0:19

Germany began an

0:22

offensive against the

0:24

Soviet Union in

0:26

1941, but it failed.

0:28

Germany began a second

0:30

offensive against the Soviet

0:33

Union in 1942, but

0:35

again, it failed. In

0:37

1943, Adolf Hitler ordered

0:40

yet another summer

0:42

offensive, though few in the

0:44

German military expected

0:47

it to succeed. Episode

1:22

395 A definitive mistake.

1:25

Today I want to talk about

1:27

Operation Citadel. Operation

1:30

Citadel was Adolf

1:32

Hitler's planned 1943

1:34

offensive against the Soviet

1:37

Union. I've already said

1:39

a little about the

1:41

early planning for Operation

1:44

Citadel in previous episodes,

1:46

most recently in episode

1:48

384. Operation Barbarossa

1:51

was supposed to have defeated

1:53

the Soviet Union before the

1:55

end of 1941. Plan Blue was

1:57

supposed to have defeated, or at

1:59

least... tripled the Soviet Union

2:02

before the end of 1942.

2:04

Neither of these operations succeeded

2:06

in defeating the Soviet Union.

2:08

Neither of these operations achieved

2:11

their defined military objectives. The

2:13

Soviet victory at Stalingrad had

2:15

robbed Germany of that ineffable

2:17

but vital military asset we

2:20

call momentum. For the first

2:22

time since the invasion began,

2:24

the opposing sides on the

2:26

Eastern Front were more or

2:29

less balanced. It

2:32

is at this moment in

2:34

the conflict that the prospects

2:36

of a peace agreement between

2:38

the Axis and the Soviet

2:40

Union were strongest. Before Stalingrad,

2:42

the only conceivable way this

2:44

conflict could have been settled

2:46

at the negotiating table was

2:48

through a Soviet surrender. At

2:50

best it would have been

2:52

a Soviet surrender in which

2:55

the Germans allowed Moscow a

2:57

few small concessions, some fig

2:59

leaves as it were, some

3:01

shreds of dignity, something like

3:03

the armistice with France. that

3:05

would have allowed a Vichy-Russia,

3:07

as it were, to carry

3:09

on. The British Foreign Office

3:11

had been worrying about the

3:13

possibility of an armistice virtually

3:15

since the German invasion had

3:17

begun, and the British repeatedly

3:19

expressed this concern to the

3:22

United States government. There was

3:24

no ideological issue with the

3:26

USSR agreeing to an armistice

3:28

with Germany under grossly unfavorable

3:30

terms. They'd already done that

3:32

once before in 1918. In

3:34

1942, the British government was

3:36

inclined to grant Stalin's request

3:38

that the Western allies recognized

3:40

the USSR's borders as of

3:42

1941, when Germany first attacked,

3:44

which would have meant conceding

3:46

the independence of the Baltic

3:49

states and Soviet control over

3:51

eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and the

3:53

territory taken from Finland after

3:55

the It was the US

3:57

government that refused to go.

3:59

along with this, apart from

4:01

the moral reasons to oppose

4:03

this arrangement, the Americans well

4:05

remembered how concessions Woodrow Wilson

4:07

had made during the last

4:09

war, proved awkward and embarrassing

4:11

to him at the Paris

4:13

Peace Conference after it was

4:16

over. The lesson was, best

4:18

to finish the war first,

4:20

then negotiate. From

4:22

Stalin's point of view, the

4:24

way the British and the

4:26

Americans kept making excuses to

4:28

postpone the opening of a

4:30

second front in Europe had

4:32

to seem suspicious. In fairness

4:34

to the Western allies, these

4:36

decisions to postpone were based

4:38

on very real military considerations

4:40

and not out of political

4:43

machination, but it's easy to

4:45

understand why Stalin would have

4:47

doubts about that. Perhaps the

4:49

Western capitalists were hanging back,

4:51

hoping that Nazi Germany and

4:53

Communist Russia would destroy each

4:55

other. On the other hand,

4:57

the viciousness of the German

4:59

war on the Soviet Union

5:01

from day one sent a

5:03

strong signal that Hitler would

5:05

not accept anything short of

5:07

full capitulation, and indeed that

5:09

even to broach the topic

5:11

of a negotiated armistice would

5:13

only encourage the Nazis to

5:15

keep up the fight. This

5:17

diplomatic calculus began to change

5:19

after Stalingrad. By spring of

5:21

1943, there was military parody,

5:23

more or less, on the

5:25

Eastern Front. It was even

5:27

possible now to envision a

5:29

Soviet victory, but such a

5:31

victory would likely come only

5:33

after further years of fighting

5:35

and at great cost to

5:38

the USSR. And the refusal,

5:40

or inability, take your pick,

5:42

of the Western allies to

5:44

open that second front would

5:46

only drag out the war

5:48

that much longer. A negotiated

5:50

settlement would end the war

5:52

this year. That would be

5:54

tempting, provided the German demands

5:56

were not excessive. The Axis

5:58

was in a comparable position.

6:00

Historically, Adolf Hitler was still

6:02

confident that the USSR could

6:04

be beaten, although his actions

6:06

during this time suggest that

6:08

he had private doubts. More

6:10

about that in a few

6:12

minutes. But with the second

6:14

anniversary of Operation Barbarossa looming,

6:16

Hitler could no longer claim

6:18

that victory would come soon,

6:20

or that the price would

6:22

not be great. Even Govels,

6:24

his propaganda minister, was out

6:26

there calling for more effort,

6:28

more sacrifice, total war. With

6:30

the Axis position in North

6:32

Africa collapsing, Mussolini saw as

6:35

clearly as anyone that an

6:37

allied invasion of Italy would

6:39

come next, and he very

6:41

much wanted peace on the

6:43

Eastern Front. The Japanese government,

6:45

which was not at war

6:47

with the Soviet Union, repeatedly

6:49

offered to facilitate negotiations between

6:51

its Axis allies and the

6:53

USSR. There

6:56

is a dearth of primary sources

6:58

that can tell us exactly what

7:00

Moscow and Berlin were thinking in

7:02

the spring of 1943, but there

7:05

is evidence that armistice was in

7:07

the minds of some in both

7:09

capitals. One such piece of evidence

7:12

is how quiet the front got

7:14

after Stalingrad. That may have been

7:16

only because both sides were exhausted

7:19

and needed to rebuild their forces,

7:21

or was something else going on.

7:24

Another piece of evidence is

7:27

a speech Stalin gave on

7:29

February 23rd 1943, which was

7:31

Red Army Day, a Soviet

7:34

holiday first celebrated in 1919.

7:36

He spoke on the war

7:38

naturally, but presented it solely

7:40

as a conflict between the

7:43

USSR and Germany, never once

7:45

mentioning his allies. This caused

7:47

some sleepless nights in the

7:50

State Department and the Foreign

7:52

Office. The US ambassador in

7:54

Moscow was publicly complaining about

7:57

the conspicuous failure of the

7:59

Soviet government to acknowledge the

8:01

generosity of America's lend lease

8:03

aid, while the British ambassador,

8:06

under instructions from London, bluntly

8:08

inquired of both Molotov and

8:10

Stalin exactly what was going

8:13

on. The replies he got

8:15

were in his words, not

8:17

in very friendly terms. Then

8:22

there was the sudden chill

8:24

in relations between Moscow and

8:26

the Polish government in exile

8:28

following the news of the

8:30

mass graves discovered in Kachian

8:32

forest. While London and Washington

8:34

supported the government in exile

8:37

and were committed to a

8:39

restoration of pre-war Poland, Moscow

8:41

was demanding the Poles concede

8:43

Eastern Poland, while also setting

8:45

up their own Polish resistance

8:47

organization, dubbed the Union of

8:49

Polish Patriots. which could and

8:51

did serve as an alternative

8:53

pro-Soviet Polish government and exile.

8:56

Both Germany and the USSR

8:58

had diplomatic delegations in neutral

9:00

Stockholm, which were staffed by

9:02

some of each country's most

9:04

prominent and experienced diplomats, which

9:06

is suggestive that some kind

9:08

of negotiation may have been

9:10

going on, or was at

9:12

least contemplated by April 1943.

9:15

It was rumored that the

9:17

German side was willing to

9:19

consider peace in exchange for

9:21

the creation of a Ukrainian

9:23

state with a German puppet

9:25

government, plus the restoration of

9:27

pre-war trade agreements, while the

9:29

Soviet side was holding out

9:31

for a return to the

9:34

status quo of the 1939

9:36

Molotov Ribbentrop Pact. But if

9:38

this is so, the evidence

9:40

also suggests that by May,

9:42

Stalin was drawing away from

9:44

thoughts of negotiation. If so,

9:46

the German revelation of the

9:48

Khatian massacre in April probably

9:50

had something to do with

9:53

this. It wasn't only that

9:55

the Germans had made the

9:57

initial revelation. had made it

9:59

the centerpiece of his anti-Soviet

10:01

propaganda, while the British and

10:03

American governments grudgingly went along

10:05

with the Soviet claim that

10:07

the graves contained the bodies

10:09

of victims of a Nazi

10:12

atrocity, not a Soviet one.

10:14

We do know that on

10:16

May 1st, Stalin began to

10:18

display a change of attitude.

10:20

On that day, he issued

10:22

a statement dismissing the idea

10:24

of a separate piece with

10:26

Germany. and blaming any talk

10:28

of such a thing on

10:31

the Nazis, who, in Stalin's

10:33

words, judged their adversaries by

10:35

their own standards of treachery.

10:37

He added that the war

10:39

could only end after a

10:41

German unconditional surrender, although he

10:43

did not link this declaration

10:45

to Roosevelt's call for unconditional

10:47

surrender at Casablanca in January.

10:51

These comments by Stalin heralded

10:54

an uptick in relations with

10:56

the UK and the US.

10:58

The Soviet press began praising

11:00

the Western Allies' victory in

11:03

North Africa, despite earlier complaints

11:05

that the North Africa campaign

11:07

was a minor side show.

11:09

Much more important, on May

11:12

23, Moscow announced the dissolution

11:14

of Cominterne, the Communist International.

11:16

The very existence of Cominterne.

11:18

had long been a sticking

11:21

point in Moscow's diplomatic relations,

11:23

since Cominterne had been created

11:25

expressly for the purpose of

11:27

overthrowing every other government in

11:30

the world and replacing it

11:32

with a communist one. The

11:34

move to shut it down

11:36

was welcomed in the West.

11:39

Clearly, if Stalin was considering

11:41

a separate piece, by May,

11:43

he had abandoned the idea.

11:45

The Kachten revelations may have

11:48

contributed to this. Stalin may

11:50

also have anticipated that a

11:52

German 1943 summer offensive was

11:54

looming, so now was not

11:57

the time to rebuff his

11:59

allies. Which brings me back

12:01

around to the the subject

12:03

of Germany's planned 1943 offensive

12:06

Operation Citadel. As I indicated

12:08

earlier, Hitler claimed to remain

12:10

confident that Citadel would be

12:12

a success, but his behavior

12:15

suggests otherwise, especially his repeated

12:17

postponement of the offensive. I

12:19

told you in episode 384

12:21

that in May, Hitler postponed

12:24

Operation Citadel until late June,

12:26

he postponed it until early

12:28

July. Let me

12:30

emphasize again how harmful these delays

12:33

were. Operation Citadel was aimed at

12:35

a big Soviet salient in the

12:37

front line around the city of

12:40

Kursk. A quick glance at the

12:42

map of the front line in

12:44

spring 1943 is all you need

12:47

to see for yourself how tempting

12:49

a target that salient was. The

12:51

problem for the Germans was that

12:53

the Red Army could read maps

12:56

as well as anybody else and

12:58

would surely guess German intentions. surprise

13:00

with regard to place was therefore

13:03

impossible. The only other possibility was

13:05

surprise with regard to time. Over

13:07

the course of this war, the

13:09

Wehrmacht had repeatedly surprised its enemies

13:12

by attacking sooner than expected, but

13:14

Hitler's procrastination had frittered away that

13:16

possibility. Hitler's

13:18

stated justification for the delay

13:21

was to allow time for

13:23

more of Germany's newest models

13:25

of tanks to reach the

13:27

front. Is this a good

13:29

time to talk about German

13:31

tank production? Hey, any time

13:34

is a good time to

13:36

talk about German tank production.

13:38

Recall that the British invented

13:40

the tank and calling them

13:42

tanks was a bit of

13:44

wartime misdirection. The cover story

13:47

was that these machines were

13:49

motorized water tanks meant to

13:51

supply British troops in the

13:53

desert. The German term for

13:55

tank during this period was

13:57

panzer kamfagen, often abbreviated PZKW.

14:00

Ponser is the German word

14:02

for armor, and Ponser comfaggen

14:04

means something like armored fighting

14:06

vehicle, which is also the

14:09

more technical English term for

14:11

tank. Today, I believe the

14:13

Germans use the term compppponser,

14:15

which you could translate as

14:17

battle armor. The word Ponser

14:19

has infiltrated the English language.

14:21

and in English it can

14:23

refer to a German tank

14:26

in the same way that

14:28

U-boat is used to mean

14:30

a German submarine. Panzer can

14:32

also be used in the

14:34

name of a German armored

14:36

formation, as in panzer division,

14:38

panzer corps, or panzer army.

14:40

Germany produced only a handful

14:42

of experimental tanks in the

14:45

latter days of the last

14:47

war. The Treaty of Versailles

14:49

then prohibited Germany from producing

14:51

or deploying any tanks at

14:53

all. So in the Weimar

14:55

period, the German military manufactured

14:57

small numbers of what they

14:59

called tractors, which were in

15:02

reality prototype tanks, which were

15:04

used for training and testing

15:06

in the Soviet Union. This

15:08

was back in the days

15:10

when the Soviets were helping

15:12

the Germans evade the terms

15:14

of the treaty. The Panzer

15:16

I tank was designed in

15:18

1932. And production began in

15:21

1934, after Hitler came to

15:23

power, and started a secret

15:25

German rearmament program. The Panzer

15:27

I wasn't much of a

15:29

tank. It was small, it

15:31

had relatively thin armor, and

15:33

its only weapons were machine

15:35

guns, because it was conceived

15:38

as an anti-infentry weapon. The

15:40

Panzer I was used for

15:42

training, and in the Spanish

15:44

Civil War. By the time

15:46

the Second World War broke

15:48

out. Pansar ones were used

15:50

in the invasions of Poland,

15:52

Norway, France, and North Africa,

15:54

and in the early months

15:57

of Operation Barbarossa. Although they

15:59

were basically obsolete, they were

16:01

still useful. They were fast,

16:03

they had radios which allowed

16:05

for better coordination, and the

16:07

Germans were more experienced in

16:09

armored warfare and had developed

16:11

a sophisticated tank doctrine. When

16:14

rearmament began in 1934, it

16:16

was already clear that the

16:18

army would need a better

16:20

tank. A key figure in

16:22

developing this new tank was

16:24

our old friend Heitz-Gudarian. He

16:26

drafted specifications for two new

16:28

heavier tanks, what came to

16:31

be known as medium tanks,

16:33

meant to be the main

16:35

German battle tanks. These became

16:37

the Panzer III and the

16:39

Panzer IV. Well, what happened

16:41

to the Panzer II, I

16:43

hear you ask? Well, the

16:45

Panzer I was incapable of

16:47

taking on an enemy tank,

16:50

and the new threes and

16:52

fours would take time to

16:54

develop and produce. So the

16:56

Panzer II was devised to

16:58

fill in the gap. It

17:00

was similar to the Panzer

17:02

I, but in addition to

17:04

machine guns, it carried a

17:07

20mm cannon. The first Panzer

17:09

IIs reached the German army

17:11

in 1936. In the early

17:13

stages of the Second World

17:15

War, up to the invasion

17:17

of France, German armored units

17:19

were using Panzer Ins and

17:21

Panzer IIs. augmented with hundreds

17:23

of pretty good Czech tanks,

17:26

captured when the Germans occupied

17:28

Czechia. Guderian conceived the Pansar

17:30

III to be Germany's main

17:32

combat tank, with a 37mm

17:34

and later a 50mm gun.

17:36

The Pansar IV was at

17:38

first armed with a halitzer

17:40

and was intended as an

17:43

anti-infantry weapon. Small but gradually

17:45

increasing numbers of threes and

17:47

fours saw action in Poland,

17:49

Norway, France, North Africa, the

17:51

Balkans, and the Soviet Union.

17:53

By the time of the

17:55

German invasion of the Soviet

17:57

Union in June 1914, 31,

17:59

the Panzer III was the

18:02

most numerous tank fighting on

18:04

the Eastern Front. But the

18:06

Germans were in for a

18:08

nasty surprise when they discovered

18:10

that the Red Army's corresponding

18:12

medium tank, the T-34, was

18:14

superior to the Panzer III.

18:16

It had a bigger and

18:19

more powerful main gun, and

18:21

its sloped armor made it

18:23

virtually invulnerable to German tanks.

18:26

As you know, the Germans

18:28

did very well in the

18:30

1941 campaign anyway, at least

18:32

until winter set in. They

18:34

destroyed thousands of T34s. Despite

18:37

the Soviet tanks' advantages, German

18:39

Panzer units were much better

18:41

trained and experienced in how

18:43

to use their own tanks.

18:45

Nevertheless, it was obvious to

18:47

the German army that they

18:49

needed better tanks. One quick

18:51

change they could make was

18:54

to upgrade the guns on

18:56

their existing tanks. They chose

18:58

to do this with the

19:00

Pansar 4 because it had

19:02

a bigger turret that could

19:04

handle a bigger gun, and

19:06

these upgraded Pansar 4s, now

19:08

with 75mm guns, became the

19:11

German army's main tank, with

19:13

the Pansar 3 demoted to

19:15

anti-infantry combat. Or in other

19:17

words, the two models swapped

19:19

rolls. That

19:21

was a stopgap solution, but

19:24

in the longer term, Germany

19:26

would need better tanks. Plans

19:28

were approved in spring 1942

19:31

for a new Panser 5

19:33

medium tank. The German government

19:35

had already begun the development

19:37

of a new heavy tank,

19:40

meant to counter the Soviet

19:42

KV heavy tanks. This new

19:44

heavy tank, the Panser 6,

19:47

picked up the nickname Tiger

19:49

while it was still in

19:51

development. The tiger would have

19:53

thick armor and fire an

19:56

88mm gun, since the Germans

19:58

had such good luck with

20:00

their 88mm guns. The smaller

20:03

Panzer 5 would be armed

20:05

with a 75mm gun. The

20:07

Panzer 6 and the Panzer

20:09

5 were meant to have

20:12

the same engine. Since the

20:14

Panzer 5 was smaller, that

20:16

would make it faster and

20:19

more nimble than its larger

20:21

cousin, the tiger. So it

20:23

got tagged with the nickname

20:25

Panther. Production began in December

20:28

1942 with the goal of

20:30

producing 600 Panthers every month,

20:32

though Germany never got close

20:35

to this goal. The tiger

20:37

was rushed into production without

20:39

a prototype. The first few

20:41

tigers had been sent to

20:44

defend Tunisia in early 1943.

20:46

They were powerful, but few,

20:48

and the allies were able

20:51

to drive the access off

20:53

the African continent despite them.

20:55

The first Panthers were sent

20:57

to the Eastern Front in

21:00

preparation for Operation Citadel. These

21:02

were the weapons with which

21:04

Hitler hoped to regain Germany

21:06

the upper hand in the

21:09

1943 Eastern Offensive. They were

21:11

fearsome tanks to be sure,

21:13

but they were also new,

21:16

meaning there were still kinks

21:18

to be worked out, both

21:20

in their designs and in

21:22

the manufacturing. They were complex

21:25

weapons. more difficult and expensive

21:27

to manufacture than the tanks

21:29

they replaced, and they were

21:32

sent into offensive action on

21:34

the eastern front just days

21:36

after the last of them

21:38

had arrived, meaning German army

21:41

tank crews did not have

21:43

much time to learn how

21:45

to use them. Incidentally, Hitler

21:48

later ordered that the panzer

21:50

five, that's with a Roman

21:52

numeral V for five, be

21:54

referred to exclusively as the

21:57

panther. and banned the numerical

21:59

designation. I wonder

22:01

what Hitler's problem with the

22:03

letter V was? Adolf

22:35

Hitler had delayed the start

22:37

of Operation Citadel from May

22:39

to June, and then it

22:41

lasted early July, July 5th,

22:43

to be exact. The delay

22:45

led to a setback in

22:47

May when Soviet reconnaissance spotted

22:49

Luftwaffe planes gathering at airfields

22:51

near to where the Operation

22:53

Citadel offensive would take place,

22:56

preemptive Soviet airstrikes destroyed hundreds

22:58

of German planes on the

23:00

ground. not that the Germans

23:02

had enough aviation fuel for

23:04

all of them anyway. Hitler

23:06

continued to exude optimism, at

23:08

least in front of his

23:10

military commanders. He told them

23:12

the new tanks were the

23:14

finest in the world, and

23:16

that when Operation Citadel began,

23:18

it would be to the

23:20

Russians like a bolt from

23:23

the blue. That was dubious.

23:25

Some of the senior military

23:27

commanders, including Alfred Yodel and

23:29

Kurt Zeitzer, questioned why there

23:31

should be a German offensive

23:33

at all. The Soviets were

23:35

surely preparing their own offensive.

23:37

Wouldn't it make more sense

23:39

to put those new tanks

23:41

into an armored reserve force

23:43

behind the front line, a

23:45

force that could then quickly

23:47

move to block any Soviet

23:49

offensive? Heinz Guderian, who was

23:52

now in charge of tank

23:54

production, met with Hitler on

23:56

June 18th and warned him

23:58

that the new tanks still

24:00

had some mechanical issues. and

24:02

their crews needed more time

24:04

to familiarize themselves with them.

24:06

Guderian then also expressed doubt

24:08

over the necessity of an

24:10

offensive, primarily intended to retake

24:12

the city of Kursk. Hitler

24:14

claimed that recapturing that city

24:16

would be a political and

24:19

propaganda victory for Germany. Guderian

24:21

argued that hardly anyone in

24:23

the world could find Kursk

24:25

on a map, and no

24:27

one would care which side

24:29

controlled it. Hitler admitted to

24:31

him that thinking about operation

24:33

Citadel gave him a queasy

24:35

stomach, but he would not

24:37

consider canceling it. The Soviet

24:39

side was indeed aware of

24:41

German plans. The British had

24:43

passed along information gleaned from

24:46

Enigma intercepts, heavily redacted to

24:48

conceal the source, that revealed

24:50

the details of the pending

24:52

operation. The Soviets also had

24:54

their own sources of information

24:56

now, such as their own

24:58

reconnaissance planes, plus information on

25:00

German activities behind their front

25:02

line, gathered and relayed to

25:04

them by organized bands of

25:06

partisans. The Red Army had

25:08

already begun preparations for its

25:10

own offensive in the same

25:12

region near Kursk. An entire

25:15

front, the step front, consisting

25:17

of five armies and four

25:19

armored and mechanized cores, had

25:21

been moved in secret behind

25:23

the bulge in the Soviet

25:25

line, ready to blunt any

25:27

German offensive, and then spearhead

25:29

the Soviet counter-offensive. The Soviets

25:31

relied on Moskirovka techniques to

25:33

encourage the Germans to believe

25:35

that their own offensive would

25:37

be farther south, including ascending

25:39

construction teams to build airfields,

25:42

suggesting preparation for an attack

25:44

there. Upon

25:46

receiving information about the upcoming German

25:48

offensive from the British, Stalin at

25:51

first wanted to marshal Soviet forces

25:53

and begin their offensive at

25:55

once in order to disrupt the

25:57

German attack. Fortunately, Vasilevski and

25:59

Jukov were able to talk him

26:02

out of it. They pointed

26:04

out that greater losses could be

26:06

inflicted on the Germans by letting

26:09

them attack into carefully prepared red

26:11

army defenses afterward would come the

26:13

time for an offensive against

26:15

a weak and exhausted German army.

26:18

Stalin conceded the point and

26:20

agreed to their plan. This marks

26:22

quite a change from the

26:24

Stalin of 1941. In those days,

26:27

his answer to every German victory

26:29

was attack, attack, and keep

26:31

attacking. Now, two years later, he

26:33

was willing to take advice

26:35

from his military commanders, at least

26:38

the ones he trusted. The

26:40

Red Army relied on its new

26:42

doctrine of defense in depth. A

26:45

series of no fewer than six

26:47

lines of trenches and fortifications were

26:49

constructed at the points in

26:51

the front line where German attacks

26:54

were expected. Instead of trying

26:56

to hold the line at the

26:58

front, the Red Army would

27:00

allow the Germans to advance through

27:03

these defenses while wearing them down

27:05

every step of the way.

27:07

In fact, as May led into

27:09

June and June into July,

27:11

Stalin began to doubt the reality

27:14

of this supposed German offensive

27:16

that was predicted to come at

27:18

any time, but that was merely

27:21

Hitler's procrastination. Operation Citadel was coming.

27:25

On July 4th, the day

27:27

before the offensive was to

27:29

begin, a German intelligence officer

27:32

warned Zeitzler that the Soviets

27:34

knew about Operation Citadel and

27:36

had prepared defenses against it.

27:39

He added, I consider the

27:41

intended operation a definitive mistake

27:43

that will rebound heavily against

27:46

us. Later

27:48

that night, just hours before

27:51

the German offensive was scheduled

27:53

to begin, and at the

27:55

other end of Europe, the

27:57

Prime Minister of the Polish

27:59

Government in exile, General Waddiswab

28:01

Sikorsk, was in Gibraltar boarding

28:03

a plane to return to

28:05

Britain after completing a six-week

28:07

tour of Polish forces fighting

28:09

in the Middle East. Shortly

28:11

before midnight, his plane, an

28:13

American B24 Liberator, took off

28:15

from the airfield. Sixteen seconds

28:17

later, the plane crashed into

28:19

the ocean, killing ten of

28:21

its eleven occupants, including Sikorski.

28:23

Only the pilot survived. I

28:25

told you that story before

28:28

in episode 392. Sikorski's death

28:30

proved quite convenient for Stalin,

28:32

and to a lesser extent

28:34

to Roosevelt and Churchill, so

28:36

much so that many Poles

28:38

then and now suspect the

28:40

crash was not an accident,

28:42

but deliberate sabotage, orchestrated to

28:44

smooth over conflicts within the

28:46

alliance. No evidence of sabotage

28:48

emerged then or since, but

28:50

neither can it be definitively

28:52

disproven. We may never know

28:54

for sure. Operation

28:56

Citadel was scheduled to begin

28:58

at 5 AM on July

29:00

5th. But when the moment

29:02

came, the Red Army began

29:04

a massive artillery barrage against

29:06

German positions. Some Germans thought

29:08

the Soviets were about to

29:10

begin their own offensive, but

29:12

no, this was a preemptive

29:14

bombardment meant to disrupt the

29:16

German attack. The

29:19

Soviet bombardment forced the Germans

29:21

to postpone the beginning of

29:23

their offensive until the shelling

29:25

ended about two hours later.

29:27

The Soviet Air Force also

29:29

attempted a preemptive strike on

29:31

Luftwaffe airfields, but unfortunately for

29:33

them the Luftwaffe was already

29:35

in the air and ready

29:37

to fight back. The attempt

29:39

ended badly, with over 150

29:41

Soviet planes shot down, in

29:43

exchange for only modest losses

29:45

on the German side. Similarly,

29:48

the Soviet artillery bombardment inflicted

29:50

little damage on the Germans,

29:52

although it did force a

29:54

brief delay. But it was

29:56

also a clear sign that

29:58

the Red Army knew all

30:00

about Operation... Citadel and had

30:03

already made preparations to oppose

30:05

it. So much for surprise.

30:07

It's a rule of thumb

30:09

in military planning that a

30:11

successful attack needs roughly a

30:13

three-to-one numerical advantage to succeed.

30:15

Operation Citadel was 625,000 German

30:17

soldiers against 1.9 million red

30:19

army soldiers, flipping that ratio

30:21

upside down. The Red Army

30:24

had a comparable proportional advantage

30:26

in numbers of tanks, artillery

30:28

guns, and aircraft. The Wehrmacht

30:30

had routinely defeated larger Soviet

30:32

formations for the past two

30:34

years, but the Red Army

30:36

of 1943 was better equipped,

30:38

more experienced, and better led.

30:40

And the Germans had made

30:43

good use of encirclements in

30:45

the past two years. Recall

30:47

that Operation Citadel was supposed

30:49

to be another such dramatic

30:51

victory. Hitler planned for two

30:53

assaults on opposite sides of

30:55

the Soviet salient at Kursk,

30:57

with the goal of breaking

30:59

through and surrounding the Red

31:01

Army units inside. In spite

31:04

of everything, the first day

31:06

of the attack went reasonably

31:08

well. The southern attack was

31:10

led by the 4th Panzer

31:12

Army, spearheaded by the new

31:14

Tiger tanks. It broke through

31:16

the first Soviet defensive line

31:18

by 9 AM. and by

31:20

sunset it had reached the

31:23

second defensive line, despite large

31:25

numbers of concealed Red Army

31:27

anti-tank guns along the route.

31:29

Red Army commanders were forced

31:31

to commit all their reserves

31:33

to stopping the fourth panzer,

31:35

and it was still just

31:37

the first day. The ninth

31:39

army led the northern attack.

31:41

It was commanded by General

31:44

Volter Model, and unfortunately for

31:46

him, his army was short

31:48

on tanks. Modell also used

31:50

his new Tiger tanks as

31:52

the spearhead, but relied on

31:54

infantry and anti-tank guns to

31:56

do most of it. the

31:58

fighting, the rest of his

32:00

panzers he held in reserve,

32:03

ready to take advantage of

32:05

any breakthrough to sweep behind

32:07

Soviet lines. That was a

32:09

bit of wishful thinking on

32:11

his part. As his subordinates

32:13

argued, a breakthrough was unlikely,

32:15

and those panzers would be

32:17

better used on the front

32:19

line. But the ninth did

32:21

advance some 10 kilometers on

32:24

the first day, which wasn't

32:26

too shabby. The

32:28

next day, the southern force

32:30

was able to advance 20

32:32

kilometers. The new German tanks

32:34

were clearly superior to Soviet

32:36

T34's. The 88mm gun on

32:38

a tiger tank could knock

32:40

out a T34 from a

32:42

distance of two kilometers. While

32:44

the T34, well, the T34

32:46

of 1943, was essentially the

32:48

same tank as the T34

32:50

of 1940. The German panther

32:52

tanks, on the other hand,

32:54

though effective, were plagued with

32:56

technical problems. They broke down

32:58

frequently and displayed an alarming

33:00

tendency to catch fire. The

33:02

German army lost as many

33:04

Panthers's to mechanical problems as

33:06

it did to combat. A

33:08

couple of days' worth of

33:10

advances would be all the

33:12

Germans would get. On July

33:14

9th, commanders of the 9th

33:16

fighting in the North, fighting

33:18

in the North, concluded that

33:20

no farther advance was possible.

33:22

They had covered less than

33:24

half the distance they would

33:26

need to link up with

33:28

the fourth panzer army advancing

33:30

from the south. The ninth

33:32

army fought on, hoping to

33:34

tie down enough Soviet units

33:37

to enable the fourth panzer

33:39

army to break through and

33:41

meet up with them. But

33:43

the fourth panzer army had

33:45

its own problems. On the

33:47

evening of that same day,

33:49

July 9th, The Red Army's

33:51

fifth guard's tank army intercepted

33:53

their advance at the town

33:55

of Prohorovka, and there followed

33:57

three days of heavy fighting.

34:00

Later that same night, came

34:02

bad news from an entirely

34:05

different direction. The Western allies

34:07

were landing troops on the

34:09

island of Sicily. This was

34:11

not a surprise to Hitler.

34:13

He had been expecting something

34:16

like this, although he thought

34:18

Sardinia would be the target.

34:20

Italian forces on the island

34:22

were too few to hold

34:24

off the invasion by themselves.

34:27

On July 12th, more bad news.

34:30

The Red Army began its own

34:32

offensive, Operation Katoosov. The following day,

34:34

Hitler summoned his senior commanders to

34:37

the Wolfslayer and told them he

34:39

was calling off Operation Citadel after

34:42

barely a week. Field Marshal von

34:44

Monstein, commander of Army Group South,

34:46

and therefore senior commander of that

34:49

southern advance that was still fighting

34:51

in earnest at Prohorovka, objected. He

34:53

thought a breakthrough was still possible

34:56

and wanted to give it a

34:58

few more days. This was a

35:01

bit of roll reversal. Until now,

35:03

it had usually been Hitler who

35:05

wanted to keep fighting while his

35:08

commanders urged withdrawal. Hitler gave Monstein

35:10

his few more days, but the

35:13

breakthrough Monstein was looking for never

35:15

came. Hitler was now, for the

35:17

first time, facing Allied offensives on

35:20

two fronts. the dreaded situation Germany

35:22

had so far managed to avoid.

35:24

His attention turned now primarily to

35:27

Italy. If the allies took Sicily,

35:29

an invasion of the Italian mainland

35:32

would surely be their next move,

35:34

and that could lead to the

35:36

collapse of Italy. How long before

35:39

the Anglo-American forces were at the

35:41

Brenner Pass? Operation Citadel had failed

35:44

in a matter of days. There

35:46

would be no grand encirclement of

35:48

the five or six Soviet armies

35:51

deployed inside the Kurzk salient. Germany

35:53

would never again regain the initiative

35:55

in the East. Germany would never

35:58

again regain the labor in support

36:00

of the German war effort. Germany

36:03

would never again regain the initiative

36:05

in the East. In fact, for

36:07

the rest of the war, you

36:10

should not expect to hear me

36:12

utter the words German and offensive

36:15

next to each other. at least

36:17

not on the eastern front. Now

36:19

the Soviets held the initiative and

36:22

their own offensive Operation Kutuzov was

36:24

in full swing. Operation Citadel was

36:26

over, but the battle of Kursk

36:29

was only beginning. We'll have to

36:31

stop there for today. I thank

36:34

you for listening and I'd like

36:36

to thank Clinton for his kind

36:38

donation. and thank you to Dan

36:41

for becoming a patron of the

36:43

podcast. Donors and patrons like Clinton

36:46

and Dan help cover the costs

36:48

of making this show, which in

36:50

turn keeps the podcast available free

36:53

for everyone always, so my thanks

36:55

to them and to all of

36:57

you who have pitched in and

37:00

helped out. If you'd like to

37:02

become a patron or make a

37:05

donation, you are most welcome. Just

37:07

visit the website History of the

37:09

20th century.com and click on the

37:12

Paypal or Patriot buttons. And as

37:14

always, the podcast website also contains

37:16

notes about the music used on

37:19

the podcast, which is sometimes my

37:21

own work and sometimes licensed, but

37:24

many times the music you hear

37:26

here is free and downloadable. If

37:28

you hear a piece of music

37:31

on the podcast and you would

37:33

like to know more about it,

37:36

including the composer, the performers, and

37:38

a link to where you can

37:40

download it, that would be the

37:43

place to go. And while you're

37:45

there, you can always leave a

37:47

comment and let me know what

37:50

you thought about today's show. We're

37:52

in the period now where we're

37:55

preparing for our son's surgery. So

37:57

allow me to remind you that

37:59

we're on a bi-weekly schedule for

38:02

the time being, hopefully not for

38:04

too long. So I hope you'll

38:07

join me in two weeks' time

38:09

here on the history of the

38:11

20th century as we continue the

38:14

story of the Battle of Kursk.

38:16

The Germans took their shot, now

38:18

the Red Army will take theirs.

38:21

That's in two weeks' time here

38:23

on the history of the 20th

38:26

century. Oh, and one more thing.

38:28

I made a little joke earlier

38:30

about Adolf Hitler and why he

38:33

might have had an aversion to

38:35

the letter V. This story begins

38:38

with a Belgian named Victor de

38:40

Lavalle. He was a veteran of

38:42

the First World War and a

38:45

member of the Belgian Olympic teams

38:47

in 1920, 1924, and 1928. He

38:49

became a lawyer and went into

38:52

politics where he became head of

38:54

the Belgian Liberal Party and served

38:57

as Minister of Justice. In

39:00

1940, he fled the German

39:02

invasion of Belgium for France

39:04

and then for Britain. In

39:06

Britain, he was invited to

39:08

take charge of Radio Belgique,

39:10

the BBC Overseas Service broadcasts

39:12

to Belgian listeners. In a

39:14

radio message broadcast in January

39:16

1941, he called on Belgians

39:18

to adopt the letter V

39:20

as a symbol of opposition

39:22

to the German occupation. He

39:24

chose the letter V because

39:26

it was quick and easy

39:28

to write, and it could

39:30

be interpreted as freight, which

39:32

means freedom in Dutch or

39:34

Flemish, or as victor, which

39:36

means victory in French. And

39:38

of course, in English, it

39:40

could also be interpreted as

39:42

meaning victory. Listeners in Belgium,

39:44

the Netherlands and France, were

39:46

encouraged to find ways to

39:48

display the letter V as

39:50

a sign to the German

39:52

occupiers that they were not

39:54

welcome. and perhaps not even

39:56

safe. A V can be

39:58

written in two strokes so

40:00

it can quickly be applied

40:02

to a wall or sidewalk

40:04

as a graffiti. The campaign

40:07

took on a life of its own.

40:09

Citizens of occupied countries flashed

40:11

V signs with their fingers

40:13

at one another as a

40:15

gesture of solidarity. BBC broadcasts

40:18

suggested ever more creative ways

40:20

to get the message across,

40:22

such as setting cutlery on

40:25

the table in the shape of a

40:27

V, or setting stopped clocks at 1105.

40:29

The public were encouraged

40:31

to sit at sidewalk

40:34

cafe tables with their

40:36

legs extended in a V

40:38

shape. Some brave souls even

40:41

managed to chalk large

40:43

V's on the backs

40:45

of German soldiers coats.

40:47

The letter V in Morse Code

40:49

is three dots and a dash,

40:52

which suggested a whole other

40:54

set of tricks, such as

40:56

knocking on the door like

40:58

this. And then there was

41:01

Beethoven's fifth symphony with its

41:03

unforgettable four-note motif that replicates

41:06

the sound of the letter

41:08

V and Morse Code. Which

41:10

was pretty clever of Beethoven,

41:13

especially since he composed that

41:15

symphony 30 years before Morse

41:17

Code was invented. The BBC

41:19

took to playing the symphony as

41:22

a gesture of defiance and urged

41:24

people on the continent to do

41:26

likewise. Beethoven himself

41:29

had once described that

41:31

four-note motif as representing

41:33

fate knocking at the door.

41:35

Now fate stood at the Nazis'

41:37

door and was announcing its arrival

41:40

in Morse code. When the

41:42

United States entered the war,

41:44

the Americans also embraced

41:46

the V symbol, displaying

41:49

it everywhere. American propaganda

41:51

posters regularly incorporated the

41:54

V motif. Women wore

41:57

V-shaped pins. The regular

41:59

three- sent postage stamp issued during

42:01

the war depicted an American eagle

42:04

with its wings stretched high in

42:06

the shape of a V. Winston

42:08

Churchill got into the act too.

42:11

He quickly adopted the V hand

42:13

gesture with the first two fingers

42:15

extended and displayed it at virtually

42:18

every public appearance. There was just

42:20

one little problem. Among working class

42:22

people in the British Isles, extending

42:25

your first two fingers toward someone

42:27

with the back of the hand

42:29

facing them has a vulgar and

42:32

insulting connotation, roughly equivalent to an

42:34

American making the same gesture with

42:36

only the middle finger extended. Therefore,

42:39

the proper thing to do was

42:41

to make the V gesture palm

42:43

forward and back the hand toward

42:46

yourself. Churchill, being

42:48

upper class, was unaware of the

42:50

significance of the vulgar gesture, so

42:52

he went about displaying his V

42:55

sign the wrong way. Embarrassed assistance

42:57

and staff repeatedly coached him on

43:00

the proper way to do V

43:02

for victory, but he frequently forgot.

43:04

Consequently, in our time, you

43:07

can find many photographs of

43:09

Winston Churchill making an obscene

43:11

gesture.