0:20

For all my life, I I have

0:22

never been a man of the of

0:24

the We will now go

0:26

from the defensive go on the attack. back

0:29

on the Adolf Hitler Hitler.

0:32

Welcome to the to the

0:34

history of the twentieth century. Episode

1:08

389, On the Defensive.

1:10

Adolf Hitler had tied

1:13

his personal and Adolf

1:15

Hitler had tied his

1:17

personal and political future

1:19

to military victory. Stalingrad shocked

1:22

at Stalingrad shocked most Germans many

1:24

of many of them on

1:26

Hitler's leadership. Hitler

1:28

Hitler understood this

1:30

intuitively. He became withdrawn.

1:33

withdrawn. The The leader who seemed

1:35

to thrive on appearances before

1:37

huge crowds now shunned the

1:39

public eye. public eye. He he wouldn't

1:41

even permit German newsreels to show

1:43

him on film. him on film. As

1:45

early as November As early

1:48

as were signs of a change. there

1:50

were signs of a change. a story in

1:52

his Albert of a story

1:54

in his memoirs of Hitler his

1:56

to Munich on his personal

1:58

train for the annual with... the Nazi

2:00

party's old fighters. This is

2:02

the same train trip in

2:04

which he first received the

2:07

news that an Allied invasion

2:09

of North Africa was imminent.

2:11

I told you about that

2:13

in episode 378. In happier

2:15

times, Hitler was fond of

2:18

appearing at the window of

2:20

his train at every station

2:22

stop, so he could wave

2:24

at the people on the

2:26

platform. During a stop on

2:28

this train trip, Spayer tells

2:31

us, Hitler and his traveling

2:33

companions had just sat down

2:35

to a pleasant dinner in

2:37

his personal dining car. White

2:39

tablecloths, silver flatware, china plates,

2:41

vases full of fresh flowers,

2:44

the works. Then a freight

2:46

train stopped alongside. Hitler and

2:48

his dining companions gradually came

2:50

to be aware that the

2:52

box car sitting just outside

2:55

the dining car window was

2:57

full of dirty, tired, hungry,

2:59

and in many cases wounded.

3:01

German soldiers returning from the

3:03

eastern front. They were staring

3:05

in shock and amazement at

3:08

the elegant dinner taking place

3:10

just two meters away. When

3:12

Hitler noticed them, he did

3:14

not so much as wave

3:16

or smile at the soldiers.

3:18

Instead, he signaled one of

3:21

the servants to close the

3:23

drapes. Hitler was complaining of

3:25

insomnia and stomach trouble. His

3:27

personal physician had been giving

3:29

him amphetamines to keep up

3:31

his energy as he plowed

3:34

through the massive workload he

3:36

had inflicted upon himself when

3:38

he took such tight control

3:40

over the German military. In

3:42

February 1943, Hitler recalled General

3:45

Heinz Guderian. The Panser General

3:47

Hitler had relieved back in

3:49

the winter of 1941, after

3:51

Goodarian had argued strenuously in

3:53

favor of allowing the German

3:55

army to retreat. Now he

3:58

made Goodarian, Inspector General of...

4:00

German armored forces. When Guderian

4:02

met with Hitler again, for

4:04

the first time in 15

4:06

months, he was shocked by

4:08

the Führer's state. He was

4:11

stooped. He had tremors in

4:13

his left arm, and his

4:15

eyes were dull. Even compared

4:17

to the Hitler of 1941,

4:19

he was temperamental, unpredictable, and

4:22

prone to outbursts of furious,

4:24

furious rage. Herman Goering remarked

4:26

that three and a half

4:28

years of war had aged

4:30

Hitler 15 years. The man

4:32

who had loved music and

4:35

listened to it every day,

4:37

put away his phonograph records

4:39

after the defeat at Stalingrad.

4:41

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebel attempted

4:43

to step into the breach,

4:45

giving his own arousing speeches

4:48

and publicly pushing a plan

4:50

for total war, a renewed

4:52

German commitment to victory, Privately,

4:54

he complained that Hitler's withdrawal

4:56

from public appearances was making

4:58

his job much more difficult.

5:01

By March, the Wehrmacht had

5:03

been able to stabilize the

5:05

situation on the Eastern Front,

5:07

along a line only slightly

5:09

different from what it had

5:12

been a year earlier. All

5:14

the planning, effort, and losses

5:16

of soldiers and equipment in

5:18

1942, had left the German

5:20

army right back where it

5:22

had started. In

5:25

North Africa, the combined forces

5:27

of the German and Italian

5:29

armies were still holding on

5:31

to about half of Tunisia.

5:33

In February, Rommel had been

5:35

able to bloody the Americans

5:38

at the Casserine Pass, but

5:40

Bernard Montgomery's eighth army had

5:42

taken Libya, and they were

5:44

approaching the fortified border between

5:46

Libya and Tunisia. Rommel felt

5:48

he had no choice. but

5:51

to hope he had done

5:53

enough and discontinue operations against

5:55

the Americans in the West,

5:57

so he could bring his

5:59

forces back to the coast

6:01

to prevent Montgomery. breaking through

6:04

into Tunisia from the South

6:06

and East. Rommel's easy victory

6:08

led him to underestimate the

6:10

Americans. They were carefully studying

6:12

their defeat and applying the

6:14

lessons learned. The US Second

6:17

Corps got a new commander,

6:19

General George Patton, who brought

6:21

a new Esprit Decor to

6:23

his command. On March 6,

6:25

Rommel led five German divisions

6:27

and nine Italian divisions. into

6:30

an attack against the lead

6:32

elements of the British Eighth

6:34

Army, hoping to disrupt their

6:36

advance into Tunisia. But powerful

6:38

British artillery strikes broke up

6:40

the Axis attack, while another

6:43

attack westward into British American

6:45

and French forces advancing from

6:47

Algeria suffered heavy losses for

6:49

minimal gain. The twin defeats

6:51

persuaded Rommel that Africa was

6:53

a lost cause. and that

6:56

the only recourse was to

6:58

withdraw. He flew to Italy

7:00

for talks with the Italian

7:02

Supreme Command, but was unable

7:04

to convince them. So he

7:06

went on to the Vairvolf,

7:09

Hitler's headquarters in Ukraine, to

7:11

meet with the furor and

7:13

attempt to persuade him. Hitler

7:15

rejected Rommel's advice. Instead, he

7:17

relieved the general of his

7:19

command in North Africa, placing

7:22

him on sick leave. Gables

7:25

at last persuaded Hitler to give

7:27

a speech on March 21st. The

7:29

speech he delivered was a mere

7:31

10 minutes long, and he read

7:33

the words from a prepared manuscript

7:35

in a flat monotone. So little

7:38

had the public seen or heard

7:40

from the furor that rumors began

7:42

to circulate that Hitler had had

7:44

some kind of mental breakdown and

7:46

was being kept under wraps at

7:48

the Berghoff, his vacation home, while

7:50

the man who had given that

7:53

speech was an imposter. Hitler

7:56

finally relented and allowed films of him to

7:58

be in included in German

8:00

in once again. Germans

8:03

could now see for themselves that the Fuhrer

8:05

was still in command. that

8:07

the on film, he came

8:09

across as aged and worn film

8:12

he came across as aged and

8:14

worn out. No one likes

8:16

to be on defense. When

8:18

we when we play tabletop

8:20

games like chess. most Most of

8:22

us prefer to play offensively. We

8:25

attack whenever we can. can. We

8:28

We defend only when we must. Adolf

8:30

Hitler Hitler no no different.

8:32

The quote I The quote I read

8:35

to you at the top of the

8:37

episode could have come from this moment,

8:39

this the spring of 1943. of 1943. In In

8:41

fact, he said it in the

8:43

spring of 1945. In the spring of

8:45

1943, he was In the spring of

8:47

1943, that he he was telling his would

8:49

that Germany would go back on the

8:51

offensive as soon as Ross was

8:53

over. over. But Hitler knew that a

8:55

full offensive up and down

8:58

the line was no longer feasible.

9:00

longer Even an offensive on the

9:02

scale of last year's of last year's

9:04

out of the question. was out of

9:06

the Hitler and his his

9:08

maps of the front maps

9:10

of the where there was

9:12

one and only one obvious

9:14

target for a 1943

9:16

offensive. offensive. You'll you'll recall

9:18

that the the fall of Stalingrad. the

9:21

advancing Red Army had

9:23

taken back back Karkov and Kursk, a

9:25

A German counteroffensive had

9:28

had retaken Karkov, but Kursk was

9:30

still behind the Soviet line. line.

9:32

Kursk was in fact in the

9:34

middle of a Red Army Army salient, about

9:36

200 kilometers wide and

9:39

sticking about 150 kilometers

9:41

into German controlled

9:43

territory. territory. Hitler

9:46

delegated the planning of this

9:48

this more modest offensive to

9:50

his new chief of

9:53

staff, of staff, Courtsitesler. On On April

9:55

15th, Hitler Hitler issued the

9:57

order to prepare for what

9:59

was labeled operation. Citadel. Wehrmacht Wehrmacht

10:01

units were told they

10:03

should be prepared to

10:05

execute the offensive on

10:07

six days on six days notice. Unlike

10:10

Barbarossa or Plan Blue, not even Hitler claimed

10:12

not even Hitler claimed

10:14

Operation Citadel would deal

10:16

the Soviet Union a

10:18

decisive defeat. The

10:20

best the Germans could hope for was

10:22

to inflict heavy losses on the Red

10:24

Army, heavy enough to

10:26

preclude any possible Soviet counter-offensive.

10:28

Otherwise, and Hitler and his

10:30

top military leaders kept telling

10:32

themselves that the losses

10:34

they had been inflicting and

10:36

would continue to inflict

10:38

on the Soviet Union the

10:40

eventually bring the country to

10:42

the breaking point. the country

10:44

They hoped that a new

10:46

generation of a new just

10:48

beginning to arrive at the

10:50

front would give Germany

10:52

a decisive edge decisive that

10:54

an encirclement of Kursk would

10:56

deliver hundreds of thousands hundreds

10:58

of thousands more Soviet POWs, who were as

11:00

slave slave labor. to keep

11:02

the German arms industry operating.

11:04

operating. The problem problem an attacking

11:06

an obvious target the that

11:08

the target is also obvious

11:11

to your enemy. the On

11:13

the Soviet side, Georgi Zhukov

11:15

did foresee something like Operation Stalin

11:17

wanted an wanted an offensive as

11:19

as much as Hitler did, but

11:21

but Zhukov persuaded him that

11:23

the Red Army should first

11:25

prepare defenses against the German

11:28

offensive that was sure to

11:30

come, that was sure to they beat

11:32

back that attack and exhausted

11:34

the Germans, the Germans, be the

11:36

time to move forward. After

12:27

Hitler gave that speech speech on

12:30

March 21st, he retired to

12:32

the the for some rest. rest.

12:34

Did I Did I say He

12:36

had some He had some

12:38

important diplomatic work to deal

12:40

with. The German The German

12:42

defeat at Stalingrad had shaken

12:44

the Axis The governments The

12:47

governments of Finland and Bulgaria

12:49

were looking for ways

12:51

to distance themselves from Germany.

12:53

Germany, Relations with Romania, Italy,

12:55

and Hungary were even more

12:58

strained. All three of three of

13:00

those countries suffered severe losses

13:02

during the for Stalingrad, and

13:04

were unhappy

13:06

that the Germans

13:08

kept blaming

13:11

them for the

13:13

defeat. the defeat. Hitler

13:15

traveled to traveled

13:17

to outside of of

13:19

Salzburg for

13:21

his meetings with

13:23

the other leaders.

13:25

Long-time listeners may listeners

13:27

may recall

13:29

how the Austro

13:31

-Hungarian Emperor exiled

13:33

his little brother.

13:35

Archduke Ludwig Victor

13:37

to this same

13:39

castle castle an

13:42

incident at a

13:44

at a in

13:46

Vienna in when

13:48

he came he

13:50

to the wrong

13:52

guy. guy. First up

13:54

was Sarborus up

13:56

was Tsar Boris

13:58

III had Bulgaria.

14:00

Germany in the Bulgaria

14:02

had assisted

14:04

Germany in the

14:06

invasions and

14:08

occupations of Yugoslavia

14:10

and Greece,

14:12

and had followed

14:15

the leads

14:17

of Germany and

14:19

Italy in

14:21

declaring war on

14:23

the United

14:25

States the the

14:27

United Kingdom, following

14:29

the Japanese

14:31

attack on Pearl

14:33

Harbor. Harbor. What Boris

14:35

and his his

14:37

government had not

14:39

done was to declare

14:41

war on the Soviet Union.

14:43

Bulgaria and Russia had traditionally

14:45

kept close ties, and Boris

14:48

refused either to declare war

14:50

or even permit Bulgarian volunteers

14:52

to fight on the Eastern

14:54

Front, as Spain was doing.

14:56

Hitler had reason to resent

14:58

the Bulgarian attitude. Back in

15:00

November 1940, Germany had negotiated

15:02

an agreement between Bulgaria and

15:04

Romania, under which Romania was

15:06

forced to cede southern Dobruja,

15:08

formerly Bulgarian territory, that had

15:10

been seized by Romania during

15:12

the Second Balkan War in

15:14

1913, episode 71. But this

15:16

German favor came with a

15:19

price. Bulgaria was compelled to

15:21

pass legislation restricting the legal

15:23

rights of its small Jewish

15:25

minority, about 50,000. Then Bulgaria

15:27

gained territories taken from Greece

15:29

and Yugoslavia, again with Germany's

15:31

blessing. After the Vansaya Conference,

15:33

Jews and Bulgaria were forced

15:35

to wear yellow stars. But

15:37

these moves to restrict the

15:39

rights of Jewish Bulgarians did

15:41

not go over well in

15:43

Bulgaria. Politicians, writers, and clergy

15:45

from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church

15:47

spoke out against these measures.

15:49

Then in early 1943, the

15:52

Germans began to press Bulgaria

15:54

to deport Jews under Bulgarian

15:56

rule to the Treblinka murder

15:58

camp. Bulgaria voluntarily turned over

16:00

more than 11,000 Jews, resident

16:02

in the new territories it

16:04

had taken from Yugoslavia and

16:06

Greece. When Bulgaria had seized

16:08

these territories, it had decreed

16:10

that all their residents were

16:12

now citizens of Bulgaria. But

16:14

that decree did not... not

16:16

extend to Jews. Bulgaria was

16:18

willing to deport those people,

16:20

but balked at expelling Jewish

16:22

Bulgarians who lived within the

16:25

country's pre-war borders. So Hitler's

16:27

agenda for his meeting with

16:29

Tsar Boris consisted of two

16:31

items, helped Germany in the

16:33

war against the Soviet Union,

16:35

and cooperate in the extermination

16:37

of Jewish Bulgarians. But Tsar

16:39

resisted getting involved in the

16:41

war getting involved in the

16:43

war. Bulgaria's military was small

16:45

and poorly equipped, he pointed

16:47

out, and it was needed

16:49

closer to home to occupy

16:51

those Greek and Yugoslav territories

16:53

and to protect the Bulgaria

16:56

in the event of Turkey

16:58

joining the allies or of

17:00

an allied invasion of Greece,

17:02

as had happened in the

17:04

last war. Boris attempted to

17:06

placate Hitler by agreeing to

17:08

deport Bulgaria's Jewish population. But

17:10

the promise was a hollow

17:12

one. Once the Bulgarian government

17:14

began rounding up Jewish Bulgarians

17:16

for deportation, the outcry within

17:18

Bulgaria persuaded Boris and his

17:20

government to a change of

17:22

plans. Jewish people were instead

17:24

deported to camps within the

17:26

Bulgaria, where able-bodied men were

17:29

conscripted to forced labor in

17:31

the countryside, building roads, laying

17:33

railroad track, and such. This

17:35

gave the Bulgarian government an

17:37

excuse to use on the

17:39

Germans. Bulgaria could not afford

17:41

to lose these people's labor.

17:43

Jewish Bulgarians never were deported

17:45

to the German murder camps.

17:47

They may have lost their

17:49

homes and property and were

17:51

forced to live in harsh

17:53

conditions, but at least they

17:55

survived. Next up for Hitler

17:57

on April 7th was Benito

17:59

Mussolini. This one was the

18:02

most important meeting as Italy

18:04

was Germany most important ally.

18:06

Things were not going well

18:08

for Mussolini in Italy. The

18:10

Italian army in Russia had

18:12

taken heavy losses from the

18:14

Red Army's operation little Saturn.

18:16

The few survivors had limped

18:18

back to Italy, leaving almost

18:20

90,000 Italian soldiers behind, dead,

18:22

missing, or captured. Mussini's

18:25

decision to involve Italy and

18:27

Germany's war against the USSR

18:29

was never popular back home,

18:32

and it was even less

18:34

popular now. And that's before

18:36

you considered the ugly situation

18:39

in North Africa. A mere

18:41

six months ago, Axis forces

18:43

had driven deep into Egypt

18:45

and the fall of Alexandria

18:48

seemed assured. Now Libya was

18:50

lost. and Axis forces were

18:52

barely holding out in Tunisia,

18:55

and the allies were now

18:57

bombing targets in Italy. Food

18:59

shortages triggered strikes throughout Italy's

19:01

industrial north, the Italian military,

19:04

and the Italian aristocracy were

19:06

grumbling. Something had to be

19:08

done. Mussolini attempted to get

19:10

in front of the political

19:13

unrest on February 6th when

19:15

he sacked his cabinet, when

19:17

he sacked his cabinet. In

19:20

particular, he dismissed his justice

19:22

minister, Count Dino Grande, and

19:24

his foreign minister and son-in-law,

19:26

Count Galiazzo Chiano, both of

19:29

whom had been pressing him

19:31

to consider a separate peace

19:33

with the allies. Grande and

19:36

Chano were each thought of

19:38

as possible successors to Mussolini,

19:40

but that now seemed off

19:42

the table. Though Chano was

19:45

given consolation in the form

19:47

of a posting as Italy's

19:49

ambassador to the Vatican, and

19:51

given a seat on the

19:54

fascist Grand Council. Remember that,

19:56

because it's going to be

19:58

important later. These

20:01

were the most sweeping cabinet

20:04

changes in the 20 years

20:06

Mussolini had ruled Italy. Chano

20:08

had been his foreign minister

20:10

since 1936. The goal of

20:12

these moves was to reassert

20:15

Mussolini's authority over Italian government

20:17

and at the same time

20:19

give the public at least

20:21

the appearance of a shift

20:23

away from the government's more

20:26

unpopular policies. Hitler

20:29

was sufficiently concerned about the

20:31

shaky political situation in Italy

20:33

to send his own foreign

20:36

minister to Rome. Ribbentrop met

20:38

with Mussolini and reiterated Hitler's

20:40

position that there would be

20:42

no negotiations with the allies.

20:44

On his return to Berlin,

20:47

Ribbentrop told Hitler that Il

20:49

Duchy was their only trustworthy

20:51

ally in Italy, but as

20:53

long as he remained in

20:56

control, Germany had nothing to

20:58

fear. And

21:00

I believe that is what

21:02

is known as foreshadowing. It

21:05

was for this reason, the

21:07

need to shore up Mussolini's

21:09

position in Italy, for Germany's

21:11

sake, that led Adolf Hitler

21:14

to oppose any talk of

21:16

withdrawing from North Africa. Even

21:18

though by April, when Mussolini

21:20

came to Salzburg for their

21:23

meeting, It was becoming clear

21:25

that their armies would not

21:27

be able to hold on

21:29

to Tunisia much longer. Hitler

21:32

still regarded Mussolini fondly. He

21:34

spent the evening before their

21:36

meeting at the Berghoff, sitting

21:38

with his guests before the

21:41

fireplace in the Grand Hall,

21:43

and reminiscing about his visit

21:45

to Italy in 1938. As

21:47

for Mussolini, He came to

21:50

Salzburg carrying a memorandum drafted

21:52

by his new foreign minister,

21:54

Giuseppe Bastianini, outlining the need

21:56

for a negotiated settlement to

21:59

the war in the East.

22:01

Before leaving, he had promised

22:03

Bastianini that this meeting would

22:05

be different. This time, he

22:08

would stand up to Hitler

22:10

and press the case for

22:12

peace talks. This meeting was

22:14

not different. For four days,

22:17

Hitler talked and Mussolini listened.

22:19

The Italians went home disappointed.

22:21

though Hitler bragged afterward that

22:23

he had stiffened Mussolini's spine

22:26

and strengthened Italy's commitment to

22:28

the war. After Mussolini left

22:30

for Rome, Hitler next met

22:33

with Hungary's Miklos Horti, the

22:35

admiral of a nation that

22:37

had no navy, who served

22:39

as regent to a kingdom

22:42

that had no king. Horty

22:44

was no fascist, though he

22:46

was a right-wing nationalist and

22:48

a self-described anti-Semite. He ruled

22:51

a small state wedged between

22:53

two much larger and more

22:55

powerful nations. For its own

22:57

safety, Hungary had to align

23:00

with one of them. Horty

23:02

had judged Germany more friendly

23:04

to Hungary and its interests

23:06

than the USSR. Remember, there

23:09

had been a communist uprising

23:11

in Hungary after the last

23:13

war, which Horty had helped

23:15

put down. He never trusted

23:18

the communists in the Soviet

23:20

Union and saw in Hitler

23:22

an ally against them. The

23:24

choice to align with Germany

23:27

had paid off handsomely for

23:29

Hungary. Germany had rewarded Hungary

23:31

with territorial concessions that had

23:33

undone many of the losses

23:36

Hungary suffered under the hated

23:38

Treaty of Trienol. Editorial writers

23:40

in the Western press labeled

23:42

Hungary the jackal of Europe,

23:45

feasting on the scraps the

23:47

German lion had left behind.

23:49

Like Bulgaria, Hungary had conceded

23:51

to German pressure and

23:54

enacted laws

23:56

that limited the

23:58

legal rights

24:00

of Jewish Hungarians

24:03

and made them

24:05

liable to

24:07

forced labor. Also like Bulgaria,

24:10

like Bulgaria, when Hungary annexed

24:12

new territories, it did not

24:14

grant Hungarian citizenship to the

24:16

Jewish residents of those lands. and

24:18

had and had been willing to turn over

24:20

to the Wehrmacht and the SS the SS tens

24:22

of of thousands of Jewish

24:24

people within Hungarian borders who

24:27

were not not Hungarian. residents

24:29

of the new territories,

24:31

and Jewish refugees

24:33

from Nazi persecution. persecution. But

24:35

again, like But again, like

24:37

Bulgaria, there was strong

24:39

political opposition to deporting Hungary's

24:42

800 ,000 Jewish citizens. who,

24:45

in the in the of

24:47

of Reinhard, now now

24:49

constituted the largest

24:51

surviving Jewish community in

24:53

in Axis Europe. Like

24:55

the the Italian the the Hungarian

24:57

army the Soviet Union had

24:59

suffered terrible losses during

25:01

Operation Little Saturn. Little

25:03

Saturn. About soldiers killed

25:06

and 60 ,000 taken

25:08

prisoner. These were heavy These were heavy

25:10

losses for such a small country. much

25:13

worse worse losses than Italy or

25:15

Germany had taken. The Hungarian

25:17

The Hungarian who were never all that were

25:19

never all that enthusiastic about invading

25:21

the Soviet Union in the first

25:23

place. place, were now now than than ready

25:25

to quit the war. In their meeting,

25:27

Hitler told In their meeting,

25:30

Hitler told Hortie that were

25:32

Jewish citizens were responsible

25:34

for Hungary's low morale for

25:36

for them to be deported. Horty

25:38

was no was no more

25:40

enthusiastic about this idea

25:42

than Sarbora been. been. He He

25:45

recognized the risk of the Allies

25:47

winning the war. and judged further

25:49

cooperation with Germany

25:51

to be be imprudent. Within

25:53

a few months, Hungarian

25:55

diplomats would be sounding

25:57

out out the Western allies a

26:00

separate piece. Hitler's next meeting was

26:02

with Norway's Prime Minister, Vidkun

26:04

Kvisling. A year ago, with

26:07

German assistance, Kvisling had set

26:09

himself up as PM of

26:12

a one-party state modeled on

26:14

Germany, and he was angling

26:17

for a peace agreement with

26:19

Germany that would preserve Norway's

26:22

independence in exchange for Norwegian

26:24

war support. Kvisling's government cooperated

26:27

in rounding up and deporting

26:29

Norway's small Jewish community and

26:32

the hope Hitler would reward

26:34

Norwegian cooperation with independence. After

26:37

some preliminary talks, the Germans

26:39

dismissed that idea on the

26:41

grounds that discussion of the

26:44

post-war status of Norway had

26:46

to be deferred until the

26:49

war was over. When Kvisling

26:51

publicly criticized the German refusal

26:54

to commit to an independent

26:56

Norway, that's when Hitler summoned

26:59

him to Klesheim. Kvisling saw

27:01

in the German defeat at

27:04

Stalingrad an opportunity for Norway.

27:06

His country would provide soldiers

27:09

and other military assistance to

27:11

bolster the German war effort

27:14

in exchange for a commitment

27:16

to independence. Hitler

27:18

would not agree to this

27:21

trade-off in April, but in

27:23

September 1943, he did finally

27:26

pledge post-war Norwegian independence. Assuming

27:28

a promise from Adolf Hitler

27:30

is worth anything. After Kvisling,

27:33

Hitler met with Josef Tiso,

27:35

the Catholic priest, who was

27:37

president of the Slovak Republic.

27:40

Slovakia had been willing, you

27:42

could even say, eager, to

27:45

cooperate with the deportation of

27:47

its Jewish population. The Slovakian

27:49

government even paid for the

27:52

deportees train tickets. No other

27:54

Axis state was willing to

27:57

go that far, except for

27:59

Croat. But once the Vatican

28:01

became aware of the nature

28:04

of the Holocaust, it applied

28:06

pressure to Tissot to halt

28:09

the deportations. As one Vatican

28:11

diplomat put it in a

28:13

private conversation, everyone understands that

28:16

the Holy See cannot stop

28:18

Hitler, but who can understand

28:21

that it does not know

28:23

how to reign in a

28:25

priest? It is

28:28

said that the church had

28:30

to go so far as

28:32

to threaten Tiso and Slovakia

28:35

with an interdict, but Tiso

28:37

eventually got the message and

28:39

suspended the deportations, though not

28:42

until after three quarters of

28:44

Slovakia's Jews were already dead.

28:46

Hitler pressed Tiso to resume

28:49

the deportations, like Horti and

28:51

Sarboros, Tiso agreed, but dragged

28:53

his feet. After

28:56

Tiso came Anté Pavilage, fascist

28:58

dictator of the Croatian puppet

29:00

state created by Germany and

29:02

Italy after the defeat of

29:05

Yugoslavia. In the case of

29:07

Croatia, its willingness to cooperate

29:09

with the Holocaust was not

29:11

in dispute. Rather, Croatia presented

29:13

the opposite problem. The excesses

29:15

of the Pavilich regime, which

29:18

was slaughtering Serbs living in

29:20

Croatia and terrorizing its political

29:22

opponents, were getting so extreme

29:24

that even ethnic Croats, who

29:26

had at first applauded the

29:28

creation of a Croatian state,

29:30

were beginning to feel nostalgia

29:33

for Yugoslavia. Even the Nazis

29:35

thought Pavilich was going too

29:37

far. Some in the German

29:39

government were urging Hitler to

29:41

depose him and put Croatia

29:43

under German military rule. Hitler

29:46

wouldn't go that far, but

29:48

he did agree to send

29:50

SS units into Croatia to

29:52

help keep the peace. After

29:54

meeting with Hitler, Pavlich agreed

29:56

to put Croatian

29:59

military and

30:01

paramilitary units under

30:03

German command. command.

30:05

Last but not least, French

30:08

but not least, French the Pierre

30:10

Laval made the trek to

30:12

Salzburg to meet with the

30:14

we met Laval, he was the

30:16

last time we met Laval. He was

30:18

serving as Deputy Prime Minister in the

30:20

Peyton government. but Petant dismissed

30:23

him in December 1940 for cooperating

30:25

too closely with the Germans.

30:28

which tells you something. In April

30:30

April Petem brought him brought him

30:32

back as Prime Minister. had

30:34

been an had been an

30:37

supporter of of Germany telling the

30:39

telling the French public that the alternative

30:41

to a German victory in the war

30:43

in the be would be supreme

30:45

across Europe. across Europe.

30:48

With the Allied the Allied of

30:50

of North Africa. and the the

30:52

German and Italian occupation of

30:54

all of France. France, The

30:56

government had little left

30:58

to offer Germany. Germany, but there

31:00

was one concession Hitler wanted

31:03

from the French. the French.

31:05

formal declaration of war against

31:07

Britain and the United States. as

31:10

retaliation for their violation

31:12

of French neutrality. French But

31:14

this went too far even for far

31:16

even for he would not agree. not agree.

31:22

By the the time Laval boarded the

31:24

train for his return to to

31:26

Vichy, It was becoming clear that

31:28

what was left of left of Tunisia would

31:31

fall to the would any day now. any

31:33

day now. The allies had massive

31:35

air superiority and inflicted heavy

31:38

casualties on the Luftwaffe. the Luft

31:40

Vafa, Navy ships operating out

31:42

of Malta of Malta access travel

31:44

to or from Africa by

31:46

sea. by sea. There was no

31:49

way to ship supplies or

31:51

reinforcements in. There

31:53

was no way to

31:55

evacuate to already there. soldiers already

31:57

there. On on April

31:59

20th. Second, the allies began

32:01

an offensive to capture the

32:04

two remaining access-held ports of

32:06

Bezert and Tunis. The final

32:09

assault began on May 6th.

32:11

The following day, British tanks

32:14

rolled into Tunis, and hours

32:16

later, American infantry marched into

32:18

Bezert. After these defeats, German

32:21

units began surrendering and mass.

32:23

The Italians vowed to fight

32:26

to fight on. until May

32:28

12th, when Mussolini ordered them

32:30

to surrender. The following day,

32:33

the last of the Axis

32:35

defenders laid down their arms.

32:38

For the first time since

32:40

Italy entered the war, there

32:43

were no Axis military forces

32:45

anywhere between Casablanca and Alexandria.

32:47

Axis losses in Tunisia were

32:50

comparable to those at Stalingrad.

32:52

which had surrendered just three

32:55

months earlier. In Stalingrad, the

32:57

Axis had begun the battle

32:59

with upward of a quarter

33:02

of a million soldiers, while

33:04

in Tunisia it was upward

33:07

of 300,000, and in both

33:09

cases we're talking about losing

33:12

experienced battle-hardened soldiers. At Stalingrad,

33:14

only 90,000 survived to be

33:16

taken prisoner. At Tunis, 250,000

33:19

were taken prisoner. On the

33:21

Allied side, British and Commonwealth

33:24

forces lost about 16,000 killed

33:26

or missing, 22,000 wounded, while

33:28

the US and French forces

33:31

each lost about half of

33:33

those numbers. The Axis lost

33:36

12,000 killed or missing. The

33:38

Luft Vafo was down more

33:41

than a thousand planes it

33:43

could ill afford to lose.

33:45

The comparison to Stalingrad was

33:48

irresistible, and many were making

33:50

it. Some Germans compared it

33:53

to Dunkirk or spoke bitterly

33:55

of Tunis The analogy was

33:57

an apt one. In both

34:00

cases, Hitler's refusal to allow

34:02

retreat had led to a

34:05

military disaster. The order to

34:07

reinforce Tunisia had cost the

34:10

Western Allies six months of

34:12

time and kept the Mediterranean

34:14

closed to Allied shipping for

34:17

the same period. But that's

34:19

pretty small beer when compared

34:22

to the price the Axis

34:24

had to pay. As

34:27

Allied soldiers were advancing on

34:30

Tunis, Hitler was in Munich,

34:32

conferring with his Eastern Front

34:34

commanders on the date to

34:36

begin Operation Citadel. Now, Germany

34:39

had only one shot at

34:41

a 1943 offensive, and the

34:43

points of attack were pretty

34:45

obvious. Germany's best hope for

34:48

a successful outcome would therefore

34:50

be to surprise the Soviets

34:52

by attacking earlier than expected.

34:54

That would mean early June,

34:57

at the latest. Late May

34:59

would have been even better.

35:01

Hitler rejected those dates and

35:03

delayed the offensive until the

35:05

end of June, justifying this

35:08

by pointing out that the

35:10

extra weeks of prep time

35:12

would allow for larger numbers

35:14

of Germany's newest tanks, the

35:17

Panthers and the Tigers, to

35:19

participate. This would not be

35:21

the last time. Hitler ordered

35:23

a delay to Operation Citadel.

35:26

Hitler went on to Berlin,

35:28

complaining to Goebbels after his

35:30

arrival that his so-called vacation

35:32

at the Berghoff had been

35:34

anything but. On the day

35:37

Tunis fell, Hitler spoke before

35:39

a meeting of regional Nazi

35:41

party leaders. He said not

35:43

a word about North Africa,

35:46

but talked at length about

35:48

the Eastern Front. hinting that

35:50

a new offensive was in

35:52

the works and expressing optimism.

35:55

He also had some words

35:57

of praise for Stalin and

35:59

communism. Stalin's

36:01

purges had cleared away his opponents

36:03

in the Red Army Army Officer Corps,

36:06

while the communist of of in

36:08

the in the supervise its

36:10

officers for political loyalties was

36:13

a sound one. a sound one. Hitler

36:15

pondered the possibility of

36:17

Nazi party officials

36:19

supervising his commanders. commanders, who frequently

36:21

resisted following his orders

36:23

his and lacked an

36:25

appropriate national national attitude.

36:28

attitude. On

36:30

May May Hitler Hitler returned to

36:32

the Wolf's just in just in

36:35

time to receive word of

36:37

the final in in North Africa. It

36:39

was now time It was now

36:41

time for him and his to consider to

36:43

consider the possibility of Italy

36:45

quitting the war. planners

36:48

drew up drew up plans

36:50

for Constantine, a German a

36:52

German occupation of Italian -controlled

36:54

territories in the Balkans,

36:57

and Operation Alaric. a a

36:59

German occupation of Italy itself. If

37:02

the Western Allies' the Western move was

37:04

next move was into southern

37:06

Italy, which now seemed likely. that

37:09

Hitler insisted they be engaged the

37:11

far from the borders of the

37:13

Reich as possible. arranged for some

37:15

for some of the best best

37:17

units to be withdrawn from the

37:19

the Eastern defend Italy. Italy,

37:21

that prove necessary? necessary. Germany

37:26

was suffering setbacks on other fronts

37:28

as well. as well. U-boat

37:30

in the Atlantic were on the rise. the

37:32

rise, and bombers were turning

37:35

German cities into rubble. Joseph

37:38

Goebbels and and other leading

37:40

Nazis it a point to

37:42

visit the the bombed cities, offer comfort

37:44

to the victims and

37:46

and revenge. revenge. But the Fuhrer

37:48

himself refused to make make

37:50

such visit. despite Goebel's

37:53

prodding. There

37:57

There was no denying it, the

37:59

the past six months had been very

38:01

bad for Germany. Something had to

38:03

change and it had to change

38:06

soon. We'll have to stop there

38:08

for today. I thank you for

38:10

listening and I'd especially like to

38:12

thank Harry and Max for their

38:14

kind donations and thank you to

38:16

Liam for becoming a patron of

38:19

the podcast. Donors and patrons like

38:21

Harry and Max and Liam help

38:23

cover the costs of making this

38:25

show, which in turn keeps the

38:27

podcast available free for everyone always.

38:29

So my thanks to them and

38:32

to all of you who have

38:34

pitched in and helped out. If

38:36

you'd like to become a patron

38:38

or make a donation, you are

38:40

very welcome. Just visit the website

38:42

History of the 20th century.com and

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click on the PayPal or Patreon

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38:58

the music you hear here is

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free and downloadable. If you hear

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a piece of music on the

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to where you could download it,

39:13

that would be the place to

39:15

go. And while you're there, you

39:17

can always leave a comment and

39:19

let me know what you thought

39:21

about today's show. The end of

39:24

the year holidays are upon us,

39:26

so it's the time of the

39:28

year when I remind you that

39:30

donations to and patronages of the

39:32

history of the 20th century make

39:34

the perfect holiday gift for me.

39:37

You never have to worry if

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it's the right size or the

39:41

right color or if it's to

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my tastes, and I promise you

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it will never be returned. Now,

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I recognize not everyone has a patronage

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or a donation in the budget, and

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if that's the case, might I suggest

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a rating and review that would help

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That would make a

40:00

nice present present too. you

40:02

can recruit a new listener yourself,

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someone in your life who might

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enjoy the podcast. who might enjoy the

40:09

podcast. And as My thanks

40:11

to thanks to being a listener. a

40:13

listener. Where do we go Where

40:16

do we go from here? World War

40:18

The Second World War continues, got

40:20

and I've got more episodes

40:22

about German and Japanese atrocities

40:24

in the pipeline. the pipeline. Maybe

40:26

I'm I'm sentimental, but just before

40:28

Christmas doesn't strike me as the

40:31

right time of year to bring

40:33

up that sort of topic. sort of

40:35

So I'm going to hold off, at

40:37

least until the dark days of

40:39

January, to talk about mass murder. to talk

40:41

about mass still be We'll still be

40:43

next week. war But

40:45

at least the but will be

40:47

soldiers will be not civilians. and not That's

40:50

not much to offer, but it's

40:52

the best I can do the

40:54

that we're in 1943. that we're in 1943.

40:56

As is is my custom, I'm also

40:59

going to release a special

41:01

Christmas episode on the 25th. on the

41:03

This episode is my gift to

41:05

you, to my listeners. In

41:07

In years past, I've used these

41:09

Christmas episodes to talk about scientific

41:11

topics. And I think

41:14

I'll do that this time as well. I'll do

41:16

that this time this being

41:18

But again, this being 1943, the obvious

41:20

topic is is the

41:22

bomb project. So I'm

41:24

going to talk about that. that. And

41:26

I'm going to tell you things about atom

41:29

bombs that would have gotten me

41:31

arrested and quite possibly executed for

41:33

treason if I had put them

41:35

into a podcast 75 years ago. them

41:37

into a there had been years

41:39

ago. And years ago. podcasts

41:41

75 years ago, that's for

41:44

Christmas. But But in the meantime... I

41:46

hope I hope you'll join me

41:48

next week here on the History

41:50

of the the 20th century we look

41:52

at the the Allied of Sicily. Operation

41:56

Husky. next week. week.

41:59

Here. on the the

42:01

history of the 20th century.

42:03

Oh, and one more thing. On April

42:05

and one more

42:08

thing. Modell, whose April would spearhead

42:10

Operation Citadel, met with Army

42:12

would spearhead Operation Citadel,

42:15

met with Hitler to discuss

42:17

his misgivings. Intelligence reports

42:19

from the front indicated that the

42:21

Red Army had built strong

42:23

defensive positions at the neck of

42:26

the Soviet salient. just at the

42:28

places where the German offensive would

42:30

strike. would strike. The Red Army

42:32

was also marshalling its own armored

42:34

formations, probably in preparation

42:36

for an offensive of

42:38

their own. an offensive of their own.

42:40

gave Hitler the same advice

42:42

advice had given Stalin. Stalin.

42:44

Instead of beginning an offensive,

42:47

the German the should hold

42:49

position hold and prepare to

42:51

destroy the Soviet offensive

42:53

once it began. once it began.

42:55

considered this advice, advice. but

42:57

ultimately rejected it. it. So,

44:02

You