40:17

So look Russia, you know

40:19

called the North Korean troops

40:21

to free Kursk region. It's

40:23

very important for them. Putin

40:25

really wanted to liberate the

40:27

Kursk region before kind of

40:29

meeting with Trump before the

40:31

deal because then it gives

40:33

him an opportunity to ask

40:35

again for the freeze of

40:37

the means that the Ukraine

40:39

is controlling part of the

40:41

Russian land. By the way,

40:43

also worth it to say

40:45

and understand what do the

40:47

Russian red lines mean. So

40:49

many people were saying, like,

40:51

Crimea is a red line

40:53

for Putin. That is a

40:55

red line for Putin. Ukraine,

40:58

in the end, occupied part

41:00

of Russia, you know, and

41:02

waging the war on the

41:04

Russian territory, but you know,

41:06

what Russia does. does everything

41:08

possible fighting back, but it's

41:10

already half a year. I

41:12

honestly thought that it will

41:14

be way faster for them

41:16

to liberate the Kursk region.

41:18

And so it's not really

41:20

easy. Again, it costs lives

41:22

of the Ukrainian soldiers. It

41:24

could be done better. So

41:26

for Ukraine is the most

41:28

important argument as well, saying

41:30

that what President Trump is

41:32

doing today is kind of

41:34

like prolonging the war. And

41:36

you know, the war is...

41:38

bad for every society. I

41:40

really understand well that it's

41:42

not something we want to

41:44

prolong, but the settlement isn't

41:46

the end. It just, because

41:48

the occupation is not the

41:50

peace. Occupation is just another

41:52

way of war. We cannot

41:54

call the occupation. a liberation,

41:56

the peace, especially if it's

41:58

used for further attacks. So

42:00

yeah, I don't see now

42:02

the opportunity to occupy Kharkiv,

42:04

Nipro or Kiev, but it

42:06

doesn't mean they won't try.

42:08

Russia is not that mighty

42:10

to take over Ukraine, but

42:12

it's strong enough to destroy.

42:14

a lot. But what Ukrainians

42:16

are trying to say that

42:18

Ukrainian task is not really

42:20

to destroy Russia or win

42:22

over Russia as such, but

42:24

make everything possible that their

42:26

mission in Ukraine will fail.

42:28

And their mission is failing.

42:30

It's already failed and it's

42:32

failing. So that is a

42:34

realistic goal for Ukraine to

42:36

let them know that there

42:38

is no sense to do

42:40

that. They won't get more.

42:42

They won't destroy Ukraine and

42:44

state. It will still exist.

42:46

So they would in some

42:48

moment retreat to some extent.

42:50

In short, you could say,

42:52

even if Ukraine can't win,

42:54

it can make Russia fail.

42:56

Realistically, recapturing all of that

42:58

territory now in the immediate

43:00

future may be impossible, but

43:02

you can ensure that Russia...

43:04

is continuing to fail in

43:06

its own goals and that

43:08

in a way is a

43:10

kind of victory and maybe

43:12

a better one than entering

43:14

some kind of deal that

43:16

would in a sense undermine

43:18

the future security of the

43:21

country. I just want to

43:23

ask you one final question

43:25

because I think maybe this

43:27

is left out and this

43:29

will be on a lot

43:31

of people's minds here and

43:33

I think there's a general

43:35

sense that Ukraine has had

43:37

a remarkable run these three

43:39

years, but is it sustainable

43:41

now? The manpower, the flow

43:43

of arms, and of course

43:45

in the background is everything

43:47

you've said about US support,

43:49

but beyond the question of

43:51

US support just from the

43:53

internal perspective, can Ukraine keep

43:55

fighting this war? So of

43:57

course there is a huge

43:59

task for the Ukrainian society

44:01

and state to go on

44:03

as long as it takes.

44:05

It's not something Ukrainians really

44:07

feel is fair and just.

44:09

But a couple of things.

44:11

In terms of, for instance

44:13

for mobilization, which is very

44:15

critical, of course, you need

44:17

to have a manpower to

44:19

fight back. You know now

44:21

we started discussing how normal

44:23

life is in some of

44:25

the parts of Ukraine where

44:27

there is no war and

44:29

it was the choice of

44:31

the Ukrainian government not to

44:33

force people leave country to

44:35

keep taxpayers inside the country

44:37

to kind of have this

44:39

double life when you have

44:41

the frontline and the normal

44:43

life. And I think that

44:45

if things are getting too

44:47

bad part of the Ukrainians

44:49

would have to decrease the

44:51

level of their life, you

44:53

know, pay way higher taxes,

44:55

have way more limitations. It's

44:57

complicated because then Ukraine may

44:59

lose more people, you know,

45:01

people leaving the country not

45:03

staying, which means Ukraine may

45:05

lose money from the taxpayers.

45:07

So it's a very complex

45:09

decision and I think in

45:11

this regard Ukrainians have to

45:13

be prepared that the level

45:15

of life would be worse,

45:17

it would be much harder.

45:19

But it's still possible. Of

45:21

course, we can't discount also

45:23

what Russia will be doing.

45:25

The Russians will be trying

45:27

during this way, you know.

45:29

divide Ukrainian society, play with

45:31

vulnerabilities. We're already observing how

45:33

they're using these talks in

45:35

Riyadh and the message that,

45:37

oh, the US has abandoned

45:39

Ukraine in order to sow

45:41

the division and kind of

45:44

create this kind of atmosphere

45:46

of despair. The mood in

45:48

Moscow, they celebrate, you know,

45:50

see how this campaign is

45:52

kind of floating the Ukrainian

45:54

media space in the social

45:56

media. the telegram channel, like

45:58

celebrating the ideas that the

46:00

West has abandoned Ukraine. So

46:02

it's also something to take

46:04

into account that if the

46:06

life of the people would

46:08

get worse and there would

46:10

be this kind of information

46:12

campaign from Moscow, there could

46:14

be a different type of

46:16

the mood. But what is

46:18

also interesting, you know, the

46:20

days after the Riyadh talks

46:22

and all the Donald Trump

46:24

tweets, I haven't seen Ukrainians

46:26

that determined and united for

46:28

quite some time for probably

46:30

last year. There is a

46:32

moment the feeling very similar

46:34

like Ukrainians had in February

46:36

2022 when the whole world

46:38

was saying, Kiyu would fall

46:40

within three days and Ukrainians

46:42

were like, no we will

46:44

fight, we'll make a cause,

46:46

we'll prove we will fight.

46:48

This moment feels like the

46:50

ones we need to prove

46:52

we can survive whatsoever, but

46:54

also it's very important for

46:56

Ukraine at the same time

46:58

not to throw Donald Trump

47:00

and the new American administration

47:02

into the Russian hands because

47:04

it would be... too much

47:06

of a present just to

47:08

give up upon the US

47:10

support and just by default

47:12

say that, okay, they are

47:14

there somewhere with Putin. I

47:16

don't believe that the US

47:18

would ever really fight on

47:20

the Russian side. So I

47:22

really think we also shouldn't

47:24

push them too hard into

47:26

the disregarding what our emotions

47:28

are because it would be

47:30

just a very good present

47:32

to the Russian leadership. Natalia.

47:35

With that, I think we

47:37

should wrap it up and

47:39

please read Natalia's pieces, not

47:41

only her current essay, but

47:43

her previous essays in foreign

47:45

affairs, many of which are

47:47

as relevant today as when

47:50

they were written. Thank you.

47:52

Thanks for having me. It

47:54

was a pleasure. Thank

48:00

you for listening. You You can find

48:02

the articles that we discussed on

48:04

today's show on today's show at.com. The

48:06

Affairs Interview is produced

48:08

by Julia Fleming Julia Fleming Dresser, Molly

48:11

Ben Metzner, and Caroline Wilcox. Our Our audio

48:13

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48:15

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48:17

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