Episode Transcript
Transcripts are displayed as originally observed. Some content, including advertisements may have changed.
Use Ctrl + F to search
0:00
Welcome to To The
0:02
Point Cybersecurity Podcast. Each week,
0:05
join Jonathan Nefer and Rachel
0:07
Lyon to explore the latest
0:10
in global cyber security news,
0:12
trending topics, and cyber industry
0:14
initiatives impacting businesses, governments, and
0:17
our way of life. Now,
0:19
let's get to the point.
0:21
Hello everyone. Welcome to this
0:23
week's episode of To The
0:26
Point podcast. I'm Rachel Lyon
0:28
here with my co-host, John
0:30
Nepper. Hi, Rachel, how are you doing?
0:32
I'm doing well, I'm doing well. You
0:34
know, I love to watch TV, I
0:36
love streaming services and I was dying
0:38
to ask you, particularly for today's
0:40
conversation, it's a little prescient, have
0:43
you been watching the Apple TV
0:45
show Prime Target at all? I have not,
0:47
but you'll have to tell me all about
0:49
it. Okay, I will. And you know,
0:51
the premise and I think today's
0:54
guest will have a lot of
0:56
thoughts on this in its validity,
0:58
but at... It's a mathematician getting
1:00
his PhD in Cambridge or something
1:02
like that and he's close to
1:04
cracking the code on crimes and
1:07
the implications of that are stirring
1:09
an international conspiracy and people are
1:11
out to get him because he's going
1:13
to crack the code on crimes and
1:15
what that means for encryption.
1:17
It's very very dramatic. I
1:19
don't know if it's true at all, but
1:21
it made me really want to learn more
1:23
about prime numbers. So
1:29
with that, we'll go ahead and
1:31
jump into introducing today's guest. I
1:33
am so excited to welcome Dr.
1:36
Bill Anderson. He is principal product
1:38
manager at Mattermost where
1:40
he drives innovation across sectors
1:42
including AI, quantum cryptography and
1:45
secure communications. He's also the
1:47
founder of Aculus Labs and
1:50
has deep experience in the
1:52
defense and intelligence communities. Welcome,
1:55
Bill. Thank you. Thanks for having me.
1:57
It's great to be here. So let's
1:59
get off with a fun, fun
2:01
question here. Looking at, you know,
2:04
disk, right, defense intelligence, security, and
2:06
critical infrastructure organizations, how are they
2:08
defining cyber resilience today and is
2:11
this significantly different than the approach
2:13
commercial organizations were taking? It's not
2:15
too different, but what, you know,
2:18
the focus is on national security
2:20
critical infrastructure for those disk organizations.
2:22
So their main difference would be
2:25
that they have to think about
2:27
a very, very highly capable adversary,
2:29
a nation-state that might be trying
2:32
to subvert our electricity supply or
2:34
break into classified networks to steal
2:36
things for various reasons. And it's
2:38
not that commercial doesn't have that
2:41
problem, too. Some elements of commercial,
2:43
too. If you're a bank. which
2:45
we actually consider critical infrastructure by
2:48
the way. But you know if
2:50
you're a bank of course very
2:52
very dedicated people are willing to
2:55
spend almost unlimited amounts of money
2:57
in order to drain unlimited amounts
2:59
of money from the bank. So
3:02
there's a cost reward sort of
3:04
equation there. But in the government
3:06
space you know defense intelligence in
3:09
particular There's a lot of benefit
3:11
to adversaries in in executing these
3:13
same kind of attacks and they're
3:16
infinitely valuable depending on how you
3:18
set your your metrics and so
3:20
When we're designing systems and defense
3:22
and response for them we have
3:25
to think It's possible that there
3:27
will be no holds barred in
3:29
going after this information and so
3:32
we have to get creative Which
3:34
by the way, unfortunately, isn't always
3:36
the case in the approach that
3:39
our governments take. But we should
3:41
be thinking the worst and planning
3:43
for the worst. The downside have
3:46
been this space along. time. They
3:48
don't always do that. And we've
3:50
actually seen the result of some
3:53
of those failures of imagination, of
3:55
bureaucracy, of the horrible slow acquisitions
3:57
process, of waste, of inefficiency, of
4:00
laziness. We see it. And unfortunately,
4:02
as I said, I hope that
4:04
didn't sound too negative, but I've
4:06
also been selling technology to government
4:09
for like 20 years. So, you
4:11
know, I've got a few scars.
4:13
So, but you know, the approach
4:16
is the things that they do,
4:18
the technologies that they buy are
4:20
actually largely the same. If it's
4:23
good to protect, you know, Bank
4:25
of America, it's probably good to
4:27
protect Department of State. And so
4:30
there's a lot of commonality in
4:32
security vendors selling with similar technologies.
4:34
The way it then gets applied
4:37
is the same. The way that
4:39
it's maintained is a little different.
4:41
And there's a lot more scrutiny
4:44
and management of sort of ongoing
4:46
analysis and response in the government
4:48
space. Not that they don't, again,
4:50
not that they don't do it
4:53
in industry, but there's just more
4:55
of it. The other thing that's
4:57
maybe a little bit different is
5:00
around collaboration. So in the commercial
5:02
space, there are these groups called
5:04
ISACs, ISACs, information sharing something. I
5:07
don't know what stands for. So
5:09
there'll be a Health Isaac, a
5:11
financial industry, Isaac, there's probably a
5:14
dozen of them or so. And
5:16
those are really great organizations and
5:18
they collaborate with each other. So
5:21
they'll set up an org that
5:23
everyone can trust, even though, let's
5:25
say 120 banks who might be
5:27
competitors wouldn't share other information. They
5:30
will share patterns of behavior. that
5:32
they're seeing. And that goes up
5:34
to the sort of central group
5:37
and the group says, hey, we're
5:39
seeing this kind of attack, this
5:41
kind of threat on these Midwestern
5:44
regional banks. Probably all the other
5:46
regional banks need to know about
5:48
this because it's going to follow
5:51
and go see them. Government can't
5:53
do that as much. There is
5:55
some information sharing among close allies,
5:58
but there isn't as, unfortunately, the
6:00
way that the international game is
6:02
played, allies who are not super
6:05
close allies might also be the
6:07
ones who are attacking us for
6:09
their own reasons. So there's a
6:11
little bit of competitive pressure there
6:14
to say, we won't tell everyone.
6:16
We're experiencing this right now. Because
6:18
by telling them. And unfortunately, I
6:21
worked closely with folks in the
6:23
intelligence industry for a while. You
6:25
learn that your questions actually reveal
6:28
a lot about your situation and
6:30
your knowledge. And so you really
6:32
don't want to reveal what's going
6:35
on. So that's one of the
6:37
big differences. You know, if your
6:39
Department of State or the DOD,
6:42
you'll talk to the experts. In
6:44
fact, you are often the experts.
6:46
You know, the NSA and cyber
6:49
command. is very much the most
6:51
expert organization around in this sort
6:53
of thing. So I'm sure that
6:55
they get advice from them, but
6:58
they don't go call up the
7:00
French government. I'm not taking on
7:02
the French government, but you don't
7:05
call the French government and say,
7:07
we're noticing this attack on our
7:09
servers. It's working. So there's a
7:12
difference. So what about for like
7:14
our listeners? What can they do
7:16
to create kind of a culture?
7:19
about cyber resilience and so on
7:21
within their organizations. Yeah, and this
7:23
my advice here goes, I'm probably
7:26
not giving advice to everyone who
7:28
needs, I mean, so a lot
7:30
of folks know this, but it
7:33
really does start at the top
7:35
if you're a private organization, but
7:37
a government as well. The leadership
7:39
has to have enough awareness and
7:42
stake and sort of authenticity in
7:44
prioritizing. cyber defenses. And what that
7:46
means is more than just saying
7:49
we have a mission to be
7:51
blah blah blah the most secure
7:53
you know government agency on the
7:56
planet. By the way they do
7:58
say that it's nonsense if they
8:00
don't follow through with listening to
8:03
what the experts are telling them.
8:05
And so when the experts say
8:07
things like the firewall that our
8:10
acquisitions program allowed us to buy
8:12
five years ago isn't enough anymore?
8:14
You don't say, well, we'll start
8:17
planning to do something better. And
8:19
that's, by the way, those are
8:21
five-year plans. Well, attackers move at
8:23
the speed of days and weeks.
8:26
So the acquisition's process is so
8:28
broken for solving these problems. It's
8:30
literally, it's laughable. It's actually laughable
8:33
that by the time someone's actually
8:35
able to get a solution in
8:37
place, it's probably two years old,
8:40
at best. Well, they're already breached.
8:42
They're already breached or what's worse.
8:44
There's already ways around them. So
8:47
it's not like as an attacker
8:49
myself, I don't go and try
8:51
to break the latest encryption algorithm.
8:54
It's usually pretty good, at least
8:56
if it's been open-sourced and analyzed
8:58
in public. What I do is
9:00
I look for the things you
9:03
didn't think about, and I go
9:05
in the open window on the
9:07
side of your house. Right. So,
9:10
you know, cryptography is often the
9:12
excellent lock that can't be picked.
9:14
And yet you've left the window
9:17
open because you didn't think to
9:19
do, you know, background checks on
9:21
the cleaners who are emptying the
9:24
garbage bins. By the way, a
9:26
lot of the garbage, a lot
9:28
of the government space actually does
9:31
think about that. That's not a
9:33
knock. They really do think about
9:35
stuff like that. But you have
9:38
to, so from the top down.
9:40
Listen to the experts. The experts
9:42
say things like, you know, we
9:44
need, you know, we're experiencing this
9:47
kind of threat right now. Our
9:49
own employees. are being fooled and
9:51
then subsequently impersonated by a fairly
9:54
sophisticated large language model attack or
9:56
an AI or a machine learning
9:58
enabled pattern is finding its way
10:01
in through our authentication systems. Like,
10:03
okay, you don't then call up
10:05
the acquisitions people and ask them
10:08
to figure it out because it
10:10
will take them five years before
10:12
they buy it. You have to
10:15
say, I understand my fact model,
10:17
I am seeing risks to our
10:19
systems, I'm going to fix them
10:22
right now. So that takes leadership.
10:24
The second thing is training. So
10:26
the DOD, for example, is staffed
10:28
primarily by 18 to 25 year
10:31
olds. So they don't come in
10:33
with a lot of experience in
10:35
making these systems secure. They have
10:38
to learn that on the job.
10:40
So you have to train them
10:42
and you have to think about
10:45
turnover as well. And this actually
10:47
applies in the rest of the
10:49
industry too. You just have to
10:52
think about turnover. You hire in
10:54
a new person at $120,000 a
10:56
year to do an important security
10:59
analyst job. That's great. They probably
11:01
don't know how to secure your
11:03
systems yet. So you have to
11:06
train them. And unfortunately they might
11:08
get hired by Amazon for 150K
11:10
in six months and then they're
11:12
gone. You've got to train somebody
11:15
new. So design the systems to
11:17
do sort of continuous training and
11:19
build the training into your systems.
11:22
And then the third thing I'll
11:24
say is that cyber response security
11:26
in general is a team sport.
11:29
You're bringing together many different sources
11:31
of information. So there's a whole
11:33
bunch of great like platforms, XDR
11:36
tools, security analysis capabilities. It'll say
11:38
this is what we see. We're
11:40
seeing these kinds of anomalies. We're
11:43
seeing this kind of trace. We're
11:45
getting information from an ISAC or
11:47
whatever. It feeds into the system.
11:50
What's the system? Where do your
11:52
people actually go to? do their
11:54
work. And so they need a
11:56
platform to go and work in.
11:59
How do I, let's say we're
12:01
at a manufacturing, a major manufacturing
12:03
site and our alarm start going
12:06
off and it appears that the
12:08
process management technology that's running our
12:10
factory or plant is gone awry.
12:13
We're under an attack. But we're
12:15
in a cloud. We don't know
12:17
exactly what's happening. We have to
12:20
figure it out. And we're not
12:22
even all there physically in the
12:24
same place. A lot of us
12:27
work remotely these days, or at
12:29
least we're not in the office
12:31
at 2 AM when this thing
12:34
happens. Where do your people go?
12:36
Well, they go to a secure
12:38
collaborative workflow platform where they can
12:40
talk to each other and then
12:43
they can integrate those data sources
12:45
and they can run a structured
12:47
workflow to say, oh, we've got
12:50
a procedure for this. And the
12:52
18-year-old who you hired last week,
12:54
who doesn't know anything yet, who
12:57
happens to be the one on
12:59
deck, says, ah, I need to
13:01
run the manufacturing flight, sort of
13:04
IT system is doing this. What
13:06
do I do? Click the big
13:08
green button, start the play, start
13:11
a channel to talk to people,
13:13
invite folks into the channel, notify
13:15
people who need to know, grab
13:17
the artifacts from your analysis tools.
13:20
create an audible record of the
13:22
things that you've done, and just
13:24
follow through as you deal with
13:27
the incident. So, you know, as
13:29
I said, leadership, training, and then
13:31
a tool to actually bring your
13:34
people together to make it work.
13:36
You know, you can't, in the
13:38
world of security today, and kind
13:41
of protecting the crown jewels, right?
13:43
I mean, data secure, you can't
13:45
escape it right now. It's a
13:48
really curious time with the exponential
13:50
creation of data, how do you
13:52
secure it, but also how do
13:55
you balance that with effective incident
13:57
response. Yeah, I would. say it's
13:59
not really a balance because it's
14:01
not an either or. It's not
14:04
that we are going to only
14:06
respond. That would be bad, right?
14:08
That's not efficient. Our files are
14:11
wide open and we'll spend all
14:13
day. No, we have to actually
14:15
secure it as well. So you
14:18
kind of have to do both.
14:20
But when I advise on a
14:22
situation, I would always start off
14:25
with, yes, the sky is following.
14:27
Your hair is on fire and
14:29
your staff are running around screaming.
14:32
Okay, understand. By the way, it
14:34
will be that way next week
14:36
too. Let us think about first
14:39
though, and this is if I'm
14:41
not trying to sell a security
14:43
product. So don't have my vendor
14:45
hat on. I have my advisor
14:48
hat on. Do you really understand
14:50
your threats? What is your threat
14:52
model? What is a reasonable threat
14:55
model for your organization? Because you
14:57
don't have unlimited budget to buy
14:59
all the tools. Even if you
15:02
did, you need to buy or
15:04
hire a ton of people to
15:06
operate them. So start off with
15:09
deciding how high up you need
15:11
to get in terms of security
15:13
before you start buying tools. Tools
15:16
are not the answer, right? And
15:18
understanding of the things that you're
15:20
likely to have to protect against
15:23
is the start. So, and again,
15:25
another good example, let's say you're
15:27
a consumer. consumer entertainment platform manufacturer.
15:29
Do you need to worry about
15:32
a nation-state attack hacking your systems?
15:34
Probably not. Maybe if you're Apple,
15:36
you do. Actually, I'm sure Apple's
15:39
got really excellent security. But if
15:41
you're some smaller vendor, it's not
15:43
have sort of global importance. By
15:46
the way, Apple does. So they
15:48
have to be really, really good
15:50
at this stuff. But if you're
15:53
someone else, you say, all right.
15:55
Yeah, we're not worried about North
15:57
Korea. you know, breaking into our
16:00
systems. You know, we're, so we
16:02
don't need to air gap everything
16:04
and do a background check on
16:07
our employees three times a year.
16:09
We don't need to do that.
16:11
We do need to do this
16:13
though, right? So we have compliance
16:16
requirements, we have reporting requirements, we
16:18
have, you know, HIPAA and various
16:20
other capabilities, you know, we have
16:23
personal information, have customer information, we
16:25
might have to comply with GDyPR
16:27
if we've got customers in Europe.
16:30
So you do have to get
16:32
up to that standard. But before
16:34
you just go shelling out money
16:37
is understand what you need to
16:39
do until you design the security
16:41
to do that. And then when
16:44
it comes to developing your incident
16:46
response, you tune that to the
16:48
threat model. No sense sitting there
16:51
looking for an army coming over
16:53
the hill if you're never, you
16:55
know, if you're, or no sense
16:57
designing a Navy if you're landlocked,
17:00
right? If you're just never going
17:02
to see that threat. And then
17:04
you have to also make that.
17:07
incident response program adaptive. Because what
17:09
will happen is eventually it'll tell
17:11
you what your threats are. You'll
17:14
be able to go back look
17:16
and say what's happened to us
17:18
over the last six months and
17:21
probably some really interesting things will
17:23
pop out like oh we didn't
17:25
realize that. We're actually getting attacked
17:28
in a way that we didn't
17:30
expect. And then that should inform
17:32
your budgeting for what your security
17:34
tools look like. So a good
17:37
example would be we decided to
17:39
let our employees use their own
17:41
BIOD laptops. And then it turned
17:44
out that since the laptops were
17:46
crossing the corporate boundary because we
17:48
gave them all the VPN so
17:51
they could get in and do
17:53
certain things. It started, we didn't
17:55
have a perimeter anymore. It also
17:58
turned out that our own networks
18:00
got used for file sharing. Right,
18:02
because our employees left their file
18:05
sharing applications on and all of
18:07
a sudden, right, we've got some
18:09
problems. So you would learn from
18:12
analyzing what the threats actually look
18:14
like. You buy integrated security systems,
18:16
so XDR, extended detection and response
18:18
platforms, buy that. first and foremost
18:21
by the collaboration platform the integration
18:23
one that has your people working
18:25
together and you know I'm dealing
18:28
with this issue what are you
18:30
doing I'm seeing this pattern great
18:32
can you give me the artifacts
18:35
great we've seen this before let's
18:37
look at the archives that we've
18:39
seen this last week we've got
18:42
an active response dealing like so
18:44
putting all those tools together and
18:46
and realizing that while you can
18:49
do automated response and sort of
18:51
continuous risk assessment, it's very much
18:53
requiring a human in the loop
18:56
on that. Because, you know, machine
18:58
learning and AI tools are great
19:00
for identifying things. They're not great
19:02
for really prioritizing them in context.
19:05
They should be, and I think
19:07
eventually they will be, but they'll
19:09
also send off a huge number
19:12
of false positives. So your humans
19:14
have to get involved in saying,
19:16
yeah, that's, you know. Okay, our
19:19
vending machines are getting hacked, but
19:21
we don't care about our vending
19:23
machines. They're still working for us.
19:26
So, but if instead it's your,
19:28
you know, it's your, you know,
19:30
CFO's personal laptop or work laptop
19:33
that's always under attack, that's a
19:35
different matter. So, so I come
19:37
back to thinking about like your
19:40
point here of how, you know,
19:42
the bad guys can basically have
19:44
infinite resources and, and, and, and.
19:46
And your comments too about how
19:49
you have to balance that, what
19:51
do you think there were the
19:53
main things that are holding organizations
19:56
back on appropriately defending themselves? Yeah.
20:00
I think that sometimes it's information
20:03
overload. It's very complex environment. There's
20:05
a lot going on where maybe
20:07
getting a lot of false positives
20:09
out of the tools that we
20:12
do have. And it can sort
20:14
of become overwhelming and that your
20:16
security team, if you have one,
20:18
hopefully you even have one, which
20:21
your security team is so busy
20:23
putting out fires that they can't
20:25
look at the big picture. And
20:28
I as a security practitioner sort
20:30
of feel for this problem because
20:32
I've also run a company before
20:34
and unfortunately you do have to
20:37
think about the budget and good
20:39
security people are expensive for a
20:41
reason. So, you know, and just
20:44
as advice to those organizations that
20:46
can't afford a full-time 200K a
20:48
year security expert, yeah, you're going
20:50
to need to outsource to an
20:53
MSSP. And that's probably really good
20:55
use of funds. So you're getting
20:57
basically a fractional expert, in fact,
20:59
what's even better. You're getting 20
21:02
fractional experts who know all the
21:04
things that you don't have time
21:06
to figure out. So yeah, so
21:09
it's that sort of information overload.
21:11
The second one I mentioned before
21:13
is the skills gap. Even if
21:15
you did have a full-time cybersecurity
21:18
professional, maybe they're expert in Windows
21:20
systems, but they're not expert in
21:22
mobile devices. or they're not expert
21:25
in Max, or they're not expert
21:27
in servers, or they're not expert
21:29
in networks. Right there, there's five
21:31
different subject areas that you can't
21:34
be expert on them all. So
21:36
there's that skills gap, training again,
21:38
support for the folks who are
21:40
doing the work. It helps, it's
21:43
necessary, but it probably, if you're,
21:45
and I've worked for, you know,
21:47
small private equity owned companies, yeah,
21:50
we never had enough money. Right?
21:52
To solve these problems. And then
21:54
the money had to go back
21:56
to pay for the death that
21:59
the private equity guys had taken
22:01
to buy the business right so
22:03
so do the do the best
22:06
you can and don't get hacked
22:08
it was kind of here's your
22:10
budget good luck we'll see you
22:12
next quarter when it's time to
22:15
send us a check so you're
22:17
saying hope is a strategy yeah
22:19
balance balance balance hope I have
22:22
another I have another approach I
22:24
have another approach if it was
22:26
up to me yes And I
22:28
hate to do this, you
22:30
guys, but we've come to the
22:33
end of today's episode. Please
22:35
come back next week as
22:37
we pick up part two
22:39
of our conversation with Bill Anderson.
22:41
And until next time, stay safe.
22:44
Thanks for joining us on the
22:46
To the Point Cybersecurity Podcast,
22:48
brought to you by Force
22:50
Point. For more information and
22:52
show notes from today's episode,
22:54
please visit forcepoint.com/podcast. And
22:57
don't forget to subscribe and leave
22:59
a review on Apple Podcasts or
23:01
your favorite listening platform.
Podchaser is the ultimate destination for podcast data, search, and discovery. Learn More