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0:56

I Aktung,

1:03

Aktung. Welcome to We're in Ways and

1:05

Making You Talk with Me, I'm Marie,

1:07

and James Holland. Your Second World War

1:09

podcast for all your Second World War.

1:11

Podcast, Needs, whatever they could be. And

1:13

Jim, we're joined today by a very,

1:15

very special guest. Someone who I think

1:17

is fair to say both of our

1:20

bookshelves have done a fair bit of

1:22

groaning thereof, his work. Certainly. drab,

1:26

which I found incredibly useful because I'm modelling

1:28

some Shermans at the moment and what this

1:30

guy doesn't know about Olive drab, it ain't

1:33

worth knowing I think it's fair to say.

1:35

So who will we join by today Jim?

1:37

It's Steve Saloga and I've got to say

1:39

I'm absolutely thrilled that you've joined us Steve,

1:41

I'm a massive fan, yes and Al's absolutely

1:44

right, I've got a ton of your books.

1:46

and you know as far as i'm concerned

1:48

you are the guru when it comes to

1:50

world war two armor you know you can

1:52

talk to the chieftain and obviously over here

1:55

we've got the brilliant David Willie but when

1:57

it comes to American hardware particularly wow you're

1:59

the man so welcome to the podcast and

2:01

thank you so much for coming on well

2:03

nice to talk to you guys and Steve

2:05

I mean we were just rabbiting away just

2:07

before we came on but I mean you

2:09

know where to begin I mean for my

2:11

money the Sherman tanks the kind of number

2:13

one tank of the war I seemed to

2:15

remember you once said it was the Pans

2:18

of three Let's start with that for an

2:20

opening gambit. I don't remember ever saying pans

2:22

are three, but if I had to pick

2:24

maybe the top three tanks of the war,

2:26

it would certainly be the Sherman, the T34,

2:28

and the pans are four. Oh, pans are

2:30

four. Okay. Let me give a reason

2:32

for that. I did a book a

2:34

number of years ago called Armour Champion,

2:36

the best tanks, World War II. And

2:38

what I argued there is that you

2:41

have to actually come up with two

2:43

categories. One category is the top tank

2:45

for commanders for commanders. And by that

2:47

I mean, what's the war winning tank?

2:49

What is the one that the big

2:51

commanders want to have because it allows

2:53

them to dominate the battlefield? So you

2:55

need, you know, the features that categorize

2:57

great tanks, you know, it's got to

2:59

have armor and firepower mobility, but it

3:01

also has to have reliability and it

3:03

has to have quantity. You have to

3:06

have a lot of them. So a

3:08

highly specialized tank like, say the Tiger

3:10

One or the M26 Pershing, it's not

3:12

going to be in that category. But

3:14

the other way to judge tanks would

3:16

be what I call the top tanker

3:18

pick. And by that I mean, you know,

3:20

if you're a tanker and you're sitting

3:22

in a tank, what do you want?

3:24

Well, you probably don't want a Sherman.

3:27

You really don't want a T34. You

3:29

want something with thicker armor, with a

3:31

bigger gun. So, you know, you want

3:33

a Tiger II, you want an IS2,

3:36

you want something like that. It's

3:38

kind of the criteria if you're

3:40

playing something like World of World

3:42

of tanks. But a tank commander

3:44

in Eisenhower or a patent is

3:46

not necessarily going to choose those

3:48

kind of tanks because oftentimes they're

3:50

few in number because they're so

3:52

expensive, their durability sometimes isn't that great.

3:54

So getting back to it, I would

3:57

say Sherman T34 pens are for for

3:59

the commanders pick. rather than the tankers pick.

4:01

It's always about pluses and minuses, isn't it? Because,

4:03

you know, you go for your bigger gun

4:05

and you go for the thicker armor, but that

4:07

then means it's heavier, which then means it's

4:09

kind of less easy to operate because it's more

4:11

complicated because the roads can't stand it. It

4:13

means, you know, if you're on the attack, that's

4:15

problematic because you've then got to have a

4:18

bridge that is capable of taking that extra weight,

4:20

you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

4:22

So it's always kind of sort of swings around

4:24

about us, isn't it? And, you know, you

4:26

put a Pershing on, well, that obviously takes up

4:28

more space than a Sherman. And a Liberty

4:30

ship, for example. So before we go any further,

4:32

and this is a staple of the internet,

4:34

we three here are talking about tanks, like we

4:36

all agree what that might be. Steve,

4:39

what is a tank? We have to

4:41

define the tank because after all, we've

4:44

just been looking at the Ardennes offensive.

4:46

And, you know, TDs come into that

4:48

battle quite comprehensively, particularly on the American

4:50

side. TD being tank destroyer. It's built

4:52

into their doctrine. It's part of their

4:54

anti -tank doctrine and part of their

4:56

sort of counter -attack doctrine. What is a

4:58

tank? Put us out of our misery,

5:00

Steve. It

5:02

does get hard to define because tanks

5:05

also spawn all sorts of variants.

5:07

So the Sherman tank also spawned self

5:09

-propelled Howitzers, you know, like the M7.

5:11

It spawned assault guns like the

5:13

M4105 millimeter, which looks like a tank,

5:15

but was classified by the Army

5:17

as an assault gun because it's intended

5:19

for indirect fire. Well, I'd say,

5:22

okay, first the weapon. It's a direct

5:24

-fire weapon. So that rules out self

5:26

-propelled artillery. Its main weapon is designed

5:28

for direct fire, you know, line

5:30

of sight fire. Armor, it has to

5:32

be fully protected because a tank

5:34

is a multi -purpose platform. It's got

5:37

to be able to fight in urban

5:39

environments and in close terrain. So

5:41

it rules out a lot of tank

5:43

destroyers which have very light armor

5:45

and have an open top because they

5:47

really don't need it. That's not

5:49

their role. And mobility, you know, okay,

5:52

tanks are very similar to other

5:54

vehicles. I don't think there's anything mobility

5:56

-wise that separates tanks from self -propelled

5:58

artillery or tank destroyers or vehicles of

6:00

that sort. So I would say

6:02

probably the... Big criteria is the fire power, direct fire weapon, the

6:04

arm protection. And let me throw on another one, which just occurred to

6:06

me. It has to have a turret as

6:09

far as I'm concerned. You know, because

6:11

once again, if it gets involved in

6:13

urban fighting or close terrain, you want

6:15

a turret to be able to reverse

6:17

the gun simply, as opposed to weapons

6:19

like the Sturngersch 3 assault gun, the

6:21

German assault gun, weapons like that. The

6:23

Soviet SU85 or SU100, which have a

6:25

fixed case mate. So I would use

6:27

that as another criteria. It should have

6:29

a turret. Fantastic, thank you. Seriously, that

6:32

we have done it. We've landed it.

6:34

Yes, but recently, Joey, who you saw

6:36

just a minute ago, our producer, got

6:39

us a tank to drive through the

6:41

centre of London as a kind

6:43

of PR stunt. And we haven't said

6:45

to people, well, well, it is a

6:47

tank, but it's not a tank,

6:50

because it's an M10. But that's

6:52

got a big gun, but it

6:54

hasn't got much armour. If you

6:56

think that that's bad, you probably

6:58

don't follow U.S. armored development in

7:00

the current period, but the U.S.

7:02

Army's latest armored fighting vehicle is

7:04

a thing called the M10 Booker. And

7:06

if you pop up a picture of

7:08

it, you look at it, you will

7:11

say it is a tank. It certainly

7:13

looks like a tank. The problem is

7:15

the Army does not define it as

7:17

a tank. They absolutely insist that it's

7:20

not a tank. It's something that they

7:22

call a mobile protected fire power. So

7:24

we're not the only ones who have

7:26

some difficulty defining this thing. Well, listen,

7:29

while we've mentioned tank destroyers, I mean,

7:31

tank destroy regiments and battalions and stuff,

7:33

they are unique to the US. I

7:35

mean, can we just talk a little

7:38

bit about that and explain to people

7:40

what they are and the concept behind

7:42

it and all the rest of it?

7:44

They started out alongside the first US

7:47

Army armored divisions in 194041, because before

7:49

194041, tanks in quotes were literally part

7:51

of the infantry branch. The cavalry also

7:53

had tanks, but they weren't called tanks.

7:56

They were called combat cars. So in

7:58

1940-41, the U.S. Army amalgamates both infantry

8:00

and cavalry into this new branch armored

8:02

force that create the armor divisions, the

8:04

separate tank battalions. At the same time,

8:07

after seeing what happens in France in

8:09

1940, the army says, well, we also

8:11

have to deal with the threat of

8:13

the Blitzkrieg of German Panzer divisions. And

8:15

the U.S. Armed Division is actually not

8:17

designed to fight panzer divisions. That's not

8:20

part of its doctrine. Its doctrine is

8:22

basically offensive. It's designed to do the

8:24

exploitation mission after the infantry has won

8:26

the breakthrough. So it's very much a

8:28

cavalry style mission because the early armor

8:30

force commanders are mostly cavalry officers. So

8:33

the rest of the army says, okay,

8:35

well, we still have this problem of

8:37

dealing with the panzers. So they set

8:39

up a separate branch from the armor

8:41

branch called tank destroyer command. And at

8:43

first there's a great debate as to

8:45

what the tank destroyer is going to

8:48

be. The head of army ground forces,

8:50

Leslie McNair, he says, he's an artillery

8:52

guy, he wants toad any tank guns.

8:54

He thinks that's very, very cost effective.

8:56

So you just use toading tank guns,

8:58

that deals with the Panzer threat. Yeah,

9:01

and that's what they've got in Tunisia,

9:03

isn't it? Exactly. And also they do

9:05

army maneuvers in the summer of 1940-41,

9:07

using toad anti-tank guns. The 37mm anti-tank

9:09

gun, which is the infantry's anti-tank gun,

9:11

and they took some old World War

9:14

I French 75s, modernized them, and they

9:16

were using those anti-tank guns. They find

9:18

that they're just not very effective because

9:20

guess what happens, you division has whatever

9:22

number, let's just say 30, and they,

9:24

so they stretch them out along the

9:27

divisional front, so at any point on

9:29

the divisional front, you only have a

9:31

handful of any tank guns. And so,

9:33

you know, the Pansers can mass and

9:35

overwhelm a handful of any tank guns.

9:37

So they come up with this idea

9:40

that the key is mobility. They have

9:42

to have an anti tank gun that

9:44

is very, very mobile. that once the

9:46

panzers appear and breakthrough you can mass

9:48

the anti-tank guns or rush them up

9:50

to the front and then counter the

9:53

panzer breakthrough. So that's where the idea

9:55

emerges of a tank destroyer that's a

9:57

vehicle and the emphasis there is speed

9:59

and not... So when you see the

10:01

early tank destroyers, some of them have

10:03

no armor at all. The M637mm is

10:06

literally just a truck with a 37

10:08

on it. The first of the 75s

10:10

is just a half track with very thin

10:12

armor and a. 75 and then the custom

10:14

built one start to appear the M10 with

10:16

a three inch gun and the M18 with

10:19

a 76 millimeter gun, then later the M36.

10:21

But there's controversy all through the war

10:23

about it. The tank destroyers don't perform

10:25

very well in Tunisia. Most of the

10:28

senior commanders say we don't want tank

10:30

destroyers. Tanks can do the job. So

10:32

that becomes a big doctrinal controversy all

10:35

through the war. Tanks to surers really

10:37

don't do that well. They do well

10:39

locally. I mean, there's certainly some instances

10:42

where tank destroyers battalions do extremely well,

10:44

but as a part of the bigger picture

10:46

of the U.S. Army, they're generally viewed as

10:49

having been unsuccessful, and they disappear after the

10:51

war. They hold a general board to inspect

10:53

lessons of the war. General board says,

10:55

no, tank destroyers are a failed concept.

10:57

We're going to use tanks to do

10:59

both missions, both the cavalry exploitation mission

11:01

as well as the tank defense mission.

11:04

Because at the end of the

11:06

bulged, Ike says these need to

11:08

all be self-propelled. Tank to straw

11:10

formations need to all be self-propelled.

11:13

The toad gun crews, they can't

11:15

keep up. They're not well enough

11:17

protected. They can't extract themselves for

11:19

danger as easily as the self-propelled

11:22

guns. That's right, isn't it? Yeah,

11:24

and the strange thing about the

11:26

fighting in the bulges is that

11:29

those toad battalions were actually a

11:31

1943. They actually appeared in 1943

11:33

after Tunisia because army ground forces

11:35

under McNair looks at the lesson

11:37

of Tunisia and says, well, look

11:39

at what the British did with

11:41

their six pounder anti-tank guns. Toad

11:43

anti-tank guns are the solution. And

11:45

so they actually go back and

11:47

convert a number of self-propelled tank-disturbed

11:49

Italians into toad battalions, and they

11:52

equip them with the toad three-inch anti-ante

11:54

tank gun. So there's two problems. Number

11:56

one, the toad concept is proves to

11:58

be not very good. And then secondly,

12:00

the three-inch toad anti-tank gun is horrible.

12:02

It's basically the carriage for the 105mm

12:04

howitzer, with a very, very large, very

12:07

heavy three-inch gun plopped on top of

12:09

it. It's not really an ideal anti-tank

12:11

gun. It's not comparable, for example, to

12:13

the German 75mm pack 40. which is

12:15

a much more compact, much more powerful

12:17

weapon. So they've got the worst of

12:19

both words. It's not the air cuff

12:21

gun repurposed, isn't it? Yeah, it's actually

12:23

a dual purpose gun. The original three

12:25

inch was both a naval gun, you

12:27

know, like a deck gun and an

12:29

anti-aircraft gun. It was not designed as

12:31

a dedicated anti-tank gun. It was just

12:33

a repurposed naval gun or anti-aircraft gun.

12:36

And as I say, it was put

12:38

on a fairly heavy, heavy, heavy carriage.

12:40

And as a result, it just wasn't

12:42

very successful. It was too heavy to

12:44

move around very easily. It had to

12:46

be moved by a prime mover. And

12:48

the whole concept of toad guns was

12:50

a failure. They were a failure in

12:52

Normandy. They had the toad battalions in

12:54

Normandy, mostly attached to infantry divisions. They

12:56

were widely hated, because you can imagine

12:58

having weapons like that in the Vekash

13:00

country. you know behind the hedgerows and

13:02

stuff and they they weren't flexible enough

13:04

to be used in that in that

13:07

environment and then in the the autumn

13:09

of 1945 it just didn't matter there

13:11

were no tanks around a shoot at

13:13

so finally the toad battalions have the

13:15

opportunity to prove themselves at the beginning

13:17

of the battle of bulge when the

13:19

Germans are attacked with large numbers of

13:21

tanks they're a complete failure they get

13:23

overrun there's any number of battalions that

13:25

just got overrun they're not very flexible.

13:27

And on the other hand, the 12

13:29

battalions and the Ardens actually do quite

13:31

well. There were a number of battalions

13:33

that really had absolutely stellar records. Well,

13:36

yeah, I mean, I'm just sort of,

13:38

you know, we've obviously been reading up

13:40

on the bulge recently and you know,

13:42

the amount of time in 36 is

13:44

Jackson's turn up with their 90 millimeter

13:46

gun and sort of. create havoc with

13:48

the German armor, I mean that seems

13:50

quite prevalent to me, maybe that's just

13:52

in the reading, I don't know. Well

13:54

it was partly because the M36 was

13:56

the most powerful, it had the most

13:58

powerful anti-tank gun of any U.S. armored

14:00

vehicle. It was basically the old M10,

14:02

but with a new turret with a

14:04

90mm gun. And it formed a stopgap

14:07

until they got the M26 Persians into

14:09

service, which don't start to appear until

14:11

February of 45. And the strange thing

14:13

is the M36 was actually not a

14:15

pick by the tank destroyer command.

14:17

It actually originated by the

14:19

armored fighting vehicle section at

14:22

Shafe Headquarters in London. These guys

14:24

were looking at the lessons. and saying we

14:26

want a more powerful weapon whether it's on

14:28

a tank destroyer or a tank they also

14:31

wanted the M26 Persian but army ground forces

14:33

when supported army ground forces would not support

14:35

a 90mm gun they said we have no

14:37

evidence from 1943 or from the Italian campaign

14:39

we need a more powerful gun and so

14:42

AFV section with shave headquarters comes up and

14:44

says you know to work around this they

14:46

said well we don't want it for fighting

14:48

tanks we want it to fight the Siegfried

14:51

line we're gonna use it as a bunker

14:53

buster And that was complete baloney. They knew

14:55

all along they wanted it for tank fighting,

14:57

but they couldn't get past the hurdle of

15:00

the bureaucracy in Washington. So they came up

15:02

with this phony thing, and AGF was forced

15:04

to do it, because AGF's doctrine was, if

15:06

the front wants it, then we've got to

15:09

do it. So they rushed these M36

15:11

to service, they started appearing in Europe in

15:13

September, October, and they're immediate success, because they're

15:15

so powerful, and they're the only weapon that

15:18

can really deal with a German panther

15:20

panther tank. The 76 millimeter on the

15:22

Sherman, unless you have HVAP ammunition,

15:24

is not very successful. And the other, the

15:26

other tank destroyers with the three inches

15:28

and the 76 are not successful. So

15:30

the M36 is the only thing out

15:32

there where you can reliably kill Panthers.

15:34

The M10 is the Sherman Shassivearit, isn't it?

15:36

And it's got that angled armor because

15:38

it's a lot more lightly armored. They're

15:40

trying to make the most of the

15:42

surface area, aren't they, by having it

15:44

in those sort of geometric shapes, right?

15:46

That's exactly it, but it's very thinly

15:48

armored. The armor on it will protect

15:50

against something like a heavy machine gun,

15:52

but it won't protect even against very

15:54

light tank guns, you know, 37 millimeter

15:56

or that sort of thing. It was

15:58

just intended to defend. tank destroyers was they

16:01

were going to sort of sit off and

16:03

fire somewhat from ambush. They weren't expected to

16:05

get into a knockdown dragout fight with tanks

16:07

at close range so the armor was fairly

16:09

modest. It was it was less than what

16:11

was on a Sherman. Yeah yeah yeah and

16:13

the crews know it of course that's the

16:16

thing. Well they have no roof over their

16:18

head. I mean that's the other thing. The

16:20

open fighting compartment goes through all the tank

16:22

destroyer designs. Always strikes me as a very

16:24

hairy hairy. design solution. You know, obviously it's

16:26

about getting the weight down and it's about

16:28

getting the bigger, larger breach of the gun

16:30

in the into a turret and all those

16:33

sort of things. But goodness me, you know,

16:35

it makes a survivability in that vehicle a

16:37

lot lower, doesn't it? Surely. Oh, exactly. And

16:39

the problem is that the way that the

16:41

tank destroyer battalions were used during World War

16:43

II is that typically a battalion to be

16:45

attached to an infantry division. Well, the problem

16:47

is that the infantry guys really didn't know

16:50

how to use either the tank tank or

16:52

the tank destroyer baton. There was no doctrine.

16:54

The first field manual doesn't come out until

16:56

March 44. And that really didn't address the

16:58

problem. And so the infantry guys tend to

17:00

use the tank destroyers the same way they

17:02

use the tanks. So they go and send

17:04

them right up to the front. You know,

17:07

so the guys in the tanks at least

17:09

have protection over their heads. So, you know,

17:11

if you're dealing, you know, you know, you

17:13

know, you know, you know, you know, you

17:15

know, you know, you know, you know, you

17:17

know, you know, you know, you know, common

17:19

problem, you know, you know, you know, common

17:21

problem, you know, you know, you know, common

17:24

problem, you know, you know, you know, you

17:26

know, you know, common problem, you know, common

17:28

problem, you know, you know, you know, common,

17:30

you know, you know, you You know, especially

17:32

in France, that's one of the most deadly

17:34

weapons in close and fighting. Whereas the poor

17:36

tank destroyer crews, you know, they're completely exposed

17:38

to small arms fire, and especially to mortar

17:41

fire, and of course, artillery fire. And so

17:43

our tank destroy a battalion, do they suffer

17:45

proportionally much more than tank battalions? Well, actually

17:47

what ends up happening is that in getting

17:49

back to this unfortunate case of tank destroyers

17:51

battalions, The infantry divisions usually get stuck with

17:53

the towed tank destroyer battalions. And what ends

17:55

up happening is that they're so awful, especially

17:58

in the first six weeks in Norman... where

18:00

the US Army is fighting in the hedgerows.

18:02

The infantry divisions try using them in

18:04

the hedgerows and their complete failure. And

18:06

so all that happens is that those

18:08

tank disturbance, the towed ones, are put

18:11

under divisional artillery. And they're simply used

18:13

to reinforce the divisional artillery. They're

18:15

not used for direct fire support

18:17

of the four infantry regiments. They're

18:19

just used as artillery. So that

18:21

issue really doesn't come up that

18:23

often. There are a handful of

18:25

self-propelled tank destroyer Italians that are

18:27

serving infantry units. but there's not

18:29

enough to really form any hard

18:31

and fast rules. Interesting. You

18:33

can see so much American doctrine

18:36

is written in reaction to what

18:38

people think happened in France in

18:40

1940, solving the problem of an

18:42

armored breakout like that, of that

18:44

situation. But obviously, as everyone's

18:46

been figuring out how to deal with that

18:49

problem, to a certain degree, they don't really

18:51

know, do they have a fair guess? No,

18:53

they don't. That's one of the US

18:55

Army's biggest problems during World War

18:57

II is... the whole issue of

18:59

translating military intelligence into actionable stuff

19:01

as far as technology as far

19:03

as tank technology or any tank

19:05

technology. It goes back to Spanish

19:07

Civil War. Spanish Civil War happens

19:09

in 1936 and the US is

19:11

paying very close attention to it

19:13

or trying to, but they really don't know. I

19:16

did a book some years ago about tanks and

19:18

Spanish Civil War and I looked at US

19:20

Army, what they thought were the lessons of

19:22

tanks in Spanish Civil War. It was a

19:24

gigantic mess. They had no idea. And as

19:27

you pointed out, if you go and look at

19:29

the Battle of France, they have no

19:31

clue what was happening. I'll give you

19:33

a specific example. One of the lessons

19:36

of the U.S. Army from the Battle

19:38

of France was, we have to build

19:40

heavy tanks because the German success was

19:43

based on heavy tanks. Now you may

19:45

ask, as anybody, from the contemporary perspective,

19:47

will, where were the heavy tanks? Yeah.

19:50

So smattering of Pansafors, and that's about

19:52

it, isn't it? When you, Right, yeah,

19:54

exactly. And it was quite honestly a

19:56

passenger force a medium tank even by

19:58

US definition. So. There was some real

20:01

problems that, you know, this whole controversy

20:03

about why the Sherman tank didn't get

20:05

a better gun, you know, in the

20:07

middle of the war in 1943-44, it

20:09

largely around, was around that issue. There

20:11

were serious misunderstandings of what the Germans

20:14

were doing. So for example, the US

20:16

Army did know about the Panther tank

20:18

as early as the summer of 1943

20:20

because they show up at the Battle

20:22

of Kursk, and there's military out of

20:24

Shays in Moscow, and they see captured

20:26

examples of the Panther tank. But U.S.

20:29

military intelligence makes a singular failure of

20:31

judgment. They view the Panthers just being

20:33

like the Tiger, just an uncommon heavy

20:35

tank. We're not going to encounter them

20:37

very often, just as the U.S. Army

20:39

didn't encounter the Tiger very often, and

20:41

either North Africa or Sicily or Italy.

20:44

So there's this attitude on the Panther,

20:46

who cares? Of course, it's very different

20:48

in 1945 when they get to Normandy,

20:50

but that's another issue. how fascinating because after

20:52

all everyone's responding to Blitzkrieg and armored warfare

20:54

but an idea of it rather than really

20:56

knowing what it is you can see why

20:59

you might come up with the tank destroyer

21:01

conception but then when you act feed it

21:03

into the reality of battle and the reality

21:05

of experience and also there is also the

21:07

gap between industry being able to keep up

21:09

with the demands of warfare so you know

21:11

self-propelled anti-tank gun that tank destroyer rather than

21:13

a toad gun there you go there's a

21:16

thing that you can make the concept prove

21:18

prove itself prove itself but that isn't possible

21:20

until much later in the war. So there's

21:22

always the lag, isn't there, between conception, what

21:24

industry can deliver for you, and then actually

21:26

putting it into place on the battlefield? And

21:28

you have the double problem with the United

21:30

States, with the time factor, because of the

21:33

distances involved. So it's not only, you know,

21:35

the time it takes to get those lessons

21:37

back to Detroit or wherever. Then on top

21:39

of that, you've got to ship the stuff

21:41

3,000 miles. So, you know, the logistic issue

21:43

becomes a major factor. That adds probably another

21:45

four or five month delay on the introduction

21:47

of new technology. Extraordinary. I'll tell you what,

21:50

we'll take a very quick break and then

21:52

we'll come back, this is fantastic brain food,

21:54

isn't it? Oh, isn't it

21:56

amazing? Yeah. Just what

21:58

we wanted. We'll see

22:00

you all in a

22:02

second. Welcome

22:14

back to We Have Ways to Make You Talk

22:16

with me, Al Murray and James Holland and

22:18

our very special guest, Steve Zaloga. How mean we've

22:20

defined what a tank is. We're getting to

22:22

the bottom of the tank destroyer principle. Exactly. And

22:24

actually, I'll be fairly enough, this explains something

22:26

we were discussing when we were in the bulge

22:28

from one of the accounts you'd been reading,

22:30

Jim, which said, tank destroyers, including towed anti -tank

22:32

pieces. And we were thinking, well, they're

22:34

just towed anti -tank pieces. How

22:36

are they tank destroyers conceptually? Well,

22:38

no, he said a towed tank

22:40

destroyer battalion and an anti -tank battalion.

22:43

What's the difference? Oh, in the US Army,

22:45

if I said a towed anti -tank battalion,

22:47

that's actually not the term. The term

22:49

is simply tank destroyer battalion. They don't use

22:51

the term anti -tank battalion. So there's only

22:53

one type. Okay. So maybe the historian

22:56

in question that wrote that line had just

22:58

got that wrong. It's just two tank

23:00

destroyer battalions. You feel the need to clarify.

23:02

It's just the point, isn't it? Because

23:04

in people's minds now, tank destroyers are tracked

23:06

vehicles, aren't they? With the M10s, M36s,

23:08

that's what people think they are. And

23:11

so you might feel the need to

23:13

distinguish for the reader now and say, towed

23:15

anti -tank weapons. I could see why it

23:17

would happen, Jim. But, Steve, do you

23:19

think if there's a sort of a conceptual

23:21

failure of the tank destroyer battalion principle

23:23

or the tank destroyer arm, what do you

23:25

use instead for your anti -tank guns? Well,

23:28

let me go back and mention one

23:30

little detail before I get into that. And

23:32

that is there are anti -tank units in

23:34

the US Army, but they're not battalions.

23:36

The divisional anti -tank units are called anti -tank

23:38

units. So if you're in an infantry

23:40

division and you have an anti -tank company, it

23:42

is called an anti -tank company. Tank destroyers

23:44

are those battalion -sized formations. Right. Okay. But

23:47

getting to the issue of what you

23:49

use instead of tank destroyers, you use a

23:51

better tank with a better tank gun.

23:53

And as I said, one of the reasons

23:55

that the US, especially in the bulge,

23:57

is having problems with the Panther is not

23:59

so much a doctrinal problem as far

24:01

as how you use your tanks,

24:04

it's a problem that in 1943,

24:06

when for example the British Army

24:08

is adopting the Sherman Firefly or

24:10

starting to develop the Sherman Firefly,

24:12

the US Army is not doing that.

24:14

There's a real failure in 1943 of

24:16

the US Army failing to show foresight

24:18

into what they're going to face the

24:20

way German tanks in the summer 44

24:22

year later. They don't sit back and

24:24

say, you know, maybe we ought to

24:27

think about the future threat. Instead, they

24:29

say in North Africa, in Sicily, in

24:31

Italy, all these places we've seen the

24:33

same threat. Basically, Panzer Force, the 75mm

24:35

gun, and a smattering of tiger-heavy tanks.

24:37

So they say, okay, France, it's going

24:39

to be the same thing. We don't

24:41

need anything better. So we'll stick with

24:43

the Sherman of the 75mm gun. Now

24:45

the British Army takes a different point

24:47

of view. They've been in the business

24:50

longer, so they've seen the Germans go

24:52

from 37mm, any tank guns to 50mm,

24:54

to 75mm. They've seen the escalation of

24:57

German tank armor. So they do show

24:59

foresight and they figure out, well, okay,

25:01

you know, we're okay dealing with pans

25:04

before us now, but we're starting to

25:06

see tigers. We probably will face a

25:08

new tank threat in France in France

25:11

in 1945, 1940. The US Army doesn't

25:13

do that. They adopt the 76mm gun

25:15

at this point in time, thinking, well,

25:17

that's going to be good enough without

25:19

really figuring out whether it can penetrate

25:21

the armor of a future tank like

25:23

the Panther. And the answer is it

25:25

can't. So there's a failure of

25:28

military intelligence that occurs, the linkage

25:30

between military intelligence and tank technology

25:32

in the summer of 43, that

25:34

gives the US Army in the

25:37

summer 1944 inadequate tanks. There should

25:39

have been a US tank in the

25:41

summer of 1945 that had a better

25:43

gun, whether it was a 90mm or

25:45

whether it meant going for high velocity

25:48

armor piercing, so-called H-Vap ammunition sooner, so

25:50

you can kill Panthers with H-Vap ammunition,

25:52

there should have been something done. And

25:54

so, of course, by the late summer,

25:57

there's a big rush to do things

25:59

in the... The big rush includes the

26:01

H-FAP high-velocity ammunition, it includes the new

26:03

M36, 90mm tank destroyer, it involves speeding

26:06

up the adoption of the M26 Pershing,

26:08

there's a whole number of things. So

26:10

the US Army has a glitch in

26:13

the summer of 43 that manifests itself

26:15

in the summer of 1945. Why do

26:17

you think that is? Because after all

26:19

they pick up the six pounder quickly

26:22

enough and the British have a very

26:24

good war with the six pound, you

26:26

know the ammunition keeps a pace, you

26:29

get the fin stabilized rounds, all that

26:31

sort of stuff and actually they're discarding

26:33

Sabo, you know all this sort of

26:36

stuff that's coming in that the British

26:38

are getting right? Why do you think

26:40

that is? Is it simply that the

26:42

Americans have been fighting the Germans not

26:45

as long as the British have not

26:47

dealing with armour as much and just

26:49

aren't up to speed in the speed

26:52

in the thinking? What is it? What's

26:54

a number of things? I'll give you

26:56

an example. The reason that the US

26:58

adopts the six pounder as the 57

27:01

millimeter any tank gun is it was

27:03

already in production in the United States

27:05

for Lindley's. The 57 is manufactured in

27:08

the United States before the 57 is

27:10

manufactured in the United States before it's

27:12

used by the US Army. The British

27:15

mission over in Washington says we'd like

27:17

you to manufacture the United States at

27:19

the same time. I'm certain that the

27:21

17 pounder would have been stuck in

27:24

the Sherman. There would have been no

27:26

problem with it. Okay, so let's go

27:28

back to why aren't 17 pounds being

27:31

made? Because the British don't need them

27:33

to make 17 pounders? Yeah, the British

27:35

mission never asked the United States to

27:37

manufacture 17 pounders. So, why aren't the

27:40

Americans looking at this 17 pounder as

27:42

a tank gun? Because the 17-pounder doesn't

27:44

get mounted in a Sherman, even in

27:47

the UK, until December 1943. So for

27:49

the US, it's too late. You know,

27:51

even if in December 1943, the US

27:53

had said it and said, hey, that's

27:56

a great idea, let's put the 17-ponder

27:58

in the Sherman. December of 43 is

28:00

just too late. Got out. They had

28:02

seen 17 pounders in Tunisia because the

28:05

British army had used them in Tunisia,

28:07

but there wasn't this feeling, largely because

28:09

of the lessons of Sicily and Italy,

28:11

that it was needed. Because the US,

28:13

you know, when they fight in Sicily, you know,

28:15

they encountered tigers in small numbers and same

28:18

thing in Italy, but they didn't feel that

28:20

there was a need for a more powerful

28:22

anti-tank gun. And once again, this

28:24

is a lack of foresight. Is that

28:27

on McNair's watch? Leslie McNair's watch. The

28:29

failing is him and his team. Yes,

28:31

it has far more to do with

28:34

army ground forces than it does with

28:36

ordinance. The ordinance department, which is are

28:38

the people, the engineers who are developing

28:40

new weapons, they have been pushing through

28:43

the war for more powerful tank guns.

28:45

That's amazing. So ordinance is going, you

28:47

know, you need something with greater velocity,

28:49

with a bigger shell. They put a

28:52

76mm in the Sherman in 1942. Hardly

28:54

had the Sherman's begin to appear, but

28:56

ordinance was sticking a 76mm gun in. And

28:58

the strange thing is that everybody took a

29:00

look at it and said the barrels too

29:03

long, the early 76mm was a very long

29:05

barrel, sort of like what you see on

29:07

a panther. So they had very good armor

29:09

penetration. Some people looked at it,

29:11

it said the barrels too long, it's going

29:13

to go and stick on the ground, cut

29:15

the barrel down. And so the 76mm

29:17

gun that eventually appears in the Sherman

29:19

has inferior anti-tank performance because the barrel

29:21

was too long and it'll bounce into

29:24

the ground. There just wasn't the feel

29:26

that they needed a high performance anti-tank

29:28

gun. Once again, it had to do

29:30

with looking at the present and not

29:33

at the future. There was just this

29:35

general failure to anticipate the threat. But

29:37

is that also because in 1943, their

29:40

only experience of fighting the Germans is

29:42

Tunisia, well, before Sicily. So actually, I

29:44

mean, you know, it's easy to forget

29:46

that America doesn't get into war

29:49

until December 1941. It's not actually

29:51

meeting any Germans on the ground,

29:53

apart from the kind of smattering

29:55

that go to DiAP. Until November 1942

29:58

1942. So yeah, it's a letter. of

30:00

November 1942 because the start of it

30:02

they're just finding the vision French. So

30:04

you're almost in 1943 by that point.

30:06

Yeah exactly it's so late that very

30:08

little can be done. So decisions are

30:10

being made in the summer of 1943

30:12

on experiences only just happened? Unless it's

30:15

a big emergency it takes the US

30:17

probably about a year to get a

30:19

new weapon into service and once again

30:21

it's this tyranny of time. even during

30:23

the war. And it's because it not only

30:25

takes the development time, but of course you

30:28

have to prepare the new ammunition, you've got

30:30

to train people, you've got to get the

30:32

maintenance people up to speed, and then it

30:34

takes time to ship, you know, you've got

30:37

the intercontinental distances that are involved. Now there

30:39

are cases where things get very very high

30:41

priority and it gets done quickly. So for

30:44

example in the case of the M36, there

30:46

is an urgent requirement put forward by the

30:48

US tank people in London. who say they

30:50

want the M36, they want the M12 supplemental

30:53

guns, and they want the M43, 2s,

30:55

the assault tank, the Sherman that has

30:57

all that extra armor on it. They

30:59

talk about that in the late autumn

31:01

of 1943, and they get that stuff sort

31:03

of the middle, the later part of

31:05

the summer of 1945. So they get

31:07

it in roughly nine months. And those

31:09

are sort of emergency bases.

31:11

The real emergency basis one,

31:14

the fastest example, was the DD

31:16

tank for Normandy. That requirement doesn't emerge

31:18

until about November, December, 1943. And basically,

31:21

Devers, who headed the ETO USA at

31:23

the time, he got in direct touch

31:25

with Marshall and said, this is urgent.

31:27

For Operation Neptune, we need these DD

31:30

tanks to land in the assault waves.

31:32

And so they give it a AAA

31:34

priority. And so they start literally in

31:37

January, and they deliver the first DD

31:39

tanks in March. Three months later, and

31:41

the first ones appear in England in

31:43

April. So it only took four months

31:46

roughly from the start of the program

31:48

to tanks turning up in the UK.

31:50

But that was AAA rating. That

31:52

was the equivalent of the A-bomb.

31:55

And so most tank programs don't

31:57

get AAA rating, but the DD

31:59

tank did. This is as much to

32:01

do with because of these great long

32:03

supply chains that McNair is thinking, I

32:05

just want to keep things simple. If

32:07

I'm reintroducing new ammunition in a new

32:09

weapon, we're going to have to start

32:11

retrain people all over again. You see

32:13

that often enough in the British Army

32:15

where they think, well, we've got people

32:17

trained to a standard on this, changing

32:19

things. Jim, we've talked about the soft

32:21

Montgomery's attitude to tactical doctrine. You know,

32:23

his view is, I've got a system

32:25

now. It's worked out and it fits

32:27

the limitations of the people I'm being

32:29

provided with by the army. If I

32:31

have to change anything, we're just starting

32:33

again and will it work and whereas

32:35

this works within the tolerances that I'm

32:37

prepared to run an army on and

32:39

I've got other things to worry about

32:41

as well. Is it as much that

32:43

you think? But it also goes down

32:45

to numbers again, doesn't it? That point

32:47

that Steve is making right at the

32:50

beginning. Numbers mean a huge amount. Most

32:52

prevalent German tank of the war, if

32:54

I remember rightly, was the Pansa for,

32:56

and I think they only make about

32:58

8,000 of them, make about 6,000 Pampfas,

33:00

they only make 1,347 Tigers and 492

33:02

King Tigers, in total, compared with 49,000

33:04

Germans and 74,000 Sherman holes, you know,

33:06

or 84,000 team 34s. I mean, numbers,

33:08

it has a value all of its

33:10

own, doesn't it. And also, the other

33:12

thing is numbers also means you've got

33:14

parts, you've got parts, you've got parts.

33:16

you can cross those apart and a

33:18

tank can be on a battlefield you

33:20

can whisk it off again because it's

33:22

got damaged and you can take one

33:24

that's been knocked out but it might

33:26

have the tracks you need for the

33:28

one that's just lost a track when

33:30

you've got those kind of numbers it

33:32

just gives you such an advantage and

33:34

an ability to maintain these beasts in

33:36

the field which of course is so

33:38

important and that's the sort of the

33:40

Achilles heel of the highly specialized short

33:42

production form tank like a king tiger

33:44

or a tiger or a pamper where

33:46

You haven't really got the numbers, they're

33:48

incredibly complex, if anything goes wrong in

33:50

the battlefield, you've got a massive headache

33:52

on your hand. You have to also

33:54

realize, and I'm sure you do, that

33:56

the US Army that goes into France

33:58

in 1945 is largely a green... an

34:00

experienced army. Yeah, of course, it's such a

34:03

good point. Except for first infantry

34:05

division, you know, there's hardly anybody

34:07

who's that experienced. If you take a look

34:09

at the tank units, there's really only two

34:12

tank units that any experience, the 70th tank

34:14

battalion, which is. just a tiny little tank

34:16

battalion. They had landed in North Africa and

34:18

then they fight in Sicily. Weren't they even

34:20

on Stewart's if I remember right? Only the

34:22

7th? Yeah, it was a light tank battalion

34:24

down on the med. In that time they've

34:27

been, since Sicily, they've also switched from Stewart's

34:29

to Sherman, so they've got a new tank

34:31

as well. Yeah, and they land on Utah

34:33

Beach. And then the other tank unit is

34:35

second armor division landed in North Africa, but

34:37

didn't really fight that much, and then,

34:40

and then, and then, they land again,

34:42

again, again, again, again, again, again, again,

34:44

again, again, again, again, again, again, armor

34:47

divisions that serve in France in 1945.

34:49

They're the only ones who had any

34:51

experience at all before they got up

34:54

to France. Isn't that amazing? I've just

34:56

not stopped to consider that. You know,

34:58

so when they're talking Sherman tanks, you

35:00

know, everybody's been trained on Sherman tanks

35:03

and everybody's been trained. Well, I'll give

35:05

you the other direct example. In April

35:07

of 1945, ordinance delivers 120 Sherman's with

35:09

76 millimeter guns to the UK. So

35:11

they go to all the tank battalions

35:13

that are training over in the UK

35:15

and they say, okay, you guys, who

35:18

wants this brand new tank with this

35:20

powerful new anti-tank gun? And everybody raised

35:22

their hand and said, we don't want to have

35:24

anything to do with it. There's two reasons

35:26

for it. Number one reason is, we've just

35:28

finished training all these guys. We don't

35:30

want a new thing that we're going

35:32

to have to train everybody on and we

35:34

don't want another logistics train where we're going

35:37

to have two different logistics train where

35:39

we're going to have two different logistics train

35:41

where we're going to. They didn't like the

35:43

76mm gun because when you go for high

35:45

performance anti-armor weapons, they have high velocity

35:48

projectiles. High velocity projectiles

35:50

can't carry a lot of

35:52

high explosive, whether it's a panther

35:54

or a firefly. And you need H.E. don't

35:56

you? You need H.E. And the guys in

35:59

the tank potential. in the armored visions,

36:01

they wanted the 75mm guns and the

36:03

Sherman's because they fired a high explosive

36:05

round that had almost twice as much

36:07

high explosive as the 76mm. 76mm was

36:10

great for shooting at armored targets, but

36:12

it was lousy for shooting at the

36:14

targets you usually shoot at. which is,

36:16

you know, troops and trucks and buildings

36:19

and stuff like that. There's hardly any

36:21

tank-on-tank actions, I mean, you know, comparatively.

36:23

And the British are in the same

36:25

tangle with a six pounder in Churchill's

36:28

as well, because it can't fire a

36:30

decent enough HE round. Everyone's got this

36:32

problem. And you go back to John

36:35

Semkin in his 75 Sherman turning around

36:37

the corner facing off a tiger tank

36:39

at 300 yards and beating it, and

36:41

beating it. He doesn't destroy the tank,

36:44

but he makes the crew bail out

36:46

and surrender. He don't need to destroy

36:48

it. He gets proved in the US

36:50

case, because the first time the US

36:53

faces a large tank-on-tank battle, the US

36:55

really has no large tank-on-tank battles in

36:57

Normandy. There's certainly encounters with German tanks,

36:59

but there's no big battles. Not like

37:02

what the British face around Khan. So

37:04

the first one occurs in Lorraine with

37:06

Pan's third army in a September when

37:08

the Germans launched that local Lorraine-Panser counter-refensive.

37:11

And so Fourth Armour Division faces a

37:13

number of German Panzer Brigades, and they

37:15

absolutely trounce them. The Panzer Brigades had

37:17

brand new Pantherss, and Fourth Armour didn't

37:20

have the new 76 millimeters or hardly

37:22

any of the new 76 millimeters. They

37:24

had all the old Shermans with the

37:26

75s. They had no problems dominating the

37:29

Germans and the reason had to do

37:31

with experience. The fourth armored vision was

37:33

first of all very well led by

37:35

John Wood. Number two, very well trained.

37:38

It had been in business since 1942.

37:40

So the cruiser experience and they had

37:42

gone enough experience without suffering heavy losses

37:44

in France. They were with third army

37:47

so they went racing down into Brittany.

37:49

They did not take heavy losses down

37:51

in Brittany. Then they took part in

37:53

the great race. you know, across past

37:56

the same river. So they got a

37:58

lot of experience and operate. tanks day

38:00

to day without suffering very heavy casualties.

38:03

So they show up in Lorraine very

38:05

well experienced, they know how to operate, very

38:07

well trained in things like tank gunnery. You

38:09

know, they didn't suffer a lot of crew losses,

38:11

so they knew not only how to use the

38:13

tank gun, but they knew how to use the

38:16

Sherman stabilizer, which is hard to use for inexperienced

38:18

crews, but forth had very good crews. And

38:20

so they knew how to use the tank

38:22

stabilizer, so they could, if not fire on

38:25

the move, at least keep the gun pointed

38:27

while they were moving. And the Germans we

38:29

were exactly the opposite. The Pants of Regades

38:32

are this new formation that Hitler had formed

38:34

in the summer of 44. It's a very

38:36

slap dash organization. The crews don't have very

38:38

much training. They weren't together very long. And

38:40

so you run up into a situation where

38:43

you have one side, the US Army side,

38:45

which doesn't have the better equipment, but has

38:47

the better training. And then on the other

38:49

side, you have the team that has

38:51

the better equipment, but they're poorly trained

38:54

and poorly led. and tactics and

38:56

training have a lot more to

38:58

do with victory and tank fighting

39:00

than the technology does. Yeah, that's

39:02

such a great line and that's

39:04

so true. That's why Semkin wins

39:07

against that Tiger. But that encounters

39:09

200 German vehicles lost for the

39:11

sort of 41. It's that proportion

39:13

of defeat that the Germans endure, isn't

39:15

it? Yeah, the brigades that were involved

39:18

in the arena are basically just, I

39:20

mean, shattered in the rain, in the

39:22

rain are basically just, I mean, shattered,

39:24

But you know it's one of the

39:27

problems that you know countries face now

39:29

isn't it I mean you know Britain

39:31

has these incredibly complicated armored fighting vehicles

39:33

and tanks and doesn't have very many

39:35

of them because they're incredibly

39:38

expensive to make they're incredibly complex and

39:40

you know they just can't afford them

39:42

you know and if anything happens to

39:44

them they're gone whereas you can have

39:46

a lesser tank with greater numbers that

39:48

can do the job that you want it

39:50

to do for the most part. just as effectively.

39:53

Yes, but I mean part of that's a function

39:55

of the fact that the vehicles we have now

39:57

are peacetime purchases aren't they? So they've got to

39:59

last where Whereas what's the life expectancy of

40:01

an M4, you know, when that rolls

40:03

off the production line, how long in

40:05

battle might that last? I mean, a

40:07

day even. I mean, this is the

40:10

thing, whereas they're not being designed to

40:12

last forever, like a Challenger 3 conception,

40:14

some of those chassis are going to

40:16

be very, very old because they're peacetime

40:18

vehicles. The last U.S. Abrams tank, I'm

40:20

one Abrams tank that was built, was

40:22

roughly 1990. So that was roughly 35

40:24

years ago. What the U.S. has been

40:26

doing since then has simply been rebuilding

40:28

the same halls. They have a facility

40:30

down in Aniston. They go and take

40:32

the tank part. They strip it down

40:34

to the basic armor hall, basic armor

40:36

turret, and then rebuild it. And so,

40:38

you know, you see, you know, the

40:40

U.S. is selling brand new Abrams tank

40:42

to Poland or to whoever, whoever, whoever,

40:44

to Egypt, or to Egypt, or to

40:46

Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, or Saudi Arabia,

40:48

or Saudi Arabia, or Saudi Arabia. Well,

40:51

It's been completely rebuilt for all intents

40:53

and purposes as a new tank. The

40:55

expendable parts are all brand new. And

40:57

the same thing with the challengers. Most

40:59

of the challenges are rebuilt. The leopards

41:01

are the same way. There are some

41:03

new built leopards, you know, in Germany.

41:05

But a lot of those things are

41:07

rebuilds also. They're just, you know, they're

41:09

built as leper two A-sevens or, you

41:11

know, that sort of thing. And they

41:13

may have been rebuilt multiple times. George

41:15

Washington's axe, isn't it. Yes, isn't it.

41:17

Yes, exactly. Is the tank, I mean

41:19

we succeed in defining a tank, and

41:21

we've gone through many of the trials

41:23

and tribulations of the tank, the Second

41:25

War, a thing that's in the air

41:27

at the moment, is the idea that

41:29

the age of the tank is over,

41:31

that now that with weapons like javelin

41:34

and drones and things, that essentially you're

41:36

really a great big moving target, aren't

41:38

you? And that it's over. I mean,

41:40

we're going off peace a little history,

41:42

but what do you think? There's a

41:44

great article in one of the U.S.

41:46

Army journals from, I think, 1937, saying

41:48

the Spanish Civil War has proven that

41:50

the anti-tank gun will sweep the tank

41:52

off the battlefield the same way that

41:54

the machine gun swept the cavalry off

41:56

the battlefield in 1914. And obviously that

41:58

didn't happen in World War II. And,

42:00

you know, in 1973 with the Mid

42:02

East War, you know, the Guided any

42:04

tank missile is going to sweep the

42:06

tank off the battlefield. And somehow that

42:09

didn't happen. Yeah. And now the

42:11

the FPV drone is going to

42:13

sweep the tank off the battlefield.

42:15

I actually have to write about

42:17

drones and I actually finished doing

42:20

our company's report on loiter emissions

42:22

and FPV drones just yesterday.

42:24

And all I can say is, yeah,

42:26

it's an interesting new technology, but it's

42:28

much like. the guiding tank missile of

42:30

1973 or the towed anti-tank gun of

42:32

1937. Yeah, it's a new ingredient on

42:35

the battlefield, but what do you replace

42:37

the tank with? The tank provides

42:39

all of these things that you need.

42:41

It provides protection. It provides fire power.

42:43

It provides mobility. If you don't have

42:45

a tank, you'd have to have some

42:47

other sort of vehicle that maybe you

42:49

don't call. a tank. But I mean

42:51

the infantry has been vulnerable since men

42:53

have been fighting in war and that

42:56

doesn't mean the war stops because you

42:58

know men are so easy to kill.

43:00

It's the same thing with tanks. Tanks

43:02

provide these features that are essential on

43:04

the modern battlefield and if you don't

43:06

have something called a tank you're going

43:08

to have some other type of vehicle,

43:10

some kind of mobile firepower to

43:12

perform those functions. I can't imagine that

43:14

warfare is going to go back. entirely

43:17

to foot infantry and you know remotely piloted

43:19

vehicles and that sort of thing. You're still

43:21

going to need some form of protection, you're

43:23

going to need some formability, you're going to

43:26

need some form of heavy firepower up front

43:28

there. So I think the solution to the

43:30

FPV threat, you know these kamikaze drones, is

43:32

probably going to be more technology not the

43:35

demise of the tank. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I

43:37

mean, right now it's very crude stuff, it's

43:39

the cop cages and all that other stuff

43:41

that they're... lashing to the tanks, but

43:43

armies have been working on active protection

43:45

systems now for three or four decades.

43:47

They're starting to show up, the Israeli

43:49

trophy systems starting to show up on

43:51

various people's tanks. The strange thing about

43:53

active protection systems, though, is that both

43:55

the Ukrainians and Russians had active protection

43:57

systems at the beginning of the war.

43:59

in 2023, they do not appear to

44:01

have been used on a battlefield. It

44:04

may have to cost. Active protection systems

44:06

are expensive. They cost a million dollars

44:08

or more per tank. So it may

44:10

just be with all the other expenses

44:12

that these armies are fighting. They just

44:14

can't afford to put active protection systems

44:16

on their tanks. But I think

44:19

that's the direction we're. leaning in

44:21

more that is technology to deal

44:23

with other types of new technology.

44:25

It's I mean it's electric countermeasures

44:27

as much as anything else isn't

44:29

it electronic countermeasures? Yeah the Ukrainians

44:31

last month said that they were

44:33

losing something like 10,000 attack drones

44:35

every month to electronic jamming. So the

44:37

FPVs are getting through but getting through in

44:39

smaller and smaller numbers. But you know part

44:42

of our problem with looking at Ukraine is

44:44

the same problem that the US Army faced

44:46

when looking at Spain in 1937. The

44:48

information that's coming out is very incomplete.

44:51

We don't really know or those of

44:53

us in the public. There's people down

44:55

in the Pentagon, there's people in Kiev,

44:57

and there's people elsewhere in Moscow, who

44:59

know the real answers because they're getting

45:02

the operations reports back from the front.

45:04

So they know how many FPV kamikazes

45:06

are successful. We don't really know. You know,

45:08

we're just getting press reports and the

45:10

press reports. are lousy. I mean, I hate

45:12

to say it now, but media these days

45:15

is terrible. I've dealt with media for 30,

45:17

40 years. I was in the media for

45:19

a number of years. The media now, they

45:21

just don't have specialists in defense affairs. And

45:24

the coverage of military affairs these days is

45:26

far worse than it was, say, 30

45:28

years ago. I can remember dealing with

45:30

the defense press 30 years ago. It

45:32

tended to be much better informed on

45:34

defense issues. these days it's not said

45:36

to say. Steve we should let you

45:38

go but one last question is that

45:40

we've been preparing a big series on

45:42

the Battle of the Bulge for the

45:44

podcast and it's coming up but boy

45:46

there's a hell of a lot of

45:48

track vehicles in there aren't there for

45:50

winter. Oh well sorts of stuff because

45:52

it's not only the tanks that's a

45:54

battle also that involves large numbers of

45:56

half tracks on both sides you know

45:58

so you have the... U.S. armored infantry because

46:01

the U.S. pumps in a lot of

46:03

armor divisions. So when they pump in

46:05

the armor divisions, they're not only pumping

46:07

in tanks, they're also pumping in armored

46:09

half tracks. And if you take a

46:11

U.S. armor division, they have three battalions

46:13

of tanks, three battalions of armored infantry.

46:15

But they also have three battalions of

46:18

fuel artillery. And people don't give it

46:20

enough credit. But the decisive arm for

46:22

the U.S. Army and the U.S.S. Army

46:24

and yardens is not. So when you

46:26

bring out that armored field artillery, you

46:28

bring a real new ingredient to the

46:30

battlefield, because it's very mobile, a lot

46:32

of firepower, and then you combine it

46:35

with very advanced fire control, and very,

46:37

very lethal. And people just ignore that.

46:39

You know, it's partly because people like

46:41

playing video games and stuff. A lot

46:43

of the enthusiasts play video games or

46:45

they play traditional board games, and it's

46:47

hard to replicate artillery. Yeah, I mean

46:49

anybody who was there on the battlefield,

46:51

I'm sure would have said, you know,

46:54

the dominant arm is the field artillery.

46:56

But from the perspective of a lot

46:58

of us who started out in this

47:00

business, you know, being enthusiasts and playing

47:02

war games and stuff like that, field

47:04

artillery is just very hard to mimic

47:06

in those venues. And so we don't

47:08

appreciate it. And field artillery in a

47:11

lot of it is tracked in the

47:13

Ardennes? Yes, on the US side it

47:15

is. Well, anything that's associated with an

47:17

armored division is tracked. Any of the

47:19

field artillery battalions with an armored division

47:21

are tracked. It's that how it works.

47:23

So if you're just field artillery attached

47:25

to an infantry division, then you're towed.

47:28

You're a priest or whatever. Yeah, yeah,

47:30

it's an M7 priest. The sole exception

47:32

is there's a handful of priest battalions

47:34

that are separate. They're under essentially GHQ

47:36

control. They're under field army control or

47:38

core control, but they're relatively small in

47:40

number. They don't really amount too much.

47:42

So most of the self-propelled stuff. is

47:45

with the armor divisions. And you've the

47:47

proximity fuse as well to sort of

47:49

round all that off. Yes. What the

47:51

Americans are doing in terms of the

47:53

tubes, I was particularly, I mean, when

47:55

we looked at the northern sector, the

47:57

bulge battle, the fires that are happening

47:59

in the Kink-Heltavalt and around there. are

48:01

absolutely emphatic battle-winning intervention by field artillery,

48:04

isn't it? I mean, it's, you

48:06

know, 10,000 rounds a day, it's

48:08

that sort of stuff, every tube

48:10

available. It's phenomenal. When they put

48:12

the hammer down in that respect,

48:14

it's really something, in that respect,

48:16

it's really something, isn't it? Well,

48:18

it crushes, the artillery crashes for

48:21

SS Pansar Corps. You know, everybody

48:23

hears about Koff Group Piper and

48:25

12th SS Pansar Vision, it, it'll

48:27

hold them, it, it'll hold them.

48:29

Right. They're going to get through and start

48:31

the exploitation. So we shouldn't be dissing kind

48:33

of McKinley? No, no, no, no. It's combined

48:35

arms. So I mean, 1945 combat is combined

48:37

arms. You absolutely must, must, must have the

48:40

infantry, because if you don't have the infantry

48:42

to stop the panzer attack, you're totally can't

48:44

do its job. You've got to hold them

48:46

in place. One of my observations from the

48:48

Ardennes battle is that everyone's talked a huge

48:50

amount about the tactical flexibility of the Germans

48:52

and their ability to kind of whisk things

48:54

into battle groups very quickly. What is amazing

48:56

to me about the Battle of the Bulge

48:59

is how quickly divisions which are going in

49:01

one direction turn 90 degrees and head off

49:03

in another direction in really quick order and

49:05

it's incredibly complicated thing because you've got to

49:07

work out your march orders and your routes

49:09

you're going to take and these are roads

49:11

which aren't simply not designed for that kind

49:13

of weight of traffic of traffic. It's absolutely

49:16

phenomenal and the speed of which they organize

49:18

themselves into task forces, which is I guess

49:20

the same as a battle group in many

49:22

ways, and hold a crossroads or whatever it

49:24

might be, whether it be a man hay

49:26

or wherever, or parkers crossroads for example. It's

49:28

incredible and no one seems to be giving

49:31

the Americans the credit for that I

49:33

don't think. I mean I think people are

49:35

still so obsessed with German tactical flexibility that

49:37

they ignore actually what's happening in the US

49:40

Army and you know the latter stages of

49:42

the war. The thing there is that that

49:44

was baked into the US armored divisions almost

49:46

from the outset because in 1942 and they

49:49

did the first reorganization the armored visions they

49:51

created those two combat command main headquarters and

49:53

those are designed specifically for

49:55

that mission they're designed to

49:57

create independent combined arms formations.

50:00

that are mixture of forces. You know,

50:02

what do you need? Do you need

50:04

more infantry? Is it a defensive battle?

50:06

Do you need more armored infantry? Or

50:08

is it offensive and you need more

50:11

speed and mobility? Do you need more

50:13

tanks? And so it gets refined in

50:15

1943 with the third reorganization, the September

50:17

43 reorganization, which adds a third combat

50:19

command. So by the summer of 44,

50:22

the Winter Division's have three combat commands

50:24

and From the summer of 44 the

50:26

combat commands learn how to create task

50:28

forces which are battalion-sized formations under the

50:30

combat command. Went out from the summer

50:33

of 43? There are task forces organized

50:35

in 43 for example on Sicily there

50:37

are task forces. So mainly it's 44

50:39

that they're doing this. But mainly on

50:41

44 and it's simply because it's not

50:44

institutionalized I would say until the summer

50:46

of 44 but by the summer of

50:48

44 it becomes commonplace. You look at

50:50

practically any engagement in 1945 and the

50:52

use of the task forces, which is

50:55

a formation under the combat command, they

50:57

become commonplace. I mean, almost day to

50:59

day. And that is once again stressing

51:01

the evolution combined arm tactics versus the

51:03

earlier blitzgrade tactics. I mean, combined arms

51:06

is, you know, the integration of the

51:08

various combat arms. And it helps to

51:10

have a headquarters element, namely the combat

51:12

command. that's set up right from the

51:14

beginning to do that. The German conf

51:17

group is typically, you use the headquarters

51:19

of whatever unit is leading the conf

51:21

group. So if you've got a panzer

51:23

regiment, it's going to be the panzer

51:25

regiment headquarters. But in the case of

51:28

the US unit, it's not the battalion

51:30

headquarters. It's a separate headquarters that exists

51:32

underneath the division that has no other

51:34

function but to create those combined arms

51:36

task forces. So, you know, that's all

51:39

that those people are there for. That

51:41

is clever isn't it? And it means

51:43

they've got the radios. That's the other

51:45

thing that everybody forgets and all this

51:47

combined arms. You have to have the

51:50

radios. And so these combat commands have

51:52

a radio setup which enables them to

51:54

deal remotely with all of their elements.

51:56

So if you've got a couple of

51:58

battalions 30 miles down the road from

52:01

you, it's no big deal to get

52:03

on the radio and say, you know,

52:05

I need you to start moving. You

52:07

know, that's the other forgotten element of

52:09

World War II technology. I mean, radio

52:11

is a big thing. You didn't have

52:13

radio back in World War I to

52:15

the same extent. So Steve, I mean,

52:17

you've written a huge number of books.

52:20

If people want to find out more

52:22

about this stuff, which ones would you

52:24

direct them to? It depends if they

52:26

want to see hardware or campaign stuff.

52:28

Most of the books I do are

52:30

for Osprey and people will be for

52:32

Osprey and people will be familiar with

52:34

the Osprey and people will be familiar

52:36

with the new Osprey publications. I do

52:38

be familiar with the Osprey and People

52:41

will be familiar with the Battle of

52:43

the Battle of Pans or Division. If

52:45

people just want to read something about, well,

52:47

it's the best tank of World War II,

52:49

I did a book specifically about that called

52:51

Armour Champion that deals only with that issue.

52:53

And if they want to read about development

52:55

of combined arms in the US army? Strangely

52:57

enough, the book I'm working on right now,

52:59

which I don't know if I'm supposed to

53:01

say, but it's an Osprey book I'm doing

53:03

a thing on US tank tactics in World

53:06

War II. Amazing. There we go. But it's

53:08

going to be a very short little book.

53:10

It's in their elite series. They've already got

53:12

books in that series dealing with armored infantry.

53:14

This is just kind of a part of

53:16

a little set that they have. Osprey did

53:18

a series called Battle Order some years ago.

53:20

They've got kind of an orange cover on

53:22

them. And I did three for them. One

53:24

on US armor units down in North Africa

53:26

and Italy. One on armor divisions in the

53:28

European theater and one on tank destroyer and

53:30

tank battalions. In the Eto. And that's a

53:32

mixture of... You know, what are the issues

53:34

of organization? What are the issues of

53:37

tactics? And it gives a lot of

53:39

examples of tanks and their tactical use

53:41

in battle. So if they don't want

53:43

to wait for this other thing, if they

53:45

see that battle order series, that covers

53:47

a lot of this ground. Brilliant.

53:49

Well, Steve, it's been absolutely fantastic.

53:51

I mean, it's been absolutely fantastic.

53:53

I mean, thank you so much

53:56

for joining us today. Well, I

53:58

always like talking about tanks. Do

54:00

we, weirdly? So happy. happy. Well, thanks everyone for

54:02

listening. You've listened to me, James

54:04

Holland and Steve Zaloga, about tanks or

54:06

we have ways Oh, making you

54:08

talk. of Thanks again everybody for

54:10

lending us your for Cheerio. us your ears.

54:13

Cheerio. Cheerio.