Episode Transcript
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0:09
Hello and welcome to The Insight by Oaktree
0:11
Capital. I'm Anna Szymanski
0:13
and today I'll be having conversations with
0:15
three Oaktree thought leaders, including co-chairman Howard
0:18
Marks. We'll discuss topics
0:20
from Oaktree's recently published quarterly letter roundup.
0:22
We'll consider what a normal credit market
0:24
is, what a recession in 2024 might
0:27
mean for liquid credit, and what opportunities
0:29
we're seeing in life sciences today. So
0:33
for my first discussion, my guest needs
0:35
no introduction. Howard, thanks so much for
0:37
joining me. It's a pleasure
0:39
to be here with you, Anna. In
0:42
your short piece in the latest
0:44
roundup, you ask investors to consider
0:47
what's normal, and specifically in
0:49
relation to financial markets and interest
0:51
rates. Can you explain why
0:54
you think it's so important for investors
0:56
to question what people perceive as
0:58
normal? You have to be
1:02
working in this business more than 43 years before 1980
1:04
to have ever seen anything
1:09
other than declining interest rates and
1:11
ultra-low interest rates. So
1:13
it's only natural to conclude that
1:15
declining and ultra-low interest rates are
1:18
normal, but maybe they're not. You
1:20
have to understand history and understand
1:22
where the current period fits into
1:24
history and understand how it's different
1:27
from normal and what it is
1:29
that shaped those differences. And
1:32
only if you look into these things
1:34
can you make a great decision with
1:36
regard to the actions to take. Now,
1:39
it gets hard because how many people
1:41
were working more than 43 years
1:43
ago and still are, and how many
1:46
of those still have their faculties and can
1:48
remember the 70s and so forth. I came
1:50
up with something a couple of weeks ago
1:52
that I hope will help get this across,
1:54
but you know Einstein said that the definition
1:56
of insanity is doing the same thing over
1:58
and over and expecting... a different result.
2:01
I think another version of insanity is
2:03
doing something in a new environment and
2:05
expecting the same result. So
2:08
if the environment fundamentally changed, that if
2:10
in the coming years we will not
2:12
have interest rates which are A, consistently
2:15
declining and B, as low as they
2:17
were in the 09 to 21 period
2:20
when the Fed funds rate averaged to
2:22
half a percent, then maybe other things
2:24
will work better than the things that
2:26
worked in that period. I think this
2:28
is significant. Why do
2:31
you think it's so challenging for investors
2:33
and people in general to reset their
2:35
idea of normal? Oh, if you made
2:37
money doing one
2:39
thing over the last 43 years, it's
2:41
kind of hard to say, you know what, that's
2:43
out the window. And that organization that I put
2:45
together, I got to get rid of those people
2:48
because I need a new skill set. And everything
2:50
I ever told you is no longer true
2:53
to the clients. This is
2:55
complicated by our human nature, if
2:57
that's the right term. But
3:00
I've been making reference to a book,
3:02
Mistakes Were Made, but Not by Me,
3:05
by Carol Tavras. And
3:07
it's about cognitive dissonance and
3:09
self-delusion. And you have a
3:11
position, you've had it for
3:13
a while, you're convinced it's right, it
3:15
has worked. And now
3:17
you get some information coming in, which
3:19
says, no, you
3:22
have to change your position. Our
3:24
brain is very good at getting rid of
3:26
that information. But if there
3:28
are real changes, we have to respond
3:30
to them. And the great economist Paul
3:32
Samuelson once said, when events
3:35
change, I changed my mind, what
3:37
do you do? And I think
3:39
in investing, there's nothing that's permanent.
3:42
You can't say always, never, can,
3:45
can't, will, has to,
3:48
you have to be open to possibilities as things
3:50
change. I mean, I've seen a lot of changes
3:52
in my life. If I stuck with what I
3:54
believed in 1969, I'd be in big trouble today.
3:57
We're recording this in December of 2019. And
4:01
you've written four memos this year. They
4:03
are lessons from Silicon Valley Bank, taking
4:05
the temperature, fewer losers or more winners
4:07
and further thoughts on sea change. Looking
4:10
over that year of memo writing, does anything jump
4:12
out at you? Well,
4:15
I mean, it's kind of a
4:17
microcosm because you've got short-term market
4:19
type events, Silicon Valley. I
4:21
thought it was important to respond
4:23
to that, mainly to A, understand the
4:26
nature and risks of the banking industry,
4:28
but paid to make the case that
4:30
it was not systemic and
4:32
did not presage a lot of contagion.
4:36
Fewer losers or more winners was at the
4:38
opposite end of the spectrum is what I
4:40
would consider a philosophy piece. There was no
4:42
advice in there that would make anybody any
4:44
money in the next year. But I think
4:46
that in investing, it's extremely important to be
4:48
thoughtful about what you do. How
4:50
do you intend to reach success? How do you
4:52
define success? What are the things
4:54
you're going to have to do to reach it? You
4:57
can't be a superior investor without
4:59
having either fewer losers than the
5:01
average or more winners than the
5:03
average or both. Which one
5:05
will you favor? Which one is more realistic
5:07
for you? So I thought that
5:10
was kind of foundational. Taking
5:12
the temperature was, look back at
5:14
history, also foundational, but explaining that
5:16
on the one hand, our investment
5:18
philosophy says we don't do macroforests. On
5:20
the other hand, I did
5:22
it five times in that period and I
5:24
explain how. On the third hand, all absolute
5:27
rules have to go out the window sometimes.
5:29
But the point is we did it on rare
5:32
occasion. If you wait for
5:34
the fat pitch to the market's crazy
5:36
high or crazy low, you might be
5:38
able to make contact with the ball
5:40
and they work. But I think it
5:42
was really important to show people that
5:44
it really did come from taking the
5:46
temperature of the market and not from
5:48
subject matter expertise with regard to, for
5:50
example, supply mortgages that I hadn't heard
5:52
of. So I hope there was a
5:54
good span of memos and that people
5:56
enjoyed them. I think that's reflective
5:58
of the last 34 years. rates
8:00
in 24? When?
8:03
How often? These things
8:05
are really hard to say. The answer is different from
8:07
three months ago. When people thought they
8:09
had the right answer three months ago, it
8:11
turned out it wasn't the right answer. What
8:13
makes them think today's answer is the right
8:15
answer? But the point is we're in that
8:17
middle zone, what I call the zone of
8:19
reasonableness. The market is not too high or
8:21
too low. The outlook for the economy is
8:23
not convincingly positive or negative. Nothing smart to
8:25
do today in those regards except
8:28
that given the change in interest
8:30
rates and where they are
8:32
and what the outlook is, and I think
8:34
that when we do this two years from
8:37
now, victory against inflation will have been declared
8:40
and the Fed funds rate will probably
8:42
be about three and a half, maybe
8:44
three. But that,
8:46
I believe, is going to be
8:48
the norm for the coming years.
8:50
So you'll have some stability, but
8:52
you won't have continuous declines. And
8:56
that's important. That shapes the
8:58
question of what strategies we'll
9:00
do best. The other
9:02
thing to note is still you
9:04
can potentially get equity type returns
9:06
from credit with less risk in
9:08
better companies than used to be the
9:10
borrowers, with less leveraged companies than
9:12
used to be the borrowers. And
9:14
these returns, whether they're approaching TAN for
9:17
liquid credit or above TAN for
9:19
private credit, these are fully competitive
9:21
with equities, more than most people
9:23
need, and they can be
9:25
earned with greater safety than with equities.
9:27
So I continue to think that the
9:29
opportunity is compelling. Before
9:31
we end, do you have any other final thoughts? This
9:34
has been another year like
9:37
the last 54. You
9:40
start the year, sometimes you
9:42
think you know what's going to happen. Sometimes
9:44
you know you don't know what's going to happen. And
9:47
usually it turns out that the time when you were
9:49
wrong was when you thought you knew what was going
9:51
to happen. We never really know what's going to happen.
9:53
The great Peter Bernstein once said,
9:56
essentially, we walk every day into
9:58
the unknown. It's much
10:00
more profitable to acknowledge that we
10:02
walk into the unknown than
10:04
to have a very definite opinion of what's
10:07
going to happen that heavily and take the
10:09
chance of being wrong. So, we
10:11
will enter 24 knowing that we don't
10:13
know what the future holds but paying
10:15
great attention to our individual investments. That's
10:18
what we've done to date and we think
10:20
is the way to success. Well,
10:22
on that note, thank you so much for joining me. It's
10:24
always a pleasure and thank you, Anna. For
10:31
our next conversation, we'll be discussing
10:34
liquid credit markets, where we
10:36
are today and where we might be going in
10:38
the future. For this
10:40
discussion, I'm thrilled to be joined by
10:42
David Rosenberg, co-portfolio manager of Oaktree's
10:45
Global Credit, U.S. High Yield Bond
10:47
and Global High Yield Bond strategies.
10:50
David, thanks so much for joining me. Thanks for having
10:52
me. In the liquid credit
10:54
piece that appears in the recent
10:56
roundup, you and your co-authors argue
10:58
that if we do finally enter
11:00
into a recession, below
11:02
investment grade credit may not behave the
11:05
same as it has in previous dislocations.
11:07
So, just to begin, can you explain
11:09
what you mean by this? Yeah, so
11:11
if you think about recession and
11:14
what that means, usually recession
11:16
is a surprise. Something
11:19
really bad happens. There's either excess going on
11:21
in a sector or maybe a commodity price
11:23
moves in an unexpected direction. It
11:26
forces everybody flat-footed, and everyone has to react
11:28
and handle it. And often, frankly, a lot
11:30
of the faults are driven by the fact
11:32
that people were planning to go and refinance,
11:34
and now the recession surprises everyone and shuts
11:37
the market down, and now they can't, and
11:39
they have to restructure. What
11:41
I think is going to be different this
11:43
go-around is the fact that this
11:45
recession by no means is any form of
11:47
a surprise. As a strategist told me the
11:49
other day, this is the most predicted recession
11:52
in history. So everybody's talking about
11:54
this potential recession, which means, by the way,
11:56
that people are preparing for it. So
11:58
if you think about... 4%
14:00
and 5% until 2020. That
14:02
changes the way the market reacts to all
14:04
this. I think that the smoothing of
14:06
the default impact is going to be
14:08
a very big driver of how things behave
14:10
this go around. What about recovery rates?
14:12
How might they be different in this cycle?
14:15
Well, that's very important. I think that
14:17
one will be to the negative, which
14:19
is when you think about recovery, I think
14:21
for bonds, recovery rates likely be very
14:23
similar as they've been historically. For
14:26
history, for us, we're calling around 50 cents on the
14:28
dollar for the market, maybe a little bit lower
14:30
on recoveries. But the story, which I think is
14:32
going to be unique this go around, is going
14:34
to be in the broadly syndicated loan market. In
14:37
the loan market, recoveries have generally been very
14:39
good. Call it north of 60 cents on
14:41
the dollar because you have a first lean.
14:43
That first lean is supposed to matter when
14:45
it comes to recovery. But the other thing
14:47
that you have is in the old version,
14:50
you think about leveraged buyouts, which is generally
14:52
where the riskiest deals come in the markets
14:54
and your typical leveraged buyout years past would
14:56
be you'd have some loans, below those loans
14:58
you'd have some bonds, below the bonds you'd
15:00
have some equity, and you'd take the company
15:02
private. The recovery from the
15:05
loans in those scenarios was buffered
15:07
by the fact that the loan did not see a
15:09
dollar of loss until the bond below it was totally
15:11
wiped out. So you have this cushion. Now,
15:14
what we've seen is the shift of what
15:16
we call loan only capital structures are very
15:18
clever in how we name things. Loan only
15:20
capital structures basically the private equity sponsors looking
15:22
at the loan market, when the loan market
15:24
moved to Covenant Light, which is another big
15:27
driver of recoveries. We'll talk about it in
15:29
a second. When the loan market moved to
15:31
Covenant Light, private equity sponsors looked and said,
15:33
well, if I can finance my leveraged buyout
15:35
with just loans, and I have
15:37
no call protecting my loans, that gives me all
15:39
this optionality. If I want to refinance my capital
15:41
structure and pay myself a dividend, sell the company
15:44
early, whatever it may be, and that's valuable. Optionality
15:46
always occurs to the value of the equity. And
15:48
so you started to see more and more leveraged
15:50
buyouts financed with only loans. And I
15:52
had this conversation with Howard Marks the other day where I said,
15:54
well, what does it mean when you have a first lean and
15:56
a structure where the whole structure is first lean? And he laughed
15:59
and said, yeah, you're senior. but senior to what? Because if
16:01
you're senior to the equity, what does that really mean?
16:04
I think that's what the market's going to have
16:06
to realize, this go around, is that when you
16:08
have a loan only capital structure, the recovery should
16:10
be no different than the bond in the previous
16:12
years when there was a bond below you because
16:14
there's nothing to cushion you. The other
16:17
reality is with Covenant Light, back when you
16:19
used to have Covenants, you had the ability
16:21
to pull the rug out early. If things
16:23
are going wrong, the lenders were able to
16:25
stop the music and say, I'm hoarding all
16:27
this cash, you can no longer pay coupons
16:30
to your bond holders, your dividends, your equity
16:32
holders, because I'm hoarding all this cash for
16:34
my recovery. That was a very powerful tool
16:36
to improve recoveries for loans. With Covenant
16:38
Light, you can't do that. The lenders
16:41
have to sit on their hands until eventually the
16:43
company has a maturity or runs out of cash.
16:45
When that happens, that means that as all that
16:47
time is playing out more money is being paid
16:49
out in coupons to bond holders if there is
16:52
bond holders or potentially leaking to equity holders and
16:54
that dilutes your recovery. The combination
16:56
of those two, I think you're going to see
16:58
a much lower recovery rate in the defaults that
17:00
you do see in the loan market
17:03
this go around. They've touched on a few
17:05
really important trends. Another trend that we've obviously
17:07
seen over the last second has just been
17:09
the dramatic growth in credit markets overall. What
17:12
impact do you think this increase in scale
17:14
could have on the opportunity set that credit
17:16
investors see if there is a recession? Yeah,
17:19
I think it has a big impact and I think
17:21
opportunity set is the right way to put it Anna,
17:23
which is I'm a performing credit guy. I
17:25
go around the world talking to people about performing credit and
17:28
I get the question all the time, how
17:30
can you talk about performing credit when you
17:32
also have this other side of Oakview that's
17:34
all excited about distressed credit? The answer, quite
17:37
frankly, is the market is so much
17:39
bigger that we can all look at it from
17:41
different angles but yet be very happy, which is
17:43
I'm very happy to look at a potential recession
17:45
where you can say, hey, the default rate, it's
17:47
around 2 percent today. Could it go to 4
17:49
percent for bonds, maybe 5 percent for loans?
17:51
Somewhere in that zip code seems reasonable. But
17:53
the 30-year average default rate for bonds is
17:56
4. So that's nothing dramatic as we said,
17:58
it's not the 10. For me,
18:00
I've got 96% of the market that
18:02
I think is going to perform and there's a lot for me
18:04
to do. For a distressed
18:06
investor, that 4% is
18:08
a small sliver of a much larger pie. So
18:10
there's plenty for them to look and do and
18:13
there's a target rich environment for them as well.
18:15
And so as the market grows, it
18:17
allows us all to be a lot more thoughtful about how
18:19
we want to deploy our capital, is a lot more to
18:21
pick from. So
18:23
let's switch topics now a little bit.
18:26
We are recording this in early December
18:29
and we recently saw a pretty meaningful
18:31
rally in a number of asset classes,
18:33
especially high yield bonds. What
18:36
would you say has been the primary cause of
18:38
this and how durable do you think this rally
18:40
might be? Yeah, I'm
18:42
always a pessimist or cynic. I like to
18:44
say professional pessimist, but people call me cynic
18:46
when it comes to these kind of things.
18:48
But there has been a dramatic rally and
18:50
I think there's two things driving this rally.
18:52
One is this concept of a no landing,
18:55
as everybody's been talking about. It's funny, early
18:57
in my career, soft landing, I always thought
18:59
meant no recession. Now soft landing means benign
19:01
recessions, they've made up no landing, have no
19:03
recession. The market always has to have its
19:05
terms. And so that
19:07
no landing camp is getting louder and louder,
19:09
that this might be the first time ever
19:11
that the Fed and the US, for example,
19:13
is fighting inflation to this degree without pushing
19:15
the economy into recession. And I suppose there's
19:17
a first time for everything, but I'm not
19:19
a believer that this is going to be
19:21
that case. As the market
19:24
thinks about that possibility, risk assets rally, as
19:26
everyone's looking for risk and ways to benefit
19:28
from the fact that this may play out.
19:30
The other part of the rally, I think,
19:32
is driven by this narrative of a pivot.
19:35
Everyone's waiting for rates to go back down. It's funny, I
19:38
think over the last year, the most
19:40
common question I've gotten from investors is
19:42
when's the Fed going to pivot? Talk
19:44
about fundamentals, you talk about markets, all people want to talk
19:46
about, oh, that's all well and good, but when's the Fed
19:48
going to pivot? And I joke and tell people, the Fed
19:50
doesn't know when the Fed's going to pivot, so how am
19:52
I supposed to know? But what I've really come around to
19:55
tell people is, look, I can't tell you when the Fed's
19:57
going to pivot. I can't tell you how the
19:59
Fed's going to pivot. But I can tell you
20:01
why, and I find it fascinating that
20:03
the market is on the side of why. Because
20:05
the Fed doesn't pivot to prop up the stock
20:07
market. As much as everybody wants that to be
20:09
the mandate, it's not actually the mandate of the
20:12
Fed that's supposed to prop up the economy, and
20:14
those aren't always the same thing. And so I
20:16
tell people, the Fed will pivot when
20:18
something bad happens, when there's a crisis. We
20:20
have a global pandemic, and the world is
20:22
shutting down. They will aggressively pivot in order
20:25
to keep things operating and keep the economy
20:27
from shutting down. And that means, if you
20:29
think about this narrative that's driving the rally
20:31
in the market, the narrative is simply
20:33
this. We're going to have a
20:35
recession, but it's going to be benign. Nothing really
20:37
serious to worry about, as we talked about the
20:40
false pickup, but not to any really scary levels.
20:42
And despite it is benign recession, we're going to see
20:45
interest rates go down 100 basis points
20:47
before halfway through the year 2024. And
20:50
I understand why everyone wants that to be true. It would be
20:52
amazing. Benign recession, 100 basis points drop
20:54
in rates, all risk assets would rally. Debt would trade
20:57
up, equities would trade up. We can all high five
20:59
and talk about how smart we are and count all
21:01
the money that we've made. It
21:03
just doesn't make any sense, because if we
21:05
do truly go through what is a benign
21:07
recession, there is no reason for interest rates
21:09
to go down 100 basis points. Everything's fine.
21:11
The recession was benign. And conversely, if you
21:13
have 100 basis points drop in rates before
21:16
we get to the summer of 2024, then
21:18
there was no soft landing. Something really bad happened.
21:20
And so I think that's the part that the
21:23
market is seizing on, is the market's gone through
21:25
this schizophrenia of the pivot is going to happen,
21:27
if it's not going to happen, it is squarely
21:29
back in the camp of the pivot is going
21:31
to happen. And that is a big driver
21:33
of the rally. But to me, part of
21:35
what may make this rally sputter out or
21:38
even go the other way is the reality
21:40
that the Fed may very well not pivot.
21:43
What I remind people is the goal of
21:45
the Fed isn't to touch 2% inflation, claim
21:47
victory, and then bring rates back down, which
21:49
by the way is inflationary. The goal of
21:51
the Fed was to stay at 2% inflation,
21:54
which may require them to keep rates where
21:57
they are for a little while. And if
21:59
that happens... and
24:00
the opportunity investors have going into
24:02
24, when you
24:04
have a potential recession. Because you think about
24:06
it, at Oaktree you always say, look, there's
24:09
no great bargain if you're going to make
24:11
more money by taking more risk. Anybody can
24:13
do that. You want to get more return,
24:15
more risk, there's really nothing exciting about that.
24:17
The art of this business is to manage
24:19
the risk down. That's where the value add
24:21
comes in my opinion. What we have right
24:24
now, which is so unique, is the market
24:26
is handing investors this opportunity to say, I
24:28
can sell my equities and go buy debt, which
24:31
is bringing my risk meaningfully down,
24:33
but actually preserve the same expected
24:35
return. That's to me, one of
24:37
the more exciting trades I've seen
24:39
in my career. In the investment
24:41
world, we call this a no-brainer,
24:43
this trade. The ability to bring
24:45
your risk down without having to
24:47
meaningfully impact your expected return is
24:49
very valuable and something that's really
24:52
exciting. For
24:59
our final conversation, we are going to
25:01
be zeroing in on one specific area,
25:03
life sciences lending. For this
25:05
discussion, I'm very happy to be joined by
25:07
Amman Kumar, co-portfolio manager of
25:10
Oaktree's Life Sciences Lending Platform.
25:12
Amman, thanks so much for joining me. Thanks
25:14
for having me, Anna. To begin our discussion,
25:17
I want to talk a little bit
25:19
about the Life Sciences Public Equity Market.
25:21
Can you discuss some of the
25:23
significant shifts we've been seeing here over the
25:25
last few years? Yes, it's certainly
25:28
been dramatic. I don't think it's an exaggeration
25:30
to say that in the last four years,
25:32
we've witnessed some of the most severe volatility
25:34
actually in the history of the life sciences
25:36
industry. Company valuations
25:38
soared during the pandemic. This
25:41
is due to both elevated patient
25:43
demand as well as breakthrough medical
25:45
technologies like mRNA vaccines, which were
25:47
disseminated both widely and quickly. What's
25:50
interesting though, is that the S&P Biotechnology
25:52
Index, also known as the XBI, hit
25:54
its all-time peak in February of 2021.
25:58
But since then, biotech valuations
26:00
have declined quite sharply. To
26:03
put this into context, the XBI index through
26:05
the end of September 2023 is still almost
26:07
60% below that February 21 peak, having declined
26:12
double digits for each of the last two years. What
26:15
has been behind this weakness? I
26:17
think there are four main reasons
26:19
behind the volatility. Firstly, we've seen
26:21
a reversal of some of the
26:24
COVID pandemic era spending trends. Secondly,
26:26
we've had some changes in the
26:28
regulatory environment, particularly by the FDA
26:30
and the U.S. Thirdly,
26:32
we saw a collapse of the
26:34
SPAC market, which had provided an alternative
26:36
source of capital and an avenue to
26:38
a public listing for some earlier stage
26:40
companies. And most recently,
26:42
there's been a direct and indirect
26:45
impact from rising interest rates. In
26:47
particular, we've seen generalist investors pull
26:49
back from investing in companies with
26:51
limited free cash or generation, but
26:53
ongoing R&D needs. This
26:56
public market weakness that you're describing, how
26:58
has it impacted the opportunity sent for
27:01
life sciences direct lenders? It's
27:03
led to a significant increase in non-dilutive
27:05
financing opportunities. For example, at
27:07
Oak Tree, we've been a top three lender in
27:09
life sciences over the last four to five years.
27:12
We've seen an increase of approximately 50% in
27:15
the pipeline for direct lending opportunities in
27:17
the last just 18 or
27:19
so months. I think one of the
27:21
reasons for this is that the life
27:23
sciences sector has always been a capital
27:25
intensive industry with companies continuously investing in
27:27
clinical trials to bring new products to
27:29
market or investing in outright topics. Historically,
27:32
this financing came almost exclusively from
27:35
the equity markets via follow on
27:37
rounds or IPOs. However,
27:39
for these fast growing companies, the cost of
27:41
equity is very high. And over
27:43
the past 10 to 11 years, you've
27:46
started to see a select group of
27:48
knowledgeable lenders who can provide non-dilutive financing
27:50
to these companies instead. And
27:52
While that non-dilutive financing space has
27:54
been growing at a double digit
27:56
Kega in its own right, the
27:58
recent equity market volatility.. He has
28:00
actually pushed more companies to look for other
28:02
solutions given that the I markets have either
28:05
been shot and follow and rounds have actually
28:07
been very difficult. It's. Interesting,
28:09
Even large companies today that will once
28:11
five billion or ten billion in market
28:14
size maybe down sixty percent and share
28:16
price today. So we've been seeing more
28:18
management teams and boards looking at these
28:21
alternative direct lending options. As
28:23
I think everyone knows, in recent years we
28:25
settling seen a slowdown in and then a
28:27
activity in any areas and I'm curious with
28:30
everything you're describing. Hear, what have we seen
28:32
with and an activity in Biotech over the
28:34
last year? and Twenty Twenty Three. And what
28:36
do you expect to see in Twenty Twenty
28:38
Four? We started to see a
28:41
pick up and I mean I actually
28:43
by strategic and life sciences focus private
28:45
equity firms in specific subsectors on. I
28:47
believe there are two key drivers for
28:50
this. one is low valuations on the
28:52
second is substantial dry powder on the
28:54
sidelines. In. Terms of
28:56
what we expect to see and twenty
28:58
twenty four given valuations remain low. For
29:00
example, they're still over two hundred companies
29:03
with negative enterprise values And importantly given
29:05
the length of time this volatilities actually
29:07
been going on. For now, I do
29:09
expect continued emanate on more opportunity for
29:11
private debt financing is a lot of
29:13
these companies seek to extend their forward
29:15
liquidity runway. And. What
29:18
would you say? Id types of
29:20
life sciences companies that are most
29:22
attractive to sponsors or large pharmaceutical
29:24
companies right now. Currently we're
29:26
seeing a lot of interest in
29:28
the oncology space. On the Cns
29:30
space see it as being Central
29:33
nervous System. For example, companies bringing
29:35
products that would treat migraine, dementia
29:37
Schizophrenia to market for sponsors was
29:39
seeing more platform plays whereby they
29:41
will look for an initial chorus
29:43
of platform. And can then
29:45
both on additional complimentary products over. For.
29:48
Strategic is a little bit different it seems.
29:51
They. Are more back filling to their
29:53
pipelines and product offerings. Interestingly about seventy
29:55
percent of all us to a pools
29:58
in the Us are actually now how
30:00
from small to mid sized companies as
30:02
opposed to large farmer or device companies
30:04
and give any large companies typically have
30:07
very strong balance sheets. I
30:09
would say it's an attractive time for them to
30:11
buy some new assets as opposed to always developing
30:13
in house which has a very long lead time.
30:16
That makes sense. We. Been talking a
30:18
little bit about opportunities, so let's switch
30:20
briefly to risks. What would you say,
30:22
are some of the biggest risks for
30:25
private investors in Biotech today? There
30:28
are three main risks that we deal with. A
30:31
nice all and no particular order. Regulation.
30:34
Reimbursements and competition.
30:37
To manage these risks. I think you
30:39
need to do two things really well. The.
30:41
First would be very careful structuring of
30:43
the credit agreements with bespoke covenants for
30:45
each company Does This allows us to
30:47
set an early said the company deviate
30:49
from its managed from based plan. And
30:52
allows us to work with management seem to
30:54
effectuate a remedial action plan if needed. And
30:58
then the second important element to mitigate risk.
31:00
Is. Careful selection of companies and assets to
31:02
lend against in the first place. For.
31:05
Example: We eliminate a lot of regulate
31:07
we risks by only focusing on companies
31:10
that a post regulatory approval. So that
31:12
means with commercial assets already on the
31:14
market. Similarly, One
31:16
of the key pillars of the
31:18
Oh Pre licensed platform is the
31:21
focus on innovative need to have
31:23
a lifesaving products which often have
31:25
limited competition during the tenure of
31:27
alone, but are less impacted by
31:29
changes in regulation or reimbursements. Is.
31:31
The come to the end of this conversation
31:34
just anything else. Any final thoughts that you
31:36
have about. What we've seen in this area
31:38
in Twenty Twenty Three and what you expect
31:40
to see And Twenty Twenty Four. I
31:43
think that the current opportunities both
31:45
vast and growing. we have a
31:48
number of secular tell wins within
31:50
life sciences, supporting this growth including
31:52
aging population, increased health care spending
31:54
in most western countries, and breakthrough
31:56
technologies. this is not
31:59
commodities lending We don't compete
32:01
with banks in this space and given
32:03
the structuring and science complexities involved in
32:05
each deal, we can generate better pricing
32:08
and covenant protections. So
32:10
overall, given that life sciences spending isn't
32:12
really correlated with what's happening in the
32:14
wider economy, I expect the
32:16
next few years to be very busy and
32:18
attractive from a lending perspective, regardless of whether
32:20
there's a softer or hard landing in the
32:22
economy. Well, Aman, that was super
32:24
interesting and thank you so much for joining
32:26
me. My pleasure, thank you. Thank
32:30
you. Thank
33:00
you. This
33:30
recording contains information and views as of the
33:32
date indicated. and
34:00
such information and views are subject to change
34:02
without notice. Oaktree has
34:04
no duty or obligation to update
34:06
the information contained herein. Further,
34:09
Oaktree makes no representation and it
34:11
should not be assumed that past
34:13
investment performance is an indication of
34:15
future results. Moreover, wherever there
34:17
is the potential for profit, there is also
34:19
the possibility of loss. Certain
34:22
information contained herein concerning economic trends
34:25
and performance is based on
34:27
or derived from information provided by
34:29
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34:31
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34:34
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34:36
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34:38
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34:40
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34:42
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34:44
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34:47
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34:49
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34:51
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34:53
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35:03
2023 Oaktree Capital Management, LP.
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