0:20

After securing French North Africa, the

0:22

Western Allies once again fell into

0:25

disagreement over the next move. Roosevelt

0:28

and Churchill agreed to another conference

0:30

to discuss the matter, and

0:33

chose a provocative venue. Casablanca

0:36

in French Morocco, the

0:39

city George Patton's Western Task Force

0:41

had attacked barely two months ago.

0:44

A conference in French North Africa would

0:47

be something like a victory lap for

0:49

the Western Allies. Welcome

0:53

to the history of the 20th Century. Welcome

1:00

to the

1:03

20th Century.

1:28

Road 383, Casablanca. As

1:35

we've worked our way through the first

1:37

28 months of the Second World War,

1:40

from September 1939 to

1:42

January 1943, you

1:45

may have come to notice how many

1:47

times I've talked about conferences among

1:49

leaders or military commanders of the

1:52

Allied powers, especially the

1:54

UK and the US. These

1:57

two countries began holding joint strategy

1:59

meetings. even before the United States

2:02

entered the war, most

2:04

notably the Atlantic Conference, when

2:06

Winston Churchill met with President Franklin

2:08

Roosevelt face to face for the

2:10

first time in Newfoundland in August

2:12

1941. This is the conference

2:16

from which emerged the Atlantic

2:18

Charter, thus it is

2:20

sometimes called the Atlantic Conference. Wikipedia

2:25

actually has a page

2:27

titled List of

2:29

Allied World War II Conferences.

2:32

There are 31 entries on the list and I've

2:36

mentioned most of the ones that have taken place

2:38

so far. Today I'm

2:41

going to skip over conferences that

2:43

mostly involved foreign ministers and military

2:45

commanders or minor allies and consider

2:48

only the conferences attended by two

2:50

of the big three, Churchill,

2:53

Roosevelt, and Stalin. After

2:56

the Atlantic Conference came the Washington

2:58

Conference, when Churchill came to Washington

3:01

shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack

3:03

to discuss joint strategy, Churchill

3:06

came to Washington again in June

3:08

1942, mostly to dissuade the Americans from

3:10

their plan to invade continental Europe in

3:12

1942 or 1943. In August 1942 Churchill

3:15

traveled to

3:20

Moscow to meet with Stalin, explained

3:23

to him that a second front in Europe

3:25

wasn't going to happen for a while yet

3:28

and persuade him that Operation Torch

3:30

would be just as helpful. A

3:35

through line of these meetings is

3:37

Winston Churchill persuading either Stalin

3:39

or more frequently Roosevelt to

3:41

do things his way. Churchill

3:45

persuaded the American president to

3:47

prioritize the European theater over

3:49

the Pacific theater, then

3:51

he persuaded him to adopt the plan

3:53

to invade North Africa rather than Europe.

3:56

Perhaps this was a bit presumptuous of

3:58

him, but the fact is

4:00

that Churchill was right every time. Germany

4:03

truly was a greater threat than Japan,

4:06

and Operation Sledgehammer, the

4:08

US proposal to invade the continent,

4:10

had it been attempted, would

4:12

have been disastrous. Now

4:16

that it was January 1943 and French

4:18

North Africa was secured, the

4:22

UK and US were once again

4:24

at loggerheads over the next step.

4:28

Predictably, the Americans wanted to go

4:30

back to Operation Roundup, their proposed

4:32

1943 invasion of the continent, while

4:36

the British side wanted first to finish

4:38

the job in the Mediterranean. That

4:41

would mean, at a minimum, ousting

4:44

the Axis from North Africa and

4:46

neutralizing the Italian Navy and

4:49

German and Italian Air Forces

4:51

operating in the region, particularly

4:53

from Sicily. So

4:56

what to do? Another

4:58

conference, obviously. Up

5:01

to now, Churchill has done all

5:03

of the traveling to these conferences,

5:06

which is understandable given President Roosevelt's

5:08

disability, which would complicate any long

5:10

trip. As for Stalin, he

5:12

was afraid to travel by air. This

5:16

time, however, Roosevelt expressed the desire

5:19

to do some traveling himself. He

5:22

was tired of conducting the war entirely

5:24

from Washington. The

5:28

two leaders chose Casablanca as the site of

5:30

their meeting. It was a good location from

5:32

which they could settle the

5:34

problem of who was going to govern French

5:36

North Africa after the murder of

5:39

Francois Darlon put an emphatic end

5:41

to the Darlon deal. Roosevelt

5:44

still didn't trust De Gaulle, whom

5:47

he saw both as a potential tyrant

5:50

and a British puppet. He

5:52

wanted Henri Giraud put in charge, while

5:55

Churchill stood four square behind

5:57

De Gaulle. Giraud

6:01

was happy to attend the conference and

6:03

was looking forward to being appointed the

6:05

new governor of French North Africa. The

6:09

Moroccan sultan, Muhammad V, was also

6:11

invited to meet with the allied

6:13

leaders to discuss the future of

6:15

the region. On

6:17

the other hand, Charles de Gaulle

6:19

complicated things greatly for Churchill by

6:22

refusing his invitation. To

6:25

de Gaulle, it was insufferable to be

6:27

summoned to a meeting of allied leaders

6:30

as if he were another of their

6:32

subordinates. And on French

6:34

territory, no less, Sacre

6:36

Bleu. Roosevelt

6:40

and Churchill also invited Stalin

6:42

to the Casablanca Conference, but

6:44

Stalin declined. The

6:46

official explanation was that Stalin needed

6:48

to remain in the Soviet Union

6:51

to oversee the Battle of Stalingrad,

6:53

which was still raging as the

6:55

conference met. Stalin's

6:59

fear of airplanes was not

7:01

irrational. Airplanes of the

7:03

time were slow, uncomfortable,

7:06

and far more prone to mechanical failure

7:08

than they are in our time, and

7:11

allied leaders had to travel long

7:13

and circuitous routes to keep outside

7:15

the reach of the Luftwaffe and

7:18

the U-boats. For

7:21

the safety of the allied leaders, the

7:23

conference was planned in the strictest secrecy.

7:27

On January 9, 1943,

7:30

President Roosevelt boarded his train in

7:32

Washington and headed north. This

7:36

was war time, so the White

7:38

House had suspended the practice of

7:40

publicizing the president's itinerary in advance,

7:42

though most reporters assumed he was taking

7:45

a routine trip to his home in

7:47

Hyde Park. When

7:50

they reached Baltimore, though, the president

7:52

and his entourage slipped off that

7:54

train and boarded a

7:56

different one headed south, and

7:59

rode it all the way to Miami. At

8:02

dawn they boarded Pan American Airlines

8:04

Dixie Clipper flying boat, which took

8:06

them on a 10-hour flight to

8:08

Port of Spain, the capital of

8:11

Trinidad, where they spent that night

8:13

in a local hotel. This

8:16

flight, by the way, represented the

8:19

first time a sitting president of

8:21

the United States rode in an

8:23

airplane. They

8:26

took off before dawn the following

8:28

morning for a 9-hour flight to

8:31

Belan, Brazil, where the

8:33

Dixie Clipper stopped to refuel, then

8:36

began the grueling 19-hour flight

8:38

across the Atlantic Ocean to

8:40

Africa. There the

8:42

plane landed at the mouth of

8:44

the Gambia River, where the light

8:46

cruiser USS Memphis was waiting. This

8:49

marked the first occasion a U.S.

8:52

president visited Africa. The

8:55

president and his party planned

8:57

to stay overnight aboard Memphis,

8:59

but first the president asked

9:01

to visit the nearby town

9:03

of Bathurst, the capital of

9:05

British Gambia. Reportedly, Roosevelt was

9:07

appalled by the poverty and

9:10

squalor in the town. He

9:12

had already stated his

9:14

intention that the United States would not

9:16

go to war merely to preserve European

9:18

colonial empires.

9:21

The sight of Bathurst convinced him

9:23

there was no place for imperialism

9:25

in the post-war world. The

9:30

following morning, the presidential party

9:32

boarded two U.S. Army C-54

9:35

transport planes for the final

9:37

leg of their journey across

9:39

the Sahara to Casablanca, where

9:42

they landed just before dinner time, five

9:44

and a half days after the president left

9:46

the White House. The

9:49

British and American delegations ate dinner

9:51

together that first night. Afterward,

9:54

Roosevelt and Churchill stayed up

9:56

past midnight, discussing some of

9:58

the key topics of the coming year. Conference

10:01

over more than a few

10:03

martinis. On

10:06

January 18, President Roosevelt

10:09

reviewed the U.S. 3rd Infantry

10:11

Division at Rabat, much

10:13

to the shock of its soldiers, who had

10:15

not known the President was in Morocco, let

10:18

alone he was about to make an inspection

10:20

tour. Roosevelt,

10:22

Harry Hopkins, and General George

10:24

Patton ate lunch together in

10:27

the field with the soldiers, al

10:29

fresco as it were. The

10:31

President and his luncheon companions ate the

10:34

same rations the soldiers were getting –

10:37

canned ham, sweet potatoes, and string

10:39

beans – while an army

10:41

band played music, including

10:43

one of the President's favorite songs, Chattanooga

10:46

Choo Choo, popularized in

10:49

1941 by Glenn Miller and

10:51

his orchestra. On

10:56

January 22, Roosevelt

10:58

and Churchill were dinner guests

11:00

of the 33-year-old Sultan of

11:02

Morocco, Muhammad V, and

11:05

his son, Crown Prince Hassan.

11:08

The Sultan presented gifts to each of

11:10

the two allied leaders, a

11:13

jeweled tiara and a

11:15

ceremonial sword, respectively. Morocco

11:18

had a significant Jewish population at

11:20

the time, about 250,000, and during

11:22

the period

11:25

of rule by the French government in

11:27

Vichy, the Sultan

11:29

had staunchly opposed the

11:31

implementation of Vichy's anti-Semitic

11:33

decrees, telling French officials,

11:37

there are no Jews in Morocco, there

11:40

are only Moroccan subjects, and

11:42

that his first duty as Sultan was

11:45

to protect his subjects. Unfortunately

11:48

the Sultan was little more than

11:50

a figurehead, and the French imposed

11:52

many of the Vichy decrees in

11:55

Morocco anyway, albeit over his objections.

11:58

Nevertheless, the Sultan explained that the Sultan was a

12:00

very good man, and that he was his resistance

12:02

by refusing to meet with any representatives of the

12:04

Nazi government in Germany. At

12:07

his 1941 Feast of

12:09

the Throne, a ceremony celebrating

12:11

the anniversary of the Sultan's

12:14

coronation, his guests of

12:16

honor were Morocco's most

12:18

prominent rabbis and other

12:20

important figures in the Moroccan Jewish

12:22

community. The

12:25

Sultan's resistance successfully delayed

12:27

any attempt to deport

12:29

Jewish Moroccans until the

12:31

Operation Torch landings overthrew

12:33

the She-Rul. Between

12:37

these public events, the British

12:40

and American delegations discussed war

12:42

strategy. General

12:44

Eisenhower appeared before them to

12:46

report on Operation Torch, including

12:49

the failure of the rush to Tunis.

12:52

He was extremely nervous about making this

12:55

appearance and it didn't help his presentation

12:57

any that he was suffering from influenza

12:59

on the big day. He proposed

13:02

a plan to deal with the German force

13:05

in Tunisia by circling south

13:07

of the Axis line and driving

13:09

straight across Tunisia to the sea.

13:12

That was when Alan Brooke, the Imperial

13:14

Chief of Staff, pointed out

13:16

that Eisenhower's plan would send the Allied

13:18

units at the tip of the spear

13:21

directly into Erwin Rommel's force, which

13:23

was withdrawing into Tunisia to link

13:26

up with the other Axis forces

13:28

in Tunis. Eisenhower

13:31

could only mutter something about giving

13:33

the plan further review. Privately,

13:38

US Army Chief of Staff

13:40

George Marshall berated Eisenhower over

13:42

the tangled logistics that had

13:44

hampered Operation Torch and

13:46

the poor discipline of the American soldiers,

13:49

with the notable exception of the troops

13:52

under the command of General Patton right

13:54

there at Casablanca. Patton

13:56

knew how to get his soldiers to

13:58

put on a good shot. show for

14:00

visitors. Roosevelt

14:03

promised to outfit the French

14:05

military in North Africa with

14:08

American equipment so they

14:10

could fight alongside their British and

14:12

American allies. Churchill

14:15

wanted the Americans to recognize Charles

14:17

de Gaulle and his Free French

14:19

Movement as the French government in

14:21

exile. But de

14:23

Gaulle's refusal even to attend the

14:25

conference wasn't exactly helping matters. It

14:29

took a private message from Churchill to

14:31

de Gaulle, threatening to cut

14:33

off British support for the Free French

14:35

Movement, to get the

14:37

general to come to Casablanca at

14:39

last. Giro

14:42

and eventually de Gaulle both

14:45

attended the conference, but

14:47

they were not invited to participate

14:49

in the military strategy sessions with

14:51

Roosevelt and Churchill. The

14:54

two French leaders did make a joint

14:57

public appearance with Churchill and Roosevelt at

14:59

a press conference on the final day

15:01

of the conference, but

15:04

the tensions between de Gaulle and

15:06

the Anglo-Americans were palpable, the

15:09

tensions between de Gaulle and Giro even

15:11

more so. Roosevelt

15:14

prodded the French generals to shake hands

15:16

for the cameras. The

15:18

handshake was so quick some of the

15:20

photographers couldn't get the shot in time,

15:23

and you can actually see their

15:25

discomfort in the pictures that were

15:27

taken. Franklin

15:31

Roosevelt hoped to set up Giro as

15:33

an equal partner with de Gaulle and

15:36

leading the Free French Movement. He

15:38

believed that Giro, who seemed much more

15:41

willing to work with Americans, would

15:43

serve as a useful counterweight to the

15:45

haughty de Gaulle. Roosevelt's

15:49

plan never worked out. Charles

15:52

de Gaulle had enormous credibility

15:54

as the first French leader

15:56

to publicly reject the armistice

15:59

with Germany. and urged the

16:01

French to fight on. The

16:03

anti-Nazi resistance in the French colonies,

16:06

the French underground in metropolitan

16:08

France, even the French

16:10

forces in North Africa respected

16:12

de Gaulle too much to

16:14

accept his being sidelined. In

16:18

the end, de Gaulle and Giraud

16:20

worked out a modus vivendi, in

16:23

which de Gaulle accepted Giraud as

16:25

commander of French forces in North Africa,

16:28

and Giraud accepted de Gaulle as

16:30

the overall leader of the Free French

16:33

Movement. As

16:35

for Franklin Roosevelt, it

16:38

wouldn't be until after de Gaulle

16:40

was back in Paris that the

16:42

American president would be willing to

16:44

acknowledge him as leader of the

16:46

French. Also

16:50

at the Casablanca Conference, the

16:53

British and the Americans discussed the U-boat

16:55

problem in the Atlantic, further

16:58

aid to the Soviet Union, and

17:01

the proper disposition of British and American

17:03

forces between the European

17:05

and Pacific theaters. They

17:08

agreed to share a summary of what was discussed

17:11

and agreed to at the conference

17:13

with Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek.

17:19

But the biggest issue of the conference, and

17:22

the one that divided the two allies, was

17:25

the strategic question of where to

17:27

strike next. The

17:29

Americans had wanted to strike directly into

17:32

France, the British had

17:34

persuaded them to execute Operation Torch

17:36

instead. Okay, fine,

17:38

been there, done that, now let's get

17:40

back to the main event, okay? Admiral

17:44

King reverted to his position that if

17:46

the British didn't feel ready to invade

17:48

Europe, then America should devote

17:50

its attention to the Pacific. General

17:54

Brooke couldn't have disagreed more.

17:57

U.S. Army operations clearly had to be done.

17:59

had some kinks that needed to be worked

18:02

out. An invasion

18:04

of France would face the

18:06

now 44 German divisions garrisoning

18:08

the country, and the

18:10

odds of success against them were slim.

18:14

The British side also had a

18:16

quantitative argument. The Allies

18:18

simply did not yet have enough

18:20

landing craft to execute a sea

18:23

invasion of France on

18:25

the necessary scale. And

18:27

neither did they have the shipping capacity

18:29

to keep such a large force in

18:31

supply after it landed

18:33

and began battling the German defenders.

18:37

And they had the numbers to prove it. The

18:39

British buried the Americans under a

18:42

blizzard of papers and statistics until

18:45

the Americans cried uncle. One

18:48

American general later described the Casablanca

18:50

Conference this way, we

18:52

came, we listened, and

18:54

we were conquered. Eisenhower

18:57

was one of the few Americans who

18:59

agreed with the British position, moving

19:02

George Patton to Grumble, that Ike

19:05

is more British than the British. Churchill

19:10

appointed Harold Macmillan to a

19:12

cabinet-level post as British minister

19:15

at Algiers, representing the

19:17

British government in the region and

19:20

working closely with Eisenhower. Macmillan

19:23

saw the relationship this way,

19:25

and they quote, we

19:28

are the Greeks in the American

19:30

Empire. You will find

19:32

the Americans much as the Greeks found the

19:34

Romans, great big

19:36

vulgar bustling people, more

19:39

vigorous than we are, and also more

19:41

idle, with more unspoiled

19:44

virtues, but also more

19:46

corrupt. We must

19:48

run Allied command as the Greek

19:50

slaves ran the operations of the

19:52

Emperor Claudius. In

19:58

exchange for agreeing to Britain, strategy,

20:01

the Americans extracted from the British

20:03

pledges to do more in the

20:05

Pacific theater, specifically to

20:07

send more military aid to

20:09

China, Australia, and New

20:11

Zealand, and further build up

20:14

British forces on the Indian border with

20:16

the goal of taking back Burma and

20:19

advancing on into Thailand and into

20:21

China. And

20:25

what exactly was the British strategy that

20:28

the Americans had conceded to? It was

20:32

first to complete the sweep across

20:34

North Africa, resting the region

20:36

from the axis, to

20:38

be followed by Operation Husky,

20:40

the invasion of Sicily. American

20:44

commanders had difficulty seeing what would

20:46

be gained by taking Sicily, but

20:49

again the British came armed

20:52

with statistics. Clearing

20:54

the Luftwaffe and the Italian Navy

20:56

out of the central Mediterranean would

20:59

reduce axis attacks on Allied shipping

21:02

and reopen more direct shipping lanes

21:04

to Egypt and India, both

21:06

of which would result in a savings in

21:08

merchant shipping, which would bring

21:10

nearer the day that the invasion of

21:12

the continent that you chaps are so keen

21:15

on can finally take place. May

21:17

1944 was

21:20

the tentative date. In

21:24

lieu of a ground invasion of Europe, the

21:27

Americans committed to joining the British

21:29

in their aerial bombing campaign over

21:31

Germany. As

21:33

we've seen, the RAF preferred to bomb

21:36

at night, despite the

21:38

problems of accuracy that entailed.

21:41

The Americans preferred to fly in

21:43

daylight, relying on their

21:45

big heavy bombers like the B-17

21:47

Flying Fortress and the

21:49

newer B-24 Liberator, flying at high

21:52

altitude, where they would be difficult

21:54

to reach, armed with

21:56

multiple machine gun turrets so they could

21:59

defend themselves. and using

22:01

the Norden bombsight, which allowed for

22:03

a high degree of accuracy even

22:06

at such altitudes. Very

22:10

well then, the British said, you do

22:12

you. The RAF

22:14

would bomb Germany by night, the US

22:16

Army Air Forces by day, coordinating

22:19

their targets so that a German

22:21

city might find itself getting pummeled

22:23

around the clock, which

22:25

would have to be highly disruptive to

22:28

production and devastating to

22:30

morale. Operation

22:34

Husky was a secret, but

22:36

Churchill could and did announce the

22:39

new bombing plan at

22:41

that press conference Allied leaders held at

22:43

the end of the Casablanca Conference on

22:45

January 24th. This

22:48

was the same press conference at which De

22:50

Gaulle and Giraud were forced to make nice.

22:53

A shotgun wedding, as Franklin Roosevelt

22:55

put it. But

22:58

when Roosevelt spoke at that press

23:01

conference, he gave the press

23:03

the biggest news story at Casablanca.

23:06

Roosevelt cited the great American

23:09

Civil War general, Ulysses S.

23:11

Grant, and noted that the

23:13

press of the time, playing off Grant's

23:15

initials, dubbed him

23:17

Unconditional Surrender Grant. In

23:21

that tradition, Roosevelt announced the

23:24

Allies had agreed they would

23:26

accept nothing less than Unconditional

23:28

Surrender from Germany, Italy,

23:31

and Japan. The

23:35

press reported that Churchill appeared

23:37

shocked when Roosevelt made his

23:39

announcement, which has

23:41

led to speculation that Roosevelt had made

23:43

it off the cuff without having first

23:45

discussed it with Churchill. That

23:48

was not the case. They had agreed to

23:50

it during the conference, but Churchill

23:53

was not expecting Roosevelt to announce it

23:55

so quickly. It

23:57

seems probable Roosevelt wanted to make

23:59

this public. pledge as part of

24:01

the effort to placate Joseph Stalin

24:04

and dissuade him from any thoughts of

24:06

a separate peace with Germany. Three

24:11

weeks later, after he'd returned

24:13

to the United States, Roosevelt

24:15

broadcast a fireside chat

24:18

in which he clarified the meaning of

24:21

unconditional surrender. He

24:23

told the American public, we

24:26

mean no harm to the common people

24:28

of the Axis nations, but

24:30

we do mean to impose

24:33

punishment and retribution upon

24:35

their guilty barbaric

24:38

leaders. On

24:43

his way back to the United States

24:46

during the stopover in Brazil, Roosevelt

24:48

met with the Brazilian president,

24:51

Guitulio Vargas. Vargas

24:53

was a right-wing dictator, but the

24:56

Roosevelt administration had worked hard to

24:58

cultivate relations with Brazil as part

25:00

of its larger good neighbor policy.

25:04

Brazil had signed on to the Atlantic

25:06

Charter, and after that

25:08

German and Italian submarines began

25:10

preying on Brazilian merchant shipping.

25:13

As it happened in the last war, these

25:16

U-boat attacks prompted Brazil to

25:19

declare war on Germany and Italy

25:21

in August 1942. Since

25:26

then, Brazilian air and naval

25:28

units were assisting in the Battle

25:30

of the Atlantic, and

25:32

with American support, Brazil would

25:34

organize a Brazilian expeditionary force,

25:36

the size of a division,

25:39

which in 1944 would fight in Europe as part

25:43

of the US Fifth Army. Brazil

25:46

would become the only South American

25:48

nation to contribute ground forces to

25:51

the war against the Axis. Vamoo!

26:06

Vamoo! Vamoo!

26:15

Vamoo! Vamoo!

26:25

Vamoo! Vamoo!

26:35

Vamoo!

26:40

Vamoo! On

26:43

January 23, 1943, the

26:46

penultimate day of the Casablanca

26:48

Conference, General Bernard

26:50

Montgomery's 8th Army captured

26:52

Tripoli. A

26:55

year ago, that would have been

26:57

considered a huge victory, but Operation

26:59

Torch changed everything in North Africa.

27:02

Ervin Rommel's defenders had simply

27:04

retreated into Tunisia, making sure

27:06

to destroy Tripoli's port facilities

27:08

before they left. Now,

27:11

Rommel's troops would be drawing supply

27:13

from the safer and more reliable

27:15

route through Tunis, while

27:17

Montgomery's supply line was

27:19

hopelessly overextended. It

27:21

would take two weeks before the first

27:24

British ships would be able to begin

27:26

offloading supplies at Tripoli, and

27:28

weeks more before the port was back

27:30

to full capacity. Relocating

27:34

to Tunisia offered Rommel

27:36

another advantage, the Marit

27:38

Line. This was

27:40

a defensive line the French had built

27:42

back in the 30s to defend Tunisia

27:45

against a potential Italian invasion from Libya.

27:48

The Marit Line was built some 200 kilometers

27:50

behind the frontier, at a point

27:52

where a line of hills created

27:54

a bottleneck in the coastal plain.

27:57

The line consisted of a set of

28:00

bunkers, atop a ridge overlooking a valley

28:02

to the east where the invaders would

28:04

have to cross. Behind

28:06

the bunkers were a series of

28:08

artillery emplacements. Rommel

28:10

thought the French constructions barely acceptable,

28:13

but the Marit line would serve

28:15

as a sort of el Alamein

28:17

in reverse. Montgomery would

28:19

find it difficult to outflank the line

28:21

with armor, given the hills to his

28:23

left. Add to that

28:25

his supply issues and Rommel

28:28

felt confident it would be Marched.

28:30

Before the 8th Army would pose

28:32

any serious challenge. This

28:34

freed Rommel to consider the Allied

28:36

force pressing into Tunisia from the

28:39

west, the one that had

28:41

participated in the too little too late

28:43

race to Tunis. If

28:46

you looked at a map of Tunisia, the

28:48

superficial impression you would get was that the

28:51

Allies held most of the country. That

28:54

was true, but Montgomery was stuck at

28:56

the Marit line in southeastern Tunisia, while

28:59

the Allied force moving in from

29:01

Algeria had succeeded in capturing the

29:03

Atlas Mountains and the highlands of

29:05

central Tunisia. But what really

29:08

mattered was the coast where Tunis lay,

29:10

where the best roads were, leading

29:12

west and south from Tunis to

29:15

the front lines, providing quick and

29:17

easy routes for trucks and tanks,

29:20

while Allied forces had to

29:22

haul their soldiers and supplies

29:24

across the mountains. The Germans

29:28

Eisenhower polished his plan for

29:30

Tunisia. It still involved

29:32

striking east to the Mediterranean coast,

29:35

cutting Rommel's supply line to Tunis, which

29:37

would make it easy for Montgomery to

29:39

overwhelm him from the south. But

29:43

the Germans were wise to this plan. The

29:46

Luftwaffe had air superiority in Tunisia,

29:48

thanks to its much nearer bases,

29:51

and it did regular reconnaissance

29:53

flights over American positions. They

29:56

had detected the Americans building up stockpiles

29:58

of equipment and supplies. in

30:00

the highlands and deduced what was

30:02

coming. Rommel

30:05

was never one to miss an opportunity, and

30:08

experience had taught him that when he

30:10

was short on supply, the British

30:12

were his best friends. We've

30:14

seen Rommel capture British supply

30:16

dumps on multiple occasions and

30:18

put those supplies, especially food

30:20

and fuel, to use in

30:23

his own offensives. He wore

30:25

those British goggles as a token of his

30:27

ability to take anything from the enemy and

30:29

put it to his own use. He

30:32

felt confident that American supply dumps

30:34

would be just as bountiful. The

30:39

first move came from the German Fifth

30:41

Army. That's the one that Hitler had

30:44

just recently deployed to Tunisia in response

30:46

to Operation Torch. They

30:48

advanced to the Fayed Pass, the

30:50

gateway into the mountains and the

30:52

Allied front line. The

30:55

pass was garrisoned by French troops using

30:57

old equipment. The German 21st

31:00

Panzer Division easily forced them

31:02

back. The

31:05

US Army's 1st Armored Division rushed to

31:07

the scene to block the advancing German

31:09

tanks. After an exchange

31:11

of fire, the Germans began to withdraw.

31:14

The Americans pursued, not realizing

31:17

they were advancing into a

31:19

trap. German 88s

31:21

had been pre-positioned along the line of the

31:24

German withdrawal and they opened up

31:26

on the American tanks, which were blown to

31:28

bits. The panzers advanced

31:30

once again, in many

31:33

cases crushing American soldiers under

31:35

their treads. The

31:39

1st Armored Division was using the M3

31:41

Stewart Light Tank, which was easy prey

31:43

for the 88s. German

31:46

panzer formations were using the larger

31:48

and more heavily armed Panzer IV

31:51

medium tank, along with

31:53

the latest in German tank design,

31:55

the Tiger Heavy Tank. The

31:57

Tiger had thicker armor than any other tank.

32:00

tank of the day, and its main weapon

32:02

was one of those 88mm guns that

32:05

were serving the Germans so well

32:07

as anti-tank weapons. Soon

32:10

the Axis held the passes out of

32:13

the mountains and had retaken most of

32:15

Tunisia. On February

32:17

19th, Rommel began an attack

32:19

westward through the American lines

32:22

in hopes of reaching their supply stores.

32:25

He directed two German panzer divisions

32:27

and an Italian armor division through

32:30

the Cassarine Pass and

32:32

into the U.S. Second Corps, which

32:34

was busy preparing for the planned

32:36

Allied offensive. Besides

32:39

disrupting American preparations and

32:41

seizing supplies, this move

32:43

would threaten to outflank the main Allied

32:45

army on the coastal roads to the

32:48

north. The

32:50

American positions in the pass and on

32:52

the hills to either side were quickly

32:55

overrun. Second

32:57

Corps commander, General Lloyd Fredendall,

33:00

had dispersed his defending units into

33:02

small groups that were easily picked

33:04

off by German armor and air

33:07

attacks. Rommel's

33:10

forces advanced almost to the Algerian

33:13

border, but despite their

33:15

shaky start, the Allies were able

33:17

to summon large numbers of British

33:20

and American reinforcements backed

33:22

by heavy artillery that forced

33:24

the Germans to a halt. With

33:27

his supply line strained once again, Rommel

33:30

decided he had done all he could, and it

33:32

was time to withdraw. The

33:36

Axis forces captured from the Americans 45

33:39

tons of ammunition and over 50,000 gallons

33:43

of fuel. That's 200,000 liters for the metric folds.

33:48

The Axis side lost 1,000 soldiers killed and

33:50

wounded, 600 captured. The

33:54

Americans lost 3,300 killed and wounded, and 3,000 captured.

34:00

Americans lost 183 tanks to the Axis's 20 and

34:02

208 artillery pieces to the Axis's 14. Rommel

34:12

had taken on a numerically superior

34:15

American force and, despite

34:17

the American soldiers' brash cries

34:19

of bring on the panzers,

34:22

he had humbled it. Just

34:24

as the Wehrmacht had humbled the

34:26

Polish army, the French army, the

34:28

British army, the Greek army, and

34:30

the Red Army, among many others,

34:34

the Americans were stunned by Rommel's

34:36

success. Fortunately for them,

34:38

there was no direct land route

34:40

from the Kasserine Pass to Washington,

34:46

D.C. Rommel's verdict was that the

34:48

Americans were inexperienced, but they learned

34:50

quickly. The Germans were

34:53

quite keen to study the American vehicles

34:55

and equipment they had captured. On

34:58

the Allied side, Dwight Eisenhower

35:00

relieved General Fredendall and gave

35:02

command of II Corps to

35:04

George Patton. The

35:06

Americans had also learned to respect

35:09

the Luftwaffe's Stuka dive bombers and

35:12

began equipping their ground units

35:14

with more anti-aircraft guns, particularly

35:16

their artillery units, which had

35:18

been the Stuka's favorite target.

35:22

After the Battle of the

35:24

Kasserine Pass, the German and

35:26

Italian commands consolidated Axis forces

35:28

in Tunisia into one unified

35:31

army group Africa to be

35:33

commanded by Erwin Rommel. This

35:37

defeat stymied the Allies and cost

35:40

them their last chance to seize

35:42

Tunis and put a quick end

35:44

to the campaign in North Africa. They

35:47

would have to find another way. But

35:51

that is a story for

35:53

another episode. We'll have

35:55

to stop there for today. I

35:58

thank you for listening, and I'd especially...

36:00

like to thank Andrew and Yuri for

36:02

their kind donations, and thank

36:04

you to Lorraine for becoming a patron of

36:07

the podcast. Donors and

36:09

patrons like Andrew and Yuri and

36:11

Lorraine help cover the costs

36:13

of making this show, which in

36:15

turn keeps the podcast available free

36:17

for everyone always. So my

36:20

thanks to them and to all of you who

36:22

have pitched in and helped out. If

36:25

you'd like to become a patron or make a donation,

36:27

you are most welcome. Just

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visit the website

36:31

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36:37

always, the podcast website also contains

36:39

notes about the music used on

36:41

the podcast, which is

36:43

sometimes my own work and sometimes licensed,

36:46

but many times the music you hear

36:48

here is free and downloadable. If

36:50

you hear a piece of music on the podcast and

36:53

you would like to know more about it, including

36:55

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36:57

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it, that would be the place to go.

37:03

And while you're there, you can leave a comment

37:05

and let me know what you thought about today's

37:07

show. And

37:10

I hope you'll join me next week here on the

37:12

History of the 20th Century, as

37:15

Stalingrad falls and the Germans

37:17

ponder what's next. Do

37:20

you want total war? Find

37:22

out next week here on

37:25

the History of the 20th Century. Oh,

37:29

and one more thing. The

37:32

Allies' demand for unconditional surrender is

37:34

familiar to us today and

37:36

easy to take for granted, but

37:39

it was in truth an extraordinary

37:41

development. Wars seldom

37:43

end in unconditional surrender.

37:46

Wars usually end when one side determines

37:48

there is no longer any hope of

37:51

victory and offers terms, and

37:53

then the other side determines that the cost

37:55

of continuing the war in the hope of

37:57

securing better terms is too great, and

38:00

that accepting the offered terms now is

38:02

the better bargain. This

38:05

war was different. From

38:07

the Allied point of view, the

38:09

governments of the three main Axis

38:11

powers were so reprehensible that any

38:13

peace agreement that allowed them to

38:15

remain in power was unacceptable, and

38:18

the Allies had very good reasons to

38:20

feel that way. There

38:23

was also the fact of the last war.

38:26

The Allies had offered Germany more

38:28

lenient terms in that war, and

38:31

for that they got another war 20 years later. This

38:35

time they were determined to eliminate

38:37

Germany's ability to wage war. There

38:41

was even talk in the

38:43

Allied side of forcibly de-industrializing

38:45

Germany after the war and

38:47

returning it to an agrarian society.

38:52

In our time, there are some who

38:54

argue that it was a mistake to

38:56

make such a strong demand right up

38:58

front, and that it only

39:00

encouraged the Axis to fight to the

39:02

bitter end and therefore prolong the war

39:04

and cost more lives. The

39:07

problem with this argument is that

39:10

we now know Hitler always intended to

39:12

fight to the bitter end, and

39:14

so did the Japanese. Even

39:17

with the demand for unconditional surrender

39:19

in place, members of

39:21

the German military attempted to overthrow Hitler

39:24

in the hope that they might be

39:26

able to negotiate better terms. They

39:28

failed, but that too

39:31

is a story for another episode. Thanks

39:47

for watching.