0:00

How we're sick and injured troops

0:02

cared for during the Kakota

0:04

campaign. We look at Medevac

0:06

and medical and surgical treatment

0:09

on the Kakota track. This

0:11

is The Principles of War

0:14

podcast, Professional Military Education

0:16

for Junior Offices and

0:18

Senior Encios. Ladies and

0:20

gentlemen, welcome back to episode

0:23

126 of the Principles of

0:25

War podcast. Last week we

0:27

started to delve into some

0:29

of the issues with providing

0:31

medical support during large-scale combat

0:33

operations. One point that came

0:36

out was the difficulty in

0:38

providing casualty management during the

0:40

withdrawal. It can be an

0:42

insidious situation. You've got casualties

0:44

that need evacuating, whilst

0:46

receiving more casualties, sometimes

0:49

mass casualties, all the while the

0:51

enemy is still advancing. and this

0:53

highlights the reason why medical services

0:55

need to be positioned far enough

0:57

behind the front lines to be

0:59

secure and to have the time

1:02

that they need to conduct their

1:04

withdrawal. That withdrawal requires significant resources.

1:06

This didn't happen during the Battle

1:08

of Isherava. Today we're going to

1:10

unravel some of the reasons why

1:12

that occurred. I think it's worth

1:14

highlighting the clinical skills, the improvisational

1:17

skills, the endurance and bravery of

1:19

the medical staff. They are doing

1:21

everything that doctors and nurses would

1:23

do in a normal hospital, except

1:25

they're doing it often in a

1:27

mass casualty kind of environment. They're

1:30

doing it in the middle of

1:32

the jungle and sometimes they're doing

1:34

that within range of the enemy.

1:36

That is an incredibly difficult

1:38

task. And yet reading through the

1:40

war diaries, you see time and

1:42

time again, medics putting themselves out

1:45

there to ensure that they're able

1:47

to look after their patients. Secondly,

1:49

is thinking about casualty management

1:52

in future large-scale combat

1:54

operations that could be

1:56

conducted in the jungle

1:59

environment. that care be provided

2:01

and critically how would the troops

2:03

be medivacked out? Especially if they

2:05

would deny the ability to use

2:07

rotary wing assets. That might be

2:10

because of weather, terrain or enemy

2:12

action, particularly the risk from air

2:14

defence assets. That medivac process may

2:16

look very similar to the process

2:18

that was carried out on the

2:21

Kakota track and that's quite a

2:23

sobering thought. If that's the case,

2:25

we really want to look at

2:27

the planning considerations so that the

2:29

care of the soldiers can be

2:31

the best care possible given the

2:34

circumstances. Jam MacLeod in her excellent

2:36

book, Shadows on the Track, has

2:38

got a paragraph that describes the

2:40

first incidents where there are troops

2:42

who are wounded in combat. She

2:45

writes, On the 7th of July,

2:47

129 soldiers from Bravo Company of

2:49

the 39th Battalion under Captain Sam

2:51

Templeton were ordered to walk from

2:53

Port Moresby to Kakota to secure

2:55

the village and its airstrip. That

2:58

they were ordered to do so

3:00

without either a dedicated medical officer

3:02

or a field ambulance unit suggests

3:04

supreme confidence, complete ignorance or extreme

3:06

neglect. Those troops were able to

3:08

get some medical support. We discussed

3:11

in the last episode the exploits

3:13

of Captain Jeffrey Doc Vernon. It's

3:15

important to remember that he is

3:17

a member of Angau so not

3:19

attached to the 39th Battalion. He

3:22

had established a hospital at Illo

3:24

to manage the care of the

3:26

Papua Natives. He travelled on foot

3:28

from a Lolo to Daniki to

3:30

offer his services to the 39th

3:32

Battalion when he heard that they

3:35

were there and without medical support.

3:37

He married up with the lead

3:39

elements of the 39th Battalion on

3:41

the 29th of July, reported to

3:43

the CEO, Lieutenant Colonel Owen, and

3:46

immediately began providing medical support to

3:48

the troops. On the 23rd of

3:50

July, Charlie Company of the 39th

3:52

was ordered to move to Dakota

3:54

and it was accompanied by the

3:56

regimental medical officer, Captain Shearer. There

3:59

was also a detachment of the

4:01

14th Field Ambulance comprising Captain William

4:03

McLaren and five other ranks. They

4:05

were sent to Kargi, south of

4:07

Templeton's crossing, to set up a

4:09

medical dressing station. This was the

4:12

only medical support that the battalion

4:14

would have until the 8th of

4:16

September when they were relieved by

4:18

the second sixth field ambulance. This

4:20

situation, which is certainly not ideal,

4:23

has come about because of a

4:25

confluence of a confluence of circumstances.

4:27

Firstly, and as always, we see

4:29

the speed with which the Japanese

4:31

are moving, they're well and truly

4:33

within the Australian's Uda loop, and

4:36

they're landing unexpectedly and heading towards

4:38

Kakota. Secondly, we've got the commander

4:40

of New Guinea Force, Major General

4:42

Basil Morris, probably failing his appreciation

4:44

of the terrain, not understanding the

4:47

importance of Kakota. Otherwise, he probably

4:49

would have sent more troops than

4:51

just the pupulin infantry battalion, which

4:53

he'd had up there in the

4:55

first place. There was also a

4:57

lack of strategic imagination within land

5:00

headquarters. They'd been preparing for defence

5:02

of Australia and had struggled to

5:04

divine how they were going to

5:06

manage the defence of Papua and

5:08

New Guinea. It was from higher

5:11

headquarters that Morris received the imperative

5:13

around the importance of Kakota in

5:15

general and the airstrip in particular.

5:17

The airstrip was the key terrain

5:19

and it may have been the

5:21

decisive terrain of the campaign. The

5:24

main thing holding back the operational

5:26

importance of the airfield was the

5:28

fact that there was no formed

5:30

road leading to it. It wasn't

5:32

near a beach. So anything that

5:34

was going to be brought in

5:37

to improve the airfield had to

5:39

be flown in and that is

5:41

logistically difficult. There was no easy

5:43

way to build up a reserve

5:45

of fuel or ammunition. It would

5:48

all have to be flown in.

5:50

For Kakota to be that decisive

5:52

terrain, there were two critical requirements.

5:54

They're both fairly obvious. The first

5:56

was, actual retention of the airfield

5:58

in the village and... Secondly, there

6:01

was the requirement for aircraft. The

6:03

first Battle of Kakota was fought over

6:05

the 28th and 29th of July, and

6:07

the battalion was forced to withdraw to

6:09

Daniki. It was briefly reoccupied between the

6:11

8th and 9th of August by Alpha

6:13

Company, but it too was forced to

6:15

withdraw again. So now we're going to look

6:18

at the integration of the medical plan

6:20

into the tactical plan. As we do

6:22

this, it's important to remember

6:24

the lack of experience within some

6:26

of these headquarters that are doing

6:28

this planning. as well as the

6:31

difficulties of responding to the advancing

6:33

Japanese. The ability of New Guinea Force

6:35

headquarters to get accurate situational awareness

6:37

would have been very difficult. Communications

6:40

were quite parlous with any of

6:42

its subordinate call signs once they

6:44

started moving up the Kakota track.

6:47

There was significant pressure from above

6:49

to retake Dakota and by above

6:51

I mean coming from McCarthy himself

6:54

and we're going to look at

6:56

that because it does have significant

6:58

impact for the troops on the

7:01

ground. And so the inability

7:03

to communicate the lack of

7:05

proper intelligence about the Japanese

7:07

locations and their capabilities and

7:09

numbers combined with the lack

7:12

of planning experience in all

7:14

of the headquarters from company

7:16

Battalion up to New Guinea

7:18

Force headquarters. combines to see

7:20

the development of a tactical plan

7:23

that has a significant amount

7:25

of hope in it. Hindsight is always

7:27

2020, however, hope is not a task

7:29

verb and when it is used there

7:31

should be some risk management. How does

7:33

the enemy's most dangerous course

7:35

of action impact your plan?

7:37

We should always be looking at the

7:40

impact of the enemy's most dangerous

7:42

course of action and then have

7:44

mitigations in place to minimize the

7:46

impact of that. If the mission

7:48

is to retake Kakota, then the

7:50

most dangerous course of action that

7:53

the Japanese could have taken was

7:55

that they could concentrate on Kakota

7:57

in such numbers that the Australians

7:59

would be unable to achieve the

8:01

combat power ratios to evict them.

8:03

What actually happened was the Japanese

8:05

were able to get so many

8:07

troops into the AO that the

8:10

Australians were unable to stop their

8:12

advance. The medical plan was still

8:14

under development on the 28th of

8:16

August. This is during the Battle

8:18

of Ishirava. So whilst the 39th

8:20

Battalion is continuing to take casualties

8:22

and on top of that we've

8:24

now got the 2nd 14th and

8:26

2nd 16th and they are unable

8:28

to stop the advance of the

8:30

Japanese as well. While all of

8:32

this is happening the medical plan

8:35

is still being developed and it's

8:37

a doozy. So I'll read a

8:39

small excerpt from the official history.

8:41

A medical plan was adopted to

8:43

fit into the general tactical plan

8:45

by which the capture of Kakota

8:47

was envisaged, together with the cutting

8:49

of Japanese communications between Kakota and

8:51

Oivi. Medical evacuation to suit these

8:53

tactics was therefore planned on the

8:55

unusual method of sending patients forward

8:57

instead of rearwood, so that they

9:00

might be transported to bases by

9:02

air from Kakota. The second 14th

9:04

and second 16th battalion casualties would

9:06

thus be taken by regimental stretcher

9:08

bearers to the forward posts and

9:10

thence by native carriers to the

9:12

regimental aid posts. It will be

9:14

seen that this plan could be

9:16

fully implemented only if Kakota was

9:18

captured from the Japanese. This explains

9:20

why the casualties were held so

9:22

close to the front lines. When

9:24

we look at the tactical picture,

9:27

we see that the second 14th

9:29

and second 16th battalions have just

9:31

joined the 39th and 53rd battalions.

9:33

However, when we looked at their

9:35

combat performance, we saw that it

9:37

wasn't as good as what New

9:39

Guinea Force headquarters was expecting. And

9:41

that was because of the fact

9:43

that they hadn't been trained to

9:45

fight in the jungle. Coming straight

9:47

from the desert into the jungle

9:49

makes for a very very difficult

9:52

transition because it is fundamentally different

9:54

combat. The withdrawal from Isherarava would

9:56

now force the medical staff to

9:58

adopt a traditional rearwood patient evacuation

10:00

process. This was going to be

10:02

done with very limited resources and

10:04

very limited time. This brings us

10:06

to the topic of expecting casualties.

10:08

These are casualties who have suffered

10:10

injuries that are so severe and

10:12

or the resources to treat those

10:14

injuries are so limited that they

10:16

are unlikely to survive. The official

10:19

history has the story of a

10:21

situation that occurred during the withdrawal

10:23

from Iora Creek. Two patients had

10:25

abdominal wounds and one a sucking

10:27

wound of the chest. Since they

10:29

had no apparent chance of survival

10:31

and no surgical measures were possible,

10:33

Majori advised a large intravenous dose

10:35

of morphine, the action of which

10:37

illustrated the extreme tolerance of persons

10:39

with such injuries, but ensured at

10:41

least comfort in their last hours.

10:44

Though abdominal wounds have always had

10:46

a high mortality, it is one

10:48

of the tragic frustrations of medical

10:50

services at war that some men

10:52

who might have had a possible

10:54

chance of survival are doomed under

10:56

the conditions such as prevailed on

10:58

the Kakota trial. So these are

11:00

very tough decisions being made by

11:02

the medical officers under extreme circumstances.

11:04

I've got an excerpt of an

11:06

interview with Stan Bissett. He was

11:09

a captain in the second 14th

11:11

Battalion and he's got a personal

11:13

story about this kind of circumstance.

11:15

This is about his brother Hal

11:17

who was known throughout the second

11:19

14th as Butch. I'll let Stan

11:21

tell the story. I was going

11:23

up on my way up to

11:25

see my brother's son. baton because

11:27

I hadn't got there. I got

11:29

out to the other batons and

11:31

Sophia and I'd gone forward. We'd

11:33

gone past our forward troops. I

11:36

ran into a jack patrol and

11:38

they'd forced them off the track

11:40

in front of us, but we

11:42

had a platoon in the bush

11:44

in the jungle beside us and

11:46

we were through then. I then

11:48

asked how to see if I'd

11:50

like to go up and just

11:52

check on the position a week

11:54

and go. I knew that they'd

11:56

been confronted by some of the

11:58

stronger forces and the Japs were

12:01

desperate to get that high ground

12:03

because that dominated the whole battle

12:05

area. I got within about 30

12:07

or 40 meters of the position

12:09

where had to go out. There's

12:11

two or 300 meters we had

12:13

to go through a combination of

12:15

shrub and open country and I

12:17

met one of bushes, Tommy Tommy

12:19

Wilson who was one of two

12:21

brothers, who was one of two

12:23

brothers, two brothers. and they were

12:25

bent gunning section on the in

12:28

10th turn and he just lost

12:30

his hand with a faulty back

12:32

light grenade the tape had come

12:34

hadn't come up properly and had

12:36

blown up in his hand he

12:38

lost his hand so I just

12:40

just up and bind it up

12:42

and then he was disoriented he

12:44

didn't know where the RFP was

12:46

so take him back to the

12:48

REP to the dock and when

12:50

I got there Kurdlekey and to

12:53

receive orders from pots that we

12:55

were to withdraw that night to

12:57

the position just south of the

12:59

rest house, which was back towards

13:01

the Lola, getting back towards the

13:03

Lola. He wanted me and Ralph

13:05

Onak, the CEO of the superintendent,

13:07

to go back and select the

13:09

position, get the position ready for

13:11

our withdrawal. So I did this.

13:13

And as I was going back,

13:15

I had a word from one

13:18

of the wounds going out that

13:20

which had been wounded. shot and

13:22

I knew the fellows were bringing

13:24

him out to a carrying him

13:26

out. So we got... Did you

13:28

think at this stage? When you

13:30

heard the first years what did

13:32

you think? That he had been

13:34

wounded and well I was just

13:36

concerned and worried and I had

13:38

them I felt that there had

13:40

been shots and mentioned that he'd

13:42

been shot in the tummy and

13:45

I thought well it was it

13:47

was there at the end because...

13:49

and abdominal wound up there was

13:51

absolutely fatal because had no way

13:53

of getting medical treatment to treat

13:55

it. And I thought, well, I

13:57

know he's been upbringing. him out,

13:59

I'd, you know, talk to be

14:01

with him. And before he, he

14:03

died. Anyway, we went back and

14:05

I, 53rd, some of the 53rd.

14:07

Just before we move on from that,

14:10

so you went and saw him?

14:12

Not at that stage, no. I

14:14

couldn't, I couldn't, I couldn't, I

14:16

had to go with Ralph Onea

14:18

back to select this position for

14:21

our trips to withdraw, that was

14:23

urgent, that was the priority

14:25

at that was the priority at

14:27

that time. And we selected the

14:29

position which was the only

14:32

suitable position there. Why was it suitable?

14:34

How was it? Because of the nature

14:36

of the ground and that we had

14:38

features which we could spread out. It

14:40

was defile. It was only limited area.

14:43

It was deep on both sides for

14:45

the enemy to have to get up

14:47

and we could have a reasonable field

14:49

of fire over the approaches in which

14:52

they could come. The only approach as

14:54

they could come. 53rd Battalion were... were

14:56

lying in that area and they'd been

14:58

sent forward to help to relieve us

15:00

but there was only two companies

15:02

in them and I asked I

15:05

tried to find an officer but

15:07

I couldn't find an officer no

15:09

problem and they didn't wouldn't

15:11

want to tell me anything

15:13

they were tired they'd they'd

15:15

been marching for a few hours and

15:17

in the end I I had to

15:19

pull my revolver and asked them to

15:21

move because I'd explained to them that

15:24

we were out the front line which

15:26

were all withdrawing to that position and

15:28

that was going to be our defensive position.

15:30

Some of them they saw the light

15:32

immediately and then they moved back and

15:35

they were okay then but and then

15:37

we established the position and then I

15:39

went forward about a couple hundred

15:41

meters to where I met the met

15:43

the stretch of barrier carrying puts you

15:45

out and I met him and helped

15:47

him with a stretch of bearers out

15:50

from the opportune that were

15:52

carrying him. It was about eight of

15:54

my mates and were doing it. They

15:56

had to fight their way through and

15:58

put him on it. John Duffy, my

16:00

medical officer, I had him and he

16:02

was, he was a great man because

16:05

he had powerhouse before the war and

16:07

he said, we put him on the

16:09

track just about 15 meters off the

16:11

side of the track and had a look at

16:13

him and we looked together and he

16:15

shook his head and I could tell

16:17

it to a day, but he gave him more for

16:19

you at the end and I said to

16:21

the dog, I'll stay with him, don't worry,

16:24

don't worry and you've tend to the others,

16:26

you know. He came gone, came back. several

16:28

times over the next six hours. That

16:30

was from 10 o'clock night on that

16:33

was in dark and I was with him

16:35

till 4 o'clock, 4 o'clock in the morning

16:37

and when he passed away he died. Well

16:39

we talked and he was good at times

16:42

but Don came back and gave him off

16:44

to easy to pain quite a few times

16:46

and we talked about you know quite

16:48

a few things mum and dad and

16:50

other times good times who's had and

16:52

that's with some of our rugby and

16:55

But we had just held hands

16:57

and shed the way. We were

16:59

very close with two lots of

17:01

things, good and bad things together.

17:04

And then we buried him,

17:06

Padre Daley came along and

17:08

we buried him in a

17:10

little clearing just the side of

17:12

the track and put a little cross

17:14

up to make the spot and

17:17

took his tablets off him

17:19

and that was it. that time onwards,

17:21

that 30th we established, I went

17:23

to the position we'd established, I

17:25

directed all that trips to the

17:27

near position. Did you have much

17:29

time though, when after you'd buried him,

17:31

did you have much time to kind

17:34

of think of that or did you have

17:36

to move on? No, we were right into

17:38

it. From there we were, the japs at

17:40

this time moved up on our western flank

17:42

and we looked like getting around behind us

17:44

and we would have been in... real trouble

17:47

if we didn't didn't get

17:49

in establishing our defensive position

17:51

very quickly. So we had to

17:53

be ready for the another attacks by

17:55

the first light. After just having been

17:58

through that, did you kind of... go

18:00

on with a different approach to

18:02

what you were doing there? I just had,

18:04

I went on with what we had

18:06

to do, and that was to just

18:08

check our positions and make

18:10

sure every company was in there

18:13

at the correct position we wanted

18:15

them to be in and put

18:17

in position that they had their

18:19

a reasonable field of fire, that

18:21

they had their pits, they could

18:23

scrape it. some sort of a

18:26

pit together and much cover as

18:28

possible for them to get and

18:30

protection. That story really highlights the

18:32

incredible devotion to duty of the

18:34

soldiers who fought during the Battle

18:37

of Isherava. Stand faced with

18:39

a terrible situation and yet after

18:41

the passing of his brother he

18:43

is right back into the fight. I

18:46

want to take a look now at

18:48

the 14th field ambulance. The CEO, Lieutenant

18:50

Colonel Malcolm Erlem, wrote an extensive

18:52

report about the difficulties in providing

18:54

medical services to the troops. It

18:57

was the 14th field ambulance that

18:59

was the first up the Kakota

19:01

track. And as such, they were the tip

19:03

of the spear when it came to supporting the

19:05

troops in the field. The 14th was a

19:07

militia unit. Because they were a militia

19:09

unit, they hadn't seen combat yet

19:12

and so were relatively inexperienced and

19:14

they were also fairly poorly equipped.

19:16

They disembarked at Port Moresby on

19:19

the 3rd of June 1942, but

19:21

they had no vehicles and there

19:23

were no attached Australian Army

19:25

service corps personnel. These would

19:27

have been their drivers and

19:29

their cooks. None of the medical

19:32

officers had any experience. in the

19:34

management of tropical diseases. And now

19:36

that they were in the tropics,

19:39

that was going to be a

19:41

fundamental part of their work. So

19:43

straight after disembarkation, two were detached

19:46

to the camp hospital in Port

19:48

Moresby so that they could get

19:50

experience in managing predominantly malaria. There

19:53

was a staffing shortfall within the

19:55

field ambulance. Another doctor was sent

19:58

to the infectious diseases hospital. and

20:00

a recent change in the

20:02

establishment of the field ambulances

20:04

meant that one medical officer

20:06

in each of the forward

20:08

companies was converted to a

20:10

bearer officer. Field ambulance staff were

20:13

also required to fill the

20:15

gaps that had been left

20:17

by the departure of the

20:19

female army nurses from the

20:21

hospital at Port Moresby. On

20:23

the 19th of February 1942,

20:25

Japanese aircraft bombed Darwin. One

20:27

of the ships that was

20:29

attacked. was the second first

20:31

Australian hospital ship Manunda. Twelve

20:33

people were killed on the

20:35

hospital ship and one of

20:37

them was sister Margaret Augusta

20:39

Domestra of the Australian Army

20:42

Nursing Service. Her death would see

20:44

the withdrawal of all of the

20:46

female nurses from Darwin and also

20:48

all of the female nurses from

20:50

Port Moresby. There were six who

20:53

had been working at the hospital

20:55

at Murray barracks. Earlham would later

20:57

write a report about the provision

20:59

of medical services and it was

21:01

a wide-ranging discussion about medicine but

21:03

it also highlighted seven key areas

21:06

of concern in the provision of

21:08

medical support. They were the

21:10

conduct of waifs and strays,

21:12

the incidence of accidental wounds,

21:14

supply problems, the composition of

21:16

medical detachments, the rate of

21:18

sickness among the soldiers, the

21:20

collection and evacuation of the

21:22

wounded and the protection of

21:24

non-combatant medical units. Firstly, we've

21:27

got the management of the

21:29

waifs and strays. A waif

21:31

is a homeless, neglected or

21:33

abandoned person, especially a child.

21:35

There shouldn't be any of

21:38

those on the Kakota track.

21:40

What Erlem is euphemistically referring

21:42

to is the malingerers and

21:44

deserters. These were soldiers who

21:46

arrived at the aid posts

21:48

without any authorization. Many of

21:50

the soldiers exaggerated or fabricated

21:52

the impact of their diarrhea.

21:55

But as one of the

21:57

doctors noted, it was difficult

21:59

and often important. possible to prove

22:01

one way or the other, especially

22:03

with the limited conditions and large

22:05

number of casualties that many of

22:07

the doctors were trying to treat.

22:10

We're not going to condemn the

22:12

individual conduct of soldiers because

22:14

it's important to remember that

22:16

many of the militia troops

22:18

had already been in Papua

22:20

for over six months. Later

22:22

in the war, six months would be

22:24

seen as well in excess of the

22:27

amount of time that a formed body

22:29

of troops should be kept in the

22:31

tropical and jungle conditions, before seeing a

22:33

decrease in health and morale. For the

22:36

second AIF troops, they had very

22:38

little time to acclimatize to the

22:40

conditions in Papua. Less than one

22:43

month before the Battle of Isherava,

22:45

The troops of the 2nd 14th

22:47

and 2nd 16th had been playing

22:49

football in Queensland, so very little

22:51

time to acclimatise and a very

22:53

rapid approach march up the Kakota

22:55

track. Some soldiers would walk out

22:57

of the front line, bypassed their

23:00

RAP and other medical posts in

23:02

an attempt to get themselves evacuated.

23:04

For those troops advancing towards the

23:06

Japanese, there would be inevitably some

23:08

stragglers. They would drop out of

23:11

the march at an advanced dressing

23:13

station, looking to be evacuated back.

23:15

The problem was that there were

23:17

no Provos marshals on the Kakota

23:19

track. There was no one to

23:22

get the soldiers to continue moving.

23:24

There was no one to give

23:26

them direction. This was left to the

23:28

medical officers and they had no

23:30

authority nor any means by which

23:32

to enforce any of the orders

23:34

given to the soldiers. Erlen wrote

23:36

that because there was no one

23:39

with the authority, some soldiers spent

23:41

much of their time in this

23:43

part of the campaign wandering up

23:45

and down the line between staging

23:47

posts and the situation was not

23:50

rectified during the withdrawal. For some of

23:52

the soldiers, the lack of conditioning

23:54

that they had received in conjunction

23:56

with the incredibly arduous conditions and

23:58

the psychological strain of being in

24:00

a jungle combat area, saw them

24:03

resorting to self-inflicted wounds as

24:05

a means of getting themselves

24:07

out of this parlour situation.

24:09

We've already discussed this

24:11

in episode 109 of the

24:13

podcast, operational mistakes on the

24:16

Kakota track, where we referenced

24:18

David Woolley's excellent paper, not

24:21

yet diagnosed Australian psychiatric casualties

24:23

during the Kakota campaign. Because

24:26

of that I won't belabor the point,

24:28

but there's a couple of points that

24:30

I want to bring out. Erlem talks

24:32

about the fact that the incidents of

24:35

suspected self-inflicted wounds would increase during heavy

24:37

fighting, and that put an inordinate strain

24:39

on an already struggling to cope advanced

24:41

dressing station. So the concerns is partially

24:44

for the individual soldiers and partially for

24:46

the ability for all of the soldiers

24:48

to get the care and treatment that

24:50

they need and deserve. Secondly,

24:52

at one point, suspected self-inflicted

24:54

wounds were patched up and

24:57

returned to their units. At

24:59

this point, there was a

25:01

dramatic decrease in the number

25:03

of self-inflicted wounds. It was

25:05

almost eliminated. However, there were

25:07

concerns about this procedure, and

25:09

shortly that policy was rescinded.

25:11

As we've alluded to many times,

25:13

one of the issues that exacerbated

25:16

the situation for the soldiers and

25:18

for the medics was that of

25:20

logistic support. Erlem wrote, they

25:22

were always short of plaster

25:24

of Paris, strapping, morphine, sulphur

25:26

guanidine. The supplies of them

25:28

were always inadequate, possibly because

25:30

of losses in dropping and

25:32

requisitions going astray. There was

25:34

no supply of blankets for the

25:36

field ambulance, which means that when

25:39

soldiers came in, they'd often lost

25:41

all of their personal kit, so

25:43

they wouldn't have a blanket.

25:45

For them... High up in the jungle, the

25:47

wetness and the coldness added to

25:49

the misery of the disease, the

25:51

injuries, and the wounds that they

25:53

had suffered in the jungle. Practically

25:55

no time was there an adequacy of stores,

25:58

mainly due to the nature of the...

26:00

action, misunderstanding as to the requisition,

26:02

stores lost in scrub and

26:04

swamp and breakages due to

26:06

dropping. Requisitions from the front

26:08

were for quantities urgently required.

26:10

The practice of the base

26:12

medical stores of chopping down,

26:14

which happened on practically every

26:16

occasion, made forward supply very

26:18

difficult. On reordering, the balance

26:20

of the original requisition was

26:22

forwarded, showing no acute shortage

26:25

at base. It was found

26:27

necessary quite frequently to break

26:29

into battalion reserve RAP stores to

26:31

enable us to carry on. The

26:33

breakages that he referred to was

26:35

because they were trying to air

26:37

drop supplies into places like Myola.

26:39

Air drops in support of Australian

26:42

troops had first been used at

26:44

the Battle of Hamel in 1918.

26:46

And yet, despite the intervening

26:48

44 years, it doesn't look

26:50

like there'd been a lot

26:52

of advancement in the techniques

26:54

and procedures for parachuting supplies

26:56

into troops. It was clear

26:58

that there was a lack

27:00

of experience in using parachute

27:02

as a mechanism for supply.

27:05

Some of the initial techniques used

27:07

were very haphazard and highly

27:09

likely to fail. Glass bottles

27:11

with no protective wrapping were

27:13

dropped in sacks. Often entire

27:15

requisitions were lost because the

27:17

aircraft would drop it in

27:19

a location that had already

27:22

been abandoned by the Australians.

27:24

Some of the equipment they did receive

27:26

was just no good when used in

27:28

the jungle. Both the standard

27:30

Thomas arm splint and the army

27:33

stretcher were far too cumbersome for

27:35

use on jungle tracks. As usual,

27:37

as Australians are so good

27:39

at doing, the troops of

27:41

the field ambulance innovated. As

27:43

much of the detritus of

27:45

the battlefield as possible was

27:47

recycled. Objects such as bully

27:50

beef tins and helmets were

27:52

used to create... cooking utensils,

27:54

water containers and even bed

27:56

pans. Not only do we see

27:58

that some of the equipment is

28:00

inappropriate for use in the jungle,

28:02

but there isn't enough of the

28:05

medical logistics supplies that is required

28:07

for the number of casualties that

28:09

are being taken, and there aren't

28:12

enough officers trained in the management

28:14

of medical logistics. The first

28:16

half of the Kogoda campaign is

28:19

a withdrawal in very arduous terrain.

28:21

We are seeing here just how

28:23

difficult the provision of those essential

28:25

combat service support roles, such as

28:28

medical support for troops, How difficult

28:30

this is? In the withdrawal. Where

28:32

are the supply dumps located? How far

28:34

back do they need to be? What

28:36

is the likely rate of withdrawal over

28:39

the next 48 hours? What amount of

28:41

supplies are going to be needed at

28:43

the front lines? What resources are

28:45

available to move the supply dumps

28:48

further back when that is required?

28:50

The management of these

28:52

dilemmas as best as possible

28:55

requires a well-functioning headquarters, ideally

28:57

one with significant combat experience,

28:59

and that is able to

29:02

affect command and control, ably

29:04

across all of the forces

29:06

with which it commands. I don't think

29:09

that we had this at Isirava.

29:11

Brigadier Potts had come to

29:13

Port Moresby as the commander of

29:16

the 21st Brigade. He replaced Porter

29:18

as the commander of Maruba Force

29:20

on the 23rd of August. The

29:22

Battle of Ishirava commenced on the

29:25

26th of August. He does not

29:27

have a lot of time to

29:29

complete his appreciation of the situation.

29:32

On his way up to Isherava, he

29:34

had found a nasty surprise about

29:36

the number of rations that were

29:38

available at Myola. This was meant

29:40

to be the main supply dump,

29:42

and yet there were only 5,000 rations

29:44

available there. This would limit the

29:46

number of troops that he would

29:48

be able to bring up to

29:51

the front line. As a consequence,

29:53

the second 27th was left out

29:55

of the battle at Isherava. Maruba

29:57

force is operating in unfamiliar...

29:59

terrain, very few of the troops

30:02

have been trained in jungle combat.

30:04

It was pretty much only the

30:06

pupuan infantry battalion that knew what

30:09

they were doing when it came

30:11

to jungle warfare. He was struggling

30:13

with a lack of logistics of

30:15

all sorts. The problem for Brigadier

30:18

Potts is that his oodlew is

30:20

large and unwieldy. Observe, orientate,

30:22

decide, act. And remember,

30:24

Major General Horiyi is

30:26

advancing relatively aggressively. There's

30:29

a couple of combat

30:31

pauses for him to be able

30:33

to bring up further supplies, but

30:35

they are nowhere as great as

30:37

the time that is required for

30:39

the Australians to prepare themselves to

30:41

defend Isherava. In this episode,

30:44

we've looked at how that

30:46

oodle loop, that ponderous decision-making

30:48

and execution cycle, has impacted

30:50

the provision of medical support

30:52

to the troops. but we're

30:54

also seeing how the medical

30:56

support to the troops is

30:58

impacting on the oodle loop

31:00

of Maruba Force. It is

31:02

placing constraints on Brigadier Pots

31:04

as he looks for viable

31:06

courses of action. We're only

31:08

halfway through Earlham's report of the

31:11

issues in the provision of medical

31:13

support to the troops as he

31:15

saw them as the commander of

31:18

the 14th field ambulance. Next week

31:20

we will return to look at

31:22

the composition of the medical detachments,

31:24

the collection and evacuation of the

31:27

sick and wounded. We're going to take

31:29

a quick detour to look at the

31:31

arrival of the second ninth Australian General

31:33

Hospital to Port Moresby. That will answer the

31:35

question, how long does it take to

31:37

build a 1,200 bed hospital? We'll continue

31:40

on with the protection of the medical

31:42

personnel and the rate of sickness amongst

31:44

the troops. That's going to lead into

31:47

a focus on the bloody flux. dysentery

31:49

and how it impacted the troops and

31:51

then we're going to finish off with

31:54

a look at the terror of the

31:56

pupuan jungle. How did the anophiles mosquito

31:58

almost bring New Guinea force to

32:01

the point of culmination.

32:03

So roll down your sleeves,

32:05

take your quinine and we'll

32:07

be back next week to

32:09

continue our look at the

32:12

medical factors in the Kakota

32:14

campaign. The Principles of War

32:16

podcast is brought to you

32:18

by Jane Zealand. The show

32:20

notes for The Principles of

32:22

War Podcasts. Follow us on

32:25

Facebook or tweet us at

32:27

surprise podcast. If you've enjoyed

32:29

this podcast, please leave a

32:31

review on iTunes and tag

32:33

a mate in on one

32:35

of our episodes. All opinions

32:38

expressed by individuals are those

32:40

of those individuals and not

32:42

of any organization.