0:19

In the wake of Pearl

0:21

Harbor, a single word favored

0:23

above all others by Americans

0:26

as best characterizing the Japanese

0:28

people was treacherous. And for

0:30

the duration of the war,

0:32

the surprise attack on the

0:35

U.S. Pacific Fleet remained the

0:37

preeminent symbol of the enemy's

0:39

inherent treachery. The attack also

0:42

inspired a thirst for

0:44

revenge among Americans that

0:46

the Japanese, with their

0:48

own racial blinders, had

0:50

failed to anticipate. American

0:53

historian John

0:55

W. Dower. Welcome

0:58

to the history of the

1:00

20th century. Episode

1:33

397. Pop goes the weasel.

1:36

The last time I talked about

1:38

the war in the Pacific

1:40

was a while ago. Episode

1:43

382, to be exact. That

1:45

episode ended with the failure

1:48

of the third Japanese offense

1:50

of Anguadle Canal. That

1:53

failure led the Japanese

1:55

military to an

1:58

inescapable conclusion. Retaking

2:00

Guadalcanal was impossible.

2:03

Senior commanders of the

2:05

Imperial Japanese Navy would have

2:07

phrased it a little differently.

2:09

They would have said, retaking Guadal

2:12

Canal is impossible because

2:14

the army is incompetent.

2:16

Senior commanders of the

2:18

Imperial Japanese Army would have had

2:20

their own way of putting it

2:22

to wit. Retaking Guadalcanal is

2:24

impossible because the Navy

2:27

is incompetent. I

2:29

closed episode 382 by noting

2:32

that by December 1942 and

2:34

the first anniversary of the

2:36

war in the Pacific, senior

2:38

Japanese military commanders were

2:41

literally coming to blows

2:43

over the failure at

2:45

Guadalcanal, who was to blame and

2:47

what to do next. The army

2:49

had promised the emperor

2:51

they would retake Guadalcanal and

2:53

had been determined to keep

2:56

their promise. If only the

2:58

accursed Navy would give them

3:00

the proper support. One army

3:02

commander compared the Navy's role

3:04

at Guadalcanal to putting up

3:06

a ladder so a worker

3:08

could get on the roof, then taking

3:10

the ladder away. The Navy

3:13

concluded that the Guadal Canal

3:15

campaign had cost too many

3:17

ships. They had managed to give

3:19

the allies as good as they got,

3:21

but the Americans had the

3:23

means to replace the ships they

3:25

lost. Japan did not. There

3:29

was also the loss of supply

3:31

ships to consider. Long-time listeners

3:34

will remember what I have said

3:36

about Japan during the Jazz Age.

3:38

Japan is a nation with limited

3:41

natural resources. Its economy

3:43

is heavily dependent on

3:45

imports. Like Britain, Japan does

3:48

not produce enough food to

3:50

feed its own population and

3:52

is therefore dependent on food

3:54

imports as well. Most of these

3:56

imports approach Japan by sea from

3:59

the south. along the East

4:01

Coast of Asia, originating from

4:03

Malaya, the East Indies, Indochina,

4:06

the Philippines, and Taiwan, or

4:08

Formosa, as most Westerners called it

4:10

at the time. You'll note

4:13

that apart from Taiwan, all

4:15

these places were controlled by

4:17

Western powers, a fact that

4:19

was a source of strategic

4:22

concern in the Japanese government

4:24

and military. Apart from

4:26

that strategic concern, Japan

4:29

needed cargo ships to transport

4:31

all those goods. In the period

4:33

between the wars, Japan embarked

4:35

on a huge shipbuilding

4:37

program, which was all the more

4:40

remarkable when you consider that

4:42

Japanese shipyards had to import

4:44

most of the materials needed

4:46

to build the ships. By 1940,

4:48

Japan had the third largest

4:50

merchant fleet in the world

4:52

behind the British Empire and

4:54

the United States. Modern diesel-powered

4:57

cargo ships flying the

4:59

banner of the rising

5:01

sun, plied the waters around the

5:03

world. Japanese passenger liners

5:06

served ports on every

5:08

continent and dominated the

5:11

trans-pacific routes. Japanese oil

5:13

tankers were the largest

5:15

and fastest in the world.

5:17

In contrast with Germany or Italy,

5:20

Japan had entered the war on

5:22

a date of its own choosing.

5:24

and the Japanese were careful to

5:26

make sure all their ships were

5:28

in or near Japanese waters when

5:31

they attacked Pearl Harbor. No

5:33

Japanese merchant ships were seized

5:35

in enemy ports, were forced

5:38

into internment in neutral

5:40

ports. Afterward, much of

5:42

Japan's merchant fleet was

5:44

rapidly converted to wartime

5:46

service. The ocean liners became

5:48

sea plane and submarine tenders.

5:51

The cargo ships transported soldiers

5:53

and supplies. The tankers were

5:56

used to refuel the Imperial

5:58

Navy. Fishing trucks. were converted

6:00

into mine layers. And with

6:02

the coming of war, production

6:05

of new merchant ships only

6:07

increased. The Japanese military estimated

6:10

that the nation needed 6

6:12

million tons of merchant shipping

6:14

to supply the Japanese economy

6:16

and the military in wartime.

6:19

That number assumes 3 million

6:21

tons for the transport of

6:23

food and raw materials for

6:25

the civilian economy. and 3

6:27

million more to be allocated

6:29

to the army and navy

6:31

for military use. Japan had

6:33

begun the war with nearly

6:35

8 million tons of merchant

6:37

shipping available, and new ships

6:39

regularly launching from Japanese shipyards.

6:42

The Japanese felt confident their merchant

6:44

fleet would be equal to the

6:47

task of supporting their war

6:49

effort. As a side note, let

6:51

me point out. that when we

6:53

speak of the tonnage of commercial

6:55

ships, we are not talking about

6:57

weight. Tunnage is a measure

7:00

of the volume of cargo

7:02

the ship can hold. In this

7:04

system of measurement, one

7:06

ton equates to a

7:08

capacity of 100 cubic feet,

7:10

or 2.8 cubic meters. On

7:13

the American side, the

7:15

attack on Pearl Harbor had

7:17

been devastating. But the attackers

7:19

had concentrated their efforts on

7:22

the U.S. Navy's battleships.

7:24

The submarine pens at Pearl Harbor

7:27

and the subs docked in them

7:29

were untouched by the attack. Within

7:31

hours after the last Japanese

7:33

bomb fell, the order went

7:36

out to the American submarine

7:38

stationed at Pearl Harbor and

7:41

at Cavite in the Philippines

7:43

to execute unrestricted submarine warfare

7:46

against Japan. Now,

7:49

longtime listeners will also recall

7:51

that the subject of submarine

7:53

attacks on civilian vessels has

7:56

been a fraught topic since the turn

7:58

of the century. Before

8:00

submarines became an accepted

8:02

part of the world's

8:04

navies, international law demanded

8:06

that any naval vessel

8:08

that intercepted an enemy

8:10

civilian ship in wartime

8:12

offer that ship the opportunity

8:15

to surrender before firing on

8:17

it. If the civilian ship did surrender,

8:19

it could be boarded and searched.

8:21

Its cargo could be seized. If

8:23

the attacker wanted to seize

8:25

the ship itself or sink

8:28

it. Those actions were permissible

8:30

under international law, but the attackers

8:32

were held responsible for the

8:34

safety of any passengers or

8:36

crew aboard that ship. This

8:38

means either taking the passengers and

8:41

crew aboard the warship and

8:43

delivering them safely to shore

8:45

or allowing them to leave their

8:47

ship in lifeboats with the proviso

8:50

that the lifeboats must have

8:52

sufficient supplies and equipment to

8:54

reach land themselves. or at

8:57

least find rescue. That was fine

8:59

for the 19th century, but the

9:01

introduction of submarines complicates

9:04

the picture. Submarines operate by

9:06

stealth, insisting that they

9:08

announce their presence takes away their

9:11

biggest advantage, especially once

9:13

radios aboard ships became

9:15

common, as an intercepted merchant

9:18

ship could be expected to

9:20

immediately announce the arrival of

9:23

an enemy submarine submarine submarine,

9:25

to any nearby friendly naval

9:28

vessel. By the Second World

9:30

War, the introduction of

9:32

anti-submarine aircraft patrols meant

9:34

that any submarine that

9:36

made an appearance could

9:38

expect to be attacked within

9:40

minutes. Also, submarines are too small

9:43

to take aboard the crew of

9:45

another ship. So that won't work.

9:49

In the First World War, the

9:51

German Navy retaliated against the

9:53

British blockade by announcing a

9:55

war zone around the British

9:57

Isles, entry into which by any...

10:00

ship flying an enemy flag made

10:02

that ship liable to be

10:04

attacked without warning, which

10:06

was called unrestricted submarine

10:09

warfare. Allied nations were

10:11

appalled by the barbarity

10:13

of unprovoked attacks on

10:15

civilians. Famously the sinking of

10:18

the British passenger liner Lucitania

10:20

on May 7th 1915 triggered

10:23

such an outcry that in

10:25

1916, the German Navy pledged

10:28

to end unannounced attacks on

10:30

civilian vessels. Less than a year

10:32

later, though, the Germans returned to

10:35

unrestricted submarine warfare, a

10:37

decision that became one

10:39

of the reasons the

10:42

United States chose to

10:44

declare war on Germany. The

10:46

London Submarine Protocol of

10:49

1936 reaffirmed that unrestricted

10:51

submarine warfare was a

10:54

violation of international law.

10:56

35 nations assented to

10:58

the protocol, including the

11:00

United Kingdom, the United

11:02

States, Germany, and Japan.

11:05

This means that at the very

11:07

least, when the US

11:09

Navy began unrestricted submarine

11:11

warfare against Japan, it

11:13

breached its treaty obligations

11:16

obligations. The German Navy

11:18

had two. What about Japan?

11:20

The Imperial Japanese Navy, the

11:22

IJN, used submarines in a very

11:24

different way. You may have

11:27

noticed this from my descriptions of

11:29

Pacific naval battles in the first

11:31

year of the war. The Japanese

11:34

included their submarines as

11:36

part of their naval task

11:38

forces and sent them into

11:40

battle against Allied warships. As we

11:42

have seen, Japanese submarines were

11:45

used for reconnaissance. Sometimes

11:47

stationed in a line across the

11:49

expected approach route of an enemy

11:51

naval force to detect their approach,

11:54

submarines were also used to finish

11:56

off enemy ships that had been damaged

11:58

by air or surface. attacks. Even

12:01

when Japanese submarines encountered

12:03

enemy convoys of troop

12:05

transports or supply ships,

12:08

they typically attacked the

12:10

escorting warships first. Attacking

12:13

civilian vessels was contrary

12:15

to Japanese military culture,

12:18

in addition to being

12:20

contrary to Japanese treaty

12:22

obligations. Bushido, the

12:24

traditional Japanese warrior

12:27

code, exalted virtues such

12:29

as honor, honesty, and

12:31

compassion. Sneak attacks against

12:33

unarmed civilian ships ran

12:35

contrary to those values.

12:38

In the early months of

12:40

the war, the Japanese Navy

12:42

in particular strove to

12:44

advance across the Pacific

12:46

at every opportunity. Japan,

12:49

like Germany, had a smaller

12:51

industrial base than its enemies.

12:53

In Japan's case, the disparity

12:56

was far greater. It was clear

12:58

from the start that Japan could

13:00

not win a war of attrition

13:02

against the United States. For this

13:04

reason, the Navy sought to engage

13:07

the Americans as quickly as possible

13:09

in a decisive naval battle that

13:12

would force the Americans to come

13:14

to terms. In other words, they

13:16

were looking for a grand battle

13:18

comparable to the Battle of the

13:20

Tsushima Strait in 1905. Not only

13:22

did that battle force Russia

13:24

to negotiate an end to the

13:27

war, it kept Russia leery of

13:29

a rematch and keen to stay

13:31

out of Japan's way for

13:33

decades afterward. The Navy's goal

13:35

was to do the same to the

13:38

United States. But the US Navy

13:40

was not likely to charge

13:42

into the sea of Japan the

13:44

way the Russians had. Therefore,

13:46

if the Americans would not come

13:48

to the IJN, The IJN would

13:51

go to the Americans. This

13:53

meant expanding across the

13:55

Pacific. It meant seizing

13:57

islands. And it meant a long...

14:00

supply chain running all the way

14:02

back to the home islands, filled

14:04

with tempting targets

14:06

for American submariners.

14:08

In the Atlantic, the British

14:10

and then the Americans developed

14:13

an elaborate set of tactics

14:15

to defend convoys and to

14:18

attack and sink German and

14:20

Italian submarines. These tactics were

14:22

part of what's known as

14:25

anti-submarine warfare, or ASW for

14:27

short. Again, in sharp contrast,

14:29

the IJN had little in

14:31

the way of ASW assets

14:33

or tactics. Japan lacked Britain's

14:35

years of hard-won experience

14:38

defending its cargo ships

14:40

against German U-boats. The

14:42

Japanese did not organize their

14:45

merchant ships into convoys. The

14:47

IJN did not have a

14:49

class of ship dedicated to

14:52

ASW, like the British frigates

14:54

or the American destroyer escorts.

14:56

It did not even have

14:58

any naval units formally

15:00

designated for ASW or

15:02

merchant ship protection. When the

15:05

war against Japan began, the

15:07

United States Navy had

15:09

substantial numbers of submarines

15:12

in the Pacific, about 70.

15:14

They were untouched by the

15:16

Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor

15:18

and the Philippines. American

15:20

submarines were better suited to

15:22

raids on convoys. compared

15:25

to other submarines of the

15:27

period, American submarines

15:29

were bigger. They carried more fuel, they

15:31

were faster, and they had a

15:33

longer range. And they carried more

15:36

torpedoes, as many as

15:38

24. American submarines were equipped

15:40

with desalination equipment to provide

15:42

water for the crew, and

15:45

they were air conditioned,

15:47

and important consideration in

15:50

tropical warfare. Knowing

15:53

the specs on American submarines, you

15:55

might have expected to hear more

15:58

about the American submarine camp. in

16:00

the Pacific over the course of

16:02

1942. But you didn't. That's

16:04

because I didn't have much

16:06

to tell you. The campaign was

16:08

frustratingly ineffective. In

16:11

fact, you could add

16:13

these disappointing results to

16:15

the list of reasons

16:18

why the IJN hadn't

16:20

developed any significant anti-submarine

16:23

capability. They had very little

16:25

reason to. This

16:27

is not to say the

16:29

Japanese weren't losing merchant shipping.

16:31

By the end of the Guadalcanal

16:34

campaign, Japan had only

16:36

6 million tons of

16:38

shipping available, the pre-war

16:40

estimated minimum. But by this

16:42

time, both the Army and the

16:44

Navy had requested more than their

16:46

shares of the total, leaving the

16:49

civilian economy with only 2.6

16:51

million tons. significantly

16:53

less than the minimum needed

16:55

to maintain the Japanese economy.

16:58

After Guadalcanal, both the

17:00

army and the Navy were

17:02

increasing their demands for military

17:05

production. Just to give one example,

17:07

the military wanted aircraft

17:09

production increased to 4,000

17:11

planes per month. That's an

17:13

incredible number, considering that Japanese

17:16

factories had never before reached

17:18

even the level of 1,

17:20

1,500 planes per month. One

17:23

wonders where the military expected

17:25

to find pilots for all

17:27

these planes. But even if pilots

17:29

could be found and factory

17:31

capacity made available, Japan didn't

17:34

have the shipping capacity to

17:36

import the necessary quantities of

17:38

bauxite, the ore from which

17:41

aluminum is smelted. American submarines

17:44

contributed to Japanese merchant

17:46

shipping losses, but most of those

17:48

losses came from airplane attacks

17:50

from airplane attacks. The numbers

17:53

sunk by submarine were not too

17:55

worrisome. Pre-war Japanese estimates

17:58

predicted losses of 70,000

18:00

tons per month, which was

18:02

considered a manageable

18:05

number. Over the first year

18:07

of the war, Japan lost

18:09

on average less than 50,000

18:11

tons per month to enemy

18:13

submarines, not a number

18:16

that generated much concern

18:18

in the IJN. Over the

18:20

summer months of 1943, though,

18:22

this began to change. Senior

18:24

IJN commanders noticed a

18:27

sharp uptick. in sinkings

18:29

by submarines. September

18:32

losses exceeded

18:34

100,000 tons. So did

18:37

October's losses broke

18:39

the 200,000 mark for

18:42

the first time. December

18:44

1943 and January

18:46

1944 saw losses

18:48

of 250,000 tons

18:50

each month. True,

18:53

the Americans were building more

18:55

and more submarines, which meant

18:58

rising numbers of American submarines

19:00

on patrol at any given

19:02

time, but these rising numbers alone

19:04

could not account for the

19:07

sudden dramatic increase in sinkings.

19:09

Japanese naval commanders therefore

19:11

concluded it must have something

19:13

to do with American torpedoes.

19:16

For some reason, American torpedoes

19:18

were suddenly a lot more

19:20

dangerous. Yes, they

19:22

were. There's a whole story

19:25

behind that. In the 30s, the US

19:27

Navy began development of a

19:29

new submarine torpedo to replace

19:31

the Mark 10, which was

19:34

a First World War weapon.

19:36

The new torpedo, the

19:38

Mark 14, incorporated a

19:40

number of technological advances.

19:43

The problem was that

19:45

torpedoes were expensive, and

19:47

this was the Great Depression.

19:49

The Navy could not afford live

19:52

fire tests that would destroy the

19:54

torpedo. So torpedoes were

19:56

tested in simulated attacks

19:58

and retrieved out. afterward.

20:00

When America entered the

20:03

war in December 1941, the

20:05

U.S. was producing a mere 23

20:07

Mark 14 torpedoes per day.

20:09

In fact, it wasn't until

20:12

1945 that torpedo production

20:14

caught up with demand.

20:17

These shortages meant

20:19

that even in wartime,

20:21

torpedoes were too valuable

20:23

to subject to live

20:25

fire tests. When

20:29

American submarines began

20:31

hunting Japanese ships, their

20:33

crews quickly discovered how

20:35

unreliable the Mark 14

20:37

torpedo was. They failed in

20:40

every imaginable respect. They

20:42

ran too deep and would pass

20:44

underneath the enemy ship and

20:46

continue on without exploding. Sometimes

20:49

they exploded prematurely.

20:51

Sometimes they hit the hull

20:54

of an enemy ship so hard

20:56

the submarine could detect the sound

20:58

of the impact, and yet they

21:00

still failed to explode. Worst

21:02

of all, despite gyroscope systems

21:04

designed to keep the torpedo

21:07

on the proper course toward

21:09

its target, sometimes one would

21:11

run in a full circle,

21:13

coming back around and threatening

21:15

to destroy the very submarine

21:17

that had launched it. Only about

21:20

one in 10 Mark 14s

21:22

actually exploded on target, no

21:25

matter how carefully the submarine

21:27

lined up the shot. Clearly,

21:30

there was something wrong

21:32

with the Mark 14.

21:34

Submarine commanders were sure of

21:36

it and were complaining

21:38

about it regularly to

21:40

their superiors. In fact, there

21:42

were multiple design flaws

21:45

in the torpedo. So many

21:47

that it became hard to tease

21:49

out why the torpedo did what

21:51

it did. Submarine crews were

21:53

convinced the torpedoes ran too

21:55

deep, which is why they

21:58

passed under their targets. Navy's

22:00

Bureau of Ordinance insisted

22:02

the crews must be

22:04

adjusting the torpedo's depth

22:06

setting incorrectly and recommended

22:09

additional training. In

22:12

August 1942, the Bureau finally

22:14

acknowledged a problem with the

22:16

depth settings. The flaw was

22:19

discovered and corrected, but

22:21

the torpedo's performance barely

22:23

improved. The Mark 14 had

22:26

two detonators. a magnetic detonator

22:28

that could detect the metal

22:30

hull of an enemy ship,

22:32

and a contact detonator that

22:35

would set off the explosive

22:37

on contact. And neither of them

22:39

was working properly. The

22:41

magnetic detonators frequently set

22:44

off the explosive

22:46

too early. For example, in

22:48

April 1943, the submarine U.S.S.S.

22:50

Pompano got off six shots

22:52

at the Japanese fleet carrier

22:55

Shokaku. The crew detected at

22:57

least three explosions, but

23:00

they were all premature, and Shokaku

23:02

escaped unscathed. Submarine

23:05

crews asked permission to

23:07

deactivate the magnetic detonators

23:10

on their torpedoes. The

23:12

Navy refused to give it.

23:14

Some crews did anyway, against

23:16

orders, and soon word got

23:19

out among American sub-crues that

23:21

the Mark 14 performed better

23:23

that way. Finally, in

23:26

May 1943, after the

23:28

Navy's most successful submarine,

23:30

U.S.S.-S.-Wahoo, returned from a

23:33

patrol having fired all its

23:35

torpedoes and scoring zero hits,

23:37

the commander of the

23:40

Pacific submarine force finally

23:42

authorized crews to deactivate

23:45

the magnetic detonators. Once

23:47

those two problems were

23:49

identified and corrected,

23:52

it became clear... The contact

23:54

detonator wasn't working right

23:56

either. Torpedos were hitting

23:58

Japanese ships. and in some

24:01

cases even getting lodged in

24:03

the enemy ship's hull, and

24:05

they still wouldn't explode.

24:07

In September 1943, new

24:09

and more reliable contact

24:12

detonators were installed. After

24:14

all these modifications, the

24:17

Mark 14 torpedo finally became

24:19

a reliable weapon, and the

24:21

American submarine campaign

24:24

against Japanese shipping

24:26

started to become a serious

24:28

threat. It

25:41

was in December 1942 that

25:43

the Japanese military finally

25:45

conceded that Guadalcanal could

25:47

not be taken and

25:50

developed plans to evacuate the

25:52

island. The Navy had been ready

25:54

to give up on this for

25:56

some time. It was the army

25:58

that needed some convincing. They blamed

26:00

the Navy for their difficulties

26:02

and insisted that the battle

26:04

on Guadalcanal could be won

26:06

if only the Navy could

26:09

deliver to the island half

26:11

the supplies the Americans were

26:13

getting. On December 29th, a

26:15

staff officer returned from Rabal with

26:18

a report that the Army and

26:20

Navy commanders on the scene were

26:23

in agreement that the campaign could

26:25

not be won. The Army was at

26:27

last convinced. Army and Navy

26:30

commanders met with the Emperor

26:32

to explain the decision to

26:34

evacuate Guadalcanal and

26:36

the village of Buna on New Guinea.

26:39

More about that in a few

26:41

minutes. The Emperor listened to

26:43

their explanations and observed that

26:45

it was the American air

26:48

units on Guadal Canal, the

26:50

so-called Cactus Air Force, which

26:52

had given the enemy the

26:55

decisive advantage. That much

26:57

was obvious. But then the

26:59

Emperor asked a difficult question.

27:01

Why was it that the

27:03

Japanese military had been on

27:05

Guadalcanal for more than a

27:07

month before the Americans arrived,

27:09

and in that time, had not

27:12

been able to complete the

27:14

construction of an airfield? But

27:16

once the Americans took over, they

27:18

were able to get the job done

27:20

in a matter of days. The Navy

27:22

commander, Admiral Nagano, could

27:24

only apologize to the

27:26

Emperor, and point out

27:28

that the enemy had

27:30

construction machinery, while the

27:32

Japanese relied on forced labor.

27:35

The Emperor was not pleased. He

27:37

authorized the withdrawals, but suggested

27:39

the Army and the Navy

27:42

needed to do better in

27:44

the future. In early January,

27:46

the Americans began an

27:48

offensive to expand their

27:51

control over Guadalcanal. A

27:54

few days later, the Tokyo Express

27:56

brought a fresh battalion of Japanese

27:58

soldiers to Guadalcanal. to hold back

28:01

the Americans and cover the

28:03

withdrawal. Japanese naval forces

28:05

in the Solomon Islands

28:07

were increased. Australian and American

28:09

intelligence picked up on these

28:11

movements, but interpreted them to

28:13

mean the Japanese were gearing

28:15

up for a fourth offensive

28:17

to take the airfield. Instead,

28:20

as that rear guard

28:22

held off the Americans,

28:24

the Japanese 17th Army

28:26

withdrew to the western

28:29

end of Guadalcanal for

28:31

evacuation. The night of

28:33

February 7th, 1943, the last

28:36

of more than 10,000 Japanese

28:38

soldiers left the island. It

28:41

took another two days

28:43

before the Americans realized

28:45

they were gone. At last, After

28:47

six months of vicious desperate

28:50

combat, Guadalcanal was

28:52

secure. The Americans began

28:54

building additional airfields on

28:57

the island and port

28:59

facilities to station ships

29:01

there, turning Guadalcanal into

29:03

a forward base from which

29:05

to launch an offensive up

29:07

the Solomon Islands chain with

29:09

the ultimate goal of taking

29:11

the Japanese base at Rabal. A

29:15

thousand kilometers to the east

29:18

on New Guinea, American and Australian

29:20

units under the command

29:22

of American General Robert

29:25

Eichelberger, had been fighting their way

29:27

across the Owen Stanley Range from

29:29

Port Moresby, aiming to cross

29:32

the peninsula and eject to the

29:34

Japanese from the northeastern coast of

29:36

the island, a second prong of

29:39

the advance on Raboul. Douglas

29:41

MacArthur told Eichelberger to take

29:43

the village of Buna. or

29:45

not come back alive. Buna lay

29:47

on the coast at the far

29:49

end of the Kakota Trail.

29:52

The Japanese had their air forces

29:54

based there, so seizing that

29:57

airfield was crucial for the

29:59

same that seizing the airfield

30:01

on Guadal Canal had been

30:03

crucial. The conditions on New

30:06

Guinea were just as difficult, if

30:08

not worse, than on Guadal Canal.

30:10

But this time, it was

30:12

the Australians and Americans

30:15

advancing through the jungle to

30:17

take a Japanese airfield. The

30:19

island was rife with malaria, and

30:22

the Australians especially had little

30:24

experience with the disease. as

30:27

well as a shortage of

30:29

necessities like mosquito netting and

30:32

quinine. The entire region along

30:34

the northeast coast of New Guinea

30:36

is basically a giant swamp, except

30:39

for a strip of solid ground

30:41

along the shore, which in most

30:43

places is less than a kilometer

30:46

wide. The marshy ground inland ruled

30:48

out the use of vehicles

30:50

or heavy artillery. There was nothing

30:52

to it but to slog through the

30:55

swamps on foot. to take on

30:57

the prepared Japanese defenses along

31:00

the coast. The Australian

31:02

Seventh Division approached the

31:04

Japanese positions in mid-November.

31:06

You may recall this was

31:09

just after the failure

31:11

of the third and

31:13

largest Japanese assault on

31:15

Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.

31:17

Any thought of further reinforcing the

31:19

Japanese 17th Army on that island

31:21

had to be ruled out in

31:24

view of the threat to Buna.

31:26

Again, the Japanese Army and

31:28

Navy were in disagreement. The

31:31

Navy believed that holding back

31:33

the Allied advance up the

31:35

Solomon Islands was the higher

31:38

priority, while the Army was

31:40

becoming more and more concerned

31:42

about New Guinea. The Japanese

31:44

fought tenaciously, as always,

31:46

during the months of

31:49

November, December, and into

31:51

January, despite diminishing

31:53

supplies. The last supply

31:55

shipment brought in by

31:57

submarine arrived on Christmas Day.

32:00

By mid-January, the Japanese rice

32:02

ration was down to 70 grams,

32:04

which is about 2.5 ounces per

32:06

day. That was about a tenth

32:08

of what the Japanese army considered

32:10

a standard soldier's ration.

32:13

Indeed, some historians argue

32:15

that the heavy fighting to

32:17

take boona in the nearby

32:20

Japanese positions was unnecessary because

32:22

the garrisons were on the

32:24

verge of starvation. When Allied

32:26

forces finally secured the area

32:29

at the end of January,

32:31

they found evidence that

32:33

the Japanese defenders had

32:35

been forced to cannibalize

32:37

their own dead. The fighting on Guadalcanal

32:40

gets more attention,

32:42

but the fighting here was just

32:44

as bad, and Allied losses were

32:46

greater. The Allied force in

32:48

this campaign numbered some 30,000,

32:51

about half the Allied force

32:53

on Guadalcanal at its peak,

32:56

and they suffered 2,000 killed

32:58

and 4,000 wounded, about double

33:00

losses on Guadalcanal. The Japanese

33:03

are believed to have lost

33:05

some 7,000 soldiers. After the

33:07

campaigns on Guadal Canal and

33:10

Nugniini, a lull followed during

33:12

the months of February and

33:15

March, as both sides rebuilt

33:17

their forces and considered their

33:20

next moves. Douglas

33:22

MacArthur was putting together an

33:24

ambitious plan to take the

33:26

Japanese stronghold of rebel on

33:29

New Britain. The Japanese were

33:31

planning counter strikes. The

33:33

man responsible for implementing

33:36

those counter strikes was Admiral

33:38

Yamamoto. In late March, he

33:40

put together a plan for

33:42

a series of airstrikes on

33:44

allied airfields and naval forces

33:46

on New Guinea and in

33:49

the Solomon Islands. In early April,

33:51

he moved his headquarters from

33:53

Truc to Rabal to take

33:55

personal command of the coming

33:57

air offensive. On

34:01

April 7th 1943, the largest

34:03

Japanese air strike since Pearl

34:05

Harbor hit Guadalcanal.

34:08

The pilots returned to

34:10

Rabao with the usual

34:12

exaggerated claims of enemy

34:14

planes shot down and

34:16

enemy ships sunk. In fact,

34:18

the allies lost one

34:20

American destroyer and one

34:22

New Zealander Corvette, with

34:25

seven airplanes shot down.

34:27

The Japanese lost 21 airplanes.

34:29

Over the next several days

34:31

there were more strikes against

34:33

Allied targets on New Guinea.

34:36

Again, little actual damage

34:38

had been done, but the

34:40

reports coming back to Rabao

34:43

from excitable Japanese pilots led

34:45

Yamamoto to conclude that his

34:48

air campaign had cost the

34:50

allies 175 planes shot down,

34:53

plus two destroyers and one

34:55

cruiser sunk. which were satisfying

34:57

numbers. Before returning to

35:00

Truk, Yamamoto decided to

35:02

take a tour of Japanese air

35:04

units stationed in the Solomon's

35:06

and on New Guinea. Officially,

35:08

this was to inspect Japanese

35:11

defenses in the region,

35:13

but Yamamoto also intended

35:15

for the visits to help

35:18

reinforce Japanese morale after the

35:20

defeats on Guadalcanal and New

35:22

Guinea. A staff officer wrote

35:24

out Yamamoto's itinerary by hand

35:27

and took it to fleet

35:29

headquarters at Rabal. He wanted

35:31

the itinerary distributed to

35:33

the various base commanders

35:36

by courier, but the communications

35:38

officer insisted it had

35:40

to be sent by radio.

35:42

Wasn't there a risk the

35:44

Americans would intercept and decode

35:46

the transmission? asked the staff

35:49

officer. The communications officer

35:51

assured him that was impossible.

35:53

There was no way the Americans would

35:56

be able to decipher this message.

35:58

New code books had recently... been

36:00

issued and they had only

36:02

taken effect two weeks ago

36:04

on April 1st. So on April

36:06

13th the coded message

36:09

was transmitted. Minutes

36:11

later it was in the hands

36:13

of U.S. naval intelligence at

36:15

Pearl Harbor. These were the same

36:18

people who had helped the U.S.

36:20

win the battle of Midway. They

36:22

worked all night and had the

36:25

message decoded by dawn on the

36:27

14th. At 8 o'clock that

36:29

morning, the Fleet Intelligence

36:32

Officer, Commander Edward Layton,

36:34

entered the office of Admiral

36:36

Nimitz. He laid a piece

36:38

of paper on the Admiral's desk

36:40

and announced, Our old

36:42

friend Yamamoto. Nimitz glanced

36:45

down at the paper. The first leg

36:47

of Yamamoto's itinerary had him departing

36:49

rebel at 6 AM on

36:51

the 18th, that was less

36:54

than two days from now, arriving

36:56

at Balale Island in the

36:59

Solomon's at 8am. His eyes

37:01

went back to Layton. Do we

37:03

try to get him? He's unique

37:06

among their people, Layton

37:08

replied. To the officers

37:10

and crew of the Imperial

37:12

Japanese Navy, he was a

37:15

beloved father figure. You know

37:17

the Japanese psychology,

37:19

it would stun the nation.

37:22

Nim Nimitz wondered if Yamamoto

37:25

might be replaced by a

37:27

better commander. There was no

37:29

better commander, Layton told him.

37:31

Yamamoto stood head and shoulders

37:33

above anyone else in the

37:35

IJN. Nimitz approved the mission,

37:38

which would be called Operation Vengeance,

37:40

as Yamamoto was the officer who

37:43

had planned to the attack on

37:45

Pearl Harbor. Nimitz assigned the

37:47

mission to Admiral Halsey, as it

37:49

was in his area of operation.

37:53

There were worries that this might

37:55

reveal the fact that the U.S.

37:57

Navy could read the Japanese Naval

37:59

Code. So a cover story was

38:01

devised. It would say that a

38:04

spy on Rabal spotted Yamamoto boarding

38:06

his plane and radioed the information

38:08

to the allies. A straight

38:10

line course from Guadalcanal to

38:13

Balale was out of the question.

38:15

Japanese radar and ground observers

38:17

in the Solomons would detect

38:20

the approaching American strike force.

38:22

So a more elaborate route was devised,

38:24

which would head west from Guadalcanal

38:27

and then turn north. so

38:29

the strike force would approach

38:31

over open water. But that meant

38:33

the round trip would be

38:35

more than a thousand miles

38:37

beyond the range of most

38:39

American planes stationed in the

38:42

Solomons. The one American plane

38:44

capable of such a raid was

38:46

the Lockheed P38 fighter. That's

38:48

the funny-looking one with the

38:51

double fuselage. They could

38:53

do the job, although even P38s

38:55

would need drop tanks. Sunday

38:59

April 18th 1943 was the

39:01

anniversary of the Doolittle raid.

39:03

Yamamoto dressed in fatigues

39:06

rather than his customary

39:08

dress whites to avoid

39:10

attracting attention. Before he left,

39:12

he gave the deputy naval

39:14

commander at Rabao two scrolls

39:16

to pass on to whomever

39:19

would take command after he

39:21

left. The scrolls contained poems

39:23

composed by the Meiji

39:25

Emperor. and copied out by

39:28

hand. Yamamoto had

39:30

done the calligraphy himself.

39:33

Yamamoto and his

39:35

staff rode aboard two

39:37

Mitsubishi G4M Medium bombers,

39:39

which were known to

39:41

the allies as Betty's. Six

39:43

zeros, the main Japanese

39:46

fighter plane, would provide

39:48

escort. 18 P38s were

39:51

assigned to Operation Vengeance.

39:53

They took off from the airfield

39:55

on Guadalcanal 35 minutes before

39:58

Yamamoto's plane took off. from

40:00

Rabal. Two of the American

40:02

fighters had mechanical problems and

40:05

had to turn back. The

40:07

other 16 flew their assigned course

40:09

at low altitude, 50 feet or

40:11

15 meters, barely above the

40:13

wave tops and observing radio

40:15

silence. They had only a

40:18

compass and their airspeed

40:20

indicators with which to navigate,

40:22

but that was enough to

40:25

get them to the chosen

40:27

intercept point. at 7.34am, one

40:29

minute ahead of schedule.

40:31

Yamamoto's planes arrived

40:33

a minute later, right on

40:36

time. The Americans were

40:38

surprised to see two bombers.

40:40

They were only expecting one.

40:42

Four of the 16 planes

40:44

were assigned to shoot down

40:46

Yamamoto's plane. Would they be

40:48

able to get both of

40:51

them? The P-38s dropped their

40:53

tanks. No wait, one of the

40:55

pilots couldn't get his tank released,

40:58

so he and his wingmen turned

41:00

back. These planes were two of

41:02

the four assigned to take down the

41:04

bombers. Now there were only two

41:06

attacking planes left. A moment

41:08

later, the Japanese bombers suddenly

41:11

descended to low altitude, while

41:13

the Americans could just make

41:15

out the drop tanks falling

41:18

from the bellies of the zeros.

41:20

They had been spotted. The

41:22

other Americans engaged the Zeros while

41:25

the two attack planes bore down

41:27

on the bombers. A cannon shot

41:29

from one of the P38s hit

41:32

the Betty's left engine. It burst

41:34

into flames and the bomber crashed

41:36

into the jungle. That was Yamamoto's

41:39

plane. The second bomber was struck

41:41

in the tail by machine gun

41:44

fire while over water. The pilot

41:46

crash landed in the

41:48

sea. Three of those

41:50

aboard survived including Yamamoto's

41:52

chief of staff vice

41:54

admiral ugaki matome One

41:56

p 38 was shot down

41:59

the others returned safely to

42:01

Gaudel Canal. News of the

42:03

success of Operation Vengeance

42:06

was transmitted to

42:08

Admiral Halsey. The first

42:10

words in the message were, pop

42:12

goes the weasel. We'll have

42:14

to stop there for today.

42:16

I thank you for listening

42:19

and I'd like to thank Richard

42:21

for his kind donation and

42:24

thank you to Jennifer for

42:26

becoming a patron of

42:28

the podcast. Donors and patrons

42:30

like Richard and Jennifer help cover

42:32

the costs of making this show,

42:35

which in turn keeps the podcast

42:37

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42:39

my thanks to them and to all of you

42:41

who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd

42:43

like to become a patron or

42:45

make a donation, you are most

42:47

welcome. Just visit the website History

42:49

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42:51

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42:53

And the podcast website also contains

42:55

notes about the music I use

42:58

on the podcast. which is sometimes

43:00

my own work and sometimes licensed,

43:02

but many times the music you

43:04

hear here is free and downloadable.

43:06

If you hear a piece of music on

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you could download it, that would be the

43:17

place to go. And while you're there you can

43:19

leave a comment and let me know what

43:21

you thought about today's show. We're

43:25

in the period now where we're preparing

43:27

for our son's surgery, so allow me

43:29

to remind you that we are on

43:32

a bi-weekly schedule for the time being,

43:34

hopefully not too much longer. Actually,

43:36

by the time this episode is

43:38

released, the surgery will be over. Although

43:40

it hasn't been done yet, as

43:42

I record this, I hope everything went

43:44

well, and I hope you'll join me

43:46

in two weeks' time here on

43:49

the history of the 20th century,

43:51

as we continue with the situation

43:53

in the Pacific. and considered Japan's

43:56

plans to build its own trade

43:58

block in the region. East Asia

44:01

co-prosperity sphere in two

44:03

weeks' time here on the history

44:06

of the 20th century. Oh, and

44:08

one more thing. A state

44:10

funeral was held for admiral

44:13

Yamamoto in Tokyo on

44:15

June 5th. A million

44:17

people lined the streets

44:19

as the procession passed.

44:21

Yamamoto received a

44:23

posthumous promotion to

44:25

martial admiral. the highest

44:28

rank in the Imperial

44:30

Japanese Navy, and he was

44:32

awarded the order of the

44:34

chrysanthemum, Japan's highest honor. Germany

44:37

awarded him the Knight's Cross

44:39

of the Iron Cross, one

44:41

of that country's highest honors.

44:43

Admiral Koga Minnayichi replaced

44:46

Yamamoto as commander-in-chief

44:48

of the combined

44:50

fleet, said his successor, there

44:53

was only one Yamamoto.

44:55

and no one can replace

44:57

him. you