0:02

In the

0:20

dark of midnight, November 8, 1942,

0:22

an Anglo-American naval force, at that time one

0:28

of the largest armadas ever assembled,

0:31

was slipping through the Mediterranean waves

0:34

toward French North Africa. Aboard

0:37

the ships, soldiers prepared for action.

0:40

In Germany, Adolf Hitler fumed

0:42

at his inability to stop them. In

0:46

Algiers, the U.S. consul was

0:48

mobilizing an unlikely alliance of

0:51

Jewish resistance fighters and disgruntled

0:53

French army officers, whom

0:56

he hoped could clear the way for the

0:58

coming invasion. Episode

1:29

379, How Green

1:31

is My Ally?

1:43

When we left off last time, just after midnight

1:45

on November 8, 1942, the U.S. consul in Algiers,

1:50

Robert Murphy, had just heard

1:53

a code message broadcast over the

1:55

BBC Overseas service that was directed

1:57

at him. Hello

1:59

Robert. Franklin is coming.

2:02

That meant Operation Torch was a

2:04

go and the landings would begin

2:06

at dawn. Murphy

2:09

reached out to the network he had built

2:11

and about 400 Jewish

2:13

resistance fighters moved across Algiers

2:15

quickly securing the local French

2:18

Army headquarters, the radio

2:20

station, the telephone exchange, and

2:23

the Villa de Olivier, the

2:25

residents of General Alphonse Joins,

2:28

commander of the French Army forces

2:30

in North Africa. Murphy

2:33

joined the resistance fighters at the

2:36

Villa where they awakened the sleeping

2:38

Joins, informed him they had

2:40

seized control of Algiers and that

2:42

American soldiers would be landing at

2:45

dawn, and invited the

2:47

sleepy and bewildered general to switch

2:49

sides and join the fight against

2:51

the Axis. So

2:53

far so good everything was

2:56

going according to plan. Then

2:58

Joins threw them a curveball. He

3:01

announced that he could not make

3:03

any decision without first consulting with

3:06

his superior, Admiral Darla, who

3:08

was here in Algiers. Say

3:11

what? Allow

3:14

me to remind you that we've met

3:17

Darla several times before. He

3:19

was commander-in-chief of the French Navy and

3:22

in that role instrumental in the

3:24

quasi-military coup that led to the

3:27

resignation of French Prime Minister Paul

3:29

Reynaud and the appointment of Philippe

3:31

Pétain as his successor, who immediately

3:33

asked the Germans for an armistice.

3:37

After the armistice, Darla became

3:39

commander-in-chief of the whole of

3:41

the French military. He

3:44

answered to no one but Pétain

3:46

himself and was one of the

3:48

most powerful figures in the Vichy government, arguably

3:51

the most powerful after

3:53

Marshal Pétain himself. He

3:56

served for a time as the Vichy government's

3:59

foreign minister. and in that

4:01

capacity had negotiated the deal that

4:03

allowed Germany and Italy to use

4:05

airfields in Syria in 1941. Coincidentally,

4:11

Darlan was in Algiers when

4:13

Operation Torch began. He

4:16

was there to visit his son, Alain,

4:18

who had contracted polio. Murphy

4:21

sent a car to collect to Darlan and bring

4:24

him to the villa. The

4:26

admiral was a short man with a prominent

4:29

chin, and he always had a pipe in

4:31

his mouth. These

4:33

characteristics, plus his naval background,

4:36

inspired the Americans to refer to

4:38

him as Popeye behind his back.

4:42

Murphy tried to persuade Admiral

4:45

Darlan and General Join that

4:47

the American invasion was looming,

4:50

resistance was futile, to coin a

4:52

phrase, and he might as

4:54

well accept the inevitable, and order the

4:56

French military in North Africa not to

4:59

resist. Then

5:02

the second resistance group turned up, this

5:04

is the one made of disgruntled army

5:06

officers. They decided

5:08

to take Darlan and Join into

5:11

custody, which muddied the waters a

5:13

bit. But then a short time

5:15

after that, the police arrived.

5:18

They freed Darlan and Join

5:20

and arrested the resistance members.

5:23

They also took into custody Robert

5:25

Murphy, the American consul, which

5:28

was a violation of diplomatic protocol, though

5:30

at this point, I think it would

5:32

be fair to say he was guilty

5:34

of actions inconsistent with his diplomatic status.

5:39

British and American soldiers landed at

5:42

dawn on beaches east and

5:44

west of Algiers. The

5:46

landings were a bit chaotic, with

5:49

some units coming ashore in the wrong places,

5:52

but the French put up little resistance,

5:54

thanks in part to those disgruntled

5:56

army officers Murphy had recruited. fighting

6:00

was at the port. There,

6:02

a British destroyer flying a

6:04

U.S. flag rushed the harbor,

6:07

braving enemy fire, and

6:09

was able to land 250 U.S.

6:12

Army Rangers who seized the port

6:14

facilities. French

6:17

forces in Algiers surrendered at 6

6:19

o'clock that evening. You

6:23

could summarize the landings at Algiers

6:25

by saying they were haphazard but

6:27

ultimately successful, since the will

6:30

to resist of the French forces standing against

6:32

them ranged from feeble

6:34

to non-existent. As

6:36

for the other two landings, all

6:39

you can say is that they were haphazard.

6:42

The invasion forces landed without the

6:44

shore bombardment that usually precedes an

6:46

amphibious landing because the Allies didn't

6:48

want to antagonize the French. They

6:51

were hoping the French would not

6:53

resist. At

6:56

Oran, a similar attempt by

6:58

British destroyers to rush the

7:00

port failed. The

7:02

beach landings were complicated when the

7:04

offshore waters proved to be shallower

7:06

than expected. Royal Navy

7:08

ships shelled the French defenders, but

7:11

they held out against the invasion. The

7:16

assault on Oran is notable because

7:18

it was the first time the

7:20

United States Army attempted an airborne

7:22

assault. A battalion

7:24

of the 509th Parachute Infantry

7:27

Regiment flew from Cornwall in

7:29

England, across Spain, toward

7:31

its goals, two airfields

7:34

south of Oran. The

7:37

operation was marred by mistakes. Most

7:39

of the 39 C-47 Dakota transports involved in

7:44

the drop got lost. Thirty

7:47

of them landed in the desert, some

7:49

distance from their objectives, one

7:51

landed at Gibraltar, three

7:53

landed in Spanish Morocco, the

7:56

Spanish interned the flight crews and

7:58

paratroopers, for a few months. Casablanca

8:03

was the main French naval

8:05

base on the Atlantic Ocean.

8:08

Pro-allied French military in Casablanca

8:10

attempted to seize control of

8:12

the city but failed. Now

8:15

warned that an Allied invasion was

8:17

imminent, the commander at Casablanca

8:20

had the shore guns at the

8:22

ready and French naval vessels sorted

8:24

to intercept to the

8:26

Allied invasion fleet led

8:28

by the US Navy battleship

8:30

USS Massachusetts. The

8:33

smaller French naval force was defeated

8:35

and the troops landed on the

8:37

coast above and below Casablanca but

8:40

as at Oran, French forces in

8:42

the city resisted. I

8:47

told you last week that Free French

8:49

commander Charles de Gaulle had been kept

8:51

in the dark about Operation Torch. They

8:54

finally told him about the landings

8:56

when he awoke that morning. His

8:59

initial response to the news was to exclaim,

9:02

I hope the Vichy

9:04

people will throw them into the sea.

9:06

You don't get France by burglary. But

9:10

by that evening de Gaulle was on

9:12

board with the invasion. He

9:14

made a radio broadcast calling on the

9:17

French in North Africa to lay down

9:19

their arms. So did

9:21

US President Franklin Roosevelt who

9:23

spoke fluent French. Like

9:27

de Gaulle, General Henri Giraud at

9:29

Gibraltar had swallowed his pride and

9:32

agreed to support the Americans. He

9:35

flew to Algiers the next day,

9:37

November 9th, and made his

9:39

own radio broadcast calling on French forces

9:41

to lay down their arms. The

9:44

French defenders at Oran and Casablanca

9:46

ignored him just as they had

9:49

ignored de Gaulle and Roosevelt. Also

9:54

on the 9th in Munich, Adolf

9:57

Hitler met with Italian foreign minister

9:59

Count Chiang. No. Recall

10:01

that Hitler had been relatively generous in

10:04

the armistice terms he'd offered France

10:06

in 1940 because he'd

10:08

wanted to deny the Allies the

10:10

use of French colonial territories. A

10:13

portion of France had been left unoccupied

10:15

and a French government permitted to function,

10:18

precisely so it could command the

10:20

loyalty of French military forces in

10:22

the colonies and order them

10:25

to remain neutral in the war against Britain.

10:28

Now that the British had occupied

10:30

Syria and Lebanon, and now

10:32

the Americans were in North Africa, Germany

10:36

no longer benefited from this

10:38

arrangement. Hitler and

10:40

the Count agreed that Germany

10:42

should occupy the previously unoccupied

10:44

zone of France, Italy

10:47

would take control of Corsica, and

10:49

together their two nations would land

10:51

soldiers in Tunis to hold off

10:54

the Anglo-American force to the west.

10:59

In French North Africa, it became

11:02

increasingly clear that the only person

11:04

who could plausibly order the French

11:06

military to cease combat and accept

11:09

Allied occupation was Darlaon.

11:12

Admiral Darlaon was the commander-in-chief of

11:15

the French military and therefore had

11:17

the formal authority to issue such

11:19

an order. The

11:21

price he demanded in exchange for

11:23

defecting to the Allies was

11:25

a stiff one, the title

11:27

of High Commissioner of France in

11:29

Africa. In other

11:31

words, he would be the supreme

11:33

civilian authority in both French North

11:36

Africa and French West Africa, in

11:38

addition to being the supreme military

11:41

authority in both places. It

11:45

was either that or send

11:47

green American soldiers into the

11:50

streets of Oran and Casablanca

11:52

to engage in Stalingrad-style urban

11:54

combat against an enemy far

11:56

more familiar with those towns than they were.

12:00

So on November 10th, Darla

12:02

issued the order. All

12:04

French military forces in North and

12:07

West Africa were to end hostilities

12:09

and cooperate fully with the

12:11

Americans and the British. French

12:15

Prime Minister Pierre Laval had been summoned

12:17

to Munich on the 10th to

12:20

discuss the situation with Hitler and Chano.

12:23

By the time he arrived, the

12:25

news of the Allied deal with Darla

12:27

had already been announced, and

12:30

the two Axis leaders were suspicious that

12:32

Pétain and his government had made

12:34

a secret deal with the Americans.

12:38

Hitler told Laval there was only

12:40

one way the French government could

12:42

prove its integrity, declare

12:44

war on Britain and the United

12:47

States, which was after

12:49

all the duty of any neutral

12:51

nation subjected to an unprovoked attack

12:54

by a belligerent. This

12:57

Laval refused to do. Marshal

13:01

Pétain would declare Darla a

13:03

traitor, and the Vichy government was prepared

13:05

to break diplomatic relations with the United

13:07

States, as it already had with

13:10

Britain, and allow Axis

13:12

soldiers to enter French North Africa.

13:15

But that was as far as Laval and

13:17

his government were willing to go. This

13:22

was tantamount to siding with the enemy, as far

13:24

as Hitler was concerned. Since

13:28

the French government in Vichy could not

13:30

or would not exercise control over

13:32

its colonial forces, its

13:35

further existence served no German purpose. Also,

13:39

since the Western Allies were in the Mediterranean

13:41

now, and the French had just

13:44

demonstrated they would not resist them, that meant

13:46

France's Mediterranean coast was wide open to an Allied

13:48

invasion. The

13:54

German and Italian militaries had already had a plan drawn up

13:56

and ready to go to the German Union. to

14:00

occupy France, Plan

14:02

Anton, which was put into

14:04

motion the next day, November 11. Hitler

14:08

wrote a letter to Pétain explaining

14:10

that the occupation was not intended

14:12

as an expression of hostility to

14:15

either Pétain personally or to the

14:17

French nation, but merely

14:19

an expedient to protect French

14:22

soil from an Anglo-American invasion.

14:25

He pledged that Germany would continue

14:27

to recognize the government in Vichy

14:30

and Pétain as its leader. Despite

14:34

these reassurances, when the

14:36

Wehrmacht entered unoccupied France,

14:38

the French military was

14:40

swiftly disarmed. The

14:42

French government in Vichy was still

14:45

the recognized government, officially, and

14:47

Pétain was still the recognized

14:49

chief of the French state, officially,

14:52

but in reality, neither of

14:54

them mattered much anymore. The

14:58

German move into unoccupied France gave

15:01

Darlaan an opening in Algiers.

15:04

He could now declare that the

15:06

French chief of state was in the power

15:08

of the German military and

15:10

therefore susceptible to German pressure. And

15:14

for this reason, Darlaan, as commander-in-chief

15:16

of the French military, had

15:19

no alternative but to declare

15:21

Pétain incapacitated and assume the

15:23

leadership of the French government

15:25

himself. The

15:29

French in North Africa had ended their

15:31

resistance, but American military

15:33

leaders were still concerned about

15:36

neighboring powers and how they

15:38

might regard Operation Torch. Franklin

15:41

Roosevelt sent personal letters to the

15:43

Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed V, the

15:45

Bay of

15:47

Tunis, Ahmed II, the

15:50

President of Portugal, Oscar Carmona,

15:53

and the Caudillo of Spain,

15:55

Francisco Franco, assuring each

15:58

of them that the presence of the

16:00

French was a U.S. military forces in North

16:02

Africa was in no way intended as a

16:04

threat to any of them, nor

16:06

was it a precursor to military action

16:09

against any of their nations. Roosevelt

16:12

pledged that the United States would

16:14

withdraw its forces from North Africa

16:16

immediately upon the end of the

16:18

conflict with Germany. It

16:23

was Spain that worried the Americans the

16:25

most, but Franklin Roosevelt

16:27

had kept the United States neutral

16:29

during the Spanish Civil War, a

16:32

policy that was not popular at home,

16:34

not even within his own political party.

16:38

Surely Franco owed him one. The

16:41

Caudillo's reply eased their concerns.

16:44

He wrote, I

16:46

can assure you that Spain knows

16:48

the value of peace and

16:50

sincerely desires peace for itself

16:53

and all other peoples. That's

16:57

diplomacy speak for there

16:59

is no way in hell I'm getting mixed up

17:01

in another war. President

17:05

Roosevelt was not happy with the Darla

17:07

deal, as it came to be known.

17:11

He cabled General Eisenhower and

17:13

told him, quote, I

17:16

want you to know that I appreciate

17:18

fully the difficulties of

17:21

your military situation. I

17:23

am therefore not disposed in any way

17:26

to question the action you have taken.

17:29

However, I think you should know and

17:32

have in mind the following

17:34

policies of this government. One,

17:38

that we do not trust Darla.

17:42

Two, that it is impossible

17:44

to keep a collaborator of Hitler

17:47

and the one whom we believe to

17:49

be a fascist in civil power longer

17:51

than is absolutely necessary. Three,

17:55

his movements should be

17:57

watched carefully and his communication.

18:00

supervised. Meanwhile,

18:05

in Libya, the

18:07

Axis retreat continued. On

18:10

November 13th, Montgomery's 8th

18:12

Army recaptured Tobruk. Remember

18:15

when the fall of Tobruk to the

18:18

Axis had been seen as an Allied

18:20

catastrophe? What a difference

18:22

four months can make. The

18:25

occupation of what used to be

18:28

unoccupied France, while it had

18:30

serious repercussions for the people who lived

18:32

there, meant little to

18:34

the overall strategic situation with

18:37

one clear exception, the

18:39

French naval forces based at

18:41

Toulon. French

18:44

naval units stationed at Toulon

18:47

represented a significant naval force.

18:50

Three battleships, four heavy

18:52

cruisers, three light cruisers, 28 destroyers,

18:56

20 submarines, and

18:58

a number of smaller craft. The

19:01

Germans and Italians very much wanted

19:03

one of three things. Either

19:06

that the French Navy joined the

19:08

Axis and battled the Allies in

19:10

the Mediterranean, or failing that, that

19:13

German forces could take control of

19:15

the ships, assign German or Italian

19:17

crews to them, and then use

19:19

them against the Allies themselves, or

19:22

if neither of those were

19:24

possible, then the fleet must

19:27

be scuttled rather than allowed to

19:29

survive and defect to the Allies.

19:32

The Allied calculation was much the same.

19:36

Allied naval commanders would have been

19:38

ecstatic had the French Navy treated

19:40

the entry of German soldiers into

19:42

unoccupied France as a breach of

19:44

the armistice, which it was, and

19:47

left Toulon for North Africa to re-enter

19:49

the war. The

19:51

day after the Allies agreed to the

19:53

Darlaan deal, Admiral Darlaan issued

19:55

an order to the fleet at Toulon to

19:58

do exactly that. the

20:00

fleet disregarded it. Marshal

20:03

Pétain declared Darlaan a traitor and

20:05

replaced him as commander-in-chief of the

20:07

French military. More

20:10

important though, the commander of the

20:12

fleet at Toulon, Admiral Jean

20:14

de Laborde, was loyal

20:16

to the Vichy government, not

20:18

to mention a long-time rival of

20:20

Admiral Darlaan. He kept

20:22

his fleet docked at Toulon. His

20:25

orders from Pétain were to deny

20:27

any foreign military permission to enter

20:29

the naval base or access French

20:32

ships, and, in the

20:34

event anyone attempted to force their way

20:36

into the base, to scuttle

20:38

the fleet. When

20:42

German forces occupied Vichy territory, they

20:44

were careful not to enter the

20:46

city of Toulon. Instead,

20:49

German naval officials began talks with

20:51

the French navy over the status

20:53

of the fleet. But

20:55

the French were unwilling to cooperate, and

20:57

the talks went nowhere. The

21:00

French used the time to prepare

21:02

the fleet for scuttling and place

21:04

demolition charges aboard their ships. The

21:07

Germans used the time to mine the

21:09

waters outside the harbor to prevent a

21:11

French escape. They also

21:14

prepared a plan to seize the base

21:16

and the ships. The

21:20

Germans finally made their move before dawn

21:23

on November 27. German

21:26

military units entered Toulon at 4

21:28

a.m., which caught the French authorities

21:30

in the city by surprise, but

21:33

they did manage to signal the French fleet,

21:35

yet the Germans were on the way. At

21:38

the naval base, Leboard gave orders

21:41

to fire on any German soldiers

21:43

who attempted to approach and

21:45

prepare to scuttle the fleet. The

21:49

approaching German soldiers lost their way

21:51

in Toulon's winding streets, which delayed

21:53

their arrival at the base and

21:55

gained the French navy precious time.

21:58

German troops finally made their way to the base. reached the entrance

22:00

to the base, the French

22:03

sentries, understanding these were Germans

22:05

they were dealing with, demanded

22:07

to see their paperwork. That

22:10

bought a little more time, but

22:12

at 5.30, with German tanks

22:14

now charging into the naval base,

22:17

Leboard gave the order to scuttle. Although

22:21

German soldiers managed to board some of

22:23

the ships, virtually every crew

22:26

was able either to scuttle their

22:28

ship or set off the

22:30

demolition charges, or both. Some

22:33

of the larger ships were on fire

22:35

for days, while the waters of the

22:37

harbor were covered with diesel fuel. Four

22:40

submarines disobeyed the order to scuttle and

22:42

were able to escape too long for

22:45

French North Africa. The

22:47

Germans captured a few of the smaller ships,

22:49

which were damaged. The big

22:51

ships, the battleships and cruisers,

22:53

were all destroyed. The

22:57

Allies were disappointed that the fleet had

22:59

not chosen to defect, but

23:01

at least the French Navy made

23:03

good on the pledge Admiral d'Arlain

23:05

had given Whitsdon Churchill back in

23:07

1940, that

23:10

France would not permit its fleet

23:12

to fall into German hands. And

23:18

speaking of Admiral d'Arlain, when

23:20

news of the d'Arlain deal went out,

23:22

the public reaction in the United Kingdom

23:25

and the United States was

23:27

widespread revulsion. For

23:30

more than two years, every

23:32

ugly and craven act of

23:34

collaboration between the Vichy government

23:36

and the Nazis had

23:38

d'Arlain's fingerprints on it. Why

23:41

are we suddenly cozying up to this

23:43

guy? CBS

23:45

radio correspondent Edward R. Murrow

23:48

asked, was America fighting the

23:50

Nazis or sleeping with them?

23:53

A British newspaper wondered if the Allies

23:56

planned to overthrow Hitler by

23:58

doing a deal with Hermann Gehry. Darlaan's

24:03

first weeks as ruler of French

24:06

North Africa offered

24:08

no reassurance. He

24:10

agreed to appoint Henri Giraud as

24:12

military commander in North Africa, which

24:14

helped mend fences between the two

24:16

of them, though Charles

24:18

de Gaulle and the Free French remained

24:20

furious at having been cut out of

24:23

the Darlaan deal. But

24:25

Darlaan refused to reinstate that decree

24:27

the Vichy government had repealed, the

24:30

one that made Jewish people in North

24:32

Africa French citizens and political

24:34

prisoners in North African prisons remained

24:37

right where they were. Darlaan

24:41

presented a difficult political problem

24:43

for the Allied leadership, that

24:46

is until Christmas Eve

24:48

1942, when a

24:50

20-year-old right-wing monarchist anti-Vichy

24:53

man named Bonnier de

24:55

la Chapelle went

24:57

to Darlaan's office in Algiers and

25:00

shot him dead. De

25:02

la Chapelle was arrested, tried, and

25:04

convicted of the murder before a

25:07

military court held on Christmas Day,

25:10

and he was executed early in the

25:12

morning of Boxing Day. Darlaan's

25:16

death cleared the way for Henri

25:18

Giraud to take control of the

25:20

French military forces in North Africa

25:23

and got the Allies out of

25:25

an embarrassing predicament. In

25:28

fact, Darlaan's death was so convenient,

25:31

few believe that de la Chapelle

25:33

acted without at least some assistance,

25:36

or at least encouragement, from

25:38

the Allies. The

25:40

unseemly haste in which he

25:42

was tried, convicted, and executed

25:44

has to be regarded as suspicious.

25:49

Overall, the Allies lost about 1,500 killed

25:52

in Operation Torch. French

25:55

losses were comparable. The

25:58

operation had been plagued by mistakes. stakes

26:00

and organizational failures that had

26:02

created chaos. Senior

26:05

American commanders like Mark Clark and

26:07

George Patton shook their

26:09

heads while they read the after-action

26:11

reports. The Americans

26:14

could only be thankful they had

26:16

fought a poorly armed and not

26:18

especially motivated French army, tried

26:20

to imagine what would have happened if George

26:23

Marshall had had his way and

26:25

this had been a European invasion

26:27

opposed by the Wehrmacht. One

26:30

shudders to imagine it. British

26:33

commanders were also disappointed in

26:35

the Americans' performance. They

26:38

remarked rather cheekily, how

26:40

green is our ally. But

26:43

as far as the rank and file

26:46

American soldiers were concerned, their mettle had

26:48

been tested and they had proven their

26:50

ability. Bring on the

26:52

panzers was a common refrain. All

26:56

I have to say is, be careful

26:58

what you wish for. On

27:34

one occasion during the planning stage

27:36

of Operation Torch, George

27:38

Marshall met with President Roosevelt to brief

27:40

him on how things were going. When

27:44

the discussion turned to the timing of

27:46

the invasion, Roosevelt put his

27:48

hands together as if in prayer

27:50

and said, please make

27:52

it before election day. In

27:56

the event, Marshall later had to report to

27:58

him that the date chosen was

28:00

four days after the U.S.

28:02

midterm elections, Roosevelt

28:04

made no objection, but he surely

28:06

must have been disappointed. He

28:09

had every reason to dread the coming

28:11

midterms. It's

28:13

a well-known pattern in American elections

28:16

that the President's party usually loses

28:18

seats in Congress during the midterms.

28:21

And by 1942, after

28:23

nearly 10 years as President, Roosevelt

28:26

was worried that the American public

28:28

might be getting tired of him.

28:31

On the other hand, this would be

28:33

a wartime election. Would

28:36

that help the President and his party? Would

28:38

it hurt? The

28:41

election results might be summed up from a

28:43

Democrat's point of view as it could have

28:46

been worse. Their

28:48

losses were high, but the Democrats

28:51

had held such large majorities after the 1940

28:54

election that they were able to retain

28:56

control of both houses. In

28:58

the Senate, the Democrats lost eight

29:01

seats, leaving them with 57 to

29:03

the Republicans 38, plus

29:06

one progressive, Wisconsin's Robert La

29:08

Follette Jr. In

29:11

the House, the Democrats lost 45 seats,

29:14

leaving them with a scant 222 seats versus the

29:18

Republicans 209. There

29:22

were also a total of five

29:24

members elected representing three minor parties.

29:27

Here's a fun fact. The House

29:29

of Representatives elected in 1942 was

29:32

the last one to include members

29:34

from five different political parties, at

29:36

least as of the date I

29:39

recorded this podcast. Here's

29:43

a not fun fact. The

29:45

turnout in the 1942 midterm election was a scant 33.9%, making

29:47

it the lowest recorded turnout

29:54

in a national election in the

29:56

United States history. How

29:59

embarrassing. Now,

30:01

you might try to explain this

30:03

disappointing number by pointing out that

30:06

the nation was at war. Many

30:08

young men had been drafted and were

30:10

away from home and likely had other

30:12

things on their mind than voting for

30:14

Congress. Many

30:16

civilians had relocated to take new jobs

30:18

in war-related industries, and they may not

30:21

have had time to get settled in

30:23

their new communities and participate in the

30:25

election. On

30:28

the other hand, Australia held

30:30

a federal election just nine months

30:32

later. Prime Minister

30:34

John Curtin, who had been leading

30:36

a Labour Party minority government since

30:38

October 1941,

30:41

got a resounding vote of approval from the

30:43

Australian public in August 1943, Labour gained

30:47

17 seats in the House of Representatives, giving

30:49

it 49 seats out of 74, and 22

30:51

out of 36

30:56

in the Australian Senate. Turnout

30:58

in that election, which was also held

31:01

in wartime, was 95.1% for

31:03

shame, America. I

31:09

do feel obligated to point out

31:11

that voting has been compulsory in

31:13

Australia since 1924 –

31:16

an excellent policy, by the way – so

31:19

that no doubt contributed to the high

31:21

turnout figure. But you'd

31:23

also have to credit the very

31:26

sensible Australian practice of conducting elections

31:28

on Saturdays, as opposed

31:30

to Tuesdays, as it is done in the

31:32

United States, which has to

31:35

be the worst idea since gentleman Johnny

31:37

Burgoyne had won too many glasses of

31:39

port and said, let's all

31:41

march south to Albany and put an

31:44

end to this accursed rebellion once and

31:46

for all. But

31:49

I digress. The

31:51

ultimate goal of Operation Torch was

31:53

to drive east as far as

31:56

Tunis, and there link up with

31:58

Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army. Algeria.

34:01

And it wasn't only air forces. Allied

34:05

commanders had badly underestimated the

34:07

capability and willingness of the

34:09

Axis to reinforce Tunisia. The

34:12

Luftwaffe had begun airlifting German soldiers

34:14

there just days after the Operation

34:17

Torch Landings, and the Italian Navy

34:19

had little difficulty in delivering vehicles

34:21

and supplies to Tunis, which is

34:23

close enough to Sicily that the

34:25

entire crossing can be made in

34:27

one flight, undetected by

34:30

British ships or planes. That

34:33

proximity, plus Axis air

34:35

superiority, meant the Italian convoys

34:37

were quite safe. The

34:40

Italians also laid large numbers of mines

34:42

to keep the Royal Navy at bay.

34:47

In a matter of days, the

34:50

Axis had succeeded in delivering one

34:52

German Panzer Division, two

34:54

German infantry divisions, and two

34:56

Italian infantry divisions to Tunisia.

34:59

And these were the forces now opposing

35:01

the Allied advance from the west. That

35:07

must have been discouraging, but Allied forces

35:09

got some good news on November 20th.

35:12

Montgomery's 8th Army had reached Benghazi.

35:16

Rommel's forces had withdrawn from the

35:18

town after demolishing its port facilities,

35:21

a clear indication that he didn't expect

35:23

to be returning there any time soon.

35:27

Three days later, Montgomery's forces halted

35:29

their advance just short of Elle-Gala,

35:31

the town that lies midway between

35:33

Egypt and Tripoli. The

35:36

British supply line was very long now,

35:38

and Montgomery wisely decided to wait a

35:40

few weeks for his supplies to catch

35:43

up. You'll remember the

35:45

British had made it this far twice

35:47

before, and twice before Rommel had surprised

35:49

them with a new offensive that drove

35:52

them back to Egypt. But

35:55

Erwin Rommel did not have a third

35:57

rabbit in his hat. own

36:00

supply situation was worse than theirs,

36:03

and his superiors had been concentrating their

36:05

efforts on reinforcing the Western frontier of

36:07

Tunisia. The best he

36:10

could manage was to lay large numbers

36:12

of mines to slow the British advance.

36:14

The Germans even resorted to burying

36:16

their helmets, which would read like

36:18

mines on British metal detectors. Rommel's

36:23

retreat had been so rapid, and

36:26

their fuel situation so desperate, that

36:28

the Germans were forced to leave

36:30

hundreds of aircraft behind to be

36:32

captured by the British. The

36:35

problem of supplying fuel to the

36:37

RAF's new forward bases was solved

36:39

by American C-47 Dakota

36:42

transport planes that delivered half

36:44

a million liters of aviation

36:46

fuel to keep the British

36:48

planes flying. From

36:50

these forward airfields, RAF

36:52

bombers could now reach Tripoli. Back

36:57

in Tunisia, Allied forces, which

36:59

were getting bigger every day thanks to

37:02

a steady flow of reinforcements, battled

37:04

their way east toward Tunis throughout the

37:07

month of December, but their

37:09

advance bogged down and finally stalled

37:11

60 kilometers short of

37:13

their goal, since the

37:15

Germans and Italians were also sending

37:17

in large numbers of reinforcements. By

37:20

the end of 1942, there were 135,000 Allied soldiers in Tunisia, mostly

37:22

Americans and British,

37:28

along with a few thousand French. Against

37:32

them stood an Axis force, mostly

37:34

Italian, and comparable in

37:36

size. The

37:39

run for Tunis had failed. There

37:41

would be no quick seizure of that

37:43

port, no rapid eviction of

37:46

the Germans and Italians. Adolf

37:49

Hitler had no reservations about deploying

37:51

large numbers of forces to North

37:53

Africa because he believed the supply

37:56

line from Italy to Tunis was

37:58

perfectly safe and judged for it.