0:19

Germany's 1943 offensive

0:22

had failed. Then it

0:24

was the Red Army's turn.

0:26

They began their own

0:28

offensive, and it became

0:30

the biggest tank battle

0:32

in history. Welcome to

0:35

the history of the 20th

0:37

century. Episode

1:11

396, The Battle of Kursk.

1:13

We returned to the Eastern

1:15

Front today, and let me

1:17

begin with a brief review,

1:19

since it has been two

1:21

weeks. Stalingrad fell in early

1:24

February. The losses

1:26

left the German front line

1:28

week in the South. The Red

1:30

Army advanced in February, taking

1:32

the key Soviet cities of

1:35

Karkov and Kursk. But a

1:37

German counterattack in March retook

1:40

the city of Karkov.

1:42

The spring season of mud,

1:44

the Rasputzitsa, then forced both

1:46

armies to halt. The Red Army

1:49

still held the city of Kursk,

1:51

which now lay inside a

1:53

Red Army salient that extended

1:55

west. After the heavy losses of

1:57

the past two years, the German...

2:00

army was now seriously under

2:02

strength, but Hitler firmly believed in

2:04

the importance of a 1943 offensive

2:06

in which Germany could reclaim the

2:09

initiative in the East. It was

2:11

called Operation Citadel, and its

2:13

goal was to attack the neck

2:16

of the Kursk salient from both

2:18

sides with forces that would meet

2:20

somewhere to the east of Kursk,

2:23

surrounding and destroying the large Soviet

2:25

forces inside the salient and recapturing

2:27

the city. This would both weaken

2:29

the Red Army, denying it the

2:32

opportunity to begin its own offensive,

2:34

while also collecting hundreds of thousands

2:36

of Soviet POWs, who could be

2:38

sent to Germany as badly needed

2:40

slave labor to keep the arms

2:43

factories working. The biggest problem

2:45

with this plan was its predictability.

2:47

Anyone looking at a map could

2:49

see that the Soviet salient around

2:52

Kursk was the most obvious target

2:54

for a German offensive. A key

2:56

ingredient to a successful offensive is

2:59

surprise, and the location of this

3:01

offensive would be no surprise. Even

3:03

if it is obvious where your offensive

3:06

will take place, it is still

3:08

possible to surprise your enemy with

3:10

when you begin your offensive. But

3:12

in the case of Operation Citadel,

3:14

the offensive did not come as

3:16

a surprise. Hitler kept delaying

3:18

it. The delays only gave the Soviets

3:21

more time to prepare. The

3:23

Red Army had its own

3:25

plan for a 1943 offensive,

3:28

also in the region around

3:30

Kursk, codenamed Operation Kutuzov after

3:33

the 19th century commander, who

3:35

successfully defended Russia from Napoleon's

3:38

invasion of 1812. So the Red Army

3:40

waited, they built multiple defense

3:42

lines, as many as eight

3:44

in some places, and prepared

3:46

to wear down any German

3:48

attack. On the German side, the

3:51

senior command was well aware of

3:53

these preparations and urged Hitler either

3:55

to get his events have started

3:57

or to cancel it. He did neither.

4:02

The German offensive began at last

4:04

on July 5th. The Corsique

4:06

salient lay along the boundary between

4:08

Army Group Center and Army Group

4:11

South. On the north side of the

4:13

salient, Army Group Center's ninth army,

4:15

commanded by Walter Model, attacked south.

4:18

On the south side of the salient,

4:20

Army Group South, fourth Panzer Army,

4:22

commanded by Herman Holt, veteran of

4:25

the Battle of the Battle of

4:27

Stalingrad, attacked north. On

4:30

the morning of July 10th,

4:32

just five days into Operation

4:35

Citadel, the news came that

4:37

the British and Americans had

4:39

landed in Sicily. Two days

4:41

later, on July 12th, the

4:44

Red Army began its Operation

4:46

Kutuzov. The main thrust of this

4:48

attack began north of the

4:50

Kursk salient and behind Modell's

4:52

9th Army. The 9th Army would

4:55

have to give up its

4:57

gains from Operation Citadel and

4:59

pull back. or else risk

5:01

being surrounded themselves. So Operation

5:04

Citadel ended not with a

5:06

bang, but with a whimper. Operation

5:08

Katoosov, on the other

5:10

hand, was just getting started.

5:12

You see, the German line had

5:15

a salient of its own around

5:17

the city of Oriel. This salient

5:19

was just to the north

5:21

of the Red Army's Kursk

5:23

salient. Imagine a fat red

5:26

arrowhead pointing west. and then sitting

5:28

on top of it a black

5:30

arrowhead pointing east, and that will give

5:32

you a rough idea of the state of

5:35

the front line. When the Ninth

5:37

Army attacked the Kursk salient,

5:39

it was southward from the

5:41

Oriole salient. The goal of Operation

5:43

Katoosov was to attack this

5:45

German salient on its northern

5:48

side, break through the German line

5:50

at the neck of the salient,

5:52

and surround the German forces inside.

5:55

The challenge for Operation Katoosov

5:57

was that part of this line

5:59

was held by one of the

6:01

best German units, the Second

6:03

Panser Army. The Soviet attack

6:05

was led by the 11th

6:07

Guards Army. This was also

6:10

an experienced veteran force, as

6:12

you can tell from the

6:14

designation guards. It was supported by

6:16

two Soviet tank corps. I'm

6:19

going to ask for your

6:21

indulgence for a few moments

6:23

as I delved even deeper

6:25

into the nitty gritty of

6:27

tanks and tank production in

6:29

1943. because you are listening

6:31

to the history of the

6:33

20th century podcast, which means

6:35

there are all kinds of

6:37

rabbit holes we might go down. All

6:39

the way back in episode 57,

6:41

I talked about the emergence of

6:43

the automobile. Some of the first

6:46

automobiles, then the first automobile

6:48

manufacturers, appeared in Germany

6:50

in the latter years of

6:53

the 19th century. These early

6:55

automobiles were manufactured one at

6:57

a time. They were essentially

6:59

bespoke motor cars. There

7:02

would be a designated spot on

7:04

the factory floor, where workers

7:06

would gather, bringing along

7:09

whatever tools and materials

7:11

they needed, and they would build

7:13

a car from the floor up,

7:15

beginning with the wheels and axils.

7:18

As you can imagine, this

7:20

was a slow and expensive

7:22

process. In 1899, the company

7:25

founded by Carl Bence,

7:27

that's as in Mercedes-Benz,

7:29

was the largest automobile

7:32

manufacturer in Germany.

7:34

That year the company

7:37

employed 430 workers and

7:39

produced 572 cars. This

7:41

works out to somewhere around

7:43

2,000 worker hours per vehicle.

7:46

That made these cars luxury

7:48

items. They sold for

7:50

prices. that amounted to

7:53

well above $100,000 in

7:55

today's currency. I

7:57

described in episode 57.

8:00

how in the United States

8:02

first ransom olds and then

8:04

Henry Ford adapted American

8:06

ideas of interchangeable parts

8:08

and assembly lines to

8:10

produce cars in much

8:13

larger numbers more quickly

8:15

and at a much lower cost. Henry

8:17

Ford could build a Model T

8:19

car at something like five worker

8:22

hours per vehicle and charge a

8:24

price around $10,000 in today's

8:26

money. As you

8:28

likely know, the cars on

8:30

an assembly line advance forward

8:33

from station to station, and

8:35

at each station, the workers

8:37

perform the same job over

8:39

and over again, and the

8:41

cars gradually come together until

8:44

they emerge as finished products

8:46

at the end of the line.

8:48

That was the American way.

8:50

The German way, the European way,

8:53

was to employ skilled workers

8:55

who in many cases handmade

8:57

the individual parts for each

8:59

car. Europe has a long

9:01

tradition of skilled specialist workers

9:04

that stretches back to the

9:06

medieval guilds. America had

9:08

no such tradition. Assembly line workers

9:10

don't need to be highly skilled.

9:13

They only need to know how

9:15

to use tools to assemble pre-made

9:17

parts. Maybe

9:20

you're wondering what all this has

9:22

to do with the Second

9:24

World War. Well, back in

9:26

episode 375, I told you

9:28

that in the year 1942,

9:31

Germany was manufacturing about 500

9:33

tanks every month, while the

9:35

Soviet Union was building 2200.

9:37

This was in spite of the

9:40

fact that the Soviet GDP in

9:42

1942 was only about half of

9:44

Germany's. So how was this possible?

9:48

Well first you should note that Germany

9:50

had to devote a larger share

9:52

of its wartime production to other

9:54

needs like you boats or aircraft

9:56

and guns to defend against the

9:59

British bombing campaign But apart

10:01

from that, German factories were

10:03

building tanks pretty much the

10:05

same way Carl Bence was

10:08

building cars a half century

10:10

earlier, by building the machines one

10:12

at a time from the floor

10:14

up. When the United States

10:16

went to war, it had

10:19

no dedicated tank factory. Most

10:21

American tanks were built

10:24

in factories converted from

10:26

the production of automobiles.

10:28

trucks or railway cars.

10:30

There were no automobiles

10:32

produced in the United

10:34

States from 1942 to

10:36

1945. All the car

10:38

companies were building military

10:41

vehicles. America's main battle

10:43

tank was the M4, known

10:45

as the Sherman Tank. The

10:47

Sherman Tank was designed from

10:49

the start to be simple

10:51

and easy to build on

10:53

an assembly line. There

10:56

are advantages to this production method

10:58

beyond the obvious one that

11:00

you can build tanks faster

11:02

on an assembly line. One is

11:05

that once the design is properly

11:07

refined, the assembly line is consistently

11:09

putting out a reliable machine. Having

11:12

large numbers of the same

11:14

machine simplifies training. Tank crews

11:16

don't have to relearn their skills

11:18

because they're not being moved from

11:20

one kind of vehicle to another.

11:23

And the same characteristics that

11:25

make a tank suitable for

11:27

assembly line construction, such as

11:30

fewer parts and easy assembly,

11:32

also make it easier to service

11:34

and repair in the field. It

11:36

is easier to supply and stockpile parts

11:38

in the field for one type of

11:41

tank than it is for many types

11:43

of tanks. The big drawback of

11:45

assembly line manufacture is that the

11:47

line has to be set up

11:49

for one particular design. And once

11:52

everything is in place on the

11:54

line, a change in the design

11:56

of the tank would require retooling

11:58

the assembly line. In

12:00

contrast, one advantage to the

12:03

German manufacturing system is the

12:05

ability to change quickly from

12:07

one design to another. Once today's

12:10

tank is finished and out the

12:12

door, the next one could be the

12:14

same or similar or entirely different.

12:16

No retooling needed. The German

12:19

army certainly appreciated this

12:21

flexibility. They were constantly

12:24

coming to the manufacturers and

12:26

requesting small changes in the

12:29

design. in response to problems

12:31

that emerged in the field. Because

12:33

of this, the Germans fielded

12:36

a wider variety of tanks,

12:38

and each model came in

12:40

a bewildering number of variants.

12:42

The main German battle tank

12:44

at the beginning of the war

12:47

was the Panzer III, later

12:49

came the Panzer IV, And after

12:51

the invasion of the Soviet

12:53

Union, when the German army

12:55

discovered that the Red Army

12:57

was fielding the surprisingly durable

13:00

T-34 medium tank, the Germans

13:02

introduced the panzer five, better

13:04

known as the panther. Having a

13:06

wider variety of tanks at

13:08

one's disposal has some advantages,

13:11

but it comes with one

13:13

big disadvantage. More models of tanks

13:15

in the field require much larger

13:17

stockpiles of spare parts for each

13:20

of the various machines. This can

13:22

strain your supply lines, and running

13:24

out of one crucial part in

13:26

the middle of a battle could

13:28

put dozens of otherwise combat-ready tanks

13:31

out of action until the new

13:33

parts arrive. German repair crews

13:35

were often forced to cannibalize

13:37

parts from one tank to

13:39

get other tanks operational. Are

13:42

you ready for some numbers?

13:44

The United States was able

13:46

to build a Sherman tank at

13:49

the cost of about 10,000

13:51

worker hours. German tanks required

13:53

20 times the labor, over

13:55

200,000 worker hours per tank.

13:57

It required more than 3.

13:59

300 worker hours to build a

14:02

panther. Germany built more

14:04

panzer-fors than any other tank

14:06

during the war, about 8500

14:08

in all. German manufacturers

14:11

also turned out about 6,000

14:14

to panzer-3s and about the

14:16

same number of Panthers. That

14:18

comes to a total of

14:20

about 20,000 medium battle tanks.

14:23

The United States produced 70,000

14:25

Sherman tanks. three and a

14:27

half times as many. Compared

14:30

to other tanks in the field

14:32

at the time, the Sherman tank

14:34

was pretty good when it was

14:36

first introduced into combat in North

14:39

Africa in 1943, by the end

14:41

of the war, not so much, but

14:44

what American tanks lacked in

14:46

quality they easily made up

14:48

for in quantity. It doesn't

14:50

matter so much if your side

14:52

is losing tanks at a faster

14:54

rate than your enemy is losing

14:56

theirs. if you can replace your

14:58

losses and they can't. All right,

15:00

so how does the Soviet Union

15:03

figure into this picture?

15:05

Soviet tank production methods

15:07

much more closely resembled

15:10

American assembly line methods

15:12

than they did the German

15:14

approach. And there's a very

15:16

good reason for that. If you

15:18

think back to our episodes in

15:21

the 1930s, when I talked

15:23

about the Soviet five-year plans,

15:25

Stalin and his government were

15:28

keen on industrializing the Soviet

15:30

Union, and when they needed

15:32

help in building factories and

15:34

learning production methods, they

15:37

turned to the United States.

15:39

The USSR was close to

15:41

an autarchy, a self-contained economy,

15:44

and as such, it was largely

15:46

immune to the Great Depression. The

15:49

economic collapse in the United

15:51

States in the early 30s was

15:53

a boon to the Soviets. American

15:55

industrial architects could be hired on

15:57

the cheap to design factory buildings.

16:00

buildings, American industrial

16:02

engineers to design assembly

16:04

lines, American machine tools

16:06

and generators, and all manner

16:09

of industrial equipment were just

16:11

sitting in American warehouses collecting

16:14

dust until the Soviets came

16:16

along and started bidding on

16:18

them. So the USSR's new

16:20

factories operated along American lines.

16:23

For example, I've already

16:25

mentioned the Zurjinski tractor

16:27

works in Stalingrad. That

16:29

plant actually predates the Great

16:32

Depression. Its construction began

16:34

in 1926. The building

16:36

was designed by Albert Khan

16:38

Associates, the same firm that

16:40

designed factories for Ford and

16:43

General Motors in the United

16:45

States. In 1929, the firm opened

16:47

an office in Moscow, where it

16:49

trained Soviet architects and

16:51

engineers in the design

16:54

and construction of industrial

16:56

buildings. The steel beams used

16:58

in the structure were manufactured

17:01

in New York. The

17:03

first tractors manufactured at

17:05

the facility were based

17:07

on the American model

17:09

1530 tractor manufactured in

17:11

the U.S. by

17:13

McCormick-Dearing, today known as

17:16

International Harvester. The

17:18

Zurjanski tractor works was

17:20

operating at full capacity

17:22

by 1932. It was turning

17:24

out 144 tractors every day. as

17:27

part of the Soviet government's

17:29

program to mechanize and

17:31

modernize Soviet agriculture.

17:33

But they also started building

17:36

tanks at the plant within

17:38

a year. When Germany invaded,

17:40

the plant was fully converted

17:42

to war production, most notably

17:45

the Soviet T34 tank. So

17:47

let's talk about the T34 for a

17:49

minute. The Americans were

17:51

producing Sherman tanks with 10

17:54

thousand worker hours per vehicle.

17:56

The Soviets couldn't match that figure,

17:58

but they were building building T-34

18:01

for something like 40,000 worker

18:03

hours apiece, which was still

18:05

only about one-fifth the labor

18:07

the Germans needed to build

18:09

a panzer-for. By the way,

18:12

Soviet tanks like the T-34

18:14

were widely reputed to be

18:16

shoddy with poor workmanship, but

18:19

these qualities can be explained

18:21

by the need to field

18:23

as many tanks as possible

18:25

as quickly as possible. and some

18:28

of the shotiness was pre-planned.

18:30

The Red Army figured the average

18:32

life expectancy of a T34

18:34

was six months. The average life

18:36

expectancy of a T34 entering

18:39

combat was measured in hours.

18:41

With statistics like that, it becomes

18:43

obvious why you wouldn't bother

18:46

building your tanks from high

18:48

quality components. Why on earth would

18:50

you include a transmission rated

18:52

for a five-year life expectancy

18:55

into a six-month tank?

18:57

So no, the

18:59

Soviet tanks did

19:01

not match German

19:03

or American tanks

19:05

in quality because

19:07

there was no reason

19:10

they should, and good

19:12

reasons why they shouldn't.

19:15

The assembly lines that

19:17

cranked out those tanks

19:20

on the other hand,

19:22

those were very good

19:25

indeed. Out

19:58

of Hitler couldn't. believe that

20:01

the Soviets were producing tanks

20:03

at quadruple Germany's rate.

20:05

But you should be able to believe

20:07

it. And even at quadruple Germany's

20:10

rate, they were using fewer workers

20:12

to build their tanks than

20:14

the Germans needed to build theirs.

20:16

When the Panther was introduced,

20:19

the disparity became even greater,

20:21

because Panthers required even more

20:24

labor to build. The

20:26

panther, as you know, was introduced

20:28

as the new German medium tank,

20:30

along with the tiger, a new

20:32

heavy tank. The Germans incorporated the

20:35

lessons taken from the T34

20:37

into their new tanks, mainly

20:39

that the T34 had thicker armor,

20:42

which was sloped in front to

20:44

diminish the impact of an enemy

20:46

shell, and wider tracks which made

20:48

it more mobile in conditions of

20:50

mud or snow, which are often

20:53

encountered in Russia. Originally,

20:57

the Panther was supposed to be

20:59

30 tons and the Tiger 50

21:01

tons, which are reasonable numbers

21:03

for a medium or heavy

21:05

tank, but demands from

21:08

the Wehrmacht command and

21:10

from Hitler for more armor

21:12

and more powerful guns, upscaled

21:15

both tanks. The Tiger ultimately came

21:17

in at 57 tons and the

21:19

Panther at 48. In other words,

21:22

the new medium tank was

21:24

about the size you'd expect

21:26

in a heavy tank. Both tanks

21:28

used the same engine, which

21:30

meant the panther had a

21:33

higher power-to-weight ratio and was

21:35

surprisingly nimble for its

21:37

size. Overall, it nicely

21:40

balanced armor, maneuverability, and

21:42

fire power, the three most

21:44

important characteristics of

21:46

a tank. At least on paper. In

21:48

practice... They were complex and expensive

21:51

vehicles rushed into combat before

21:53

all the bugs had been

21:55

worked out. Panther engines had an

21:58

annoying tendency to break down.

22:00

even catch fire. In the 1943

22:02

tank battles around Kursk, the

22:04

Germans lost as many Panthers

22:07

to breakdowns as to enemy

22:09

action. They were certainly effective

22:11

in combat when they worked.

22:14

A Panthers gun could destroy

22:16

a Soviet T-34 from a

22:18

distance of two kilometers, while

22:20

a T-34 could only damage

22:22

a Panther at short range.

22:24

and a T34 could not penetrate

22:26

the armor on the front of

22:28

a tiger tank at all. The

22:30

only option a T34 tank crew

22:33

had when they were facing a tiger

22:35

was try to maneuver until they

22:37

could shoot at the enemy tank

22:39

from the side, and even then,

22:41

it had to be at virtually

22:44

point blank range. Needless to

22:46

say, this gives the tiger

22:48

plenty of opportunity to shoot

22:50

first. The

22:52

Soviets did make incremental improvements

22:55

to the T34 between 1941

22:57

and 1943, but only incremental

23:00

improvements. Nothing to match

23:02

the tiger or the panther. Assembly

23:05

line manufacturing creates

23:07

incentives to keep design

23:09

changes minimal to avoid

23:12

expensive and time-consuming retooling.

23:14

The bottom line is that the

23:16

T34 was the best tank on

23:18

the battlefield in 1941. By 1943,

23:20

it was seriously outclassed by

23:23

the latest German models. When

23:25

you consider these facts, you

23:27

begin to understand Hitler's desire

23:30

to delay the start of

23:32

the 1943 German offensive for

23:34

the sake of getting more of

23:37

these monster tanks onto the

23:39

battlefield. But any historian

23:41

will tell you the delay was

23:43

a serious mistake. First of

23:45

all, as we've seen, the delay

23:47

sacrificed to the crucial element of

23:50

surprise, and even beyond that, the

23:52

Soviet position isn't as bleak as

23:54

it seems at first glance. The

23:56

Soviets still held the big

23:58

advantage inherent in assembly line

24:00

manufacture and that is numbers.

24:03

Like the Americans with their

24:05

Sherman tank, the Soviets were willing

24:07

to accept a tank of lesser

24:09

quality if it meant overwhelming quantity.

24:12

The Red Army went into these

24:14

battles with around double the number

24:16

of tanks the Germans had

24:19

available. And as impressive as these

24:21

new tanks were, less than 10% of

24:23

the German tanks in the field were

24:25

Panthers or Tigers. The rest of them

24:27

were the same old panzer threes

24:30

and panzer fours. Since a panther

24:32

could knock out a T34 at

24:34

a range of over a kilometer

24:36

while a T34 had no hope

24:38

of doing the same to a

24:41

panther unless it was very close

24:43

and did some fancy maneuvering, Soviet

24:45

tank units fighting at course had

24:48

but one practical tactic. To rush

24:50

the enemy with numbers. and

24:52

hope enough tanks survive to get

24:54

in close and begin scoring hits.

24:56

This is the armored equivalent

24:58

of the mass infantry charge,

25:00

so beloved of 19th century

25:02

generals. The principle of those

25:04

mass infantry charges, back in

25:07

the days of more primitive firearms,

25:09

was that the enemy would only

25:11

be able to pick off a

25:13

fraction of the advancing soldiers. The

25:15

rest of them would survive to

25:17

get in close and overwhelm the

25:19

enemy with numbers. In

25:21

the 20th century, modern

25:23

weapons turned infantry charges

25:26

into feudal exercises and

25:28

mass slaughter. But in 1943, mass

25:31

tank charges could still work.

25:33

And this was the approach the

25:35

Red Army took. At Kursk, tank

25:37

crews were ordered to rush the

25:39

enemy, get in as close as

25:41

possible, and try to get alongside

25:44

a German tank and take a

25:46

shot at its more vulnerable side

25:48

armor. This seemed such

25:50

a departure from normal armor tactics

25:53

that the Soviet tank crews joked

25:55

that they were going to come

25:57

alongside the Germans and board their

25:59

tanks. the way pirates of old

26:01

might board another ship at sea. No

26:03

one actually did such a

26:06

thing during Operation Katuzov, as

26:08

far as I know. There

26:10

are stories of Soviet tanks

26:12

simply ramming their adversaries. I

26:14

haven't seen conclusive evidence this

26:16

happened very much, but I wouldn't

26:19

be surprised if it did once

26:21

or twice. Given the disparity

26:23

in numbers, a tank for a

26:25

tank and even trade would have

26:27

been a bargain for the Russians.

26:31

The full weight of the Operation

26:33

Katoosov offensive fell on the

26:35

German Second Panzer army. They could

26:37

not hold their ground against

26:39

the onslaught and began pulling

26:41

back. This in turn threatened

26:43

the ninth army to their

26:46

south within circlement, forcing Model

26:48

to pull back from the

26:50

small sliver of territory he'd

26:52

gained during Operation Citadel and

26:54

withdraw to the west of

26:56

the Soviet offensive to avoid

26:58

being surrounded. The

27:01

Germans were able to evacuate

27:03

the Oriole salient in good

27:06

order and avoid encirclement, which

27:08

came as a disappointment to

27:10

Red Army soldiers who had

27:12

been hoping for another Stalin

27:15

Grodd. Still, they had pushed

27:17

the enemy back, and after three

27:19

weeks of heavy combat, the Red

27:21

Army retook the city of Oriole

27:24

on August 5th. On that

27:26

day, Stalin ordered an artillery

27:28

salute in Moscow. to honor

27:30

the soldiers who captured the

27:32

city. This would become a

27:34

regular practice going forward,

27:37

but Oriel was first, and

27:39

for that, the city still bears

27:41

the nickname, City of the First

27:43

Salute. Another first was

27:45

celebrated in Oriel six

27:48

weeks later, when Soviet

27:50

partisans, who had harassed the

27:52

Germans in the region around

27:54

the city during the occupation,

27:57

paraded through the streets in

27:59

triumph. But

28:01

the Red Army wasn't finished

28:03

yet. Even as the Germans abandoned

28:06

Oriole, farther south, another

28:08

offensive began, this one against

28:11

the northern flank of Army

28:13

Group South, codenamed Operation Rumyancef,

28:15

named after the Russian field

28:18

marshal who had served under

28:20

Catherine the Great. Army

28:22

Group South was still

28:24

overextended after having retaken

28:27

Karkov. The same day the Red

28:29

Army forces farther north took

28:31

Oriel, this southern offensive

28:33

retook Belga Road and pushed

28:36

on to the south, now threatening

28:38

the Germans in Karkov with

28:40

encirclement. The recapture of

28:43

Karkov from the Soviets five

28:45

months earlier had taken some

28:47

of the sting out of

28:50

the defeat at Stalingrad, and

28:52

Hitler ordered the city be held

28:54

at all costs. Monstein

28:56

led a series of

28:58

armored counterattacks that delayed

29:01

the Soviet advance, but on

29:03

August 20th he told Hitler

29:06

he simply did not have

29:08

the numbers to hold the

29:10

front line he'd been assigned,

29:12

and he needed either large

29:14

numbers of reinforcements or

29:17

permission to withdraw.

29:19

Karkoff fell to the

29:21

Red Army on August 23rd. The

29:24

fourth and final time, the

29:26

city would change hands.

29:28

In Moscow, 224 guns

29:30

fired 20 salvos apiece

29:32

to salute the soldiers

29:35

who recaptured Kharkov. And

29:37

10 Red Army infantry

29:39

divisions involved had

29:41

Kharkov appended to

29:43

their names, as

29:45

in 84th Kharkov

29:47

infantry division.

29:49

These three actions, Citadeletusov.

29:52

and Rumyancef

29:54

are collectively referred to

29:57

as the Battle of

29:59

Kursk. Some measures, the battle

30:01

of Kursk, was and remains

30:03

the largest tank battle in

30:05

military history, with the Germans fielding

30:07

around 2,000 altogether, and the

30:10

Soviets 4,000. Tank maneuvers across

30:12

the open terrain kicked up enormous

30:14

clouds of dust, and it has

30:16

been suggested that the world afterward

30:18

experienced a period of

30:21

climate cooling caused by

30:23

these tremendous quantities of

30:26

dust circulating circulating circulating

30:28

circulating circulating What

30:31

began as the German

30:33

1943 summer offensive developed

30:35

into a crushing Soviet

30:38

victory. The first summertime Soviet

30:40

victory of the war.

30:43

Casualty figures are difficult

30:45

to come by, as many

30:47

of the German army records

30:49

from the time are lost

30:51

or destroyed, but here are some

30:53

estimates. The Germans lost

30:55

around 45,000 killed and

30:58

130,000 wounded. The Red Army

31:00

lost around 300,000

31:02

killed and 800,000

31:04

wounded, numbers that are

31:07

around 6 times greater. The

31:09

Germans lost about 1,000

31:11

tanks and 700 aircraft,

31:14

while the Soviet side

31:16

lost 5,000 tanks and

31:19

3,300 aircraft, losses around

31:21

5 times greater. But

31:25

even though Soviet losses were

31:27

higher, the Soviets had

31:29

much larger personnel reserves

31:31

and manufacturing capacity, they could

31:33

afford losses on this scale. The

31:36

Germans simply couldn't. The

31:38

losses at Stalingrad had been

31:40

severe, and the German military

31:42

had needed several months to

31:45

muster the soldiers and equipment

31:47

to mount Operation Citadel, and

31:50

even those numbers had proved

31:52

inadequate. Gone now is

31:54

any hope of recreating

31:57

the massive encirclements of

31:59

1941. front has developed into

32:01

a grinding war of attrition,

32:04

and it is already obvious

32:06

which side can afford the

32:08

cost of fighting such a war,

32:11

and which cannot. We'll have to

32:13

stop there for today. I thank

32:15

you for listening, and I'd

32:17

like to thank Antonio and

32:19

Nicholas for their kind

32:22

donations, and thank you

32:24

to Alejandro for becoming a

32:26

patron of the podcast. Donors

32:29

and patrons like Antonio

32:31

and Nicholas and Alejandro

32:33

help cover the costs of making

32:35

this show, which in turn keeps

32:38

the podcast available free for everyone

32:40

always. So my thanks to them and

32:42

to all of you who have pitched in

32:44

and helped out. If you'd like to

32:46

become a patron or make a donation,

32:49

you are most welcome. Just visit

32:51

the website History of the

32:53

20th century.com and click on

32:55

the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

32:59

As always, the podcast website contains

33:01

notes about the music used on

33:03

the podcast, which is sometimes my

33:05

own work and sometimes licensed, but

33:08

most of the time the music

33:10

you hear here is free and

33:12

downloadable. If you hear a piece of music

33:14

on the podcast and you would like

33:16

to know more about it, including the

33:18

composer, the performers, and a link to

33:20

where you could download it, that would

33:22

be the place to go. And while you're

33:24

there, you can leave a comment and let

33:26

me know what you thought about today's show.

33:30

We're in the period now where

33:33

we're preparing for our son's surgery.

33:35

So allow me to remind you

33:37

that we are on a bi-weekly

33:39

schedule for the time being, hopefully

33:42

not too long. I hope you'll join

33:44

me then in two weeks' time

33:46

here on the history of the

33:48

20th century as we turn back

33:50

to the Pacific Theater and see

33:53

how Japan is coping after their

33:55

failure to retake Guadalcanal.

33:57

Pop goes the weasel. In two weeks,

33:59

time here on the history

34:02

of the 20th century. Oh and

34:04

one more thing. In 1955,

34:06

Monstein published his

34:08

memoir, which was titled

34:11

Lost Victories. The title

34:13

gives away the point he

34:15

was trying to make, which

34:17

was that Hitler's poor leadership

34:19

cost Germany the war. He

34:21

was hardly the first

34:24

general to write a

34:26

memoir, blaming defeat on

34:28

someone else. But neither was

34:30

he forthcoming about the

34:32

Wehrmacht's role, about his personal

34:34

role, in perpetrating either the

34:37

Holocaust or the mass murders of

34:39

Red Army prisoners. Too many

34:41

historians, in Germany and

34:43

in other countries, accepted the

34:46

claims of surviving Wehrmacht commanders

34:48

that they were merely professionals

34:51

carrying out their duties and

34:53

had nothing to do with Nazi

34:55

war crimes. It was not until

34:57

fairly late in the century that

35:00

the German military's share of the

35:02

guilt was brought fully to light.