0:02

The will

0:20

for victory, which gives a commander the

0:22

strength to see a grave crisis through,

0:26

is something very different from Hitler's will,

0:29

which, in the last analysis, stemmed

0:31

from a belief in his own

0:33

mission. Such a

0:35

belief makes a man impervious to reason,

0:38

and leads him to think that his

0:40

own will can operate even beyond the

0:42

limits of hard reality, whether

0:44

these consist in the presence of

0:46

far superior enemy forces, in

0:49

the conditions of space and time, or

0:52

merely in the fact that the enemy

0:54

also happens to have a will of

0:56

his own. Eric

0:59

von Manstein. Welcome

1:03

to the history of the 20th century. Episode

1:37

381. Der

1:40

Mansteinkompt. Last

1:44

time we looked at the Battle of Stalingrad.

1:47

It was late November 1942. The

1:51

Red Army had just completed the encirclement

1:53

of the city. That

1:55

same day, 6th Army Commander Friedrich

1:57

Paulus flew to the town of

2:00

Nieden. Nizhne-Cherskaya, which was outside the

2:02

pocket in which his army was

2:04

trapped, to discuss the

2:06

situation with other senior commanders, and

2:08

because the headquarters established there had

2:11

secure telephone links to Army Group

2:13

B headquarters and to the

2:15

Wolfslayer. At

2:18

the Wolfslayer, Hitler flew into yet

2:20

another of his rages when he

2:22

heard that Paulus had left Stalingrad.

2:25

He contacted Paulus, accused

2:27

him of cowardice and of abandoning

2:29

his soldiers, and ordered him

2:31

back to Stalingrad immediately. Paulus

2:36

disregarded that order, for the

2:38

time being, and remained in

2:40

Nizhne-Cherskaya another day for talks,

2:42

though he fumed to his

2:44

fellow commanders over Hitler's insulting

2:46

accusations. Paulus

2:48

and his fellow commanders also thought

2:50

Hitler's order that the 6th Army

2:52

hold on at Stalingrad rather than

2:54

attempt to break out of the

2:56

encirclement was unwise to say the

2:58

least, but they were

3:01

unwilling to criticize Hitler's order

3:03

too harshly without knowing the

3:05

larger strategic situation. Remember

3:08

that just this past spring, Hitler had

3:10

ordered Paulus to stay in place when

3:13

Paulus wanted to retreat, and

3:15

that had led to a great German victory,

3:17

so experience had taught him to

3:20

trust the Fuhrer's judgment. However,

3:24

when they consulted with Army

3:26

Group B, the Chief of

3:28

Staff there told them bluntly that

3:30

Army Group B lacked the means to

3:32

break through the encirclements, and that Paulus

3:35

was on his own. A

3:37

message from Hitler told them that

3:40

information on resupply by air was

3:42

forthcoming, but the commanders at

3:44

this meeting all agreed it would be

3:46

impossible to supply a force as large

3:48

as the 6th Army entirely

3:50

by air. The Luftwaffe

3:52

simply didn't have that many

3:54

planes. They agreed

3:57

that they break out and retreat west

3:59

to rejoin the war. the rest of Army

4:01

Group B was the only reasonable course

4:03

of action, and assured each other

4:05

that surely the Fuhrer would soon reach

4:07

the same conclusion. Even

4:10

that choice would be a difficult

4:12

one. Sixth Army was

4:14

low on fuel, and Hitler had

4:16

already ordered their horses withdrawn, which

4:18

meant they would have to leave

4:20

behind most of their artillery, tanks,

4:23

and other vehicles. Worse

4:25

still, since the retreat would have to

4:27

be on foot, any wounded

4:29

soldier who couldn't march would

4:31

have to be left behind to be taken

4:33

prisoner. That would amount to

4:35

about 10,000 soldiers altogether. It

4:40

doesn't seem to have occurred to them that

4:42

time was of the essence. The

4:45

Red Army forces behind them had not yet

4:47

dug in and set up their defenses, and

4:50

the Russian winter was looming. Every

4:52

day of delay would make the

4:54

proposed breakout that much more difficult.

4:57

Nonetheless, Paulus refused to consider

5:00

ordering a breakout against Hitler's

5:02

instructions. That

5:05

evening, Paulus at last flew back

5:07

to Stalingrad. Aboard the

5:10

plane with him were several cases of

5:12

a nice red table wine, and a

5:14

few more of champagne, because if

5:16

you're going to be surrounded by the Red Army, you might

5:18

as well do it in style, am I right? Upon

5:22

their return, and despite Hitler's

5:25

orders, Paulus consulted with

5:27

his corps commanders. Everyone

5:29

agreed that a breakout attempt was

5:31

the only answer. At

5:34

10.15 that evening, Paulus received

5:36

a radio message from Hitler reaffirming

5:39

the order to stay put and promising

5:41

that relief was on the way. Paulus

5:44

and his staff began drawing up a

5:47

plan for a breakout and retreat anyway,

5:49

so it would be ready to put into motion

5:51

as soon as Hitler gave the word. As

5:56

I told you last time, Hermann Göring

5:58

consulted with the Luftwaffe. a command on

6:00

the possibility of supplying the 6th Army

6:02

by air. He

6:05

told them the Army would require around

6:07

500 tons of supplies per day, although

6:09

the actual figure was more like 700

6:11

tons. They

6:13

told him they could manage 350

6:15

tons per day tops, which

6:18

was about half of what the Army would need.

6:20

And even at that, it was a very

6:23

optimistic estimate. That was 350 tons per

6:25

day under ideal conditions. If

6:29

the weather turned bad, and remember we're

6:31

talking about Russian winter here, that

6:34

would interfere with the supply operation.

6:37

The transport planes would also be vulnerable

6:39

to the Soviet Air Force or to

6:41

Red Army anti-aircraft guns on the ground.

6:45

How vulnerable? That was impossible to

6:47

say. That depended on the

6:49

Russians. Despite

6:53

this dodgy math, Göring confidently assured

6:55

Hitler that the Luftwaffe was up

6:57

to the job. With

7:00

that assurance, any possibility that Hitler

7:03

would come to see reason had

7:05

evaporated. The fate of

7:07

the 6th Army was now sealed.

7:11

On November 24, three days

7:13

after the encirclement was completed

7:15

and two days after Paulus's

7:17

return, Hitler issued him detailed

7:19

orders mapping out the defensive

7:21

lines the 6th Army should

7:23

take up to hold what

7:25

Hitler was now calling Fortress

7:27

Stalingrad. When these

7:29

instructions arrived in Stalingrad, Paulus

7:31

and his staff realized that the

7:34

order to break out would never

7:36

come. Shortly

7:39

before that order was received,

7:41

one of Paulus's corps commanders,

7:44

General Walther von Seidlitz Kurzbach,

7:47

took matters into his own hands. Seidlitz

7:49

had already sent Paulus a lengthy

7:52

memorandum laying out the argument that

7:54

Stalingput was, in his words, completely

7:57

unthinkable. He concluded

7:59

it was the duty of 6th

8:02

Army commanders to disregard Hitler's order

8:04

and begin to withdraw on their

8:06

own authority. Seidlitz

8:08

went on to practice what he

8:10

preached by ordering the divisions under

8:12

his own command to destroy their

8:14

supply stores, demolish their

8:16

defensive positions, and begin

8:18

a withdrawal from the northern part of the

8:21

city. His soldiers

8:23

set to work, building bonfires and

8:25

casting into them their stocks of

8:27

supplies, overcoats, boots,

8:30

foodstuffs. Seidlitz

8:33

personally cast equipment into the

8:35

flames. Needless

8:37

to say, the supplies Seidlitz ordered destroyed

8:39

would be very much missed in the

8:42

weeks to come. The

8:44

nighttime fires and explosions also attracted

8:46

the attention of the Red Army.

8:49

One of the withdrawing German divisions

8:51

was caught out in the open

8:54

and attacked, suffering many casualties. The

8:58

Soviet 62nd Army was trapped inside

9:00

the pocket right along with the

9:03

Germans. The months of

9:05

bitter fighting in the city had gradually

9:07

squeezed them down into small pockets along

9:09

the river. This being

9:11

Russia, by late November the surface of

9:13

the Volga River was dotted with ice

9:15

flows, making it increasingly

9:17

difficult to reinforce or resupply Soviet

9:20

forces in the city. Here's

9:24

a question that has no doubt entered your

9:26

mind as you've listened to me tell you

9:28

the story of Operation Uranus. How?

9:32

How did the Red Army pull this off? How

9:35

did they surprise the Germans, then surround

9:37

and isolate a quarter million Axis soldiers

9:39

in the midst of the most important

9:41

battle on the Eastern Front? Last

9:45

week I talked a little bit

9:47

about Moscow-Rovka, Soviet tactics used to

9:50

conceal and misdirect the enemy, but

9:53

we also have to talk about the mistakes

9:55

the Germans made. First

9:58

and foremost was the failure of Adolf

10:00

Hitler and the German military command

10:02

to recognize the danger. If

10:05

you look at a map of the Eastern

10:07

Front just before the Soviet offensive began, you

10:10

can see that the 6th Army at Stalingrad

10:12

sits at the tip of a German salient

10:15

stretched from the dawn to the Volga. It

10:18

was an obvious target for a

10:20

Soviet counteroffensive. Beyond

10:22

failing to recognize that specific danger,

10:25

the German side persisted in their

10:27

relief that the Soviet Union was

10:29

on the verge of collapse. The

10:32

whole rotten structure had not come crashing

10:34

down after the Germans kicked the door

10:36

in in 1941, but Hitler

10:39

maintained the USSR was at the end of

10:41

its rope and would disintegrate by the end

10:43

of 1942. Hitler

10:46

believed this for ideological reasons, yet

10:48

he had also made himself the

10:50

commander of the entire German army.

10:54

There are two kinds of military leaders in the

10:56

world. There are those

10:58

who reject empirical evidence and take

11:00

their decisions purely on ideological grounds

11:03

and then there are winners.

11:08

The Wehrmacht's top commanders might not

11:10

have based all their thinking on

11:13

Nazi ideology, but they have

11:15

been living and working under Hitler and the Nazis

11:17

for going on 10 years by this time. And

11:20

a German general didn't have to be

11:22

a Nazi to be dismissive of the

11:25

Russians and their military, as

11:27

many of them indeed were. They

11:29

didn't believe the Red Army was capable of

11:31

an offensive on this scale either. But

11:36

the Germans being caught off guard is only

11:38

part of the story. You

11:40

also have to credit the

11:42

planning, preparation and effort that

11:44

went into Operation Uranus. First

11:47

of all, Russia is a

11:49

huge country with a large

11:51

population and ample resources. This

11:54

is how the Red Army was able to

11:56

absorb appalling losses in the opening months of

11:58

the war. And yet, come

12:00

back bigger and stronger than ever. The

12:03

USSR was fielding new army divisions

12:06

at an astonishing rate, far

12:08

in excess of what its enemies believed

12:10

it was capable of. You

12:12

can ding Hitler and German military

12:14

intelligence for failing to anticipate this,

12:17

but you also have to credit the

12:19

Soviet government and military for accomplishing what

12:21

no one believed them capable of. How

12:25

did they do that? Well,

12:27

there are five reasons. First,

12:31

Russia has a big population. Longtime

12:34

listeners will recall that back in the

12:36

bell-apoc days of the podcast, I was

12:38

telling you at the beginning of the

12:41

century how the other European powers feared

12:43

Russia's sheer manpower. They

12:45

worried that Russia could field armies large

12:47

enough to overwhelm any of them, maybe

12:49

all of them. Remember

12:53

how back in those days, everything

12:55

was about mobilization. A

12:57

key reason why the First World War

12:59

happened was the consensus view that a

13:02

fully mobilized Russian army could steamroll over

13:04

any opponent, but that it would take

13:06

Russia six weeks or more to mobilize.

13:09

Therefore, the key to avoid getting

13:12

steamrolled was to mobilize your own

13:14

military faster and defeat the

13:16

Russian army before it becomes too big

13:18

to beat. When

13:20

Russia began a general mobilization of its

13:23

army during the July crisis, Kaiser

13:25

Wilhelm and his military commanders felt

13:27

they had no choice but to

13:29

mobilize the German military. To

13:32

delay was to run the risk

13:34

of leaving Germany unprotected against a

13:36

massive Russian invasion. Longtime

13:39

listeners will also recall that yes, Russia did

13:41

mobilize a huge army in 1914, but that

13:45

army was critically short on equipment

13:47

and ammunition. Russia didn't

13:49

even have enough rifles to arm all

13:51

its soldiers. Unarmed soldiers were

13:53

told to wait in the rear until a

13:56

comrade was wounded, then pick up their weapon.

14:00

me to the second reason. Whatever

14:02

you may think of the Bolsheviks, of

14:04

Lenin or of Stalin, you

14:06

have to acknowledge they recognized

14:08

Russian industry was backward and

14:11

spent two decades working to

14:13

expand and modernize it. They

14:15

also recognized that in the last war, too

14:18

much of Russian industry was in the western

14:20

part of the country where it could be

14:22

seized by the Germans. It

14:24

was therefore communist policy to build

14:27

new industries farther east, as far

14:29

east as the Ural Mountains or

14:31

even further, to keep them

14:33

out of reach of any future invader. One

14:38

good example of this is the Magnetogorsk

14:40

Iron and Steel Works, which began operation

14:42

in 1932. I told

14:45

you the story of its establishment in episode 235.

14:50

It was modeled after Gary, Indiana

14:52

in the United States, that

14:54

is, a one industry city designed

14:56

and built around the huge steel

14:58

works. Magnetogorsk contributed huge

15:00

quantities of steel to the

15:02

Soviet war effort, and

15:04

the Wehrmacht never got within a thousand

15:06

kilometers of it. Not a

15:09

single German bomb ever fell on it. What

15:13

about the industry that was in the

15:15

west that the Germans could and did

15:17

seize control over? If

15:19

you remember when I told you about

15:22

Operation Barbarossa, the initial German invasion, I

15:25

also told you how the Soviet government

15:27

ordered the machinery and workers from more

15:29

than a thousand such factories packed up

15:32

and moved east. And

15:34

this is the third reason. Production

15:36

from these factories declined throughout the second half

15:38

of 1941 as they moved. At

15:42

the end of 1941, overall

15:44

Soviet industrial production was down to

15:47

half the pre-war level. But

15:49

over the course of 1942, most

15:52

of these factories began production at

15:54

their new locations. The

15:57

gross national product of the USSR, never

16:00

reached the level of Germany's GDP

16:02

throughout the war, but

16:04

the USSR was able to put

16:06

a far larger share of its

16:08

economic output into military production. Here's

16:11

a sample statistic. In the

16:14

year 1942, with a large part of

16:16

the nation under enemy occupation, that

16:19

was a low point for Soviet GDP,

16:21

it was only half of Germany's that

16:23

year, and yet Germany produced

16:26

5,500 tanks that year, while the USSR

16:29

produced 22,000. Fourth,

16:34

there was Lend-Lease from the

16:36

UK, and especially from the

16:38

US, which was pouring

16:40

into the Soviet Union by 1942,

16:42

just when it was desperately needed.

16:45

The Western Allies sent tanks

16:47

and planes, yes, but perhaps

16:49

more important were shipments of

16:51

more mundane goods. It's

16:53

more fun to think about Sherman tanks

16:56

and hurricane fighters, but the

16:58

Allied shipments of Jeeps and trucks

17:00

and telephone equipment and spam were

17:03

a great help to the USSR.

17:06

Telephone lines allow for commanders to receive

17:08

reports and issue orders much more quickly,

17:11

and contrasted with radio, telephone lines

17:13

are secure, the enemy can't listen

17:15

in. Trucks, as

17:17

I've already noted, allow infantry to move

17:20

faster and make it easier to keep

17:22

them in supply. At

17:24

the beginning of the war between the Soviet Union and

17:26

Germany, 80% of German infantry

17:30

and virtually 100% of Soviet

17:32

infantry got from here to

17:34

there by marching. Trucks

17:37

aren't very comfortable, and soldiers riding

17:39

in trucks are extremely vulnerable to

17:41

enemy attack if they're unfortunate enough

17:43

to encounter one, but

17:45

it sure beats walking. I

17:49

can't help but be reminded of

17:51

Hermann Göring's dismissal of Americans as

17:53

capable only of making refrigerators and

17:55

razor blades. I rather

17:58

wish someone had asked the Reichsmark commercial,

18:00

if he thought the Americans were good at

18:02

making trucks, and whether he

18:05

thought trucks might have some

18:07

military applications. If

18:11

you think about all this in

18:13

connection with Operation Uranus, you begin

18:15

to understand how the USSR was

18:17

able to deliver large numbers of

18:19

soldiers, planes, and tanks to the

18:21

Stalingrad Front so quickly, and then

18:23

move them behind German lines so

18:25

quickly, encircling the 6th Germany

18:28

in a matter of days with a

18:30

force large enough to resist German attempts

18:32

to break through it. We're

18:34

about that in a few minutes. This

18:38

leaves us with our fifth and final reason. You

18:41

already know the Red Army could and did

18:43

raise a lot of new units in 1942.

18:47

Part of the training for these new units

18:49

inserted them on the front lines for a

18:51

time so they could get a taste of

18:53

live combat, then withdrawing

18:55

them and reassigning them elsewhere.

18:59

Often it was in the Moscow region of

19:01

the front where these training assignments took place.

19:04

It was a good way to train

19:06

units, but it had the fringe benefit

19:08

of confusing German intelligence. The

19:10

Germans picked up on the large

19:12

number of new formations appearing along

19:14

the Moscow front, and interpreted this

19:17

as evidence of an impending offensive

19:19

there. I

19:21

have to tread carefully here because this

19:23

was more than just Moskirovka. On

19:26

November 25, just days

19:28

after Operation Uranus began down

19:30

at Stalingrad, the Red

19:32

Army initiated Operation Mars, an

19:35

offensive aimed at encircling and destroying the

19:37

German 9th Army near Moscow.

19:41

A key historical question is

19:44

whether Operation Mars was a diversion

19:47

or a full offensive equal

19:49

to and parallel with Operation

19:51

Uranus. And it is

19:53

a question historians still debate in our time.

19:56

British military historian Sir Anthony

19:59

Beaver whose work I relied on

20:01

to help me understand the Spanish Civil War

20:03

and the present war, is

20:06

firmly of the opinion that Operation Mars

20:08

was a diversion. He

20:10

argues that Stavka did not spend

20:12

nearly as much time and effort

20:14

planning Mars and that Mars didn't

20:16

receive nearly as much ammunition and

20:18

support as Uranus. There

20:21

is evidence that the NKVD

20:23

deliberately leaked information concerning Operation

20:25

Mars to German military intelligence

20:27

as part of the deception.

20:32

Other historians though will tell you

20:34

that more soldiers participated in Mars

20:36

than in Uranus and that Operation

20:38

Mars cost the Red Army around

20:40

70,000 soldiers killed and twice that

20:44

many wounded, so if

20:47

it was meant to be a separate

20:49

and co-equal offensive, it failed decisively. If

20:52

it was a mere deception, it was

20:54

a very costly one. Their

20:57

argument goes that Soviet military

20:59

history recast Operation Mars as

21:01

a deception only after

21:04

the fact to cover up its failure

21:06

as an offensive. Either

21:09

way, there is no doubt that

21:11

Operation Mars tied down German units

21:13

in Army Group Center and

21:16

deterred the Germans from any thought

21:18

of transferring units from there to

21:20

Stalingrad to help break the siege

21:22

of the 6th Army. Thank

21:52

you. Adolf

22:18

Hitler's response to the encirclement

22:21

of Stalingrad was very much

22:23

on brand. He

22:25

summoned the Romanian dictator, Marshal

22:27

Jan Antonescu, to the Wolfslayer

22:30

to blame him for the encirclement, berating

22:33

him over the failure of those two

22:35

Romanian armies to hold the front line.

22:38

The two dictators got into a shouting

22:40

match, and all this was

22:42

hardly fair to Antonescu. He

22:44

was the most loyal of Hitler's Axis

22:47

partners, the one most supportive

22:49

of Nazi ideology, and the first to

22:51

join with the Germans in the war

22:53

against the Soviet Union. The

22:57

attitude of most German soldiers

22:59

mirrored Hitler's. They

23:01

were angry that the Romanians had

23:03

allowed the encirclement to happen, and

23:06

German officers and soldiers both criticized

23:08

and argued with their Romanian counterparts

23:11

whenever they met. The

23:13

Romanians could only point out that they

23:15

had been complaining for months to the

23:18

German command that they lacked guns powerful

23:20

enough to stop a Soviet tank and

23:22

would be unable to hold back a

23:24

Soviet armor defensive, yet their

23:27

pleas for better equipment had gone

23:29

unheeded. Meanwhile,

23:32

the Soviet Air Force was dropping

23:34

100,000 propaganda leaflets

23:36

over Romanian positions, calling on

23:38

the Romanians to quit the

23:41

war. Then

23:43

Hitler came to his senses and issued

23:45

a decree to the army ordering a

23:47

halt to all criticism of the Romanians.

23:52

Hitler also ordered that all news

23:54

of the encirclement be suppressed. The

23:58

German public heard only that there had been a

24:00

war against the Romanians. been a Soviet offensive somewhere

24:02

near Stalingrad, reports emphasized

24:04

German counterattacks and Soviet

24:07

casualties, giving the impression

24:09

that the offensive had been a costly

24:11

failure for the Soviets. The

24:13

Nazis believed or hoped that

24:15

they could keep news of

24:17

the encirclement under wraps until

24:20

after Stalingrad was relieved. The

24:24

responsibility for relieving Stalingrad and

24:26

breaking the Soviet siege fell

24:29

to the now field marshal, Erich

24:31

von Manstein. We've

24:33

crossed paths with him before. It was

24:36

Manstein as a staff officer who

24:38

proposed making a surprise assault through

24:40

the Ardennes, the central strategy for

24:42

the war against France. Hitler

24:45

had already been thinking along the same

24:47

lines. They tried it, it worked

24:50

brilliantly, and Manstein became

24:52

one of Hitler's favorites. Manstein's

24:55

star rose farther after he

24:57

became commander of the German

24:59

11th Army and captured Sevastopol

25:02

in July 1942. Hitler promoted

25:05

him to field marshal for this and

25:07

sent him and the 11th Army north

25:10

to do the same to Leningrad. That

25:13

didn't work out so well. I

25:15

promise you we will get to the siege of

25:17

Leningrad, but in late November

25:19

when Stalingrad was surrounded, Hitler brought

25:21

Manstein back to the south and

25:24

put him in command of the

25:26

newly created Army Group Dawn, which

25:28

made him Paulus's superior, and

25:31

now the commander who had made his name

25:33

with a successful siege was handed

25:35

the job of breaking one. Manstein

25:39

was not particularly fond of

25:41

the Nazis. He detested

25:43

both Göring and Himmler and

25:46

had taught his pet dachshund, Knirps, to

25:49

raise a paw in salute when

25:51

Manstein said Heil Hitler. Upon

25:54

receiving his orders, Manstein rode from

25:56

the Leningrad front down to Stalingrad

25:58

in a sumptuous railroad car that

26:00

used to be the property of the

26:03

Queen of Yugoslavia. Along

26:05

the way, he stopped for a meeting

26:07

with the commander of Army Group Center,

26:09

Field Marshal Hans Gunther von Kluge, for

26:12

a briefing on the situation in Stalingrad.

26:16

Kluge told him bluntly that the

26:18

6th Army could not hold out. He

26:21

also told Manstein bluntly that the

26:23

Führer, with his tendency to issue

26:25

orders himself to individual units down

26:28

to the battalion level, was

26:30

part of the problem. He

26:32

warned Manstein that Hitler credited the

26:34

German Army's survival of the past

26:36

winter in Russia, not

26:39

to the morale of our own soldiers and

26:41

all our hard work, but exclusively

26:43

to his own skill. Welcome

26:47

to the German Army High Command,

26:49

Field Marshal. You are now

26:51

an overpaid NCO. The

26:56

day Manstein's train arrived at Army

26:58

Group B headquarters, November 24, was

27:00

the same

27:02

day Hitler issued his order for the

27:04

6th Army to take up defensive positions

27:06

and wait for air supply. This

27:10

day also happened to be Manstein's 55th

27:13

birthday, and he assumed his

27:15

new command with a surprising degree

27:17

of optimism. He was

27:19

one of the few who believed there was

27:21

a way out of this predicament for the

27:23

German Army. Other

27:27

senior commanders, the less optimistic

27:29

ones, quietly hoped Paulus

27:31

would find it within himself to

27:33

disregard his orders and break out

27:36

of the encirclement. It's

27:38

what Rommel would have done, but

27:40

remember that Paulus is no Rommel.

27:43

Paulus is the guy you send when you

27:45

want to reign Rommel in, as

27:48

OKH had actually done last year. See

27:50

episode 357. A

27:56

survey of letters sent home from the

27:58

6th Army to loved ones. back in

28:00

Germany in the first few weeks of the

28:02

encirclement, reveals a

28:05

generally optimistic attitude among the

28:07

soldiers who repeated to

28:09

their families their commander's assurances that the

28:11

siege would soon be broken. Some

28:14

of this may have been motivated by a

28:16

desire not to worry their families, but

28:19

many German soldiers in the early days

28:21

of the siege clung fast to their

28:23

faith in Adolf Hitler. The

28:25

Führer said he would get them out, and

28:28

the Führer's word is all you need. The

28:33

Soviet side at first didn't

28:35

realize how many enemy soldiers

28:37

they had trapped. Red

28:39

Army intelligence estimated the number at 80,000,

28:43

which is less than a third of the true

28:45

number. Surprisingly, Red

28:47

Army soldiers continued to defect to

28:49

the 6th Army even after it

28:52

was surrounded, simply

28:54

because they dismissed their officers'

28:56

claims as propaganda. They

28:59

came in for a nasty surprise

29:01

when they reached German-held territory, only

29:04

for the Germans to confirm what

29:06

their officers had already told them

29:08

that Stalingrad was surrounded. As

29:13

for the airlift, when it

29:15

began, it could not deliver even the

29:17

minimal 350 tons per

29:19

day senior Luftwaffe commanders had

29:21

promised Göring. It

29:23

barely managed 350 tons in the

29:26

first week of operation, and most

29:28

of the tonnage they flew into

29:30

the pocket was aircraft fuel, which

29:33

was necessary to supply the fighter

29:35

planes that provided cover for the

29:38

transport planes. Soldiers'

29:43

rations were soon cut to

29:45

one-half, then to

29:47

one quarter. The

29:49

Germans began slaughtering the few horses

29:51

they still had. The

29:53

animals could no longer be fed, at least

29:55

this way they could be used for food.

30:00

Defense of the pocket boiled down

30:02

to First World War style trench

30:04

warfare with all the misery

30:07

that entailed. Red

30:09

Army soldiers had it pretty bad as well,

30:12

but they were encouraged by the great victory

30:14

they had just won. The

30:16

Red Army played music over

30:18

loudspeakers for the German soldiers,

30:21

interspersed with recorded propaganda appeals,

30:24

warning them that escape from Stalingrad

30:26

was impossible, surrender their

30:28

only alternative. They

30:30

particularly liked to play tango

30:32

music because the Soviets

30:35

believed it sounded appropriately

30:37

foreboding. That's

30:54

to the master, is

30:56

some tango. Russian

31:02

soldiers began the practice of sneaking

31:05

into no man's land at night

31:07

and erecting an effigy of Adolf

31:09

Hitler, then taunting the Germans

31:11

by inviting them to shoot at it. German

31:15

soldiers resisted these attempts to lower

31:17

their morale at first, but

31:20

as the fighting went on, winter set

31:22

in and rations were cut, the

31:25

propaganda became increasingly effective.

31:30

As the battle raged on in the city,

31:33

Stalin and his senior commanders were

31:35

already planning their next offensive, codenamed

31:38

Operation Saturn. As

31:41

originally conceived, Saturn was an even

31:44

bolder and more ambitious stroke than

31:46

Uranus. Once again,

31:48

the Red Army would take advantage of

31:50

a weaker Allied army on the German

31:52

flank, this time the Italian

31:55

Army, which held part of the line

31:57

north and west of Stalingrad, just passed

31:59

by. the point where Operation Uranus had

32:02

begun. Operation Saturn

32:04

would see an offensive begin there,

32:07

punch through the Italian line, and

32:09

drive south and west to Rostov

32:11

on the Don. The

32:13

fall of Rostov would at one stroke

32:15

cut off all German forces to the

32:17

east, meaning not only

32:20

Manstein's Army Group Dawn, but

32:22

also Army Group A, which was still

32:24

fighting in the Caucasus. Zhukov,

32:29

however, correctly foresaw

32:31

that Manstein would attempt to

32:33

relieve Stalingrad, and that

32:35

the attack would originate from a point

32:37

south and west of the city. Stalin

32:41

and Stavka conferred, and decided

32:43

that now was not the

32:45

time for Operation Saturn. The

32:48

Red Army would instead concentrate

32:50

on reducing and eliminating German

32:52

forces in Stalingrad. Operation

32:55

Saturn would be downgraded to an

32:57

offensive that would still punch through the

32:59

Italian lines, but this would be done

33:01

only after the Germans began their relief

33:04

effort. The offensive would

33:06

then turn east, not west, attacking

33:09

the German relief force on its left

33:11

flank, forcing the Germans

33:13

to turn and face the attack

33:15

and abandon Stalingrad. The

33:17

more limited operation became known as

33:20

Little Saturn. Manstein

33:24

was indeed preparing an offensive to

33:26

break open the encirclement and relieve

33:28

the Sixth Army in consultation

33:30

with Hitler. This

33:33

was dubbed Operation Winter Storm.

33:36

Manstein, however, judged that the Sixth

33:38

Army could not hold Stalingrad over

33:40

the winter, even if

33:42

Winter Storm was a success. He

33:45

therefore developed a second secret plan

33:48

to evacuate the Sixth Army once

33:50

the Soviet encirclement was breached. This

33:53

he named Operation Thunderclap. Operation

33:58

Winter Storm began